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A European State of Mind

Rhetorical formations of European identity within the EU 1973–2014

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A European state of mind?

European identity has become an increasingly central issue in the EU's political imaginary. In recent years, European identity—and related notions of a European destiny, European culture, and a European narrative—has been deployed as a weapon against the rise of the political far-right across Europe. Not only have parties from the far-right increased their mandates in various national parliaments, but we see a similar pattern when it comes to the European Parliament (EP).[1] This political landscape has prompted the EU to seek effective ways of countering the mythologies of the far-right, which often centre around origin, the nation as the fundamental and delimited unit of community, and values of continuity, tradition, and stability.

One example of such counter-strategies is the EU initiative New Narrative for Europe, launched in 2013, which explicitly seeks to thwart growing nationalism in a still-increasing number of EU member states, doing so by seeking to create a shared cultural narrative. "We won't have real unity", said then-president of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso at the project launch, "until we acknowledge a sense of belonging to a community which is bigger than the nation or the region, a sense of a shared European destiny".[2] In other words, the strategy of the EU to counter nationalism and populism in many ways draws upon nationalist and populist myths about collective identity and even a shared destiny.[3]

It is from this apparent paradox, countering nationalism with nationalist tools, that the study begins. How does the EU work rhetorically—that is, discursively and symbolically—with collective identity formation? This is the fundamental question of this working paper in which I examine such work from a thematic and a diachronic perspective as well as the implications of such formations for both the EU and its citizens.[4] After explaining the fundamental idea with the project and introducing the theoretical framework, the main analytical results are presented and summarized. The paper ends with some methodological considerations, indicating how rhetorical scholarship can contribute to other disciplines within EU scholarship.

The EU and European identity

Efforts to create European identity are not novel practices designed only to counter forces of the far right. Identity has been a theme within the European Community since the early 1970s. The prospect of crafting European identity has been—and continues to be—conceived as a positive and desirable quest in various strands of the political rhetoric of the EU with an almost self-evident justification: it

[1] We have witnessed this increase in Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, and Belgium, just to mention the top five. See BBC News, "Europe and Right-Wing Nationalism". On the EP, see Simons, "EU Elections 2014"; Handelsblatt, "Europawahl 2014".
[2] Barroso, "Speech by President Barroso", para. 32.
[3] These efforts could arguably be viewed as a type of metapolitics. For example, rhetorical scholar Karl Ekeman explores the role of culture in the metapolitical strategies of the European alt-right. See Ekeman, "Solecism or Barbarism"; Ekeman, "On Gramscianism of the Right".
[4] This paper is a condensed presentation of my eponymous doctoral thesis from 2022. See Therkildsen, "A European State of Mind".

is viewed as a necessary, legitimising step to further integrate member states and, simultaneously, as a marker of the plurality as well as the unresolved and always-in-the-making nature of the EU. In this way, varying, if not even contradictory, demands and hopes are invested in the notion of European identity: it shall create unity even as it reflects diversity.

With the signing of the Declaration on European Identity in 1973, European identity became an explicit endeavour within the Community; and in 1984, the first concrete steps towards creating such identity were undertaken in the form of a committee that was founded with a mandate to propose "measures to strengthen and promote its [the Community's] identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world".[5] The result was the publication of two reports titled 'A People's Europe' and the practical implementation of a range of functional as well as symbolic measures: the Erasmus programme, the EU passport, Europe day, the European anthem, and the EU emblem which we recognise on numberplates, the flag and the Euro currency.

Efforts to propose a European identity have presented themselves in legal and ceremonial texts as well, among them the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 and the non-ratified Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in 2004. While the former implemented the Union citizenship and the economic and monetary union, and consolidated earlier treaties into the three-pillar structure, the latter proposed the federal idea of a common constitution for all member states, which was eventually rejected by the very polity it was supposed to constitute. To be sure, creating a common legal framework is not the same as crafting identity *per se* but these two treaties offer more than a legal framework; they exemplify rhetorical practices of normative and moral orientation toward European values, history, heritage, and culture, as well as anticipations for the future.

