



CERGU'S WORKING PAPER SERIES 2021:1



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN RESEARCH

WELFARE CHAUVINISM, A PRIVILEGE OF THE WEALTHY?

A Cross-Country Study on the Effect of Socioeconomic Status and Social Spending on Welfare Chauvinism

Clara Lundén

Centre for European Research (CERGU)
University of Gothenburg
Box 115, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG
December 2021
© 2021 by Clara Lundén. All rights reserved.



This paper was the winner of the 2021 Rutger Lindahl Award for Best Master's Thesis in European Studies.

Abstract

This thesis uses realistic group conflict theory to explain how socioeconomic status influences welfare chauvinism. It also introduces the concept of a cost-bearing factor, which suggests that individuals who feel like they pay disproportionately for welfare are less willing to extend welfare to immigrants, to explain why social spending may influence welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The study poses that the effect of socioeconomic status may vary depending on a country's social spending. By using multinomial logistic regression, individual-level data from the eighth round of the European Social Survey and country-level data from OECD are used to look at the relationship between socioeconomic status and social spending as predictors for welfare chauvinism. The results indicate that while the effect of socioeconomic status is partially conditional upon low social spending, there is no proof that the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism is conditional upon high social spending.

Contents

1. Introduction.....	1
1.2. Aim	2
1.3. Structure.....	2
2. Literature review	3
2. 1. Welfare Chauvinism	3
2. 2. Material self-interest	4
2.2.1. Socioeconomic status.....	4
2.2.2. Social spending	7
3. Theory	10
3.1 Realistic group conflict theory	10
3.2 The conditional factor	11
4. Material and Method.....	15
4.1 Material	15
4.1.1 Dependent variable	15
4.1.2 Independent variables	16
4.1.3 Control variables	18
4.2 Method	20
5. Results.....	22
5.1 Descriptive statistics	22
5.2 Multinomial Logistic Regressions	25
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1.....	25
5.2.2 Hypothesis 2.....	30
5.2.3 Hypothesis 3a.....	32
5.2.4 Hypothesis 3b.....	37
5.3 Control variables.....	42
6. Discussion	44
6.1 Realistic group conflict theory and socioeconomic status	44
6.2 The cost-bearing factor and social spending	45
6.3 An interacting effect?.....	47
7. Conclusions.....	49
8. References.....	52
8.1 Literature.....	52
8.2 Datasets	54
Appendix.....	56

Figures

Figure 1. Theoretical Model	11
-----------------------------	----

Graph 1. Social spending	16
Graph 2. Welfare Chauvinism	22
Graph 3. Living on income	23
Graph 4. Social spending, dummy variables	23
Graph 5. Controlled crosstabulations	23
Graph 6. Margins plots over Model 3	33
Graph 7. Margins plots, Model 6	37

Table 1. Multinomial logistic regressions	27
---	----

Figures in appendix

Table A 1. Variable list	56
Table A 2. Mean estimation table	56
Table A 3. Tabulation of Welfare chauvinism	57
Table A 4. Tabulation of Living on Income	58
Table A 5. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when High-spend dummy=0(Other) with Chi ²	58
Table A 6. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when High-spend dummy=1(High) with Chi ²	58
Table A 7. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when Low-spend dummy=0(Others) with Chi ²	59
Table A 8. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when Low-spend dummy=1(Low) with Chi ²	59
Table A 9. Bivariate Models	61
Table A 10. Excluded control variables	63
Table A 11. Interaction Models without % Foreign-born population	65
Table A 12. Margins plot 'Exclusion from welfare', without foreign-born pop	67

1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, populist radical right parties (PRRP) have been on a rapid rise in Europe. Over the past two decades, Europe has seen PRRPs gain enough votes in different countries to serve in national parliaments, be part of minority coalitions, and even be a majority leader (Mudde 2007, p.541; Afonso 2015, p.273-274; Santana et al. 2020, p.289). To explain this phenomenon, researchers have studied the rise of PRRPs from a variety of angles. One well-discussed theory poses that the nativist arguments of PRRPs often resonate well with the most vulnerable in society. It has been reasoned that those who stand to “go without” in terms of employment or social benefits are more likely to vote for a PRRP if the party claims to put natives or citizens’ need above immigrants (Greve 2019). The concept of *material self-interest*, and how it influences the vulnerable in society has thus been theorized as a major contributing factor to why an individual chooses to vote for a PRRP.

However, that social vulnerability would increase the chances of voting for a PRRP is a contested conclusion in the literature. Several researchers have found that rarely is the majority of a PRRP’s voter base working-class citizens or the most vulnerable in society (see Arzheimer 2016; Brady & Finnigan 2016). The point is especially contested in research surrounding welfare chauvinism. The term *welfare chauvinism* is used to describe a common argument of PRRPs, which is that welfare should be restricted on the basis of citizenship or nationality. In literature exploring welfare chauvinistic attitudes, the findings of different authors contradict each other. On the one side, there are findings that show how the most vulnerable in society display more welfare chauvinistic attitudes due to increased competition over social benefits (Mewes & Mau 2012). On the other side, findings show that individuals who are themselves in need of welfare, tend to display more positive attitudes towards welfare programs, including those that include immigrants (Brady & Finnigan 2014, p. 35).

Material self-interest could also be used to explore the welfare chauvinistic attitudes of the higher socioeconomic groups of society. One task of welfare states is to use tax-funded social contributions to alleviate social and financial inequalities in society (Palme 2006). Although varying in size, a part of the revenue that pays for welfare in all countries comes from individual taxes, for example, taxes on income or property. As a result, some individuals end up paying more in contributions than they receive in social benefits, and vice versa. Research has shown that those who feel that they are paying more for welfare than the benefits they are receiving, will be less inclined to support the extension of welfare to individuals whom they may feel have not contributed to the welfare system (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018; Vadlamannati 2020). I call this the ‘cost-bearing factor’. Theoretically, this factor is higher in countries that spend more on welfare (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018, p.298). However, this point is also contested. Researchers have suggested that generally, welfare chauvinistic attitudes are

lower in countries with egalitarian welfare systems as compared to liberal or conservative systems (Van Deer Val et al. 2013).

In this thesis it is posed that it is possible that the reason for the variation in findings in research on socioeconomic status and welfare spending as predictors for welfare chauvinism, might be that the two interact with each other and that one is conditional upon the other. As such, this thesis explores the possibility that the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinistic attitudes may differ depending on levels of welfare spending.

1.2. Aim

The concept of welfare chauvinism is the basis of this paper. The aim is to contribute to the literature by looking at the effect of socioeconomic status and social spending on welfare chauvinism, to offer a plausible explanation for variation in welfare chauvinistic attitudes, but also as to why the results of research on these two predictors vary. However, by looking at variation between countries with low and high social spending, I also offer a plausible reason for PRRPs success in countries that once seemed unlikely to support them: wealthy, high social-spending countries. I thus pose the following research questions:

- How does individuals' socioeconomic status affect welfare chauvinistic attitudes?
- How do European countries' different levels of social spending affect their residents' welfare chauvinistic attitudes?
- To what extent does a European country's social spending affect the relationship between its residents' socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism?

To answer these questions, several hypotheses are constructed based on previous research. Individual data from the eighth round of the European Social Survey (ESS8) from 2016 and country-level data from OECD are used in multinomial logistic regressions to test all hypotheses.

1.3. Structure

The study is structured as follows. The next section contains an extensive examination of previous literature, beginning by explaining the concept of welfare chauvinism, followed by looking at the two factors which may influence material self-interest, socioeconomic status and social spending. Section 3 further explains and specifies my theoretical model and introduces the study's hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the material and method used for the analysis, followed by the results in section 5. Section 6 evaluates the results in relation to the literature and theory presented in sections 2 and 3. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion connecting the results of the study to the research questions

2. Literature review

2. 1. Welfare Chauvinism

Since the 1990's PRRPs across Europe have carried out an anti-immigration rhetoric, citing the threats they perceive that 'outsiders' cause their way of life. In the past two decades, PRRPs have won an increasing number of votes in most European countries (Akbaba 2018, p.205). Initially, researchers categorized the economic policies of these parties as overall neo-liberal (Ennsner-Jedenasik 2014, p.295). However, upon further investigation, many researchers contested this view; among these is Cas Mudde, who in his book *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* claims that the argument came from the fact that the European right-wing populist parties used neo-liberal rhetoric in their youth, but that these were not backed up by neo-liberalism in the party-programs (Mudde 2007, p.19). He also claims that since the 1980s, several right-wing populist parties have had more welfare-friendly attitudes. However, as is common for right-wing populist parties, these attitudes come with a restriction of nationality. Only citizens or natives of the PRRP's own country should be privy to the welfare of their respective country (Mudde 2007, p.121-122).

This nativist conception of the welfare state is sometimes known as welfare chauvinism, a term first coined by Jørgen Gol Andersen and Tor Bjørklund in a discussion of right-wing populist parties progress in Denmark and Norway. It was then used to describe the common arguments of having to prioritize the native old or sick, which are often emphasized by these parties. The authors claimed that PRRPs do not propagate for reduced welfare, but that the access to this welfare is conditional on whether the recipient is perceived as being part of the native population (Andersen & Bjørklund 1990, p.211-213).

However, welfare chauvinism does not necessarily mean the total exclusion of immigrants from welfare. Instead, welfare chauvinism could be considered as either nativist or nationalistic. Nativism describes the desire to promote the wants and need of the native above those of immigrants. In politics, nativist attitudes tend to inspire policy suggestions that are restrictive or discriminating towards immigrants. Although it is common for it to be so, nativism does not have to be ethnocentric. However, it does require a perception of a firm in-group with a hard line towards the out-groups. It might be based on history, religion, ethnicity or race (Ridel 2020, p.19-20). Nationalism instead implies loyalty to the nation. Nationalists celebrate the uniqueness of their nation and see it as something that needs protection from outside influences (Tamir 2019, p.422). Although this sounds similar to nativism, nationalism does not have to imply such a hard line between the in- and out-group. In the literature, nationalism has often been divided into civic and ethnic variants. Ethnic nationalism refers to the belief that the state the nationalist wants to protect is made from ethnic, historic or cultural ties. Civic nationalism refers instead to a belief that the national state is made up of a political system,

values or ideology that require protection from influences outside the nation (Tamir 2019, p.425-426). This division of nationalism has been widely criticized as it originally was meant to categorize nationalism of whole countries. However, for this paper, it is a valid distinction to make as it might explain different types of welfare chauvinistic attitudes on individual levels. Nativism, then, which resonates with ethnic nationalism, represents a form of welfare chauvinism that is exclusionary towards immigrants in absolution; welfare should never be granted to immigrants on the same conditions as to natives. Welfare chauvinism could instead resonate with civic nationalism, where an individual might feel that an immigrant's access to welfare should be conditional upon the immigrant's ability to adapt and adjust to the system of the receiving country. Thus, once a part of said system, they might be counted into the 'in-group' and allowed access to welfare.

Behind welfare chauvinism's condition of national belonging, whether nativist or nationalistic, is the perception of deservedness; who deserves access to welfare? In a study from 2006, Wim van Oorschot finds that support for different social programs is based on individual perceptions of how deserving the person benefiting from the program is of assistance. He finds that across the European countries in his study, elderly people are perceived as the most deserving, closely followed by sick and disabled persons, then unemployed, and lastly immigrants (Van Oorschot 2006, p.37). This idea of deservedness translates into variation in support for welfare, and David Brady and Ryan Finnigan find that if a program is perceived to be skewedly – or only – beneficial for immigrants, it less likely to gain high support by the majority (Brady & Finnigan 2014, p.23).

Thus, the perception of deservedness linked with the idea of restricting immigrants' access to welfare is the combination that is the base of welfare chauvinism as a concept. Ever since Andersen and Bjørklund first coined the expression, researchers have attempted to explain the variation between individuals in welfare chauvinistic attitudes, and this thesis attempts to add to that discussion. The following two parts will look at two plausible explanations derived from the idea of material self-interest.

2. 2. Material self-interest

Material self-interest refers to the desire to protect one's current or future material possessions from something that is perceived to be depleting them or to be a threat to them. The following section assesses two types of material self-interest found in the literature, the effect of socioeconomic status and the cost-bearing factor.

2.2.1. Socioeconomic status

When it comes to the concept of socioeconomic status being a factor which influences whether or not a person will show welfare chauvinistic tendencies, there are two lines of opposing arguments. The first

line of argument considers if the impact of immigration will cause those with lower income to show higher levels of welfare chauvinism, as benefits become more competitive (Greve 2019, p.47). Jan Mewes and Steffen Mau argue that a majority of immigrants to European countries usually become a part of the same socioeconomic group as the receiving country's working class. As such, immigrants and people of lower socioeconomic status may come to compete for the same jobs. It is also a possibility that an influx of immigrants allows employers to offer lower wages, as there is higher competition for the jobs. Therefore, natives or nationals of lower socioeconomic status may be less supportive of immigration overall (Mewes & Mau 2012, p.122). However, since immigrants tend to join the group with lower socioeconomic status, there is also a risk that immigrants may be in greater need of welfare than the general population. Native or nationals with lower socioeconomic status may therefore perceive immigration as a threat to their chances of receiving welfare benefits. Either because those benefits now have to cover more people, or because of a fear of reduced support for welfare as costs become higher for the general population. Therefore, Mewes and Mau argue that persons of lower socioeconomic status may be reluctant to extend welfare to immigrants, and thus be more likely to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes (Mewes & Mau 2012, p.123)

In contrast, the second line of argument states that those in need of welfare will be more likely to support welfare overall, regardless of whether or not that welfare is beneficial for immigrants. Therefore, those of lower income or socioeconomic status will show lower levels of welfare chauvinism (Breznau & Eger 2016, Brady & Finnigan 2014). In Ursula Dallinger's article, "Public support for redistribution: what explains cross-national differences?" (2010), she studies the overall support for redistribution through social programs. Although her study is not about welfare chauvinism, she acknowledges a version of both arguments, stating that an economic downturn can lessen overall support for immigration due to a decline in real wages, and thus a lack of support of taxes. However, she argues that these types of attitudes are only likely for those who have some sort of financial and job security. Conversely, for those without such security, an economic downturn combined with an economically vulnerable position could result in increased support for welfare programs (Dallinger 2010, p.338). Examining the possibility of both arguments on how socioeconomic status influences support for welfare, she finds that generally, economic upturns and higher per capita GDP lessen support for redistribution through the welfare state (Dallinger 2010, p.340-342). Thus, Dallinger finds economic vulnerability to be a predictor for higher welfare support.

