Jade Fletcher: Ontological Oppression and Feminist Metaethics

Abstract

I argue that if you are the sort of feminist theorist who thinks that pernicious ideologies can construct ontologically oppressive realities, then this creates an explanatory demand to provide a normative basis for critique.

But if you are the sort of feminist who thinks that ideological social construction is that metaphysically powerful, then you have reason to be suspicious of moral theorising of the sort that would provide such a normative basis for critique.

My motivating concern is that the very same sort of theorists who endorse a picture of the social world where ethically and epistemically defective ideologies are capable of bringing into being oppressive social realities are also likely to reject outright, or at least be suspicious of, recourse to universal or objective moral values.

The feminist metaphysician needs to be able to say: yes the world really is that way, but it ought not be. My aim in this talk is to explain why these are hard things to say at the same time.