Q0G Lunchseminarium med Silviya Nitsova

Abstract: 

State capture by extremely wealthy elites is a widespread phenomenon in developing democracies, yet the mechanisms through which it works and the impact it has on political and policy outcomes remain poorly understood. I develop a network-based approach to studying captured institutions. Focusing on the national legislature and using social network and regression analyses of unique quantitative data and original interview-based evidence on the case of Ukraine (2014-2022), I demonstrate that oligarchs seek to defend their wealth by promoting as legislators individuals who are linked to them via interpersonal ties. The connections between oligarchs and legislators take the form of a highly fragmented, weakly connected, and decentralized network with distinct clusters, where oligarchs occupy central positions, and influence the adoption of policies related to oligarchs' economic interests. The study has important implications for the scholarship on money in politics, oligarchy, political connections, neopatrimonialism, legislative politics, political parties, and political representation.