



SIPGI WORKING PAPER NO.3. 2023

PREFERENCES FOR REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

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Preferences for Refugee Settlement

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Abstract

Recent years have seen a stark increase in refugee flows and scholars paying attention to the determinants of attitudes toward refugees. However, our understanding of locals' preferences for refugee settlement (e.g., refugees living in camps or spreading across the country) is limited, which has critical implications for refugee integration. This study carried out a conjoint experiment in Turkey. While the analysis highlights the role of cultural and security concerns, most factors fail to explain settlement preferences. More importantly, 60% of participants have stable preferences, and the characteristics of refugees have limited effects. Age, attitudes toward refugees (e.g., opinions on refugee return), and intergroup relations are the main predictors of stable preferences. Over 50% of the sample prefers refugees to be at border camps, and security concerns are likely to be the main reason for this. This study contributes to the literature by highlighting the stability of preferences for refugee settlement.

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[†] I would like to thank Gizem Arikan, Miceal Canavan, Thomas Chadeaux, Darin Christensen, Sara Mitchell, Scott Williamson, and the participants of the MiReKoc Wednesday Seminars, the International Security Centre Research Meeting at the Hertie School, the EPSA 2022 Annual Meeting, the Hertie Migration Lunch Meeting, the IMISCOE 2022 Annual Meeting, and the SIPGI Conference at the University of Gothenburg for invaluable feedback. I would also like to thank the Irish Research Council Government of Ireland Postgraduate Scholarship Programme for financial support (Project Number 207922, Award Number 15275).

Introduction

Recent years have seen a stark increase in the number of refugees and scholars paying attention to the determinants of attitudes toward refugees. Existing research emphasizes the importance of sociotropic economic concerns, cultural concerns, humanitarian concerns, and inter-group relations (Adida et al. 2019; Alrababa'h et al. 2021; Bansak et al. 2016; Getmansky et al. 2018; Getmansky et al. 2020; Hangartner et al. 2019; Hartman & Morse 2020; Ghosn et al. 2019; Lazarev & Sharma 2017). In terms of outcomes, these studies generally focus on opinions about accepting refugees into the country and perceptions of the effects of refugees on the host country. This strand of the literature has tremendously improved our understanding of attitudes toward refugees and has critical implications for understanding social cohesion.

Yet, our understanding of the preferences of locals for refugee settlement (e.g., refugees living in camps or spreading across the country) is limited. How refugees settle in the host country has significant effects on their social and economic integration (Bansak et al. 2018; Hynie 2018; Marten et al. 2019; Khun & Maxwell 2022). This study set out to examine the determinants of preferences for refugee settlement through a conjoint experiment in Turkey. Using hypothetical refugee scenarios, participants were asked to pick a settlement option from (i) settling refugees in a border camp, (ii) settling refugees in a camp within the country, (iii) the government spreading refugees across the country depending on the city's population, and (iv) refugees picking places to settle. In the analysis, most factors fail to explain the preferences of locals on how refugees should settle. Only the religion of refugees and armed group that controls refugees' hometown are statistically significant. While Christian refugees are more favored to settle at border camps, Sunni refugees are more preferred to spread across the country. Refugees coming from areas controlled by YPG (a Kurdish group in Syria) are more favored to settle at border camps possibly due to YPG's relations with PKK (Kurdish insurgents in Turkey). However, the effect sizes of these statistically significant attributes are small.

The main hypothesis registered in the pre-analysis plan of this research¹ is about the effects of refugee ethnicity. As with many other factors in the study, ethnicity does not have explanatory power over preferences for refugee settlement. In the experiment a significant pattern emerged.

¹ This study is pre-registered at XXX (redacted for anonymity purposes)

Each participant selected a settlement option for 10 hypothetical scenarios, and more than 60% of participants stuck to one option in their answers. Regardless of scenario characteristics, they were always in favor of a certain settlement option. In other words, a significant proportion of participants have very strong preferences and the characteristics of refugees do not change their opinion at all. Furthermore, slightly more than half of the sample always prefers refugees to settle at border camps. This stability of preferences for refugee settlement was not predicted and could not be specified in the pre-analysis plan. However, this is an important pattern that requires further elaboration. Therefore, in this study, I deviate from the pre-analysis plan and after a brief discussion of the conjoint experiment, examine the predictors of stability of preferences. Here, as the explanatory factors, I use demographics and respondents' opinions on certain policy issues. Since I cannot manipulate these predictors, I provide correlational evidence.

The observational analysis reveals that older participants are more likely to prefer refugees at border camps than younger participants. Kurdish participants, as members of an oppressed group, are more likely than others to prefer refugees spreading across the country, which is in line with studies on group empathy (Hartman & Morse 2020; Sirin et al. 2016; Turkoglu et al. 2022). While participants who think Turkey should decrease the number of refugees it hosts prefer refugees at border camps, those who think Turkey should increase the number of refugees it hosts prefer refugees spreading across the country. Similarly, while participants who think that refugees should return immediately prefer refugees at border camps, those who think refugees should be able to stay, even after the war ends, prefer refugees spreading across the country. Compared to participants who have more frequent casual contact, participants who have monthly or less frequent casual contact prefer refugees spreading across the country, which is in line with studies on casual intergroup contact (Enos 2014; Hangartner et al. 2019). Further analysis highlights security concerns as a possible reason why locals prefer refugees at border camps.

Governmental and non-governmental organizations implement various programs to reduce prejudice and increase social cohesion. It is important, therefore, to understand who changes their opinion depending on the characteristics of refugees. Programs should target people who are open to change, not people who have stable opinions. Thus, I also examine the predictors of who changes their opinion on preferences for refugee settlement. In comparison to older participants, younger participants are more likely to adjust their preferences depending on refugee

characteristics. Participants who think Turkey should decrease the number of refugees it hosts and participants who think refugees should return immediately are less likely to change their opinion than others.

This study speaks to different strands of literature. First, the findings of this research are relevant to studies on attitudes toward refugees (Adida et al. 2019; Alrababa'h et al. 2021; Bansak et al. 2016; Getmansky et al. 2020). While most existing studies focus on accepting refugees into the country and the effects of refugees on the host country as the main outcomes, this research scrutinizes the preferences of locals for refugee settlement. This understudied outcome has significant implications for the social and economic integration of refugees (Bansak et al. 2018; Hynie 2018; Mart'en et al. 2019; Khun & Maxwell 2022), and further research will help us better understand social cohesion. Additionally, a limited number of studies has examined the effects of security concerns on attitudes toward refugees (Getmansky et al. 2018), and this study complements this strand of the literature.

Second, the findings of this study highlight the stability of preferences for refugee settlement and also that the characteristics of refugees have a limited impact on people's opinions. This is in line with recent research that emphasizes the stability of attitudes toward immigration (Kustov et al. 2021). Therefore, scholars should consider the possibility of stable preferences in when designing research and examining preference for refugee settlement.

