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THE SEGERSTEDT INSTITUTE

REPORT

REPORT 5

REVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVES IN COUNTER-EXTREMISM INTERNATIONALLY:

What works?

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1. Introduction

In the challenge to all forms of violent extremism (Islamist, far right and far left), educational institutions are often tasked to play a role. There is a mass of literature globally on the role of schools and universities in tackling extremism. However, the vast bulk of this is prescriptive: what schools *ought* to be doing, or *could* be doing. There have been a considerable number of conferences run by international agencies and academic institutions to explore the role of education in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) or Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE). These often result in ‘calls for action’ or the need for more research, or may generate collections of articles that give different viewpoints. These collections are useful but can be fragmented. What we do not have is an overview of what educational institutions are *actually* doing in different countries *in a sustained way* to tackle violent extremism, and whether there is any evidence of the impact of these activities. This review begins such a task.

It first has a brief section defining the terms in use (CVE, PVE). It then moves to an overview of how the issues have been taken up by different international organisations, and the programmes that they have. Examples of national overarching government policies are given. Prescriptions and policies as well as actual programmes on the ground are all based on an explicit or implicit theory of change, and the models are discussed next. While such theories of change relate to assumptions about causation in becoming an extremist, this review does not embark on an overview of such causal theories themselves.

Next, the typology of types of intervention under different headings briefly describes a range of projects in use, looking at their main basis and rationale, whether directly or indirectly tackling VE, and the extent of evaluation. It is difficult to categorise initiatives, as many, if not most, overlap and have multiple aims. This review also cannot track down every single activity globally. Yet identifying the entry points for a wide range of programmes or projects enables some analysis of different directions taken and what is realistic and effective in conventional educational settings. This review does NOT spotlight ‘examples of good practice’ as supported by various agencies if they do not have any evidence of what works, or were one-off initiatives no longer functioning. It tries to focus on initiatives and practices in educational institutions that are explicitly, or at least in part about extremism: thus it cannot go into all the multiple projects on racism, behavior, bullying, prejudice, mindfulness etc. For each type of initiative, a main example is given in some detail, followed by one or two other similar programmes in brief.

The ensuing section tackles evaluation, in terms of the difficult issues in evaluating CVE and what measures the various initiatives have used. The final section summarises the learning on ‘what works better’ (not best, as this is too absolute) in the design and execution of any programme or policy on CVE for educational institutions.

2. Definitions of countering violent extremism

There are many different definitions of CVE and PVE. Sometimes the terms are used interchangeably, and sometimes CVE is directed more to counter-narratives, identifying and deterring those at risk or even already radicalized, while PVE goes further back to lay foundations for building resilience to extremism across a wide spectrum of people. PVE is sometimes seen as the ‘softer’ side of counter-terrorism (CT), involving non-traditional security actors such as teachers, social workers, community leaders, youth and women in addition to the traditional CT actors such as policymakers, senior government officials, police officers and intelligence officials. Zeiger and Ali combine CVE and PVE in their definition of CVE as:

... programs and policies for countering and preventing radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism as part of an overall counter-terrorism strategy and framework. This definition is inclusive of strategic, non-coercive counterterrorism programs and policies including those involving education and broad-based community engagement; more targeted narrative/messaging programs and counter-recruitment strategies; disengagement and targeted intervention programs for individuals engaging in radicalization; as well as deradicalization, disengagement and rehabilitation programs for former violent extremist offenders, (Zeiger & Aly, 2015:2)

Traditional counter-terrorism focuses on the denial of opportunities for terrorist activity by disrupting recognized terrorist groups. PVE, by contrast, aims to get to the root of violent extremism by challenging the ‘push’ and ‘pull factors’ that can lead to radicalization and violence. It aims to prevent the recruitment of individuals into violent extremist groups by providing positive alternatives to engagement or reengagement in violent extremism (Zeiger, 2015).

In looking at what happens in schools, this review will be focusing mainly on the strategic, ‘non-coercive’ side of CVE/PVE, the programmes that reflect approaches in education that potentially engage all youth, rather than target specific individuals – although some relevant programmes are mentioned that do have those who are more ‘at risk’ in mind.

3. The response of international organisations and agencies

Virtually all key international organisations have now organized conferences and symposia on PVE-E (Preventing Violent Extremism through Education). These bring together ‘experts’ on PVE, with the meetings having a variety of aims – sometimes stopping at ‘calls for action’ for policy makers, but sometimes developing resources, specifically on PVE or on related resources such as racism or teaching controversial issues. Organisations will sometimes fund specific projects, such as USAID in Nigeria.

UNESCO has developed two key resources:

- A Teacher's Guide on the Prevention of Violent Extremism (2016)
- Preventing Violent Extremism through Education: A Guide for Policy Makers (2017)

OSCE has produced

- Guidelines for Educators on Countering Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims: Addressing Islamophobia through Education ODIHR (2011)
- Inventory of Policy Documents and Legislation adopted by OSCE Participating States to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism (2016)

It engages in the following activities/targets:

- Capacity-building
- Youth and Civil Society:
- Women and CVE
- Community-policing:
- Human Rights:
- Youth Engagement in CVE:
- #UnitedCVE: an on-going OSCE-wide social media campaign

United Nations has a *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*¹ and an *Inventory of State Programmes*, derived from a Working Group on radicalization and extremism that lead to terrorism.²

Council of Europe has produced a training pack for teachers Living with Controversy: Teaching Controversial Issues through Education for Democracy Citizenship and Human Rights³ (2015) which includes issues of extremism.

European Commission adopted the *EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism* in 2014, which aimed to identify and counter the methods, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into extremism. Through its *CT*

¹ <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/citif/en/plan-action-prevent-violent-extremism>

² <http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf>

³ <https://rm.coe.int/16806948b6>

Morse project, it conducted an assessment of the regional coordinating bodies and the status of CVE research by these bodies (European Commission, 2016).

INEE (International Network for Education in Emergencies) has conducted a survey of programmes on conflict and has a data base of resources *Catalogue of resources on Preventing Violent Extremism* (2016). An example of a report is: *INEE Round Table Report: The Role of Education & Youth in Urban Violence and Countering Violent Extremism* (2015)⁴

Club de Madrid organizes large conferences for policy makers. Outputs include:

- Stop Violent Extremism: Madrid +10 (2015)⁵
- Preventing Violent Extremism: Leaders Telling a Different Story (2016)⁶

INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES specific to CVE include:

EC Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN): A network of frontline or grassroots practitioners from around Europe who work daily with people who have already been radicalised, or who are vulnerable to radicalisation. Practitioners include police and prison authorities, teachers, youth workers, civil society representatives, local authorities representatives and healthcare professionals. There are nine working groups.

Hidayah Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, based in Abu Dhabi. Produces many materials and research reports, e.g. *The Abu Dhabi Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism* (Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund & Hidayah, 2014) and education reports: *Abu Dhabi Plan of Action for Education and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)* (2015) and *The Role of Education in Countering Extremism* (Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Hidayah, 2013)

Networks across countries include

- Counter Extremism Project in 38 countries
- Violence Prevention Network (VPN) based in Germany
- RESOLVE: network of local researchers focused on CVE, *Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism (RESOLVE)* Network in 2015, on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York City.

⁴ <http://www.ineesite.org/en/round-table-role-of-education-youth-urban-violence-extremism>

⁵ http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/programa/madrid_10_preventing_and_countering_violent_extremism

⁶ http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/programa/preventing_violent_extremism_leaders_telling_a_different

4. Examples of government responses and national programmes

National governments have designed their own strategies and policy frameworks for CVE/PVE.

The most well known is the UK's *Prevent* strategy, often considered to be foundational and which other countries have borrowed from. This is the fourth strand of the '4Ps' of the UK counter-terrorism strategy (Prepare, Protect, Pursue, Prevent). It was created by the Labour government in 2003 (although not made public for some years) and its remit was widened by the coalition government in 2011, in order to separate direct counter-terrorism activities from integration work with communities. The Prevent strategy has three objectives:

- Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it,
- Protecting vulnerable people
- Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation.

It also includes providing advice, support, production capabilities and social media training to civil society groups to help deliver counter-narrative campaigns as well as removing extremist material from the internet. Training and learning materials are provided to staff in organisations like schools and the National Health Service in order to help them recognise radicalization. There are local Prevent teams who advise and support organisations.

In 2015 the law was changed to *oblige* specified public organisations to prevent people being 'drawn into terrorism'. This includes councils, the NHS and schools, as well as police and criminal justice bodies. The government's *Guidance on Prevent* says that as part of their duty these organisations need to consider whether those at risk should be referred to the Channel programme, a (voluntary) support plan which may include mentoring, drug or alcohol programmes, anger management as well as employment opportunities. About 7,500 referrals were made to the scheme in 2015-16 - the equivalent of 20 a day - according to a Freedom of Information Request to the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC). Out of those referrals, action was taken in one in every 10 cases. No action at all was taken in 37% of the cases, while a quarter of people referred were found to be vulnerable but not at risk of terrorist involvement. The remaining 28% were still being considered. In cases where an ideology was recorded, just over half related to Islamist extremism and nearly one in 10 were linked to far-right extremism. In some areas of the country, including parts of north-west England, the number of far-right referrals outstrips the number of Islamist cases.

While the Prevent strategy has divided opinion, the government says it is working, and that 150 people, including 50 children, were stopped from entering conflict zones in Iraq and Syria in 2015 because of the strategy. The government also says that its counter-radicalisation programmes reached more than 42,000 people in 2015-16.

Prevent has come under considerable criticism: that it stigmatizes and alienates Muslims, that it is seen as 'toxic', that, in schools it stifles debate, that the government WRAP (Workshop on Raising Awareness of Prevent) training for all public bodies is too short and does not allow time for deep exploration. As it is a duty, it generates an overly cautious approach to referrals, with many doubtful interpretations of behavior and speech. Surveys of Prevent among teachers find opinion was divided, with some believing that concerns about students were better

managed by teachers rather than being passed on to the police, and others feeling it helped them to spot signs of vulnerability in a child so that they could assist in preventing them going down the path of potentially criminal activity. Critiques from researchers relate to the ‘securitisation’ of schools, normalizing security concerns so that they become embedded in accepted, everyday practices.

A particular concern relates to the definition of extremism which is being ‘*in opposition to fundamental British values*’ of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech and tolerance.

The question is what is particularly British about these values, and the implication that any querying of them means suspicion of being an extremist. Busher et al (2017) in their survey of educationalists found widespread discomfort and uncertainty around the focus on the specifically British nature and content of these values and how they can be translated into *inclusive* curriculum content and practice. Yet most interview respondents also spoke about how they and their colleagues were working to ensure that the duty did not have these effects among their students e.g. by foregrounding democracy, active citizenship, equality and anti-racism in their activities designed to address the duty; by seeking out materials that foster a balanced understanding of the threats posed by extremism, terrorism and radicalisation; by emphasising to students that AQ/ISIS-inspired terrorism should in no way be seen to be representative of Islam or Muslims; and by, in some cases, introducing students to some of the Prevent training materials. The survey commented that while there was much in the findings that was testament to the professionalism and dedication of teachers and local Prevent teams, there remain difficult questions: about how the link between Prevent and fundamental British values contributes *in practice* towards reducing the risk of harm to students; about the proportionality of the additional costs and pressures placed on school/college staff; and, above all, about the unintended consequences of the duty for students, and for Muslim students in particular.

Elsewhere

As Macnair and Frank (2017) outlined, other nations and organizations soon modeled their own CVE programs after *Prevent*. For example, in 2007 the **Netherlands** government introduced their *Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan*. The **American** equivalent of *Prevent* (which it was partially based on) is the *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, introduced in 2011, which similarly was intended to specifically counter violent extremism by incorporating communities and supporting the building of resilience from the ground up.

The **Canadian** approach to countering terrorism, entitled *Building Resilience against Terrorism* focuses on four aspects – prevent, detect, deny and respond. In 2012 it was noted that this neglected to mention the role education can play in preventing extremism and in the development of a resilient community that would ensure public safety and harmony. However, in 2017 this role is still not apparent.

In France there is the *Stop Jihadisme* campaign. Launched January 2015, this aims to give French citizens the tools to spot and prevent radicalization. The government-run website promoting this campaign holds a number of resources and info-graphics geared to help citizens

spot and prevent jihadism⁷. In terms of education, France's Ministry of Education presented 11 measures to prevent radicalization and promote secular, republican values within France's school system. (This review leaves this in French, in case it suffers in translation):

Mettre la laïcité et la transmission des valeurs républicaines au cœur de la mobilisation de l'École

- Mesure 1: Renforcer la transmission des valeurs de la République
- Mesure 2: Rétablir l'autorité des maîtres et les rites républicains
- Mesure 3: Créer un nouveau parcours éducatif de l'école élémentaire à la terminale: le parcours citoyen

Développer la citoyenneté et la culture de l'engagement avec tous les partenaires de l'École

- Mesure 4 : Associer pleinement et développer les temps d'échange avec les parents d'élèves
- Mesure 5 : Mobiliser toutes les ressources des territoires

Combattre les inégalités et favoriser la mixité sociale pour renforcer le sentiment d'appartenance dans la République

- Mesure 6 : Engager un chantier prioritaire pour la maîtrise du français
- Mesure 7 : Accélérer la mise en œuvre du plan de lutte contre le décrochage
- Mesure 8 : Renforcer les actions contre les déterminismes sociaux et territoriaux
- Mesure 9 : Une action en faveur des publics les plus fragiles

Mobiliser l'Enseignement supérieur et la Recherche

- Mesure 10 : Mobiliser l'Enseignement supérieur et la Recherche pour éclairer la société dans son ensemble sur les fractures qui la traversent et sur les facteurs de radicalisation
- Mesure 11 : Renforcer la responsabilité sociale des établissements d'Enseignement supérieur

⁷ <http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/lutte-contre-terrorisme-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation/comment-lecole-se-mobilise-t-elle>

<https://www.reseau-canope.fr/prevenir-la-radicalisation/agir-en-milieu-scolaire.html>

The guidance on what schools can do outlines four aspects: prevention (for all students, across the curriculum); tracking and reporting; secondary prevention and youth follow up; and teacher training.

