

Whither Europe?

Borders, Boundaries, Frontiers in a Changing World

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Edited by Rutger Lindahl



GÖTEBORG UNIVERSITY

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Foreword

The Centre for European Research at Göteborg University (CERGU) was established in 1995. Its main aim is to stimulate multidisciplinary research and studies focusing on European issues. CERGU primarily fills the function as communication resource for researchers within different academic disciplines at Göteborg University and as support organisation for research networks with universities and institutes in Sweden and abroad. Conferences, seminars and workshops constitute some of the CERGU core activities, together with courses on the PhD, Graduate, and Undergraduate levels. CERGU also acts as host for multidisciplinary research projects. To promote contact between, on the one hand, researchers and students at Göteborg University and, on the other, interested parties in industry, business and the public sectors also constitutes a central task for CERGU.

The initiative to organise the conference, *Whither Europe? Borders, Boundaries, Frontiers in a Changing World*, was taken by the Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence Steering Committee. The practical responsibilities were delegated to CERGU. The task to organise the conference was given to an organising committee with the following members: Professor Mats André (History of Ideas and Theory of Science), Professor Ulla Björnberg (Sociology), Professor Per Cramér (Law, Jean Monnet Chairholder), Professor Björn Hettne (Peace and Development Studies), Professor Rutger Lindahl (Political Science, Jean Monnet Chairholder and Director of CERGU) and Professor Per Månson (Sociology). The organising committee has been supported administratively by Ms. Birgitta Jännebring (CERGU).

The organisers hope that this publication will help promote research on the role of borders, boundaries, frontiers, or whichever term is used, to enhance our understanding of the consequences of existing or potential division lines within Europe or between Europe and other parts of the world. Questions and comments are welcome and should be addressed to info@cergu.gu.se, or to the authors.

The organisers would like to gratefully acknowledge economic support from The Göteborg University, The Wennergren Foundation, The Swedish Riksbank Tercentennial Fund, The Swedish Network for European Research in Political Science, The Swedish Network for European Research in Law and The City of Göteborg.

Göteborg, 10 April 2003

Rutger Lindahl

Director of CERGU and member of the organising committee

Contents

Introduction	
<i>Rutger Lindahl</i>	1
1. Where should EU Enlargement stop	
<i>William Wallace</i>	7
2. Borders in the Enlarged EU: Fixed and Hard or Soft and Fuzzy?	
<i>Jan Zielonka</i>	19
3. Europe and the Idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’	
<i>Gerard Delanty</i>	25
4. Discussant’s Comments on the Presentations of William Wallace, Jan Zielonka and Gerard Delanty	
<i>Per Cramér Aant Elzinga Björn Hettne</i>	45
5. Europe and America; Strategies for Survival	
<i>Dennis Smith</i>	57
6. Borders of Europe: A Turkish Perspective	
<i>Sahin Alpay</i>	73
7. Russia and Europe. Looking for a Formula of Relations	
<i>Arkady Moshes</i>	83
8. Discussant’s Comments on the Presentations of Dennis Smith, Sahin Alpay and Arkady Moshes	
<i>Sven-Erik Liedman Elisabeth Özdalga Per Månson</i>	93
About the authors	103

Introduction

Rutger Lindahl

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The end of the Cold War was, to quote the declaration from the CSCE conference in Paris in 1990, also the start of “a New Era”. The expectations from this New Era were, all over Europe, to a great extent linked to positive developments regarding democracy, market economy, rule of law, and the removal of the security threats that had plagued Europe since the end of World War II. The existence during the Cold War period of the block-border, “the Iron Curtain”, was of fundamental importance for the political, economic, social, and military system on each side of this border. For a long time, it represented firmness and stability, but also problems and anxiety. When this border lost its block-dividing role in 1989, a window of opportunity opened up for reorganizing relations between states, regions, and peoples.

Since then we have witnessed how the process of political and economic integration has partially been followed by social and political disintegration. As old borders lose their traditional importance, opportunities have appeared for the creation of new communities as well as for the disruption within old. We have also been witnessing how travel and trade patterns in Europe have changed rapidly. Travel across borders has been facilitated. Processes like the enlargement of the European Union will cross old frontiers, but probably also result in new dividing lines between insiders and outsiders. To what extent these new lines of demarcation will have an excluding function remains to be seen.

The existing organisational structures, primarily concerning the European Union and the NATO, were immediately challenged by applications for membership by a number of European states; many of these formerly belonged to the Eastern block. But in spite of these positive tendencies there has been great concern voiced over the risk of having to deal for many years to come with problems stemming from the legacy of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain. A risk is seen of having the old system of dividing lines across Europe exchanged for a system with new dividing lines, some of which might take other forms than traditional state borders.

The traditional and often simplified conception of the role of state borders—to mark where one jurisdiction ends and another begins—is still, not least in the minds of the European citizens, regarded as important. This in spite of the fact that the European integration process is built on the concept of an in-

ternal borderless market and a general reduction of the role of borders. The introduction of a new system for border control following the Schengen Agreement directed the attention of the general public, as well as the politicians, towards the question of what kind of external border the EU should establish. Should it be a fixed and hard border or a flexible and soft one? The EU decision on this question will have considerable short and long term consequences for the cooperation patterns in Europe. It will also have a decisive impact on European security inside, as well as outside, the new EU border.

As a normative civil system, Europe pretends to move its frontiers towards the east and the south. This process takes place in a framework of globalisation. As a peace project, the European Union has put an end to interstate war between the Member States, but this does not mean that intrastate conflicts and political violence have disappeared. What the widening of the European Union will mean to stability and security in Europe, and on a global level as well, remains to be seen.

The EU enlargement process has stimulated many Europeans to look upon themselves as “frontier-workers” - maybe not in a physical sense, but more in a psychological sense. Citizens in the East as well as in the West still face many “mental barriers”, which in many cases can be identified as legacies of the Cold War period, but also as, e.g., results of intensified competition on the European labour market. These “mental barriers” must be overcome in order to pave the way for the establishment of good political, economic, social, and cultural relations within Europe, as well as between Europe and other parts of the world.

At Göteborg University there are many researchers and students who devote time and energy to analyse development processes in Europe as well as on a global level. Over the last decade there has been a growing tendency among scholars and students to approach these questions from a multidisciplinary perspective. The Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence steering committee at Göteborg University decided to further the multidisciplinary efforts within this field of research by organising an international conference.

The conference, “*Whither Europe? Borders, Boundaries, Frontiers in a Changing World*”, was held in Göteborg, 16-17 January 2003. More than one hundred participants from abroad and from other Swedish universities attended the conference. The theme was very much inspired by work carried out by many distinguished European scholars. Among the many interesting books covering this theme and published in the last few years, one had a special, inspiring effect on the thinking within the organising committee. The book is entitled *Europe Unbound* (2002) and is edited by Professor Jan Zielonka at the

European University Institute. In the introductory chapter of this book you will find the terms “border”, “boundary”, and “frontier” defined and discussed.

The first day of the conference contained two plenary sessions in which invited speakers and discussants analysed different aspects of borders, boundaries and frontiers within Europe as well as between Europe and the world at large. The second day was devoted to workshops. Three themes were selected: “Human rights”, “Migration, citizenship and identity”, and “The development of a new European Security Architecture”. The organisers found the contributions both to the plenary sessions and to the workshops to be of high quality and of such a general public interest that they ought to be published. So a decision was made to publish the interventions by the speakers and the comments delivered by the discussants on the first day in one volume and a selection of the papers presented in the workshops in three separate volumes.

This book contains the interventions from six invited speakers and comments on these interventions by six invited discussants. The first chapter is written by Professor William Wallace. He is addressing the question “Where should EU enlargement stop?” His analysis starts with the assertion that the boundaries of Europe are to be found in our heads, as no agreement exists on where Europe ends or what geographical features, values, religious beliefs, or claimed ethnic origins define the limits of Europe. He finds that a major problem arises when the idea of Europe is institutionalised into statements about political inclusion and exclusion. The best illustration of this problem is found in the current process of enlargement of the European Union. The crucial question is perhaps not, “where does Europe end?” but rather, “where should the EU end?” In order to find solutions to this dilemma William Wallace discusses strategies for acceptable association with the EU of primarily the states around its future eastern and southern peripheries, short of full membership. This strategy is recommended, as the capacity of the EU to absorb further new members is seen as limited and as there is a real danger that over-extension will risk leading to incapacitation of the EU and destabilization in Europe.

In chapter 2, Professor Jan Zielonka puts focus on the problems caused by the fact that “Europe does not end neatly”. He argues that there is a need to develop cross-border strategies to avoid impoverishing or destabilising those countries immediately outside the new external border of the EU. The EU—and NATO—must take on the responsibility for the European peripheries. This responsibility probably goes far beyond what most policy-makers in Brussels, or in the national capitals within the EU, have yet contemplated. In his discussion on which kinds of borders are acceptable in the future Europe, Jan Zielonka criticises the today very common policy-preference of hard borders. Hard and fixed borders are seen as neither realistic nor desirable. Is then perhaps, he

asks, the answer to the question of how to provide a minimum degree of democracy and sense of cultural identity to develop the EU into a kind of neo-medieval empire with soft borders in flux?

Professor Gerard Delanty takes his departure in a discussion of the concepts “unity” and “diversity”, which are quite common in the debate on European identity. In his discussion, he maps out the issues that are at stake in defining European identity and he makes a critical assessment of the idea “unity in diversity”. A clarification of the concepts, both separately and in combination, shows that there is more unity than is indicated by the current appeal to diversity. What then might constitute an acceptable basis for European identity? Gerard Delanty discusses the role of communication and ends up with an argument that what is European is not possible to capture by references to cultural discourses, but perhaps through a European-wide belief in social justice.

The fourth chapter contains interventions by three discussants, Professors Per Cramér, Aant Elzinga and Björn Hettne.

The first contribution to the second session is presented in chapter 5. Professor Dennis Smith analyses the important external relations between Europe and the USA. His analysis concerns what is at stake in this relationship for both sides and potential trends in their future relations. Is “The West” in the process of ceasing to exist due to the ending of the Cold War frontline in Europe and consequently the lack of a distinct “Other”? He also examines the escalation during the last decade of a “War of Words” over the Atlantic Ocean. The central part of his analysis deals with what he defines as three powerful tendencies in world politics, which in different combinations will have major implications for the future relations not only between Europe and America, but also on relations on the global level. Professor Smith discusses the risk for the Europeans to, in a not too distant future, find themselves facing an Atlantic front-line and an “America problem”. If not, both sides will support building a powerful and fair system of global governance. If this will be the case, what will be the European contribution?

The following chapter contains an analysis by Professor Sahin Alpay of the relations between Europe (the European Union) and Turkey from a Turkish perspective. His focus is on the recent debate on whether or not Turkey belongs to Europe. He also looks at this question in a historic perspective. The solving of Turkish EU-membership is seen as a test case for which of the visions of the future EU that will prevail. The result of this test case will, according to Professor Alpay, be of fundamental importance for the role of borders and relations with peripheral countries in Eastern Europe as well as in North Africa.

Chapter 7 is written by Dr. Arkady Moshes, who at a very late stage accepted to speak at the conference; the originally invited Russian speaker did not receive his passport back from the Russian authorities in time for his scheduled departure to Göteborg. In his chapter, Dr. Moshes presents perspectives on the future relations between Russia and the European Union. His analysis is concentrated on factors that will make an institutionalised partnership possible and on factors that might turn out to be obstacles for the establishment of a viable and mutually beneficial relationship. Among the most potent positive factors, he identifies a “Russian identity”, public opinion on the EU, development of positive economic interdependence, and common security threats. Factors that might lower the Russian interest in cooperation with the EU are, e.g., the asymmetric economic relations, the EU fear of “Big States”, lack of public support, political will, and resources for building the EU-Russia partnership due to the present concentration on the ongoing enlargement process and, not least, remaining “Cold War”-perceptions of Russia as “The Other”. Based on this set-up of factors, Arkady Moshes presents and discusses two future scenarios for the Russia-EU relations.

The last chapter contains comments by the three invited discussants Professors Sven-Erik Liedman, Elisabeth Özdalga and Per Månson.

It was the aim of the organisers of the conference, “Whither Europe?” to further research and debate on the present and the future role and shape of borders in Europe. By publishing the presentations by invited speakers and the comments by discussants, as well as a selection of the papers presented in the workshops, the organisers also aim to bridge gaps between researchers representing different academic disciplines and to promote pluridisciplinary and multinational research in order to enhance our understanding of problems caused by what are labelled borders, boundaries, or frontiers and find proper ways to handle them in a changing world.

1. Where should EU enlargement stop?

William Wallace

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The boundaries of Europe are in our heads. 19th century mapmakers, historians writing the ‘story of our nation’ and of its place in European history, novelists, children’s writers, have all contributed to our sense of what it is to be ‘European’, which other countries we regard as part of ‘our’ Europe, and where our Europe ends – and barbarian Asia, or Africa, begin. This means that there can be no continent-wide agreement on where Europe ends, or where its centre lies – or what geographical features, values, religious beliefs or claimed ethnic origins define the extent and limits of Europe. The ‘Europe’ which an educated Greek imagines has Scandinavia only on its northern fringes (and Iceland nowhere), with the Baltic far less important than the Mediterranean. A Portuguese naturally assumes that Madeira and the Azores are part of Europe, but is unlikely to know where Lapland is, or whether Finland shares a frontier with Russia. Most British think that Gibraltar is the southernmost point in Europe, and that Poland – or one of the Baltic states – marks its eastern edge, unaware that Finland stretches further east than these, or that Crete and Cyprus stretch much further east and south; let alone that two thirds of Turkey lies east of Ankara, sharing a common frontier with Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

‘Europe’ as an imagined continent is loosely defined in both positive and negative terms. It represents, our political leaders like to remind us, a ‘community of values’ – though there is room for argument as to what exactly those shared values are, beyond the list of conditions now set out in the Copenhagen criteria which the EU has imposed on its eastern and southern candidate states, not all of which are fully applied in practice by some of the current member states. We may agree on a shared commitment to democracy, to government which clearly represents the majority of its citizens – although by that criterion no British government since 1945 has been fully democratic. We certainly agree on the importance of the rule of law; though we differ widely about how far law should extend into the private lives of our citizens. We agree on the importance on limited government, and about maintaining the boundary between the public and the private sphere, both in the economy and in society; though, again, British assumptions about where that boundary should be

drawn differ significantly from Swedish, and both differ from Italian or Greek. Some wish to define Europe in terms of its commitment to a ‘social’ model of democracy, or to the market economy modified by social protection; there’s a struggle under way in the EU Convention at present over how far to include an explicit social dimension in the proposed EU Constitution, led by representatives of states that do not in practice provide the most generous social protection to all their citizens.

Most of these European values are in principle extendable beyond our geographical region – by which I mean that they represent the universal values of liberal democracy, which other states around the world also practice and to which more may aspire. In the nineteenth century, after all, to become modern was to become European, to imitate the hegemonic continent. Japanese and Ottoman young men learned European dances and adopted European dress, while also studying European military techniques, civil administration, and engineering. In the 21st century, it’s an elusive question as to whether all the liberal democracies now fully share the same values – as Francis Fukuyama claimed in *The End of History* – so that to accept globalization today is to accept Americanization, imitating the hegemon in similar fashion. Those who most strongly press the social dimension of Europe’s market economy and welfare systems distinguish European values from American: seeking in effect to exclude the USA from our definition of shared political community.

There are some politicians in Europe – mostly in Catholic Europe – who wish to define Europe in Christian terms, to exclude the Muslim countries to the south and south-east; even some who assume that European civilization is best represented by Western Christendom, so that Croatia (for example) has a far stronger claim to be included within the institutionalized European family than Romania or Bulgaria. Many Americans, however, now see Europe, both protestant and catholic, as essentially a godless society, in sharp contrast to the aggressively Christian United States. Buried in all of our national myths and histories are the barbarian ‘others’ against whom appeals to European solidarity were defined – on those rare occasions when Europeans were not fighting each other: the Mongols, the Slavs, the Moors, the Huns, the Turks – but also in my country those devilish barbarians, the Vikings, or those demons the Greeks still remember from mediaeval history, the Franks.