Finally, most recently, the project New Narrative for Europe has sought to create a sense of belonging among EU citizens. The explicit purpose of this project was to create a bond between older and younger generations of Europeans due to a perceived lack of interest in the EU from its citizens generally but especially from young people, a disinterest founded in a lack of embodied historical memory and the nationalist turn in both the European Parliament and in national parliaments. The New Narrative project, therefore, turns to culture. It is in the name of culture that the many contributors of the initiative compose stories of European origin, of cosmopolitanism, and of European values. According to the initiative, culture—in its widest sense—is not just where the architects of the EU would have wanted to start, but also the hope for the future, that which will help create social cohesion.[6]

[5] Adonnino, "People's Europe", 5.
[6] One of the architects, Jean Monnet, is often quoted for saying: "If I were to do it again from scratch, I would start with culture", although scholars question the authenticity of this statement. See, e.g., Shore, *Building Europe*, 44; García, "New Narrative Project", 345.

Politics and identity

The fact that identity is political has meant that the scholarly literature on collective identity formation within the EU largely conceptualises these endeavours as identity politics.[7] No longer strongly rooted in leftist social movements, identity politics, in both scholarly and public use, has come to designate any kind of political engagement with identity and therefore can signify both nationalist, racist rhetoric as well as feminist, queer, and anti-racist rhetoric. Speaking about identity in a political context is not necessarily the same as engaging in identity politics, however, and I therefore propose to separate the notion of *collective identity formation* from *identity politics* and argue that the theory of constitutive rhetoric, conceptualised in 1987 by the Canadian rhetorician Maurice Charland, is a more fruitful framework for exploring collective identity formation. I develop this argument about identity politics further elsewhere,[8] but I will sum up the argument by saying that the ways in which the concept of identity politics has almost unnoticeably slipped into EU scholarship is problematic. Moving identity politics from its original site—that is, social movements—to another, the European Union, obscures the difference between the two in terms of power and agency. Borrowing from Michel de Certeau, social movements in a very different manner than the EU have to adjust tactically to the institutional strategies, structures, and communication channels laid out for them.[9] Consequently, moving identity politics from a marginalised to an empowered setting is not simply a move from a bottom-up to a top-down perspective; it entails a difference in terms of agential status, range of power and available objectives, as well as the concrete measures taken to reach these objectives.

Instead, I turn to the theory of constitutive rhetoric as a frame for understanding the *rhetorical process of collective identity formation* in order to better account for the rhetorical process through which an audience is projected in a set of artefacts: How do collective identities come to life? Drawing on literary and rhetorical scholar Kenneth Burke and philosopher Louis Althusser, Charland explains this as a process of *identification* (rather than persuasion) and a process of *interpellation.* According to Althusser, interpellation is the act of hailing—calling upon—a subject which, in self-recognition[10] turns around (literally or metaphorically) and, consequently, accepts the subject position and ideology this hailing brings with it: Europeans![11] Charland views the process through which people accept this hailing and come to understand themselves as Québécois, Basque, European, and so on, as a process of identification,[12] and he is interested in the material implications of such processes: What ideology is inscribed in these interpellations? And what practices are rendered possible as a consequence thereof?

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[7] See, among others, Risse et al., "To Euro or Not"; Hansen, "Europeans Only?"; Risse, "Euro and Identity Politics"; Risse, *Community of Europeans?*; Cross, "Identity Politics".
[8] Therkildsen, "A European State of Mind".
[9] de Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life.*
[10] Althusser also mentions guilt and uses religious ideology as one possible example of interpellation out of many, but by doing that, Judith Butler argues, "the divine power of naming structures the theory of interpellation". She thus seeks to show "how interpellation is essentially figured through the religious example", compelled by conscience and/or a desire to be. Butler, "Conscience Doth Make Subjects", 10, 12.
[11] Althusser and Jameson, *Lenin and Philosophy*, 118.
[12] Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives*, 50, 195.

According to Charland, the interpellated subject exists only as a rhetorical, ideological construction, not an extra-rhetorical entity existing independently of ideology. Charland discerns three rhetorical functions, which consist of (1) transcending the individual subject in order to constitute a collective subject; (2) positioning this collective subject in a transhistorical narrative, and (3) positioning and constraining the subject to act in accordance with the narrative logic.[13]

The first function concerns how the individual subject becomes part of a collective subject. This movement is a result of what Burke terms *ultimate identification*, as it transcends the interests of particular subjects or groups in order to create this collective identity.[14] In this sense, ultimate identification is similar to what political theorist Ernesto Laclau calls the *empty signifier*.[15] So, in the same way that "justice" can be meaningful to people in different places and with different histories and experiences, "European" can be meaningful to people in Germany, France, Poland, Greece, and so forth, while meaning different things.

