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QoG lunchseminarium med Albana Shehaj

Samhälle & ekonomi

"Backsliding in a Landslide: How EU's Fiscal Distributions Empower Corrupt Governments"

Seminarium
Datum
6 okt 2021
Tid
15:00 - 16:00
Plats
Digitalt via Zoom

Medverkande
Albana Shehaj, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University
Bra att veta
QoG-institutet arrangerar regelbundet seminarier på temat samhällsstyrningens kvalitet samt korruptionens orsaker och konsekvenser.

Alla seminarier hålls på engelska om inte annat annonseras.
Arrangör
The Quality of Government institute

Abstract: How do the European Union’s (EU) fiscal allocations impact the electoral outcomes of corrupt incumbent parties? Works examining the link between EU funds and corruption prompt questions about how EU funds interact with political corruption to shape party dynamics and electoral outcomes. In this project, I account for the degree of executive corruption in recipient states to analyze the impact of EU fiscal allocations on governing parties’ electoral outcomes. I propose a theory of corruption compensation whereby EU allocations deliver political latitude that corrupt incumbents utilize to advance their governing authority. Examining data on EU fiscal allocations from 2000 to 2015, I find that higher shares of EU allocations are correlated with higher electoral margins for corrupt incumbents in recipient countries. These findings lend robust empirical support to the argument that misallocation of EU transfers by corrupt parties advances their electoral payoffs and buffers their political latitude over the opposition.