We have to define Europe either by reference to values or in terms of differentiating ourselves from excluded non-Europeans, because Europe – unlike North America, or Australia – is not a clearly separate geographical entity. It’s a series of peninsulas and islands on the western edge of the Eurasian land-mass, into which successive waves of immigrants from northern Asia have poured over the past several thousand years – Teutonic tribes of Saxons and

Franks, Vandals, Lombards, Slavs, Magyars, Bulgars and others ; to become assimilated into the established cultures of Western or Eastern Christendom over time, and then to absorb the secular values which have gradually replaced authoritarian Christianity over the past two centuries. This process of secularization isn't yet complete within Germany, where the churches still retain a privileged role, or in Greece; and it's still under way in Turkey, though perhaps only a generation behind. It's always tempting to claim that 'we Europeans' have always held to the values we now proclaim, sliding past our awful history during the process of transition from traditional societies to advanced democracies. An Austrian academic in a conference on eastern enlargement in the early 1990s asked me how I thought 'these countries without our long experience of democracy will cope with the strains of democratic transition'; forgetting that up to 1947 Czechoslovakia's experience of democracy had been rather longer than Austria's, and that only the accident of the Cold War divide had landed Austria in the democratic 'West' while consigning Czechoslovakia to the socialist 'East'.

If we define 'Europe' in terms of values and standards – political, economic, social and administrative standards – then it's a work in progress, not an established and bounded community. The process of democratic transition in Eastern Europe should be seen as another stage in a long series of transitions – and highly unlikely to be the last. Forty years ago Ireland was economically marginal, surviving partly through remittances from emigrants, its politics dominated by an authoritarian Catholic hierarchy and by divisions which had lingered since the civil war of the 1920s. Thirty years ago Greece, Spain and Portugal were all authoritarian regimes, and the Portuguese economy in particular looked more like one of the EEC's African and Caribbean associates than that of a potential candidate for membership. Now we accept all these as respected members of institutionalized Europe. On different timescales, and with a similar degree of economic assistance and political interference, there is no reason why not only Romania and Bulgaria, but also Serbia and Albania, and perhaps even Ukraine and Belarus, will successfully negotiate the same transition. And Turkey is already well ahead of most of these in following this path.

Drawing lines on Maps

Our mental maps of Europe are still shaped by the assumptions of 19th century mapmakers. My 1994 edition of the Oxford/Hammond Atlas of the World still shows Europe as if it were a defined geographical space, on the definition

successfully imposed by French geopoliticians: with the Straits of Gibraltar dividing Europe from Africa, European Russia shaded darker than Russia beyond the Urals, as if to indicate that it is at least semi-European, the Bosphorus dividing European Turkey from Asia Minor (with European Turkey coloured purple in my map, in contrast to the drab shading that Asia Minor shares with the Middle East, the Caucasus and North Africa – and with ‘Asiatic’ Russia and Kazakhstan). Two of my LSE colleagues have been taken to the hill west of Yekaterinburg where the Russians have now erected a sign declaring that this is the watershed between Europe and Asia, and thus the eastern limit of Europe; they tell me it’s a rather unimpressive hill to mark a continental divide.

These imagined boundaries still exert a powerful hold over European leaders. President Giscard d’Estaing clearly regards the Bosphorus as the end of Europe, despite the bridges which link the European and Asian sides of Greater Istanbul. John Major as British Prime Minister once told a radio interviewer that he saw no problem in the long-term enlargement of the EU ‘to include even Russia, at least as far as the Urals’ – to be firmly told by his staff immediately afterwards that the UK had no plans to persuade Russia to divide itself into separate European and Asian states.

It is absurd, in world historical terms, to regard the Mediterranean as a boundary and the Baltic as an inland European sea: the very term Mediterranean conjures up its role as the inland sea that held successive civilizations together. The Straits of Gibraltar are half as wide as the Straits of Dover. The Vandal kingdom of Andalusia stretched across the straits, from what is now northern Morocco to what is now southern Spain; the Christian reconquest, which ended with the Moor’s last sigh at the fall of Granada in 1492, would have swept on across the straits, if a Genoese adventurer in Spanish service – Christopher Columbus – had not distracted the ambitions of the Spanish kingdom elsewhere. The Moroccan government has twice expressed its long-term interest in applying to join the European Union, citing the ‘historical contribution’ that Morocco has made to European civilization – stretching historical links to identify the current Kingdom of Morocco with the wonderfully multi-cultural mediaeval Moorish kingdom of Al-Andalus. Sicily once formed part of a thriving Arab kingdom, Tunisia part of a thriving Norman/Sicilian kingdom; Algeria was for half a century part of metropolitan France. All round the Mediterranean, ethnic groups have mixed, converted from one religion to another, captured and colonised. Some of those who took part in the mayhem were Normans, the grandchildren of Nordic adventurers; others were Varangians in Byzantine service, recruited in Scandinavia. And the process is still continuing, as the migrant flow from north to south of 100 years ago has given way to a determined flow

from south to north – some of it legal, most of it illegal, but almost impossible to stop.

These mental maps of Europe, however, do change over time. My generation adjusted unthinkingly to the artificial boundaries imposed by the Cold War. Our definition of ‘Europe’ shrank to its western half; ‘the European Community’ was only a community for states of western Europe. A team of historians led by Jean-Francois Duroselle produced an authoritative *History of Europe* under the auspices of the European Community, published in 1989 in all Community languages except Greek, which took Europe and Western Christendom as virtually coterminous and treated the eastern edges of Western Christendom as boundary regions beyond the heartland of the Rhine valley, Burgundy and northern Italy. Polish, Hungarian and Czech dissidents in the 1970s worked hard to change the way we saw our continent, reintroducing the idea of ‘central Europe’ between the entrenched camps of East and West: neatly defined by Milan Kundera as ‘a part of the Latin West which has fallen under Russian domination... which lies geographically in the centre, culturally in the West, and politically in the East’. They wished, of course, to move Catholic central Europe into the West, leaving orthodox eastern Europe behind. They accepted the painful reality that political and economic Europe has a long-established Western bias, with central and eastern Europe alternatively dependent or half-excluded.

Part of the problem that has faced Western policy-makers since the end of the Cold War has been the succession of claims from countries to their east for privileged relations with the richer West. Hungarians, Romanians, Ukrainians in their turn claimed to be the last bastion of civilized Europe – with, implicitly, the barbaric hordes beyond their eastern frontier; some Croats have attempted to make a similar case. I have heard senior officials from Austria and, recently, Malta appeal to old images of Europe as Western Christendom by claiming that they had ‘saved Europe from the Turk’ – inaccurately in both cases, since the great sieges of Vienna and Valetta were lifted by reinforcements from other states, not by their own efforts (and of course deeply politically incorrect in today’s multicultural and secular Europe). Margaret Thatcher, of course, would have responded that Britain had saved Europe from the Austrians, and their misguided German allies; she was extremely fond of reminding her continental colleagues of the contribution that Britain had made to European unity by taking part in its conquest and occupation half a century ago.

I hope that we have all learned from the past ten years – most of all from the bitter experiences of the collapse of Yugoslavia – not to misuse historical claims to bolster current political ambitions. All of our countries have clouded histories (including Sweden, for example in the 30 Years’ War); none can

claim to embody superior intrinsic virtue. It is a particular temptation for Protestant countries, however, to continue to do so.

When I was learning about the different historical faultlines and remembered political communities re-emerging from the collapse of the cold war division, I regret that I outlined the 16th century dividing line between Western and Eastern Christendom on one of the maps I drew, as presented to a Harvard seminar chaired by Professor Samuel Huntington. Maps provide powerful images. He converted my dotted line into a solid and thick divide, to represent what he interpreted as different civilizations. Norman Davies, whose history of Poland as *The Heart of Europe* had set out to correct the Western bias of Duroselle and his team, rightly included a much wider variety of faultlines in his massive history of *Europe*: the Protestant-Catholic divide, echoes of which are still affect relations between northern and southern European countries (on such issues as expenses for European Parliamentarians, for instance), the ‘Limes’ of the Roman Empire, the limits of Ottoman Europe, and of course the Iron Curtain. I remember a Greek minister telling a conference to mark the tenth anniversary of Greek EU entry, in Athens, that ‘we had underestimated the strength of the Ottoman legacy in Greek attitudes to the state.’ But all of these faultlines are gradually diminishing in significance, through generational change, social and political integration. Political cultures change slowly; but if we look back across Europe over the past two generations, from Finland to Portugal, or from Ireland to Greece and Turkey, it’s evident that political attitudes and assumptions *have* changed, and that this process of socio-political integration is now slowly working its way across central, eastern and south-eastern Europe in its turn.

Cultural claims, institutional benefits

Our problems begin when the idea of ‘Europe’ is institutionalized into statements about political inclusion and exclusion. Article 98 of the Treaty of Paris of 1952, which established the original European Coal and Steel Community, declares that ‘Any European state may apply to accede to this Treaty’, leaving entirely undefined how to assess whether an applicant was ‘European’ or not – not an issue that concerned West European politicians when the Iron Curtain cut eastern Europe off from any prospect of future membership. That phrase has been repeated in every EU Treaty since then, without any more exact definition: an acute problem for policy-makers in our post-cold war region, in which the Council of Europe has 44 member states, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has over 50 members, stretching

around the Caspian Sea to the borders of Afghanistan and China. We don't have to agree on the outer cultural – let alone ethnic – limits of Europe; that can continue to provide a focus for historians to debate, without ever needing to reach a conclusion. But we *do* have to decide where the outer limits of European institutions have to be drawn. The policy question is, therefore, 'Where should the EU end?'

The pressure we now face is that every state which claims to share a European heritage, in one form or another, now wishes to leverage that claim into the political privilege of EU membership – with all the advantages of financial transfers, free movement of labour, and seats round the table within EU negotiations that that brings. Suggestions of less than full membership are taken – by Romanians, Albanians and Turks now, quite possibly by Ukrainians and Belarussians in 5 years' time – as political exclusion, as denial of their European identity, an insult to their status and a blow to their prestige. Public opinion in Norway and Iceland still seems content with the close outside association that they have been offered, without any sense of adverse discrimination; the majority of Swiss even think it a privilege to stay outside the EU. But for poorer countries and weaker states, the prize of EU membership seems irreplaceable: in terms of political acceptance, of market access, and of external economic assistance. One of the most urgent tasks for the European Union after this enlargement is therefore to design a strategy for acceptable association of the states around its eastern and southern periphery, short of full membership – to separate the question of 'Europe' from the boundaries of the EU.

Even in neutral Sweden, however, we should not forget that there is another European institution in the process of enlargement, with a similar line of hopeful applicants wishing to follow those who have already been accepted into the organization. NATO has now agreed to accept a further seven states into full membership by 2004, to become a body with 26 member states; including Romania and Bulgaria. 19 of those 26 states will also be members of the EU. The new NATO-Russia Council gives Russia, too, a privileged relationship; while Partnership for Peace and the 'European-Atlantic Partnership Council' stretch further, bringing in the West European neutrals and the authoritarian Central Asian regimes. It's worth noting that the language of the North Atlantic Treaty had a much more restrictive definition of 'Europe', which appeared – in its separate reference to the Mediterranean theatre – to exclude Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. Greece and Turkey were nevertheless included in this 'Western' security institution, through the accidents of the Cold War, as British economic weakness and Soviet pressure persuaded the USA to include them in the Marshall Plan.

That historical accident formed the basis for Greece's early association agreement with the European Economic Community, on which it founded its successful claim for later full membership; and for Turkey's similar association agreement, and the expectations of full membership to which that led. In 1965-6 there was an active debate inside Israel as to whether it should seek to follow Turkey in negotiating an association agreement, which would have included a similar clause about eventual movement towards full membership. Israel, after all, has a claim to share a European heritage; it is a democratic state, with a market economy. There are papers now again circulating both within the Israeli Labour Party and within Likud, I have been told, which discuss the attractions of EU membership, as providing an 'anchor' for Israeli security and prosperity in any move towards a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The EU and NATO are both committed to a process of enlargement which will continue for a further 10-20 years. Romania and Bulgaria hope to join the EU before the end of the decade; so does Croatia, and so of course does Turkey – which we will be discussing in more detail later in the day. The South-East European Stability Pact, at least as I read it, commits the EU and NATO to accept the weak states of the Western Balkans – however many of them there may be at the end of the reconfiguration of Yugoslavia, Serbia-Montenegro, and Kosovo, as well as Bosnia, Macedonia and Albania – into full membership. Can either institution draw the line after that: to say that 'the boat is full', that they will close their doors to a Ukraine or a Belarus rather than encourage them to follow the same path of economic and political transition that others have taken successfully, or even to Georgia and Armenia as European institutions expand around the Black Sea?

We don't have to answer all of these questions now. But we do need to have a rather more strategic approach to the states of the European periphery than the EU or NATO have yet managed to develop. Jan Zielonka will no doubt say much more about the necessity of establishing and maintaining clear boundaries for the enlarged EU, as well as about the desirability of pursuing cross-border strategies to avoid impoverishing or destabilising those immediately outside. The EU, unfortunately, works through trading off concessions among those who sit round the table – often to the disadvantage of those outside, such as the agricultural exporters and textile producers of the southern Mediterranean. Very little of the common budget is devoted to external economic assistance – and the struggle over the redistribution of benefits from the common budget is likely to become so much more bitter after the next enlargement that it will be even more difficult to divert funds from those outside. But it's essential that the enlarged EU does give a much higher priority to eco-

conomic and administrative assistance to its new neighbours – as Commissioner Patten has for some time been arguing. If we hope to avoid posing the stark choice to the economically and politically dependent states around Europe's periphery of economic and political disadvantage or the demand for early full membership, the EU must develop a much more generous strategy of association, including much more generous terms for market access, movement of labour, and financial transfers than has yet been discussed. The financial pain of such a strategy will be felt by all current EU members; the strain of competition in agriculture and intermediate manufactures will be felt most painfully by the EU's southern states and by its new eastern members. It will require imaginative political leadership, of the sort that is at present in very short supply across the EU, to persuade these member states to accept such concessions.

There is a case for saying that the capacity of the EU to absorb further new members is not unlimited, and that there is a real danger that over-extension will risk leading to incapacity. President Mitterand once said that the greatest risk of enlargement was that as the last successful claimant entered the EU would cease to be able to provide the political, security and economic benefits which all the determined applicants had been seeking. If we are honest, with ourselves and with our neighbours, we should admit that the dangers of over-extension are greatest with the accession of further large states. Macedonia and Albania pose awkward problems of conditional assistance over the period of transition for European institutions; but their entry will not significantly alter their balance. Turkish entry to the EU, however, would unavoidably alter that balance; we cannot have a rational discussion about the implications of Turkish accession until both sides accept that population and geographical extent are more delicate issues in the Turkish case than Islamic culture. Acceptance of the principle of long-term Ukrainian accession would raise problems of a similar scale. For NATO, its future relationship with Russia, a vast ex-super power that stretches to the Pacific, raises similar issues of scale and impact.