The second rhetorical function concerns the transhistorical community created between the collective subject today and in the past. The narrative of European democracy, cosmopolitanism, and cultural heritage indicates a clear continuation and development from a past collective agent to a present collective agent, and the former (Europeans of the past) becomes the ground for the existence of the latter (Europeans of the present) as well as the specific goals fought for on this basis. In other words, the collective subject gains rhetorical agency in the present moment from a sense that it extends through time; a consubstantiality between the dead and the living exists. Transhistoricity in this context does not mean that something is ahistorical or atemporal in the sense that it is beyond the influence of historical events or temporal movement; rather, transhistoricity assumes a sameness despite historical events and temporal movement. This is what makes it extraordinary. An example of this function is the anachronistic claim of territories and peoples. Consider, for example, how often we speak about Danes, Swedes, Germans, the French, and, indeed, Europeans, when talking about people living long before any such peoples or people identifying as such existed. We see similar strategies in the EU initiatives in which the distinction between the EU and Europe is blurred not only in name but also in time, as I will exemplify below.

Finally, on this basis, constitutive rhetoric positions and constrains the subject by inscribing them into a narrative with a "history, motives, and a *telos*". It calls on them to provide narrative closure: "While classical narratives have an ending, constitutive rhetoric leaves the task of narrative closure to the constituted subjects".[16] But not just any closure; the people addressed are, through their interpellation, compelled to act in accordance with the vision projected by the narrative in order not

[13] Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric", 139–41.
[14] Charland, 138.
[15] Laclau, "Death and Resurrection", 306–7. Laclau borrows this example from Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). For a more thorough explanation of how the empty signifier functions and how it relates to the *floating signifier*, see Laclau, 305–11. See also Laclau, "Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?".
[16] Charland, 143.

to disparage their position within the narrative, and hence their ability to act.[17] Consequently, the narrative logic is compulsive in the sense that it is characterised by a teleological movement toward emancipation.[18] Relying on Althusser's materialist conception of ideology, Charland asserts that this third function, the insertion of a narrative agent in the material world, reveals the ideological nature of constitutive rhetoric.[19]

Of course, not all efforts at constitutive rhetoric succeed, and they do not necessarily fit with the neat process just outlined. In my doctoral thesis, I therefore discuss and suggest various reconceptualisations and alterations with the help of, among others, Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, Frida Buhre, and Roland Barthes.[20]

The scope and means of European identity formation

While the quest for European identity was formalised already in the founding days of the EU, its scope has changed over time. The identity formation practices in the geopolitically unstable 1970s and 1980s revolved around the image of the EU on the global scene and in the face of the Community citizens. But following the reunification and the end of the Cold War, the scope of European identity gradually became the collective citizenry and has today become an endeavour to reach the minds and bodies of EU citizens. This more recent movement is particularly visible in the visionary rhetoric of the New Narrative for Europe initiative: Citizens are expected to "to feel the European project"[21] and to partake in a particular "European state of mind".[22]

Poster campaign for New Narrative for Europe. © Leftloft

[17] Charland, 141.
[18] Charland, 144.
[19] Charland, 143.
[20] Butler, *Excitable Speech*; Butler, "Conscience Doth Make Subjects"; Laclau, "Death and Resurrection"; Buhre, "Speaking Other Times"; Barthes, *Mythologies*. See my discussion and suggestions in Therkildsen, "A European State of Mind", p. 64–77, 270–271.
[21] Eliasson, "Your Inner We", 193.
[22] Deventer et al., "Declaration".

