QoG lunchseminarium med Marko Klašnja

Abstract: Widespread corruption is an important reason for the democratic ceiling in many developing democracies, including post-communist Eastern Europe. Anti-corruption efforts are crucial in addressing this obstacle, yet their track-record has been mixed. Despite the ubiquitous popular distaste for corruption, we argue that the public itself can stymie anti-corruption. We hypothesize that popular frustration with corruption induces significant support for effective but illiberal anti-corruption methods. Moreover, as in other policy domains, popular anti-corruption preferences exhibit partisan divisions. In combination, we expect partisan bias in illiberal anti-corruption preferences, which creates fertile ground for the misuse and thus potentially failure of anti-corruption campaigns. Using data from original surveys and experimental and quasi-experimental designs in Romania, we find evidence consistent with our theory. We also confirm its broad applicability with observational cross-national data. Taken together, the findings suggest that public opinion can pose significant constraints on key aspects of liberal democracy.