In a study on immigration's effect on welfare support through the theory of group boundaries, Nate Breznau and Maureen A Eger take Dallinger's result into account but mainly find support for the second line of argument. In their paper, they divide group boundaries into three categories based on who is considered to be "in" a group, and who is considered to be "out." What the authors call the *exclusive* category follows the idea of ethnic citizenship or nativism; the "in-group"

consists of solely native-born individuals, and this group is likely to be less supportive of the welfare state as the number of foreign-born in their country increases. The *conditionally inclusive* category focuses more on the foreign-born's ability to adapt and assimilate into their "new" country and thus resonates with the idea of civic nationalism. The "in-group" of this category depends on the perceived deservedness of the foreign-born. The *inclusive* category already looks upon immigrants as part of the "in-group" and their views on welfare will therefore not be altered by an increase of immigrants (Breznau & Eger 2016, pp 196-197). The authors theorize that support for welfare will be lower if offered to immigrants as well as natives, in individuals with *exclusive* and *conditionally inclusive* group boundaries when compared to those of *inclusive* group boundaries (Breznau & Eger 2016, p. 196-197). They find, however, that individual material security is an important factor. Less access for the individual to material security results in increased social risk, and thus higher support for the welfare state, while greater access for the individual to material means causes a feeling of having more to lose in a high distribution system (Breznau & Eger 2016 p.197). They find that in groups that generally display *exclusive* group boundaries, the negative effect of immigration on support for welfare might lessen for those who are in a socioeconomically vulnerable situation. However, for those with a higher socioeconomic position in the same category, the negative effect of immigration on support for welfare might be stronger (Breznau & Eger 2016 p.198, 208). In effect, what they are arguing is that even those who might vote for PRRPs due to being generally anti-immigration might be willing to extend social contributions to immigrants if they themselves are dependent on welfare.

Similar to Breznau and Eger's results, Brady and Finnigan actively argue against the first line of argument on how socioeconomic status' affects welfare chauvinistic attitudes, which states that increased immigration would lessen the support for welfare, in the areas where immigration would lead to a higher competition for social benefits. In their study, they find that welfare support is actually the highest for programs that would theoretically be more competitive due to increased immigration, as these are often those that are also necessary for the socioeconomically vulnerable natives (Brady & Finnigan 2014, p.34). In what they call the "competition-hypothesis," they claim that within areas of welfare that might become more competitive with a large influx of migrants, e.g., unemployment benefits, increased immigration is linked to increased support for social programs. As welfare as a resource gets scarcer, the need for it causes more individuals to support government funding of said resource (Brady & Finnigan 2014, p. 35).

The literature discussed above shows that there has been research that has found support for both tracks of the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism. However, as far as I have been able to find, there has been a lack of research explaining why these results differ. In this study, I pose that it is likely that the reason for these differentiating results is due some other factor which may interact with socioeconomic status, and therefore explain the results of the opposing lines of argument.

2.2.2. Social spending

Another factor which may have an influence on material self-interest is social spending. Research has suggested that different types of welfare states have varying influence on the support for welfare (Larsen 2006, Van der Waal et al. 2013). Welfare states are complex entities, part of the economic systems of modern democratic capitalist systems (Garland 2014, p.329). As such, the concepts of the welfare state can be difficult to define. What once started as state-funded poor-relief during the industrialization era (Freedman 2006, p.31) has evolved in varied ways over time. On the most basic level, the welfare state could be defined as having the purpose of securing at least a bottom-line welfare for its citizens (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.19). However, some scholars have argued that this definition is much too narrow to capture the complexity of the modern welfare state. In 1990, Gøsta Esping-Andersen published his well-renowned book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, in which he created a typology for the variation of western welfare states based on the concepts of de-commodification and stratification. De-commodification refers to the systems used by the welfare state to secure a livelihood for citizens who cannot work, such as sick leave, unemployment contributions or parental leave (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.22-23). As such, de-commodification aims at making the individual less of a commodity, less dependent on the fluctuations of the labor market. Stratification refers to the welfare policies that a state chooses to pursue and how they order social relations, that is social equality or inequality (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.24). Esping-Andersen identified three types of welfare states: 1. The liberal welfare state, characterized by means-tested social grants, given only to those most in need of them and otherwise private social insurance is encouraged. The liberal welfare system, Esping-Anderson argued, resulted in low levels of de-commodification, where individuals are dependent on the labor market to survive. 2. The conservative/corporatist welfare state, which is characterized by generous, but conditional, social contributions. With social insurance often tied to employment, and emphasizing the male breadwinner model, Esping-Andersen argued that it did little to enhance de-commodification or minimize social stratification, as welfare in these countries highly depends on employment (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.27). 3. The social democratic state, characterized by universalism with high levels of de-commodification and low levels of social stratification reached by social spending throughout society, such as healthcare, education, elderly care, and childcare (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.27). Based on this categorization, Larsen (2006) found that the social democratic regime has proven best at minimizing social inequality, which in turn has raised public support for the regime (Larsen 2006).

Based on Esping-Andersen's typology and Larsen's finding, increasing success for right-wing populist parties and welfare chauvinist attitudes in the northern, social democratic, European states might seem counter-intuitive. These countries that usually have large support for a universal welfare state might be assumed to be likely to present more solidarity towards immigrants when it comes to

access to the welfare state (Van der Waal et al. 2013, p.176). Indeed, research has found that when following Gøsta Esping-Andersen's welfare regime categorization (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.26-28), egalitarian (social democratic) countries generally held lower welfare chauvinistic attitudes than conservative and liberal regimes (Van der Waal et al. 2013, p.176). However, increasing support for right-wing populist parties promoting welfare chauvinistic arguments can be observed in both the Nordic European states as well as other states with fairly generous welfare programs (Keskinen 2016, Norocel 2016). And in contradiction to results finding that welfare chauvinism attitudes are less common in egalitarian countries, Krishna C Vadlamannati finds instead that countries with liberal welfare states actually have less welfare chauvinistic attitudes than egalitarian ones (Vadlamannati 2020).

According to several researchers (see Breznau & Eger 2016, Brady & Finnigan 2014, van Oorschot 2006), welfare chauvinism is, as mentioned above, based on the perception of deservedness. Who is deserving of access to different welfare programs? Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik suggests and finds support for the deservedness-factor to be largest in countries that spend more on social programs (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018). Similar to the way that Brady and Finnigan (2014) argue that welfare support will be the lowest for social programs that are perceived to be beneficial for immigrants only, Ennser-Jedenastik argues that in countries where social spending is higher, the chance of individuals feeling that they are paying for welfare that does not benefit them is higher than in countries that spend less. Specifically, what he observes is that for universal and means-tested systems the probability of individuals feeling that they are bearing the cost while immigrants benefit, is higher than for insurance-based systems. He argues that the reason for this is that in insurance-based systems individuals pay private companies rather than the state for their welfare insurance. As such, it is less likely that individuals living in countries with such systems will feel that immigrants benefit from welfare that they have paid for in terms of taxes, than it is for individuals living in countries with universal or means-tested systems (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018, p.298, 307-309). Vadlamannati argues that there is an assumption among voters for PRRPs, asserting that immigrants, specifically refugees, seek out states with a more generous social spending and that the assumption is that refugees are unskilled and will become a liability to the welfare state. Vadlamannati states that if costs of immigration are higher than economic gains, natives might feel that immigrants (or in her paper, refugees) take an unfairly high share of welfare benefits. This effect will be greater in high spending countries because the perceived economic loss will more easily seem higher than the perceived economic gains in these countries (Vadlamannati 2020, p.1601). Her paper, like many others, focuses on the idea that a sudden increase in immigration would lead to higher welfare chauvinism in a country but finds that this is conditional upon welfare spending and that these attitudes would increase the most in high social-expenditure countries. This idea of welfare chauvinistic attitudes being linked to how much an

individual perceives that they pay for welfare contra how much they receive in benefits; I call the *cost bearing factor*.

Similar to the literature on socioeconomic status, the results of research on social spending as a predictor for welfare chauvinism is divided. Some research has found that individuals living in high spending, egalitarian systems are less likely than others to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes (Van der Waal et al 2013), Others have found that egalitarian systems are instead the most likely to foster welfare chauvinism (Enns-Jedenastik 2018). Other still find that welfare chauvinism is the least likely in liberal systems with low social spending (Vadlamannati 2020). However, few studies have offered an explanation for these varying results. In the following section, I look at socioeconomic status and social spending as predictors for welfare chauvinism from a theoretical perspective and suggest that the reason for the varying results for both factors, may be that they actually interact with each other.

3. Theory

3.1 Realistic group conflict theory

As stated, research on socioeconomic status as a predictor for welfare chauvinism is divided. One popular theory to explain the first line of argument on the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism, stating that low socioeconomic status will result in welfare chauvinistic attitudes, has been *realistic resource conflict theory* (Mewes & Mau 2012, p.123). The original strand of the theory, introduced by Muzafer Sherif, suggests that competition for finite resources lead to conflict between groups with a vested interest in said resources, if one group gaining the resource results in the other group losing out on the same resource (Scofield 2010; Jackson 1993, p.398). To assess deservedness or right to the resource in question, individuals tend to divide themselves and others into an *in-group* and an *out-group* (Jackson 1993, p.397). For example, if immigrants tend to end up working in low-skilled jobs in the receiving country, this will increase the competition for low-skilled jobs, causing native low-skilled workers to come in conflict with immigrants due to scarcity of low-skilled jobs as a resource. This type of reasoning is often used to explain the typical PRRP-voter; “young, low-educated male who is either unemployed or a manual laborer” (Shehaj et al. 2019 p.3). When applied to welfare, realistic group conflict theory suggests that the in-group (natives or citizens) most in need of welfare, e.g., poor, unemployed or otherwise dependent on social benefits, will perceive the presence of immigrants as hostile if this out-group requires, or appear to require, welfare assistance. Thus, realistic group conflict theory offers an explanation for the first line of argument on how low socioeconomic status’ affects welfare chauvinism, based on an increased competition of resources.

However, through controlled experiments, Sherif also found that when two groups work together to achieve a common goal or increase the number of resources, this has the potential to reduce inter-group conflict and instead foster positive relations and support between two groups (Jackson 1993, p.398). Thus, realistic group conflict theory also offers a possible explanation for the second line of argument on socioeconomic status as a predictor for welfare chauvinism, stating that economically vulnerable individuals are more likely to support extending public welfare to immigrants. Looking at the differentiating results of the research on socioeconomic status as a predictor for welfare chauvinism through realistic group conflict theory, it could be argued that it is possible that the most vulnerable from the native ‘in-group’ in society see a need to work with the vulnerable from other groups to increase the overall number of resources available to all of them. It is, of course, also possible that interaction between these two groups increases due to their socioeconomic status, meaning that they might work more closely in low-skilled, low paying jobs or reside in low-income areas, etc. Thus, inter-group goals and contact are likely to result in lower welfare chauvinistic attitudes for persons of lower socioeconomic status.

While Sherif's original theory may be used to reason on why socioeconomically vulnerable persons may, or may not, have welfare chauvinistic attitudes, it does not do as well to explain the welfare chauvinistic attitudes of persons with higher socioeconomic status. In 1983, Lawrence Bobo expanded on the theory to focus on perceived threats to the in-group, as well as actual threats to a person's own resources. When looking at conflicts about ethnic equality and integration between white and black persons in the United States of America, Bobo noticed that in addition to conflict arising from individuals feeling that resources they need are becoming scarcer due to increased competition, individuals might also become hostile towards the out-group if they feel that the societal position of the in-group is being threatened. He argued that there need not be an actual threat towards an individual's personal resources, for said individual to perceive a threat towards members of the in-group, and thus threat towards the overall position of the in-group in society (Bobo 1983). When taking into account Bobo's expansion of the theory to include perceived threats, it is possible that the lack of inter-group goals and contact between immigrants and natives or citizens of high socioeconomic status result in the opposite effect of what Bobo found that inter-group contact have between individuals with low socioeconomic status and immigrants. Bobo argued that it is not only the conflict over material goods but also perceived threats to social status, which might cause inter-group conflicts between an in-group and an out-group. Without the mitigating effect of inter-group relations, persons of higher socioeconomic status might only perceive a threat to the native group's status in society. It is then possible that the lack of inter-group relations result in persons of higher socioeconomic status being more likely to perceive immigration as a threat, and therefore exhibit more welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Based on this, I expect that the most socioeconomically vulnerable in society will have less welfare chauvinistic attitudes than those of higher socioeconomic status.

- **Hypothesis 1:** Individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than are individuals with lower socioeconomic status.


3.2 The conditional factor

The literature review on social spending as a predictor for welfare chauvinism, introduced the idea of the *cost bearing factor*. Research has found that in countries that spend more on welfare, those who feel that they might be paying more for welfare than they receive in benefits, will be more likely to favor restrictions on said welfare. The effect of this factor should increase as social spending does.

- **Hypothesis 2:** Individuals residing in countries with high social spending are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than are individuals residing in countries with low social spending.

However, I acknowledge that for both hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2, there was research that argued the opposite relationships of what the hypotheses of this thesis suggest. Hypothesis 2 is also contradictory to realistic group conflict theory. Contrary to what has been theorized in Hypothesis 2, if one were to attempt to explain the link between welfare spending and welfare chauvinism based on realistic group conflict theory, the implication would theoretically be that high spending countries would display less welfare chauvinistic attitudes than lower spending countries. This is due to the fact that welfare as a resource should exist to a higher degree in high spending countries, and thus create less competition for it. Therefore, the theory alone cannot explain the link between high social spending and welfare chauvinism.

Figure 1. Theoretical Model



Based on the varying results of the research on socioeconomic status and social spending, it is reasonable to assume that the link between both predictors and welfare chauvinism is affected by some other factor. I suggest that these two factors are actually interlinked. That is, the effect of an individual's socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinistic attitudes will be conditional on the welfare spending of their country's government. This relationship is depicted in Figure 1. Based on realistic group conflict theory, I suggest that in countries with high social spending it is less likely that individuals with lower socioeconomic status will display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than it is for individuals with lower socioeconomic status residing in countries with low social spending. This is due to welfare as a resource being in less competition in high spending countries. In contrast, in countries with low social spending, individuals with lower socioeconomic status will show higher levels of welfare chauvinism than individuals with higher socioeconomic status, due to increased competition for resources (social benefits), as a result of immigration.

However, to explain the results of some researchers which state that countries with high social spending display more welfare chauvinistic attitudes overall (e.g. Vadlamannati 2020), one should also take the cost-bearing factor into account. The reasoning behind the cost bearing-factor is that individuals who feel like they pay more than they receive for welfare, are less likely to want to expand welfare programs to cover immigrants. Following the reasoning of this factor, I theorize that in

high spending countries, it is more likely that individuals of higher socioeconomic status, who do not feel like they benefit from welfare, will resent paying for the welfare of immigrants. Therefore, individuals of high socioeconomic status living in countries with high social spending will be more likely to possess welfare chauvinistic attitudes than those of lower socioeconomic status within their country. In countries with low social spending, this factor will theoretically be non-existent, or at least have less of an effect, as individuals with higher socioeconomic status will pay less for welfare, than they would in a country with high social spending. As such, individuals with high socioeconomic status, living in a country with low social spending, who neither feel like they are paying, nor competing, for welfare will display lower levels of welfare chauvinism than will individuals who do feel like they have to compete for welfare, i.e., those of lower socioeconomic status.