In **Denmark**, the 2014 Prevention of Radicalisation and Extremism Action Plan was in 2016 translated into the *Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalisation National Action Plan*. For schools, this included

- Making human rights a fixed part of the national curriculum for Social Studies and the compulsory subject on health, sexuality and family education.
- Increased focus on pupils' sense of citizenship and critical faculties through simplified common objectives for the Danish Folkeskole
- Theme week on community feeling, democracy and citizenship in the education system
- Materials for learning portal on preventing radicalisation and extremism
- Updating of contingency and security plan
- Guidance on how to prevent extremism and radicalisation in schools
- Advisory hotline
- Counselling for educational institutions
- Survey of existing literature

In **Australia**, the overall strapline for the government strategy is *Living Safe Together: building community resilience to violent extremism*⁸. The Government's Countering Violent Extremism Strategy supports Australia's broader counter-terrorism efforts by addressing factors that make people vulnerable to extremist influences and recruitment by terrorists. The objectives are to:

- Identify and divert violent extremists and, where possible, support them in disengaging from violent extremism
- Identify and support at-risk groups and individuals to resist and reject violent extremist ideologies
- Build community cohesion and resilience to violent extremism
- Communicate effectively to challenge extremist messages and support alternative narratives

Early intervention programmes aim to help individuals who:

- are vulnerable to radicalisation and showing signs of going down that path
- are attempting to travel to participate in overseas conflict, and
- have previously undertaken activities in conflict zones and have returned to Australia but are not subject to criminal charges.

Intervention programmes may include youth diversion activities, healthcare initiatives, mentoring, employment and educational pathway support and counselling. *The Education strand* is '*Building community resistance to violent extremism by equipping communities with*

⁸ <https://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/pages/home.aspx>

the skills and resources to understand and address extremism and reduce marginalisation.' This includes a resource: *Helping Schools Understand Radicalisation*, and projects such as the Digital Youth forum '*digiengage - our diverse digital future*'.

General comments

In addition to government-implemented CVE programmes, a multitude of local, publicly-created CVE programs also exist in communities all over the world (see Mirahmadi, 2016 for an example). The strategies adopted by the various CVE initiatives, while similar in their ultimate goal of preventing violent extremism, range in their primary targets and methods of implementation. They include increasing the surveillance/policing of communities, engaging and conversing with religious leaders, the attempted removal of extremist media and propaganda, the release of counter-messages and counter-narratives, community cohesion programmes, mentoring programmes, and educational initiatives aimed at teaching anti-discrimination and the acceptance of cultural/religious differences (Macnair and Frank 2017). CVE programs have nevertheless been criticized as neglecting the rise and potential danger of violent extremism that is influenced by various other secular and political ideologies such as right-wing extremism. Looking at the histories of national strategies outlined above, one finds however that they are mostly continually under review in the light of critiques and new phenomena of extremism.

5. Theories of change with regard to interventions

A standard definition of a theory of change (TOC) is: '*a logical statement that connects program activities and assumptions to the desired change or goal of the project*' (Herrington, 2015). The logic is one of 'if'.. 'then'.. 'because'.... In this *Search For Common Ground* evaluation, Herrington quotes for example the UNICEF Learning for Peace Burundi Programme:

If we include peacebuilding content into pedagogical materials and training in relevant pedagogical techniques then education service providers will increase their capacity to supply peace and conflict-sensitive education, which will increase the capacity of children to manage conflict peacefully, which in turn will make children more resilient to conflict and stymie the cycles of violence in children and adults.

It can be seen that theories of change contain a number of assumptions about causality and knock-on effects. Theories of change relating to education and PVE relate to theories of why individuals are at risk of becoming extreme and/or violent and then identify a point along any 'pathway' when such processes can be interrupted or reversed. The causes or triggers for extremist behaviours and predispositions which underly TOCs include:

- Vulnerable populations: unemployment, marginalization: *therefore* vocational education
- (Mis)understanding of religious texts: *therefore* religious instruction for the 'correct' view; knowledge of 'other' religions
- Black and white thinking, lack of complexity; *therefore* integrative complexity, value pluralism
- Boredom, need for status, sense of isolation: *therefore* channelling into alternative avenues, sport, music, youth groups
- Susceptibility to grooming: *therefore* understanding of social media, propaganda; showing reality of life in Syria etc.
- Intolerance, prejudice, bias: *therefore* contact, multiculturalism, diversity training

Many programmes in schools of course combine these theories, in order to target diverse populations. It is clear in many PVE programmes that 'common-sense' assumptions hold sway and are not or cannot be tested.

One salient example is from Afghanistan where in late 2013, Mercy Corps carried out research to test the theories of change that link unemployment, poverty and economic deprivation to support for political violence, terrorism and insurgency. The INVEST programme increased youth employment considerably in Helmand by offering technical and vocational education. It had strong positive impacts on most of its intended economic outcomes, as well as on several of the social and political outcomes. However, INVEST had limited impacts on participants' willingness to engage in political violence or their belief that violence is sometimes justified in Afghan politics, and hence did not seem to contribute to stabilisation. Contrary to assumptions, respondents with *higher* personal confidence, more social connections, and who identified as an Afghan before a tribe or religion were *more* likely to be willing to use violence for a political cause. The assertion that young Afghans' negative views of the effectiveness of local or national government bodies are a major driver of support for insurgent movements was not upheld. Rather, young Afghan's sense of respect and dignity stood out as important leverage

points for promoting stability. The research concludes that this aligns with the growing body of theoretical research from social psychology that points to subjective feelings of shame, alienation and lack of significance as underlying factors that drive youth—both poor and well-off—to engage in violent extremism (Mercy Corps 2015). This research is a good example of how one theory of change can morph into a more relevant or even unexpected one.

Such detailed research and complex findings are rare in the field of PVE. Many borrow from theories within conflict more generally, such as contact theory. Academics from the University of Exeter for example have asserted that the Tony Blair Institute's *Global Dialogue* programme makes teenagers more resilient to recruitment by extremists. The programme (detailed later, Section 6.4) enabled children from different cultures to virtually 'meet' via videoconferencing and blogging and showed a marked increase in 'open-mindedness' and empathy which is then seen to act as inoculation against extremist views. The implied theory of change here is that children will be permanently more open-minded about 'others', and indeed vaccinated and resistant to the disease of prejudice and stereotyping. The problem with all contact theory approaches is demonstrating long-term impact, both on individuals and on social stability. These have been going in countries as far apart as Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka for decades, with little way of knowing whether they can demonstrate a decline in support for violent solutions to conflict, especially when identity and safety are actually threatened by 'others'.

More sophisticated is work within integrative complexity which starts from the research that shows that people with low complexity, or black and white thinking, are more susceptible to threat and seeing others as the enemy. If political actors' levels of complexity drop below certain base lines, real world conflict can be predicted within weeks (Liht and Savage 2013) (As this review is being written we are seeing this phenomenon being tested with the North Korea and Donald Trump, both low complexity thinkers). Therefore programmes to increase complexity of thinking in children (detailed more below, Section 6.7) have a theory of change that assumes that because individuals are more receptive to messages with a complexity level similar to their own when thinking about conflicted social issues (based on persuasion literature), increasing complexity in thinking and valuing builds resilience to the very low complexity communications and recruitment efforts of extremists. Low IC ideology provides no other means to resolve grievances apart from mobilization and violent confrontation. But raised IC expands the 'problem space' along with improved cognitive flexibility and critical reasoning, supported by emotional management and social skills (including empathy for self and other) that are fostered in the IC intervention, so that participants can see more options for resolving conflicts in pro-social ways.

A theory of change may start from a base line: In 2001, the Islamic University in Gaza polled 1000 local youth aged 9–16 years old and found that 45 per cent of the students had actively participated in violence and 73 per cent wanted to become martyrs. A study of 190 students from Mutah University, Jordan, found that radical beliefs were highly concentrated on the ideas of martyrdom, violence, hatred and jihad (quoted in Ghosh et al 2017). An intervention would be able to 'test' both attitudes and behaviours after a period of time, with the TOC clearly related to shifts in belief systems.

International organisations and funders often employ a results framework: here this would mean the identification of an extremism driver, a theory of change, an entry point, an output (indicators), an outcome (indicators) and an impact. Outputs and outcomes are sometimes

reversed. But the key warning is not to stop at outputs (that a certain number of people have undergone a workshop) and attempt impact evaluation.

Viable theories of change will allow for different impacts along the linear paths. Burde et al (2015) for example talk of how their theory of change is framed around ‘what works’ to promote key outcomes in education in emergencies programming. They identified access, quality, and wellbeing as the most important ‘*mediating constructs*’, or intervening variables, for education in emergencies interventions, serving to explain the relationship between the intervention(s) and the desired effect(s). ‘*The mechanisms in our theory of change further narrow in on the interceding steps: these are the particular domains that interventions should target in order to improve learning, tolerance, and stability in crisis- affected contexts. But then there are moderators, the characteristics that either strengthen or weaken the relationship between the intervention and the outcomes*’. They proposed that some interventions will be more or less effective for different type(s) of population, such as girls versus boys, or children with disabilities versus children without.

In contexts of concern about violent extremism, it is not always clear that universal educational TOCs inevitably work. As Search For Common Ground (2015) point out with regard to conflict contexts, ‘*general assumptions and proven education theories of change may not be relevant or appropriate in conflict contexts and complex environments where additional variables can upset the traditional change pathways*’ (Herrington 2015:30). Even worse, ‘*if education policies, plans, and strategies are not conflict-sensitive and instigate tension between groups then they can contribute to and fuel conflict*’ (p31). We saw this in UK with regard to the Prevent strategy.


As we look in more detail at specific programmes, it is interesting to see whether there is a specific theory of change, implicit or explicit, and what the causal variables in extremism are seen to be. The impact on participants can be measured in terms of the programme’s short term goals (e.g. they know more about the Koran, they have understood extremism and radicalization, they understand how groomers operate on line, they show more empathy for those that are ‘different’); but do we know whether such knowledge and understanding persists or spreads in time or space? A central problem in any TOC or logic pathway, is that it is mostly linear, assuming a number of constants. It is also instructive to see whether PVE programmes have a scattergun theory of change – that the same programme can be delivered to a diverse group with the assumption or hope that it will work for the majority (most will grow in tolerance and that it will not trigger adverse reactions) or have a targeted TOC, for particular individuals who have demonstrated troubling behaviour.

The major issue then for TOCs in the field of PVE is that of indicators and proxies. Is the programme CVE specific or CVE relevant? While there might be some concrete observables (the number of people going to fight in Syria), most programmes rely on proxy measures such as learners becoming more open-minded. This suffers not just from the usual attribution question (was it the programme that achieved this?) but the equivalence issue (that open-mindedness equals resilience), leading to the temporal/spatial question (whether new open-mindedness pervades all situations and contexts with the same effects). We now look at the programmes to see how they treat such questions.

6. Typology of initiatives and entry points in cve/pve in education

This section looks at interventions that take place in schools and HE, as well as sometimes extra-curricular activities for youth. It also includes some of the on-line materials that schools have chosen to use, even if not designed specifically for formal settings. Together with others who have put together compendia of initiatives, this section has to start with a caveat. As Sheikh et al (2010) concluded from their Rapid Evidence Assessment, the evidence relating to the success of these initiatives in PVE is often mixed. This means that even though many preventative initiatives are highly prevalent and popular (e.g. cognitive behavioural initiatives or mentoring initiatives), there is no strong evidence indicating that they are in fact effective at achieving positive outcomes. To a certain extent this was because there was a lack of availability of high quality evaluations of projects. Additionally, many preventative initiatives that have been evaluated and reported on were more than a decade old. This review reveals a similar picture, finding glowing accounts of a host of projects which, on further exploration, had not lasted, let alone spread. This review selects those that have some sustainability and embeddedness.

