




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Exploring split ticket voting motives

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Exploring split ticket voting motives

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Abstract

Split ticket voting is becoming increasingly common in most political systems. Tendencies to split votes has grown steadily during the last decades (Dalton, 2014: 197). Split ticket voting refers to the act of splitting one's vote on several candidates or parties in elections and can occur in two different ways: by the division of votes to several, equivalent offices (horizontal voting) or to multiple levels of government (vertical voting) (Burden & Helmke, 2009:2).

But why does it occur, who is the split ticket voter and how can we understand its steady increase among the electorate? This report investigates split ticket voting motives in Sweden using data from the 2018 Swedish National Election Study. The special circumstances offered by Sweden's concurrent elections enable comparisons of voting motives on the national and local levels. The results show that *sincere voting* motives are most salient among split ticket voters in Sweden, and that *strategic motives* are relevant as a measure of threshold-insurance. Furthermore, the results show high salience of issue politics, and local level politics prominently referenced among split voters. Additionally, the analyses reveal differences between groups based on social and political cleavages, suggesting that motives for split-ticket voting vary across different groups.

Sammanfattning

Röstdelning blir allt vanligare. Benägenheten att röstdela har ökat stadigt i Sverige under de senaste decennierna och ökade nivåer av röstdelning rapporteras från många olika valsystem (Dalton, 2014:197). Röstdelning innebär att dela sin röst på flera kandidater eller partier i val, något som kan ske på två olika sätt: genom att dela sin röst i flera, likvärdiga val (horisontell röstning), eller genom att dela sin röst till flera politiska nivåer (vertikal röstning) (Burden & Helmke, 2009:2).

Men hur förklarar vi dess förekomst, vem är den typiska röstdelaren och hur kan vi förstå dess stadiga ökning? Denna rapport undersöker röstdelningsmotiv i Sverige med hjälp av Valundersökningen 2018. Sveriges gemensamma valdagar möjliggör jämförelser av röstmotiv till nationella och lokala val. Resultaten visar att *preferensröstning* är det vanligaste motivet för röstdelning, följt av *strategiska motiv* som huvudsakligen används för att hålla partier ovanför fyraprocentsspärren på den nationella nivån. För preferensrelaterade motiv är sakfrågor såväl som lokalpolitiska frågor mest förekommande. Resultaten visar även skillnader i motiv mellan grupper baserat på sociala och politiska skiljelinjer, vilket tyder på att röstdelningsmotiv varierar mellan olika grupper.

Split ticket voting motives

There are three main theories established in the field of split ticket voting motives. The first, *sincere motives*, suggest split votes to reflect genuine but divided support towards multiple parties or candidates. The second, *strategic motives* reflect tactical deliberations where votes are split to maximize one's political impact. The third, *protest motives*, is a way for voters to express discontent towards parties or candidates in one or several levels of government, whereby votes are split to manifest disaffection.

1) *Sincere voting* refers to the act of voting in accordance with preference, regardless of outcome (Plescia, 2017: 20); this encompasses support for parties, candidates, or policy in all levels of government. Accordingly, split ticket voting based on sincere motives is the expressed electoral support for multiple parties and/or candidates. The expression of a sincere vote is largely formed by the electoral context; in systems where votes are cast on candidates rather than parties, candidate-effects are evidently more salient. Conversely, party-centred systems increase the relevance of preferences based on parties. Moreover, candidate-centred preferences are more often expressed in systems with clear distinctions between parties and candidates in elections (Karp, Vowles, Banducci & Donovan, 2002:13).

Candidate effects are often associated to candidates' ability to form personal links to parts of the electorate. The identity of the candidate, as well as their ability to personalise the political content are relevant factors explaining 'the personal vote' (Plescia, 2017: 20). Another factor explaining candidate effects refer to voters' preference towards local representation. Here, the personal identity of candidates is less relevant. Instead, the ability to promote local policy is central (Karp et al., 2002: 6). Additionally, voter attachment is an important factor for the salience of candidate-effects. Weakly attached voters are more likely to consider multiple aspects of elections and to split votes on contending parties/candidates (Karp et al. 2002: 4). Similar heuristics is applicable in all aspects of sincere voting, as weak political bonds make voters more inclined to consider multiple aspects of politics and more susceptible to campaign effects and party strategies (McAllister & White, 2000: 574).

Another expression of sincere voting is based on support towards policy, either as a manifestation of ideological identification or as support towards political proposals and policies. Sincere voting based on policy support is often contingent on the salience of political issues, and often applicable in high-profiled issues (Solevid & Oscarsson, 2019: 152-153). Likewise, issues that offer clear and distinct political divisions increase the salience of sincere voting.

2) *Strategic motives* can reflect numerous voting deliberations. Most commonly, strategic voting is used to manage risk of a wasted vote, to ensure parties or candidates to reach the electoral threshold, or to balance policies. The wasted vote heuristics is a way for voters to manage and opt out of non-viable candidates or parties to ensure electoral impact and is salient when there is an impending risk of wasting one's vote. Threshold insurance measures is used to ensure that small parties reach the electoral threshold, either to ensure the political survival of the party or to affect party coalitions and parliamentary formations (Plescia, 2017: 20). Inversely, voters can opt out from parties close to the threshold if considered non-viable. The heuristics of threshold insurance is salient for voters in multiple levels of elections and relevant in the assessment of parties as well as candidates.

The policy-balancing model is a way for voters to affect the orientation of policy. By voting for parties or candidates slightly to the left or right to one's preference, voters can achieve an overall shift of policy towards their ideal point (Brunell & Grofman, 2009: 63). Contingent on voter's ability to assess potential political outcomes and to deliberate several aspects of politics, the policy-balancing model is relevant for voters in multiple levels of politics.

3) Lastly, *protest voting* motives are commonly applied in reference to the second-order theory. Here, protest voting is salient for voters in so called ‘secondary elections’, i.e., elections beyond the vote to the national government (or president). As the main objective of voting in national election is to influence the composition of government, the protest vote is less salient in first-order elections. Using slightly different heuristics in second-order elections, voters are thus expected to be more inclined towards experimental voting and to vote based on disaffection (Reif, 1997: 112). Connected to the electoral cycle, protest voting is expected to be more prominent if second-order elections are held mid-term of national elections (Reif, 1997: 112-113). In these instances, the vote is more often used to signal disaffection towards the incumbency, established parties and to challenge status-quo. The protest vote can be used to signal discontent towards multiple aspects of politics, e.g., on policy, government and towards established parties. Small parties, oppositional parties and single-issue parties are often beneficiaries of the protest vote and can be applied to explain the success of e.g., green parties and anti-immigration parties. For instance, the success of the Swedish local party ‘The Democrats’ in the 2018 municipal election in Gothenburg was the result of dissatisfaction towards local implementation of policy on infrastructure (Solevid et al., 2019). Similarly, the success of parties opposing the joint policies of the European Union as well as the success of green parties in elections to the European Parliament is a way for voters to affect the direction of policy (Hix & Marsh, 2007: 496). The success of (single) issue niche parties and anti-establishment parties in national elections (for example, the National Rally in France or the Sweden Democrats in Sweden) contradicts the second-order theory and suggests the protest vote to be salient in all levels of election.