Thus, I suggest the possibility that the cost-bearing factor, and thus levels of social spending, and socioeconomic status interact with each other. In countries with high social spending there will be an abundance of welfare as a resource. Following realistic resource conflict theory, a plenty of resources should lead to less conflict between groups of lower socioeconomic status and immigrants. Therefore, I suggest that individuals with low socioeconomic status will not be more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with higher socioeconomic status. However, as welfare is more extensive, the cost for it increases, increasing the effect of the cost-bearing factor. Because of this, I suggest that countries with high social spending, individuals with higher socioeconomic status will be more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than will those of lower socioeconomic status.

- **Hypothesis 3a:** Whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, is conditional on the social spending of their country: in countries with high social spending individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

I suggest the opposite to be likely in countries with low social spending. Welfare as a resource will be scarcer, thus creating a larger conflict between individuals for these resources. The cost-bearing factor will be less in these countries as individuals do not pay as much for welfare. Thus, in countries with low social spending, individuals of lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, as they need to compete for resources, than individuals of high socioeconomic status are.

- **Hypothesis 3b:** Whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, is

conditional on the social spending of their country: in countries with low social spending individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

4. Material and Method

4.1 Material

To test the hypotheses listed in section 3, this study uses the eighth round of the European Social Survey (ESS8) from 2016 to gauge individual attitudes, and OECD data to measure country-level indicators (European Social Survey 2016). To account for lagged effects, the variables constructed by OECD data uses values from 2015.

Round 8 of ESS8 was conducted in 23 countries during 2016 and early 2017. Out of these 23 countries, Russia has been dropped from this study due to lack of data on country-level variables in the OECD dataset, as well as Israel since it is not technically a European country. That leaves respondents from Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In total, that produces an N=39,000. After all variables have been coded to exclude missing or otherwise disruptive values, N for all statistic Modelling =34,127.¹

4.1.1 Dependent variable

The dependent variable is created by ESS8 survey question E15 “When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services?”, with response options; 1= “Immediately on arrival”, 2= “After a year, whether or not have worked”, 3= After worked and paid taxes at least one year”, 4= “Once they become a citizen”, and 5= “They should never get the same rights”. The use of the same question from an earlier round of the European Social Survey (Round 4, 2008), as a way to measure welfare chauvinistic attitudes, is well established in the literature (Mewes & Mau 2012; Reeskens & Van Oorschot 2012; Van Der Waal 2013). Van Der Waal et al. even proclaim it to be the “only internationally comparative dataset containing a measure of welfare chauvinism”, of which they know (Van Der Waal et al. 2013, p169). However, different studies have disagreed on how to code the responses. Van Der Waal et al. chose to eliminate response 4 altogether since it pertains to the legal status of immigrants, which they argue to be a separate issue (Van Der Waal et al. 2013, p.172). However, as noted by Mewes and Mau, the response option does gauge a version of welfare chauvinism (Mewes & Mau 2012, p.131) and excluding it could distort the proportions of the replies, thus increase the risk of false inferences. Instead, this study follows the coding scheme of ESS8 question E15 applied by Reeskens and Van Oorschot, and divide the responses based on inclusion, conditional inclusion and exclusionary attitudes. They combine responses 1 and 2, as the second response ‘After a year, whether or not have worked’ does not require the immigrant to fulfil a specific condition. Thus, the dependent variable of this study is a categorical variable where the outcomes are coded 1-2= ‘Unconditional Access’, 3= ‘Conditional upon

¹ Full ESS8 Survey questions, as well as mean estimations for all variables, can be found in appendix.

reciprocity', 4= 'Conditional upon Citizenship' and 5= 'Exclusion from welfare.' (Reeskens & Van Oorschot 2012, p.125).

4.1.2 Independent variables

In order to test hypothesis 1, by measuring the effect socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinistic attitudes, the first independent variable is constructed from ESS8 question F21. The question asks the respondent how they perceive it is to be living on their current household income. The answers are coded so that 1= 'Finding it very difficult to live on current income', 2= 'Finding it difficult to live on current income', 3= 'Coping on current income' and 4= 'Living comfortably on present income.' Using this specific variable to gauge socioeconomic status ensures two things: First, as it measures the perception of the adequacy of the household's income rather than real values, it is easy to compare respondents across countries without having to take into consideration the overall economic situations of individual countries. Second, looking at household income rather than individual income is a more accurate way of gauging the socioeconomic status of the respondent. While the respondent might have reasoned that they might find it difficult to live on their income alone, the combined income of the household might allow for it to be easier to cope or even live comfortably. Vice versa is, of course, true as well, an individual with an income that would be high enough for individual needs might find that the lack of income, or low income, from other members of the household results in them finding it difficult to live on the combined household income.


The second independent variable, which tests hypothesis 2, is constructed by OECD data on social spending (OECD Social Spending 2015)². An active choice was made to not use any types of welfare-state typologies. It could be argued, as history has shown, that the welfare state is not a static entity, it evolves and changes over time, and a lot has happened in the past thirty years. Retrenchment of the welfare state has been evident in all European states to a varying degree since the 1980s. (Bonoli & Palier 2000). The variation of previous research attempting to use Esping-Andersen's typology might vary simply because the welfare states have changed, and countries that once fit in one typology no longer do. Some authors have also suggested that Esping-Andersen's typologies were too generalizing (Sümer 2009, p.22), and others have added new categories to account for countries they felt did not fit with the original model (Cerami et al. 2008, Ferrera 1996). Using this typology might therefore not be completely reliable. Therefore, I suggest that social spending is a better way of gauging the general quantity of social benefits as a resource available to citizens. It is also a better measure for the cost-

² OECD defines social expenditure as "cash benefits, direct in-kind provisions of goods and services and tax breaks with social purposes. To be considered 'social', programs have to involve either redistribution of resources across households or compulsory participation." The data only includes public spending, where the financial flows are controlled by the government (OECD Social Spending 2015).

bearing factor as a higher percentage of GDP being spent on welfare should correlate with individuals feeling that more of the personal income they spend on taxes are being spent on social benefits.

Graph 1 depicts the percent of GDP that the countries of this study spend on social protection. To facilitate easier interpretation of the results, the variable is grouped after its 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, creating 4 categories coded 1-4: “Low” =1, “Medium Low” =2, “Medium High” =3 and “High” =4. However, since the last two hypotheses stated in section 3 specify high spending, contra low spending countries, the variable is re-coded into 2 dummy variables. The first is divided by the 25th percentile, where all values up to the 25 percentile are coded 1, and all others = 0. The first dummy variable thus measures low spending countries. The second variable is coded so that all values from the 75 percentile and up are coded 1, and all below are coded 0. The second dummy variable thus measures high spending countries. The division of the 25 and 75 percentiles are visualized in graph 1 by two vertical lines. The first puts Ireland, Iceland, Lithuania, Switzerland, Estonia and the Netherlands in the dummy for low social spending. The second line separates Italy, Belgium, Finland and France as the countries that make up the dummy for high social spending.

Graph 1. Social spending



Source: OECD 2015

The OECD data is not a perfect indicator of welfare spending. It does not account for private market solutions or charity organizations. However, it does account for all government-funded social spending such as cash benefits or tax breaks for social purposes. For this study, the data is sufficient, as the dependent variable gauges when immigrants should have the *right* to the same type of welfare as natives, which indicates that the measure does not ask about private solutions or charity. Instead, the focus is on government funded programs and benefits.

The independent variables are then combined into two interaction variables. The first interaction combines the first independent variable, measuring how well the individual perceives that

they can live on the current household income, with the dummy variable measuring high social spending. The first interaction variable is used to test hypothesis 3a. The second interaction combines the first independent variable with the second dummy variable measuring low social spending and is used to test hypothesis 3b.

4.1.3 Control variables

The variables introduced in this section are meant to either control for competing theories or factors that have been established in the literature to influence welfare chauvinism or are known for affecting individual attitudes.

First, the major competing theory to explain welfare chauvinistic attitudes relates to increased immigration (Van Der Waal et al. 2013, p.171). In a well-cited work by Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, the authors suggest that the major reason for less support for state-supplied welfare in the United States of America compared to Europe is due to differences in cultural and ethnic homogeneity, where Europe generally has more homogeneity than the US. The result of their study show that increased immigration leads to less support for public welfare, due to increased ethnic and cultural heterogeneity which results in less solidarity between groups in society (Alesina & Glaeser 2004). However, several studies have since contested these results, finding no connection, or that the connection between increased immigration and reduced welfare-support is conditional upon some other factor (see Breznau & Eger 2016; Brady & Finnigan 2014; Soroka et al. 2015; Vadlamannati 2020). However, since it is a contested theory, it is important to include a variable to control for the possibility that cultural homogeneity has an effect on an individual's welfare chauvinistic attitudes. For this purpose, a variable is created from OECD data on the percentage of foreign-born of the total population of a country (OECD Foreign-born population 2015). The variable reports a specific value for each country in the study. As the theory suggests that ethnic and cultural heterogeneity decreases the support for welfare, I expect that increases in the percentage of foreign-born population would increase the likelihood for welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

Another competing possibility is that anti-immigration attitudes in general will increase welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Individuals who are against immigration overall, may see welfare as a resource that should be kept for the native or the citizen. Research has shown that there are a few factors which tend to influence anti-immigration attitudes, which in turn then may have an impact on welfare chauvinistic attitudes. First, one common theory to explain overall attitudes toward immigrants is based on an individual's perception of them posing a cultural threat (Lucassen & Lubbers 2012, p.549). Therefore, a control variable is created from ESS8 question B42: "... would you say that [country]'s culture is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? The variable is coded 0-10, where 0= "Cultural Life Enriched" and 10= "Cultural Life Undermined". I

expect that increased values of this variable would increase the likelihood of welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

Second, there is a well-documented gender gap in the support for PRRP and anti-immigration attitudes, where women tend to be overall less hostile towards immigrants and less likely to vote for PRRP (see Spierings & Zaslove 2015; Immerzeel et al. 2015; Akkerman 2015). Therefore, a dummy variable measuring gender is created, coded 0= “Female”, 1= “Male”. I expect men to be more likely to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes than women.

Education is also a common control variable in studies of anti-immigration attitudes. Education has been found to influence perceptions of immigrants and ethnic minorities, where higher levels of education result in more acceptance of immigrants (Van Der Waal 2013, p.172). The ESS8 dataset includes an ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) coded variable to measure the highest level of obtained education across countries. The values are coded as 1= “less than lower secondary”, 2= “lower-tier upper secondary”, 3= “upper tier upper secondary”, 4= “advanced vocational, su-degree”, 5= “lower tertiary, BA level”, 6= “higher tertiary education, >= MA level”. The variable is treated as an interval variable in the analysis. I expect higher education to decrease the likelihood of welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

A third common indicator for high anti-immigration attitudes is the area of residence of an individual, where it is suggested anti-immigration attitudes that lead to support for PRRPs tend to be more common in rural areas than urban areas (Mamonora & Franquesa 2019, p.711; Förtner et al 2020, p.3-4). As it is possible that these anti-immigration attitudes and support for PRRP translate into higher welfare chauvinistic attitudes, a control variable measuring location within a country is included. A dummy variable measuring rural residency is created from ESS8 question F14: “Which phrase best describes the area where you live”, with the responses 1= “A big city”, 2= “The suburbs or the outskirts of a big city”, 3= “A town or small city”, 4= “A country village”, 5= “A farm or a home in the countryside”. 1-3 are coded 0= “Urban” and 4-5 are coded 1= “Rural”. I expect that living in a rural area will increase the likelihood of welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

Finally, a control variable measuring age was included. Some researchers have found that anti-immigration attitudes increase with age (Chandler & Tsai 2001, p.180). Others have found that age decreases the support for egalitarian welfare (van Oorschot 2012, p.34). Based on this, I expect that increase in age would increase welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Thus, a variable measuring age from 18-100 is included.

4.2 Method

The choice of method for this study centers entirely around the dependent variable. As mentioned, different studies have pointed at ESS8 being the best or only dataset that contains a variable that accurately measures welfare chauvinism. However, as mentioned in the discussion above on the dependent variable, researchers have used different methods to analyze this categorical variable. The two options are ordered and multinomial logistic regression (Mewes & Mau 2012, Van Der Waal 2013, Reeskens & Van Oorschot 2012). The decision for choosing one method over the other has been based on the inclusion or exclusion of the dependent variable response stating that immigrants should only be granted the same access to welfare once they become a citizen.

One could make the case that even with this response included, the dependent variable follows an order based on how difficult it should be for an immigrant to obtain the same rights to welfare. It would then be that ‘Unconditional access’ = not difficult, ‘Conditional upon reciprocity’ = somewhat difficult, ‘Conditional upon citizenship’ = very difficult, and ‘Exclusion from welfare’ = impossible. However, the argument for omitting ‘Conditional upon citizenship’ in order to treat the variable as ordered is based on the idea that the word ‘citizenship’ might have other implications. While Van Der Waal et al. claims that it has legal implications that “... addresses the legal status of immigrants – citizens versus non-citizens – which is substantially different” (Van der Waal 2013, p.172), I argue that this response, along with ‘exclusion from welfare’ might represent two extreme versions of two types of welfare chauvinism: nativist or (civic) nationalist. The exclusive response should be interpreted as a nativist attitude, where the needs of the native should always be protected over those of the immigrant. The ‘conditional upon citizenship’ response could represent a civic nationalistic attitude, meaning that once an immigrant is a legal part of the receiving country, it is implied that said immigrant has adjusted and adapted to the country’s rules, regulations and system. Only then, when they have assimilated to their new society, are they considered as being deserving of the same right to welfare as the native.

Thus, as I choose to include the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ response, I cannot assume the dependent variable to be ordered, and therefore must treat it as nominal. As such, I must use a type of logistic regression, and since this study analyses all values of the dependent variable, simple logistic regression that treats binary dependent variables was excluded. As I have established that I could not treat the dependent as ordered, that leaves multinomial regression as the appropriate way to analyze the dependent variable.

Logistic regression aims at determining how well an independent variable, or variables, predict the odds of an event occurring, the odds of a specific outcome. It uses logged odds to model a linear function of the independent variables in a regression (Pollock & Edwards 2020, p.282). Simply


put, the logistic regression coefficient produces a value that predicts a change in the logged odds of the occurrence measured by the dependent variable, per one-unit increase in an independent variable. From this, we can calculate the probability of changed values of the independent variable affecting the outcome of the dependent variable (Pollock & Edwards 2020 p.287-288). Multinomial regression is a simple extension of binary logistic regression, which allows for more than two categories, or outcomes, of the dependent variable. The method predicts a categorical outcome based on the value of the independent variable(s). In difference to binary logistic regression, which measures the odds of one of two outcomes, multinomial regression estimates the odds of each specific outcome of the dependent variable, relative to the odds of falling into a baseline outcome. Here, the baseline outcome is 'Unconditional access'. This outcome represents having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes. As the baseline outcome, all coefficients are interpreted as the logged odds of an observation falling into this outcome, compared to the specific outcome measured. The coefficient thus reports how a variable increases or decreases the likelihood of an individual falling into a welfare chauvinistic outcome, relative to the likelihood of falling into the 'unconditional access' outcome (UCLA: Statistical consulting group, 2021).