Gielen (2017) looked at 73 studies, of which only two were specifically on education. She claims that within the field of CVE, no RCTs have been undertaken, only two quasi-experimental studies by Aldrich and a quantitative longitudinal study by Feddes et al. By drawing on interpretive methods of data collection such as interviews or participant observation, one can provide a “thick description” of a specific intervention. However, interpretivists are criticized for only providing insight into the effectiveness of one specific intervention, in one specific context. Gielen’s map of the policy (p9) is a useful one for assessing where a CVE intervention is targeted:



It would seem that when looking at schools and HE, it is mostly primary prevention that is the concern – at the breeding ground level and then the level of vulnerable individuals. However, it could be argued that even this complex model above does not tackle a fourth dimension, that of government responsibility. As an author of a review of anti-extremism measures in Bosnia writes

There have been several knee-jerk reactions by some in the international community to counter this problem through stand-alone, extra-curricular projects, without tackling the systemic drivers, which are political. These have not worked, as demonstrated by over a decade of limited and pilot projects. In fact, such an approach has actually made the situation worse by providing a veneer of democratic responsibility and modernity to parties and policy-makers who sign on to “reforms,” knowing full well that in the absence of substantial curricular reform – which would itself undermine the nationalist foundations of the political system – the status quo will indeed remain intact. (Perry 2015:4)

Burde et al (2015) conclude that there is little evidence on how types of schooling or educational content and practices contribute to conflict by facilitating participation in and support for violence and extremism. Specifically, the complex relationship between education and radicalisation/tolerance is not addressed widely through intervention programmes. When it is addressed, such as with human rights education or conflict resolution programmes, the programmes are not evaluated rigorously to understand the impact on student attitudes and behaviour. Indeed, discriminatory content and practices can fuel participation in violence by influencing some (but not all) learners' perceptions and attitudes. They stress that studies should isolate the mechanisms that lead to intolerance/support for violence. Studies should also explore why similar students exposed to the same negative curricula choose different paths (violent versus nonviolent, or intolerant versus tolerant).)

It is with all these caveats in mind that we look at 20 types of initiative. This review would not attempt to pass any judgement on their impact, and can only relay what is said in the various descriptions. The examples are not in any order of importance or priority, although sometimes linking together. One example is given in more depth, others referred to briefly.

6.1 Islamist radicalisation

A project from the Violence Prevention Network based in Germany is *MAXIME Berlin–Intercultural and Interreligious Prevention*. The aim of the project is to prevent (further) disintegration and radicalisation of vulnerable youth, to support multipliers to recognize radicalized attitudes and to deal with them, to establish capacity in interreligious and intercultural dialogue and to reduce prejudices and fears in the mainstream society.

The method is 1-3 day workshops for groups of youth around 15 years old identified as at risk of radicalization, conducted by intercultural or interreligious tandem teams who pick up topics such as the theological base of Islam, religious everyday practice, Islam and human rights and the Middle East conflict. Other topics are:

- traditionalism and concepts of honour as well as gender roles in Islam
- opportunities to participate in German society
- different currents of Islam and their cultural and historical backgrounds

- religious fanaticism and Salafism

The precursor was *Maxime Wedding*, where an evaluation found 10-15% of participants were in danger of radicalization, or had already been radicalised.

The programme has been assessed with two main evaluations (Maxime Wedding 2013 and Maxime Berlin 2016), finding a great deal of success: participants said they could speak their mind, could understand other points of view better and had rethought their personal beliefs. There was a positive impact on capacity to dialogue, ability to reflect, and take on standpoint of others. Muslim youth felt valued, and had a better understanding of their own religion. There was a changed perception of Jews after sessions on the Middle East conflict and recognition of the falsity of ISIS. The programme helped the teachers too to tackle issues, and original conflictual atmospheres in the workshops gave way to more tolerance, trust and rules of discussion.

What worked was:

- Joint visits to different places of worships, especially mosques
- Roleplays and a UN simulation in the context of the Middle East conflict, learning about the dynamics of conflict rather than just learning about other faiths. This workshop was facilitated by experienced Israeli and Palestinian trainers who worked in tandem to give different perspectives.
- Political education which discussed who belongs to Germany
- Authentic trainers who themselves lived up to the proposed values, value the students at their level, understanding their backgrounds '*Every opinion has a biography, and what interests us is not the opinion but the biography*'
- (for Muslim students) a greater knowledge of Islam

For sustainability, it is thought that these programmes need to be embedded in formal curriculum in schools (although there is some resistance from teachers concerning workload and the demands of the curriculum, and whether the degree of extremism that they see merits this intensive approach).

Similar initiatives

Another German project is from Berlin, called Teach2Reach, cited in the Violence Prevention Network.⁹ This involves *Aufklärungsworkshops zu religiös begründetem Extremismus* (awareness workshops on religiously underpinned extremism). The aim is to raise awareness (through preventive political education) about extremism and recruitment strategies as well as the development options for working with youth showing signs of radicalization. Further aims are to break the spell of jihadism and to raise the resilience of youth towards extremism.

6.2 Right wing extremism racism

The *Swedish Tolerance project* is now known as the *The Kungälv Model*, one which started after the killing of a young boy by skinheads in the town of Kungälv in 1995, and has been

⁹ <http://www.violence-prevention-network.de/de/aktuelle-projekte/teach2reach>

running for 20 years.¹⁰ This project aims to combat intolerance and racism through equipping high school teachers with the knowledge, research and information on Nazi and right-wing extremism in Sweden. The training includes a historical background of extreme right-wing groups in Sweden as well as a resource network of the latest trends and propaganda being utilized by these groups. It is held that local issues require the analysis and insight of local actors. Teachers, social workers and community youth workers in Kungälv work together to identify high-school teenagers in or at risk of joining neo-Nazi gangs. They map local social structures and interrelationships to identify trouble spots and at-risk youth. They find out where youth are most accessible in daily life and find partners there: schools, teachers, parents and social workers.

The basic idea is to split the structure of a group, providing a different setting for teaching and social-pedagogical work. The approach uses the image of a bunch of grapes to picture the different roles, formations and patterns of influence in a group – the core group, ideological collaborators, followers, girls, perpetrators, collaborators, sympathizers, bystanders or seekers. The structure where the unrest originates has to be destroyed or split, but the split is not enough in itself. In addition there must be work toward establishing new, positive and social relationships. The work demands a high degree of adult participation as well as the presence and participation of youth with no social burdens, but with high social status and a good sense of empathy.

After 20 years it is showing results. It is claimed that there are now no active Nazi or white supremacist organizations in Kungälv and no informal gangs. There is an increased sense of security, less vulnerability, and most important of all, less hatred. However, the greatest success of the Kungälv Model is its ability to get students of widely different backgrounds "to sit down together, learn together, live together."

In Kungälv they counted the costs related to extremism and the costs for prevention and they claim the benefits are a tenfold of the costs. The result of one study '*The Price of Intolerance*'¹¹ shows that a white supremacist group could cost the municipality over 290 million SEK over a 15 year period (43 million USD). The cost of running The Tolerance Project over the same period is about 13 million SEK.

Similar initiatives

From Norway comes: *Dembra* (Democratic preparedness against racism and anti-Semitism). With the support of the Norwegian Directorate of Education and Training, this programme trains teachers and management in secondary schools to prevent anti-Semitism, racism and undemocratic attitudes in schools. The programme offers three seminars on conceptual, theoretical and historical frameworks to the challenge that are combined with hands-on training exercises for inspiring learning inside and outside the classroom. Each school team also designs

¹⁰ <http://www.osce.org/odihr/105385?download=true>

¹¹ <http://www.teskedsorden.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Intoleransenspris-Eng.pdf>

their own school project tailored to the local context that is implemented with the support of mentors and experienced trainers supporting the schools.¹²

6.3 Islamophobia and community cohesion

Germany has the programme *Wie wollen wir leben?* (How do we want to live?) by Ufuq.de (*Pädagogik zwischen Islam, Islamfeindlichkeit und Islamismus*)¹³. They have run 450 peer-based workshops, based on 5 educational films dealing with questions of Islam, anti-Muslim racism, Islamism, jihad and democracy, which had made 2000 copies by 2016. They encourage debates about religious concerns of youngsters in mixed teaching environments and provide space to reflect about questions of norms, values, identity and participation. As interventions prior to and in early stages of radicalisation, they aim at fostering an identification as German Muslims. The workshops are conducted by peers (who themselves have a Muslim background, ranging from more, less or no religiosity) and allow quick, short term interventions (generally 90 minutes) on topics that arise in schools or social centres. The films and workshops explicitly do not follow a religious argumentation; instead, they take up religious concerns as starting points for discussion and translate them into general questions about social norms and values. It is held that reflection on the question of how we want to live together – in the class, the school, the locality, the society – makes young people resilient and protects against simplistic views of the world and of enemies which they have been offered, for example, from Salafism. Evaluations show teachers saying the climate in the class had completely changed, with the discussions liberating, strengthening recognition between the students, with the opportunity for diverse perspectives (religious and non-religious), and the variety within Muslim lives that is shown by the team.

One of the films is called *Stand up For your Rights: islamFeindlichkeit, salafistische propaganda und das engagement Junger muslime*. The film tackles the experiences of discrimination of young Muslims in Germany and criticises anti-Muslim resentment and racism in the media as well. It shows how Salafist internet propaganda highlights these experiences and validates the foundation of a enemical ‘us versus them’ picture.

Similar initiatives

Wales: the GOT project: *Getting On Together*¹⁴ has four inter-locking programmes challenging extremism and promoting integration.

- GOT Schools and Colleges (11-19 year olds) is designed to assist teachers in addressing (controversial) issues relating specifically to Islamic radicalisation. There are 5 DVD episodes and full teaching resources, bi-lingual (Welsh-English).
- GOT Community: In conjunction with South Wales Police and Welsh Government, an itinerant programme principally directed at key adult community figures

¹² http://www.hlsenteret.no/undervisning/dembra/dembra_eng.html

¹³ <http://www.ufuq.de/workshops-zu-islam-islamfeindlichkeit-und-islamismus-an-schulen-in-augsburg-und-schwaben/>

¹⁴ <http://got.uk.net>

- GOT Youth & Community: A bespoke programme targeting youth and young adults in informal settings
- GOT: ‘Understanding Islam’ takes the knowledge and Understandings from Phase 1 and puts sensitive issues within reach of classroom teachers of religious education or Personal and Social Education through 20 filmed scenarios involving Cardiff students.

The objectives, differentiated according to the target audience, are:

1. To counter intolerance and extremism through independent and critical thinking.
2. To facilitate knowledge and understanding of the non-violent message of the Islamic faith.
3. To reduce prejudice and discrimination between all cultures, faiths and creeds.
4. To promote integrated and cohesive communities.

Nigeria has a very different context, of Boko Haram. *USAID* has been funding a programme called ‘Sesame Square’. This is based on the well known Sesame Street, with a similar cartoon format. Its aim was to include tolerance messages, and while it does not explicitly refer to Boko Haram, the aim is to give a message of education for all, gender equity (that girls can do anything), and ethnic and religious tolerance. There have been some critiques (see Moland 2016), that with escalating conflict, the question is whether one should tolerate or celebrate *all* groups (including Boko Haram itself?). The programme may be unrealistic, even offensive. A central question is whether, paradoxically, peace education is a luxury for countries already experiencing peace. However, another interesting initiative is a project where *ex Boko Haram children and children of widows study side by side* with victims.¹⁵ This was seen to be successful. One teacher said he had accommodated Boko Haram’s religious precepts by agreeing to have girls wearing the hijab and knee-length dresses and by asking the mothers to spell out what they wanted for their child.

6.4 Inter-group contact

There is a long history of contact theory underlying projects, with the assumption that actually meeting and interacting with others who are ‘different’ will challenge stereotypes and biases. The *Tony Blair Institute’s Global Dialogue Programme* is based on this, and claims that it makes teenagers more resilient to recruitment by extremists. The programme has enabled children from different cultures to virtually ‘meet’ via videoconferencing and blogging. The programme promoted interreligious and intercultural understanding to build young people’s resilience to narratives often used by extremist groups, which frequently suggest that people from different cultures have nothing in common. The children were to discover what they have in common, learn to successfully navigate difference, and realise that stereotypes about different cultures were not true. The programme was not designed to de-radicalise those who are already engaged in extremist activities.

In its lifetime, the programme has run in 40 countries, including Pakistan, Palestine, India, Israel, Italy, the UK, and the USA, and has connected 230,000 students aged 12-17 in over

¹⁵ <https://www.voanews.com/a/nigeria-boko-haram-children-education/4057576.html>

2,500 schools around the world. An independent study by the University of Exeter showed a marked increase in ‘open-mindedness’, which is then seen to act as ‘inoculation’ against extremist views¹⁶. Participants had greater empathy towards children from different backgrounds and religions, widening parameters of ‘us’ and ‘them’. In many schools the results were ‘spectacular’. The students found that children living in different cultures not only had much in common with them, including musical tastes, but also were enabled to encounter the differences between cultures and perspectives, to ask questions, to engage in respectful challenge, and thus to learn to successfully navigate diversity, without resorting to conflict. A linguistic analysis of the language students used after taking part in the programme found ‘unequivocal evidence of the programme producing a shift towards open mindedness.’ The use of words like ‘us’ and ‘we’ expanded to refer to young people from around the world, rather than just a narrow group. The University of Exeter academics suggested that blogging be used more to allow spontaneous communication.

The inferences and TOCs that are held are clearly set out in the evaluation: the lead researcher said: ‘Those who have experienced the positive potential of dialogue across a range of different perspectives are less likely to fall prey to the simplistic black and white ways of thinking that underlie extremism. It is reasonable to say that this programme serves as a kind of inoculation against extremist violence’. However, in some schools the results of the Generation Global Programme were more pronounced than others, with the commitment of the teachers to the programme making a perceptible difference in results.