Determinants of split ticket voting

The political capacity of split ticket voters has long been debated. While some suggest split ticket voting to be the result of voter confusion (see e.g., Campbell & Miller, 1957 & Schoen, 1999), others propose split voting to reflect a deliberative and rational process (see e.g., Karp et al., 2002; Bawn, 1999). In reference to the claim of voter confusion, votes are split as a compensatory measure to manage low political capacity, and to balance multiple viable options (Burden & Helmke, 2009). An alternative claim of voter confusion refers to uncertainties towards the electoral system, whereby votes are split to compensate confusion towards electoral procedures (Jesse, 1988). Among claims in favour of the rational split ticket voter, high levels of political sophistication is emphasised, and split votes argued to reflect high political capacity rather than confusion or detachment. Here, research points towards a positive association between education and split ticket voting and for split ticket voters to display high levels of education and political interest (Karp et al., 2012: 16-17; Erlingsson & Oscarsson, 2015: 370).

Less debated, research show weak political attachment among split ticket voters. Self-evidently, voters not closely connected to specific parties and/or candidates are more inclined to split their votes (McAllister et al., 2000: 563). Further, research suggest differences in split ticket voting tendencies based on gender and age, and for women and younger to be somewhat more prone to split votes (Erlingsson et al., 2015: 370).

So far, several factors explaining the propensity for split ticket voting have been established by previous research. Split ticket voters tend to have weak bonds to parties, are well educated and politically interested. Younger are more inclined to split votes than older and women are slightly more willing to divide votes than men. Though not conclusive, a majority of research argue split ticket voting to reflect a deliberative process and for split voters to display high political capacity. Though not directly linked to split ticket voting, additional aspects found in research on political behaviour are relevant to explore in the context of split ticket voting. In a Swedish context, ideology and residence are strong political dividers, and left-right placement and the rural-urban dimension strongly affect political opinions (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016: 54-55).

Figure 1 Split ticket voting in Sweden 1970-2018 (per cent)



Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

The Swedish context

Record high levels of split ticket voting was reported in the Swedish election 2018, with 30 per cent – almost a third of all voters – splitting their votes on multiple parties on the national and local level. When concurrent elections was introduced in 1970, split ticket voting was rare and approximately 6 per cent of Swedish voters split their votes (Berg, Erlingsson & Oscarsson, 2019: 93). During the last decades split ticket voting has steadily increased, and Swedish voters have become more inclined to cast votes on multiple parties (Persson, 2020: 2).

Several aspects are relevant to explain the steady increase of split ticket voting in Sweden. On a system level, Sweden's electoral and political setting are relevant factors. Concurrent elections to national, regional and local government offer voter wide range of parties in all levels of politics and increase the salience of split ticket voting (Solevid et al., 2019: 145). Sweden's proportional multi-party system reinforces voters' wide selection of viable parties, as well as the relatively low electoral threshold¹. Although Sweden is a unitary state with centralised government, there is a long-standing tradition of strong local self-government. Regions and municipalities are entrusted to implement policies determined by national government and to make local adaptations (Lidström, 2015: 365). This organisational feature makes politics salient on multiple levels, potentially increasing the relevance of multilevel considerations, further increasing the salience of split ticket voting.

On an individual level, voter sophistication is a relevant factor for the steady increase of split ticket voting. In accordance with a worldwide pattern of social development, the Swedish electorate have become better equipped to navigate the political sphere. The general development towards higher education has improved voters' deliberative capacity (Dalton, 2014: 24). Thus, reinforcing voters' ability to form multiple but separate political preferences (Solevid et al., 2019: 145).

¹ The electoral threshold in Sweden is 4 per cent in national election, and 3 per cent in regional and local elections (2 per cent in municipalities with one constituency).

The combination of conditions offered by the Swedish setting is favourable in many concerns. Concurrent elections make numerous parties available in all levels of politics, thus increasing the salience of split ticket voting. Adding to the wide range of viable options, Sweden's multi-party system structure and low electoral threshold further reinforce split voting incentives. The strong local governance in Sweden increase the salience of politics on all levels, potentially adding to the formation of multilevel party preferences. Taking voters improved political skills into account; large parts of the electorate is well equipped to form diversified political preferences and to distinguish between the different tiers of elections. All this considered, Sweden presents ideal opportunities to explore split ticket voting and the salience of different voting motive theories.

Data and coding scheme design

The analysis of split ticket voting motives in Sweden is conducted with data from the 2018 Swedish National Election Study. The survey offers exclusive data on split ticket voting as it includes an open-ended question on voting motives. Unlike most survey questions on split ticket voting where options are fixed, the SNES surveys open-ended format enable respondents to freely list their main motives. By not giving respondents any cognitive queues, the survey offers unique data on split voting motives based on a bottom-down perspective. Thus, allowing a way to test the relevance of established theories on split ticket voting motives while also considering additional motives.

The modes of data collection of the 2018 Swedish National Election Study consists of a combination of mail back and web questionnaires. In total, the survey was sent, by random selection, to 23 400 respondents. The preliminary response rate is 46,4 per cent. The post-election edition, which include open ended questions on split ticket voting, was sent to 7 700 respondents, and the field period ranged from 2018-08-30 to 2018-11-02. The open-ended question on split ticket voting motives asked respondents: "If you chose to vote for different parties in national and local elections: For what reason did you vote for different parties this year's national and local elections?" Respondents were limited to enter a maximum of three reasons when answering the question. In total, 962 respondents answered the open-ended question on split ticket voting².

Testing of split ticket voting motives in Sweden was conducted through the development and application of a coding scheme. The scheme allows simultaneous testing of established theories as well as consideration of additional motives found in the SNES data material. The coding scheme consists of three sections. The first section contains the main motives for split ticket voting established by previous research; sincere, strategic and protest-based motives. An additional category is added to this section, which allows consideration of alternative motives found in the data. The second section enable multi-level consideration, and motives are distributed according to local, regional and national level references. Here, an additional category has been added in which non-specific level responses are placed. The third section allows specification of the three main motives through five subcategories which denotes whether the main motives are expressed in reference to political issues, politics, candidates, party leaders or parties.

Coding was conducted by manual categorisation, and each response was evaluated and sorted in accordance with the structure of the coding scheme. Responses not corresponding to the categories of the scheme was sorted into the additional category. Responses placed in this category was thereafter analysed, and supplementary categories was added to the main sections of the scheme. Responses not corresponding to the supplementary categories was placed into the additional category.

² When excluding missing codes, total number of respondents are 906.