One principle that the EU, in particular, should hold firmly to is that no candidate should be accepted into membership before its government, administration and public have understood the implications and obligations of membership. The European Community allowed Greece to join in 1981, within 4 years of making its application, beguiled by the argument that Greece was 'the cradle of European democracy' briefly dominated by military dictatorship – and suffered the consequences of a disruptive member state for more than a decade. Ten years of political and economic conditionality towards the former socialist states of central and eastern Europe has painfully educated them into the obligations of membership – and moderated the enthusiasm of their publics for membership. I'm not sure that a similar process has yet taken place either

in Cyprus or in Malta, and therefore fear that we may face a similar degree of unreality of expectations and refusal to trade concessions against benefits in these two states. There are many in Greek Cyprus who believe that EU membership will give them unification of the island without needing to make concessions to Turkish Cypriot concerns, for example. I'm told that a Maltese official, discussing an agreement to join a minor EU agency, expressed Malta's enthusiasm for membership qualified by the admission that 'it had not occurred to us that we would have to pay anything to join'. And I am not at all persuaded that a realistic debate has yet got under way within Turkey about the obligations of full membership and the changes they will force on Turkey; demands to be accepted as a candidate have been pitched far more in terms of Turkey's right to be accepted as a European state, not in terms of the conditions Turkey will have to meet, or of the long period of transition that will be necessary before they are met in full.

Too rapid a process of further enlargement might threaten to overwhelm the limited absorption capacities of the EU. The process of mutual adjustment and learning that will accompany the entry of ten new member states in 2004 will take some time. It may be possible to absorb Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia within a limited time scale without causing too much internal readjustment. The other states of the Western Balkans are unlikely to be ready for full membership for 10-15 years. For them, and for Turkey, an intermediate form of association which gives them some voice and standing within the EU, and a generous degree of access to the single market, to the European labour market and to financial assistance is urgently needed. For Ukraine – and in time also Belarus – and perhaps also Russia, a different form of 'European Economic Area', designed to assist economic development and encourage political and social interaction, is urgently needed. I hope that policy-makers in Sweden are already working on a blueprint.

Then there are the insecure, autocratic, dependent states to the Mediterranean south – and Israel, for which the EU remains the largest market for its non-military exports. The EU's Mediterranean strategy has so far been better at rhetorical promises and conferences than at trade concessions or effective financial partnerships; the NATO Mediterranean dialogue has been even less effective. But the EU cannot afford to neglect its southern neighbours. Political or economic breakdown in North Africa would spill immediately across the Mediterranean, with refugees landing in Spain and Italy, France and Greece, and some of them travelling on to Sweden, Denmark, even Norway. The Mediterranean is not a secure boundary. The logic that has led west European states to attempt to export security and prosperity across central and

eastern Europe, in order to avoid importing insecurity and economically desperate migrants from there, also applies to North Africa and the Near East.

Europe does not end, neatly, to the east or to the south. It extends across peripheral regions, border areas where economic life depends upon access to Europe's wealthier core. The EU is unlikely to be able to extend full membership to the weak states across these border regions – not in the foreseeable future, at least. But the EU – and NATO, in so far as NATO is now becoming a pan-European security organization – must take responsibility for Europe, including Europe's broad Eurasian and North African peripheries. That will require the EU-25 to develop capabilities for external economic partnership, external financial transfers, foreign policy, cooperative border management with its neighbours, and cooperation in military and civilian security far beyond what most policy-makers in Brussels or in national capitals have yet contemplated. The EU, now more than NATO, is becoming the focus for regional stabilization, security, and economic development: the regional power, which needs to act as a creative regional power – benevolently, generously, in terms of its own enlightened self-interest, rather than becoming preoccupied with internal bargaining at the expense of those outside.

2. Borders in the Enlarged EU: Fixed and Hard or Soft and Fuzzy?

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My main point will be the following: I will argue that the Union desperately tries to acquire fixed and hard external borders for the reasons William Wallace mentioned. Schengen is the major instrument to harden borders and the principle of tough conditionality is to make sure that enlargement is not an open-ended process. But, I will argue, in reality the Union is getting soft borders in flux rather than fixed and hard borders. Despite all efforts the Union does not look like a traditional territorial actor, but like a kind of new and unbounded entity with fuzzy borders and various kinds of multilevel regulatory arrangements. In the future, I believe, it will increasingly resemble a kind of what I call a neo-medieval empire rather than a territorial Westphalian super-state. This, of course, will have serious implications, which we have not even started to discuss in Europe. If you look at the agenda of the European Convention then you realize that it is engaged in totally different matters.

Why is the Union trying to harden and fix its borders? One reason is evident to everybody. It is the well-publicized fear of *the other*, or, some would even add, of the other barbarian. As William Wallace rightly argued, in Western Europe there is much concern about inclusion to the Union of much poorer post-communist countries. There is also a problem of managing the increasingly multicultural environment in all member states. Politicians simply and naturally follow the public and try to harden, if not seal, those borders. They hardly ever went to the public to justify the enlargement; but if they went at all to the public to argue why we needed enlargement, they said that “this will help us manage problems with migration and crime”. After all, the candidates are going to adopt Schengen as the first precondition of accession. Without enlargement, it is argued, we would not be able to cope with the question of borders. This is obvious to all who read newspapers and follow political campaigns. For instance, now there are elections in Holland and the political discourse there is all about managing multicultural societies, migration, trans-border crime, and so on.

Another, and probably more serious, reason for acquiring harder borders has to do with state- and polity-building. Let me explain what I mean. Borders

are obviously not just lines on the map where one jurisdiction ends and the other jurisdiction starts; borders are complex political institutions. We can argue that no rule-bound political life can function without them. In fact, if you read Max Weber and the generations of his disciples, they will all tell you that the whole history of human organization was largely about providing an overlap between territorial borders and various functional boundaries. They even point to the reason why the modern state prevailed over other types of polities. This was due to their remarkable ability to assure an overlap between administrative borders, military frontiers, cultural traits, and market transaction fringes. This is not an abstract question. We are talking about a basic ability of the Union to provide a minimum degree of order, legitimacy, and justice. Consider such issues as democracy, identity, or redistributive justice. How to provide a minimum degree of democracy in the Union with soft and ever-changing borders? Democratic rules and norms must operate within a clearly defined territory and for clearly defined *demos*. How to provide a minimum sense of cultural identity in the Union with soft and ever-changing borders? Identity is basically about belonging to a certain kind of community that lives on a certain territory and cherishes certain norms. There is also a problem of distributive justice. In a Union without clear borders, it would be very difficult to envisage the distribution of public goods in any organized manner. All these things are very closely linked. For instance, it is impossible to establish where and why taxes and benefits from redistribution should be paid and who should pay them without referring to some democratic rules and solidarity based on cultural links. In short, borders are prerequisites of political order and the Union just cannot ignore this Weberian consideration. In the open European space citizens could find themselves without any form of public protection, arbitration, jurisdiction, regulation, and reallocation.

Of course, some of you will immediately raise the question whether this Weberian consideration is still relevant in this, what you have called, post-Soviet and post-modern Europe. A more crucial question probably is if hard, fixed borders is a workable proposition in the Europe of today? Let me concentrate on the latter question, partly because it is more empirical, and partly because it shapes the answer to the former question.

Let me start with the scope of Europe's borders and then tackle the nature of Europe's borders. William Wallace already explained why it is difficult to fix the EU's borders. We just cannot tell some countries that they cannot join the European Union because they had the historical misfortune of being swallowed by the Ottoman Empire rather than the Habsburg Empire, or because they adopted Christianity from Constantinople rather than Rome 1000 years ago. Furthermore, political, economic, and security criteria are also very

tricky. For instance, economic criteria argue in favour of embracing prosperous countries, while political criteria support embracing the weak and unstable countries. Take, for instance, Macedonia. It makes sense to include the country on security grounds, but on economic grounds it does not make any sense at all. In fact, it is difficult to tell what should be the criteria of accession without saying what the objectives of European integration really are. Is the EU basically about economics, about politics, about security, or about culture? How can you say that “we do not want you for reasons of security”, when you believe that the EU is not about security? However, in the Union the ambiguity and double-language are the norm from the early days of integration. The implication is that integration by disguise is now followed by enlargement by disguise. Experts sometimes wonder why the public in the member states is not so enthusiastic about enlargement, and in candidate states too, as a matter of fact. The answer may be: because it was never explained to them what it is all about.

However, this ambiguity concerning the scope of future borders provides the Union with enormous leverage. Many countries modify their behavior in anticipation of possible membership. Moreover, the Union does not want to antagonize some of the countries because they are strategically important. Think about Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia. Besides, even if the Union were to draw firm lines on Europe’s map, the borders would nevertheless remain in flux for some time. This is because there are transition periods and opt-outs negotiated by individual member states. In other words, in the Union’s increasingly acting in concentric circles and a variable geometry, it is difficult to talk about fixed borders, especially functional ones. In the enlarged and more diversified Union, it would be virtually impossible to provide a total overlap between administrative borders, military frontiers, cultural traits, and market transaction fringes.

Many people may agree that fixing the future scope of Europe’s borders is not such a good idea. However, there currently seems to be a total political consensus that we cannot afford soft borders because of migration, trans-border crime, and terrorist threats. I do not know any politicians, from left to right, who would say, “let’s keep our borders soft”. They may argue about the degree they want to harden borders and the means they want to use for hardening them, but hard borders are a common objective in today’s Europe. But again, it is easier said than done. To start, it is difficult to seal borders that are neither fixed nor linear. More importantly, there is mounting evidence that hard borders do not necessarily help mitigate concerns about cross-border crime and migration. Most experts will tell you that the most advanced way of combating illegal migration and crime does not take place on the border. The

experts' term is "remote policing"; this policing takes place within broader border zones or even within countries importing or exporting crime. Basically, we are talking about suburbs of large cities of Europe on both sides. In fact, some of the experts argue that by creating hard borders we create a market for crime rather than mitigating concerns relating to crime. In fact, those experts will tell you that the key here is the enhanced cooperation between various police units rather than an investment in ever greater numbers of border guards with ever more expensive and sophisticated surveillance technology. But this is what the governments are doing without thinking that if the cooperation is the key to combat cross-border crime, then mutual trust rather than mutual suspicion is the key to their success. Similarly, when we want to tame immigration we have to address the reasons why people emigrate. Immigration can hardly be tackled only by installing hard borders. In fact, the majority of those who reside illegally in Western Europe came here with a valid visa. I will come back to some of these issues later.

By now let me conclude that hard borders are not necessarily so crucial for coping with migration and transnational crime, but at the same time they hamper profitable trade, cultural exchanges and they jeopardize our existing system of Western civil rights and freedoms. At this conference one should especially stress that hard borders also undermine some of the most important pillars of our strategy for a larger Europe. Let me give you three examples. First of all, there is a fundamental conflict of spirit and purpose between two major European projects: one is enlargement and the other is installing hard borders according to Schengen. Although politicians often talk about enlargement as being a function of Schengen, there is a major conflict between them. Enlargement is basically about inclusion, while the hard border regime is about exclusion. Enlargement is about overcoming the division of Europe, while hard borders are about creating or recreating divisions of Europe. Enlargement is about equal access of Eastern Europeans to Western Europe and hard borders are about perpetuating inequality in Europe. The Union officials try to conceal this exclusional nature of Schengen, but everybody who studies Eastern Europe knows that Schengen is seen there as nothing but a symbol of inequality, division, and exclusion.

Of course, I do not want to endorse a zero-sum rationale here. I do not think that all frustration in Eastern Europe is set to produce instability and I believe also that some exclusion might be necessary in the long term to provide some inclusion. However, it would be wrong to believe that largely contradictory policies could be sustained indefinitely. We should look at the issue of borders in a strategic context. The Union should know what kind of Europe it is trying to build and choose its policy accordingly. If the Union's prime ob-

jective is the reduction of inequality, division, and exclusion in post-Cold War Europe, then the hard border policy is hampering these objectives.

Second, the policy of hard external borders would make it difficult for the Union to handle the problem of national minorities. Let us not forget that the major source of migrants into Western Europe come from countries faced with violent ethnic conflicts. This is the most striking factor stimulating migration if we look at the statistics, and it is especially evident in the context of the Balkans. What policy do we have in the Balkans? It is to keep borders where they are, but to keep them relatively open so that people living on the wrong side of the borders do not reach to arms to redress the borders. You cannot employ this policy in the Balkans and say “well, for the Balkans we suggest this, but we are going to keep hard borders for ourselves”. Ethnic problems in other regions of Europe may not be so serious, but let us not forget the sizable Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia, or the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, and Serbia. The introduction of hard borders is going to frustrate intense human links there, affect economic relations, and even cause some legal problems. We have been telling the Hungarian and Romanian governments for years to make a deal about cross-border contacts; now with the introduction of Schengen we are telling them “forget about it”.

Again, there is no reason to take this as a zero-sum game. For instance, the Hungarians want to have some kind of “national visas” for their compatriots abroad that will allow them to come to Hungary and work there, but not to other members of the European Union. In fact, holders of the overseas UK passport are treated similarly today, although let us not forget that the UK is not part of Schengen. At the end of the day, however, these are all steps aimed at softening and not hardening borders. So let us not delude ourselves in thinking that the hard border politics is going to stay with us for long after enlargement.

Finally, the installation of hard borders will undermine the Europeanisation process in Eastern Europe. And this Europeanisation process is a precondition for the success of EU-isation (i.e., adoption of the *acquis*), and, probably also more importantly, the key to the EU strategy for a larger Europe. Europeanisation is basically about “constructive multi-lateralism” and grass-roots “interconnectedness” and its well known manifestation is the EU’s regional policy of cross-borders cooperation through, e.g., the program of INTERREG. I once asked the head of this program: “Don’t you think that Schengen is going to jeopardize regional cooperation?” She said that “we have excellent contacts with capitals of all these countries. We are just working together on how to strengthen our borders”. But what about people living in the bordering zones? They were crossing those borders easily all the time; now they would have to go to the capitals to request a visa. It is like Polish-

GDR cooperation during the Cold War: the capitals cooperated very well, but ordinary people were kept apart.

So I hope it is clear that having hard and fix borders is neither realistic nor desirable. Of course, it is easier to accept this argument if you belong to what Charles Maier called the “party of globalization” which wants to take advantage of the free movement of goods, people, and ideas across the borders. If you belong to the “party of territoriality” that is afraid of all these exchanges, then you may still think that this is all bad news. We intellectuals, and also politicians, try to have it both ways. We will say, “well, we want to harden borders, but we are also against new dividing lines in Europe”. But we cannot have it both ways! And since I cannot see hard borders as a workable proposition in the enlarged EU, I suggest that we should prepare ourselves for a kind of neo-medieval European Union that has soft borders in flux. I, myself, am not so afraid of this neo-medieval EU because it might provide an attractive alternative to the notion of absolute sovereignty. It might allow the existence of overlapping authorities and recognize fully multiple identities. I think post-modern empires should not be confused with pre-modern ones, because they exercise power in totally different manners. In the end, if I were to choose a future vision of the Union, I would rather go for a neo-medieval empire than a Westphalian super-state. However, we should also be aware of the fact that in a Europe with fuzzy borders it would be more, rather than less, difficult to assure a minimum degree of democracy, identity, and distributive justice. We should look for new and creative solutions to address these crucial problems because anarchy is not good for anybody.

3. Europe and the Idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’

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Introduction

For over one hundred years the question has been asked again and again as to the cultural form of Europe. What is Europe? What is European identity? Is there an underlying European idea from which politics might be grounded? Originally the question of Europe arose in the sixteenth century in the context of threats to Christendom and continued, as its secular successor, to be loosely associated with the ideas and ideals of a civilization that could claim to be European (since the only contending civilizations were conquered by Europeans).¹ But this was to change. Since the beginning of the twentieth century the stage of world history had moved beyond Europe and its civilizational heritage had now to define itself with respect to the West, now principally represented by the United States of America, and the communist ‘Asiatic’ East. Europa migrated westwards once again (as the myth of the Rape of Europa recalls of an earlier migration when Europa migrated from Asia Minor to the lands we now call Europe). But in this later migration Europe lost its identity, which was claimed by the wider, and predominantly American, West.² With the leadership of the West in the hands of America, Europe could no longer claim to represent European civilization, which in the aftermath of fascism had betrayed itself. In fact civilization had become a residual category, that is that which is left when culture has been extracted. As the German distinction between culture (*Kultur*) and civilization indicates, civilization has been exhausted but culture can be preserved so long as it maintains a distinction between its high and low variants.