Attitudes toward Refugees

With the increase in the number of refugees, scholars are increasingly paying attention to the determinants of attitudes toward refugees. Adopting different strategies, studies examine the effects of sociotropic economic concerns, cultural concerns, humanitarian concerns, and intergroup relations on locals' opinions toward refugees (Adida et al. 2019; Alrababa'h et al. 2021; Bansak et al. 2016; Getmansky et al. 2020). First, existing studies highlight the significance of sociotropic economic concerns (effects of newcomers on the country's economy) (Adida et al. 2019; Bansak et al. 2016; Lazarev & Sharma 2017). Locals have more positive attitudes toward refugees who have higher levels of education and high-skill jobs, as these refugees are likely to contribute to the country's economy by paying taxes.

Second, previous research underscores the role of cultural concerns that are generally manifested as religious differences (Adida et al. 2019; Alrababa'h et al. 2021; Bansak et al. 2016; Lazarev & Sharma 2017). In the EU and the US, Christian refugees are more favored than Muslim refugees (Adida et al. 2019; Bansak et al. 2016). In Jordan, as a Sunni majority and Christian minority country, Sunni refugees are more favored than Christian refugees, who are more favored than Alawite refugees (Alrababa'h et al. 2021). Similarly, in Turkey, as a Sunni majority and Alawite minority country, Christian refugees are less favored than Sunni and Alawite refugees (Getmansky et al. 2020). Past research also suggests that refugees who have local friends and who can speak the local language are more favored than others (Adida et al. 2019; Bansak et al. 2016; Getmansky et al. 2020).

Third, humanitarian concerns are articulated as important factors affecting attitudes toward refugees. People escaping from persecution are more favored than those who look for better economic opportunities, and those who experienced violence in their home country or suffer from trauma are more favored than others (Bansak et al. 2016; Alrababa'h et al. 2021).

Fourth, with respect to the role of intergroup relations, while Ghosn, Braithwaite & Chu (2019) find a positive correlation between contact and attitudes toward refugees, Hangartner et al. (2019) find that casual contact results in negative attitudes toward refugees. These findings are in line with studies on the contact theory. While meaningful/substantive contact improves intergroup relations (Hässler et al. 2020; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006), casual contact has negative effects (Enos 2014).

Finally, Hartman & Morse (2020) suggest that those people in the host country who have themselves experienced violence are likely to have more positive attitudes toward refugees, and emphasize the role of empathy and shared experiences. Turkoglu, Canavan & Icduygu (2022) note that the effect of oppression experience is observed on social and cultural issues but not on economic ones.

Preferences for Refugee Settlement

In the literature on attitudes toward refugees, researchers generally examine what factors affect locals' willingness to accept refugees into the country and perceptions about the possible effects of refugees on the country (e.g., economy and security) (Adida et al. 2019; Alrababa'h et al. 2021;

Bansak et al. 2016; Ghosn et al. 2019; Hangartner et al. 2019; Hartman & Morse 2020; Lazarev and Sharma 2017).² Existing research has significantly improved our understanding of the determinants of attitudes toward refugees, which has critical implications for policy making.

Our understanding of whether people in the host country prefer refugees at camps or spread across the country is still limited. Where refugees live has significant consequences for their social and economic integration (Bansak et al. 2018; Hynie 2018; Marten et al. 2019; Khun & Maxwell 2022). Therefore, comprehending preferences for refugee settlement will help us better understand the relations between refugees and locals as well as social cohesion in the host country.

This study sets out to examine the role of ethnic relations on preferences for refugee settlement through a conjoint experiment. It is pre-registered at XXX [redacted for reasons of anonymity]. While the analysis did not lend support to the effects of ethnic relations, it revealed an interesting pattern: the stability of preferences. More than 60% of participants did not change their preferences regardless of the characteristics of refugees. Although this was not predicted, it is an important pattern worth further investigation. Therefore, this study deviates from the preregistration plan, and after a brief discussion of the conjoint experiment, it mainly focuses on the stability of preferences and what predicts such stability.

Displacement and Turkey

Turkey, with around 3.8 million refugees, hosts the highest number of refugees in the world, which is around 15% of all the people displaced across borders (UNHCR 2022*b*). Most of these refugees are from Syria.³ At the beginning of the Syrian refugee inflow most newcomers resided in camps. For instance, in 2013, around half of all refugees were settled in camps managed by the government (UNHCR 2014). However, as the number of refugees increased abruptly, the government could not manage to create enough capacity in the camps, and many refugees had to find residence in urban areas and deal with accommodation issues themselves. According to the latest statistics, by

² As a significant exception and important contribution to the literature, Getmansky, Matakos & Sinmazdemir (2020) ask participants whether hypothetical refugee scenarios can include their neighbors and whether the refugees in such scenarios should get work permits and citizenship.

³ Before the civil war in Syria, Turkey was not a significant actor in hosting refugees. In 2010, the number of refugees in Turkey was less than twenty thousand (UNHCR 2022*a*).

2020 around 98% of refugees lived in urban areas, with only around 2% of refugees in Turkey residing in camps (UNHCR 2022c). Although most refugees do not currently live in camps, at the beginning of the inflow from Syria the majority did so, and in the public debate and presentation of the refugees, camps were salient. Therefore, the Turkish public is familiar with refugees living in camps and also spreading across the country.

In terms of political and social context, the Turkish public showed solidarity with Syrian refugees at the beginning of the migration (Erdoğan 2020). Here, common religious identity played a significant role and was exploited by the government (Lazarev & Sharma 2017).⁴ However, this positive atmosphere did not last long. Even in the earlier years, many people expressed concerns about hosting refugees and the relevant constraints, such as inadequate services (İçduygu 2015). Over time, the public has become more discontent with the presence of Syrian refugees (Secen 2021). At the time of the experiment, there was no specific incident by or against refugees that might impact the findings.

Research Design

In order to examine preferences for refugee settlement, I carried out an online conjoint experiment in Turkey in January 2021.⁵ Participants were recruited through Benderimki.⁶ Those who were 18 or older and living in Turkey were invited to participate in the study. In total 1,201 people were surveyed. For the summary statistics of the sample please see Appendix B Table A1.

Similar to Shaffer et al. (2020), in this study I use group level characteristics sociotropic economic concerns and indicates whether the economic costs of hosting refugees will be covered by Turkey or the UN and EU. The second one is about cultural concerns and denotes the religion of refugees. This is common practice in the literature (Adida et al. 2019; Alrababa'h et al. 2021; Bansak et al. 2016; Getmansky et al. 2020).

⁴ Among secular circles, common religious identity discourse created a backlash (Lazarev & Sharma 2017).

⁵ For a discussion of ethical considerations, please see Appendix A.

⁶ Benderimki is the largest online marketing and survey company with more than 350,000 panel members and is also used by other scholars (e.g., Getmansky, Matakos & Sinmazdemir (2020)).