The metaphor "Europe is a state of mind" functions as an anaphora that initiates six consecutive paragraphs in the first part of the New Narrative declaration (a 4 page manifesto published first on its own, then included in the publication *Mind and Body of Europe* from 2014), here in abbreviated form: "Europe is a state of mind, formed and fostered by its spiritual, philosophical, artistic and scientific inheritance, and driven by the lessons of history";[23] "Europe is a state of mind shared by citizens across the continent";[24] "Europe is a state shared by the men and women who, with the force of their beliefs both religious and secular, have always provided light in the darkest hours of European history";[25] "Europe is a state of mind rooted in its shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law";[26] "Europe is a state of mind that exists also beyond its borders";[27] and, most noticeable,

> Europe is a state of mind that goes beyond a grouping of nation states, an internal market and the geographical contours of a continent. Europe is a moral and political responsibility, which must be carried, not only by institutions and politicians, but by each and every European.[28]

In sum, grounded in history and spiritual, philosophical inheritance, founded on shared values, shared by citizens all over the continent but also beyond and by determined men and women throughout time, the European state of mind turns Europe into a moral and political responsibility. This responsibility is connected to a specific space (notably Europe, not the EU) and it rests with institutions, politicians, each and every European, from the past into the future. The vision of a European state of mind is, in other words, spatially and temporally all-encompassing and permeates both the public and the private spheres.

The state of mind metaphor is central to the New Narrative declaration, but it is also circulated by other contributors to *Mind and Body of Europe*, who couples mind with heart. Culture is important, because it is viewed as the gateway to a more emotional attachment to Europe and/or the EU. "We fear our Union will suddenly become something nobody really identifies with—estranged from our minds and hearts",[29] says one of the contributors, and another one notes that recognizing the true value of intellectual debate "is not only a matter of opening one's mind, but also one's heart" and continues by arguing that Europe "is a moral project and a representation of values. . . . The only true measure of Europe's success is the good that lives in the hearts and minds of its citizens".[30] Indeed, the EU and its citizens have become intertwined, if not inseparable. It is citizens' political and moral responsibility to identify with, advance, and confirm the European integration project.

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[23] Deventer et al., "Declaration", 126.
[24] Deventer et al., 126.
[25] Deventer et al., 126.
[26] Deventer et al., 126.
[27] Deventer et al., 127.
[28] Deventer et al., 126.
[29] Bratušek, "Speech Delivered by the Then Prime Minister of Slovenia at ISPI, Milan, on 9 December 2013", 82.
[30] Gescinska, "Intellectuals, Populist Rhetoric", 64.

Following a historical narrative about the EU's role in putting "an end to war" and transforming "a polarised Europe to a multipolar Europe", the section ends with a description of the EU, personified as the heart of Europe:

> It was the European Union that provided the visionary framework and the sense of purpose that was necessary in responding to the tremendous challenge of reunifying Europe. Europe began to beat as one, its many arteries found a heart.[31]

Here, the EU is distinguished as the agent, who has provided a vision and a purpose for Europe: Europe was divided but reunified by the visionary framework of the EU. The EU is thus distinguished from Europe in order to become the centre that provides the vision for Europe as a whole.

From functionality to symbolicity

Concurrently with this change in scope, the means of identity formation have both altered and increased— the functional and structural instruments of the 1970s and 1980s are during the 1980s supplemented with practices of interweaving the citizenry through sports, education, television, and the Community symbols (flag, emblem, anthem). These proposals seek to weave Community member states and Community citizens together physically and symbolically; a vision that significantly distinguishes this initiative, 'A People Europe', from the Declaration on European Identity from 1973.

The second report of 'A People's Europe' proposes the

> (i) . . . organization of European Community events such as cycle and running races through European countries;
> (ii) creation of Community teams for some sports to compete against joint teams from geographical groupings with which the Community has special links;
> (iii) inviting sporting teams to wear the Community emblem in addition to their national colours at major sporting events of regional or worldwide interest;
> (iv) exchanges of sportsmen, athletes and trainers between the different Community countries.[32]

In these four proposals, geographical and bodily movement and interweaving as well as visual recognition are integral. Human exchange creates physical, embodied links between member states and citizens (iv), and running and cycling (i) have the capacity to link member states geographically and to make this link visible in a very physical sense, both to the contestants but also to citizens watching such events in the media. The types of sport deemed suitable for Community events are significant, in other words. Likewise, the invitation to use Community emblems (iii) suggests creating

[31] Deventer et al., "Declaration", 127.
[32] Adonnino, "People's Europe", 26.

a visual, symbolic connection between the Community and the individual member states as well as among the member states.

