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Dorna Behdadi porträtt
Photo: Monica Havström
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Dorna Behdadi: Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence

Culture and languages

Dissertation for Ph.D. in Practical Philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science.

Dissertation
Date
12 Jan 2024
Time
15:15 - 19:00
Location
Renströmsgatan 6, room J222

Organizer
Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science

Thesis title:
Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence

Examining committee:
Docent Barbro Fröding, Kungliga tekniska högskolan, Stockholm Professor Sven Nyholm, Ludwig Maximillian Universitetet i München Lektor Susana Monsó National Distance University (UNED) Madrid

Substitute if member  in the committee will be missing:
Professor Göran Duus-Otterström, Göteborgs universitet

Opponent:
Professor Manuel Vargas University of California, San Diego

Chair:
Docent John Eriksson, Göteborgs universitet

Abstract

Can nonhuman animals and artificial intelligence (AI) entities be attributed moral agency? The general assumption in the philosophical literature is that moral agency applies exclusively to humans since they alone possess free will or capacities required for deliberate reflection. Consequently, only humans have been taken to be eligible for ascriptions of moral responsibility in terms of, for instance, blame or praise, moral criticism, or attributions of vice and virtue. Animals and machines may cause harm, but they cannot be appropriately ascribed moral responsibility for their behavior.

This thesis challenges the conventional paradigm by proposing an alternative approach where moral agency is conceived as the competence to participate in moral responsibility practices. By shifting focus from intra-individual to contextual and socially situated features, this practice-focused approach appears to make the attribution of moral agency to nonhuman animals and AI entities more plausible than commonly assumed.

Moreover, considering the current and potential future prevalence of nonhuman animals and AI entities in everyday settings and social contexts, a potential extension of moral agency to such entities could very well transform our social, moral, and legal practices. Hence, this thesis proposes that the attribution or withholding of moral agency to different entities should be carefully evaluated, considering the potential normative implications