Here, three levels are used: Alawite, Christian, and Sunni Muslim. For humanitarian concerns I employ two attributes: the level of destruction and attack type in hometown. The former is intended to measure the level of conflict intensity, which might capture both the level of violence and economic/infrastructure destruction. There are three levels: high, medium, and low. The latter aims at measuring discriminate and indiscriminate violence. Here, two levels are used: airstrikes and ground force attacks. Attacks perpetrated by air forces target certain regions without differentiating between military forces and civilians. By way of contrast, ground forces, in general, are able to distinguish who is from the armed forces or a civilian. For security concerns, the attributes are ethnicity and the armed group that controls the hometown. For the ethnicity attribute, Arab and Kurd are used as the levels, and for the territorial control of hometown attribute, Assad Forces, Syrian Free Army, and YPG (Kurdish forces) are used.

Participants were shown two groups and asked “if Turkey has to accept one of these groups into the country as refugees, which group should Turkey accept.” For this question, they had to pick one group. Afterward, they were asked “if Group 1 is accepted into the country, how should this group be settled?” and “if Group 2 is accepted into the country, how should this group be settled?” Here, participants picked from among the following options: refugees should settle in places that they prefer, the government should settle refugees within the country depending on the city’s population, a camp should be established at the border, and a camp should be established in the country.⁷ Answers to the second question are the main interest of this research. From the refugees’ perspective, choosing their place to settle and the government spreading them across the country are generally better options than living in camps. Camps are likely to be located in remote areas, be overcrowded, and have underdeveloped facilities. Refugees living in cities among the local population may have access to better public services and opportunities. Between the camps, those at the border are more likely to be disadvantageous than those within the country because they

⁷ While the first part of the experiment is forced-choice design, the second part is choice-based design (Hainmueller, Hopkins & Yamamoto 2014).

are, in general, close to the conflict region. From the locals’ perspective, refugees living among the host population might facilitate integration, while refugees living at border camps might facilitate their return.

Table 1: Experimental Design

Attributes	Group 1	Group 2
Economic costs covered by	United Nations and European Union	Turkey
Religion	Christian	Sunni
Level of destruction in hometown	Limited damage	Severe damage
Attack type in the hometown	Airstrikes	Ground forces
Ethnicity	Arab	Kurd
Territorial control of hometown	Syrian Free Army	YPG (Kurdish forces)

If Turkey has to accept one of these groups into the country as refugees, which group should Turkey accept

	Group 1	Group 2
	<i>If Group 1 is accepted into the country, how should this group be settled?</i>	<i>If Group 2 is accepted into the country, how should this group be settled?</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refugees should settle in places that they prefer. • Government should settle refugees within the country depending on cities’ population. • A camp should be established at the border. • A camp should be established in the country. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refugees should settle in places that they prefer. • Government should settle refugees within the country depending on cities’ population. • A camp should be established at the border. • A camp should be established in the country.

Every participant saw five pairs of hypothetical refugee scenarios (ten scenarios in total). An example set-up is presented in Table 1. In the analysis, standard approaches are followed (Hainmueller, Hopkins & Yamamoto 2014). For each option a separate model is run. The number of participants choosing refugees settling in places they prefer and government settling refugees

within the country depending on the city’s population is small. Separate analyses for these options are not likely to be informative.⁸ This is why these two options are grouped. The probability of preferring a camp at the border is estimated with the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Border Camp}_{ijk} = & \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{UN/EU Cost Covering}_{ijk} + \gamma_2 \text{Sunni}_{ijk} + \gamma_3 \text{Christian}_{ijk} + \\ & \gamma_4 \text{Severe Destruction}_{ijk} + \gamma_5 \text{Moderate Destruction}_{ijk} + \gamma_6 \text{Ground Forces}_{ijk} + \\ & \gamma_7 \text{Kurd}_{ijk} + \gamma_8 \text{FSA Control}_{ijk} + \gamma_9 \text{YPG Control}_{ijk} + \epsilon_i \end{aligned}$$

where i indicates the respondent, k indicates the round, and j indicates the scenario. In this setting, $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, 1201\}$, $k \in \{1, \dots, 5\}$, and $j \in \{1, 2\}$. Each respondent i yields 10 observations: 5 rounds and 2 choices per round. The unit of analysis is the hypothetical refugee group, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether participant $_i$ preferred the border camp option for the hypothetical refugee group scenario $_j$ in round $_k$. The explanatory variables are the attributes explained above.⁹ Since scenarios are randomized and orthogonal to participant characteristics, the above model gives us the unbiased estimate of the average effect of each attribute on the likelihood that participants prefer a border camp for refugees. The model is estimated via ordinary least squares regression and standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. For preferring a camp within the country and dispersal, the same model is run with different dependent variables (a binary that indicates whether participant $_i$ preferred the camp within the country option for the hypothetical refugee group scenario $_j$ in round $_k$ and a binary that indicates whether participant $_i$ preferred the dispersal option for the hypothetical refugee group scenario $_j$ in round $_k$).

Results

Figure 1 reports average marginal component effects (AMCE)¹⁰ of attributes for settlement preferences.¹¹ The left panel presents the results for preferring a border camp, the mid-panel for

⁸Separate analyses for these options are reported in Appendix C Figure A4.

⁹For sociotropic economic concerns, the reference category is Turkey covering the costs; for religion, it is Alawite; for the level of destruction, it is low-level destruction; for the attack type, it is air force attacks; for ethnicity, it is Arab; and for territorial control of hometown, it is Assad forces.

¹⁰Following the suggestions of Leeper, Hobolt & Tilley (2020), marginal means are reported in Appendix C Figure A1.

¹¹For a brief discussion about the effects of attributes on accepting refugees into the country (i.e., when the dependent variable is the answers to the first question in Table 1), please see Appendix D.

preferring a camp within the country, and the right panel for preferring dispersal. The analysis reveals that most factors fail to explain preferences for refugee settlement, and for the factors that we observe statistically significant AMCEs, the effect sizes are small. The experiment is well-powered to detect even an effect size of 0.03 for an attribute with three levels. Thus, lack of power is not a concern for the main inferences.

First of all, for sociotropic economic concerns, whether the UN/EU or Turkey will cover the costs of hosting refugees does not affect participants' preferring a camp or dispersal of refugees across the country. Second, humanitarian concerns do not significantly impact preferences for refugee settlement. How much refugees suffered in their country of origin does not affect how people in the country of asylum prefer refugees to settle.




Figure 1: Effects of refugee attributes on settlement preferences

Third, the ethnicity attribute does not have significant effects on settlement preferences. Whether refugees are Kurdish or Arab does not impact how participants prefer refugees to settle. In the survey, there are Turkish and Kurdish participants, and considering the ethnic ties of Kurds in Turkey

to Kurdish refugees from Syria, there might be a variation in preferences for refugee settlement by participant ethnicity. Thus, I carry out subgroup analyses, and the results suggest that while Turkish participants do not differentiate between Kurdish and Arab refugees, Kurdish participants prefer Kurdish refugees to spread across the country and not settle at a border camp.¹² One way to interpret this finding is that life at the border camps is not desirable because the border camps are close to conflict zones and facilities are likely to be underdeveloped. Thus, Kurds want their co-ethnics to have a relatively better life and spread across the country rather than being contained in border camps. This is particularly significant given that the bordering region is a predominantly Kurdish area.

