Adrián Sampedro León: The Argument Against Tropes’ Simplicity

Abstract

Tropes are property instances. Theories committed only to tropes are both explanatorily powerful and ontologically parsimonious. However, trope theories have been charged with being incoherent. The problem concerns the alleged simplicity of tropes. Tropes are simple in the sense that they either lack proper parts or they have only tropes as proper parts.

The argument against tropes’ simplicity stems from the premise that entities able to stand in mutually independent internal relations cannot be simple in the above sense. But tropes are able to stand in exact resemblance and numerical distinctness relations. Since exact resemblance and numerical distinctness are mutually independent internal relations, tropes cannot be simple.

I contend that if a certain view of internal relations is endorsed (the existence-based view), there is no longer a tenable argument against tropes’ simplicity, but a reductio of the following conjunction: exact resemblance and numerical distinctness are internal relations, and tropes are able to stand in exact resemblance and numerical distinctness relations. Insofar as both conjuncts are highly plausible, I recommend denying the core premise against tropes’ simplicity: entities able to stand in mutually independent internal relations cannot be simple.