Table 1 Coding scheme, classification of split ticket voting motives, 2018

Sincere motives	Protest motives	Strategic motives	Additional motives
Preference, unspecified	Discontent, unspecified	Strategy, unspecified	Other, unspecified
Preference, political issue	Discontent, political issue	Supporting	'Change/incumbency shift'
Preference pol. issue, local	Discontent pol. issue, local	Supporting local	
Preference pol. issue, regional	Discontent pol. issue, regional	Supporting regional	
Preference pol. issue, national	Discontent pol. issue, national	Supporting national	
Preference politics	Discontent, politics	Preventing	'Election compass'
Preference politics, local	Discontent politics, local	Preventing local	
Preference politics, regional	Discontent politics, regional	Preventing regional	
Preference politics, national	Discontent politics, national	Preventing national	
Preference, candidate	Discontent, candidate	'Divide votes on multiple parties'	
Preference candidate, local	Discontent candidate, local		
Preference candidate, regional	Discontent candidate, regional		
Preference candidate, national	Discontent candidate, national		
Preference leader	Discontent, leader	'Option not viable'	
Preference leader, local	Discontent leader, local	(party/candidate not eligible or viable in all levels of election)	
Preference leader, regional	Discontent leader, regional		
Preference leader, national	Discontent leader, national		
Preference party/parties	Discontent party/parties	Strategy, other	
Preference party, local	Discontent, party, local		
Preference party, regional	Discontent party, regional		
Preference party, local	Discontent party, national		
Preference, personal (personal gain and/or beneficial for self/family)		'Large party able to implement policies'	
Preference set by level of (politics preference formed in reference to level of politics)			

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: The coding scheme used to categorise split ticket voting motives based on the open-ended question "If you chose to vote for different parties in national and local elections: For what reason did you vote for different parties in this years' national and local elections?"

Distribution of split ticket voting motives

As a first measure of testing split ticket voting motives, the distribution of answers into the coding scheme are examined. Note that the distribution of the scheme refers to the number of responses, which exceeds the number of respondents for the survey question. This as it is possible for respondents to enter several motives.

An initial examination of the main motives in table 2 (sincere, strategy, protest) show heavily skewed distributions. It appears that Swedish split ticket voting is mainly explained by sincere motives; with well over half of the distribution (68 per cent) of responses found within preference-based motives. This corresponds to the theoretical assumptions, which suggest high salience of sincere voting motives in Sweden. The proportional system enables voters to vote in accordance with preference, as the risk of a wasted vote is low. The salience of sincere voting is enhanced further by the large variety of viable parties enabled by the multi-party system design, and low electoral thresholds. Though much less mentioned, strategic motives is second most common of the main motives with 13 per cent of the responses. In accordance with theory, strategic motives would be salient for Swedish voters in reference to the electoral threshold and strategic split ticket voting a way to keep parties above the threshold. Here, strategic deliberations are less likely to adhere to risk management of a wasted vote due to Sweden's proportional system design.

Table 2 Distribution of the coding scheme, split ticket voting motives, 2018 (percent)

Sincere, total (n)	68,4 (901)	Protest, total (n)	8,0 (105)	Strategy, total (n)	13,2 (175)	Additional, total (n)	10,4 (137)
Preference, unspecified	0,2	Discontent, unspecified	0,3	Strategy, unspecified	1,9	Other, unspecified	6,6
Preference, political issue	11,3	Discontent, political issue	0,2	Supporting	0,2	'Change/incumbency shift'	2,2
Pref. pol. issue, local	9,6	Disc. pol. issue, local	0,7	Supporting, local	1,6		
Pref. pol. issue, regional	1,5	Disc. pol. issue, regional	0,2	Supporting, regional	0,3		
Pref. pol. issue, national	2,0	Disc. pol. issue, national	0,2	Supporting, national	1,8		
Preference politics	1,9	Discontent politics	0,3	Preventing	0,3	'Election compass'	1,6
Pref. politics local	7,7	Disc. politics, local	1,4	Preventing, local	0,9		
Pref. politics regional	0,8	Disc. politics, regional	0,0	Preventing, regional	0,1		
Pref. politics national	1,1	Disc. politics, national	0,2	Preventing, national	0,7		
Preference, candidate	4,5	Discontent, candidate	0,1	'Divide votes on	0,9		
Pref. candidate, local	7,9	Disc. candidate, local	0,8	multiple parties'			
Pref. candidate, regional	0,8	Disc. candidate, regional	0,0				
Pref. candidate, national	0,2	Disc. candidate, national	0,1				
Preference leader	0,2	Discontent, leader	---	'Option not viable'	1,8		
Pref. leader, local	0,5	Disc. leader, local	0,2	(party/candidate not			
Pref. leader, regional	0,1	Disc. leader, regional	---	eligible or viable in			
Pref. leader, national	0,9	Disc. leader, national	0,1	all levels of election)			
Preference party/parties	1,7	Discontent party/parties	0,3	Strategy, other	1,8		
Pref. party, local	8,4	Disc. party, local	2,2				
Pref. party, regional	1,4	Disc. party, regional	0,4				
Pref. party, national	1,7	Disc. party, national	0,3				
Preference, personal (personal gain and/or beneficial for self/family)	0,7			'Large party able to implement policies'	0,9		
Preference set by level of politics (preference formed in reference to level of politics)	3,3						

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: Distribution of split ticket voting motives in percent, number of responses in the parenthesis. The scheme is a categorisation of responses based on the open-ended question "If you chose to vote for different parties in national and local elections: For what reason did you vote for different parties in this year's national and local elections?" As respondents could leave up to three motives, number of responses (n=1 318) in the table exceeds the number of respondents (n= 962). Abbreviations refer to 'Preference' (Pref.), 'Discontent' (Disc), 'Political' (pol.).

Least common among the main motives is to split votes based on protest. Only 8 per cent of responses refer to discontent. Swedish split ticket voters appear uninclined to split votes based on dissatisfaction, which corresponds to theoretical assumptions. According to theory, concurrent elections reduce the salience of the protest vote, and voters are less inclined to use their vote to signal dissatisfaction if elections are held simultaneously. Slightly more common, the added category, which contain responses beyond the theoretical framework, amounts to 10 per cent of responses. Here, motives are mainly scattered (other unspecified motives 6,6 per cent), references to change/incumbency shift (2,2 per cent) and references to election compass tests (1,6 per cent) are slightly less common.

The level categories, which show response distributions on the local, regional and national level, are also skewed. Adding responses for each separate level show that the local level is the most commonly referenced level-specific category. In total, approximately 40 per cent, almost half of the responses refer to the local level. In many ways, this is an interesting result as it contradicts previous notions of the salience of local level politics. The local level has often been regarded less relevant, and instead national level politics has been considered the main factor in which voter preferences are formed (Reif, 1997). But as evident by the distribution in table 2, the local level appears salient for

voters and perhaps it is necessary to reconsider the relevance of local level politics and the notion of the local voter?

In comparison, the national level (9 per cent) and regional level (6 per cent) is much less prominent. Possibly, the low salience of the national level can be explained by the way in which respondents formulate motives. In reference to the second-order theory, it is possible that motives are formed in reference to the national level, and the departure from the main vote are expressed. Deliberations are possibly formed in parity of the national vote, whereby local levels are referenced rather than the national. Though this would imply prevalence of the national level, it also shows deliberative capacity of voters on the local level, which suggests voter awareness towards politics on multiple levels.