Fourth, cultural concerns are a significant determinant of preferences for border camps. Christian refugees are more favored at border camps than others. There is a preference for refugees who do not have religious ties to the host country to be kept away from the locals. By contrast, Sunni refugees are preferred to be dispersed across the country. In other words, respondents prefer refugees with similar cultures around them compared to refugees that they have less in common with.

Finally, the possible transnational ties of refugees to the insurgency in the destination are the most important determinant of the preferences of locals for refugee settlement. Existing research suggests that living in an area controlled by an armed group can be perceived as support for that group (Kalyvas 2006, Lichtenheld 2020, Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004). Therefore, if refugees come from areas controlled by insurgents that have ties to rebels in the host country, locals from the majority group are likely to display negative attitudes because these refugees may be perceived as a possible pool of resources (recruitment and economic) for the rebels and may place the government in a disadvantageous position. In the experiment, refugees coming from areas controlled by YPG are more preferred at the border camps and less preferred within the country. There are no significant differences between refugees from areas controlled by Assad forces and FSA.

Negative attitudes toward refugees coming from YPG-controlled areas are likely to be indicators of security concerns but not in the sense that previous studies have suggested. Following past studies (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006), one would expect respondents to prefer refugees coming from areas

¹²The results are reported in Appendix C Figures A3-A5.

controlled by rebels that have ties with insurgents in the host country to settle away from the conflict zone so that there would be limited interaction between rebels and refugees. When this logic is applied to the Turkish-Syrian case, we would expect Turkish participants to prefer refugees that come from areas under the control of YPG to be away from the border region (i.e., conflict zone). However, this is the opposite of what we observe in the analysis. From the results, the public is not likely to make the association suggested by previous research.

The conjoint analysis suggests that most factors fail to explain preferences for refugee settlement. While statistically significant effects are observed for religion and the armed group that controls the area refugees come from, the effect sizes are small. All in all, the characteristics of refugees have limited explanatory power over the preferences of locals for how refugees should settle in the host country.

Stability of Settlement Preferences

In the conjoint experiment, participants were given four settlement options to pick from for each hypothetical scenario. This is a choice-based conjoint experiment. Here, participants can choose a settlement option depending on refugee characteristics. Alternatively, they might have a very strong preference and refugee characteristics cannot affect their opinions. Therefore, they always choose the same settlement option for all scenarios in the experiment. In this study, 734 participants (more than 61% of the sample) stuck to one option for all ten profiles (i.e., all the profiles that they were exposed to) and did not change their preference at all. Out of 1,201 participants, 607 insisted on border camps, 49 on interior camps/within country camps, and 78 on dispersal.¹³ Slightly more than half of the sample preferred refugees at the border, no matter what the refugee characteristics were.

This stability of settlement preferences and the dominance of border camp as a choice raise interesting questions. Who insists on certain preferences? Who is open to changing their settlement preference? Why is border camp the dominant preference? The stability of preferences was not foreseen and was not registered in the pre-analysis plan. This is an interesting finding that requires further investigation, particularly considering the literature emphasizing the stability of attitudes

¹³When I carry out the analysis in Figure 1 with only participants who change their preferences depending on refugee characteristics, the results are still very similar to Figure 1. Please see Appendix C Figure A6.

toward immigration (Kustov, Laaker & Reller 2021). Thus, I carry out exploratory analyses. I examine what predicts preferences for refugee settlement, why some people always have a preference for refugees at border camps, and who changes their opinion depending on profile characteristics. Analyses in this section are not pre-registered. Additionally, I focus on how demographics and opinions about certain policies impact preferences. Since I cannot manipulate these predictors, the evidence provided here is correlational, not causal.

In this analysis I use the following demographic predictors: binary variables of whether participants are male, single, employed, and Kurd, continuous variables of age and household size, and a categorical variable of education (secondary or lower, high school, and university). In terms of opinions about refugees, before the conjoint experiment all participants answered a question about whether Turkey should increase, decrease, or keep the number of refugees it hosts the same. A second question was asked about the return of refugees, with the options of immediate return, return after the war, and opportunity of staying even after the war ends. A third question about frequency of exposure to Syrian refugees, with options of daily, weekly, and monthly or less, was also asked.¹⁴

I carry out two different analyses to examine the predictors of settlement preferences. First, for the analysis in Figure 1, I include the aforementioned demographics and opinions, and the results are reported in Figure 2.¹⁵ The results for preferring border camps mirror the results for dispersal. As age increases, participants are more likely to prefer refugees at border camps and less likely to prefer their dispersal across the country. Increases in education level are correlated with increases in preferences for border camps and decreases in preferences for dispersal. Sex, marital status, employment status, and household size do not impact preferences. Kurdish participants are more in favor of refugees spreading and less in favor of them settling at border camps compared to other participants. This finding is in line with the research on group empathy (Hartman & Morse 2020, Sirin, Villalobos & Valentino 2016, Turkoglu, Canavan & Icduygu 2022). Kurds, as members of an oppressed group, have more positive attitudes toward refugees (i.e., people who also suffer from oppression and conflict).

¹⁴In the analysis, secondary or lower education is used as the base category for education levels, keeping the number of refugees the same for opinions on the number of refugees Turkey hosts, refugees returning after the war ends for opinions on refugee return, and weekly exposure for exposure to Syrian refugees.

¹⁵Attributes of hypothetical scenarios are included but not reported.




Figure 2: Relationship between respondent characteristics and settlement preferences at the hypothetical scenario level

When it comes to how existing opinions affect settlement preferences, those who already have negative attitudes toward refugees prefer them to settle at border camps.¹⁶ Compared to participants who think Turkey should keep the number of refugees it hosts the same, those who think Turkey should increase the number of refugees prefer refugees to disperse across the country, and those who think Turkey should decrease the number of refugees it hosts prefer refugees at border camps. In terms of opinions on refugee return, compared to participants who think refugees should return after the war, those who think refugees should be able to stay in Turkey, even after the war, prefer refugees to spread across the country, and those who think refugees should immediately return to Syria prefer them at border camps.¹⁷ Findings on the effect of exposure to refugees are in line with the research on casual contact (Enos 2014, Hangartner et al. 2019). Those who have daily or weekly exposure to refugees (i.e., casual contact, which is different to meaningful contact – e.g., friendship) are more in favor of refugees settling at border camps and less in favor of them

¹⁶Questions about the number of refugees, return of refugees, and exposure to refugees were asked prior to the conjoint experiment. All participants were exposed to these questions and hypothetical refugee scenarios.

¹⁷The confidence intervals for increasing the number of refugees and refugees not returning even after the war ends are larger than others because the number of participants who think that Turkey should increase the number of refugees it hosts and the number of participants who think that refugees should be able to stay in Turkey even after the war ends is smaller than the number of participants who pick other options.

dispersing across the country compared to those who have monthly or less frequent exposure.