5. Results

5.1 Descriptive statistics

Before testing the hypothesis, the data was carefully considered.

Graph 2. Welfare Chauvinism




Source: ESS8, Weighted data

As shown by Graph 2 over the dependent variable, measuring welfare chauvinism, a relatively small percentage of respondents feels that immigrants never should be granted the same access to welfare as persons already living in the respondent's country of residence. Only 6.97³ percent falls into this outcome, which could be considered a nativist version of welfare chauvinism. The 'unconditional' outcome is the second least common response at 19.57 percent. This shows that the extreme values are much less common than the conditional categories. The most common outcome is 'Conditional upon reciprocity', with 47.58 percent of the responses. Although this outcome is welfare chauvinistic, reciprocity is the easiest condition to fulfill, and should therefore be considered as the weakest of the welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

Graph 3, over the first independent variable which measures socioeconomic status, show how respondents feel that they are coping on the household income nowadays has low variation. More than 82.8 percent of respondents fall into the two highest categories, 'Coping on current income', and 'Living comfortably', and only 17.18 percent in the lowest two categories, 'Very difficult', 3.55 percent, and 'difficult', 13.63 percent.


³ See appendix for tabulations of dependent and independent variables with row observations and percent.

Graph 3. Living on income



Source: ESS8, Weighted data

Graph 4. Social spending, dummy variables




Source: ESS8

To test hypothesis 2 and 3, social spending was divided into two dummy variables, one measuring the responses of individuals residing in high spending countries compared to all other countries, the other measuring the responses of individuals residing in low spending countries compared to all other countries. Graph 4 shows that a higher percentage of observations resides in low spending countries, with 27.96 percent, as compared to observations residing in high spending countries, 21.19 percent.

Assessing the variation of responses in the dependent and independent variables raised some concerns about running the regression models. The statistical method chosen to test all my hypotheses, combined with the inclusion of an interaction term, might result in some outcomes and categories ending up with very few observations. For example, the likelihood of a person both ending up in the 'exclusive' outcome of the dependent variable, the 'very difficult' outcome of the independent variable, measuring how well the respondent is managing on their current income and resides in a high spending country, seemed low. Graph 6 and 7 show the distribution of 'living on income' on the

different outcomes of ‘welfare chauvinism’ controlled for the dummy for high social spending, and low social spending respectively.

Graph 5. Controlled crosstabulations



Source: ESS8, Weighted data

As shown by the graphs, the ‘very difficult’ value of ‘living on income’ overall generates very few observations and the number of observations is further divided by the outcomes of the dependent variable, and when controlled for social spending. Likewise, the ‘exclusion from welfare’ generally reports the least observations, especially for individuals who are ‘living comfortably’ on current income. Therefore, to make sure that there was an indication of at least some level of relationship between the interaction variable and welfare chauvinism, some controlled cross-tabulations with corresponding Chi-square values are produced to assess the effect of statistical significance at the inclusion of an interaction term (Pollock & Edwards 2020, p.135).⁴ The corresponding Chi-square value for all controlled cross tabulations indicates p-values<.01. These results indicate initial support for the possibility that the relationship between socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism differs depending on a country’s social spending and encourages further testing of the hypotheses.

⁴ Full tables with reported frequencies, percentage and Chi² contributions can be found in the appendix.

5.2 Multinomial Logistic Regressions

5.2.1 Hypothesis 1

In Model 1 and 4 of Table 1, the independent variables are introduced without the control variables, which would account for alternative explanations for the variation in welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Across Model 1 and 4, the variable ‘living on income’ which measures socioeconomic status, reports statistically significant, negative coefficients across all outcomes of the dependent variable. These results indicate that increased socioeconomic status decreases the logged odds of falling into any of the welfare chauvinistic outcomes as compared to the baseline outcome. Thus, when only controlling for social spending, increasing steps in socioeconomic status decrease the likelihood of having either of the welfare chauvinistic attitudes, compared to the likelihood of having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes. These results contradict hypothesis 1, which stated that individuals with higher socioeconomic status would be more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than individuals with lower socioeconomic status. Instead, the results of Model 1 and 4 indicate that individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than are individuals with higher socioeconomic status.

However, once the control variables are introduced, the result of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism varies over the different outcomes of the dependent variable. In Models 2 and 5 the coefficients for socioeconomic status, measured by ‘living on income’ are positive in both of the conditional outcomes of welfare chauvinism. Model 1 and 4 show that increasing steps in ‘living on income’ decrease the logged odds of falling into the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome. Conversely, Model 2 and 5 report coefficients showing increases in the logged odds of falling into either of these outcomes with .053 and .06 respectively, per one-unit increase in ‘living on income’. These results indicate that increasing socioeconomic status increases the likelihood of a respondent falling into ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ compared to the likelihood of falling into ‘Unconditional access’.

The effect of introducing control variables to the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome in Models 2 and 5, is mirrored for the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome. The coefficient in Model 1 and 4 shows a decrease in the logged odds of falling into this outcome compared to the baseline outcome, per one-unit increase in socioeconomic status. In contrast, with the introduction of control variables in Model 2 and 5, the coefficient for ‘living on income’ reports an increase in the logged odds by .066 and .067 respectively, per one-unit increase in socioeconomic status. The results thus show that increasing socioeconomic status increases the likelihood of an individual feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, compared to feeling that immigrants should be granted unconditional access to welfare. They also indicate that the negative effect of socioeconomic

status for the conditional outcomes in Model 1 disappears with the introduction of one or several of the control variables.

For the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome, the coefficient for ‘living on income’ remains negative with the introduction of control variables, albeit with a reduced effect compared to Model 1 and 4: to -.189 in Model 2, and -.191 in Model 5. The results of Model 2 and 5 thus indicate that as socioeconomic status increases, the likelihood of falling into ‘exclusion from welfare’ decreases, as

Table 1. Multinomial logistic regressions

Outcomes of Welfare Chauvinism	Independent variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<u>Unconditional Access</u>	(Baseline outcome)						
<u>Conditional upon Reciprocity</u>	Living on income	-.065** (.028)	.053* (.029)	.036 (.034)	-.061** (.028)	.06** (.029)	.066** (.031)
	High social Spending	-.061 (.046)	-.144*** (.047)	-.317 (.197)			
	Low social spending				-.033 (.046)	.205*** (.058)	.466** (.206)
	% Foreign-born pop.		-.031*** (.003)	-.031*** (.003)		-.035*** (.004)	-.035*** (.004)
	Immigr. Impact culture		.055*** (.01)	.055*** (.01)		.054*** (.009)	.054*** (.009)
	Gender		-.004 (.042)	-.004 (.042)		-.001 (.042)	-.001 (.042)
	Education		-.107*** (.012)	-.107*** (.012)		-.106*** (.012)	-.106*** (.012)
	Living in rural area		.12*** (.044)	.12*** (.044)		.109** (.044)	.109** (.044)
	Age		.007*** (.001)	.007*** (.001)		.007*** (.001)	.007*** (.001)
	Living on income*High soc. spending			.055 (.062)			
	Living on income*Low soc. spending						-.079 (.061)
	Constant	1.126*** (.094)	.958*** (.134)	1.01*** (.144)	1.097*** (.092)	.938*** (.134)	.92*** (.138)
<u>Conditional upon Citizenship</u>	Living on income	-.122*** (.03)	.066** (.032)	.057 (.038)	-.133*** (.03)	.067** (.032)	.054 (.034)
	High soc. Spending	.011 (.05)	-.114** (.051)	-.201 (.214)			

	Low soc. spending				.413*** (.05)	.973*** (.061)	.516** (.232)
	% Foreign-born pop.	-.095*** (.004)	-.095*** (.005)			-.11*** (.005)	-.11*** (.005)
	Immigr. Impact culture	.09*** (.01)	.09*** (.01)			.094*** (.01)	.094*** (.01)
	Gender	.117** (.046)	.116** (.046)			.128*** (.046)	.128*** (.046)
	Education	-.109*** (.013)	-.109*** (.013)			-.11*** (.013)	-.11*** (.013)
	Living in rural area	.239*** (.048)	.239*** (.048)			.214*** (.048)	.212*** (.048)
	Age	.009*** (.001)	.009*** (.001)			.009*** (.001)	.009*** (.001)
	Living on income*High soc. spending		.028 (.067)				
	Living on income*Low soc. spending						.137** (.069)
	Constant	.694*** (.101)	.639*** (.147)	.667*** (.159)	.698*** (.098)	.694*** (.147)	.731*** (.151)
<u>Exclusion from welfare</u>	Living on income	-.602*** (.04)	-.189*** (.045)	-.178*** (.054)	-.616*** (.04)	-.191*** (.045)	-.187*** (.047)
	High soc. Spending	.316*** (.069)	.016 (.073)	.068 (.275)			
	Low soc. spending				-.3*** (.077)	.539*** (.089)	.717** (.29)
	% Foreign-born pop.	-.111*** (.007)	-.111*** (.007)			-.119*** (.007)	-.119*** (.007)
	Immigr. Impact culture	.377*** (.014)	.377*** (.014)			.38*** (.014)	.38*** (.014)
	Gender	-.037 (.068)	-.037 (.068)			-.032 (.068)	-.032 (.068)
	Education	-.32*** (.021)	-.32*** (.021)			-.322*** (.021)	-.323*** (.021)
	Living in rural area	.071 (.07)	.072 (.07)			.063 (.07)	.063 (.07)

Age		.01*** (.002)	.01*** (.002)		.011*** (.002)	.011*** (.002)
Living on income*High soc. spending			-.022 (.092)			
Living on income*Low soc. spending						-.063 (.094)
Constant	.74*** (.124)	-.79*** (.216)	-.815*** (.23)	.907*** (.122)	-.732*** (.215)	-.743*** (.218)
Observations	34127	34127	34127	34127	34127	34127
Pseudo R ²	.007	.048	.048	.008	.051	.052

*Standard errors are in parentheses *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$, Source: ESS8, weighted data*

compared to the likelihood of falling into ‘unconditional access’. Thus, individuals with higher socioeconomic status are less likely to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare, compared to feeling that immigrants should be granted unconditional access to welfare than are individuals of lower socioeconomic status.

While Model 1 and 4 contradict hypothesis 1, the results of Model 2 and 5 give it partial support. The results of the conditional outcomes indicate that persons with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to have a conditional welfare chauvinistic attitude, compared to having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than persons with lower socioeconomic status are. In contrast, individuals with higher socioeconomic status are less likely to have exclusionary welfare chauvinistic attitudes, compared to having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than are individuals with lower socioeconomic status. Thus, only the two conditional outcomes of the dependent variable support Hypothesis 1, while the results of the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome contradict it. As such, Hypothesis 1 cannot be fully accepted in its current state. The results do, however, give support for the assumption that the dependent variable is not ordered. Instead, the results indicate that there seems to be a distinction between the outcomes which need to be explored to explain the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism. This is further deliberated on in the *Discussion* section below.

5.2.2 Hypothesis 2

The results for social spending also vary between the models without control variables and the models with control variables. Models 1 and 4 introduce the dummy variables for high social spending and low social spending, respectively. These are used to test hypothesis 2, which stated that individuals residing in countries with high social spending would be more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than individuals residing in countries with low social spending. The only outcome category with statistically significant coefficient for social spending in both models is ‘exclusion from welfare’. For this outcome, the coefficient for high social spending in Model 1 reported a positive coefficient of .316 and the dummy for low social spending in Model 4 reported a negative coefficient of -.3. These results indicate that while living in a country with high social spending increases the logged odds of falling into ‘exclusion from welfare’ over ‘unconditional access’, living in a country with low social spending decreases the logged odds of this outcome. This lends some support for hypothesis 2. When controlled for socioeconomic status, the results show that individuals living in countries with high social spending are more likely to display exclusive welfare chauvinistic attitudes, rather than no welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than individuals living in countries with low social spending. However, the dummy for low social spending also reports a statistically significant coefficient for ‘conditional upon citizenship’ of .413. This indicates that living in a country with low social spending increases the logged odds of falling into the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome, compared to the ‘unconditional access’ outcome. Thus, in contradiction to hypothesis 2, the results of Model 4 show that it is more likely for individuals living

in countries with low social spending to feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, compared to feeling that immigrants should have unconditional access to welfare. Conversely, the results of model 1 indicate that high social spending does not seem to affect the likelihood of an individual feeling that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, compared to feeling that immigrants should have unconditional access to welfare.

However, once again, the effect of these variables alters once control variables are introduced. This indicates that effect of social spending is affected by one or several of the control variables.⁵ Looking at Model 2 and countries with high social spending, introducing control variables has a remarkable effect. In Model 1, the coefficient for high social spending for the conditional outcomes of the dependent variable lacks statistical significance. When control variables are introduced in Model 2, both coefficients for the conditional outcomes are statistically significant, while the coefficient for 'exclusion from welfare' loses its statistical significance. For the 'conditional upon reciprocity' outcome, the coefficient increases in strength compared to Model 1, from -.061 to -.144 as well as gaining statistical significance at the $p < 0.01$ value. For the 'conditional upon citizenship' outcome, the coefficient for high social spending changes from having no statistical significance in Model 1, to reporting a value of -.144, as well as gaining statistical significance at the $p < 0.05$ value. Thus, when control variables are introduced, living in a country with high social spending decreases the logged odds of a respondent falling into 'conditional upon reciprocity' by -.144, and into 'conditional upon citizenship' with -.114, compared to 'unconditional access'. That is, living in a country with high social spending decreases the likelihood of an individual feeling that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional, compared to feeling that immigrants should have unconditional access to welfare.

The results of Model 2 do not support hypothesis 2. They instead show that living in a country with high social spending decreases the risk of having conditional welfare chauvinistic attitudes, while there is no proof that high social spending affects exclusive welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

Introducing control variables in Model 5, which looks at countries with low social spending, also affects the coefficients for social spending. The coefficients for low social spending are positive and statistically significant across all outcomes of the dependent variable. For the 'conditional upon reciprocity' outcome, the coefficient for low spending is .205 in Model 5, compared to a non-significant coefficient in Model 4. The coefficient measuring low social spending in 'conditional upon citizenship' increases from .419 to .973, meaning that once control variables are introduced, the effect of living in a country with low social spending increases. The coefficient for low social spending in the

⁵ A full discussion on possible associations between control variables and social spending, along with models that test these, can be found in the appendix.

‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome changes direction as compared to the bivariate Model, from -.419 in Model 4 to .539 in Model 5. Thus, the results of Model 5 show that living in a country with low social spending increases the likelihood of a respondent having any of the welfare chauvinistic attitudes as compared to favoring unconditional access to welfare for immigrants. This effect is strongest for the ‘Conditional upon citizenship’ outcome. This is an interesting detail as this outcome for low spending countries stood out in the Model 4 as well. Just as stated in the discussion of the results of the effect of socioeconomic status there seems to be a distinction between the outcomes which needs to be explored to explain the effect of low social spending on welfare chauvinism. A discussion on this can be found in the Discussion section below.

The results of Models 2 and 5 do not support hypothesis 2, i.e. that it is more likely for individuals living in countries with high social spending to have stronger welfare chauvinistic attitudes than for individuals living in countries with low social spending. In fact, the results support the opposite relationship between social spending and welfare chauvinistic attitudes. High social spending decreases the likelihood of having conditional welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Low social spending, in contrast, increases the likelihood of an individual having any welfare chauvinistic attitudes measured by the dependent variable.


5.2.3 Hypothesis 3a


Model 3 tests hypothesis 3a: whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, is conditional on the social spending of their country. In countries with high social spending individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status. For this model, the interaction variable measuring the interaction between socioeconomic status and high social spending is introduced. For the conditional outcomes, the coefficients for the interaction variable are positive. Usually, a positive value of a coefficient in a multinomial logistic regression would indicate that this variable increases the logged odds of a respondent of this group falling into the measured outcome as compared to the baseline outcome. However, interaction terms are, as always, a little bit more complicated to interpret. Interaction terms must always be analyzed in combination with the coefficients for the variables it is made up of. That is, an increase in variable a, equalizes the same increase for the ‘a’ of variable ab. One way to interpret an interaction variable is thus to calculate the regression equation of the Model where the interaction is included. The multinomial logistic regression equation looks like this: $n_{ij} = \log \frac{\pi_{ij}}{\pi_{ij}} = \alpha_j + x'_i \beta_j$, where ‘i’ represents a member of a group (value of independent variable), and ‘j’ represents outcome (value of dependent variable) (Rodríguez 2021). The equation can be extended to incorporate all variables of a model. By doing so, one can calculate the overall prediction of the likelihood of an outcome on the dependent variable, for every value of independent variables or control variables. Another way, and one

that makes it easier to visualize the results, is to create margins plots based on Model 3, showing the predicted margins of an outcome of the dependent variable, at every value of socioeconomic status, for both values of the dummy variable for high social spending, with the control variables being held at their means.

Graph 6 reports the probability of all possible outcomes of the dependent variable, for both values of the dummy variable measuring high social spending, at every value of 'living on income', which measures socioeconomic status. Model 3 indicates no statistical significance for the interaction variable measuring 'Living on income' and 'High Social spending'. However, through the margins plot, we can still look at the predicted outcomes of countries with high social spending, contra all other countries.

Graph 6. Margins plots over Model 3





Source: ESS8, weighted data

The margins plot also has the benefit of reporting the probability of an outcome, irrespective of the probability of falling into any other outcome. Therefore, the margins plot does not have to be interpreted in reference to the baseline. Thus, a benefit of creating a margins plot for multinomial logistic regression is that one can produce the predictive margins for the baseline outcome, as well as all other outcomes.

Graph 6a shows the margins plot for the 'unconditional access' outcome. The slope measuring the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism in countries with high social spending differ slightly from the slope measuring the effect of socioeconomic status in all other countries. Thus, at first glance, margins plot 6a could seem to indicate that the effect of socioeconomic status is conditional upon the social spending of a country. However, margins plots also report the 95% confidence intervals (CI) for all values of socioeconomic status. If the CI of the slopes at a certain value overlap, there is no statistical significance for the difference between individuals living in countries with high social spending, and individuals living in any other country, for that value. As margins plot 6a shows, the CI overlaps for all values of socioeconomic status. As such there is no statistical significance for the difference in the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism depending on the social spending of an individual's country. Furthermore, both slopes are negative, indicating that the direction of the relationship is the same in both countries. It is less likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status to have no welfare chauvinistic attitudes than it is for individuals with lower

socioeconomic status to hold such attitudes – regardless of their country’s social spending. Hypothesis 3a states that whether or not individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status is conditional on the welfare-spending of their country. The hypothesis suggest that in countries with high welfare spending individuals with higher income are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status. Hypothesis 3a thus also assumes that this is true only for countries with high social spending, which indicates the opposite relationship for all other countries: in all countries except those with high social spending, individuals with higher socioeconomic status will be less likely to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status. As such, even if the CI’s did not overlap, margins plot 6a does not support hypothesis 3a, as the relationship between socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism would be the same for both countries with high social spending and countries with any other social spending.

The margins plots for the conditional outcomes, 6b and 6c, indicate similar results to the margins plot for ‘unconditional access’. For both outcomes the slope measuring socioeconomic status in countries with high social spending differs slightly from the slope measuring socioeconomic status in all other countries, indicating that the effect of socioeconomic status is conditional upon social spending. However, the difference between individuals of lower socioeconomic status and individuals with higher socioeconomic status is small in the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome and barely detectable in the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome, indicating at best a minor difference between different categories of socioeconomic status, making it unlikely that these differences would be statistically significant. Furthermore, for both of the conditional outcomes, both slopes indicate that it is more likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes than it is for individuals with lower socioeconomic status. As such, the direction of the relationship between socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism is the same for individuals living in countries with high social spending, and individuals living in any other country. Therefore, whether or not individuals with higher socioeconomic status will be more likely than individuals with lower socioeconomic status to have either of the conditional welfare chauvinistic attitudes, is not conditional upon high social spending. Thus, neither of these margins plots support hypothesis 3a. Also, for both outcomes, the CI once again overlaps for all values of socioeconomic status, indicating that there is no statistical significance for the difference in the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism being dependent on high social spending.

Margins plot 6d over ‘exclusion from welfare’ is the only one to indicate a statistically significant difference in the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism, between countries with high social spending and all other countries for all values of socioeconomic status except ‘Living comfortably’. For this outcome of the dependent variable, the effect of differences in socioeconomic

status is greater for individuals living in countries with high social spending, than it is for individuals living in any other country. While the results indicate that the effect of socioeconomic status is conditional upon social spending, they do not indicate that the direction of the effect is conditional upon high social spending. Both the slope measuring socioeconomic status in countries with high social spending, and the slope measuring socioeconomic status in all other countries, are negative. Thus, regardless of social spending, it is less likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare, than it is for individuals with lower socioeconomic status. As such, margins plot 6d contradicts both stipulations made in hypothesis 3a. Whether or not individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare than individuals of lower socioeconomic status, is not conditional upon high social spending. Furthermore, margins plot 6d indicates that individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare, than are individuals with higher socioeconomic status.

However, the results of margins plot 6d over ‘exclusion from welfare’ have some implications for the results of hypothesis 2, which states that it is more likely for individuals living in countries with higher social spending to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than it is for individuals living in countries with lower social spending. When the interaction between socioeconomic status and social spending is accounted for, it is more likely for individuals living in countries with high social spending to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare, if they fall into any of the lower three values of socioeconomic status, than it is for individuals living in any other country. These results are considered with the results from testing hypothesis 2 in the discussion section below.

I hypothesized that whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, is conditional on the social spending of their country: in countries with high social spending individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status. Neither Model 3 nor its corresponding margins plot find any evidence for this. The only outcome in which the effect of socioeconomic status is conditional upon social spending, is in the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome. However, in both countries with high social spending and in all other countries, it is more likely for individuals with lower socioeconomic status to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare, than it is for individuals with higher socioeconomic status. As such, the direction of the relationship between socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism is not conditional upon social spending. Therefore, although the results indicate an interaction between socioeconomic status and social spending, there is no support for hypothesis 3a.

5.2.4 Hypothesis 3b



Hypothesis 3b assumed the opposite relationship of hypothesis 3a. Whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, is conditional on the social spending of their country: in countries with low social spending, individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes. To test this, an interaction between ‘living on income’ and the dummy for low social spending is introduced in Model 6. To facilitate easier interpretation, I once again use margins plots over the predicted margins, for all outcomes of the dependent variable, depicted in Graph 7.

Graph 7, showing the margins plots over Model 6, shows slightly more statistically significant results than did the model and graph which included the interaction for socioeconomic status and high social spending. First, if temporarily disregarding the CI, the margins plot over the ‘unconditional access’ outcome indicate that it is less likely for individuals living in countries with low social spending to feel like immigrants should have unconditional access to welfare than it is for individuals who live in any other country. As socioeconomic status increases, the probability of feeling that immigrants should have unconditional access to welfare decreases, both for countries with low social spending, and all other countries. There is no variance in the difference between countries with low social spending and all other countries across the values of socioeconomic status. Thus, the effect of social spending is not conditional upon low social spending, meaning there is no interaction between socioeconomic status and social spending. Also, regarding the CI, at all values of socioeconomic status the CI overlaps, indicating that there are no statistically significant differences in the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism between countries with low social spending and all other countries.


Graph 7. Margins plots, Model 6

7a

7b



7d



Source: ESS8, weighted data

Second, for the 'conditional upon reciprocity' outcome, Model 6 reports that the coefficient for the interaction variable is not statistically significant at the $p < .1$ value. However, margins plot 7b indicates statistically significant differences between countries with low social spending and all others, for the two highest groups of socioeconomic status. Although there was no statistical difference between the two lowest values of socioeconomic status, margins plot 7b indicates that the high levels of socioeconomic status in countries with low social spending, decreases the probability of an individual feeling that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity. In contrast, high levels of socioeconomic status in any other country increase the probability of an individual feeling that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity. As such, it is more likely for an individual living in a country with low social spending to feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity if they have lower socioeconomic status, compared to individuals with higher socioeconomic status. However, it is more likely for an individual living in any other country to feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity if they have higher socioeconomic status, compared to individuals with lower socioeconomic status. Therefore, whether or not individuals with lower socioeconomic status feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity is conditional upon the welfare spending of their country. The results of

the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome are thus in accordance with hypothesis 3b. Individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to feel that welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity than are individuals with higher socioeconomic status, *if* they live in a country with low social spending.

In Model 6, the coefficient of the interaction variable for the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome, is positive and statistically significant, showing an increase in the logged odds of .137 per one-unit increase in socioeconomic status, *if* an individual lives in a country with low social spending. Margins plot 7c over the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome in Graph 7 shows this relationship. For the very lowest socioeconomic category measured by ‘living on income’, there is no statistically significant variation between individuals living in countries with low social spending and individuals living in any other country, in regard to whether or not they are more likely to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship. As socioeconomic status increases, however, the probability of falling into the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome increases at a higher rate if an individual lives in a country with low social spending compared to if they live in any other country. However, the slope for countries with high spending and the slope for other countries are both positive. Regardless of social spending, higher socioeconomic status increases the probability of an individual feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship. Thus, although the strength of the effect of socioeconomic status is conditional upon social spending, whether or not it is more likely for individuals with lower socioeconomic status to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, is not. Instead, the results of margins plot 7c, show that whether there is a difference between an individual living in a country with low social spending and an individual living in any other country, regarding the likelihood of feeling that immigrants’ access should be conditional upon citizenship, depends on their socioeconomic status. For individuals with the lowest socioeconomic status, there is no difference between countries with low social spending and all others. As socioeconomic status increases, it is more likely for an individual from a country with low social spending to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, compared to the likelihood of individuals with the same socioeconomic status living in any other country.

Finally, the coefficient for the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome in Model 6 is not statistically significant. The corresponding margins plot, 7d, shows that it is less likely for individuals living in countries with low social spending to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare compared to granting them unconditional access to welfare than it is for individuals who live in any other country. As socioeconomic status increases, the probability of feeling that immigrants should be excluded from welfare decreases. However, these two effects do not interact, and the margins plot does not indicate that the effect of socioeconomic status on the probability of falling into the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome is conditional upon social spending. Yet, the results of margins plot 7d over ‘exclusion

from welfare’ do have some implications for hypothesis 2, which stated that it is more likely for individuals living in countries with higher social spending to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than it is for individuals living in countries with lower social spending. Margins plot 6d, above, which measures the interaction between socioeconomic status and high social spending, indicates that it is more likely that individuals living in countries with high social spending feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare, compared to individuals living in any other country. Similarly, margins plot 7d indicates that it is less likely for individuals living in countries with low social spending to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare than it is for individuals living in any other country. Although the difference in probability of failing into the ‘exclusive’ outcome between countries with low social spending and all other countries is very slight, it is statistically significant for all values of socioeconomic status, except the lowest. The results of margins plot 7d are considered with the results of hypothesis 2 in the ‘Discussion’ section below.

I hypothesized that whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, is conditional on the social spending of their country: in countries with low welfare spending individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Only the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome support this. For this outcome alone, the results of the margins plot indicate that individuals who have low socioeconomic status are more likely to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity than individuals with higher socioeconomic status are, *if* they live in a country with low social spending. In contrast, for the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome, Model 6 and the corresponding margins plot show that compared to individuals living in other countries, individuals living in countries with low social spending with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to feel that immigrants’ access should be conditional upon citizenship, than individuals with lower socioeconomic status are. Although this indicates that the effect of socioeconomic status is dependent on social spending, it does not indicate that the direction of that effect is dependent on social spending. Regardless of social spending, increasing socioeconomic status increases the probability of feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship. Also, in contrast to hypothesis 3b, individuals living in countries with low social spending are more likely to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship if they have higher socioeconomic status, compared to individuals with lower socioeconomic status.

I cannot, therefore, accept hypothesis 3b. Instead, the results of Model 6 and corresponding margins plots indicate a difference between the conditional outcomes which would explain the different results of the two outcomes, but which was not covered by the theoretical Model on which the hypothesis was based. This is further elaborated on in the discussion section below.

5.3 Control variables

While the effect of the introduction of control variables have been discussed in their relation to the independent variables, this section offers an analysis of the effect of the control variables on welfare chauvinism in their own right.

The variable that measures the percentage of foreign-born population is introduced as it represents one of the main alternative theories of what causes variation in welfare chauvinistic attitudes across individuals. Some research has suggested that increased immigration leads to less support for public welfare in general, because of an increase in cultural heterogeneity (Alesina & Glaeser 2004), while others have found the link between increased immigration to be non-existent or conditional upon some other factor (Brezna & Eger 2016; Brady & Finnigan 2014; Soroka et al. 2015; Vadlamannati 2020). In this study, the result of the variable measuring percentage of foreign-born population shows coefficients that are statistically significant across all models and outcomes of the dependent variable, indicating that there is indeed a relationship between this variable and welfare chauvinism. The coefficients are also consistently negative, meaning that as the percentage of the foreign-born population increases, the logged odds of falling into any of the welfare chauvinistic outcomes, as compared to the non-welfare chauvinistic baseline outcome, decrease. This contradicts the theory of cultural and ethnic heterogeneity, stating that increased heterogeneity would increase welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The results instead show that as the percentage of foreign-born population increases, welfare chauvinistic attitudes become less likely.