Thus, for much of the twentieth century, it was high culture, not the now decadent category of civilization, nor the low culture of nationalism or the crass materialism of the nascent mass society that was the crucible in which Europe could be defined. But this was, to use Hegel’s term, an unhappy consciousness, an alienated mind that had lost its connection with itself. The dis-

¹ See Delanty (1995a), Viehoff and Segers (1999) and Pagden (2002) for an extended account.

² See Baudrillard’s comments on this (Baudrillard, 1989, pp. 75-83).

cord between mind and reality in European thought influenced conceptions of European identity. The most influential writings on Europe all defined Europe as an idea, a cultural discourse of the mind, an essence, based on myth. The assumption was that Europe is based on a cultural idea and that this idea can be embodied in a societal form, albeit one that had yet to be realized. We need only think of works such as Husserl's *Crisis of the European Sciences*, Paul Valery's *The Greatness and Decadence of Europe*, Karl Jaspers *The European Spirit* or T. S. Eliot's *The Unity of European Culture* to witness this discord in the European cultural identity.³

There have been two attempts to 'recapture' Europa. The first was in the treaties of Rome and Paris which gave birth to the present European Union. The second was in 1989 and 1990 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the state socialism. With the European Union and the creation of new European institutions such as the Council of Europe culture became associated with the emerging reality of a European polity and became, for a time, diluted in a project that has been dominated by economic and social concerns and increasingly with politics. Politics in the 'New Europe' has caught up with culture. With the collapse of state socialism in central and eastern Europe, 'the return to Europe' as it was called, put questions of civil society at the forefront of new debates on the meaning of Europe. With these developments, the abstract question of culture had been eclipsed in the way the discourse on culture had earlier eclipsed civilization. Whether in the vision of a 'Europe of regions', a 'postnational European civil society', a 'European federation', it began to look like a European identity was consolidating and in a largely political form.

However, ten years later, with the enlargement of the EU, the 'return to Europe' - or the making of a 'new Europe' - has lost its utopian promise. In the postcommunist constellation, the rise of nationalism, incomplete democratization and the unsettling effects of capitalism, which have led to major social and geographical disparities, have retarded, not advanced, the promised European ideal. The economic and political consolidation of the European Union, on the other side, has also led to a growing skepticism of a common European identity emerging. With the widespread recognition among western populations that Europeanization is leading to a growing democratic deficit and a deeper crisis in loyalties, the question of the possibility of a European identity is once again on the agenda. But the mood is different. The enlargement of the EU is deeply unpopular and there is a clear indication of cultural backlashes, fueled by fears of immigration (Delanty, 2003; Holmes, 2000). Many of the

³ See Delanty (1995b) for a discussion of this literature.

potential new member states are divided on the question of membership. Until now Europeans aspired to the unity of 'Europe' secure in the knowledge it was not possible. A project that was once led by the conservative right has become the refuge of a besieged democratic left.

The question of culture and identity has thus returned with many people asking the question as to the cultural form of Europe. European culture is once again called upon to provide a definition of Europe. But it is evident that Europe will not be codified by the political institutions alone and in place of a European Identity are in fact identities. I would like to address one major contemporary response to the question of Europe, namely the debate on 'unity in diversity'.

Unity in Diversity – A New European Myth?

In recent years the question of the identity of Europe is coming increasingly to be defined around the idea of 'unity in diversity.' This has become the most influential expression of European identity today as is evidenced by a wide range of documents, speeches, publications.⁴ In many ways, it is a uniquely European discourse and the fact that it has become pronounced today is particularly interesting.⁵ I believe there is a connection between this idea and the crisis of other definitions of Europe. Why has unity in diversity come to have such a significance today? What does it mean? Although it is a bureaucratic expression, generally lacking philosophical depth, it has wider cultural resonances. A careful sociological analysis of this discourse is warranted. It will provide the main point of departure for my proposal to move beyond, what I will be arguing, are its limitations.

I would like to state at the outset that I am not opposing the term, which in many ways is a harmless, if rather pointless, conception of European identity as one of inter-cultural understanding. It might quite well be the case that this is the only way we can define Europe – not based on a single identity but on many. However, I do believe the term needs some critical examination as it contains within it unclarified assumptions about the nature of identity and of culture. The idea of unity and diversity reflects a broader debate about universalism and relativism and perhaps, too, the much deeper philosophical theme

⁴ One of the best examples of it is the 450 page glossy compendium, *Unity in Diversity*, containing short texts on Europe by leading academic and political commentators (Taylor, 2001). The term unity in diversity is nowhere clarified.

⁵ This needs some qualification. The Indian prime minister, Nehru, used the term to define the national identity of India.

in European thought of becoming and oneness – how something can change and still remain the same.

‘Unity in diversity’ is an interesting term, which can be traced back to nineteenth-century nationalism and cosmopolitanism.⁶ It embodies two ideas – ‘unity’ and ‘diversity’ but the key to it is the ‘in’ for the concept of unity that it indicates is to be found in diversity, not above or beyond it. It is in this respect that unity in diversity is a post-liberal construction and, I would suggest, is heavily influenced by a kind of postmodern communitarianism that has gained intellectual ascendancy today. On first appearances it suggests the liberal attitude, but closer examination reveals something quite different. Let us take each of these terms, unity and diversity, which are more than two terms in an equation. In fact each represents the hitherto dominant expressions of European identity, namely the Eurofederalist aspiration to a deep unity and the liberal respect of diversity within the limits of a broadly defined moral universalism. We can then consider more precisely the significance of the new discourse.

The notion of the essential unity of Europe is best associated with the Eurofederalist definition of Europe as resting on a civilization but whose highest expression is in culture. To a degree the Eurofederalist tradition sought to recover the idea of European civilization. For the greater part there is little doubt that this tradition, with had its roots in Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, lost out to the liberal doctrine, but it was for a time influential, leading to notions of a European federal order, the Pan Europe Union, the unification of Europe. The federalist vision, popular in the first half of the twentieth century, continued to be influential in the second half, but only in a more cultural direction. Many influential historians wrote works that aimed to be histories of Europe rather than of states, for example Daniel de Rougement. In such works the emphasis was on a unity that transcended the divisions of European history, which now included battles over the price of butter or the shape of the banana.

This civilizational idea was famously embodied in ‘The Declaration European Identity’ of 1973, signed in Copenhagen by the then nine member states.⁷ The Declaration states: ‘The Nine member countries of the European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of the relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs.’ The document is also interesting in that it suggests the idea of a unity in diversity, referring as it did to the ‘diversity of cul-

⁶ Wintle argues the idea of unity and diversity stems from the work of Guizot and romantic nationalism in the nineteenth century (Wintle, 1996, pp. 4-5).

⁷ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 1973, No. 12, Section 5, Clause 2501, pp. 118-22.

tures' in the plural. However, it did not express the version of this which I believe has come into focus today. The Copenhagen Declaration was more explicitly concerned to elucidate the doctrine of unity than diversity. It referred to a 'common European civilization' based on a 'common heritage' and 'converging' attitudes and ways of life. The Declaration strongly emphasized the notion of 'Identity' with a capital 'I' as an official identity – 'The European identity' - to define the political structure of the then EEC in its relation with the external world: 'The diversity of cultures within the framework of common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a united Europe, all give the European identity its originality and its own dynamism.'

There are not many adherents to the idea of European unity today, especially one resting on a notion of civilization (see Strath, 2000). Diversity and radical hermeneutics is the order of the day but more importantly for a time it was the liberal idea of Europe that gained ascendancy and with this the liberal approach to diversity. This had two important dimensions, in politics and in morals. In Charles de Gaulle's notion of a 'Europe of Nations' the European project from the beginning was seen as a project of nation-states. As Andrew Milward argued in a now classic text, the European Union rescued the nation-state from itself and from the problems facing it (Milward, 1993). Neither Robert Schuman nor Jean Monet saw the European integration to be anything more than the co-operation of free nations who would not be under any central authority. While the momentum to greater integration did, as previously mentioned, lead to visions of a cultural identity emerging, there was rarely any assumption of integration leading to unity. The French dominated project saw Europeanization as the culmination of those very republican values upon which the nation-state was founded. Catholic social modernism, to be sure, added another, more social and economic, dimension to this otherwise largely liberal project, but one that was easily contained within the liberal principles of the modern state. The principle of subsidiarity, borrowed from the Catholic states, was never seen as uprooting the national state and the republican principle of sovereignty. I say liberal here in the sense of a project that was within the bounds of the political theory of liberalism, that is a conception of the state as limited in scope. The state as 'nightwatch man' would not infringe on social and cultural questions. Beyond that role the founding fathers – including Monet, Schuman, Adenauer and de Gaulle - had no vision of a unified Europe. If anything it was Winston Churchill who held to a strong notion of European unity, as in his notion of a 'United States of Europe' (but excluding Britain,

which having rescued Europe from itself would opt for the Atlantic alliance). The founding fathers of the European Union certainly had no vision of culture as a binding force and they did not think much ahead of the prevailing liberal and republican ethos of the post-war decades. By the late 1980s this had changed in some key respects.

The liberal conception of the state had always presupposed some notion of the diversity of culture on the one side and, on the other, a basic commitment to universalistic moral values which were somehow beyond the reach of culture. The liberal position was characterized by tolerance of national cultures, which on the whole were untouched by Europeanization. This, in general, was a thin commitment to a European order of values, and which were not in essence specifically European but universalistic, if not merely western. In the context of the Cold War and the American led West, this was not surprising. In this period the liberal ethos of European integration began to go into abeyance and eventually into decline. It declined simply because it could no longer be believed in, neither in theory nor in practice. In practice it ceased to be credible in face of the all too obvious legal might of the EU, which since Maastricht had handed over more and more power to the supra-state, which could no longer be seen in liberal terms. To a degree a kind of European civil society along with a European citizenship was emerging and which was not necessarily an extension of national civil societies but something quite different. In theory – in philosophy and in ideology – the liberal position lost out to a new way of thinking in which diversity would play a much stronger role. It was inevitable, in the age of postmodernism and globalization, that this would be a postliberal conception of diversity.

Official statements on European culture and identity are rare, but nonetheless indicative of the new cultural turn.⁸ Article 128⁹ of the 1992 (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union states: ‘The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1992). In the absence of empirical research, is difficult to trace the intellectual and political origins of the new idea of diversity that emerged in the 1990s. But a few points can be made. Influencing it were the following:

Firstly, the international climate, which might be seen as an expression of globalization, was one that led to a growing emphasis on a conception of diversity that could not be contained within liberalism. The influential UNESCO

⁸ See Shore (2000) for the most detailed analysis. See also Roche (2000) and Banus (2002).

⁹ This is now 151 in the amended Treaty of Amsterdam.

document, *Our Creative Diversity*, in 1995 (World Commission on Culture and Development, 1995) argued for a strongly relativistic conception of culture, although not one that rejected all the precepts of moral universalism.¹⁰ More generally, developments in the area of human rights were leading more and more in the direction of cultural rights. Globalization increasingly seemed to be working towards a world order of multiple centres. With many parts of the world entering into a postdevelopmental phase, the idea of a universal world culture lost its hegemonic position.

A second reason was an intellectual shift towards cultural relativism. From the 1980s onwards North America cultural relativism allied to radical hermeneutics reached new heights with radical communitarianism and its arguments for affirmative action and group rights. Postmodern thought, too, gave philosophical weight to cultural relativism.

Thirdly, within Europe the major challenge facing the European Union was the question of how to balance 'deepening' with 'widening.' The earlier enlargement projects of the European Union – the incorporation of the British Isles, the Iberian Peninsula and Scandinavian – did not challenge the basic assumptions upon which the EU had been built in era of consensual politics. The eastern extension is a different matter, with the incorporation of ten states by 2004 and many more in the following years. The liberal assumptions have been challenged in two respects. Politically, the EU cannot avoid differential treatment to the new countries. The illiberal nature of the enlarged EU is, for the most part, an accepted fact. Culturally, given the diversity of languages, religions and societies, the recognition of diversity is an administrative necessity.

Fourth, with the European Union becoming a major global power and needing to define itself in the world and not just within Europe, a cultural identity has distinct advantages.

Fifth, the older ideas of a Europe of nations had to adjust to the fact that Europe had become a land of significant migration from the rest of the world and that it is not any longer simply 'European' in terms of traditional assumptions about culture and identity. The shift from homogeneity to diversity is at the core of all debates on citizenship today (Bennett, 2001; Delanty, 2000).

Sixth, many countries within Europe have themselves internal debates along the lines of unity in diversity. The best example of this is Germany where the emergence of the Berlin Republic has been accompanied by a debate on 'inner unity' [*innere Einheit*], a concept that reflects the wider Europe-

¹⁰ See Eriksen (2001) for an interesting analysis of the idea of universalism and relativism in this document.

an debate on unity within the limits of diversity. In the UK the debate on Britain as a multi-ethnic society has also appealed to the notion of unity in diversity, a concept that has also been implicit in the White Paper in 2002, 'Secure Borders, Safe Havens: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain'.

Thus it has come about that a new ideology of culture has emerged in Europe. Unity in diversity is the phrase that perfectly captures the current situation in Europe. It expresses too the political spirit of the age – to be equal but different (Touraine, 2000). The slogan differs from earlier conceptions of Europe in that the principle of unity is now posited less as a higher unity than one constituted in the fact of diversity, an 'inner unity'. The recognition of diversity replaces the older liberal notion of universalistic values which might be capable of loosely defining the basic normative framework of the European Union. In the case of the Council of Europe, which has a strongly human rights focus, the commitment to unity in diversity maintains a certain balance with a commitment to upholding universalistic values within Europe. 'Diversity lies at the heart of Europe cultural richness, which is our common heritage and the basis of our unity', according to the official statement of the Council of Europe.¹¹

Moreover, unity in diversity makes a compromise with national and regional particularity. The EU is now caught in the contradictory situation of having to define a common European culture that is universal – but not so universal that it is global and thus not distinctively European – and at the same time does not negate national and regional cultures. On the one side, the condition of universality must be satisfied and, on the other, the principle of diversity must be upheld. The President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, in his book *Europe as I see It*, discusses this dilemma in an interesting way. Arguing that the cultural unity of Europe is in Christianity, from which it derives its universalism, Europe can escape the Eurocentrism that it had become snared in. 'Europe's destiny is not inherently Eurocentric, but one of universality', he argues and goes on to say this universalism needs to be given a stronger position today in aspiring to 'a new cultural unity.' This new unity, which is based on an underlying unity, must, he argues, acknowledge 'otherness' and the ability of cultures to live together: 'This means the mutual acceptance among Europeans of their cultural diversity' (Prodi, 2000, pp. 46-7).¹²

¹¹ See the Council of Europe's website www.coe.int

¹² In his Preface to the compendium, *Unity in Diversity*, Prodi also refers to an 'underlying unity' that guarantee a European identity beyond the diversity of cultures (see Taylor, 2001).

The philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer has also argued strongly for a conception of European identity as one based on unity and diversity. Faced with the diversity of Europe, he has argued for a conception of Europe that does not seek to overcome differences: 'To participate with the other and to be part of the other is the most and the best that we can strive for and accomplish' (Gadamer, 1992, p. 235).¹³ Edgar Morin, too, argues the unity of Europe lies in the unique capacity to cope with differences without the need for an overarching principle of unity (Morin, 1987).