In the analysis above, the unit of analysis is the hypothetical refugee scenario. Each participant saw ten scenarios and thus appeared ten times in the dataset. As an additional check, I aggregate data at the individual level. As dependent variables, I calculate the mean of preferences ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 means that a participant never selects that option and 1 means that a participant always selects that option. Similarly, 0.2 denotes that a participant selects that option 20% of the time (i.e., two scenarios out of 10). I create a dependent variable for each of three options: border camp, a camp within the country, and dispersal. I use the same explanatory variables as in Figure 2.¹⁸ Additionally, I account for city fixed effects¹⁹ and clustered standard errors by city. The model is estimated via OLS.²⁰

The results of the analysis at the individual level are reported in Table 2. The findings from the scenario-level analysis are corroborated here. Younger people are more in favor of refugees spreading across the country and less in favor of border camps. More educated people are less likely to prefer refugees living among locals. Kurds prefer refugees dispersing across the country more than others. Participants who already have negative attitudes toward refugees (i.e., those who think Turkey should decrease the number of refugees it hosts and those who think refugees should return immediately) prefer refugees to settle at border camps more than those who have relatively positive attitudes. Finally, less contact is correlated with a higher propensity to prefer refugees spreading across the country and a lower propensity to prefer border camps.

Why do Locals Insist on Border Camps?

The previous section highlighted locals' stable preferences and their predictors. Border camps stand out as the most dominant preference. More than half of the sample always preferred refugees at border camps regardless of the characteristics of refugees. This section aims to provide evidence suggestive of why people prefer refugees at border camps. In the survey, after the conjoint experiment, participants answered questions on the effectiveness of camps compared to refugees spreading across the country. More specifically, they indicated their agreement with the following

¹⁸Since I aggregate scenarios at the individual level, I cannot include scenario characteristics in the analysis.

¹⁹Certain cities might host more refugees than others, and this might affect attitudes. Also, refugees in certain cities might behave differently than others. City fixed effects account for factors at the city level.

²⁰People living in cities closer to the border might have different attitudes than others. The comparison of participants living in border cities and others suggests that there are no significant differences between these two groups.

Table 2: Relationship between respondent characteristics and settlement preferences at the individual level

	Border camp (1)	Within camp (2)	Dispersal (3)
Age	0.005** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Male	0.002 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.016)	0.006 (0.019)
Education - High school	0.052 (0.030)	0.007 (0.024)	-0.059* (0.023)
Education - University	0.060* (0.025)	0.014 (0.026)	-0.074*** (0.019)
Single	-0.005 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.023)	0.028 (0.019)
Household size	-0.010 (0.009)	0.012* (0.005)	-0.003 (0.007)
Unemployed	-0.043 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.048 (0.029)
Kurd	-0.099** (0.034)	-0.033 (0.028)	0.132** (0.044)
Refugee number - Lowering	0.131*** (0.032)	-0.028 (0.022)	-0.103*** (0.027)
Refugee number - Increasing	-0.182* (0.081)	0.012 (0.054)	0.170* (0.081)
Return - Immediately	0.099*** (0.026)	-0.048* (0.020)	-0.051** (0.020)
Return - No return	-0.208** (0.065)	-0.059 (0.055)	0.266*** (0.072)
Exposure to Syrians - Daily	-0.004 (0.022)	0.008 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.021)
Exposure to Syrians - Monthly or less	-0.094*** (0.028)	0.011 (0.021)	0.083** (0.028)
Constant	0.580*** (0.071)	0.128* (0.051)	0.292*** (0.059)
Observations	1,201	1,201	1,201
R ²	0.217	0.113	0.195

Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. City fixed effects are included but not reported. For the first model, the dependent variable is preference for border camps; for the second model, it is preference for camps within the country; for the third model, it is preference for dispersal. These denote the mean of specified preference by individual and range from 0 to 1, where 0 means that a participant never selected that option and 1 means that a participant always selected that option. In the analysis, secondary or lower education is used as the base category for education levels, keeping the number of refugees the same for opinions on the number of refugees Turkey hosts, refugees returning after war ends for opinions on refugee return, and weekly exposure for exposure to Syrian refugees. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

statements on a Likert scale (1-strongly disagree and 5-strongly agree). Compared to dispersing refugees across the country, settling them in camps: is better for Turkey’s security, is better for Turkey’s economy, is better for refugees’ social integration, is better for the governance of the asylum system, increases the probability of refugees being exploited by Syrian armed groups, increases the probability of refugees returning back to their country, and increases the probability of terrorist attacks.²¹ While these questions do not differentiate between border camps and camps within the country, given the dominance of border camp preferences, people are likely to think about border camps when answering the questions. Using these items, I carry out various analyses.

First, I examine the bivariate relationship between opinions on the effectiveness of camps and refugee settlement preferences. Since it is difficult to expound the predictive power of factors looking at statistical significance,²² I present R^2 in Table 3 from bivariate regressions. In the final row, I use all items as explanatory variables in the same model. The first column presents R^2 for when the dependent variable is preference for border camps, the second model for preference for camps within the country, and the third column for preference for dispersal. The analysis suggests that the item about camps being better for Turkey’s security, compared to refugees spreading across the country, has the highest explanatory power among all items. While R^2 for the security item is 0.06 for preference for border camps and 0.09 for preference for dispersal, when all items are combined it is 0.07 and 0.10, respectively. Looking at R^2 , the explanatory power of the security item is much larger than other items (around three times larger or more than the explanatory power of others). Compared to preference for border camps and dispersal, opinions on the effectiveness of camps fail to explain preference for camps within the country. No item’s R^2 reaches to even 0.01. Overall, this simple bivariate relationship analysis highlights the importance of security concerns in explaining why respondents prefer refugees at border camps.

Second, I employ recursive partitioning and regression trees as an unsupervised machine learning method (Breiman, Friedman, Olshen & Stone 1984). While R^2 from a regression analysis might inform us about predictive power, it might suffer from over-fitting. Recursive partitioning and regression trees might overcome this problem. This is a two-stage classification method. In the

²¹For summary statistics, please see Appendix B Table A2.

²²While all items are positively and significantly correlated with preference for border camps, they are negatively and significantly correlated with preference for dispersal. Items are not significantly correlated with preference for camps within the country and there is no clear pattern in the direction of relations.