6. 5 Dialogue, critical discussion and promoting free speech

A different form of contact is horizontal networking and spreading out to different communities of interest. The international CVE competition called *Peer to Peer: Challenging Extremism* (P2P) was the result of a partnership between the US Department of Homeland Security, Facebook, and EdVenture Partners and encourages and provides funding for university students from around the world to develop and carry out their own CVE campaigns across communities. The program objectives were to design, pilot, implement, and measure the success of a social or digital initiative, product, or tool that motivates or empowers students to become involved in CVE among four different types of group. *Uncommitted populations* have formed no opinion about the violent extremist narrative and therefore have not been involved in preventing or promoting it. *The silent majority* are those who oppose violent extremism but currently are not active in raising public awareness about it or broader prevention efforts. *Civic-minded individuals* are interested in the public good but not necessarily focused on preventing radicalization and/or engaging in grassroots CVE efforts. *At-risk youth* are those who are exposed to the violent extremist narrative and vulnerable to radicalization. (Moffett & Sgro, 2016: 148).

To date, over 2000 students representing 95 universities and 35 countries have competed in the P2P initiative. One specific example is the *Voices Against Extremism* campaign at

Simon Fraser University in Canada. Here the students responsible for VAE decided to build their counter-narrative campaign around the four key pillars of humanization, education,

¹⁶ http://www.exeter.ac.uk/news/featurednews/title_585671_en.html

respect and empowerment (H.E.R.E). For *humanization*, people are to be portrayed not as labels ('refugees'), but as real people with their own faces, names, and stories. To this end, VAE created *Stories of Resilience*, an online social media campaign that featured individuals of various backgrounds sharing their experiences of how extremism has affected their lives as well as their thoughts and opinions on community and Canadian identity. Presented through social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, and updated every few days, *Stories of Resilience* featured recent refugees, recent immigrants, law enforcement officials, academics, politicians, aboriginal leaders, university students, artists, and even former members of extremist organizations.

The *educational* component was primarily to inform the general public about extremism and terrorism by defining these concepts, tracing their history, and attempting to explain how and why they are able to occur. This was done through educational essays and an educational video that was uploaded to YouTube (entitled *An Evolution of Violent Extremism & Terrorism*), as well as maintaining information kiosks around various university campuses where VAE members could speak to other students directly about these issues. For the '*respect*' component, VAE members worked with elementary school children on art activities related to extremism, but also attempted to reach the 'silent majority', the large proportion of the general public that disagrees with extremist behavior, but does little to openly challenge it. The VAE approach was modelled upon the belief that community members themselves are the most potent anti-extremism and anti-radicalization forces, but only if they are confident enough to speak about issues of extremism as they arise. This aim lead to VAE's largest undertaking, an art gallery event entitled *Art is H.E.R.E: Reshaping Identities* which acted as a forum where all individuals who had been involved with the campaign to that point could meet and engage with members of the local community and wider. Metrics revealed that the VAE Facebook page had a total reach (defined as the number of unique individuals who were exposed to the content) of over 160 000. Offline, VAE members were able to directly engage with nearly 100 elementary school students, and with nearly 300 members of the general public who attended the art gallery event. In addition, the campaign was covered and featured by a number of local newspapers, radio stations, and websites, and received international recognition when some of the students responsible were invited by the OSCE to present their campaign at the international United CVE P2P competition in Germany.

Reviewing *Peer2Peer*, Moffett and Sgro (2016) are concerned however that the campaign's primary goal of fostering humanization, education, respect and empowerment, while noble, lacks empirical clarity. No attempt is made to define or describe how these concepts are measured or validated, and as a result, there is no concrete way of telling whether or not VAE had any significant impact on them. Yet admittedly examples of extremist-fostering behavior are often witnessed at the most micro of levels – one-on-one social interactions – and because of this, an effective CVE program is one that should make attempts at arming individuals with the social tools required to challenge these behaviors at the ground level as they witness them. VAE, and the P2P initiative as a whole, does stress the important role that individuals themselves play in motivating their peers to challenge extremism and to speak against hate.

Similar initiatives

Other examples of peer interaction are the South Africa (Govt and NGO-Valued Citizens) project: *Open Dialogues in School*. This partnership between the Gauteng Province Department of Education and an NGO created interactive platforms in schools to promote constitutional

values and develop youth responses to current challenges. The Open Dialogues programme is also said to enhance learners' communication and critical thinking skills by facilitating constructive debates and discussions between peers in a safe space.¹⁷

This question of discussion of sensitive issues and 'safe spaces' leads however to the questions relating to the right to free speech – particularly as it relates to 'extremist' speakers in schools and higher education. The *Right2debate* campaign rejects 'no platforming' and calls on universities not to ban controversial speakers¹⁸. This is in collaboration with the counter-extremism think tank Quilliam. As well as safeguarding free speech and the right to debate within universities, overall the campaign is aiming to transfer power into the hands of the student community, and the wider public, and give students the power to "effectively challenge extremist narratives."

6.6 Conflict and conflict resolution

In the Netherlands is the programme *Expedition Friend or Foe* (by *Critical Mass*). The work is based on academic theories on social processes, coming from cultural anthropology, political science and social psychology. These are translated into teaching methods, including drama, thematic games, documentary and simulations. The approach is a combination of experience, reflection and action. The aim is to give young people skills to deal with (inter-group) conflict in a constructive manner.

The core of *Friend or Foe* is five shipping containers with which the team travel to schools and place in school yards. These are packed with 'experiences'. In an intimate atmosphere students are encouraged to explore their friends and foes, who they are and how they turned into that. Together with the trainers, students search for (new) ways to no longer think in contradictions – friends or foes – and to find ways to deal constructively with diversity. The containers each deal with one of the following five topics:

1. Bullying & dealing with people who are 'different'
2. Exclusion
3. Prejudice & discrimination
4. Conflict hardening & conflict escalation/radicalization
5. Reflecting on your own role & social pressure

Surveys of 1040 students found that students liked the experiential aspects and had changed their perceptions and instant judgments of others (Reported in RAN 2017).

¹⁷ <http://www.valuedcitizens.co.za/programmes/diversion-and-citizenship-programmes/65-sondela-dialogue>

¹⁸ <http://www.independent.co.uk/student/news/student-led-right2debate-campaign-calls-for-universities-to-challenge-not-ban-controversial-speakers-a6898341.html>

6.7 Integrative complexity and value pluralism

A growing initiative emanates from the University of Cambridge UK, where researchers (Savage, Boyd-MacMillan, Liht) have developed the theory, application and assessment of interventions based on integrative complexity (IC). The core framework is based on cognitive psychology, social psychology and social neuroscience. The theory is that social, emotional or political pressures can lead to ‘tunnel vision’ – an over-simplification in values, thinking, and identity that makes people vulnerable to the black and white thinking of extremists. IC interventions by trained facilitators try to leverage a change in mind-set through broadening values, thinking, and social identity complexity using action-learning, group exercises, and multi-media materials. Courses are usually 16 contact hours, delivered flexibly as required in different national and local contexts (currently England, Scotland, Pakistan, South Africa and Northern Ireland). IC involves:

- Knowing your own mind, your own values and beliefs
- Branching out in your thinking so that you actively listen to other viewpoints
- Weaving together the best of different viewpoints into win/win solutions concerning complex life issues.

This leads to making informed decisions, with the ability not only to see polarized ends (black-and-white) but also to take into account the complete spectrum of values related to a topic under discussion – otherwise known as the ‘grey areas’. An understanding of IC can allow one to not only appreciate the differences between two perspectives, but also acknowledge the existence of common beliefs and values that underlie each perspective. This allows for a more expansive understanding of why views differ, and how even these differences can be seen to have similar underlying beliefs, hence allowing for development of social intelligence and empathy, rather than aggressive reactivity.

There are three different target audiences:

- a) For those vulnerable to specific extremisms or sectarian conflicts. This is an audience of both sexes, age range 11 years - adult, either those considered to be potentially vulnerable or those working/mentoring the above groups. These IC courses can be run in communities, schools, mosques, or prisons.
- b) School students, ages 9-18, relating to all extremisms and intergroup conflicts, for citizenship skills, critical thinking abilities, broad-based prevention of extremism, using interactive games and teacher-led learning.
- c) Young children ages 5-8. ‘Storybook IC’ is being piloted in South Africa and prepares young children to develop IC through developing empathy and social/emotional intelligence.

IC has been used in Pakistan at Sabaoon (the facility established for the deradicalization and rehabilitation of adolescent and pre-adolescent males in KPK, Pakistan). This started from the finding that *‘these children are not dangerous in themselves, but can be made to behave in very dangerous ways’* (Peracha et al 2016). These individuals lacked the ability to think and reason in a manner that would have allowed them to question the militant narrative, and the reasons for so-called “Jihad” against the state. They had lost their identities and had been assigned new names by the militants, a ‘metaphoric murder’. Work with them had to restore their identities as well as a more complex way of seeing the world. The programme was then extended to five

secondary schools in the Swat region where the recruitment of children and adolescents was the highest (based on the findings from the Sabaoon population). Tests found both grade achievement and logical thinking improved. The programme *Being Muslim Being British*¹⁹ also tackles identity and explores hot issues facing young British Muslims today, aiming at value pluralism. The course is ‘theologically friendly’, without being theologically driven.

The intervention is tested for effectiveness via measuring IC pre and post course delivery. Five years of strong cross-cultural empirical findings show increased critical, complex thinking post intervention, predicting a reduction in and prevention of extremism and inter-group conflict. Thinking in an integration wise complex way is a non-fakable measure of the structure of thinking (Savage et al 2014). IC is now being started in Northern Ireland. In addition to the IC assessment, this will have five measures – empathy, resilience, emotion regulation, implicit attitudes and a negotiation task. The assessment is to use PCTs – paragraph completion tests. In Scotland this had shown increases in metacognition, embodied cognition and social cognition.

Similar initiatives

A similar approach to hybrid identity is found in a study of an Islamic school in USA, which fostered being ‘wholly Muslim and wholly American’ (Brooks and Ezzani 2017). The school was investigated using Lynn Davies’ *Critical Idealism XvX model* (2008) of schooling types that do or do not counter extremism, and found that the school exhibited many of the qualities of the anti-extremist school. It promoted social integration, whether respect for other faiths or managing to deal with Sunni v Shia issues within the school; it was managing and allowing ambiguity and individual choice, particularly if the Koran does not give an absolute (as in the hijab or dog ownership); it was reaching compromises with parents about controversial issues taking small steps (e.g girls leading prayer); and it was promoting free speech in the school, for example debating the existence of God. Both human rights principles and humour were in evidence. Parents with extremist or fundamentalist ideologies and who were not open to the school’s vision, tended to disenroll their children, and a new teacher who said the school could not conduct Friday prayers as it was not a proper masjid and prayers did not count, also left. The school said

Our ideals come from the concept of having an “American Muslim identity.” I ask students, “What is America?” The answer is that it is a country of immigrants. I explain to them that everyone in America has come from somewhere else, except for the Native Americans. I tell them that everyone has a story about how they ended up here together...

6.8 Moral agency versus moral disengagement

Another initiative which focusses on internal states is the *Beyond Bali* programme in Australia (Taylor et al 2017). A paper by Aly, Taylor & Karnovsky (2014), suggested that rather than

¹⁹ Being Muslim Being British - <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss4/3/>

Being Kenyan Being Muslim - <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss3/2/>

focus on external factors exclusively, that is, political disenchantment or alienation, it is essential to focus on individuals' internal tendency to morally disengage. Moral agency as a remedy for moral disengagement is described as both refraining from inhumane behaviour and deliberately engaging in humane behavior.

The *Beyond Bali* Education Programme is a five module one about the 2002 Bali Bombing, its impact, and the Bali Peace Park response that is designed to build psychological resilience to violent extremism. The programme applied a theoretical framework based on Moral Disengagement and Moral Development to engage students in learning about the Bali bombings and exploring their own values and assumptions. This is designed to activate students' self-regulatory mechanisms of moral agency and psychologically immunize them against the social influences that promote violent extremism. Students learn about Bali and its location as well as the motivations behind the attack.

The programme focuses on the victim's story and includes an 'ethical dilemmas' module which asks about revenge and what should happen to the perpetrators of the bombing. Ethical dilemma story pedagogy is an approach to values learning that employs such stories as a means to engage learners in:

1. critical thinking about a dilemma problem that has no clear cut, black-and-white answer;
2. critical self-reflection on taken-for-granted assumptions grounded in personal values, which involves individual reflection and explanation of dilemma decisions;
3. social learning through subsequent discussions with peers;
4. emotional learning through promoting active and empathic listening skills when different views are shared in class; and
5. problem-solving by co-developing suggestions for possible solutions.

A qualitative evaluation of the program trial indicates that the program achieved some success in building resilience by engaging participants in constructing violent extremism as unjust and inhumane; creating empathy with victims of violent extremism; developing self-efficacy in resisting violent extremism influences and responding to influences in positive, productive ways and considering the devastating impacts of violent extremism.

I knew there was a bombing and it was a bad thing that happened but just the way people talked about it I assumed that the people responsible were 100% fruit loop and it was just a random act and was a tragedy but we should just move on, not that something could be learned from it. (Aly et al 2014:382)

6.9 Philosophy for children (p4c)

P4C has developed over 35 years, and is practised in approximately 60 countries²⁰. Children are taught how to create their own philosophical questions. They then choose one question that is the focus of a philosophical enquiry, or dialogue. For example the question might be 'Is it ever OK to steal?' Children learn to distinguish different types of question: those that seek clarification, those that probe reasons and evidence, those that explore alternative views, those

²⁰ <http://www.sapere.org.uk/AboutP4C.aspx>

that test implications and consequences, and questions about the questions (e.g. how does this question help us?)