It is difficult to make sense of these proclamations of European identity and of the relationship between unity and diversity. However, it is possible to distinguish at least four arguments or presuppositions about the relation of unity and diversity. These are the following:

(1) *Diversity as Derivative of Unity*. This is the position that there is an underlying unity that comes from the historical heritage of Graeco-Roman and Christian culture. Although this has crystallized into different European traditions, the argument is that it constitutes the core of the European consciousness, which is one of centuries long tolerance, a spirit of compromise and a love of freedom. This is a position that is reflected in much of the older unity in diversity literature which identifies Europe with a spirit or ethos of liberty. In this way of thinking the older Euro-federalist influence is still strong. The basic idea here, then, is two-fold: (a) although unity may be incomplete, the foundations of it already exist and (b) diversity is not an obstacle to realizing unity because the principle of unity is in part one of tolerance and understanding for diversity.

(2) *Unity as Derivative of Diversity*. In this sense unity derives from the overcoming of differences. This sense of unity and diversity is a more recent conception that abandons the assumption of an underlying unity. In the view of many EU policy makers unity – that is, a common European identity – can be created by cultural policies. In this version of the unity and diversity argument European identity is a project to be achieved rather than simply an identity that exists in some form. This is a position that has some popularity with EU policy makers, but does not command widespread popular support, perhaps because it is associated with official culture and empty symbols. This model of cultural unity is quite explicitly European but seeks to accommodate national diversities on a symbolic level. Examples of this approach might be the Cities of Culture programme, or various cultural programmes supported by the European Commission (see Sassatelli, 2001; Shore, 2000). The 1973 Copenhagen Declaration, mentioned above, is also an example of this conception of

¹³ This was originally published in German in 1984 as *Das Erbe Europas*.

unity over-riding diversity. Another example is the 1995 'Charta of European Identity.'¹⁴ In all these cases unity is to be created out of the fragments of diversity, which suggests a weak kind of cosmopolitanism, such as inter-cultural understanding.

A variation of this theme is that unity will come from an emerging European way of life, perhaps as shaped by the integrated market, Structural Funds, educational exchange programmes, open borders, the Euro etc (see Borneman and Fowler, 1997). The sociological assumption is that convergence emerges out of divergence.

(3) *Unity as Diversity*. This is a more recent argument that moves the emphasis from unity to diversity. Hence the emphasis is on a unity that consists of the fact of diversity. In this view the unity of Europe derives less from a historical cultural heritage than from the interaction of the different European traditions. In this logic, the condition of diversity is given priority over unity - unity derives from diversity. This is reflected in, for example, the above cited paragraph in the Amsterdam Treaty in Romano Prodi's reflections on Europe (Prodi, 2000). Diversity, here of course, refers to the plurality of national and regional cultures and not to other expressions of diversity. European cultural policy has constantly oscillated between this position and the previously outlined stance.¹⁵ With the official documents of the EU, it is this position that is becoming the more influential. It is also the broad stance of the Council of Europe. In this position unity can only consist of the recognition of diversity and thus be based on values compatible with the fact of diversity.

(4) *A Self-Limiting Unity*. The unity of Europe is minimal kind of unity formed out of an active engagement with diversity. In this case diversity refers not just to national and regional differences but to multi-ethnic differences. The diversity of Europe makes a strong unity impossible but does not preclude the possibility of a reflective kind of unity emerging. This is a position that is best associated with Jürgen Habermas who argues European identity must be related to values such as those that could be common to all Europeans (Habermas, 2001). In his view, because of the divisiveness of culture and the danger of nationalism, such values can only be constitutional ones, albeit ones that are formed out of processes of public critique and deliberation. This more explicitly post-national position thus sets up a tension between unity and diversity, positing a minimal but workable kind of unity that avoids essentialist cultural appeals to unity or to diversity. The recognition of diversity is essential,

¹⁴ The Charta was proposed by Václav Havel in 1994 and was taken up by Europa-Union Deutschland and was drafted in 1995. See http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm

¹⁵ For an excellent discussion of this, see Banus (2002).

but it is also crucial too to see that diversity is not an overriding value in itself. In this view, unity is merely the limited universalism of modern values such as critique and reflexivity. The distinctive nature of Habermas's position is that these values go beyond the typical liberal ones of respect for others and tolerance for difference, etc by giving a greater role to communicative structures than to an underlying cultural identity. This position and the previous one are not substantially different in neither appeal to a strong sense of unity and seek to reconcile diversity with a workable kind of unity that does not see unity nor diversity as fixed principles. The Habermasian stance differs in arguing for a sense of unity that is stronger than the mere recognition of diversity and thus makes less concessions to diversity.

In another version of this argument, Massimo Cacciari offers an interpretation of European identity which captures a sense of unity emerging out of interacting discourses. In his book *L'Arcipelago* he describes Europe as an archipelago of spaces connected by various links (Cacciari, 1997). Europe in this view is a network of differences, a mosaic of overlapping and connecting diversities. There is no overarching or underlying unity, but connections.¹⁶ A European identity thus might be seen as the recognition of differences and the capacity to build upon these links (see also Morin, 1987).

Critical Perspectives: Neither the One nor the Many

The idea of unity in diversity, I have argued, has become an influential way of thinking about European cultural identity today, especially in the context of the enlargement of the European Union. It is an alternative to the two dominant positions, the strongly Euro-federalist notion of the essential unity of Europe as a largely underlying unity and the liberal influenced argument of a higher moral universalism over-riding the inconsequential cultural diversity of Europe. It thus offers an escape from the dilemma of universalism and particularism. With its suggestion of a unity that is shaped in an acknowledgement of diversity, many difficulties are overcome. But at what price? How coherent is this notion of a unity in diversity? Taking into account the different versions of this notion, discussed above, some problems can be mentioned.

One problem that needs to be addressed is why diversity should be a value in itself. It is not at all evident that the recognition of diversity will lead to a collective identity and indeed why a collective identity is desirable.¹⁷ This

¹⁶ Similar arguments have been proposed by Castells (1998) and Derrida (1993).

¹⁷ For a critique of the idea of a collective identity, see Niethammer (2002).

seems to be the assumption behind the phrase unity in diversity - a higher unity derives from an underlying one and will attain a degree of coherence out of the recognition of diversity and ultimately manifesting itself in a collective identity. Sociologically, it is difficult to make much sense of this beyond the suggestive level of a rhetorical commitment to a soft cosmopolitanism. Diversity exists on many levels in Europe and elsewhere.

There is the obvious level of polynational diversity to begin with, the numerous national cultures. Regional diversity both within and across national cultures is a further dimension complicating national diversity. Indeed, it may be the case that there is greater diversity within nations than across them. However these are two levels of diversity and which are generally taken to be the only ones as far as defining the unity of European identity. Diversity also exists at the level of ethnic groups and which does not have a geopolitical dimension to it. With most European societies being *de facto* multicultural, diversity has become the reality everywhere (Tully, 1995). On this level, diversity can be differentiated in several ways, as diversity is reflected in language, religion, national identity, customs etc. We can add to this diversity on the level of life styles, taste cultures and forms of consumption, class and gender.

But diversity can also mean something beyond the simple fact of the plurality of forms of life. It can also indicate difference in the stronger sense of divisions. There is the question of diversity on the level of competing conceptions of morality, as in deep conflicts on life and death (abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering etc), between religions and between religion and secularism or many nationalist struggles where there is little if any common ground upon which, what John Rawls has called, an 'over-lapping consensus' could be built (Rawls, 1987).

One of the problems with the unity in diversity argument is that it conflates these two sense of diversity: plurality and divisions. In the first sense the assumption is that unity is either the basis of the cultural differences – broadly the liberal position – or is something to be achieved on a political level – the position held by Habermas. The second sense is that diversity is an obstacle to unity. This leads theorists such as Habermas to argue that if unity is possible at all it can only be the recognition of difference or the capacity to stand out side a cultural tradition.¹⁸ In the case of Rawls, unity is possible where contending groups share a common ground. What is at stake, then, is the degree of diversity, the extent of conflict arising from diversity and whether this conflict allows common ground to emerge (Rawls) or whether it facilitates a capacity for cultural transformation (Habermas).

¹⁸ See Habermas (1996, 1998).

Current thinking seems to point towards a view of unity in diversity as an accomplished fact and that therefore the only unity possible is that which is built on the basis of whatever common values can be found in the various European identities. A European identity is then not an over-riding identity but only the common expression of those values that presently exist. This might suggest that it is unlikely that European identity can rest on stronger values, in a way comparable to, for example, American values or 'Asian values'.

There is an interesting contrast here which is worth pursuing. American values have traditionally been defined in terms of meritocratic individualism and have mostly been molded by consumer capitalism. More recently diversity has been held to undermine the possibility of defining shared American values, for culture has ceased to be universal. The case of what is often termed 'Asian values' on the other hand makes diversity the basis of collective identity. But, Asian values in fact are indistinguishable from Singaporean national identity, for Singapore (a multi-ethnic state) does not have a historical nation, which is why it made the appeal to Asian values the basis of its national identity. Perhaps Europe can emulate the Singaporean example and make European values the basis of its identity, given the fact that the EU does not have a nation to fall back on and the changes of a European 'nation' being created are remote. The language of debating diversity in Europe today leans too heavily in the direction of cultural divisiveness. Culture is what divides, not what unites. In view of this it is difficult to see how a European identity could be shaped. Identities, whether individual or collective, require more than the recognition of difference but shared values. The contradiction of the unity in diversity myth is that it denies the possibility of a European identity since this will always be in danger of undermining national diversity.

In addition to these levels of diversity there is the additional question of the relation of diversity to multiplicity, in particular to what is often called multiple identities. Diversity suggests the numerical condition of several identities which have to be chosen. It has in itself an unclarified relation to multiplicity conceived of as overlapping and entangled identities.

It might also be suggested that the appeal to diversity will legitimate xenophobic arguments, such as those now popular with the extreme right. It has been a pervasive tendency for the extreme right in several European countries to argue against migration, Islam and minorities precisely on the grounds of the need to respect cultural diversity. The ideological proponents of the new right argue that cultures are separate and cannot be reconciled to an unity.¹⁹ The diversity myth ultimately reinforces these extreme positions as well as

¹⁹ See Taguieff (1994).

more generally simply reflecting some of the positions nationalists have always argued, namely the autonomy of national cultures. Unity and diversity is, in essence, a doctrine of cultural relativism. To a degree relativism is an unavoidable dimension of any culture committed to the liberal values pluralism, respect for the individual, tolerance etc. But taken to an extreme it can be a legitimating ideology of cultural incommensurability. Interpreted in a less extreme way, it is either a meaningless statement of the pluralism of a polynational Europe or does not explain how unity comes about. It certainly does not explain the nature of identity construction or account for existing kinds of unity that have nothing to do with diversity.

One of the major limits of the unity in diversity argument is that it confines European identity to very inflexible reference points. National and regional identities are thus static or rigid identities rather than interpenetrating identities and European identity can only be the expression of the common – here in the sense of Rawls's over-lapping - features of these identities, or in the more limiting case of the recognition of these differences. What is neglected is the critical and transformative dimension of identities and the capacity of Europeanization to bring about change as opposed merely to reflect existing identities.

In sum, unity in diversity is a deeply problematic concept where it is not a meaningless piece of rhetoric suggesting intercultural understanding. To the extent to which it corresponds to something tangible it is close to a legitimization of xenophobic nationalism whereby the unity of Europe consists in the separation of peoples into different cultures. However, I believe a more nuanced interpretation is possible.

Conclusion: Beyond the Diversity Myth

I wish to propose the argument that there is more unity than is indicated by the current appeal to diversity. This is not a refutation of the obvious reality of diversity on many different levels or of deep cultural divisions. Some of the deepest divisions in Europe are not in fact national or even cultural at all. There are major divisions on the level of political ideology for instance and the national polities themselves are fraught with huge differences that leave their populations largely indifferent to the wider question of Europe. Diversity exists on a European level in particular discourses, such as environmentalism, sustainability, anti-corruption, biotechnology, humanitarianism. In these cases the critical issue is less one of consensus than dissensus (Eder, 2001). Unity also exists as in, for instance, the holocaust memory, which in the view of many is a European memory (see Levy and Sznajder, 2002). What I think is indicat-

ed by such examples is that a European identity exists on the level of discourses that are neither ones of unity nor of diversity but of communication. Europeans are communicating more and more about a wide range of problems. These discourses occur on several levels. They are in part transnational, occurring in the largely English language dominated European civil society, but also, and more significantly, they occur within regional and national public spheres in a plurality of languages.

However, what is more significant and obscured by the unity in diversity idea is that the distinctively 'European' is not something that can be captured by cultural discourses, such as those that are typically associated with either cultural unity or cultural diversity. The turn to culture and to collective identity obscures what arguably is the really common European value, namely the enduring and pervasive European-wide belief in social justice. With its origins in the idea of the social contract, the social movements of the modern period and the twentieth-century welfare state, the recognition of social justice is one of the characteristically European values, distinguishing it from other parts of the world where the social contract has been weaker. Although the so-called 'European social model' has remained a marginal dimension of EU politics and policy making, it is a potentially more viable basis for European identity than the cultural discourse of unity in diversity.

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Discussant's comments
on the presentations by

William Wallace

Jan Zielonka

Gerard Delanty

4. Discussant's comments on the presentations by William Wallace, Jan Zielonka and Gerard Delanty

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All three presentations given this morning focus on the idea of an European identity. This is an incredible powerful concept that is used in several different ways within the framework of European integration. On the basis of the presentations I think it is possible to identify at least three different, but interrelated, contexts where the perception of "Europeaness" plays an important instrumental role.

A perception of a European identity may deliver a focal point to gather around in order to fulfil a social need of commonness. Thereby the common identity may promote common interests and communication needed to solve concrete problems in society. Gerard Delanty has elaborated this function of a common identity and I will return to his presentation in a moment.

The concept of a European identity may be used as an instrument to further internal cohesion and thereby integration in a top to bottom approach. This is a clear parallel to 19th century nation state building where most nations provided themselves with unique qualities and a honourable past. William Wallace referred to a modern example in this genre; Duroselle's "Europe: a history of its peoples", sponsored by the European Commission. This work presents a highly selective West European history where humanistic traditions are highlighted while less admirable European projects such as colonialism and genocide of non-Europeans are hardly mentioned.

The possession of a European identity may be used as an instrument for selection. The European identity thus becomes an instrument both for inclusion and exclusion. From a legal point of view this instrumental function is clearly expressed in article 49 of the TEU. According to this article any "European state which respects the principles set out in article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union".

When we discuss the future borders of Europe the third meaning of European identity becomes the most central. In this connection the concept becomes highly problematic and generates arguments for a self-identification that is based on a negation of the other. This is illustrated by that incoming Member

States have to define themselves as insiders by disassociating themselves from outsiders.

I think that William Wallace makes a very important point when he states that the question of Europe's limits has to be separated from the boundaries of the EU. Through such a separation we do not have to answer the question where Europe ends. This question could be the focus for a stimulating and open-ended continuing debate.

However, we have to take a position on the question of the scope of EU enlargement. Such a position should however never be definite and as far as possible it ought to be de-dramatized.

According to William Wallace the limits for enlargement must primarily be set by the absorption capacity of the Union. The risk of over-extension, leading to incapacity, must be avoided.

An assessment has to take place case by case and be based on a number of variables such as socio-political acceptance, demography and relative economic strength. However a crucial variable has hardly been mentioned here this morning. That is the establishment of a stable mutual constitutional trust between present and acceding Member States. The principle of constitutional trust could be seen as an absolutely essential fundamental principle not only of EU law but also of the EU itself. All Member States have to have a stable trust in that all other Member States uphold fundamental common values, most importantly democracy and effective safeguards for fundamental human rights and freedoms. Such a trust is a necessary prerequisite for establishing an acceptance of that legislative decisions are taken by qualified majority in the Council and of European Law as the supreme law of the land in all Member States.

Both William Wallace and Jan Zielonka underlines the fundamental importance of creating "soft" or "non-excluding" external borders of the European Union, this in order to de-dramatize the demarcation line between ins and outs. William Wallace argues that the Union have to take a responsibility for Europe including its Eurasian and North African peripheries. In this connection he presents a number of concrete measures that ought to be taken. These include a more generous strategy for association, including market access, labour mobility and financial transfers as well as co-operative border management.