The low salience of the regional level within the scheme can partly be explained by the design of the SNES survey question. The question formulation refers to split ticket motives in elections on the local and national level and can potentially weaken the salience of the regional level among respondents. Regardless, the regional level is undoubtedly the least referenced level-specific response. This is correspondent to previous theory which suggests low salience of regional level politics. As a last note on level-based responses, the non-level specific responses amount to 21 per cent. Thus, unspecified level responses is the second largest level-related category, which means that many motives does not express level-specific reasons for their voting preferences.

The third section of the scheme, which covers specifications of the main motives, refers to five subcategories: political issues, politics, candidates, party leaders or parties. Adding responses for each of these five subcategories show that the largest of the five refers to political issues. In total, approximately 25 per cent, a fourth of all responses, mentions political issues in some way. This corresponds well to theoretical expectations of the salience of issue politics in a Swedish context. Sweden's multi-party system design implies a relatively large number of political parties. As a way to navigate the political system, parties use political issues to position themselves and to distinguish towards voters. Political issues serve as an important feature for voters to assort parties and form political preferences. Thus, the large share of issue references in the coding scheme seems reasonable.

Other subcategories are referring to parties (16 per cent), candidates (14 per cent) and politics (13 per cent). The relatively low frequency of responses related to parties is somewhat surprising as Sweden has a strong party-centred system. The low response rate in reference to candidates is less surprising. Although preferential voting is possible in Sweden, relatively few cast candidate votes, only 24 per cent in the 2018 national election (Oscarsson, Andersson, Falk & Forsberg, 2018: 10). As lists are fixed, the effect of casting a personal vote has been debated. The low rate of motives referring to politics can possibly be related to the width of the category. Instead of referring to the general politics of a party, it is possible that respondents give issue specific motives as it is more detailed. The least referenced subcategory is party leader, which is only mentioned among 2 per cent of all responses in the scheme.

Distribution of individual level factors

So far, the overall distribution of split ticket voting motives in the coding scheme have been covered. But as previous research suggest, individual level factors are important to consider when exploring split ticket voting. Through the evaluation of individual level factors, we gain knowledge on who the split ticket voter is and the driving forces behind split ticket voting in a Swedish context.

Based on the coding scheme in table 3, a cross-tabulation is performed using the main motives (sincere, strategic, protest and additional motives) and individual level factors emphasised by previous research on split ticket voting.

Table 3 Cross-tabulation of split ticket voting motives among selected groups, 2018 (per cent)

	Sincere	Protest	Strategy	Additional	Total	Number of responses
<u>Gender</u>						
Women	61	9	17	13	100	546
Men	65	9	14	12	100	480
<u>Age</u>						
18-30	55	5	23	17	100	168
31-60	64	9	16	11	100	548
61-84	65	12	11	12	100	325
<u>Education</u>						
Low	66	9	9	16	100	142
Medium	65	9	15	11	100	399
High	59	10	18	13	100	472
<u>Residence</u>						
Rural area	70	5	12	13	100	141
Town/village	69	8	12	11	100	196
City	62	10	14	14	100	482
Large city	54	10	24	12	100	202
<u>Left-right placement</u>						
Left	54	9	24	13	100	276
Neither left nor right	64	9	12	15	100	325
Right	69	9	11	11	100	384
<u>Political interest</u>						
Very interested	59	9	20	12	100	191
Somewhat interested	64	9	16	11	100	568
Not very interested	64	9	12	15	100	265
Not at all interested	31	8	23	38	100	13
<u>Party identification</u>						
Yes	61	9	16	14	100	210
No	64	9	15	12	100	714
Uncertain	56	12	18	14	100	103
<u>Party member</u>						
Yes	46	14	28	12	100	43
No	64	8	15	13	100	985
<u>Political knowledge</u>						
Low	66	9	13	12	100	68
Medium	60	9	17	14	100	359
High	64	8	16	12	100	511

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: Low education = upper secondary studies, Medium education = upper secondary degree, college/university studies, High education = College/university degree and/or postgraduate studies/degree. The variable 'Political knowledge' is an index based on nine knowledge questions on Swedish politics. Low political knowledge = 0-6 correct answers, Medium political knowledge = 7-9 correct answers, High political knowledge = 10-11 correct answers. Note that parts of the distributions are based on small selections, indicated by the small n counts, interpretation of these counts with some caution.

From previous research we know that split ticket voting is associated with weak partisanship. But are there differences *among* split ticket voters in reference to their voting motives? Can voters be more prone towards certain motives in reference to their party affiliations? Through the two measures party identification and party membership we can compare motives on the basis of the different response categories. In reference to the measure political identification, the largest shares of responses are found within sincere motives, among all response categories. Overall, there are small differences in distributions between response categories. Among the uncertain category, proportions are marginally larger within protest and strategic motives compared to the other response categories and motives.

This means that among split ticket voters, those uncertain of whether they identify to a certain party are slightly more prone towards protest and strategic voting than split ticket voters with clear party identifications (yes and no). Conversely, respondents with clear party identifications are marginally more inclined towards sincere voting than those who are uncertain. Based on political membership, differences are somewhat larger between groups. Here, party members are less inclined to refer to sincere motives (46 per cent) than non-party members (64 per cent). Instead, party members show stronger tendencies towards protest and strategic motives (14 and 28 per cent) than non-party members (8 and 15 per cent). These results are rather intuitive, it appears reasonable for party members to motivate divergence from their main party in reference to disaffection or for tactical reasons rather than sincere motives. Conversely, non-party members are more inclined to refer to sincere motives. This too seems reasonable, and those weakly attached to parties are more likely to form multiple preferences.

The next aspects refer to political sophistication. As previously mentioned, research is less conclusive on the level of sophistication associated to split ticket voting. The cross tabulation includes three measures of political sophistication, education, political interest and political knowledge. In reference to education, some voting motive differences appear among the education levels. Respondents in the high education category are somewhat less prone towards sincere motives, and more inclined towards strategic motives. Conversely, respondents with low education are more likely to refer to sincere motives as well as additional motives. Based on this, there are no conclusive evidence on the association between education level and split voting motives. Theory suggests that both sincere and strategic motives require deliberative capacities often associated to education. However, cross tabulations show weaker tendencies towards sincere motives among the highly educated. Though, strong tendencies towards strategic motives among respondents with medium and high education. The next measure, political interest does not show corresponding distributions. Here, respondents who are not politically interested are much less inclined to express sincere motives than all other response categories. Instead, those not politically interested are more inclined refer to additional motives, and marginally more inclined towards strategic motives. The most politically interested split ticket voters does not distinguish from the other categories. Instead, it is the two middle groups (somewhat and not very interested) who distinguish as they are most prone towards sincere voting and least prone towards strategic motives. The last measure of political sophistication is political knowledge. Here, differences are small between groups and motives are evenly distributed. Respondents with low political knowledge are marginally less inclined to refer to strategic motives than respondents with medium or high political knowledge.