The teacher, as facilitator, supports the children in their thinking, reasoning and questioning, as well as the way the children speak and listen to each other in the dialogue. After the enquiry the children and facilitator reflect on the quality of the thinking, reasoning and participation, and suggest how they could improve, either as individuals or as a group (community). One setting for this was in ‘Alternative Provision’ with about 80 students, almost all permanently excluded, and almost all coming from difficult and/or disturbed backgrounds. The school had been using P4C for two years to give the students a framework in which they can think, reason, reflect and disagree without creating conflict.

The overall reported impacts of encouraging young people to question and interrogate ideas include:

- greater recognition that others are entitled to their point of view; that there are not necessarily any ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers, but instead a number of different perspectives and lines of inquiry
- an increased appetite among pupils and teachers to have conversations about potentially controversial issues (such as nationalism) in school settings
- more open-mindedness among pupils, e.g. in relation to current affairs
- improved academic performance of some pupils, due to their application of interrogatory and analytical approaches in their written work for other subjects.

A recent quasi-experimental study was extended from a previous large randomised controlled trial involving 42 schools and nearly 3,000 students, in which half were used for comparison with P4C schools but without random allocation (Siddiqui and Gorard, 2017). The non-cognitive outcomes were assessed before and after the intervention for both groups using a specific survey instrument developed for the purpose and used across a number of previous studies. It was designed to assess changes in self-reported ‘social and communication skills’, ‘team work and resilience’ and ‘empathy’ and a number of similar concepts. It was concluded that in their own right, these types of programmes may indeed improve behaviour, co-operation, self-confidence, empathy and tolerance for others. It was also confirmed that *‘they may be feasible for practitioners facing the demand that they tackle extremism and radicalisation, and enhance so-called ‘British values’.*

6.10 Rights, democracy and citizenship

One of the most widely spreading programmes to use rights in education is *UNICEF’s Rights Respecting Schools*. The UNICEF Rights Respecting Schools Award started in 2004, to encourage schools to use the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as their values framework. The ethos is that everyone in the school learns that children and young people have rights under the CRC and that everyone is responsible for respecting the rights of others. This is not just to foster a civilised school community but also to support a life-long respect for rights, and greater participation in the community through advocacy for rights. Currently 4200 schools across UK are working towards the award, from nursery upwards. All people in or associated with the school (students, teachers, support staff, governors and parents, as well as visitors) are to know the CRC and the implications for the way people relate to each other.

There has been some limited research on the impact of RRSs. Findings from Sebba and Robinson (2010), for example, suggest that the RRSA has had a ‘profound’ effect on the majority of schools involved in the programme. For some, it was a ‘life changing’ experience. Knowledge of the CRC was reflected in rights respecting language, attitudes and relationships. It became a ‘way of being’. Listening, respect and empathy were evident, and there was little or no bullying or shouting. Where conflicts did arise, pupils were more likely than previously to resolve these for themselves. Pupils became involved in campaigns that were understood to be about upholding the rights of others and about living sustainably. There were improved attitudes to diversity and towards those with behavioural or emotional problems. Pupils challenged stereotypes or prejudice. Pupils were involved in governing bodies or staff appointments, or evaluating teaching and learning. The improved relationships between pupils and between pupils and staff increased attainment, and fixed term exclusions decreased.

RRSs are therefore supported by the National Union of Teachers for work in preventing violent extremism, arguing that it is easier to teach controversial issues in a RRS. One RR primary school reported a recent ‘sophisticated’ conversation post-Brexit, about who will be able to live here; another does projects around female genital mutilation. The rights of refugees and asylum seekers are another contemporary political issue which has benefitted from a specific rights awareness. In their policy safeguarding statements, RR schools are therefore mentioning rights as part of safeguarding and security in the school. A number of schools are using charts for successful teaching in the context of tackling push/pull factors for extremism. OFSTED (English Inspection agency) have consistently been enthusiastic about RR schools across a range of measures, including safeguarding as well as achievement. An ongoing assessment process of RR schools in Birmingham finds that that by engaging parents in their children’s education this builds bridges into communities, thereby promoting community cohesion. When parents understand the implications of Articles 13 and 14, about freedom of expression, religion and conscience, and when they see schools genuinely valuing their heritage and opinions, trust can be built. The security of rights provides a space where dissenting voices can be heard and coalesce. A research proposal is now under consideration by the Dept for Education which explores how or whether a rights based approach is able to make children more resilient to extremism (for example, through complexity of thinking, awareness of rights relating to religious freedom, greater belonging in the school, enhanced appreciation of diversity and the rights of others and protection of identity).

Similar initiatives

Other whole school approaches are found in the Flemish Educational System. The *Prevention Pyramid* of Johann Declerk is cited by the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN 2017) as being used in schools, with 5 levels and 58 examples of what schools could/should do, ranging from existential learning about identity to body scans and searches. This would be useful for school policy discussions. This review could not however find evidence of what aspects schools are actually taking on, and which works.

In Albania, the Ministry of Education talks of the need to ‘vaccinate’ students against extremism. The Islamic Community implemented a one-year pilot project beginning in 2015 with US Embassy support entitled *Promoting Democratic Values and Active Citizenship among Muslim Youth* (Regional Cooperation Council, 2016). The project looked at human rights, democratic values and the issue of violence in society, in five of the less developed parts of Tirana, neighborhoods viewed as potentially at-risk due to limited socio-economic opportunity.

The project focused on 15- 25 years olds, mostly male but some female. There were three phases to the project:

1. getting to know the participants, youth, local government, religious players, etc.
2. organization of 8 seminars per location (40 in total) with Islamic Community representatives, experts, and others to discuss human rights, active citizenship and some explicit topics related to FTFs and Syria, etc.
3. joint work among the participants to develop mini projects/workshops related to what they had been discussing during the program.

Examples of projects included the development of counter narrative messages, organizing discussion meetings with local community members and influencers; football tournaments, where they had the chance to distribute awareness materials; and gathering mothers of young people to talk about these issues and their role.

6.11 Using history to understand propaganda

One well known and established approach to raising awareness of influence is to use history to enable learners to understand the past and how the past is reflected in their current lives. *Facing History and Ourselves*²¹ is an international organization found in USA, China, South Africa, UK, France and Northern Ireland, and has been going for 40 years.

Their mission is to engage students of diverse backgrounds in an examination of racism, prejudice and anti-semitism in order to promote the development of a more humane and informed citizenry. The idea is that by integrating the study of history, literature, and human behavior with ethical decision making and innovative teaching strategies, the programme enables school teachers to promote students' historical understanding, critical thinking, and social-emotional learning. As students explore the complexities of history (for example the Holocaust), and make essential connections to current events, they reflect on the choices they confront today and consider how they can make a difference.

The resources are not just about genocide, but a wide range of events, people and movements—including Ed Husain's story of how he became an Islamist extremist in UK, Jewish Partisans in Belarus, desegregation of schools in the US, the teaching of Japan's war history, race theory, the idea of 'the Indian', freedom of the press and of what it means to belong.

Research uses RCTs to assess academic engagement, civic attitudes, social and emotional skills and moral reasoning. In US, a district-wide, randomized controlled study demonstrated statistically significant increases in 7th grade students' empathy, pro-social behaviour, civic attitudes, and decreases in aggression compared to a control group. After two years of exposure to *Facing History*, students, then in 8th grade, were less likely than a control group to endorse bystanding and more likely to intervene in bullying situations. In a quasi-experimental study funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Harvard University researchers found that 8th grade students in *Facing History* class rooms showed greater increases in relationship

²¹ <https://www.facinghistory.org/our-work>

maturity and decreases in racist attitudes and self-reported fighting behaviour than the comparison group. In addition, *Facing History* students were more likely to value engaging with others from different backgrounds.

Facing History and Ourselves was an amazing thing to have as a high school student ...That class got me to think about how our history has shaped our present and how it is shaping our future. It also taught me that singular actions can affect more than just that one person or thing. There really is a ripple effect to everything we do, or don't do in some cases, and how big that ripple is we ... may not know until later down the line.
(Student)

Similar initiatives

Two rigorous studies (Burde et al, 2015) show the positive impact of ‘multiple perspective history’ teaching, which either increases openness to out-group perspectives of the history of intergroup conflict, or promotes positive intergroup relations. They report on a number of initiatives in Israel using multi-perspectivity in history teaching to Jewish and Arab students (e.g. Goldberg, 2014, Adwan and Bar-On, 2004). Whereas a single authoritative narrative decreased openness to the other side’s perspectives, empathetic dual narrative increased it. The impact was more pronounced for the minority Arab students. There was a lower level of dominating discourse for the dominant group. These results are also partly supported by qualitative findings from Northern Ireland that indicated that students showed more interest in out-group perspectives in a context of multiple-perspective history teaching (Barton and McCully, 2012).

However, in a quasi- experimental study of a year-long, school-based programme for Israeli Jewish and Israeli Palestinian youth, the programme created a change in adolescents’ peripheral beliefs, but it did not influence their core beliefs that were central to their groups’ collective narratives. A delayed post-test two months after the first post-test showed that the peripheral beliefs transformed by participation in the programme changed back to their initial states that were apparently influenced by the context of hostile social and political forces.

In UK, an INSTED (In-Service Training and Educational Development) project for teachers on *Sensitive and Controversial Issues* (started in 2011) derives from PVE concerns²². It includes Jahan Mahmood’s work on *Our Forgotten Heroes*, which looks at how 400,000 Muslim soldiers (out of 1.3 million Indians) fought for UK in World War One. Jahan Mahmood and Avaes Mohammed work with schools to combat Islamophobia and show how Muslims have been part of British national history and struggle. The theme is that World Wars I and II connect every family in Britain. “*If more was known about the contribution of so many Muslim soldiers of the British Indian Army, it might help to restore a sense of pride, and cement the social bonds of different communities in British society,*” Jahan suggests. “*This would turn the idea of a shared heritage into a meaningful weapon against prejudice.*”²³

²² <http://www.insted.co.uk/sensitive-issues.html>

²³ http://www.emel.com/article?a_id=1699

6.12 Religious education

For some schools, religious education (not religious instruction) would be a key entry point for discussing extremism. In their *Statement on Extremism*²⁴, Clacton County High School for example puts religious education at the forefront of '*How staff at Clacton County High School are protecting students against extremism*', placing it first in a list of subjects in the curriculum:

The Religious Education department at Clacton County High School studies the main world religions and promotes tolerance and understanding of world views in timetabled lessons in KS3 and through REAL (Religious and Ethical And Lifelong Learning) days in KS4. When appropriate, we discuss current issues in the news that may prompt students to question human behaviour and their motives behind it. We encourage students to use critical thinking skills to identify bias and in doing so develop the skills of analysis and evaluation. Lessons regularly look at 'right' and 'wrong' in terms of religious beliefs and British Law, so it is made clear what is acceptable behaviour in this country.

The school follows the local 'Agreed Syllabus'²⁵ in its requirement to:

- promote discernment
- have secure values and beliefs, and have principles to distinguish right from wrong
- challenge injustice, be committed to human rights and strive to live peaceably with others
- reflect on the impact of religion and belief in the world, considering both the importance of interfaith dialogue and the tensions that exist within and between religions and beliefs
- develop their evaluative skills, showing reasoned and balanced viewpoints when considering their own and others' responses to religious, philosophical and spiritual issues
- encountering people from different religious, cultural and philosophical groups, who can express a range of convictions on religious and ethical issues

It is significant that this syllabus includes not just dialogue but an awareness of the 'tensions that exist within and between religions and beliefs'. Yet this acknowledgment of religious tension may not be widespread in RE teaching. Revell and Elton-Chalcraft (2016) found for the UK that racism and anti-racism were not dominant themes in RE, either in the non-statutory framework for RE nor the RE textbooks, either for trainee RE teachers or students. In addition, Ofsted reports have commented that in many instances RE has a focus on learning about religions rather than on encouraging pupils to reflect on values and their own development.

The European REDCo²⁶ research with 14–16 year olds in eight European countries (England, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation and Spain) shows

²⁴ <http://www.countyhigh.org.uk/policies/Statement-on-Extremism.pdf>

²⁵ In UK there is a locally agreed syllabus for RE (a national curriculum requirement)

²⁶ 'Religion, Education, Dialogue and Conflict' Project (REDCo), sponsored by the European Commission

young people who want an opportunity to learn and talk about religion in schools. They see the classroom (not family or peer group) as the only likely potential ‘safe space’ for this to happen, and they appreciate skilful teachers who can *both* provide accurate information *and* manage discussions that include significant differences in viewpoint. In his article relating to this project, and while seeing the potential for religious education to contribute to anti-extremism, Jackson (2016) is concerned about two issues: the first for extremism *not* to be the predominant aim for studying religions, thereby excessively influencing the selection of content that relates only to this aim. The second, seen in the UK example, is a view of anti-extremism which potentially, and inadvertently, undermines the ‘democratic’ justification that it claims to uphold – that is, how to manage the tension between human rights values and some religious/cultural positions. In the RedCo research, some students wished to avoid conflict: some of the religiously committed students felt vulnerable.

The learning from such research and evaluations points not just to the syllabus, but how teachers are able to manage competing values – and not just in religion.