Table 3: Explanatory power of opinions on the effectiveness of camps over refugee settlement preferences

	<i>Border Camp</i>	<i>Within Camp</i>	<i>Dispersal</i>
Better for security	0.06	0.00	0.09
Better for economy	0.02	0.00	0.03
Better for integration	0.02	0.00	0.04
Better for governance	0.01	0.00	0.03
More likely to return	0.02	0.00	0.02
Increases terror	0.02	0.00	0.01
Increases exploitation of Syrians	0.00	0.00	0.00
All together	0.07	0.01	0.10

R^2 from bivariate regression are reported except for the final row. In the final row, all items are used as explanatory variables in the same model. The first column presents R^2 for when the dependent variable is preference for border camp, the second model for preference for camps within the country, and third column for preference for dispersal.

first stage, a variable that best splits the data into two groups is found. Then, for each subgroup, this process is repeated until they reach a minimum size or no improvement can be made. In the second stage, the tree from the first stage is trimmed using cross-validation. Without trimming, the final output would be too complex to interpret (Therneau, Atkinson & Foundation 2022). Given the dominance of border camps, this analysis is only carried out for this preference.²³ The variable of interest is whether participants always prefer refugees at border camps. For 607 participants, it is coded as 1 and for the rest (i.e., 594 participants), it is coded as 0. Using the demographics and opinions from Table 2 and the opinions on the effectiveness of camps compared to refugees spreading across the country from Table 3 as predictors, this analysis classifies participants by whether they always prefer refugees at border camps.

The results are reported in Figure 3. While blue boxes denote participant groups more in favor of border camps, green boxes indicate participant groups less in favor of border camps. Each box has a unique identifying number in a smaller box on the top and contains three important sets of information. In each box the first row indicates whether the majority of participants in this group always prefer border camps for refugee settlement (1 denotes that the majority of participants in this group are in favor of settling refugees at border camps). The second row indicates the percentages of participants who did not always prefer border camps (left side) and participants who always prefer border camps (right side). The third row denotes the percentage of this subgroup in the

²³Given that the limited number of people who always prefer camps within the country and dispersal is very limited, an informative analysis is not likely.




Figure 3: Classification tree for preferring refugees at border camps

whole sample.

This analysis highlights the importance of security concerns. The sample splits at the beginning with the item on camps being better for the country’s security, and depending on variable importance, it is further split. The left side is for those who agree with the statement under the box (i.e., the left side of $\text{Camp Security} < 4.5$ denotes participants who select less than 4.5 on the item about camps being better for the country’s security and the right side indicates participants who select more than 4.5). Participants who strongly agree with camps being better for the country’s security (i.e., those who selected a value higher than 4.5 for this item) consist of 47% of the sample, and among them 64% always prefer refugees to settle at border camps (box 3). Among participants who strongly agree with camps being better for the country’s security, those who want to decrease the number of refugees Turkey accepts consist of around 34% of the sample, and in this group the proportion of participants who consistently prefer border camps is around 67% (box 7). When this group is further disaggregated by age, those who are 33 or older are more in favor of containing

refugees in border camps. Around 78% of this group consistently prefer border camps over other settlement options (box 15). Given the multitude of groups, there is not enough space to explain all the subgroups. The examples above should make it slightly easier to read the tree. Overall, the most important predictors of border camp preference seem to be opinions on camps being better for the country's security, economy, and integration of refugees, the participant's age, whether the participant is Kurdish, and opinions on the return of refugees and the number of refugees Turkey should host.²⁴

All in all, the examination of R^2 from bivariate analyses and the classification results from recursive partitioning and regression trees underscore the importance of security concerns in explaining why participants prefer refugees at border camps.

Who Changes their Mind?

The analysis in this study highlights the stability of preferences for refugee settlement and the dominance of border camps as the most popular option. Here, I examine who changes their preference for refugee settlement depending on hypothetical refugee profiles. I create a binary dependent variable. For the 734 participants who stuck to one option,²⁵ this variable is coded as 0, and for participants who change their preference depending on profile characteristics it is coded as 1. Using the same covariates as in Table 2, I run a linear probability model.²⁶

The results are reported in Figure 4 and emphasize the importance of three variables: age, opinions on the number of refugees Turkey should host, and opinions on refugee return. Age is negatively and significantly correlated with changing minds. Younger people are more likely to change their settlement preference depending on refugee characteristics than older people. Participants who think that Turkey should decrease the number of refugees it hosts are less likely to change their preferences depending on refugee characteristics and more likely to stick to one option

²⁴Here, one can highlight the high correlation between opinions and rightfully suspect the importance of the item about camps being better for the country's security. To alleviate the concerns, I run the analysis without this item to see if any other item about the effectiveness of camps replaces it. The results are in Appendix C Figure A7 and underscore the importance of security concerns. When the security item is taken out of the analysis, no other item about the effectiveness of camps replaces it and opinions about the return of refugees become the most important predictor.

²⁵This includes participants who always prefer border camps, participants who always prefer camps within the country, and participants who always prefer dispersal.

²⁶Using logit to estimate the model does not affect inferences, and the results are very similar to Figure 4. Please see Appendix C Table A3.




Figure 4: Relationship between respondent characteristics and changing preferences depending on refugee characteristics

than participants who think that Turkey should increase the number of refugees it hosts or keep it the same. Similarly, participants who think that refugees should return immediately are more likely to stick to one option than other participants. Education variables are significant at the 0.1 level and suggest that more educated people are less likely to change their preferences. There is no statistically significant relationship between other factors and preferences for refugee settlement.²⁷

It is important to understand who changes their preferences depending on the characteristics of refugees as it might have policy relevance. It is critical to reduce locals' prejudice against refugees for a harmonious society and many governmental and non-governmental organizations carry out various interventions to do so. These institutions should target people who are open to changing their opinions so that their efforts can produce the best outcomes. Including people who will not change their opinions might be a waste of resources.

²⁷Similar to preference for border camps, I carry out recursive partitioning and regression tree analysis for changing minds. This analysis highlights the importance of age and opinions on the effectiveness of camps for Turkey's security as predictors of stability of preferences for refugee settlement. While those who strongly agree with camps being better for Turkey's security compared to refugees spreading across the country are less likely to change their preferences depending on refugee characteristics than others, among those who do not strongly agree with the aforementioned statement, people who are 23 or younger are more likely to adjust their preferences depending on refugee characteristics.

Generalizability

The findings of this study are based on a conjoint experiment and observational analysis of a survey carried out in Turkey, and therefore, one might question the generalizability of the findings. The conjoint experiment has two main takeaways. First, the religion of refugees matters for locals' settlement preferences. While Christian refugees are favored at border camps, Sunni refugees are favored to spread across the country. This finding is likely to generalize as it is in line with existing research. In Christian-majority countries, Christian refugees are more favored than others, and in Muslim-majority countries, Muslim refugees are more favored (Adida, Lo & Platas 2019, Alrababa'h et al. 2021, Bansak, Hainmueller & Hangartner 2016, Getmansky, Matakos & Sinmazdemir 2020). Therefore, in a Christian-majority country, this study predicts that locals would favor Christian refugees dispersing across the country and Muslim refugees at border camps. Second, the conjoint analysis underscores the importance of armed actors who control refugees' hometown. Here, refugees who come from areas controlled by YPG are more favored to settle at border camps than other refugees. The main reason for this is likely to be the transnational relationship between PKK and YPG. If there is no insurgency or ethnic tension in the host country and the insurgency in the origin country is not related to the host country, the armed actor who controls the hometown might matter less or not at all.