Physical movement and feelings of fraternity are also invoked in the proposals for a "European dimension in education", which we find in the Lisbon Treaty, but it was first proposed in 'A People's Europe'.[33] This educational dimension continues to take form throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The notion concerns the need for more—and better—information about the Community in order to be seen and recognised by its citizens; but it also has a more long-term concern with influencing the social imaginary of the citizenry. For instance, 'A People's Europe' suggests preparing "appropriate school books and teaching materials", setting up "voluntary work camps for young people", which involves work "for social purposes, for the preservation of the heritage, or the restoration of historic buildings",[34] and establishing what we know today as the Erasmus programme. Accordingly, the "European dimension" implies both organised educational initiatives (education material) and a more implicit type of instruction (work camps, student exchange) that is bodily acquired; a social type of learning where norms and routines are embodied through social and physical interaction around a common project that many will recognise from school (decorating the class room together, fixing the school yard).

These different types of constitutive means replace one another while also accumulating: EU citizens today move (more or less) freely across the internal borders, they go abroad to work and study, they watch EU-funded film productions, and they have accepted and incorporated the EU emblem into their daily lives (for example, by driving their cars) and their political practices (such as protesting).

Manchester anti-Brexit protest for Conservative conference, October 1, 2017 © Creative Commons

[33] Adonnino, "People's Europe", 24.
[34] Adonnino, 24.

In sum, the move towards the mind and body of its citizens pushes the scope of European identity and suggests an intertwinement of the institutional, collective, and individual levels of identity formation. Although we can trace a transition over time from the institutional level over the collective to the individual level, the institutional identity never completely disappears. These levels constitute one another.

The EU and political historiography

Another central component of the EU's constitutive rhetoric is the historiographical work of crafting a *new narrative*—an Archive of Glory—in relation to the *founding narrative* of peace. Both narratives focus on locating a proper origin as the foundation for the EU. While the founding narrative of peace focuses on the founding events of the first half of the twentieth century, the new narrative reaches beyond the lifetime of the EU in search of a broader, richer and more authentic past: a set of values and a cultural, philosophical and scientific heritage located primarily in Antiquity, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment. So, while the founding narrative directs its attention towards the event of Europe becoming the EU, the new narrative reverses this direction and turns from the EU to Europe in its search of cultural collective identity.

This turn to Europe and thus to a past beyond the EU may be one of the most noticeable characteristics of the search for a new narrative. In the New Narrative initiative, two disconnections––with the EU and the past, respectively—are articulated. Many of the contributions in *Mind and Body of Europe* therefore propose to revisit the grandeur of a past, which seems to have been forgotten, in order for citizens to reconnect with their past, and by extension, the EU. Verbs such as "restore", "reinstate", "regain", "reaffirm", "retrace", and "revive" are prominent and suggest a return to and retrieval of something glorious, which Europe—and, again by extension, the EU— has always embodied: "Today, vigilance is required to continuously *reaffirm* and build upon those fundamental values and principles that, from the outset, have been deeply embedded in the 'raison d'être' of Europe. They need to be *reactivated* and made relevant for the European citizens".[35] And more elaborately:

> Europe is a state of mind shared by citizens across the continent. [...] They *retrace* and *revive* the routes of the men and women who, since Antiquity, and increasingly during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, developed for Europe a shared grammar of music and art, a common body of science and philosophy, an astonishingly rich literature and thriving trade networks.[36]

In this archive of glory, the past in general but more specifically Antiquity, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, are figured as cultural resources in present and future mythology. For this return to

[35] Deventer et al., 127, my emphasis.
[36] Deventer et al., "Declaration", 126.

make sense, twentieth-century European history is figured as a trauma that the EU can help overcome—by turning to a more estranged and more authentic past.

So, the founding narrative of peace plays an ambiguous role. It is first and foremost focused on the origin and foundation of the EU in the immediate post-war period and the EU's quest for enduring peace. Therefore, the transcendence of these horrors is a salient part of the founding narrative:

> The Nine European States might have been pushed towards disunity by their history and by selfishly defending misjudged interests. But they have overcome their past enmities and have decided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common.[37]

Here, the Declaration on European Identity draws a clear line between before and after, marked by the overcoming of past enmities and the decision to strive towards unity. This effort to establish a ground zero is a general trait throughout the five initiatives, although with different ideas of temporal unfolding: one of continuity, and one of rupture. The Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty articulate rupture as caused by past division. In the Maastricht Treaty, the member states are "RECALLING the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent",[38] and in the Constitutional Treaty, Europe is "reunited after bitter experiences",[39] and "the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny".[40] Bitter experiences and division represent specific moments of rupture in the past, and they can be preserved in the past if these experiences are transcended. The disconnection between EU citizens and their past can—in this progressive temporal unfolding—be remedied with the help of the EU.