6.13 ‘Correct’ versions of islam: theological interventions

A study for the UK Department for Communities and Local Government (Pratchett et al 2010) found that the two most successful deradicalization interventions with young people were ‘capacity building or empowering young people’ and interventions that ‘challenged ideology that focused on theology and used education or training.’ Education and training in theology was also found to be successful in preventing violent religious extremism for Muslim women, although interventions that allowed women to debate and discuss theological issues were more successful. The study also emphasized that work delivered through outreach approaches was more successful than work taking place in formal institutions.

The *Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims* recently adopted a charter on countering violent extremism and is engaged in efforts to strengthen community resilience against violent extremism through initiatives that include engaging in interfaith dialogue and advocacy on human rights and governance. This involves cooperation with stakeholders—including civil society groups, national and county governments, faith-based organizations, and international development partners—aimed at preventing and combating violent extremism within the Muslim community and beyond (Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015).

Interventions in **Pakistan** reveal some fascinating stories, lending support to the idea that for at-risk populations there, traditional Muslim institutions are critical places for conducting counter-extremism. For example, when community members in Rahim Yar Khan in southern Punjab became concerned about several young men who had been radicalized, the parents of the young men approached a local madrasa to request an intervention. One of the community’s well-respected scholars met with the young men to explain that terrorism had no place in Islam. “*It wasn’t a simple process,*” he explained. “*We argued back and forth for days, but eventually the boys learned that their concept of jihad was doctrinally inaccurate*”. Such interventions are occasionally taped and informally shared with other at-risk youth. Their efficacy is due to the fact that religious scholars within traditional Muslim networks are familiar with arguments employed by radical clerics and counter them point-by-point within a sound, theological framework. Also, religious leaders operate at the grassroots level and are intimately aware of dynamics within their communities. As such, they can rapidly identify radicalization and know how to intervene appropriately. In a village near Bhera, for example, a father learned that his

son was being influenced by a radical recruiter to believe that he would enter paradise if he became a suicide bomber. The father turned to teachers at the local Dar ul-Uloom, who advised him on how to publically cast doubt on the recruiter's religious credentials by delegitimizing him in their conservative community. The father rescued his son by exposing the radical mullah. In a community gathering, he challenged the mullah: "*After sending my child to paradise, why don't you send your own son to join him so that mine won't be lonely?*" The recruiter eventually relented and was unable to attract additional children from that town (Mirahmadi et al, 2012).

The question arises however, about the wider reach and politics surrounding disengagement initiatives. Reviewing the Pakistan programmes mentioned above, Khan (2015) in a paper for the United States Institute of Peace holds that disengaging militants and the general population without violating sacred beliefs is critical. This can be done by involving moderate religious scholars who can dispel incorrect notions of Islam sanctioning violence and terrorism. Yet If deradicalization is to meet with any success in Pakistan, the national narrative needs to change from an exclusionary one that considers Sunni Muslims its prime citizens to one that embodies pluralism and secularism, based on tolerance and the rights of people to make religious, political, and social decisions without fear of state and social persecution. The rule of law must be all powerful and protection extended to everyone without prejudice. Such a view relates to the concerns in Bosnia about recognizing politics, mentioned above.

6.14 Changing beliefs through knowledge of others

One theory of change is that simply providing more knowledge can change attitudes and beliefs. An example is provided by Amjad and Wood (2009) who, using an experimental and control group of Muslim students (N=92) in a university based in Pakistan, quantitatively assessed the impact of a *knowledge-based intervention* that attempts to change normative beliefs about aggression towards Jews. This study also sought to establish whether any observed change in beliefs is accompanied by a change in the likelihood of joining an extremist group. In the experimental condition, students received a substantive talk by a British Pakistani psychologist who was working on Muslim-Jewish relations. This addressed the history of victimisation of Jewish people before the Crusades, the kind treatment of Jewish people by the Prophet Muhammad, the shared Semitic heritage of Judaism and Islam; and the sharing of knowledge between scholars of Judaism and Islam throughout history. A questionnaire relating the normative beliefs was administered at the start and end of the lecture to this and a control group. In the 3 days following the lecture, participants were approached and asked to join extremist groups. Amjad and Wood provide no more detail about the content and methodology of this particular knowledge-based intervention and the findings should thus be interpreted cautiously. The results of their assessment show that those participants who received the intervention were less likely to request information about or join the extremist group when approached. People who had not received the intervention were 5.29 times more likely to request information and 16.57 times more likely to join. The magnitude of the effect suggests that normative beliefs were not strongly held and were relatively amenable to change. (Amjad and Wood, 2009: 517)

Knowledge based approaches will depend on context. Ezekiel (2002) from an ethnographic study of *neo-Nazi youths in Detroit, USA*, found that conventional knowledge based approaches to anti-racist education in schools were felt to be ineffective from the participants' perspective. The teaching of multiculturalism was seen as an exercise in hypocrisy. Black History Month was an annual annoyance. Adult-led discussion seemed like sermonizing. Ezekiel argued that

respecting the pre-conceptions of participants – however unpalatable – without necessarily accepting them, is an essential first step in making an educational initiative genuinely participant led. ‘*Education about racism should begin with respect for the constructs and emotions that students bring with them into the classroom*’ (2002:65).

6.15 Psycho-physical; personal, social and health education

The Arktos NGO in Belgium has developed the *BOUNCE Resilience Training* programme. The BOUNCE Resilience Tools were designed as an early prevention psycho-physical training for (vulnerable) youngsters to strengthen their resilience against radical influences and to raise the awareness of their social environment. The project has developed three sets of training modules based on testing in Belgium and the Netherlands:

1. BOUNCE Young, a tool for training youth, where youngsters learn to bounce back and bounce up when dealing with challenges, with ten interactive agroup training sessions
2. BOUNCE Along, a tool for training adults and front line workers, The tool provides tips, insights and practical exercises for adults in the social environment of youngsters. It assists them and strengthens their role in the early prevention of violent radicalisation.
3. BOUNCE Up, a train-the-trainer tool.

BOUNCE Along covers five topics: ‘a positive point of view’, ‘strengthening resilience’, ‘resilient relations and communication’, ‘concerns and challenging situations’, and ‘information and support’. The tools are available online for free, but it is suggested that prior to utilizing the training programmes, the facilitators undergo training themselves. All the tools are currently available in English, French, Dutch, Serbian and Albanian.

Similar initiatives

Another psychological intervention uses cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). One study (Heller et al, 2013) reports results from a large randomized controlled trial of an intervention called ‘Becoming A Man’ for disadvantaged male youth Grades 7-10 from high-crime Chicago neighbourhoods. The intervention was delivered by two local non-profits and included regular interactions with a pro-social adult, after-school programming, and - perhaps the most novel ingredient - in-school programming designed to reduce common judgment and decision-making problems related to automatic behaviour and biased beliefs, (that is, CBT). Programme participation reduced violent-crime arrests during the programme year by 8.1 per 100 youth (a 44% reduction). The study did not mention extremism as such, but had some interesting clues, for example of the impact on reducing automatic, angry behaviour, but also common biased beliefs such as hostile attribution bias (over-attribution of malevolent intent to another).

6.16 Using former extremists, realism

The organization *Extreme Dialogue*²⁷ aims to build resilience to radicalisation among young people through a series of open-access educational resources and short films that explore prejudice and identity, and foster critical thinking and digital literacy skills. *Extreme Dialogue*

²⁷ <http://extremedialogue.org/>

encourages safe and constructive discussions around extremism and radicalization in educational or community settings in Canada, Germany, Hungary and the United Kingdom. The short films tell the personal stories of those profoundly affected by extremism: a former member of the extreme far-right in Canada, a mother from Calgary whose son was killed fighting for ISIS in Syria, a youth worker and former refugee from Somalia, a former member of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) whose father was killed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a former member of the now banned British Islamist group al-Muhajiroun, a Syrian refugee now living in Berlin, and a member of a Roma community in Hungary targeted by far-right demonstrations. The films are accompanied by a set of educational resources that include Prezi presentations and practitioners' resource packs to be used with young people aged approximately 14 to 18.

Evaluation feedback collected via quantitative and qualitative feedback forms from school pilots in Calgary, Canada and London, United Kingdom included testimonials from students that they had gained a more nuanced understanding of the radicalisation process, the spectrum of extremist groups, the consequences of violence and the importance of a range of perspectives.

Similar initiatives

Films are also used by the UK anti-extremism organization *ConnectFutures*²⁸, which interviewed former extremists about their backgrounds and experiences and, after the research, made films of their participants for use in schools. These have been well received by teachers and students, particularly when a former extremist is able to come to talk to students live and answer their questions. The important link between gangs/crime and radicalization is explored in the film of 'The Woolwich Boys'²⁹.

In Indonesia, the NGO *Aliansi Indonesia Damai (AIDA)*: *bebas darkekerasan ekstremis* (*Alliance for a Peaceful Indonesia: Free from Extremist Violence*) is an organisation supporting victims of terrorism. They have developed outreach Teams of Youth Ambassadors consisting of one victim of terrorism, one former violent extremist and one religious authority. These outreach teams have been piloted in several schools and community settings targeting students aged 16-18. The victim of terrorism and the former violent extremist each tell their stories, after which there is a question and answer session. The religious leader serves as a religious authority on questions of ideology and faith, while the victim and former extremist provide warnings against the consequences of violent extremism.³⁰

*C4C, Counter-Narration for Counter-terrorism: Voice of the victim*³¹ use the testimonies and the stories of the victims of terrorism. The C4C project has developed a multi-language open

²⁸ www.connectfutures.org

²⁹ <https://www.connectfutures.org/new-film-woolwich-boys-gangs-extremism-september-2017/>

³⁰ <https://toolkit.thegctf.org/document-sets/abu-dhabi-plan-action-education-and-countering-violent-extremism/good-practices/iii>

³¹ <http://www.c4c-project.org>; details in RAN; see also AIVITER Memoria futura /Future Memory (Italy)

source web platform, entitled “The Terrorism Survivors Storytelling - Global platform for resilience stories and radicalisation awareness”. This has been tested in an Italian school, where the students made videos. After the experience, fewer students in the class justified the use of violence in terrorism.

6.17 Social media, digital literacy

Here the target is on-line radicalization. Perhaps one of the best known in UK is *Digital Disruption*. The project is designed to equip young people with skills to question the content they encounter online, to be discerning and ‘savvy’. The project also enables young people to recognise some of the techniques that influence their ideas, opinions and real life behaviour. This is done through running workshops with young people, by giving teachers the tools and training they need to teach these skills in the classroom and by creating digital resources³² that educators can use. These target the ‘digital native’ generation (11-19 year olds) who are often confident, but not competent Internet users. Research found that 1 in 4 young people do not make any checks at all when visiting a new website; less than 1 in 10 ask who made the site and why. One third of young people believe that information generated by search engines must be true and 15 per cent base their opinions of a website on how it looks and feels to use.

The focus on Digital Literacy as a means of preventing online radicalisation all stemmed from a project in the London borough of Tower Hamlets in 2009, which set out to prevent young people from being radicalised in the borough. This was after it was learnt that extremist messages were recorded onto audiotapes and placed into the shoes of young Muslims whilst they were at prayer at a local mosque. The parent Company *Bold Creative* provided expertise in youth communications and interactive design to ensure that Digital Disruption’s resources were relevant, fun and accessible for a young audience. The deliverables (exercises and videos) centre around trust; propaganda; and source checking. One well known film is the Vampire Conspiracy. Students make their own films about propaganda.

Similar initiatives

In France there is the project *les Promeneurs du Net*³³. Youth workers approach at risk teens on online social networks and provide support with social, educational or preventive measures, where needed. They also propose meetings or active involvement in concrete projects. By detecting early signs of radicalised views, this approach also allows prevention of radicalisation and/or violent extremism among young people.

³² www.digitaldisruption.co.uk

³³ <http://www.promeneursdunet.fr/>

Also links to new Web Walkers project across other countries in Europe

6.18 Improving economic opportunities and civic engagement

Here the TOC relates to drivers of extremism that are located in poverty and lack of opportunities. A USAID study of three interventions in East Africa (USAID 2013) found that for the education component, Madrasa students had lower scores than secular schools for preparation and optimism about the job market (which made them more at risk). Of the three programmes designed to tackle this, the most effective was the *Garissa Youth Program (G-Youth)*. This is a localized intervention that focusses on a combination of livelihoods/skills training as well as civic engagement in the Garissa municipality of Kenya's NE Province. Almost all the participants were ethnic Somali youth. G-Youth has four primary pillars of intervention: Youth Action, Youth Education, Youth Work and Youth Civics. After completion of a three week intensive work readiness programme, Garissa youth can apply for entry into specialised programmes, for example, IT or media, or market research. The G-Youth programme has also established a youth radio broadcast that reaches youth throughout the NE Province and beyond. G-Youth has also rehabilitated the local library structures, creating and staffing a career-counselling centre with a specific youth wing. There has been a Youth Summit as well as support for cultural and recreational activities, as prioritized by the youth themselves.

It is thought that many of G-Youth's successes can be attributed to the relationships developed with local government authorities (notably Members of Parliament, religious leaders (including the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) and clan leaders. It was viewed with scepticism to start with, but is now widely appreciated, particularly as it is in a usually neglected part of the country, and will expand further.

What was learned that the initial strong focus just on livelihoods needed to incorporate many other elements of programming focused on building youth associations, advocacy, civic engagement, and community projects. G-Youth was certainly influenced by the developing Kenya Yes Youth Can Program (managed by the same USAID Education Office), which emphasizes a youth-owned and youth-led approach encompassing economic, social and civic engagement.