The observational analysis suggests that people have stable preferences for refugee settlement, and younger people are more likely to change their preferences depending on refugee characteristics. These findings are likely to be extended to other cases. Recent research highlights that in Europe and the US, people have stable attitudes toward immigration, and major economic and political shocks do not change attitudes (Kustov, Laaker & Reller 2021). Thus, people in other countries other than Turkey are also likely to have stable preferences for refugee settlement. Similarly, research from different contexts suggests that younger people are more likely to change their attitudes (Kustov, Laaker & Reller 2021, Zaller 1987). There is no reason to expect that this will be different for preferences for refugee settlement. In various contexts, older people are likely to have more stable preferences than younger people.

Finally, this study argues that security concerns might explain why locals prefer refugees at border camps. More specifically, people who think camps, rather than refugees spreading across

the country, are better for the country's security, prefer refugees to be at border camps. This finding is likely to extend to other contexts. For instance, a study carried out in Greece emphasizes the importance of security concerns in relation to refugee hosting facilities (Fabbe, Kyrkopoulou & Vidali 2022). However, state capacity might be a scope condition. Both Turkey and Greece have quite a strong state capacity and are able to control refugee camps. If the host country has weak state capacity and is unable to control the refugee camps, and thereby limit insurgent group activities, refugee camps might be seen as a source of problems (Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguayo 1989). Thus, in a country where the government cannot control refugee camps and the existence of camps might cause problems, locals might not prefer refugees to settle in camps. If rebels or other actors are active in camps and exploit the system, the locals' perception of the effectiveness of camps for the country's security is not likely to be positive.

Conclusion

This study set out to examine locals' preferences for refugee settlement through a conjoint experiment carried out in Turkey. The results highlight the importance of religion of refugees and armed group that controls refugees' hometown. Other factors including ethnicity,²⁸ humanitarian concerns (e.g., level of destruction in hometown), and whether the costs are covered by Turkey or EU/UN do not have explanatory power over preferences for refugee settlement. Although the religion and armed group that controls hometown attributes have statistically significant AMCEs, the effect sizes are small. Furthermore,

In the conjoint experiment, more than 60% of the sample never changed their preferences, regardless of refugee characteristics. Furthermore, more than half of the sample always preferred refugees at border camps. Both of these patterns are important and worth further exploration. Given the lack of significance for most attributes in the conjoint experiment and the small effect size, the main focus of this paper is on the stability of preferences and the predictors of preference for border camps.

The findings of this study have various implications. First of all, the lack of significance for the ethnicity attribute is relevant to the literature on refugees and civil conflict. Previous studies

²⁸The main hypothesis registered in the pre-analysis plan was about the effects of the ethnicity of refugees. The analysis suggest that whether refugees are Arab or Kurdish does not affect respondents' preferences.

suggest a significant relationship between refugee flows and spread of civil war citing changes in the ethnic composition as a possible mechanism (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006, Weiner 1992). This argument can be extended to settlement preferences and may imply that Turks would be more likely to prefer Kurdish refugees, rather than Arab refugees, to settle away from the Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country (i.e., the area where the Kurdish insurgency is based). However, the analysis of this research could not find statistically significant effects of refugee ethnicity on preferences for refugee settlement and the effect size is close to 0. Also, recent research could not find significant relations between refugees and spread of civil conflict (Zhou & Shaver 2021), and this study complements that strand of the literature.

Second, more than 60% of participants have a stable preference, and refugee characteristics have no effect on the opinions of respondents. This is in line with recent findings on the stability of attitudes toward immigration (Kustov, Laaker & Reller 2021). Scholars should consider the possibility of stable attitudes in future research.

Finally, stability of preference has practical implications. Governmental and non-governmental organizations implement various programs to change people's attitudes, reduce prejudice, and create a more harmonious society. Given limited resources, they should strategically target participants and focus on people who are open to changing their attitudes.

The findings of this study are based on research in Turkey. The previous section offered a detailed discussion of the generalizability of the results and suggested that most findings are likely to extend to other contexts. Further research on the topic would be helpful to assist better understanding of the determinants of preferences for refugee settlement and to help generalize the findings of this research.

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Preferences for Refugee Settlement

APPENDIX

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Appendix A: Ethical Considerations

In the survey, before everything, respondents saw the information sheet. This sheet first explained the purpose of the study and what the questions were about. Afterward, it highlighted that the profiles that they would see are hypothetical and there is no right or wrong answer. More specifically, respondents read, “Here, we will show you hypothetical refugee group attributes. We will also show you statements and ask you to indicate whether you agree or disagree with them. Please keep in mind there is no right or wrong answer. We are interested in your opinions.” If they would like to get more information about refugees in Turkey, the survey directed them to the website of the Directorate General of Migration Management [<https://www.goc.gov.tr/>], the United Nations Refugee Agency in Turkey [<https://www.unhcr.org/tr/>], or an NGO, the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants [<https://sgdd.org.tr/>].

The information sheet also highlighted that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and there are no consequences if respondents choose not to participate. They could discontinue the survey at any time. Respondents were also informed about data protection and anonymity of information. In particular, the information sheet stated that “all the information that we collect about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly anonymously. You will not be able to be identified in any reports or publications. If you want to read more about how we deal with your data, please read here (in English)[[link to the website](#)].” Finally, they were informed about this project and the institution that carried out the research. If they have any questions about the survey or would like to get any information about the results of the study, the researcher’s email address was provided. In the end, respondents were asked to click a button to confirm that they read and understood all the information and they consent to participate in this study.

This survey did not use deception. It revealed the researcher’s identity, its academic purpose, and provided no misinformation. The respondents generally were not considered to be a vulnerable population: they voluntarily responded to the survey on issues that are prevalent in public discourse in Turkey. Finally, I have no reason to think that participation in this survey had any long-lasting effects neither on the participants nor indirectly on others. The information that the participants received was very similar to what they already encounter in their everyday lives. The profiles of refugees reflected the refugee population in Turkey, and the questions on were already part of the

public discourse in Turkey.

For this study, I teamed up with *Benderimki*, which is a leading company in online survey and research in Turkey and used by other scholars. Members of their nationally representative panel were invited to participate with the only criteria of being at least 18 years of age. The panel company has more than 300,000 members who are knowledgeable about the process and are invited to participate in many surveys. Participants were compensated by the panel company using normal rates for an online panel participation and were informed about the compensation prior to beginning the survey.

Appendix B: Summary Statistics

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	36.241	10.525	18	65
Male	0.496	0.500	0	1
Married	0.583	0.493	0	1
Urban	0.762	0.426	0	1
Kurd	0.143	0.350	0	1
Unemployed	0.202	0.402	0	1
Household Size	3.940	1.455	1	11
<i>Education</i>				
Primary School	0.091	0.287	0	1
Secondary School	0.137	0.344	0	1
High School	0.413	0.493	0	1
Two-Year University	0.142	0.349	0	1
Open University	0.038	0.192	0	1
University	0.179	0.384	0	1

The unemployed category includes students.