As the main competing theory on what affects the variation in welfare chauvinistic attitudes across countries, it is relevant to see what would happen to the full models including the interaction variables if the measure for percentage of foreign-born population was excluded. When excluding foreign-born population from the models, the interaction variable for high social spending reports a statistically significant coefficient for the ‘conditional upon citizenship’.⁶ The change in statistical significance indicates that the interaction term is closely associated with the variable measuring foreign-born population. While this does not affect the results of this study, it may have implications for future research.

The remaining control variables behave mostly in the way expected. First, the second competing theory found in the literature is one of a perception that immigrants pose a threat to the native culture of the receiving country (Lucassen & Lubbers 2012, p.549). To control for this, a variable measuring the perception of immigration as a cultural threat is included. The coefficients for this control

⁶ Models excluding % foreign born population. and analysis of these can be found in the appendix.

variable are positive and statistically significant across all models and outcomes of the dependent variable. Thus, increasing feelings of immigration undermining the cultural life of the country, increase the logged odds of falling into one of the welfare chauvinistic outcomes as compared to the 'Unconditional access' outcome. Second, the 'Gender' variable only reports statistically significant coefficients for the 'conditional upon citizenship' outcome where they are positive across all models. As this variable is coded 0= Female, 1=Male, this means that being male increases the logged odds of feeling that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, as compared to feeling that immigrants should be granted unconditional access to welfare. For this outcome alone, gender is a predictor. Third, the coefficients of the variable that measures education are statistically significant and negative across all models and outcomes of the dependent variable. This indicates that as the level of education increases, the logged odds of falling into a welfare chauvinistic outcome decreases as compared to the logged odds of falling into the 'unconditional access' outcome. Fourth, the coefficients for the dummy variable measuring if a respondent lives in a rural area are statistically significant and positive for the conditional outcomes, across all models, but not for the exclusive outcome. Thus, living in a rural area increases the likelihood of conditional welfare chauvinistic attitudes but there is no proof that it affects exclusive welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The final control variable measured age. The coefficients for this variable are positive and statistically significant across all models and outcomes of the dependent variable. The effect looks somewhat weak at first glance, but it is important to remember that this variable is measured from age 18 to 100. Thus a 10-, 20- or 30-year increase would have quite the stronger impact on the logged odds of falling into a welfare chauvinistic outcome, than would a 1- or 2-year increase. Increasing values of age increases the likelihood of having either of the welfare chauvinistic attitudes, compared to the likelihood of having no welfare chauvinistic attitude.

6. Discussion

While the results of the multinomial regressions do not find full support for any of the hypotheses of this paper, the results nonetheless offer partial support for some hypotheses, show some relationships that might have not been expected, as well as contribute to the literature on welfare chauvinism.

6.1 Realistic group conflict theory and socioeconomic status

Based on realistic group conflict theory and the literature on how socioeconomic vulnerability affects welfare support, I hypothesized that individuals with lower socioeconomic status were less likely to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with higher socioeconomic status. Realistic group conflict theory suggests that as competition for finite resources increases, so does inter-group conflict. However, inter-group collaboration and common goals mitigate this effect. Furthermore, based on Lawrence Bobo's expansion of realistic group conflict theory, it is possible that individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to perceive immigration as a threat to the status of the in-group. Individuals with lower socioeconomic status may be more likely to have inter-group contact with immigrants, as well as see welfare as a common goal for both their in-group and migrants, than individuals of higher socioeconomic status. The results of testing hypothesis 1 show that it is more likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status to have conditional welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than it was for individuals with lower socioeconomic status, compared to the likelihood of having no welfare chauvinistic attitude. In contrast, however, the results show that it is less likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare entirely, than it is for individuals with lower socioeconomic status, compared to the likelihood of having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The results for the conditional outcomes thus support hypothesis 1, while the results for 'exclusion from welfare' contradicted it. As such, it is likely that there is a distinction between the exclusionary outcome of the dependent variable, and the conditional outcomes.

As argued in the literature review, welfare chauvinism can be both nativist and (civic) nationalistic. As nativism protects the interest of natives over immigrants regardless of how the immigrant may adapt to the society of their new/host country, the 'exclusive from welfare' outcome corresponds to a nativist attitude. As such, the results could be interpreted as it being more likely for individuals with low socioeconomic status to have a nativist attitude towards immigrants' access to welfare, compared to no welfare chauvinist attitudes, than it is for individuals with higher socioeconomic status. With that said though, multinomial logistic regression does not allow for interpretation across all outcomes. That is, the results do not show if it is more likely for an individual of low socioeconomic status to be more likely to have conditional welfare chauvinistic attitudes than an exclusionary attitude. They do, however, suggest that there is an underlying reason as to why the effect of socioeconomic status differs between the conditional outcomes and the exclusive outcome.

The results of this study and the research behind it offers no explanation for this division, but future research should focus on the distinction between nativism and nationalism when it comes to welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

6.2 The cost-bearing factor and social spending

Models 1 and 4, without control variables, seem to lend some support for hypothesis 2: that individuals who live in countries with high social spending are more likely to have stronger welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals living in countries with low social spending, at least for the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome. However, when control variables are introduced, the results show a reversed relationship. For the conditional outcomes, the model including the dummy for high social spending shows negative coefficients, meaning that it is more likely for an individual living in a country with high social spending to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be unconditional, compared to feeling that it should be conditional upon reciprocity or citizenship than it is for individuals living in any other country. The model which includes the dummy variable for low social spending reports positive coefficients for the variable in all outcomes of the dependent variable. Thus, it is more likely for individuals living in high spending countries than low spending countries, to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional rather than unconditional. As the model measuring countries with high social spending does not report a statistical value for ‘exclusion from welfare’, the only conclusion to be made about this outcome is that it is more likely for individuals living in countries with low social spending to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare, compared to the likelihood of feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be unconditional, than it is for individuals living in any other country.

However, some contradicting results are found in the margins plots over the interaction variables over both socioeconomic status and high social spending, as well as socioeconomic status and low social spending. Graph 6d indicates that it is more likely for individuals living in a country with high social spending to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare than it is for individuals living in any other country. Following the same relationship, graph 7d indicated that it is less likely for individuals living in countries with low social spending to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare than it is for individuals living in any other country. As such, the results of margins plots 6d and 7d indicate that it is more likely for individuals living in countries with higher social spending to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare than it is for individuals living in countries with lower social spending. However, the margins plots report the probability of an outcome irrespective of the baseline. Thus, the results of margins plot 6d and 7d are not in comparison to having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes. They are a comparison of the individuals who feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare. For those individuals, it is more likely that they live in countries with higher social spending, compared to the likelihood of living in countries with lower social spending. Thus, the

results of testing hypothesis 2 in Models 2 and 5 still hold up: it is more likely for individuals living in countries with lower social spending to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes, compared to the likelihood of having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than it is for individuals living in countries with higher social spending. However, although the differences between countries with high contra low social spending are slight and should not be overstated, the results from the margins plots for ‘exclusion from welfare’ based on Model 3 and 6 add support for the inference that future research need to define different types of welfare chauvinism within the concept of nativism contra (civic) nationalism, to explain the effect of socioeconomic status and social spending on welfare chauvinism.

The results of testing hypothesis 2 were surprising in light of the research behind the cost-bearing factor. Only Van Der Waal et al.’s study found similar results to those of this study. Following Esping-Andersen’s typology of the welfare state, Van Der Waal et al. found that individuals of social democratic countries are on average less likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than are those of liberal or conservative countries (Van Der Waal et al. 2013). However, as shown by Graph 1, Finland is the only social democratic country that falls into the group of countries with high social spending. Thus, being a country with a social democratic regime cannot explain the results of this study.

One possibility to explain these unexpected results, linked to realistic group conflict theory, is that in countries with lower social spending there is simply less welfare as a resource which increases the competition of it, making individuals in these countries less willing to extend welfare to immigrants. Another explanation is that the studies that supported the cost-bearing factor, did not accurately measure the effect of social spending on welfare chauvinistic attitudes. One study used Esping-Anderson’s typology to gauge the effect of social spending on the arguments of PRRPs (Ennsner-Jedenastik 2018). The other combined the effect of refugee flows with social spending on the support for PRRPs over time and argued that since increased refugee flows had a higher effect on the support for PRRPs in countries with high social spending, this was an effect of welfare chauvinism (Vadlamannati 2020). Furthermore, researchers have found that the economic policies of PRRPs differ between parties and countries (see Mudde 2007; Afonso 2015; Schumacher Kersbergen 2014; Krause & Giebler 2020). Others have suggested that differences in the political systems of countries affect both the rise of PRRP and what type of politics they might pursue (Golder 2016). In the purpose of this paper, I aimed to offer a plausible explanation as to why countries with high social spending, which once seemed unlikely to have support for PRRP, now do. Unfortunately, the results of this study offer no such explanations. Rather, they explain why welfare chauvinism is more common in countries with low social spending. However, the results of this paper combined with the discussion of the literature above, suggest that welfare chauvinism might not always translate into votes for PRRP. Thus, future research could focus on the effect of individual welfare chauvinistic attitudes on PRRP voting, depending on what type of welfare system the country they are based in have.

6.3 An interacting effect?

For the last set of hypotheses, based on the mixed results of previous research of both socioeconomic status' and welfare spending's effect on welfare chauvinism, I posed the possibility of the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism being conditional upon social spending. To gauge this effect, I introduced two interaction variables: one measuring socioeconomic status and high social spending, and one measuring socioeconomic status and low social spending. The introduction of these two variables in Model 3 and 6 yielded very few statistically significant results. Model 3 tested hypothesis 3a, stating that whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, is conditional on the welfare-spending of their country: in countries with high welfare spending individuals with higher income are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The Model reports no statistically significant coefficients for the interaction term. Furthermore, the margins plot based on Model 3 does not indicate that whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes is conditional upon the welfare spending of their country. Therefore, no support for hypothesis 3a is found. The results of hypothesis 2 indicates that the cost-bearing factor is not a predictor of welfare chauvinism. Living in a country with high social spending does not increase the likelihood of welfare chauvinistic attitudes. In light of those results, the lack of proof for hypothesis 3a is not surprising. However, the results of the variable measuring percentage of foreign-born population, indicate that this variable affect the interaction between socioeconomic status and high social spending. Thus, future research should look at this association to see how levels of immigration in high spending countries may affect how socioeconomic status influence welfare chauvinistic attitudes.

Hypothesis 3b stated that in countries with low social spending, individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with higher socioeconomic status. In the models and margins plots testing this hypothesis, some statistically significant results are found in the conditional outcomes. 'Conditional upon reciprocity' was the only outcome where the interaction variable indicates that whether individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic outcomes is conditional upon the social spending of their country. The results show that in countries with low social spending, individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity, compared to feeling that immigrants' access to welfare should be unconditional, than are individuals with higher socioeconomic status. For all other countries, the relationship is reversed. As such, the 'conditional upon reciprocity' outcome alone supports hypothesis 3b.

The results of the 'Conditional upon citizenship' outcome in Model 6 and the corresponding margins plot show that the effect of socioeconomic status is conditional upon social

spending. However, whether individuals of lower socioeconomic status are more likely to feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship than individuals with higher socioeconomic status, is not conditional upon the social spending of their country. As such, the results did not support hypothesis 3b. Furthermore, the results also contradicted the direction of the relationship stated by the hypothesis. Individuals with higher socioeconomic status were more likely to feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship than were individuals of lower socioeconomic status.

Once again, the lack of support for hypothesis 2 and that the cost-bearing factor does not seem to be a predictor for welfare chauvinism, may explain why there is no support for hypothesis 3b. However, although the results cannot confirm hypothesis 3b, the results from testing it still yield two important take-aways. First, socioeconomic status and low social spending interact with each other, affecting the probability of an individual having a welfare chauvinistic attitude. Although only 'conditional upon reciprocity' indicated support for hypothesis 3b, the results of 'conditional upon citizenship' show that the differences between countries depend on what level of socioeconomic status individuals have. Thus, while the results of the interaction variable for socioeconomic status and low social spending on the 'conditional upon citizenship' outcome do not support hypothesis 3b, they still offer an explanation as to what extent social spending affects the relationship between socioeconomic status and social spending. The effect of social spending on the relationship between socioeconomic status and feeling that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship is higher in countries with low social spending, compared to all other countries.

Second, so far, I have suggested that there is something unique with the 'exclusion from welfare' outcome compared to the conditional outcomes, which would explain why the effects of different variables contrast for this outcome, across several different Models. I have argued that 'exclusion from welfare' correlates with nativist arguments, while 'conditional upon citizenship' correlates with (civic) nationalist arguments. But how and where does 'conditional upon reciprocity' fit in? What makes an individual have one welfare chauvinistic attitude over another? The lack of answers to these questions shows that the results of testing hypothesis 3b indicate that future research should carefully evaluate different types of welfare chauvinism.

7. Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to add to the discussion in the literature about the effects of both socioeconomic status and social spending, as well as to offer a plausible explanation PRRP's success in countries with high social spending, over the past few decades. To do so, three research questions were asked. The first question asked what effect socioeconomic status has on welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The results of the study show that in comparison to having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes, individuals with higher socioeconomic status were more likely than individuals with lower socioeconomic status to have conditionally welfare chauvinistic attitudes, but not exclusionary welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Thus, the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinistic attitudes depends on the attitude measured. It is more likely for persons with higher socioeconomic status to have conditionally welfare chauvinistic attitudes compared to having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes than it is for individuals with low socioeconomic status. However, it is more likely for persons with lower socioeconomic status to have exclusive welfare chauvinistic attitudes compared to having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes than it is for individuals with higher socioeconomic status.

The second research question asked how social spending in European countries affects welfare chauvinistic attitudes. While hypothesis 2 suggested that high social spending would increase the likelihood of an individual having welfare chauvinistic attitudes, the results of this study showed a reversed relationship. High social spending decreases the likelihood of individuals having welfare chauvinistic attitudes, while low social spending increases the likelihood of individuals having welfare chauvinistic attitudes. However, a discrepancy is found for exclusive chauvinistic attitudes, where individuals who feel that immigrants' should be excluded from welfare, it is more likely that they live in countries with higher social spending than in countries with lower social spending.

Finally, the third research question considered to what extent a European country's social spending affect the relationship between its residents' socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism. Based on varying results in the literature on how socioeconomic status and social spending affect welfare chauvinism, I posed that these two factors might interact with each other. The results show that while low social spending and socioeconomic status interact, they find no proof that high social spending and socioeconomic status do. The results of the interaction between low social spending and socioeconomic status also differ between the welfare chauvinistic attitudes. It is less likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, to feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity *if* they live in a country with low social spending. However, for individuals living in any other country it is more likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status than individuals with lower socioeconomic status to feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity. As such, both the effect of

socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism and the direction of that relationship are conditional upon social spending. In contrast, the effect of social spending on the feeling that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, is conditional upon socioeconomic status. The results show that individuals with low socioeconomic status have the same probability of feeling that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, regardless of the social spending of their country. For individuals with higher socioeconomic status, however, it is more likely for individuals living in countries with low social spending to feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, than it is for individuals with the same socioeconomic status living in any other country. In conclusion, socioeconomic status and low social spending affect each other's effect on the conditional welfare chauvinistic attitudes, but which factor is conditional upon the other, varies between the two attitudes.