The relationship between these two narratives exposes a tension in the EU's understanding of the past. The new narrative is built on the assumption that (especially young) EU citizens have become disconnected from their European past. They have forgotten the atrocities of war and division during the First and Second World Wars and thus the *raison d'être* of the EU. As such, EU citizens are encouraged to remember and thus return to these founding events to invoke the foundational values of the EU that helped Europe overcome these divisions in the past. At the same time, war and division are generally figured as events of the past that already *has been* or *should be* transcended. In this historiography, remembering the past has the overall purpose of locating and reconnecting with European traits and capacities of a more distant past in order for Europe to get back on the track of civilisation.

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[37] Commission of the European Communities, "Declaration on European Identity", 119.
[38] Council of the European Communities, "Treaty on European Union", 3.
[39] European Communities, "Constitution for Europe", 9.
[40] European Communities, 9.

Crucial to this temporal logic is the idea of historical rupture. War and genocide are not articulated as recurrent events (as history would suggest[41]); rather, the First and Second World Wars and the Holocaust are figured as ruptures in an otherwise continuous and progressive path of civilisation; a temporality we recognise in much of the thinking around the turn of the millennium—the idea of post-nationalism, the end of history, and similar imaginaries.[42]

The historiography of the EU in this way invokes plural temporal imaginaries that enable the EU to assert itself as a general representation of peace: a past achievement of peace, of restoring time, has empowered the EU to become a general representative of peace and, as a result, a normative *exemplum* that extends beyond the EU. This aspect of the EU's constitutive rhetoric is discussed more thoroughly elsewhere,[43] but it is worth remarking in this context that this trait is visible, for example, in the role played by the EU in places of contested statehood, such as Kosovo. The EU's involvement here is somewhat problematic. As Münevver Cebeci argues, a normative model of peacebuilding is applied in ways that turn political questions into technocratic and thus depoliticised questions because the EU prioritises stability over reform: "By imposing their own model and 'best practices' through a claim to be representing peace, Europeans maintain the right to decide about the future of the target societies and set what is normal for them".[44]

Visions of eternity and omnipresence: cosmopolitanism and a European state of mind

This urge to be of importance beyond its own borders is driven by visions of eternity and omnipresence. Themes of European cosmopolitanism, a European destiny, universality as European essence, and a European state of mind in conjunction provide a frame for what it signifies and entails to be an EU citizen and project a vision of the model EU citizen. Borrowing from Adrian Favell, we may envision this model citizen as the *Eurostar*.[45] This frame is characterised by a tension between abstract ideals of mobility, plurality, and deliberative democracy and the concrete practices of both the EU and its citizens through which these ideals are enacted. For example, movement is central to the constitutive rhetoric of the EU. The institutions of the EU literally move from country to country, drawing threads across the EU map. Likewise, the connectivity enabled by free movement is supported and enhanced by policies within the cultural and educational sector. The seeds of these policies were planted in 'A People's Europe' in 1985, and the EU has since then continuously produced extensive amounts of information material that seek to encourage people to make use of their right to move

[41] See, for example, Giorgio Agamben's critique of the conceptualisation of the Holocaust as an extraordinary break from history rather than the culmination of a historical development. See Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, § 7, part 3.
[42] Bennett, "Multicultural States"; Fukuyama, "End of History?".
[43] Therkildsen, "A European State of Mind".
[44] Cebeci, "Representing Peace?", 305–306.
[45] Favell, *Eurostars and Eurocities*.

freely within the union.[46] The New Narrative project is an addition. In a previously cited part of the New Narrative declaration, physical movement is paired with a more metaphorical movement, European cosmopolitanism:

> Europe is a state of mind shared by citizens across the continent. The students, researchers, scholars, artists, professionals and politicians who live, study, work, think and travel across national borders do so in order to deepen and expand their knowledge, unleash their creativity and widen their opportunities. They retrace and revive the routes of the men and women who, since Antiquity, and increasingly during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, developed for Europe a shared grammar of music and art, a common body of science and philosophy, an astonishingly rich literature and thriving trade networks.[47]

The visions and ideas of 'A People's Europe' are echoed and connected to the rich cultural heritage that such movement has created from Antiquity to the present, notably embodied by the creative/EU elite (students, researchers, scholars, artists, professionals and politicians). Here, the capacity to move enables deepened knowledge, unleashed creativity, and opportunities, and in this way, the physical sense of movement is connected to a metaphorical level at which movement is understood as a movement of the mind. The former leads to the latter.