Table A2: Summary Statistics of Opinions on Refugees and Camps

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Refugee number - Lowering	0.619	0.486	0	1
Refugee number - No change	0.354	0.478	0	1
Refugee number - Increasing	0.027	0.164	0	1
Return - Immediately	0.333	0.472	0	1
Return - After war	0.644	0.479	0	1
Return - No return	0.022	0.148	0	1
Exposure to Syrians - Daily	0.480	0.500	0	1
Exposure to Syrians - Weekly	0.283	0.451	0	1
Exposure to Syrians - Monthly or less frequently	0.236	0.425	0	1
Camps better for security	3.945	1.292	1	5
Camps better for economy	3.540	1.383	1	5
Camps better for integration	3.410	1.282	1	5
Camps better for governance	3.704	1.257	1	5
Camps make return more likely	3.537	1.293	1	5
Camps increase terror	3.371	1.293	1	5
Camps increase exploitation of Syrians	3.356	1.215	1	5

Appendix C: Robustness Checks and Additional Results




Figure A1: Effects of group attributes on the settlement preferences. Following the suggestions of Leeper, Hobolt & Tilley (2020), instead of AMCEs, marginal means are reported.




Figure A2: Effects of group attributes on the settlement preferences. The government spreading refugees across the country depending on the city's population and refugees picking places to settle options are separately analyzed.




Figure A3: Effects of group attributes on the probability of respondents favoring a group to settle in a border camp by the ethnicity of participants.




Figure A4: Effects of group attributes on the probability of respondents favoring a group to settle in a camp within the country by the ethnicity of participants.




Figure A5: Effects of group attributes on the probability of respondents favoring a group to disperse throughout the country by the ethnicity of participants.




Figure A6: Effects of group attributes on the settlement preferences. The analysis is run with only participants who change their preferences depending on the characteristics of refugees.

Table A3: Relationship between respondent characteristics and settlement preferences at the individual level - The model is estimated via logit.

	Border camp (1)	Within camp (2)	Dispersal (3)
Age	0.033*** (0.009)	-0.024 (0.026)	0.009 (0.015)
Male	0.023 (0.153)	0.053 (0.327)	0.342 (0.247)
Education - High School	0.428* (0.174)	0.233 (0.558)	-0.491 (0.295)
Education - University	0.398** (0.146)	-0.243 (0.585)	-0.111 (0.267)
Single	0.009 (0.181)	-0.389 (0.560)	0.005 (0.232)
Household Size	-0.057 (0.060)	0.348** (0.111)	0.015 (0.072)
Unemployed	-0.288* (0.147)	-0.682 (0.396)	0.748 (0.431)
Kurd	-0.534* (0.220)	-1.065 (0.770)	1.035** (0.374)
Refugee number - Lowering	0.796*** (0.178)	-0.910 (0.501)	-0.692* (0.308)
Refugee number - Increasing	-0.869 (0.466)	0.887 (0.745)	1.438** (0.502)
Return - Immediately	0.709*** (0.145)	-0.405 (0.483)	-0.853 (0.559)
Return - No return	-1.090 (0.578)	-18.038*** (0.605)	1.337* (0.561)
Exposure to Syrians - Daily	-0.052 (0.152)	0.165 (0.512)	0.117 (0.359)
Exposure to Syrians - Monthly or less	-0.412* (0.187)	0.598 (0.400)	0.681 (0.401)
Constant	-0.893* (0.447)	-20.231*** (1.733)	-2.797*** (0.712)
Observations	1,201	1,201	1,201
Log Likelihood	-695.880	-152.233	-262.336

Standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. City fixed effects are included but not reported. For the first model, the dependent variable is preference for border camps; for the second model, it is preference for camps within the country; for the third model, it is preference for dispersal. These denote the mean of specified preference by individual and range from 0 to 1, where 0 means that a participant never selected that option and 1 means that a participant always selected that option. In the analysis, secondary or lower education is used as the base category for education levels, keeping the number of refugees the same for opinions on the number of refugees Turkey hosts, refugees returning after war ends for opinions on refugee return, and weekly exposure for exposure to Syrian refugees. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure A7: Classification tree for preferring refugees at border camps. The item about camps being better for the country's security is excluded from the analysis.

Appendix D: Results When the Dependent Variable is Accepting Refugees into the Country

The main analysis in the paper presents the results for preferences for refugee settlement. Here, I presented the results for when the dependent variable is accepting refugees into the country. While this is not the main focus of this paper, it helps us better understand the results on settlement preferences. In the analysis, the same model as in the paper is used with a binary dependent variable indicating whether the hypothetical refugee group is accepted to the country. Figure A8 presents average marginal component effects (AMCE) of attributes.




Figure A8: Effects of group attributes on the probability of respondents favoring a group to accept to the country

The results on accepting refugees to the country are in line with existing studies (Adida, Lo & Platas 2019, Alrababa’h, Dillon, Williamson, Hainmueller, Hangartner & Weinstein 2021, Bansak, Hainmueller & Hangartner 2016, Getmansky, Matakos & Sinmazdemir 2020, Lazarev & Sharma 2017). Sociotropic economic concerns matters. Participants are more likely to accept refugees when

the costs are covered by the UN/EU compared to when costs are covered by Turkey. Cultural concerns play a significant role in shaping attitudes toward refugees. Given that Turkey is a Sunni-majority and Alawite minority country, Sunnis are more preferred than Alawites who are more preferred than Christians. Humanitarian concerns are an important determinant of whether people would prefer refugees in their country. Refugees who are coming from severely destructed areas are preferred over those who are coming from areas with moderate and limited destruction. Ethnicity and attack type¹ do not affect preferences. Finally, security concerns matter and refugees from areas controlled by YPG (an ally of the Kurdish insurgent group PKK) are less preferred compared to refugees that come from areas controlled by Assad forces. Refugees from areas controlled by Free Syrian Army are preferred over others, which is likely to stem from good relations between FSA and the Turkish government.

Here, the analysis could not conclude the significant effects of ethnicity. However, the sample covers both Turkish and Kurdish respondents and Kurdish participants' in-group favoritism may cancel out Turkish participants' out-group hostility. Thus, I run the analysis separately for Turkish and Kurdish participants and the results are reported in Figure A9. For both subgroups, the ethnicity attribute is statistically significant. While Turkish participants favor Arab refugees over Kurdish refugees, Kurdish participants favor Kurdish refugees over Arab refugees.

¹Attack type aimed at measuring discriminate and indiscriminate violence dichotomy as a proxy for humanitarian concerns. However, not observing significant effects for this attribute should not be read as humanitarian concerns do not matter. As the level of destruction attribute demonstrates, humanitarian concerns play a significant role in shaping attitudes. Rather, the attack type attribute failed at capturing what it aimed to capture. Given that humanitarian concerns are not the main focus of this paper and there is another attribute to capture it, this does not constitute a significant problem.




Figure A9: Effects of group attributes on the probability of respondents favoring a group to accept to the country for Turkish and Kurdish respondents, as well as the differences between sub-samples

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