Along the same lines Jan Zielonka's presentation includes a powerful argumentation that the future external borders of the Union have to be given a non-excluding character. Enlargement is about overcoming division while hard borders recreate divisions.

Thus, in both presentations emphasize the importance of establishing clear boundaries for the EU, *as well as* the desirability of pursuing cross-border

strategies in order to avoid exclusion of those outside. On certain points there might exist a tension between these two desired objectives of delimitation *and* openness. In such situations a reasonable balance has to be struck. However these tensions should not be exaggerated; Co-operation across borders in order to solve a common problem is more efficient than sealing the border.

As I stated at the beginning of this conference I wholeheartedly support these observation and I think it is urgent that this line of argumentation reach the ears of political decision makers.

However, it seems to me that the present developments within the Union are far from encouraging. The Union is clearly in the process of strengthening, or “hardening” the external border regimes. This is motivated by the need to defend the Union against perceived external threats such as illegal immigration, trafficking and international terrorism. Furthermore, this development seems to be supported by a near consensus among the members of the political elites within the Union. Consequently, we must ask ourselves, what is required to muster the political willingness needed to take up a responsibility that is wider in scope than the Union itself?

Jan Zielonka’s larger vision of a future “Neo-Byzantine Empire”, a complex structure with overlapping sovereignties and blurred borders, I find mind thrilling and it is worth a conference in itself. Here, I would just like to make one minor reflection concerning the question of democratic legitimacy. The vision presented clearly refers to the No-Demos thesis; a functioning democracy requires a defined territory and a reasonably homogenous Demos. As a consequence, the central arena for democracy within this visionary Neo-Byzantine Empire must be based on sub-imperial units. Thus, this vision for the future seems to encapsulate a more challenging version of the problems we are facing today. I am here referring to the present debate on how to remedy the faltering democratic legitimacy for decisions taken by Union institutions, most importantly, the debate on the future balance between National and European parliamentarism within the Union structure. The vision presented is attractive because it seems to be adaptive, dynamic, flexible and non-excluding. But, in the light of our recent experiences, could such a complex structure ever be designed so that it is perceived as legitimate from a democratic point of view?

Finally, I would like to thank Gerard Delanty for his clear and sobering critical analysis of the concept “unity in diversity”. This concept has been developed as a pragmatic patent solution to avoid the pitfalls of both proclaimed value universalism and cultural particularism. Nevertheless, this self-contradictory agreement on disagreement might actually have a value, not as a

basis for identity, but as an illustration of present European reality. It mirrors the tension in the basic objective of *an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe*. No matter how close the Union, it is to remain among distinct peoples or Demoi. This rejection of the one state ideal is usually understood as intended to preserve the rich diversity of the relatively distinct European peoples as well as to respect their right to self-determination.

As an attractive alternative Gerard Delanty suggests that the belief in social justice might constitute a possible viable basis for a European identity. This is certainly a value that is common to most European societies that have developed more or less sophisticated welfare systems. I feel sympathy for this idea but I think that the prospects for expanding the role of the European Union within this area are very limited. As a consequence of the underlying principles for the distribution of powers between the Member States and the Common institutions, social issues only have a marginal position in EU politics. The inclusion of social issues would require the attribution of powers for economic redistribution to the common institutions. The financing would furthermore require a dramatic increase of the common budget, most efficiently through a supranational fiscal policy. Such a revolutionary development certainly seems utopian today.

"Essentialist, pragmatic and constructivist analyses and the hardening of borders in Fortress Europe"

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All three of the presentations in this session are informative and stimulating. Not being a political scientist, but approaching the analyses from the vantage-point of a specialist in the philosophy and politics of science let me first of all make some meta-theoretical observations. I shall concentrate on the presentations of William Wallace and Gerard Delanty.

What can be gleaned from the three interventions taken altogether? we see at least three approaches to the question of boundaries and identities.

- an essentialist approach;
- a pragmatist one; and,
- a constructivist approach.

The latter in particular prompts the question of our own reflexivity the role of academic scholars as close to the policy-making elites.

The essentialist approach seems to be outmoded, dwelling as it does on certain universal European virtues. It trades on either claims to uniquely embodied values or else a highlighting of difference vis a vis other geopolitical regions, for example the US and Americanization.

William Wallace discusses how reference to religion, civilization and cultural formation justifies boundaries and, extensions of them. Gerard Delanty is concerned with changing policies and views regarding a European identity. He notes how earlier advocates of European unity, historically, have called on certain essences like Christianity, a common civilization, spirit or mentality. In the 20th century came a cultural turn, whence references began to be made to a common cultural matrix. Both Wallace and Delanty reject essentialism and criticize historical and even current versions of it. Wallace states the matter clearly, when he argues how historical claims get misused, and how no actor, state or supranational entity can claim to embody intrinsic virtue.

The pragmatic approach is that of the old Coal and Steel Community. In this view boundaries are where they happen to be and the thing is to make the best of them, extend them if it is to the advantage of industrial growth and pri-

vate wealth. In the neo-liberal trickle-down version, wealth creation comes before social justice and greater equity in the distribution of wealth. Within the EU-bureaucracy and amongst member countries' governments so far this version of pragmatism lives side by side with the one of less hardheaded proponents who emphasizes social justice and democratic norms - the project of a social Europe.

Delanty, more so than Wallace, distantiates himself from the essentialist and pragmatic approaches. All three scholars in their analyses seem to opt for some form of constructivism. This is an approach that assumes boundaries to be in flux, temporarily fixed as a result of power struggles, skillful negotiation and politics, including identity politics. It also calls for deliberation and critique. All three speakers are moreover sensitive to the pitfalls of extreme constructivism, one that opens for cultural relativism and reactionary backlash. At the same time Jan Zielonka argues that soft borders are to be preferred to the hard borders that are currently the order of the day. Hard borders, he says, are counter-functional. A question that emerges however is how to operationalize soft borders?

Towards the end of the 20th century we are told, a new situation has arisen, one where it is no longer possible to promote an ideal of unity in homogeneous cultural terms. Instead, to meet the new identity crisis the formula has now become one of unity as the recognition of diversity. Delanty provides an incisive analysis and critique of this notion. His portrayal of the present situation reminds one of a family sized pizza where the ingredients are mixed but the slices may have different ethnic toppings. I agree this view tends to consolidate existing identity cleavages, thereby fanning the smoldering cinders of reactionary types of nationalism and xenophobia.

Instead of a notion of diversity inside a common compound, Delanty suggests a strategy that backs away from the cultural turn to bring in a critical political realism. He warns against the strategy of European commonality as something that is postulated on the basis of ideal typical progressive values and thence trying to give them flesh and blood. Yes, it may be a strategy that gets away from agonizing over essentialist or culturalist attempts at a unitary grounding, but tending as it does to a kind of voluntarism reminiscent of the pragmatic approach, where does it leave us? Singapore is given as a (negative) example, where one finds a multi-ethnic state that does not have its own national history, but a state that nevertheless has gone on to appeal to pan-Asian values as a basis for its national identity. Europe might use a similar strategy as a supra-national entity to avoid falling back onto a given nation or set of nations as its culturally defined core. But this, just as the case of multiculturalism as a family pizza, is only to shift the problem to a new level. I had hoped Delanty

would elaborate a bit more on the question of Singapore as a negative example because I think it has important implications when it comes to avoiding new pitfalls.

Having said all this let me now get back to boundaries, prompted by Jan Zielonka's presentation. Yes, boundaries are symbolic representations and mental maps that can get pretty arbitrary in their accommodation of various interests. However boundaries are also coterminous with real existing instruments for filtering populations in the European commonwealth. Boundaries are also institutions and social facts. It is not only a matter of where Europe ends, it also a question of where Europe begins. Asking the question this way leads into Zielonka's argument about the ongoing process of a hardening of boundaries. The Schengen agreement is an instrument in this process. This means European boundaries actually begin at home.

Here in Göteborg we have a situation today where the European boundary fleshed out in the Schengen agreement crisscrosses the Landvetter and Säve airports. On non-domestic flights arriving passengers may find that they get checked as they disembark, even though there is no formal passport control desk any longer for intra-EU European flights.

Or if you go to Sahlgrenska City Hospital and happen to be one of greater Göteborg's roughly 700 or so asylum seekers, persons *sans papier* who are officially called "illegal", then you have to pay 2000 Swedish Crowns to see a doctor. This may be compared to the 220 Crowns that a Swedish resident has to pay, who on top of that has a 10-digit personal identity number that the receptionist's computer will accept; the person *sans papier*, lacking such a 10-digit number is already spit out by the computer. If you are unlucky the police might be onto you, backed up by the National Migration Agency and Swedish legislation. Now if you are a citizen from another EU member country and have a proper health insurance policy you won't have that trouble either. My point is that you don't have to go very far to look for boundaries. They are not merely mental maps; they are also social facts.

Another example of boundaries right here at home we saw during the EU summit in Göteborg in June. During the meeting in Göteborg there was police mobilization and clashes with demonstrators like in Seattle, Prague and Genoa where there were anti-WTO manifestations and the anti-EU manifestations in Prague and Genoa. The events of June 2001 here in Göteborg are very much in the news just now since a fresh committee report came out yesterday with severe criticism of the police leadership and its inability, locally, to handle EU summit meetings.

Thus as social facts, European boundaries cut into the hearts of our own countries, as part of the project Fortress Europe. The question raised in Wallace's paper is where to place the moat around the fortress and how to get new associate members to agree to a two tier system, act as guards and operate outlying surveillance points on the other side of this moat. Or, to quote William Wallace: "Political or economic breakdown in North Africa would spill immediately across the Mediterranean, with refugees landing in Spain, Italy, etc. The Mediterranean is not a secure boundary...." The conclusion is that security checkpoints have to be extended beyond the current perimeter so as to avoid importing insecurity and economically desperate immigrants, people *sans papier*.

Yes, so it might look from the summit. But there is also another perspective, that of the social movement, including church missions, The Attac movement, anti-EU coalitions in Sweden, and the 15,000 demonstrators on Göteborg streets in June 2001. Some of these groups argue that to be a person is to be a human being. To be a person is never "illegal", or is it?

So what I am asking for is more reflexivity and symmetry or balance regarding different value biases in the discussion of boundaries. What is our own role as policy advisors, can we be neutral, objective, or is there always an element of partiality to one or another existing perspective, be it top-down or bottom-up?

The problem here is similar to the one I see in my own field - Science policy studies. The analyst stands too close to the policy-maker, and ideas, concepts, standpoints get circulated back and forth to an extent where it becomes difficult to distinguish academic papers from documents commissioned by planners and decision-makers for policy advice. I worry for the integrity of science.¹ We are all hybrids to some extent, unless of course we subscribe to the old ivory tower. However there is an important question of balance between science and policy. In an academic setting I would have expected a more symmetric stance, taking cognizance not only of the views of those at the top, but also the views from bottom up. Like Richard Falk in his critique of the top-down view of globalization, I want equal room for discussion of bottom-up Europeanization predicated on a different logic from that of the market and other exclusionary interests.

Let me finally close with a remark on the recent discussions concerning the creation of a European Research Area. This is a question that, I find, has bearing

¹ This question is currently also being flagged in discussions regarding science advice in the EU. See for example Peter Collins and Dimitris Kyriakou, "Independent Science Advice in the EU", in *The IPTS Report*, no. 70 (December 2002), pp. 4-7. The IPTS report is edited by the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) in Seville and issued in cooperation with the European S&T Observatory Network.

on our agendas as scholars working at various centers specializing in European Studies.

The old pragmatists pinned their hopes on more material goods, i.e. coal and steel. The new ones, among other things, give space and guidelines for the construction of the European Commission's Framework Program that is supposed to stimulate research to feed back into European decision-making processes, with an eye to greater cohesion and integration, as well as other forms of instrumental utility. "Value-added" is currently the bottom line; the accent is on hard economic values and market criteria, here as elsewhere. The Framework Program from which some scholars get an increasing portion of their funding is a good indicator of the problems I am trying to get at. There is a gap in Europe between words and deeds. Words refer to multiculturalism and diversity, deeds or policies tend to privilege economics, and with it scientific knowledge that is most useful in this context. Voices need to be raised with ideas to redress the imbalance of current scientific priorities within the European Framework Programs. I anticipate that each of the speakers may have a good deal to say about this issue as well as my concern with the value bias implicit in our own work as academic scholars, or what I include under the problem of reflexivity and symmetry.

In view of the current developments and the trends just highlighted, I want to ask the three speakers about their view of Europe's future role on the geopolitical arena. Do you think the European Union will become another superpower, one that will challenge the hegemony of the US, and if so, in what domains will this become most visible? Or, if this is not a likely scenario, what will the role of the EU be, particularly with regard various aspects of so-called globalization?

“European Identity and the Transatlantic Rift”

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Let me first turn to the theme of the conference, Borders, Boundaries and Frontiers, as an attempt to bring the three presentations under one umbrella, and then draw some overall conclusion on the role of Europe in the world and her relation to the USA.

Basically, the conference theme boils down to inclusion and exclusion. The concepts of frontiers, borders and boundaries signify different modes of inclusion and exclusion, and these three modes can only be understood as interrelated processes, cultural, political, social and economic. So, the organisers have really tried to make the topic of this conference as complicated as possible. To simplify, then, we can perhaps say that frontiers are predominantly cultural, borders political, and boundaries social.

By *frontiers* one could mean the cultural penetration from the European core towards the peripheries. Inclusion versus exclusion is here a question of more or less voluntary cooptation. This implies being a subject in an empire and participant in a civilization, rather than a "barbarian" in the periphery outside the Great Wall that protects the civilized.

Historically, European identity has meant: Christendom, the Modern Project (or Enlightenment), and Western Transatlantic Civilization, i.e. the West. What European identity means today, and may mean tomorrow, is harder to say. Hence this conference.

The frontier concept suggests identity as a set of values, Christian, modern etc. But which values are relevant today? The suggestion from Gerard Delanty is justice as a shared European value. This is an interesting and important proposition. He rightly points out, though, that social policy in Europe is marginal and neglected. It has also been a controversial field. A European policy against social exclusion is only now emerging. Since 2000 there is what is called an Open Method of Coordination in the struggle against poverty and social exclusion.

I would like to raise the the question whether not secularism should be seen as a shared European value. It was stressed recently by Javier Solana in contrasting American and European value systems in the area of foreign policy.

Solana spoke about the emerging transatlantic rift as a cultural phenomenon. The war against terrorism is by the USA conceived in religious terms, as a struggle between good and evil, while Europeans according to Solana is secular: "We do not see the world in black and white terms". Solana ends by saying that Europe therefore has an obligation to become more of an actor in the world.

Borders, which means "drawing lines on the map", as William Wallace puts it, are perhaps simpler to deal with, conceptually. These lines on the map follow the old national borders - in case of an Enlargement in an ever widening space. The question of inclusion and exclusion is here decided by the insiders, but as long as the enlargement goes on, the general attitude is inclusive. But how long will it go on? As William Wallace also rightly says, the question is where should EU (not Europe) end? A strategy of enlargement is badly needed. What is also needed is a system for managing external relations to different parts of the world. Such a system has actually developed in an embryonic form through the EU "group to group- policy". It could be further developed into a kind of regional and interregional world order based on institutionalized partnerships between regional organizations.

Boundaries, finally, are social divisions, constructed and negotiated among various identity groups. But identities are constantly being transformed and boundaries are in permanent change. This issue has become political dynamite. More inclusion in terms of enlargement could mean more internal exclusion in terms of new social boundaries, as Europe is becoming increasingly heterogeneous. But more exclusion through "hard" borders, as Zielonka puts it, creates social tension, when ethnic kins (like the Hungarians) are situated on both sides of a hard border. I therefore also agree with Zielonka about the necessity of soft borders, at the same time as the struggle against social exclusion inside Europe must go on.

