The Political Calculus of Anticorruption Reform

Abstract: 

Anticorruption policies rarely receive widespread political support because they can be risky for politicians. Yet, some politicians pursue them. I argue that electoral incentives play a central role in driving anticorruption reform where corruption is systemic, and develop a theoretical framework to explain when reform occurs, who advances it, and how politicians choose between types of policies. Leveraging original data on anticorruption bills introduced to the Mexican Congress (2009-2021) and the random timing of corruption scandals, I explore the role of issue salience, personalized incentives, and strategic framing. I show ample evidence of legislators' strategic behavior---Anticorruption sponsorship is more likely after scandals, and among opposition legislators or those up for reelection. Moreover, legislators are more likely to sponsor punitive policies to signal a costly commitment to anticorruption, which are less likely to become law compared to non-punitive policies. These insights have broad implications for democratic governance and anticorruption strategy.