The encouragement to move is primarily targeted Western movers, despite the fact that other, much larger groups within the EU, would make for better candidates, such as Eastern movers. EU citizens from Western EU member states have been part of the union for a much longer period of time, but very few move on a long-term basis. As Adrian Favell discusses, EU citizens from Eastern EU member states have contrastingly shown an incredible incentive and motivation to move and circulate capital back into the developing regions of the union and in this way enacting the ideal envisioned by the EU's economic policies. One of the crucial differences is that Western and Eastern movers do so for very different reasons. Western movers move for studies and cultural exchange, for urban creativity and cosmopolitan encounters. Eastern movers, on the other hand, move for low-paying blue-collar jobs—for jobs that pay the bills.[48] There is a tension, then, between the *abstract ideal* of cosmopolitan movement and its *concrete practices* as performed by EU citizens.[49]

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[46] Favell, 240. See, for instance, the brochure *It's Your Europe: Living, Learning and Working anywhere in the EU*, published as a part of the *Europe on the Move* programme: "It's no secret. Europe can change your life if you want to". European Commission, *It's Your Europe*, 3.
[47] Deventer et al., "Declaration", 126.
[48] Favell, "Immigration, Migration", 183.
[49] I develop here on similar arguments made by Peo Hansen and Maria Johansen. Peo Hansen argues that the abstract value of diversity is often highlighted as central to the political imaginary of the EU, but when looking at concrete EU policy, diversity is framed in "much more limited terms". See Hansen, "Europeans Only?", 57. Maria Johansen makes a similar point when she notes the threat of contamination posed by the concrete to the purity of the abstract, although in a very different context, namely raison d'état and the Swedish intelligence and security service. The concrete forms of transparency (societal critique of and debate about intelligence and security service) threatens transparency in its abstract purity (democracy in need of protection). In the context

In sum, politics is a constant mutual interpellation that amounts to several layers of interpellations. Contradictory rhetorical practices—for instance, on the one hand, promoting ethnocultural ideas while, on the other, advancing principles that explicitly counter such ideas—such practices create a peculiar language specific to the EU that reflects its ambivalent relationship to ideology.

The same ambivalence is visible in the figuration of the EU as a rhetorical agent. On the one hand, the constitutive rhetoric of the EU suggests a desire to become recognised and mythologised as the Subject (with a capital S, in Althusser's understanding)—as the heart of Europe, as a state of mind, as a symbol of transcendence, eternity, peace, and tolerance in the social imaginary of the citizens. On the other hand, it seeks to be viewed as the silent benefactor and facilitator of peace and deliberation, the arbiter of soft, nonideological power. At the centre of this ambivalence is the Eurostar. It is the job of the Eurostar to embody the culture of non-ideology in the face of the ideology of others.

Method and cross-disciplinarity

I want to conclude with some words on method and cross-disciplinarity. Rhetorical research on the EU is surprisingly scarce, and this is a shame, since rhetorical scholars have a lot to learn and to explore, and because rhetorical scholarship has a lot to offer the cross-disciplinary field of European/EU studies.

The existing research on European identity in relation to the EU stresses important perspectives relating to the dynamic, interdependent, and ambiguous nature of identity formation. But, a common denominator of these most often social science studies is their reluctance to discuss what the concept of European identity actually signifies and the symbolic forms it takes. To varying degrees, disciplines well-stablished within EU studies discuss narratives, myths, or discourse as important parts of identity formation, but few examine how this discourse and other symbolic practices involved actually manifest. Political scientist Luis García recently noted a 'narrative turn', both in scholarship and in "institutional and political practice", and he identifies New Narrative for Europe as an example of the latter.[50] Indeed, we see many validations of such a turn in historical, sociological, and political scientific areas of EU scholarship, and many of these scholars rely on discourse analysis.[51] However, with notable exceptions, such as the work of anthropologist Cris Shore and political scientist Peo Hansen,[52] scholars exhibit a remarkable reluctance to actually engage with

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of this study, we could say that the abstract value of difference and diversity seems contaminated by the concrete enactment of said difference and diversity. See Johansen, *Offentlig skrift*, 244.

