"Are American options European after all?"
Sören Christensen, GU/Chalmers Mathematics
"Managerial entrenchment and matching leverage preferences"
Timo Korkeamaki, Hanken School of Economics
We study the effect of managerial entrenchment on CEOs' tendency to imprint their personal leverage preferences upon the firms they manage. Using a unique data source that allows us to measure personal wealth and indebtedness in great detail, we find a connection between CEOs' personal leverage and that of their firms. Our results indicate that the connection is driven by the CEOs who have a longer tenure with the firm and the CEOs who also serve in a dual role. The connection is significantly weaker for those CEOs who have a proportion of their personal wealth tied to the firm.
"Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence"
Daniel Ferreira, London School of Economics
Neubergh Lecture: "Greece, the Eurozone and the European Central Bank's monetary policy"
Mats Persson, Stockholm University
"Game intelligence and statistics in team sports – a game theoretic approach"
Carl Lindberg, AP2 and Chalmers
We set up a game theoretic framework to analyze a wide range of situations from team sports. A fundamental idea is the concept of potential; the probability of the offense scoring the next goal minus the probability that the next goal is made by the defense. We develop categorical as well as continuous models, and obtain optimal strategies for both offense and defense. A main result is that the optimal defensive strategy is to minimize the maximum potential of all offensive strategies.
"Back-Running: Seeking and Hiding Fundamental Information in Order Flows"
Liyan Yang, University of Toronto
"Competition in the Cryptocurrency Market"
Hanna Hałaburda, Bank of Canada
"The Mutual fund Fee Puzzle"
Michael Halling, Stockholm School of Economics
"Suppliers, Investors, and Equity Market Liberalizations"
Martin Strieborny, Lund University
"Relative Pay for Non-Relative Performance: Keeping up with the Joneses with Optimal Contracts"
Ron Kaniel, University of Rochester and Visiting Professor HGU
"Non-bank Loan Investors and Borrowers' Renegotiation Prospects"
Teodora Paligorova, Bank of Canada
"Shaped by Their Daughters: Executives, Female Socialization, and Corporate Social Responsibility"
Henrik Cronqvist, China Europe International Business School (CEIBS)
Henrik has a PhD from University of Chicago and has previously been professor at Claremont McKenna College and a faculty member at Ohio State University. He has published in e.g. American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, and Review of Financial Studies.
"Ownership Determinants of Stock Return Volatility"
Anders Vilhelmsson, Lund University
"Bank Information Sharing and Liquidity Risk"
Kebin Ma, University of Warwick
"Solving Models with Disappointment Aversion"
Romeo Tedongap, Stockholm School of Economics
"Institutional Quality, Trust and Stock-Market Participation: Learning to Forget"
Frederik Lundtofte, Lund University
"Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty"
John Quah, Oxford University
"Star sell-side analysts listed by Institutional Investor, Wall Street Journal and StarMine. Whose recommendations are most profitable?"
Yury Kucheev, KTH
"How Individuals React to Defined Benefit Pension Risk"
Nicolas Salamanca Acosta, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research
In this paper we develop a measure of (hybrid) defined benefit (DB) pension risk and show how this pension risk relates to individual portfolio and retirement decisions. We find that people in riskier DB plans are, on average, not only less likely to hold equity but also hold a smaller share of their wealth in equity. This relation is stronger for people who are better informed about their pension plan risk, and for retirees. We do not find that pension risk is related to the intended age of retirement. We provide extensive evidence supporting the identification and robustness of our results, and their interpretation as a behavioral response of people to pension risk. Our findings show that a well-funded DB pension system can improve the welfare of its participants in previously unexplored ways.