The rationale behind Europe's expansion and the creation of systems of cooperation with the external world should, in normative terms, be to play a world role - such a claim is no less realistic for Europe than the US claim for the role as world leader. As we all know Europe has already played such a role once - with mixed results. Jurgen Habermas has suggested that Europe, differently from other rising and declining empires, may be given 'a second chance' to influence world history; this time through a 'non-imperial process of reaching understanding with, and learning from, other cultures'.

If we take this, perhaps somewhat idealistic, idea seriously, the European world role must be qualitatively different from the US role - an alternative world order based on social justice, secularism, soft rather than hard power, and soft rather than hard borders.

European identity lies in the mission and duty she has in providing an alternative model of world order. Without even trying to exploit the possibility of a second chance, we can forget about identity.

The rift between the Atlantic alliance partners is becoming dramatic. One major difference between the American and the European view on world order is that the belief in international institutions and the enthusiasm for multilateralism and interregionalism found in the EU is not at all shared with the USA.

The USA has always preferred bilateralism in its handling of external affairs. NAFTA, which is often compared to the EU, was in fact a result of extended bilateralism. Similarly APEC is a result of a great number of bilateral agreements, whereas the ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) is based on an interregional agreement between the two regional organizations: EU and ASEAN.

Thus one first crucial difference is the EU preference for long term multi-dimensional, horizontal, institutional arrangement, whereas the USA prefers more temporary 'coalitions of the willing' under its own leadership and subordinated under 'the national interest' (Regionalism against unilateral globalism).

This difference can be related to contrasting ideas in political philosophy, as has recently and eloquently been pointed out by John Kagan. According to him, Europeans (from Venus) prefer to live in the ideal world of 'permanent peace' of Immanuel Kant, which is the natural choice of the weak, whereas the Americans (from Mars) live in the real world of Thomas Hobbes. This shows the responsibility, duty and mission of the strong (utopianism against realism).

A third dimension of this European-American contrast in political culture is what Javier Solana, the EU spokesman in foreign affairs, as was pointed out above, referred to as the US religious approach to foreign policy, whereas the European approach is supposed to be rationalist and secular. Thus the USA tends to see political conflict as a struggle between good and evil, or God and Devil, Europe has a tradition of making a political analysis of conflict, pragmatically looking for compromises (rationality against religiosity).

5. Europe and America; Strategies for Survival

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Introduction

In this paper I am looking at some aspects of the relationship between Europe and America.¹ I will not be focusing on the details of particular institutions or specific political disputes but instead I will try to get a sense of what is at stake in this relationship for both sides, what assumptions and interests they bring to it, and how the relationship might develop in the future.²

Going Beyond Stereotypes

After World War II, the United States and Western Europe were closely linked together as military and political allies within NATO. They were the ‘West.’ For over four decades global politics was shaped by the confrontation between ‘East’ and ‘West’ across the ‘iron curtain’ that ran through Germany. According to the slogans of the West, on one side of the iron curtain there was ‘Capitalism and Democracy.’ On the other side there was ‘Communism and Tyranny.’ In the West, America and ‘free’ Europe were bound together in a military alliance: the United States provided the lion’s share of the firepower. Europe provided the likely field of battle.

Now the politics has changed and so has the terminology. Eastern Europe has become Central Europe and the East has been displaced from within Europe to the other end of the Euro-Asian landmass. East now means, above all, China and Japan, not forgetting North and South Korea. There is no longer a clear frontline between East and West.³ Furthermore, the global East-West distinction

¹ This paper is part of a larger project focused on the development of global society and politics. It also complements earlier work by the author on modernity, globalisation, the European Union and the development of transatlantic intellectual culture from the early nineteenth century to the present. See Smith 1983, Smith 1988, Smith 1990, Smith 1991, Smith 1999.

² The relationship between Europe and America is profoundly affected by the relationships each has with other countries including Russia, China, Japan, India and so on. These other relationships deserve far more attention than can be devoted to them in this paper.

³ Russia belongs to both East and West – or perhaps neither. Many of the sites of global tension – for example, in Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel – do not take the form of an ‘East vs. West’ conflict.

is no longer about having or not having capitalism or multi-party democracy: Japan has both of these and China scores one out of two. In fact it is not at all clear what the East-West distinction means any more.

The outcome of all this is that the 'West' is in the process of ceasing to exist.⁴ The problem is that to be viable the West needs an 'other.' To be more precise, the West is used to defining itself as different from and better than some 'other' inferior or threatening entity. It claims that it has the duty to challenge, dominate, educate or eliminate that 'other.' Inconveniently, the old 'other' – Soviet Communism – has disappeared.

For over a decade the search has been on for another 'other.' At various times Russia, Japan, Islam, China and terrorism have all been dressed up to fill the part. But none of these has that potent combination of three elements exhibited by Stalin's USSR: geopolitical weight, clarity of definition, and manifest hostility to the West. Russia is too understanding, Japan too Americanised, China too capitalist, Islam too diverse, and terrorism too shadowy.

No convincing substitute 'other' for the West has been found. As a result the idea of 'the West' is losing its power and resonance as an ideology. At the same time, Europeans and Americans are becoming more overtly critical of each other. Unable to find a viable 'other' outside the West, each half of the West is finding its 'other' – the inferior and/or threatening entity to be challenged and educated – in the other half of the West across the Atlantic. There are plenty of stones lying around to be thrown because transatlantic hostility is many centuries old. The stereotypes are already constructed. In a sentence, they say (on the one side) that the Old World is corrupt and cowardly and (on the other side) that the New World is uncivilised and reckless.

Even during the Cold War period there was a very strong undercurrent of anti-Americanism in Western Europe. The last few years of the Vietnam War, ending in American humiliation, marked the high - or low - point of the barrage of criticism against America that was maintained by Europe's intellectuals. Now the Cold War is over. The American military is unchallenged on the world's battlefields. Europe seems weak by comparison and has no other protector to turn to. Not surprisingly, some Americans are eager to 'put Europe in its place.'

One recent example, that shook many people, was the cover story in *Time Magazine* suggesting that Europeans were fundamentally hostile to America's

⁴ It is becoming part of the 'North' but unfortunately this theme cannot be pursued here.

main ally in the Middle East because of an ingrained anti-Semitism.⁵ This is rather shocking for European intellectuals who are not used to considering either that they might be vulnerable to such criticism, which seems so unfair, or that their own past criticisms of America might actually have stung those they criticised. In this article and others like it Americans are, so to speak, giving Europeans a taste of our own medicine.

In my view, we are in danger of seeing a rapid escalation of a transatlantic war of words in which false stereotypes will be strongly reinforced. On the American side there is a desire to compensate for past insults by rubbing Europe's nose in the dirt. On the European side there is a desire to compensate for today's feeling of relative political impotence by pulling America off its pedestal, symbolically at least. Very soon neither side will be listening to the other. This would be disastrous at a time when what is urgently needed is an open, frank and, if possible, tactful dialogue in which mutual learning can take place.

The Realities of Power

It is in this spirit that I want to begin by taking an appreciative but critical look at an incisive recent analysis of the relationship between Europe and the United States by Robert Kagan. He is an American based in Brussels on the staff of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Kagan published an article in *Policy Review no 113* (June-July 2002) entitled 'Power and weakness.' His basic argument is that although the United States and Europe both share the values of the Enlightenment and thus have similar cultures, the two have moved apart and no longer share a common view of the world. In fact their perspectives, especially on the nature of power, have diverged to a very great extent.

Basically, Kagan argues, powerful people and powerful nations think differently and have different interests from weak people and weak nations. In the eighteenth nineteenth-centuries European leaders used their military power to get what they wanted and justified it in terms of '*raison d'etat*.' Americans criticised them for refusing to accept international law, especially on the high seas. Now the situation has been reversed. The United States is clearly dominant. America is facing the systemic opportunities and constraints brought by being the hegemonic power like Europe did in the late nineteenth century. Europe is confronting the systemic opportunities and constraints associated with weakness like America did in the early nineteenth century.

⁵ In Time Magazine, 29th April 2002, Michael Elliot wrote: 'Put at its crudest, most Europeans know very few Jews; they killed too many of them. In America, there is a thriving community for whom the survival of Israel is a passionate commitment; in Europe, there isn't. No number of school lessons or church sermons about the Holocaust can overcome that humdrum truth.'

In Kagan's view, 'Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant's "Perpetual Peace." The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less.'

In Kagan's view this situation has not been produced by the election of George W Bush or by the tragedy of September 11th 2001. On the contrary, it has been maturing for some time and is likely to be long-lasting: 'When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defence policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways' (Kagan 2002).

Kagan compares the situation of the United States and Europe to that of a Wild West saloon bar in which Europe plays the saloonkeeper serving the drinks and America plays the sheriff. There are some outlaws drinking at the bar but the saloonkeeper prefers to let them stay there for the time being. After all, outlaws shoot sheriffs, not saloonkeepers. He does not want the disorder that will follow if he tries to throw out the outlaws on his own. In fact he is not very happy to see the sheriff walk through the swing doors of his saloon to take on the outlaws because he knows that when this happens a few chairs are bound to be broken at the very least. Perhaps some people will be killed. But the sheriff, like Gary Cooper in *High Noon*, accepts the stark reality that law and order can only be protected if he continually wins gun battles with the community's enemies.

In other words, the Kantian peace of the community depends on having an armed and effective defender who is ready and willing to go into the Hobbesian world of force – and win. In the 1990s, Kagan points out, Europe showed that it was incapable of acting alone to impose law and order in the Balkans. The Americans had to step in to keep peace in Europe's own back garden. In fact, the very existence of a peaceful European garden owed a lot to the United States. After World War II the Americans provided a security guarantee for Western Europe. As a result the French accepted that it was safe to enter into close cooperative relations with the Germans who had been their archenemy for over one hundred years.⁶

⁶ Cf. Smith 1999b, Lundestad 1998.

The European frontier

This is an interesting analysis but Kagan ignores some important ways in which the New Europe is very similar to the United States. The European Union has become a frontier society, continually expanding. Initially, six members signed the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to become the European Common Market. They had become twelve by 1988, forming a solid territorial block from Sicily to Scotland and from Portugal to Denmark. Greece was a territorial outlier, floating free in the far southeast. By 1998 Sweden, Finland and Austria had also joined. In 2004 a further push eastwards will bring in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania – with Cyprus and Malta providing company for Greece in the Mediterranean camp. Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey have also applied, as is well known.

This process has an uncanny resemblance to the Westward expansion of the American state during the 1840s, 50s and 60s. In the American case there was constant anxiety about how the entry of each new territory would affect the balance between the North and the South and also the relative power of the federal government and the individual states. Eventually these tensions led to civil war. In the European case, successive phases of enlargement produce similar tensions but a violent outcome of such tensions is highly unlikely. Europe has already had its civil war (twice) and one of the main purposes of the European movement has been to stop it happening again.

The moving frontier has helped to bring about an important change in the way Europe defines itself, both to its members and to those seeking to join. In the early days of the Common Market there was much talk about a distinctive European culture and tradition embodied in the great Gothic cathedrals and so on. There were frequent references to Charlemagne. However, as the frontier has moved to the edge of the old Holy Roman Empire and far beyond these cultural references have become less important. They have been replaced by constant reminders of the universal democratic values which the European Union wants to stand for. Those values are, in principle, applicable anywhere.

The European Union has increasingly identified itself with the need to strengthen and maintain human rights. This change has mirrored the increasing democratisation of the EU's institutions. The European Parliament has not developed so far as to be able to conduct formal impeachments in the American style but it did manage to force the resignation of all the European Commissioners in 1999.

So, on the one hand the EU is learning to solve the problems faced by an expanding continental polity operating on the principle of *pluribus in unum*: continually revising voting systems, wrestling with issues of subsidiarity, nur-

turing a single currency within a single market, and developing a viable judicial system. On the other hand, it is identifying itself closely with the global movement for human rights. Like America.

Table 1 Comparison of United States and European Union

	GDP (PPP) (2000)	Population (2000)
United States	9612.7	283.2
European Union	7836.4	376.3

Source: Human Development Report 2002

The gross domestic product of the European Union - its potential tax base - is now about eighty per cent of the American equivalent (see table one). The big difference from America is, of course, that this GDP is spread across several sovereign (or semi-sovereign) states. Coordinating European policy is an enormous task. However, the latest round of enlargement seems bound to stimulate structural changes that will enhance coordination. Increasingly, the EU is becoming a pro-active force, an agent in international relations rather than simply a club of like-minded states.

A learning process is under way. For example, if and when Bulgaria and Romania join the European Union, the EU will, in geographical terms, surround and 'swallow' ex-Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the so-called Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe gives the EU an active role in bringing law, order and peaceful civil society to the Western Balkans.⁷ Furthermore, the EU president is now also talking about a 'proximity policy.' He looks forward to the development of 'a strong network of relations based on shared political and economic values with neighbouring countries from Russia

⁷ Here is the official view of the White House on these developments towards the end of the Clinton period: 'As the EU has deepened and expanded, with the monetary union, with the common foreign and security policy, coordination of justice and home affairs issues, broadened membership, the U.S.-EU relationship has become much deeper and more important. The President, several years ago, instituted these twice a year summits. He was right to do so. Our trading relationship, for example, between the United States and the EU is more than \$1 billion of trade every day. This is an extraordinarily broad and deep relationship. Remarkably, American investment in Europe increased seven fold between '94 and '98. In the meantime, Europe is the leading investor in 41 of our 50 states... Similarly, the EU is increasingly a partner of ours on security, as it develops a common, foreign and security policy backed up by a defence policy. Henry Kissinger used to say that he wished that he had one phone number to call in Europe to find out what Europe's foreign policy was. Well, now, there is, it's Javier Solana.' White House press briefing by National Security Advisor Samuel Berger and National Economic Advisor Gene Sperling, 25th May 2000.

to the Mediterranean.’⁸ These processes will help to develop the policies and principles of the EU in its relations to neighbouring states.

Three Tendencies: Towards Multilateralism, Multipolarity and Militarisation

However, it would be realistic to assume that for at least the next two decades (and perhaps longer) the United States is going to remain the most powerful single actor in global affairs. The European Union will certainly need those two decades to consolidate its institutions further and make crucial decisions about internal structure, foreign policy and defence strategies. During the same period China will also be preoccupied with its internal development. Japan faces major challenges of restructuring; Russia even more so. By default, the United States is going to be Number One. This is the second time this has happened. It happened before in 1945 when most of the industrialised world was devastated. Now America’s second unipolar moment has arrived.

It is by no means clear how the world is going to develop but at least three tendencies may be discerned. They are parallel, overlapping and to some extent in conflict with each other. These tendencies are towards multilateralism, towards multipolarity and towards militarisation in foreign relations. I will discuss each, briefly, in turn.

Towards Multilateralism

After 1945 the American victors were able to establish an international political order that John Ikenberry has described as an ‘open or penetrated hegemony’ with the United States at the centre.⁹ According to Ikenberry the idea was to bind the United States and other nations throughout the world into regional and global institutions. America made the rules but took the interests of other countries into account sufficiently to give them reassurance that the United States was acting, and would continue to act in a restrained and generous (or at least not-too-selfish) way. In Europe these efforts resulted in Marshall Plan,

⁸ President Prodi also stated that the proximity policy must be ‘attractive, unlocking new prospects and bringing mutual benefits. It must motivate our partners to cooperate more closely with the EU and it must be dynamic, based on a structured, step-by-step approach.’ He called for a genuinely European debate, and emphasised that ‘This is something we as Europeans, after listening to everyone, shall decide ourselves, without any outside interference. The debate on where Europe’s borders lie is actually a debate about our identity.’ However, ‘this search for the roots of our identity does not mean creating new divisions. European integration will offer benefits and new prospects for our neighbours as well.’ President Romano Prodi addressing the European Parliament in Strasbourg, 18 December 2002, quoted in <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/E>

⁹ Building the domestic coalition within the United States that enabled this expansive foreign policy to be pursued was a major achievement requiring great political skill on the part of Roosevelt. See Kupchan 2002, 194-8.