[50] García, "New Narrative Project", 350.

[51] See, e.g., Diez, "Europe as a Discursive Battleground"; Forchtner and Kølvraa, "Narrating a 'New Europe'; Hansen, "Europeans Only?"; Hoffmann, "Re-Conceptualizing Legitimacy"; Howarth and Torfing, *Discourse Theory*; Kaiser, "Clash of Cultures"; Kaiser, "One Narrative or Several?"; Manners and Murray, "End of a Noble Narrative?"; Sala, "Europe's Odyssey?"; Sala, "Narrating Europe"; Wodak and Angouri, "From Grexit to Grecovery"; Wodak and Weiss, "Analyzing European Union Discourses".

[52] Shore, "Inventing the 'People's Europe'"; Shore, "Imagining the New Europe"; Shore, *Building Europe*; Shore, "In Uno Plures"; Hansen, "Europeans Only?". Although not as encompassing, it is still worth noting Forchtner and Kølvraa's analysis of narratives of old and new Europe and how they are interrelated, and Holmes's

how the narrative in question is voiced and crafted: they paraphrase texts and/or reconstruct their arguments, but do not analyse and interpret the symbolic forms and practices.[53]

As Robert Asen claims, scholars from disciplines not traditionally preoccupied with discourse tend to "treat concepts like metaphor and narrative as a critical smorgasbord assembled in the interests of taxonomy".[54] Contrastingly, rhetorical analysis aims at illuminating interdependence, nuances, and complex relationships between artefacts.[55] Rhetorical scholarship can, in other words, make valuable contributions. It can do so theoretically, as I hope to have shown, but also methodologically by engaging closely and thoroughly with communication's concrete manifestations, in this case, the symbolic and discursive practices of the EU. Rhetorical analysis is important if we truly want to understand *how* political myths and narratives of collective identity are crafted and the different ways they work.

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ethnographic analysis of the experimental character and interconnectedness of post-Maastricht identity formation. Such identity formation stems from a range of very different voices and thus arise bottom-up as well as top-down, he argues. See Holmes, "Experimental Identities (after Maastricht)"; Forchtner and Kølvraa, "Narrating a 'New Europe.'"

[53] A notable example of this lack of engagement with the text is Vivien Schmidt's analyses of the European Central Bank's and EU leaders' rhetorical handling of the sovereign debt crisis. Her argument is compelling, but her analysis consists mainly of her own reconstructions of the differing discourses (coordinative and communicative). She neither shows the empirical examples that lay the foundations for interpretation, nor explains how she arrives at these interpretations. In fact, neither in the text nor in the bibliography does she list the artefacts she analyses. See Schmidt, "Arguing about the Eurozone Crisis"; Schmidt, "Speaking to the Markets". Another example is Ian Manners and Philomena Murray's analysis of six different EU narratives (among which, one is the New Narrative) and their interaction. After describing and paraphrasing the New Narrative declaration in one paragraph, their analysis consists of a slightly longer paragraph in which they apply a set of predefined analytic concepts, as in the following: "From the perspective of temporal ordering of events, the New Narrative did not provide any coherent *narrative structure*. Although it did have a beginning ("The Mind and Body of Europe"), a middle ("Europe's Evolving Narrative") and an end ("The Renaissance Meets Cosmopolitanism"), the narrative linking these parts of the story was unconvincing. Thus in terms of *narrative identity*, the New Narrative was not able to constitute a recognisable story of what Europe is for most Europeans; instead, it tended to identify a partial, culturalist sense of Europe". See Manners and Murray, "End of a Noble Narrative?", 191. Although their conclusion may be right, I am less convinced by the way they arrive at that conclusion.

[54] Asen, "Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric", 124. Asen's critique refers to Frank Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Deborah A. Stone, *Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making* (New York: Norton, 2002).

[55] Just, "Constitution of Meaning", 19.

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