Among the most salient cleavages in Swedish politics, we find left-right placement and the rural-urban dimension (place of residence). Political opinions are often formed and differently distributed across these dimensions. It is therefore reasonable to test potential differences among split ticket voters in reference to these measures. Starting with residence, differences are visible among split voters according to motives. An interesting linear relationship is visible among response categories for sincere motives. Here, respondents living in rural areas are most prone towards sincere voting (70 per cent). Those living in town/villages and cities are somewhat less inclined towards sincere voting (69 and 62 per cent), and respondents living in large cities much less prone (54 per cent). Conversely, respondents in large cities have much stronger tendencies towards strategic motives (24 per cent) than those living in rural areas (12 per cent), town/villages (12 per cent) and large cities (14 per cent). For protest motives, people living in rural areas are less inclined to refer to protest reasons (5 per cent) than all other categories (town/village 8 per cent, cities and large cities 10 per cent). Undoubtedly, the rural-urban dimension is relevant to explain differences among split ticket voters in reference to their voting motives. Based on left-right placements, there are also relevant groups differences among

the different motives. Like theory suggest, there are evident differences between people to the right and left on the political scale. Here, people to the right are more inclined towards sincere motives (69 per cent) than people to the right (54 per cent). Conversely, people to left are more prone towards strategic voting (24 per cent) than people to the right (11 per cent).

Through previous research we know that split ticket voters are more often young than old, and marginally more often women than men. But are motives differently distributed among split ticket voters in reference to age and gender? The cross tabulation shows small differences between men and women. And though there are some differences, men are somewhat more prone towards sincere voting and woman towards strategic voting, -they are small. Instead, differences are larger in reference to age. Like previous theory suggest, the youngest age group (18-30) differentiate from the older groups. They are more prone towards strategic voting (23 per cent) compared those 31-60 (16 per cent) and 61-84 (11 per cent). Conversely, the youngest are less inclined towards sincere voting (55 per cent) and protest voting (5 per cent) than older (64 and 65 per cent, respectively 9 and 12 per cent). The youngest group also refers to additional/other motives (17) somewhat more often than the older groups (11 and 12 per cent). The pattern suggests younger split ticket voters to differentiate from other age groups in accordance with their voting motives.

Table 4 Logistic regression, effect of individual level factors on split ticket voting motives. Dependent variable: sincere voting.

	Model 1 OR	Model 2 OR	Model 3 OR	Model 4 OR	Model 5 OR	Model 6 OR
<u>Age</u>						
18-30	0.77 (0.16)					0.80 (0.18)
31-60	1.36 (0.22)					1.32 (0.23)
<u>Education</u>						
Low		0.74 (0.16)				0.79 (0.18)
Medium		1.00 (0.16)				1.03 (0.17)
<u>Residence</u>						
Rural area			1.70* (0.44)			1.69* (0.45)
Town/village			1.47 (0.34)			1.51 (0.36)
City			1.42 (0.27)			1.40 (0.28)
<u>Left-right placement</u>						
Neither left nor right				1.17 (0.21)		1.11 (0.21)
Right				1.89*** (0.35)		1.75** (0.33)
<u>Political interest</u>						
Somewhat interested					0.97 (0.20)	0.94 (0.20)
Not very/not at all interested					0.69 (0.16)	0.69 (0.16)
Intercept	1.99*** (0.25)	2.32*** (0.26)	1.62*** (0.26)	1.67*** (0.23)	2.51*** (0.46)	1.37 (0.38)
N	867	867	867	867	867	867
-2 LL	1 066.772	1 073.158	1 070.266	1 062.059	1 070.564	1 044.417
LR Chi2	8.71**	2.32	5.22	13.42***	4.92**	31.06***
Pseudo R ²	.0081	.0022	.0048	.0125	.0046	.0289

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 SE in parenthesis, Reference categories: Age: 61-84, Education: high, Residence: large city, Left-right placement: left, Political interest: very interested. Pseudo R² = McFadden's pseudo-R², -2LL = 2log likelihood, LR Chi2 = Likelihood ratio chi-square.

Sincere, strategic and protest split ticket voters in different voter groups

There seems to be individual level differences among split ticket voters in reference to their voting motives. To establish whether these differences are statistically significant, it is appropriate to perform regression analysis. However, all measures from table 3 will not be included in the regressions. Measures with small differences (gender and political knowledge) and highly skewed measures (political identification and political member) will be excluded. Additionally, two of the categories (not very and not at all interested) within the measure political interest are merged in further analysis. This due to low number of observations in the category “not at all interested” which can cause empty cells in the regression and create inflated standard errors.

Starting with table 4 and the logistic regression analysis of sincere motives, we see few statistically significant differences. Only two of the five measures show significant results which means that few groups are significantly different from each other based on sincere motives. However, split ticket voters living in rural areas are statistically different from split ticket voters living in large cities. With odds ratios over one, respondents in rural areas are more prone towards sincere voting than respondents in large cities. Split ticket voters placed to the right are also more prone to sincere voting than split voters to the left, indicated by significant odds ratios above one. Though values marginally decrease in the full model, the effect remain significant when considering all predictors. -Thus, few values are statistically significant for sincere motives but those who are significant remain so under control for additional predictors.

For protest motives (table 5), only one measure is statistically significant in the regression model. Here, age appears to show some group differences based on protest motives. Results show that the youngest cohort is statistically less inclined to refer to protest motives than the oldest group. Thus, age is the only factor with visible group differences among split ticket voters in reference to protest-based motives.

Table 5 Logistic regression, effect of individual level factors on split ticket voting motives. Dependent variable: protest voting.

	Model 1 OR	Model 2 OR	Model 3 OR	Model 4 OR	Model 5 OR	Model 6 OR
<u>Age</u>						
18-30	0.41* (0.16)					0.37* (0.37)
31-60	0.75 (0.18)					0.77 (0.19)
<u>Education</u>						
Low		0.93 (0.31)				0.94 (0.34)
Medium		1.00 (0.24)				1.12 (0.28)
<u>Residence</u>						
Rural area			0.43 (0.20)			0.42 (0.19)
Town/village			0.74 (0.26)			0.72 (0.26)
City			0.95 (0.27)			0.94 (0.27)
<u>Left-right placement</u>						
Neither left nor right				0.87 (0.25)		0.84 (0.25)
Right				0.90 (0.25)		0.86 (0.24)
<u>Political interest</u>						
Somewhat interested					0.96 (0.29)	0.97 (0.30)
Not very/not at all interested					0.83 (0.29)	0.94 (0.33)
Intercept	0.15*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.08)
N	867	867	867	867	867	867
-2 LL	572.284	577.994	573.198	577.808	577.667	566.110
LR Chi2	5.77	0.06***	4.86	0.25	0.39	11.95
Pseudo R ²	.0100	0.97	.0084	.0004	.0007	.0207

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 SE in parenthesis, Reference categories: Age: 61-84, Education: high, Residence: large city, Left-right placement: left, Political interest: very interested. Pseudo R² = McFadden's pseudo-R², -2LL = 2log likelihood, LR Chi2 = Likelihood ratio chi-square.