The evaluation stresses that it is critically important to ensure that CVE programming addresses a multitude of drivers, including both livelihood opportunities as well as civic engagement. While a clear strategy to involve parents was missing, the G-Youth model, with a deliberately limited geographic scope of intervention anchored around the establishment of strong community relationships over time, offering the most 'holistic' approach. The learning from focus groups was that youth who are *engaged*, but have a low sense of *efficacy*, were frustrated and possibly vulnerable to extremist attitudes. To address this phenomenon, future CVE programmes should address ways to increase youth voice and influence, particularly by encouraging more avenues for engagement with authorities, with linkages to civil society, NGO, media and local government programmes.

One of the other programmes funded by USAID was the *Somali Youth Leaders Initiative* (SYLI). To respond to this evidence gap on what works in CVE, in 2016 Mercy Corps carried

out a rigorous mixed-methods impact evaluation of this³⁴. The research tested the impact of increasing access to formal education and civic engagement opportunities on youth participation in and support for political violence. (Both of these types of interventions are prominent priorities in the Somali National Strategy and Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism). Specifically, they used an ex-post quasi-experimental matched design, relying on survey data from youth in Somaliland, supplemented by Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with in and out of school youth (both males and females), teachers, Ministry of Education officials, and members of Community Education Committees.

The research findings challenge some common assumptions. Although improving access to secondary education reduced youth participation in political violence by 16%, it increased support for political violence by 11%. However, when combining secondary education with civic engagement opportunities that allow youth to carry out community action campaigns, both participation in and support for violence drop significantly, by 14% and 20% respectively. Giving youth in schools the ability to participate in civic engagement activities alongside formal education, it seems, fulfills a common desire among youth—the desire to do something positive, meaningful and impactful. The researchers suggest that addressing this need is one way to steer youth away from a path towards violence, making a difference through non-violent actions leading to stability-related outcomes.

All of the projects, particularly SYLP and G-Youth, rely on a degree of self-selection. Only youth who are inclined to take advantage of an opportunity provided by a project will enroll and meet selection criteria. By partnering with non-traditional organizations (i.e. mosques) and offering services in high demand (i.e. English skills or recreation), relationships can be built and programme content adapted for to accomplish broader messaging. There is a need to target gangs and the under-18s.

The findings signal that education by itself does not fully address the underlying drivers of potentially destabilizing actions such as support for political violence. By increasing young people's concern about future employment prospects and their dissatisfaction with government's provision of education, schooling does not relieve youths' frustrations; rather it can compound them. What matters to youth is not just having an opportunity to learn, but also being able to use their capabilities to achieve their ambitions and shape their future and the trajectories of their communities and nation.

Similar initiatives

The *Antwerp Drop Out Prevention Network*³⁵ in Belgium provides programmes giving the opportunity to develop competences and qualifications, tackling unqualified and early school leaving, grade retention, truancy and cross border behaviour, radicalisation, expulsion, inequality (poverty, language) and the gap between education and the labour market. The partners in the network are:

³⁴

https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/CRITICAL_CHOICES_REPORT_FINAL_DIGITAL.pdf

³⁵ www.antwerpen.be/onderwijs

- Local educational forums and projects
- Schools and Pupil Guidance Centres
- (Local) welfare facilities and health services.
- Justice department and police
- Flemish employment services / job centres

This is seen as a very close knit network for detection and follow up of youngsters with a problematic school career, using all relevant partners. In 2013 the network started monitoring and follow up of possibly radicalised youngsters in schools. Part of the team received specialized training to enable them to identify and engage in follow up. At present the team can be consulted by the schools and the pupil guidance centres as well as by the ‘radicalisation antenna’ in the culture, sport and youth departments of the city³⁶.

6.19 Diversionary activities

Initiatives in preventing extremism are sometimes indirect, not tackling ideology, but diverting youth into other areas of interest and importance for them. From Belgium (Flanders) comes the programme *Athena-syntax Where Art and Education Meet*. This project grew from a dialogue between teachers of science, religion and worldviews, after they had noticed students were confused by discrepancies between lessons on evolution and on origin narratives. The project is built upon common values: that any interaction in the school presupposes the acknowledgement of universal human rights; mutual respect; freedom of choice; freedom of the individual; freedom of speech; gender equality; secularism (the separation between church and state) and dogma-free scientific research themes.

There are four themes (time, choice, space and human being) which are dealt with across subjects, and through focused projects with ever-widening perspectives. During the first two years of secondary school it starts from the student’s own (religious or other) worldview (DISCOVER). In years 3 and 4, other worldviews are introduced (ENCOUNTER), and during the last two years, extensive dialogue is undertaken regarding societal themes, using the various religions and worldviews to offer diverse perspectives on these themes (EVOLVE). The teachers of the various religions, ethics, science and art develop the dialogues together, leading towards a learning pathway that is linked to educational outcomes and Active Citizenship.

The Athena-Syntax model specifically focuses on art. The rationale is that within the space and the freedom art offers, people are able to discuss difficult and sensitive topics. The art has a ‘sublimating’ function. The project brings motivated and professional artists into the school to work with students; numerous debates, presentations, excursions and workshops are also organized, for example, concerning the evolution of social behaviour, and the meaning of science, art and religion – again with prominent speakers being invited in connection with controversial topics.

Koninklijk Atheneum Antwerpen³⁷ had faced big challenges in their school. They witnessed infiltration by radical Islamists and there were conflicts around religious symbols.

³⁶ https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/11450_en

³⁷ Athena-syntax@atheneumantwerpen.be

Demonstrations and clashes took place outside the school and the school was in the national and international press. The school took serious measures by banning the veil on the one hand, and at the same time invested seriously in the staff with an intensive programme in personal communication. The Athena-Syntax art programme was evaluated using official measurements through student surveys in 2011 and 2015. It was found that the number of students becoming radicalised had decreased; since the intervention began, no more students had left to fight in Syria. '*Our students' art is of course the most beautiful evidence*'. Films of their work, focusing on identity formation, use of local role models and 'heroes' emphasise how they have choices for the future.

Similar initiatives

Elsewhere, 'diversionary' activities such as sport have been evaluated. Research by the Office for Public Management (OPM), evaluated the impact and effectiveness of the *West London Alliance (WLA) PVE Pathfinder Programme*. The case was an example of a number of projects aimed at involving young people in a variety of diversionary activities and support networks ranging from sporting activities such as football sessions to group discussions. For example, the ASDC Somali youth project in Ealing (London) involved Muslim youths in a number of activities within the security of the youth club such as cooking or football matches. The research found the potential barriers to this kind of project included engaging those 'most at risk' in diversionary pursuits, due to the sensitivity of the subject. However, those who did take part supported the view that diversionary activities had the potential to redirect individuals away from extremist ideologies.

6.20 Deradicalisation and mentoring

In most countries, full deradicalisation programmes mostly do not happen in school settings, but interesting initiatives are found in Pakistan. Pakistan runs six main deradicalization programmes throughout the country: the Sabaoon Center for Rehabilitation (mentioned earlier) Mishal, Sparley, Rastoon, Pythom, and Heila (Khan 2015). The objective of the first three is to educate detainees in curricula that include formal education, including corrective religious education, vocational training, counseling and therapy, and a discussion module that addresses social issues and includes sessions with the students' families. The Mashal Centre, run by the Pakistan Army, has been running since 2010 and focuses on offering three-month courses. Most participants are under 30 years of age. According to the Centre's own assessment more than 1,000 individuals have 'graduated' from the programme, with only 10 per cent failing. The Sabaoon Centre focuses on rehabilitation and readjustment of child recruits who were to be suicide bombers. In 2013 the Centre was looking after 85 boys and is reported to have had about 100 successful rehabilitation cases (Ranstorp and Hyllengren (2013)

In Europe, there would not be specific schools for this, rather intervention projects. In Germany the NGO *Cultures Interactive* works on right wing de-radicalisation. It uses a "Fair Skills" de-radicalization approach combining youth-cultural workshops with civic education, deradicalization interventions, anti-bias and democracy training, psychology and self-

awareness training to prevent right-wing radicalization in Berlin and in rural towns of Eastern Germany³⁸.

6.21 Evidence of schools using handbooks on extremism

This review has also talked to writers of specific texts for schools on extremism to ask if they know how their books are being used in schools. Jamieson and Flint in the UK have written two key handbooks: *Radicalisation and Terrorism* (2015) and *Talking about Terrorism* (2017). These texts, written by experienced teachers, are built on the philosophy that children can cope with uncertainty, and that there is not an answer to every question. Jane Flint believes very strongly that teachers should be gentle but honest, and that they should not attempt to reassure children that ‘there won’t be more terrorist attacks’. In part this goes back to her teaching after the London transport bombings, but she has also found that not providing false hope or illusion is an important guideline in dealing with children where, for example, a family member is terminally ill.

With regard to *Radicalisation and Terrorism*, published in 2015, the authors report that they have had mainly anecdotal evidence and feedback from individuals and individual schools. In most cases teachers said they had used the book together with other sources such as children’s TV or YouTube clips. An example was the YouTube clip after the Paris attacks (and TAT suggests a number of such YouTube clips³⁹). The authors report that for *Talking about Terrorism*, Stockport County Council has ordered 90 copies, so that the book is clearly being distributed to schools and used as a recommended text.

At a seminar where the resources were discussed, the attendees were Personal, Social and Health Education (PSHE) and Citizenship teachers working with 11-14 year olds. They all said they had experienced problems with discussing terrorism/extremism in the classroom because they did not understand enough about the subject themselves, although most had had the official WRAP (government) training. Those who had had such training said it was very oriented towards Islamist terrorism as the principal threat, and had felt it was quite biased. One teacher had found it particularly hard to explain why terrorists killed themselves as well as others. There was consensus around two main issues: a) the one that you do not have to have all the answers; and b) that grievance is one of the most important concepts to explain to children. This shifts the primary focus away from the assumption that religion is the ‘cause’ of terrorism. Many of the discussions in the seminar revolved around issues of identity and these were viewed as important. There was almost universal disapproval of the concept of ‘British values’ which were frequently changed to ‘values we are proud of’. Another aspect seen as important was ‘people who keep us safe’ and ‘who to talk to if you are worried’. All these were incorporated into *Teaching About Terrorism*. All the teachers reported difficulties in making time for discussions of issues around violence and terrorism, mostly due to other pressures on curriculum time. However they all reported massive interest in the subject, and could have spent much more time on it.

³⁸ <https://toolkit.thegctf.org/document-sets/abu-dhabi-plan-action-education-and-countering-violent-extremism/good-practices/iii>

³⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHfDcU9eBf4>

In terms of evaluation of the lessons, the teachers were particularly interested in lesson evaluation and reflection on this topic, and in giving children time to return to the issues with questions or responses. One teacher kept a ‘success diary’ in which pupils were invited to note at least one strength or benefit from the lesson. Another had a ‘learning log’, i.e. ‘one thing I’ve learned from the lesson: how can I apply it in my life?’ Yet another teacher had a ‘floor book’ whereby any pupil could pick a jotter type book off the floor and write down thoughts or fears without signing their name.

In the US, Edith King’s (2017) E-book text *Educating Students in Times of Terrorism* is used at the U. S. (federal) agency, Western Region Equity Assistance Center, located at Metropolitan State University of Denver, Colorado. The instructor using this text is the Equity Specialist Coordinator for training elementary and secondary teachers to be able to discuss terrorism and extremism with students.

7. Issues in monitoring and evaluation

As noted in the section on Theories of Change, evaluation of initiatives in PVE are notoriously difficult. Chowdury Fink et al in their publication *Evaluating CVE Policy and Progress* (2013b) outline some obvious features to consider such as the objectives of the evaluation, scope and level, identifying an evaluator, developing indicators, but at a more complex level, ‘What qualifies as a CVE programme?’ CVE engagement is being undertaken in a range of areas, with a number of projects in such other policy domains as education, development, social services, and conflict mitigation. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to know what qualifies as a CVE-specific or a CVE-relevant program and where CVE results may be an additional outcome or impact rather than the primary objective of the programme. As they point out, in particular, evaluating CVE impact may be difficult if it is not explicitly elaborated in the initial design or implementation plan, with the question: ‘What exactly are the outcomes?’ (p3) As discussed earlier in this review with regard to a theory of change, a base-line study is often intimated ‘keeping in mind that, in complex environments, small shifts may represent big successes’.

Deradicalisation programs have grappled with the difficult question of evaluating an intangible outcome and where the base line starts. For some, success has been defined through behavioural characteristics (e.g., whether detainees exhibit violent behaviour, join violent groups, or support the use of violence for political expression). Other programmes have sought cognitive changes, such as an ideological transformation of a detainee (which means particular benchmarks). Recidivism and group membership are more-straightforward measures. Others have looked at individual transformations, participation in community activities and sports, and personal and professional development as indicators of success. These start to offer insights for CVE in education settings.

An evaluation of work within the Violence Prevention Network (VPN) on prisoners used interviews with prisoners, trainers and staff before, during and after interventions⁴⁰. They found that far fewer participants were reincarcerated after their interventions compared to state interventions. There were interesting findings:

1. People can change
2. The first year is the most critical
3. There is no change in behaviour without the capacity for empathy
4. The key is gaining insights rather than conditioning
5. The trainers is more important for success than the methodology
6. Deradicalisation is more than a training programme
7. Secure income increases the possibility for success

For educational settings, 1,3,4 and 5 have particular salience.