The results of this paper gave a few options for future research. First, although this thesis finds limited proof that an interaction between socioeconomic status and social spending would explain the varying results from previous research on these two predictors for welfare chauvinism, the results point at a different underlying factor which may account for this previous variation. The differentiating results of the variables of this study across the outcomes of welfare chauvinism suggest that there is a need for future research to provide a distinction between different welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Specifically, both socioeconomic status and social spending had different effects on the welfare chauvinistic attitudes that may be considered (civic) nationalistic, and the welfare chauvinistic attitudes that may be considered nativist. As such, future research should look at factors that may predict what type of welfare chauvinistic attitude an individual might have. Furthermore, the results of this study indicate that future studies on welfare chauvinism need to account for the division between nativist and nationalistic welfare chauvinistic attitudes, regardless of what predictors are being looked at.

Second, the results provide a possible way to evaluate the support for PRRP in countries with high social spending. As stated above, a part of the aim of this paper was to provide a plausible reason for PRRP support in high spending countries. Unfortunately, the results offer no such explanation. However, the results combined with previous research on PRRPs offers a new possibility that would be of value for future research to examine. The economic policies of PRRPs are known to vary between parties and countries (Mudde 2004, 2007). Some researchers have also found that the political system of the country of the PRRP may influence what type of arguments PRRP use and how successful they are (Golder 2016). Thus, it is possible that welfare chauvinistic attitudes do not always translate into support for PRRP. While welfare chauvinistic attitudes may not be more common in countries with high social spending, there is a possibility that they are a better predictor for PRRP support in countries with higher social spending, compared to countries with lower social spending.

Future research should therefore evaluate the possible variation in how welfare chauvinism translates into voting for PRRPs depending on different welfare systems.

8. References

8.1 Literature

- Afonso, A. (2015). Choosing whom to betray: populist right-wing parties, welfare state reforms and the trade-off between office and votes. *European Political Science Review*, 7(2), pp.271–292.
- Andersen, J.G. & Bjørklund, T. (1990) Structural Changes and New Cleavages: the Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway, *Acta Sociologica*, 33(3), pp. 195–217. doi: 10.1177/000169939003300303.
- Akbaba, S. (2018). Re-narrating Europe in the Face of Populism: An Analysis of the Anti-immigration Discourse of Populist Party Leaders. *Insight Turkey*, 20(3), 199–218.
- Akkerman, T. (2015). Gender and the radical right in Western Europe: a comparative analysis of policy agendas. *Patterns of prejudice*, 49(1-2), pp.37–60.
- Alesina, A. & Glaeser, E.L. (2004). “Race and Redistribution” in *Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: a world of difference*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.105-123 doi
- Arzheimer, K. (2017). ”Electoral Sociology : Who Votes for the Extreme Right and Why and When?” in C. Mudde (Ed), *The populist radical right: a reader*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge
- Brady, D. & Finnigan, R. (2014) ‘Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for Social Policy?’, *American Sociological Review*, 79(1), pp. 17–42. doi: 10.1177/0003122413513022.
- Breznau, N. & Eger, M.A. (2016). Immigrant presence, group boundaries, and support for the welfare state in Western European societies. *Acta Sociologica*, 59(3), pp.195–214.
- Bobo, L. (1983). Whites' opposition to busing: Symbolic racism or realistic group conflict? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45(6), pp.1196–1210.
- Bonoli, G., & Palier, B. (2000). How do welfare states change? Institutions and their impact on the politics of welfare state reform in Western Europe. *European Review*, 8(3), 333-352.
- Cerami, A., & Korkut, U. (2008). Social policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The emergence of a new European welfare regime. *Sociologický Casopis*, 44(3), 595-597.
- Chandler, C., & Tsai, Y. (2001). Social factors influencing immigration attitudes: An analysis of data from the General Social Survey. *The Social Science Journal (Fort Collins)*, 38(2), 177-188.
- Dallinger, U. (2010). Public support for redistribution: what explains cross-national differences? *Journal of European Social Policy*, 20(4), pp.333–349.
- Enns-Jedenastik, L. (2018). Welfare Chauvinism in Populist Radical Right Platforms: The Role of Redistributive Justice Principles. *Social Policy & Administration*, 52(1), pp.293–314.
- Esping-Andersen, G. 1989. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. 1st ed.,
- Ferrera, M. (1996). The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Social Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 6(1), 17-37.
- Freedon, M. (2006). The coming of the welfare state. In *The Cambridge history of twentieth-century political thought* (pp. The Cambridge history of twentieth-century political thought).
- Förtner, M., Belina, B. and Naumann, M. (2020) ‘The revenge of the village? The geography of right-wing populist electoral success, anti-politics, and austerity in Germany’, *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*. doi: 10.1177/2399654420951803.

- Garland, D. 2014. The Welfare State: A Fundamental Dimension of Modern Government. *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie/European Journal of Sociology*, 55(3), pp.327–364.
- Greve, B. (2019). "Why inequality matters" in *Welfare, Populism and Welfare Chauvinism*. Policy Press, pp. 39-55.
- Golder, M. (2016). Far right parties in Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19, 477- 497.
- Immerzeel, T., Coffé, H. & Van Der Lippe, T. (2015). "Explaining the gender gap in radical right voting: A cross-national investigation in 12 Western European countries", *Comparative European Politics*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 263-286.
- Jackson, J. (1993). Realistic group conflict theory: A review and evaluation of the theoretical and empirical literature. *The Psychological Record*, 43(3), p.395–413
- Keskinen, S. (2016). From welfare nationalism to welfare chauvinism: Economic rhetoric, the welfare state and changing asylum policies in Finland. *Critical social policy*, 36(3), pp.352–370.
- Krause, W. & Giebler, H. (2020). Shifting Welfare Policy Positions: The Impact of Radical Right Populist Party Success Beyond Migration Politics. *Representation (McDougall Trust)*, 56(3), pp.331–348.
- Larsen, C. (2006). *The institutional logic of welfare attitudes: How welfare regimes influence public support*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Lucassen, G. & Lubbers, M. (2012). Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats. *Comparative political studies*, 45(5), pp.547–574.
- Mamonova, N. & Franquesa, J., (2020). Populism, Neoliberalism and Agrarian Movements in Europe. Understanding Rural Support for Right-Wing Politics and Looking for Progressive Solutions. *Sociologia Ruralis*, 60(4), pp.710–731.
- Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 541-563
- Mudde, C. (2007) "It's not the economy, stupid!", in *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 119–137. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511492037.006.
- Norocel, O.C. (2016). Populist radical right protectors of the folkhem: Welfare chauvinism in Sweden. *Critical social policy*, 36(3), pp.371–390.
- Palme, J. (2006). Welfare states and inequality: Institutional designs and distributive outcome. *Research in social stratification and mobility*, 24(4), pp.387–403.
- Pollock, P.H. & Edwards, B. C. (2020). *The essentials of political analysis*. Sixth Edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, an imprint of SAGE
- Reeskens, T. & van Oorschot, W. (2012). Disentangling the 'New Liberal Dilemma': On the relation between general welfare redistribution preferences and welfare chauvinism. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 53(2), pp.120–139.
- Riedel, R. (2020). Nativism versus nationalism and populism - bridging the gap. *Central European Papers*, 6(2), pp.18–28.
- Rodríguez, G. (2021). *The Multinomial Logit Model*. Princeton University. Retrieved 02-05-2021 from <https://data.princeton.edu/wws509/notes/c6s2>

- Santana, A., Zagórski, P. & Rama, J. (2020). At odds with Europe: explaining populist radical right voting in Central and Eastern Europe. *East European politics*, 36(2), pp.288–309.
- Schofield, J. (2010). Realistic Group Conflict Theory. In: John M. Levine and Michael A. Hogg Editors, 2010. *Encyclopedia of Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. pp. 682-684
- Schumacher, G. & van Kersbergen, K. (2016). Do mainstream parties adapt to the welfare chauvinism of populist parties? *Party politics*, 22(3), pp.300–312.
- Shehaj, A., Shin, A.J. & Inglehart, R., (2019). Immigration and right-wing populism: An origin story. *Party Politics*, p.1-12.
- Soroka, S. N., Johnston, R., Kevins, A., Banting, K. and Kymlicka, W. (2016) Migration and welfare state spending. *European Political Science Review*. Cambridge University Press, 8(2), pp. 173–194. doi: 10.1017/S1755773915000041.
- Spierings, N. & Zaslove, A. (2015). Gendering the vote for populist radical-right parties. *Patterns of prejudice*, 49(1-2), pp.135–162.
- Spierings, N. & Zaslove, A. (2017). Gender, populist attitudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties. *West European politics*, 40(4), pp.821–847.
- Sümer, S. (2009). Comparing Gender Regimes: A Theoretical Framework. In *European Gender Regimes and Policies: Comparative Perspectives* (1st ed., pp. 19-38). Taylor & Francis.
- Tamir, Y. (2019). Not So Civic: Is There a Difference Between Ethnic and Civic Nationalism? *Annual Reviews*, 22(1), pp.419–434.
- UCLA: Statistical consulting group. (2020) *Multinomial Logistic Regression*. Retrieved 23-04-2021 from <https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/spss/output/multinomial-logistic-regression/>
- Vadlamannati, K.C., (2020). Welfare Chauvinism? Refugee Flows and Electoral Support for Populist-Right Parties in Industrial Democracies. *Social Science Quarterly*, 101(4), pp.1600–1626.
- Van Der Waal, J., De Koster, W. & Van Oorschot, W. (2013). Three Worlds of Welfare Chauvinism? How Welfare Regimes Affect Support for Distributing Welfare to Immigrants in Europe. *Journal of comparative policy analysis*, 15(2), pp.164–181.
- van Oorschot, W. (2006) Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states, *Journal of European Social Policy*, 16(1), pp. 23–42. doi: 10.1177/0958928706059829.

8.2 Datasets

- European Social Survey 2016: Integrated Dataset (ESS8). Retrieved from https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/download.html?file=ESS8e02_2&y=2016
- OECD Data. *Social Spending 2015*. Retrieved from <https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/social-spending.htm>

OECD Data. *Foreign-born population 2015*. Retrieved from
<https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-population.htm>

Appendix

Table A 1. Variable list

Variable list	Question asked
(1) Welfare chauvinism	Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your view.
(2) Living on income	Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?
(3) Low social spending	Represents the 25% of countries included in this study, which spend the least on social welfare.
(4) High social spending	Represents the 25% of countries included in this study, which spend the most on social welfare.
(5) % foreign-born pop	Country-level variable measuring percentage of population born in other country.
(6) Immgr. Impct. cult	... would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?
(9) Gender	Sex? (Male/Female)
(10) Education	What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed? (ISCED coded)
(11) Rural dummy	Which phrase [...] best describes the area where you live?
(12) Age	What year were you born?

Source: ESS8

Table A 2. Mean estimation table

		Number of obs = 34,127
Mean	St.Dv	

<u>Welfare Chauvinism</u>		
Unconditional access	20	
Conditional	.48	
upon reciprocity		
Conditional	.25	
upon citizenship		
Exclusion from welfare	.7	
<u>Living on current income</u>	3.14	.80
<u>Social spending (High)</u>		.41
Other	.79	
High	.21	
<u>Social spending (Low)</u>		.45
Other	.72	
Low	.28	
<u>% Foreign born population</u>	11.67	4.34
<u>Immigration impact on culture</u>	5.08	2.70
<u>Gender</u>		.50
Female	.51	
Male	.49	
<u>Education</u>	3.78	1.90
<u>Living in rural area</u>		.49
Urban	.61	
Rural	.39	
<u>Age</u>	49.39	18.04
<u>Living on income*High soc. spending</u>		
High	.66	1.31
Other	2.46	1.48
<u>Living on income*Low soc. spending</u>		
Low	.87	1.46
Other	2.26	1.55

Source: ESS8, weighted data

Table A 3. Tabulation of Welfare chauvinism

Should immigrants gain access to welfare?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Unconditional access	6680	19.57	19.57
Conditional upon reciprocity	16238	47.58	67.16
Conditional upon Citizenship	8829	25.87	93.03

Exclusion from welfare	2380	6.97	100.00
Total	34127	100.00	

Source: ESS8, Weighted data

Table A 4. Tabulation of Living on Income

Feeling about living on household's income nowadays	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Very difficult	1210	3.55	3.55
Difficult	4651	13.63	17.18
Coping on current income	16327	47.84	65.02
Living comfortably	11938	34.98	100.00
Total	34127	100.00	

Source: ESS8, Weighted data

Table A 5. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when High-spend dummy=0(Other) with Chi²

Should immigrants gain access to welfare?	Feeling about living on household's income nowadays					
	Very difficult	Difficult	Coping on current income	Living comfortably	Total	
Unconditional access	177 20.68 0.4	588 18.63 2.0	2224 17.70 27.0	2297 22.58 40.9	5286 19.76 70.3	Freq. Percent Ch ² cont.
Conditional upon reciprocity	384 44.73 2.6	1445 45.82 5.0	6132 48.82 2.0	5034 49.48 1.7	12994 48.59 9.4	Freq. Percent Ch ² cont.
Conditional upon Citizenship	182 21.19 6.9	812 25.73 0.0	3408 27.13 9.7	2478 24.36 7.4	6879 25.72 23.9	Freq. Percent Ch ² cont.
Exclusion from welfare	1145 13.40 80.6	310 9.82 80.3	798 6.35 3.7	364 3.58 95.0	1586 5.93 259.6	Freq. Percent Ch ² cont.
Total	857.5108 100.00 90.4	3154.331 100.00 87.3	12561.62 100.00 40	10172.54 100.00 144.9	26746 100.00 363.3	Freq. Percent Ch ² value

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

Source: ESS8, Weighted data. Frequencies have been rounded to closest whole number.

Table A 6. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when High-spend dummy=1(High) with Chi²

Should immigrants gain access to welfare?	Feeling about living on household's income nowadays					
	Very difficult	Difficult	Coping on current income	Living comfortably	Total	
Unconditional access	54 16.96 0.8	253 19.23 0.0	621 16.88 9.8	485 23.45 20.0	1413 19.76 30.7	Freq. Percent Ch ² cont.
Conditional upon reciprocity	112	555	1731	945	3342	Freq.