Table 6 Logistic regression, effect of individual level factors on split ticket voting motives. Dependent variable: strategic voting.

	Model 1 OR	Model 2 OR	Model 3 OR	Model 4 OR	Model 5 OR	Model 6 OR
<u>Age</u>						
18-30	2.64*** (0.072)					2.39** (0.69)
31-60	1.66* (0.38)					1.63* (0.39)
<u>Education</u>						
Low		0.37** (0.13)				0.51 (0.18)
Medium		0.74 (0.15)				0.80 (0.17)
<u>Residence</u>						
Rural area			0.42** (0.14)			0.54 (0.18)
Town/village			0.42** (0.12)			0.49** (0.15)
City			0.48*** (0.11)			0.56** (0.13)
<u>Left-right placement</u>						
Neither left nor right				0.40*** (0.09)		0.47** (0.11)
Right				0.39*** (0.09)		0.42*** (0.10)
<u>Political interest</u>						
Somewhat interested					0.66 (0.16)	0.77 (0.19)
Not very/not at all interested					0.53* (0.15)	0.58 (0.17)
Intercept	0.12*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.35*** (0.06)	0.36*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.06)	0.55 (0.18)
N	867	867	867	867	867	867
-2 LL	753.776	756.010	752.804	744.342	761.183	714.233
LR Chi2	12.84**	10.61**	13.81**	22.28***	5.44	52.39***
Pseudo R ²	.0168	.0138	.0180	.0291	.0071	.0683

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 SE in parenthesis, Reference categories: Age: 61-84, Education: high, Residence: large city, Left-right placement: left, Political interest: very interested. Pseudo R² = McFadden's pseudo-R², -2LL = 2log likelihood, LR Chi2 = Likelihood ratio chi-square.

The motive which shows the largest group differences is undoubtedly the strategic motives (table 6). Here, all of the five measures are statistically significant, and several categories are significantly different within each measure. Starting with age, all cohorts are statistically different from each other. The two younger age groups are comparatively more inclined towards strategic voting than the oldest group, indicated by odds ratios over one. People 18-30 are most prone to strategic voting and odds are notably high, in comparison the reference group as well as the middle age group. Among the different education levels, split ticket voters with low education are statistically different from split ticket voters with high education. Here, those with low education are comparatively less inclined to split vote for strategic reasons. However, the effect does not remain under control for the other predictors in the full model. The rural-urban dimension also shows statistical differences and strategic motives appear most salient for people living in large cities. As all other residence groups display ratios below one, they are statistically less prone towards strategic split voting than people in cities. However, the difference between people in large cities and rural areas does not remain after control for the other predictors.

The left-right dimension also shows significant group differences, and people to the right as well as those neither to the left or right are less prone towards strategic voting than people to the left. These differences remain after control for additional predictors. Based on political interest, those who are very interested in politics are significantly more prone towards strategic split voting than those not very/not at all interested in politics. However, the effect does not remain after control for other predictors, which suggest small group differences when considering additional individual factors. In short, several of the individual factors are relevant to explain group differences in reference to strategic motives. Additionally, several measures remain significant in the full model, further

reinforcing that there are relevant differences among split ticket voters. Additionally, the strongest pseudo-R² value (.07) among all regression models is found in the full model of table 6, supporting the explanatory power of the combined measures.

The weakest group effects are found in table 7, which shows additional/other motives. This is rather reasonable and confirms the voting contains multiple and differentiated motives, which limits possibilities to find group-based differences. The selection of responses in this category are too scattered. Although there are not significant differences between groups in this category it is relevant to consider the category in large. Table 2 shows a relatively large share of responses within the additional/other category, 137 responses -corresponding to 10 per cent of the total distribution. This is larger than the amount of protest-based motives.

In conclusion, some motives show significant group differences. Mainly, there are relevant differences between split ticket voters on the basis of strategic motives. Sincere motives also show some groups differences. However, neither protest nor additional/other motives indicate significant results between groups of split ticket voters. As logistic regressions provide odds ratios, which are not sufficient in order to interpret results adequately, probabilities are provided in the appendix (see table 8-11). Probabilities confirms the results of the regression tables and provides further information on the likelihood of the different voting motives between groups.

Table 7 Logistic regression, effect of individual level factors on split ticket voting motives. Dependent variable: voting, additional.

	Model 1 OR	Model 2 OR	Model 3 OR	Model 4 OR	Model 5 OR	Model 6 OR
<u>Age</u>						
18-30	1.49 (0.42)					1.56 (0.45)
31-60	0.95 (0.21)					0.95 (0.22)
<u>Education</u>						
Low		1.05 (0.29)				1.00 (0.30)
Medium		0.76 (0.16)				0.72 (0.16)
<u>Residence</u>						
Rural area			1.03 (0.36)			1.09 (0.39)
Town/village			0.86 (0.28)			0.89 (0.30)
City			11.7 (0.31)			1.21 (0.33)
<u>Left-right placement</u>						
Neither left nor right				0.95 (0.23)		1.00 (0.25)
Right				0.75 (0.18)		0.80 (0.20)
<u>Political interest</u>						
Somewhat interested					0.92 (0.26)	1.15 (0.35)
Not very/not at all interested					1.17 (0.35)	0.94 (0.26)
Intercept	0.15*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.33)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.17 (0.06)
N	867	867	867	867	867	867
-2 LL	697.984	698.745	699.380	699.122	699.674	691.413
LR Chi2	2.95	2.08	1.45	1.70	1.15	9.41
Pseudo R ²	.0042	.0030	.0021	.0024	.0016	.0134

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 SE in parenthesis, Reference categories: Age: 61-84, Education: high, Residence: large city, Left-right placement: left, Political interest: very interested. Pseudo R² = McFadden's pseudo-R², -2LL = 2log likelihood, LR Chi2 = Likelihood ratio chi-square.

Conclusion

This report has examined several aspects of split ticket voting in Sweden using a unique set of data from the Swedish National Election Study 2018. Through the open-ended question on split ticket voting we have gained knowledge on the motives of split ticket voters. This report presents why and how split ticket voters split their votes through a bottom-up perspective. Through the development of a coding scheme, the salience of established theories on split ticket voting motives have been tested. The results suggest high salience of sincere voting among Swedish split ticket voters. In accordance with previous research, the salience of sincere motives is possibly an effect of the electoral and political system. Sweden's proportional, multi-party system enables the electorate a large selection of viable options with low risk of a wasted vote. Though much less salient, strategic motives are also referenced among split ticket voters. In the context of Sweden, strategic deliberations are relevant for voters in reference to the electoral threshold and votes can be used to keep parties above the threshold. Protest motives are not salient for Swedish split voters and few refer to disaffection when motivating their choice. The coding scheme design enable consideration of motives beyond established theory. Though comparatively few refer to this category, it is still relevant to consider. The category constitutes 10 per cent of all responses of the scheme. Further, two sub-categories are distinguishable within this category (change/incumbency shift and election compass results). Thus, considering additional motives can be relevant to understand split ticket voting incentives.