For police officers on the beat, success may be determined by shorter response times, more invitations by communities to interact, more calls with information or requests for assistance, or a higher conviction rate. For government officials, success may be determined by overall

⁴⁰ https://www.mdx.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/52003/2010-FPS-Harald-Weilnbock-THHO-21910.pdf

expressions of public satisfaction with counterterrorism policies, rising perceptions of public safety and confidence in law enforcement, and a reduction in the number of planned or executed terrorist attacks. In education, the indicators are more difficult. Is an increase in the number of students referred to the police or to mentoring programmes for being at risk of radicalisation a sign of teachers' greater perception or a failure of the PVE programmes, i.e. a good or bad sign?

The Danish experience (the Aarhus model) targeted three levels of the 'Prevention Triangle':

1. The general level (building and strengthening the state's resistance against extremist propaganda, for example through campaigns and general education, with a focus on inclusion, democracy and citizenship)
2. Group level (a more specific focus on vulnerable groups, aiming to forestall the radicalisation process)
3. Individual level – prison mentors, coaches etc

Evaluation 'when faced with short time horizons and noisy data' was on four levels:

1. Reaction: Immediate experience of the course
2. Learning: increased knowledge and changes in attitude
3. Behaviour: changes in practice
4. Results: effects on surroundings

One measure not found in the cases in this review is the 'Most Significant Change methodology (MSC) in which subjects are asked how their life and worldview has changed after an intervention. The claim is that MSC is also well-suited to monitor and evaluate grassroots initiatives that do not have predefined outcomes against which to evaluate. This is the approach that WORDE field researchers utilized in the Pakistan study, resulting in anecdotal evidence of successful peace-building initiatives (Miramahdi et al, 2012).

Elsewhere, some evaluations will begin from the 'drivers' of extremism to extrapolate what might help to interrupt these. In East Africa, for example, USAID funded projects used surveys of 1500 youth to investigate five thematic areas that push or pull an individual into violent extremism:

- Level of civic engagement
- Level of efficacy
- Level of support and belief in the power of youth organisations
- Level of individual's sense of identity
- Level of support for use of violence in the name of Islam

This combined set of indicators led to complex and sometimes surprising findings. The 2013 study by Mercy Corps in Somalia found that youth who are involved in civic engagement initiatives are less likely to *endorse* political violence, but are more likely to have *engaged* in such violence. This counter-intuitive finding shows positive attitudes expressed in a survey may not translate, at least immediately, to less violent behaviour. It is always possible that 'empowerment' through civic engagement can go the 'wrong' way. Even demonstrated *outcomes* in efficacy etc. have yet to translate into the *impact* of a reduction in terrorism and youth violence. Monitoring and evaluation analysis (Bamberger, Rugh and Mabry, 2012) finds

that impact in development programs often cannot be demonstrated until seven to ten years after the beginning of an intervention.

Another form of evaluation is the ‘rapid evidence assessment (REA). This was used by Pratchett et al (2010) in their community intervention review. The REA looked at a wide range of databases, both nationally and internationally, to find evidenced, evaluated interventions which had been intended to change attitudes towards violent extremism. (This source was used in this review to locate educational interventions). The authors note the need for refinement in terms of quality, scope, and definitional clarity, thereby reducing their evidence base from 813 references to 68, and with further detailed reading the identification of 18 sources, which between them offered 70 different interventions. Out of these 70 interventions 55 of those related to preventing support for violent extremism *in the name of religion*.

It can be seen from the examples and initiatives in the above section that evaluation is varied, but that it is rarely definitive. A brief overview of the types of evaluation used in the case studies in this review finds:

- Attitude surveys (perceptions of ‘others’, empathy, awareness, support for violence, changed gender perceptions) as well as overall interest in the topic
- Psychological measures (of self-efficacy, self-esteem, sense of identity, sense of security)
- Cognitive measures (measuring changed structures of thinking through coding of responses to scenarios such as moral dilemmas)
- Behavioural measures (decline in anger, extent of civic engagement)
- Knowledge measures (knowing more about conflict and the causes of extremism)
- Ex post quasi-experimental designs linked with Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)
- Future projections from respondents (the likelihood of joining an extremist group)
- Impact on the community (decline in supremacist organisations and gangs)
- Cost-benefit analysis of economic impact of the reduction in community tension.
- Changed climate in the class and in the anti-extremism sessions themselves
- Linguistic analysis of the language used by students to talk about themselves and others
- Products from the programmes: students voluntarily campaigning, making films and starting websites, putting on community events, developing art
- Metrics from use of Facebook pages from campaigns, the take up by media

Some use RCTs and /or comparison groups, a few base-line/end-line, and most use post intervention assessments. Some use external evaluators, but many use internal assessments during and immediately after a programme. Clearly, this depends on the funding of a programme and what a donor or government requires. This review cannot comment on the validity or rigour of the evaluations nor the results claimed, only report on attempts to assess.

As has been seen from the descriptions, some programmes claim absolute success; others acknowledge confounding factors which influence impact. These factors include:

- The pre-experience of the participants/students: what they bring to PVE
- Whether changed attitudes actually lead to permanent or even temporary changed behaviours
- How teachers use materials provided

- The post-context: that attitudes or even behaviours seem to change as a result of a programme, but core beliefs remain, and may re-emerge when there is conflict or hostility, or a terrorist attack
- Whether what works in one locale is transferable to another, particularly in different contexts for conflict or community cohesion, related to ethnicity or religion.
- The range of the programme (whether confined to schools or targeted at the wider community)
- Whether surveys overcome correlation versus causation concerns, that is whether any change can be attributed solely to a programme
- Who are full, partial and non-beneficiaries (and how one knows).

8. What works better?

This concluding section moves to pulling together insights from the varied case studies and their evaluations, but looking firstly at general commentaries. In an interesting critique of the initiatives cited in the various RAN compendia, Mattson et al (2016) point out that '*These texts are highly focused on what young people must not become, what they should avoid and how they can see beyond propaganda, and less focused on pupils developing an understanding of themselves, the society they live in or on how teachers can incorporate pupils' lived experiences into their teaching*'. As they argue, projects are individualised and decontextualised. The discourse is of the war on terror.

Burde et al (2015), while liking multiple perspective history, say starkly that '*No robust evidence shows the best ways for education to counter extremism*'. Promising observational evidence shows that equal educational access and greater national levels of educational attainment may limit participation in militancy or extremism, but these results are mixed. More scholars are therefore calling for attention to the *quality* of education. For example, Shafiq and Sinno suggest "*the direct effect of educational attainment on suicide bombing attitudes depends critically on the content of education and the values inculcated in educational institutions. If educational curricula and institutions do not promote peaceful conflict resolution, then educational attainment may not affect attitudes towards suicide bombing* (2010:170 as cited in Burde, 2014:19).

In a recently published research overview, the Swedish researcher Herz (2016) mapped out certain components that seem to be successful in preventing radicalization and violent extremism generally: effective collaboration between authorities, having a local presence, involving family and civil society, increasing human rights and access to welfare, focusing on the individual instead of the ideology and critically examining one's own organization. Herz suggested that professionals in, for example, schools should use traditional and general preventive social work and pedagogy to promote democratic, social and human rights.

An extensive review of literature on education and extremism by the Health and Education Advice and Resource Team at the UK Institute of Development Studies (IDS 2015) acknowledged the diverse contexts of extremism across the world and the fact that 'education' does not just take place in the classroom, with the need for broader societal processes to support and underpin any formal response. However, the team identified 18 educational 'facilitators' generally that are said to help build resilience to extremism in young people - many of which, as they admit, feel like general principles of good teaching (e.g. clear communication of learning objectives, ground rules for discussion, using simple theoretical frameworks and interactive techniques, encouraging engagement with a range of information, and appreciating the value of an evidence-based approach). The question is whether teaching approaches for challenging extremism are indeed just 'good teaching' or whether they require some sort of specific focus to tackle push/pull factors into extremism and questions of identity.

For Pratchett et al (2010) it was clear that education and training delivered to challenge ideology and theology was successful when it was non-prescriptive, but instead focused on allowing individuals to develop independent thinking or research and leadership skills in order to question and challenges themselves and others about knowledge they received. This would be supported by Sheikh and Reed (2010) who found that across the interventions in the literature, a key element of success was gaining the trust of young people by employing a respectful,

listening style of interaction. This was also the case in a small scale qualitative study by Cockburn (2007) with 11 young male supporters of the far right. When asked to consider the quality and impact of anti-racist education or diversity awareness training the young people reported feeling angry at the way these were delivered. This was because they felt that the deliverers were not interested in listening to them, engaging with their ideas and constructively challenging their beliefs in a respectful manner. Similarly, McCauley (2002) claims that there is little evidence that directly teaching values can reliably cause changes in behaviour. Based on a review of research on social and anti-bias learning, he argues that “feet first” education (enacting actual changes in behaviour) is more likely to change hearts and minds than “head first” education (teaching values and principles). For example, he shows that people have unlearned racism by engaging in de-segregated situations.

Bonnell et al in their 2011 review posited three sets of broader support factors, within schools and other education settings, which are important in enabling the key ingredients to be employed in successful teaching approaches and interventions to PVE:

1. *Effective partnership* working with local agencies is required to ensure local understanding about the intervention, enlistment of locally-trusted individuals, the development of a ‘network of support’ to ensure the intervention’s sustainability in different places over time; and open communication and ownership for specific aspects of an intervention.
2. *Strong support from school leaders* is essential in gaining the buy-in of teachers and students and, where appropriate, parents and local community representatives. It means that the intervention is more likely to be well-resourced physically and in time resources and training, and have a strong and clear educational rationale for those who are involved in it
3. If an intervention or programme is to be sustainable, it needs to be *linked with and anchored into the wider curriculum* structures and teachers’ working practices in order to increase its potential to have maximum impact and avoid the necessity of spending time on one-off, isolated discrete interventions that may need to be repeated at further cost in the future.

It would seem, ironically perhaps, that the myriad PVE interventions and workshops, interesting though the students find them, are less than effective in providing permanent resilience unless they are part of a broader framework in the school. Perry writes with regard to Bosnia that:

While there are indeed micro-level examples of good practices – discrete teacher-training workshops, youth camps, reconciliation-minded arts programs, etc. – these are the exceptions that prove the rule. They are also nearly always externally proposed and funded extra-curricular options. In terms of compulsory education and the curricula that shape formal education, the monoperspective, “us vs. them” narrative continues. Only by ensuring that every student in the country can receive an education that is inclusive, multiperspective and multi-sourced; where critical thinking skills and media literacy are mainstreamed; and where any child can with confidence go to any school and learn together with their peers, will the attraction of extremist agendas be effectively diminished. (Perry 2015:4)

This conclusion would apply much more widely than Bosnia.

Just as in the 2015 *Search For Common Ground* report on monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding, a systems approach is called for – looking at upstream structures of plans and curricula, capacity development of staff and individual development of learners. Even if there are specific ‘entry points’, these need to have multipliers into the wider community to ensure any hope of sustainability⁴¹. Mirahmadi (2016) comments that whilst most CVE community engagement programmes are criticized because Muslim communities tend to be targeted and singled out, the community-based Muslim-led organization WORDE is applauded. She explains that the success of the programme lies in the bottom-up top-down approach of the programme and diversity of the organization. Diverse faith and ethnic communities are the frontiers of the programme in which they have ownership and shape the programme, but at the same time are supported by local government and law enforcement.

To **summarise** the above comments and the case studies under review, the following eight ‘principles’ can be confirmed. CVE/PVE is more successful

- When a strategy is firmly embedded into a school in its permanent safeguarding policy, in its ways of thinking (e.g. rights, integrative complexity, philosophy for children) and in its curriculum (e.g. multiple perspective history)
- When teachers have had good (i.e. more than superficial) preparation to be able to discuss controversial issues, react to an immediate terrorist event and/or safely and sensibly identify children at risk
- When a programme is non-prescriptive, not moralising, but leads to independent thinking and reflection on ethical dilemmas and concerns; when learners are listened to.
- When a holistic set of ‘recipients’ is envisaged and targetted – students, teachers, family and community, acknowledging the networks of interaction that surround learners
- When a wider range of actors is involved and consulted on the programme – local police, religious leaders, community actors, social workers
- When a multitude of ‘drivers’ of extremism is acknowledged and a programme does not just target one (e.g. poverty, or ideology)
- When a programme is not just learning about ‘other’ faiths, but provides a political understanding of conflict
- When a practical and visible outcome is achieved: civic engagement, campaigns, production of counter-narrative materials, i.e. that learners are not just recipients of ‘interventions’ but become active in anti-extremism work themselves.

That is, while the term ‘prevent’ is understandable, this review can confirm that PVE has to focus less on what students should *not* become and more on what they actively become. CVE/PVE work has in fact to be wary of the notion of an ‘intervention’, with the implication of a one-off attempt at interrupting a negative pathway towards radicalisation, and should be more about building a permanent culture in schools where resilience to extremism is just one aspect of a fuller learning of rights, history, religious and ethnic conflict, and community

⁴¹ http://dmeforpeace.org/sites/default/files/EP%20guide%20_%20Final%20B%201027.pdf

dynamics. CVE/PVE work is also about promoting habits of active citizenship in terms of tackling injustice and grievance through non-violent means.

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