	34.94	42.14	47.04	45.75	13.0	Percent
	7.5	2.9	2.5	0.1	9.4	Ch ² cont.
Conditional upon Citizenship	78	312	1,026	519	6879	Freq.
	24.38	23.71	27.87	25.13	26.21	Percent
	0.4	3.1	3.9	0.9	8.4	Ch ² cont.
Exclusion from welfare	76	197	302	117	691	Freq.
	23.73	14.93	8.20	5.67	9.37	Percent
	70.3	43.5	5.3	30.2	149.3	Ch ² cont.
Total	319	1316	3679	2066	7381	Freq.
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Percent
	79.1	49.5	21.5	51.2	201.3	Ch ² value

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

Source: ESS8, Weighted data. Frequencies have been rounded to closest whole number.

Table A 7. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when Low-spend dummy=0(Others) with Chi²

Should immigrants gain access to welfare?	Feeling about living on household's income nowadays					
	Very difficult	Difficult	Coping on current income	Living comfortably	Total	
Unconditional access	174	648	2098	1926	4846	Freq.
	19.45	18.84	17.48	23.13	19.65	Percent
	0.0	1.1	28.8	51.5	81.4	Ch ² cont.
Conditional upon reciprocity	3667	1527	5821	4118	11833	Freq.
	41.00	44.38	48.51	49.45	47.98	Percent
	9.1	9.3	0.7	3.8	22.8	Ch ² cont.
Conditional upon Citizenship	199	849	3235	1924	6207	Freq.
	22.25	24.67	26.96	23.11	25.17	Percent
	3.0	0.3	15.3	14.1	32.7	Ch ² cont.
Exclusion from welfare	155	417	847	359	1777	Freq.
	17.31	12.11	7.06	4.31	7.21	Percent
	126.6	115.0	0.4	97.0	339.0	Ch ² cont.
Total	894.7458	3440.911	12001.52	8326.82	24664	Freq.
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Percent
	138.8	125.8	45.2	166.3	476.0	Ch ² value

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

Source: ESS8, Weighted data. Frequencies have been rounded to closest whole number.

Table A 8. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when Low-spend dummy=1(Low) with Chi²

Should immigrants gain access to welfare?	RECODE of hincfel (Feeling about household's income nowadays)					
	Very difficult	Difficult	Coping on current income	Living comfortably	Total	
Unconditional access	40	176	601	946	1763	Freq.
	16.69	19.35	16.85	19.94	18.63	Percent
	0.5	0.2	6.1	4.3	11.2	Chi ² cont.
Conditional upon reciprocity	103	401	1576	1951	4038	Freq.
	42.99	43.97	44.20	41.25	42.67	Percent

	0.0	0.4	2.0	2.2	4.5	Chi ² cont.
Conditional upon Citizenship	59	270	1210	1736	3275	Freq.
	24.48	29.60	33.92	36.59	34.60	Percent
	7.1	6.6	0.5	5.4	19.6	Chi ² value
Exclusion from welfare	38	64	179	105	387	Freq.
	15.84	7.08	5.03	2.22	4.09	Percent
	80.8	19.8	7.7	40.7	149.0	Chi ² cont.
Total	249	911	3566	474	9463	Freq.
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Percent
	88.4	27.0	16.2	52.6	184.3	Chi ² value

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

Source: ESS8, Weighted data. Frequencies have been rounded to closest whole number.

The results of Chi-square show that when the dummy for high social spending is 0 (Low), Chi-square= 363.3, and when 1(High), Chisquare=201.3. When the dummy for low social spending is 0 (High), Chi-square= 476.0, and when 1(Low), Chi-square=184.3. With 9 degrees of freedom, all Chi-square values have a corresponding p-value of <.001, meaning that they are statistically significant. As such, the null hypothesis saying that the relationship between welfare chauvinism and socioeconomic status combined with social spending is actually 0 is rejected. While these results alone are encouraging enough to continue with hypotheses testing, one more aspect of the results of the Chi-square test is noteworthy. An advantage of using the Chi2 to analyze a controlled tabulation is that one can analyze how different outcomes contribute to the Chi-square total, and thus to statistical significance (Pollock & Edwards 2020 p.138). Interestingly, of the outcomes of the dependent variable, the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome, which graph 1 showed to have the least percentage of observations, contributes the most to Chi2 across all four categories of the two dummy variables measuring social spending, and all categories except ‘coping on current income’ of the variable measuring socioeconomic status. This suggests that the category which yields the most statistical significance to the relationship between welfare chauvinism and socioeconomic status when combined with social spending, is the exclusive category of the dependent variable. Other outcomes of the dependent variable contribute in variation to the Chi-square value, although none as much as the ‘exclusion from welfare’. Regardless, the Chi-square results and corresponding p-values supports the continuation of testing this thesis hypothesis through multinomial logistic regression.

Table A 9. Bivariate Models

		Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4	Model A5	Model A6	Model A7	Model A8	Model A9
Welfare Chauvinism Outcomes										
<u>Unconditional</u>	Baseline									
<u>access</u>										
<u>Con.</u>	Living on inc.	-.061** (.028)								
<u>Reciprocity</u>	High social spending		-.05 (.046)							
	Low social spending			-.045 (.046)						
	% Foreign born pop.				-.029*** (.003)					
	Immigr. Impact culture					.069*** (.01)				
	Gender						-.005 (.041)			
	Education							-.125*** (.011)		
	Living in rural area								.164*** (.043)	
	Age									.009*** (.001)
	Constant	1.097*** (.092)	.916*** (.024)	.904*** (.022)	1.261*** (.047)	.577*** (.048)	.904*** (.028)	1.415*** (.051)	.842*** (.026)	.459*** (.06)
<u>Con.</u>	Living on income	-.122*** (.03)								
<u>Citizenship</u>										
	High social spending		.032 (.05)							
	Low social spending			.387*** (.05)						
	% Foreign born pop.				-.094*** (.004)					
	Immigr. Impact culture					.108*** (.01)				

<u>Exclusion</u> <u>From welfare</u>	Gender					.109** (.045)				
	Education						-.146*** (.012)			
	Living in rural area							.288*** (.046)		
	Age								.011*** (.001)	
	Constant	.7*** (.098)	.301*** (.026)	.279*** (.024)	1.411*** (.056)	-.214*** (.052)	.258*** (.031)	.904*** (.055)	.203*** (.028)	-.246*** (.067)
	Living on income	-.618*** (.039)								
	High social spending		.419*** (.068)							
	Low social spending			-.419*** (.076)						
	% Foreign born pop.				-.118*** (.006)					
	Immigr. Impact culture					.403*** (.013)				
	Gender					-.046 (.064)				
	Education						-.423*** (.018)			
	Living in rural area							.241*** (.065)		
	Age								.019*** (.002)	
	Constant	.898*** (.121)	-1.11*** (.038)	-.94*** (.033)	.389*** (.071)	-3.353*** (.088)	-.943*** (.044)	.556*** (.071)	-1.054*** (.041)	-1.92*** (.099)
	Observations	34127	34127	34127	34127	34127	34127	34127	34127	34127
	Pseudo R ²	.006	.001	.001	.01	.026	0	.013	.001	.003

Standard errors are in parentheses *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$, Source: ESS8, weighted data

Table A 10. Excluded control variables

Welfare chauvinism outcomes		Model A10	Model A11
<u>Unconditional access</u>	Baseline		
<u>Conditional upon Reciprocity</u>	Living on income	-.012 (.03)	-.083*** (.029)
	High soc. spending	-.101** (.047)	
	Low soc. spending		-.029 (.047)
	% Foreign born-pop		
	Immigr. Impact culture		
	Source on income (baseline paid work)		
	Pension	.019 (.056)	.064 (.056)
	Social benefits	-.372*** (.095)	-.289*** (.095)
	Savings or investments	.113 (.247)	.087 (.249)
	Gender	-.001 (.041)	.005 (.041)
	Education	-.117*** (.012)	
	Living in rural area	.1** (.044)	.149*** (.043)
	Age	.006*** (.002)	.007*** (.001)
	Constant	1.137*** (.126)	.735*** (.118)
	Living on income	-.07** (.032)	-.161*** (.031)
	High soc. spending	-.041 (.051)	
	Low soc. spending		.421*** (.051)
	% Foreign born-pop		
	Immigr. Impact culture		
	Source on income (baseline paid work)		
<u>Conditional upon Citizenship</u>	Pension	.102* (.061)	.166*** (.061)
	Social benefits	-.365*** (.106)	-.322*** (.106)
	Savings or investments	.102 (.265)	.082 (.268)
	Gender	.119*** (.045)	.128*** (.045)
	Education	-.121*** (.013)	
	Living in rural area	.214*** (.047)	.254*** (.047)
	Age	.007*** (.002)	.008*** (.002)

<u>Exclusion from Welfare</u>	Constant	.553*** (.136)	.189 (.128)
	Living on income	-.431*** (.044)	-.64*** (.042)
	High soc. spending	.221*** (.07)	
	Low soc. spending		-.291*** (.078)
	% Foreign born-pop		
	Immigr. Impact culture		
	Source on income (baseline paid work)		
	Pension	.082 (.086)	.223*** (.084)
	Social benefits	-.452*** (.146)	-.267* (.149)
	Savings or investments	.399 (.403)	.298 (.404)
	Gender	.024 (.065)	.021 (.065)
	Education	-.347*** (.02)	
	Living in rural area	.076 (.067)	.225*** (.066)
	Age	.008*** (.002)	.015*** (.002)
	Constant	1.066*** (.182)	.061 (.17)
	Observations	34127	34127
	Pseudo R ²	.019	.012

*Standard errors are in parentheses *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$, Source: ESS8, weighted data*

The differentiating results between the Models 1 and 3 and Models 2 and 5 suggest that one or several of the control variables explain the effect social spending as a predictor for welfare chauvinism. After running all control variables separately in bivariate regressions with the dependent variable (see table A9), the results showed that ‘percentage of foreign-born population’, ‘immigration’s impact on cultural life’ and ‘education’ had the largest effect on Pseudo R². Pseudo R² does not show the variation in the dependent explained by a Model, in the same way R² does. Instead, it is a measure of how much better the Model predicts the outcome, and thus can only be used in comparison to other Models attempting to predict the same outcome. The relatively high R² of the three control variables listed above, thus indicates a superior predictive power. Therefore, there is the possibility of one or more of them explaining the effect of the dummy variables for social spending. Because of this, I tried excluding and including these variables from the regression to see if either or several could be the explanation for the changed coefficient social spending in the multivariate Models, as compared to the bivariate Models (see table A10). After testing several different combinations for high social spending and low social spending respectively, it became clear that when either ‘percentage of foreign-born population’ or

‘immigration’s impact on cultural life’ were included in the Models, they had the effect of changing the direction of the coefficients of the dummy for high social spending in the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ and ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcomes. Thus, when either control is accounted for, living in a country with high social spending decreases the chance of falling into one of the welfare chauvinistic outcomes, and increases the chance of falling into the ‘unconditional access’ outcome.

Introducing either of the three variables, ‘percentage of foreign-born population’, ‘immigration’s impact on cultural life’ or ‘education’ in the Models with the dummy for low social spending has the effect of changing the coefficient of the low spending dummy from negative to positive. The coefficient for ‘conditional upon citizenship’ remains positive and statistically significant through all variations. These results show that when either of the three control variables are accounted for, living in a country with low social spending increases the likelihood of falling into one of the welfare chauvinistic outcomes, and decreases the chance of falling into the ‘unconditional access’ outcome.

Table A 11. Interaction Models without % Foreign-born population

Welfare chauvinism outcomes		Model A12	Model A13
<u>Unconditional access</u>	Baseline outcome		
<u>Conditional upon</u>	Living on income	.005	.042


<u>Reciprocity</u>		(.034)	(.031)
	High social Spending	-.361*	
		(.198)	
	Low social spending		.277
			(.203)
	% Foreign born pop.		
	Immigr. Impact culture	.056***	.055***
		(.01)	(.01)
	Gender	-.01	-.009
		(.041)	(.041)
	Education	-.105***	-.105***
		(.012)	(.012)
	Living in rural area	.108**	.104**
		(.043)	(.043)
	Age	.007***	.007***
		(.001)	(.001)
	Living on income*High soc. spending	.079	
		(.062)	
	Living on income*Low soc. spending		-.087
			(.061)
<u>Conditional upon Citizenship</u>	Constant	.729***	.584***
		(.145)	(.136)
	Living on income	-.053	-.035
		(.037)	(.034)
	High soc. Spending	-.424**	
		(.213)	
	Low soc. spending		.07
			(.223)
	% Foreign born pop.		
	Immigr. Impact culture	.092***	.094***
		(.01)	(.01)
	Gender	.104**	.109**
		(.045)	(.045)
	Education	-.106***	-.106***
		(.013)	(.013)
	Living in rural area	.22***	.203***
		(.047)	(.047)
	Age	.009***	.009***
		(.001)	(.001)
	Living on income*High soc. spending	.116*	
		(.067)	
<u>Exclusion from Welfare</u>	Living on income*Low soc. spending		.114*
			(.067)
	Constant	-.08	-.204
		(.156)	(.147)
	Living on income	-.291***	-.27***
		(.051)	(.046)
	High soc. Spending	-.146	
		(.272)	
	Low soc. spending		.298
			(.279)
	% Foreign born pop.		
	Immigr. Impact culture	.378***	.379***
		(.014)	(.014)
	Gender	-.041	-.04

	(.067)	(.068)
Education	-.317***	-.319***
	(.021)	(.021)
Living in rural area	.065	.069
	(.07)	(.07)
Age	.01***	.01***
	(.002)	(.002)
Living on income*High soc. spending	.062	
	(.091)	
Living on income*Low soc. spending		-.107
		(.092)
Constant	-1.732***	-1.79***
	(.224)	(.212)
Observations	34127	34127
Pseudo R ²	.039	.04

Standard errors are in parentheses *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$, Source: ESS8, weighted data

As shown by Model 1 in Table A11, excluding the control variable from the Model measuring the interaction between socioeconomic status and low social spending did not have any significant effect. However, as shown by Model 2 in Table A11, excluding it from the Model measuring the interaction between socioeconomic status and high social spending produced a statistically significant coefficient for the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome. Table A12 shows the margins plot over ‘conditional upon citizenship’, which illustrates the interaction between socioeconomic status and high social spending reported for this outcome in Model 2 of Table A11.

Table A 12. Margins plot 'Exclusion from welfare', without foreign-born pop.



Source: ESS8, weighted data

When the variable measuring percentage of foreign-born population is excluded, the effect of varying socioeconomic status on ‘conditional upon citizenship’ is dependent on whether or not an individual lives in a country with high social spending or in any other country. In countries with high social spending, it is more likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship rather than without conditions, than it is for individuals with lower socioeconomic status. The opposite relationship can be observed in all other

countries: it is more likely for individuals with lower socioeconomic status to feel that immigrants' access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship rather than without conditions, than it is for individuals with higher socioeconomic status. As such, the results of Model 1 in table A11 would have given some support for hypothesis 3a: in countries with high social spending, it is more likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than individuals with lower socioeconomic status. Thus, the results indicate that the effect of the interaction between socioeconomic status and high social spending is closely associated with a country's percentage of foreign-born population.