The coding scheme also show high salience of local level politics among split ticket voters. Whether this means high relevance of local level issues, or if the local level is mentioned in parity of the national level is non-decisive. Regardless, the fact that voters split their ballots suggests multi-level preferences and relevance of the local level. Further, the scheme shows high salience of issue politics. The combined relevance of sincere motives, issue politics and the local dimension indicates that split ticket voters are capable of forming sincere and separate opinions. It also suggests high political capacity among split ticket voters, and that elections are considered separately rather than as one instance.

Another important finding is that there are differences among split ticket voters in reference to their voting motives. Most notable, there are clear distinctions between split ticket voters based on strategic motives. Here, younger cohorts are more prone to strategic deliberations than older groups. People in large cities are more likely to split votes based on strategic motives than people in smaller areas. Similarly, people to the left of the political scale are more inclined towards strategic motives than people in the centre and to the right. Sincere and protest motives show few group differences. Here, only the youngest and oldest groups are statistically different from each other and the oldest cohort more inclined towards sincere and protest motives. These results show that there are differences *among* split ticket voters in reference to their voting motives. Adding to the knowledge of split ticket voting, this tells us that voters are not a homogenic group. In order for us to understand why split ticket voting occurs, it is important to consider that motives are differently salient between groups.

To some extent, these results confirm previous research on split ticket voting. As theory suggests, sincere voting is salient for voters in proportional systems, likely due to the low risk of a wasted vote. Further, strategic motives are also salient and utilised as threshold insurance in a proportional system setting. As theory suggests, protest-based motives are not salient for the Swedish split ticket voters. Whether this is an effect of Sweden's concurrently held elections is inconclusive.

In some regards, the results contradict previous theory. Contrary to previous claims, results suggest high salience of the local level. Here, the second-order theory is not fully applicable as there seems to be no primacy of the national level. Instead, results suggest reevaluation of the notion of the local level voter, as split ticket voters appear to vote

based on preference and in accordance with local level issues. Further, previous claims of the uniformed and confused split ticket voter is not confirmed. Instead, results suggest high deliberative capacity among split ticket voters as motives cover multiple aspects and levels of politics.

Based on the findings of this report, several aspects of the split ticket voter can be studied further. First, evidence suggests that split ticket voters take multilevel considerations when casting divided votes. Whether split ticket voters consider each election separately should be examined further. Second, as results indicate that motives differ among groups of split ticket voters, future studies should consider the salience of *multiple* explanations to why split ticket voting occurs. Split ticket voters are evidently not a homogenous group, suggesting salience of several, differently distributed motives. Third, the report shows high relevance of the local level among split ticket voters. Further investigations should examine how and why local level politics affect the voting behaviour of split ticket voters.

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Appendix

Table 8 Predicted probabilities of split ticket voting motives among groups, 2018 (probabilities). Dependent variable: sincere motives.

Predictor	Predicted probabilities	Confidence interval
<u>Age</u>		
18-30	0.62 (0.04)	0.54-0.70
31-60	0.73 (0.02)	0.69-0.77
61-84	0.67 (0.03)	0.62-0.73
<u>Education</u>		
Low	0.65 (0.04)	0.56-0.74
Medium	0.71 (0.02)	0.66-0.75
High	0.70 (0.02)	0.65-0.75
<u>Residence</u>		
Rural area	0.74 (0.04)	0.66-0.82
Town/village	0.72 (0.03)	0.65-0.78
City	0.70 (0.02)	0.65-0.75
Large city	0.62 (0.04)	0.55-0.70
<u>Left-right placement</u>		
Left	0.64 (0.03)	0.58-0.70
Neither left nor right	0.66 (0.03)	0.61-0.72
Right	0.76 (0.03)	0.71-0.80
<u>Political interest</u>		
Very interested	0.72 (0.04)	0.65-0.80
Somewhat interested	0.71 (0.02)	0.67-0.75
Not very/not at all interested	0.64 (0.03)	0.58-0.71

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: All predictors at their mean values. All probabilities = $p < 0.001$, SE in parenthesis.

Table 9 Predicted probabilities of split ticket voting motives among groups, 2018 (probabilities). Dependent variable: protest motives.

Predictor	Predicted probabilities	Confidence interval
<u>Age</u>		
18-30	0.05 (0.02)	0.02-0.09
31-60	0.10 (0.01)	0.07-0.13
61-84	0.13 (0.02)	0.09-0.17
<u>Education</u>		
Low	0.09 (0.03)	0.04-0.14
Medium	0.10 (0.02)	0.07-0.14
High	0.09 (0.02)	0.06-0.12
<u>Residence</u>		
Rural area	0.05 (0.02)	0.01-0.09
Town/village	0.09 (0.02)	0.05-0.13
City	0.11 (0.02)	0.08-0.14
Large city	0.12 (0.03)	0.07-0.17
<u>Left-right placement</u>		
Left	0.11 (0.02)	0.07-0.15
Neither left nor right	0.09 (0.02)	0.06-0.13
Right	0.09 (0.02)	0.06-0.13
<u>Political interest</u>		
Very interested	0.10 (0.03)	0.05-0.15
Somewhat interested	0.10 (0.01)	0.07-0.13
Not very/not at all interested	0.10 (0.02)	0.06-0.13

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: All predictors at their mean values. All probabilities = $p < 0.001$, SE in parenthesis.

Table 10 Predicted probabilities of split ticket voting motives among groups, 2018 (probabilities). Dependent variable: strategic motives.

Predictor	Predicted probabilities	Confidence interval
<u>Age</u>		
18-30	0.21 (0.04)	0.14-0.28
31-60	0.15 (0.02)	0.12-0.19
61-84	0.10 (0.02)	0.07-0.14
<u>Education</u>		
Low	0.09 (0.03)	0.04-0.15
Medium	0.14 (0.02)	0.10-0.18
High	0.17 (0.02)	0.13-0.21
<u>Residence</u>		
Rural area	0.13 (0.03)	0.07-0.19
Town/village	0.12 (0.03)	0.07-0.17
City	0.13 (0.02)	0.10-0.17
Large city	0.22 (0.03)	0.15-0.28
<u>Left-right placement</u>		
Left	0.23 (0.03)	0.17-0.29
Neither left nor right	0.12 (0.02)	0.09-0.16
Right	0.11 (0.02)	0.08-0.15
<u>Political interest</u>		
Very interested	0.18 (0.03)	0.12-0.25
Somewhat interested	0.15 (0.02)	0.11-0.18
Not very/not at all interested	0.12 (0.02)	0.08-0.16

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: All predictors at their mean values. All probabilities = $p < 0.001$, SE in parenthesis.

