Miira Tuominen: Aristotle on Animal Intelligence. A Difference in Degree or by Analogy?

Abstract

In his logical and ethical-political works as well as in the De anima and The Parts of Animals, Aristotle notes that humans alone have reason (logos) and have the capacity to think (phronein) and grasp essences (noein), and that humans alone are deliberative. However, in the zoological works, he ascribes the property of being intelligent (phronimos) or intelligence (phronêsis) to various non-human animal species, using the derivatives of the same word (phronêsis) that he uses for human practical wisdom. He also compares the intelligence level between animals, identifying for instance bees as more intelligent than other animals (phronimôtera) and humans as the most intelligent ones (phronimôtata) – he even describes a certain spider as the wisest (sophôtaton) because she weaves the best nets and repairs them immediately if a prey has caused damage. These descriptions suggest that human and non-human animals are intelligent and that there is a gradual difference between them.
 
However, in the History of Animals, Aristotle also explains that some features in human beings differ from features in other animals by analogy and not in degree. Although intelligence (phronêsis) is not explicitly mentioned, the closely connected ‘sagacity’ (sunesis) is. This seems to indicate that the difference in human and non-human animal intelligence (being phronimos) is also one by analogy. In recent decades, there has been a tendency in scholarship to argue for the gradual difference with the assumption that this puts non-human animals in a better position.

In this talk, I argue for a qualified reading of the difference by analogy such that (i) in a narrow sense of the word, practical wisdom belongs to humans alone whereas non-human animals have another natural power that is the same by analogy, in the sense that it is in the same relation to their lives as human practical wisdom is to the human one. In addition, (ii) there is a broader sense in which cognitive capacities of different animals can be compared gradually but despite the continuum, there are also differences in kind (and not merely gradual ones) between the cognitive powers of other animals.