Table 11 Predicted probabilities of split ticket voting motives among groups, 2018 (probabilities). Dependent variable: additional motives.

Predictor	Predicted probabilities	Confidence interval
<u>Age</u>		
18-30	0.19 (0.03)	0.12-0.26
31-60	0.13 (0.02)	0.09-0.16
61-84	0.13 (0.02)	0.09-0.17
<u>Education</u>		
Low	0.15 (0.03)	0.09-0.22
Medium	0.11 (0.02)	0.08-0.15
High	0.15 (0.02)	0.12-0.19
<u>Residence</u>		
Rural area	0.14 (0.03)	0.08-0.20
Town/village	0.11 (0.02)	0.07-0.16
City	0.15 (0.02)	0.11-0.18
Large city	0.13 (0.03)	0.08-0.18
<u>Left-right placement</u>		
Left	0.15 (0.02)	0.10-0.19
Neither left nor right	0.15 (0.02)	0.11-0.19
Right	0.12 (0.02)	0.08-0.16
<u>Political interest</u>		
Very interested	0.14 (0.03)	0.08-0.19
Somewhat interested	0.13 (0.02)	0.10-0.16
Not very/not at all interested	0.15 (0.02)	0.11-0.20

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: All predictors at their mean values. All probabilities = $p < 0.001$, SE in parenthesis.

Table 12 Ordinary least square regression, effect of individual level factors on split ticket voting motives. Dependent variable: sincere motives.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<u>Age</u>						
18-30	-0.06 (0.05)					-0.05 (0.05)
31-60	0.06 (0.04)					0.06 (0.04)
<u>Education</u>						
Low		-0.07 (0.05)				-0.05 (0.05)
Medium		-0.00 (0.03)				0.01 (0.03)
<u>Residence</u>						
Rural area			0.12* (0.05)			0.11* (0.06)
Town7village			0.09 (0.05)			0.09 (0.05)
City			0.08 (0.04)			0.07 (0.04)
<u>Left-right placement</u>						
Neither left nor right				0.04 (0.04)		0.02 (0.04)
Right				0.13*** (0.04)		0.12*** (0.04)
<u>Political interest</u>						
Somewhat interested					-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Not very/not at all interested					-0.08 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
Intercept	0.67*** (0.03)	0.70*** (0.02)	0.62*** (0.04)	0.63*** (0.03)	0.72*** (0.04)	0.58*** (0.06)
N	867	867	867	867	867	867
R ²	0.008	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.004	0.023

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 Unstandardized coefficients, SE in parenthesis, Reference categories: gender: man, age: 61-84, education: high, Residence: large city, Left-right placement: left, Political interest: very interested, Political identification: no, Political member: no, Political knowledge: high.

Table 13 Ordinary least square regression, effect of individual level factors on split ticket voting motives. Dependent variable: protest motives.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<u>Age</u>						
18-30	-0.07** (0.03)					-0.08* (0.03)
31-60	-0.03 (0.02)					-0.03 (0.02)
<u>Education</u>						
Low		-0.01 (0.03)				-0.01 (0.03)
Medium		0.00 (0.02)				0.01 (0.02)
<u>Residence</u>						
Rural area			-0.06 (0.04)			-0.07 (0.04)
Town7village			-0.03 (0.03)			-0.03 (0.03)
City			-0.01 (0.03)			-0.01 (0.03)
<u>Left-right placement</u>						
Neither left nor right				-0.01 (0.03)		-0.02 (0.03)
Right				-0.01 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)
<u>Political interest</u>						
Somewhat interested					-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Not very/not at all interested					-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Intercept	0.13*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.04)
N	867	867	867	867	867	867
R ²	0.006	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.000

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 Unstandardized coefficients, SE in parenthesis, Reference categories: gender: man, age: 61-84, education: high, Residence: large city, Left-right placement: left, Political interest: very interested, Political identification: no, Political member: no, Political knowledge: high.

Table 14 Ordinary least square regression, effect of individual level factors on split ticket voting motives. Dependent variable: strategic motives.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<u>Age</u>						
18-30	0.14*** (0.04)					0.12** (0.04)
31-60	0.06* (0.03)					0.06 (0.03)
<u>Education</u>						
Low		-0.11** (0.04)				-0.07 (0.04)
Medium		-0.04 (0.03)				-0.03 (0.03)
<u>Residence</u>						
Rural area			-0.13** (0.04)			-0.10* (0.04)
Town/village			-0.13*** (0.04)			-0.10** (0.04)
City			-0.12*** (0.03)			-0.09** (0.03)
<u>Left-right placement</u>						
Neither left nor right				-0.14*** (0.03)		-0.11*** (0.03)
Right				-0.14*** (0.03)		-0.12*** (0.03)
<u>Political interest</u>						
Somewhat interested					-0.06 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Not very/not at all interested					-0.09* (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
Intercept	0.11*** (0.029)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.05)
N	867	867	867	867	867	867
R ²	0.015	0.011	0.018	0.028	0.007	0.062

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 Unstandardized coefficients, SE in parenthesis, Reference categories: gender: man, age: 61-84, education: high, Residence: large city, Left-right placement: left, Political interest: very interested, Political identification: no, Political member: no, Political knowledge: high.

Table 15 Ordinary least square regression, effect of individual level factors on split ticket voting motives. Dependent variable: additional motives.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<u>Age</u>						
18-30	0.05 (0.04)					0.06 (0.04)
31-60	-0.01 (0.03)					-0.01 (0.03)
<u>Education</u>						
Low		0.01 (0.03)				0.00 (0.04)
Medium		-0.03 (0.03)				-0.04 (0.03)
<u>Residence</u>						
Rural area			0.00 (0.04)			0.01 (0.04)
Town/village			-0.02 (0.04)			-0.01 (0.04)
City			0.02 (0.03)			0.02 (0.03)
<u>Left-right placement</u>						
Neither left nor right				-0.01 (0.03)		0.00 (0.03)
Right				-0.03 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.03)
<u>Political interest</u>						
Somewhat interested					-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Not very/not at all interested					0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Intercept	0.13*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)
N	867	867	867	867	867	867
R ²	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.011

Source: The Swedish National Election Study 2018.

Comment: *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 Unstandardized coefficients, SE in parenthesis, Reference categories: gender: man, age: 61-84, education: high, Residence: large city, Left-right placement: left, Political interest: very interested, Political identification: no, Political member: no, Political knowledge: high.

The Swedish National Election Studies Program was established in 1954 by Jörgen Westerståhl and Bo Särilvik and is today a high profile network of researchers at the Department of Political Science in Gothenburg. The Program serves as a collaborative platform for Swedish and international scholars interested in studies of electoral democracy, representative democracy, opinion formation, and voting behavior.

The aim of our research is among others to explain why people vote as they do and why an election ends in a particular way. We track and follow trends in the Swedish electoral democracy and make comparisons with other countries.

Professor Henrik Ekengren Oscarsson is the director of the Swedish National Election Studies Program.