NATO and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which was a precursor both of the OECD and the European Community.¹⁰

The Cold War erected new barriers that limited the spread of these American-inspired and American-dominated institutions. A rival multilateral system came into existence sponsored by the Soviet Union. After the fall of the Berlin Wall the American system expanded in Europe, North America and Asia. Within Europe NATO took in ten new members.¹¹ The North Atlantic Cooperation Council¹² (which later became the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) provided a framework for negotiating Partnerships for Peace.¹³

A major purpose of these initiatives was to provide a strong incentive for countries with unstable, violent, inefficient, corrupt or dictatorial regimes to meet the criteria for political, legal and economic organisation imposed by NATO (and by the EU) upon new entrants. It was intended to be a way of encouraging peaceful, stable and increasing prosperous democratic regimes, which were also congenial sites for foreign direct investment.

Outside Europe, America joined with Australia, Japan and other Southeast Asian states in 1989 to form the APEC forum.¹⁴ In 1992 the United States, Canada and Mexico established the North American Free Trade Association.¹⁵ In 1995 GATT was given enhanced judicial powers and became the World Trade Organisation.

In Bill Clinton's words, the American approach was: 'We have to be at the center of every vital global network'¹⁶ These multilateral institutions have the dual function of not only embedding American influence and interest but also legitimising or – depending on how you see it - disguising that influence and interest.

¹⁰ See Ikenberry 2001, 203-14, Smith 1999b.

¹¹ Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

¹² Founded in 1991.

¹³ Aimed at promoting transparency and generating mutual confidence, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) brings together 27 Partners and 19 Allies for regular consultations on issues encompassing all aspects of security and all regions of the Euro-Atlantic area. Meetings take place regularly at the level of ambassadors, foreign and defence ministers, and chiefs of defence. Occasionally, heads of state and government gather for summit meetings, as they did in Washington in April 1999. Extract from official NATO website at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/part-coop.htm>

¹⁴ Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, founded 1989.

¹⁵ The NAFTA treaty was signed in 1992, implemented in 1994. By treating Mexico as part of North (rather than Central) America despite major and important cultural differences, the United States may have provided an interesting precedent for those who within the EU considering whether or not Turkey should be excluded on the grounds that, culturally, it is not 'European.'

¹⁶ Quoted in Bacevich 2002, 113.

Towards Multipolarity

The second tendency is a gradual shift in the direction of multipolarity. In November 1999 Jacques Chirac told a Paris audience that ‘The European Union itself [must] become a major pole of international equilibrium, endowing itself with the instruments of a true power.’¹⁷ In October 2000 Tony Blair speaking at the Polish Stock Exchange argued that ‘Europe’s citizens need Europe to be strong and united. They need it to be a power in the world. Whatever its origin,’ he added, ‘Europe today is no longer just about peace. It is about projecting collective power.’¹⁸

In February 2002, Chancellor Schröder was asked what response was needed to America’s overwhelming power. He replied that ‘the answer or remedy is easy: a more integrated and enlarged Europe with ‘more clout.’ The following month Valéry Giscard d’Estaing opened the European Union’s constitutional convention, and said that if it is successful Europe ‘will be respected and listened to not only as the economic power it already is, but as a political power that will speak as an equal with the largest existing and future powers on the planet.’ A few days later Romano Prodi stated that one the EU’s main goals was to become ‘a superpower on the European continent that stands equal to the United States.’¹⁹

Europe’s political establishment is clearly committed to making the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity by making the European Union more prominent and active in global affairs. The obstacles to increased integration and coordination within Europe are considerable and there will be major crises along the way whose exact character is impossible to predict. However, the

¹⁷ Chirac was pointing out the dangers of a future bipolar world in which China was stronger and the US Congress becoming increasingly isolationist and unilateralist. In such circumstances Europe could be, he implied, a powerful third force reducing global tensions. The relevant passage is: ‘En réponse à la mondialisation, de nombreux Etats choisissent de s’associer pour garder, à l’échelle d’une région, la maîtrise de leur destin. L’Union européenne est l’exemple le plus achevé de cette nécessaire intégration régionale. Mais l’ASEAN, le Mercosur ou l’ALENA, malgré certaines difficultés, illustrent aussi la force de ce mouvement. Un mouvement que, pour ma part, je juge souhaitable et qui m’a conduit, depuis quatre ans, à multiplier les initiatives en faveur de l’organisation de ce monde multipolaire. Parce que la situation actuelle est mal vécue par de nombreux pays, y compris par le plus puissant d’entre eux, les Etats-Unis, où le Congrès cède trop souvent aux tentations de l’unilatéralisme et de l’isolationnisme. Et parce que pointent déjà, entre Washington et Pékin, les prémices de ce qui pourrait être un jour une nouvelle tension bipolaire. Nous n’échapperons pas à ce risque grave sans mettre en place d’un dialogue équilibré entre les pôles régionaux. Et c’est l’intérêt de tous. Or, pour moi, ce dialogue ne pourra exister que si l’Union européenne devient elle-même un pôle majeur de l’équilibre mondial, en se dotant de tous les instruments d’une véritable puissance’ From speech at Élysée Palace 4th November 1999 (<http://www.delegfrance-cd-geneve.org/chapter1/chirac041199.htm>).

¹⁸ ‘Prime Minister’s speech to the Polish Stock Exchange’, October 6th 2000. See <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=1341&SectionId=32>. Quoted in Kupchan 2002, 151.

¹⁹ Quotes from *New York Times*, March 1st 2002, *Washington Post*, March 17th 2002, cited in Kupchan 2002, 154-5.

political challenge has been accepted by the European elite. It is not a question of 'whether' progress in this direction will be made but 'how much,' by what means', and 'how quickly.'

Turning briefly to Asia, Japan, whose population is nearly half the size of the United States, remains the second largest economy despite its recent troubles; it is perfectly possible that eventually it will restructure and resume its rapid growth, just as the United States did after 1931. China is now growing very quickly. Its population is six times as large as the United States. It is quite conceivable that sometime during the next twenty years China will become a much more powerful economic actor and an increasingly formidable military power able to put its own concerns near the top of the regional and, increasingly, the global agenda.

Meanwhile, it is important not to exaggerate the extent of America's economic dominance.²⁰ It is true that the United States controls the International Monetary Fund, has the richest home market in the world and boasts the most influential stock exchange. But if you take the world's top five hundred corporations, measured in terms of their revenues in 1996, only 162 are American: 126 are Japanese and 117 are based in Germany, France and Britain.²¹

Towards Militarisation

The third trend, which is being driven hard by the United States, is towards the increased militarisation of international relations. By 1989 America had overcome its Vietnam syndrome, its fear of humiliation in battle.²² Instead of standing down the huge military establishment that had been maintained during the Cold War, the government has used it for two other purposes apart from homeland defence. One purpose is to provide by its physical presence a

²⁰ During the past fifty years the United States has encouraged much of the rest of the world to adopt an American business approach, either using its influence as an occupying power (for example in Japan and Germany) or working through the IMF, World Bank and other agencies. The lesson has three parts: weaken the state, give the market an expanded role, and give business more status. That lesson has been well learnt, first in Western Europe, then in Japan, now in China. In some places, such as Russia, the results have been damaging, so far at least. But the overall effect has been to increase the wealth and income of America's global neighbours – and diminish America's relative economic advantage.

²¹ *Fortune Magazine* quoted on ILO Bureau for Workers' Activities website.

<http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/multinat/multinat.htm#Geographical%20distribution%20of%20largest%20companies>

²² The intervention in Somalia in 1991-2, which ended disastrously at Mogadishu, revived some of these fears and made the US government more reluctant to deploy ground troops in dangerous situations. September 11th has, temporarily at least, overcome this aversion to some extent.

constant reminder to the rest of the world that the United States is capable of exercising overwhelming force against anyone who opposes its policies.

In 1998, William Cohen, the US Secretary for Defense said that the object of having US forces around the world was ‘to shape people’s opinions about us in ways that are favourable to us.’ As he put it, ‘when people see us, they see our power, they see our professionalism, they see our patriotism, and, they say that’s a country that we want to be with.’ In Cohen’s view, ‘economists and soldiers share the same interests in stability.’ In other words, US military power is ‘stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity.’²³

The other task for the US military has been to ‘punish’ states and others that stand in the way of American policy. Sometimes this has involved full-scale wars, as in the Persian Gulf. These also have a ‘demonstration effect.’ George Bush Sr remarked at a press conference held in 1991 just after Desert Storm that ‘because of what has happened we won’t have to use US forces around the world. I think when we say something is objectively correct...people are going to listen.’²⁴

More common than full-scale wars have been limited operations, usually involving long-distance or high-level bombardment although sometimes carried out with ground forces. In Pentagon jargon they are known as ‘Operations Other Than War’ or OOTW. They have become routine during the past dozen years. In fact, the US Commission on National Security recently reported that ‘since the end of the Cold War, the United States has embarked upon nearly four dozen military interventions...as opposed to only sixteen during the entire period of the Cold War.’²⁵

The American government perceives these deployments as legitimate police actions undertaken for everybody’s benefit although they are often severely criticised and resented by others, including many Europeans. These military actions are presumably what Robert Kagan has in mind when he writes that ‘just as Europeans claim, Americans can still sometimes see themselves in heroic terms – as Gary Cooper at high noon. They will defend the townspeople, whether the townspeople want them to or not’ (Kagan 2002).

²³ Bacevich 2002, 128-9. Bacevich’s book, *American Empire*, describes the militarisation of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. See also Bobbitt 2002.

²⁴ Bacevich 2002, 60.

²⁵ The commission reported in 1999. Bacevich 2002, 74, 142-3.

Strategies for Survival

I have identified three powerful tendencies. The way they interact will have major implications for the relationship between Europe and America. There is no space to explore these implications in great detail but some of the possibilities may be briefly described. On the way it will be possible to comment further on Kagan's analysis.

Table 2 Possible Global Pathways

	Multilateralism	Multipolarity	Militarisation	
Pathway one	Yes	Yes	No	European Preference?
Pathway two	Yes	No	Yes	American Preference?
Pathway three	Yes	Yes	Yes	Cold War?
Pathway four	No	Yes	Yes	Hot War?

One possible future pathway leads towards a world in which there is a strong multilateral framework within which powerful regional interests – in America, Europe and Asia for example – bargain constructively and peacefully without frequent resort to military action and certainly without using threats of force against each other. This seems to be the pathway preferred by powerful groups within the European Union (see table two). The EU is in many ways a movement of peace and reconciliation and is proud of having overcome many of the obstacles that prevented peaceful cooperation between bitter enemies.

Kagan is right to say that the European movement was strongly reinforced by the presence of American military power, especially in its early days. However, he is wrong to suggest that Europe has lost interest in power. Its leaders clearly wish to exercise a much higher degree of global influence. Paradoxically, in order to be in a stronger position to argue for a de-militarisation of international relations on America's part, they may have to build up their own military capacity to some extent. This will not be popular with European electorates.

A second possible future pathway leads towards multilateralism without multipolarity reinforced by American military power. This seems to be the pathway preferred by powerful groups within the United States. However, while this pathway is the most likely one to be followed during the next two decades, long before 2023 there are likely to be strong signs that a multipolar

world is coming into existence (even though its particular shape is impossible to predict).

If (or more likely when) this happens global development may shift onto *a third possible future pathway combining multilateralism, multipolarity and the continued militarisation of international relations*. This is preferred by neither Europe nor the United States. In this situation those who resent America's use or threat of military force against them will have other powerful states or alliances of states to turn to. Under these conditions the multilateral structure may break up into competing institutions and we may see a new cold war and a new arms race.²⁶

Another possibility is the withdrawal of the United States from the multilateral structure it has erected with such care. This might happen if domestic politics within the United States were to move decisively in favour of an isolationist and unilateralist stance. The early days of the current Bush administration – pre 9/11 – revealed the strength of that possibility.²⁷ This development might also be encouraged if Asian and European economic growth began significantly to undermine American dominance within the global economy as a whole.

So a fourth possible future pathway combines multipolarity with continuing militarisation but with a decisive weakening or fragmentation of multilateral institutions. The danger inherent in this scenario is that the United States government might be under pressure to exercise international influence to an even greater extent than now by military means. A domestic population concerned about its jobs and living standards might be cajoled into supporting an aggressive militaristic policy. It would be ironic indeed if the United States, having helped solve Europe's 'Germany problem' during the twentieth century then gave the world an 'America problem' in the twenty-first century. A likely outcome of this pathway would be hot, rather than cold, war.

Faced with these four possibilities, how should Europeans, especially the European Union, behave towards the United States? I have no simple solutions but I would suggest that the worst possible response would be to feed the anti-Americanism to which we are all prone and which is deeply resented the other side of the Atlantic. Far better would be to take advantage of the fact that the American hegemony is, to some extent at least, open and 'penetrated,' as Ikenberry puts it.

²⁶ America's current attempt to establish and secure a decisive technological lead over all potential military competitors is an attempt to secure a strategic advantage should this situation arise.

²⁷ Ronald Reagan created a coalition of the South and the West based on agrarian populism, support for military spending and a policy in favour of free trade. George W Bush has appealed to the same coalition, which is reinforced by the growing Latino vote. See Kupchan 2002, 236-44.

In other words, it is possible for us to make contacts and seek influence within the American political, business and policy communities. Doing this effectively means understanding the American point of view, which is an essential preliminary to any attempt to change it. The way many Americans see it, they have acquired a globally dominant position they only half-wanted. They feel they have the responsibility to act against ‘evil troublemakers’ and ‘out-laws’ on behalf of the world – a largely ungrateful world – and they do not see why they should not have some political and economic gains from the burden they are carrying.

Now the Americans have become the global superpower, they like being Number One and find it difficult to see or admit that this will ever change. But things will change. How can we ease for America (and therefore for all of us) the pain brought by the process of eventually being forced to vacate the position of unchallengeable Number One Nation? How can we avoid the world being forced down the pathway towards ‘hot’ war?

In the long term the best way will be to unite and bind all national states, including America, within a global constitutional framework. This is what has happened within Europe. The old conflict between France and Germany as to who is Europe’s Number One is certainly not over but it is largely contained within the corridors of Brussels and Strasbourg. Looking ahead, how can something similar be done for the relations between the United States, the European Union, China, Japan, Russia and so on?

If it can be achieved, the most effective strategy will be to strengthen the global multilateral order that the United States has done so much to build. The object should be to make these institutions the basis of a powerful and fair system of global governance. A useful beginning would be to give the Americans much more credit for the institution-building they have already done at the global level and regionally. Europe will be able to make a significant contribution to this process if it continues to establish itself as a strong and independent power that deals with the United States by being a candid and friendly neighbour who is neither too arrogant nor too obsequious.²⁸ This is a difficult road but the alternatives are worse.

²⁸ At the same Europe should obviously be maintaining and strengthening its links with other key actors such as Russia, China and India.

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6. Borders of Europe: A Turkish Perspective

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The recent European summit meeting in Copenhagen on December 12 – 13, 2002 took the decision to formally invite ten countries, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe, to join the Union in 2004. This historic decision effectively brings to an end the division between Western and Eastern Europe that existed since the end of the Second World War.

It was remarkable that the media debates that took place in and around the historic Copenhagen meeting of the European Council were concerned as much with various issues and difficulties involved in the accession of the new member states as the question of whether Turkey belonged to Europe or not. This was due mainly to two reasons: First because Turkey, as the only candidate country which had not yet begun membership negotiations with Brussels, was asking for a date to be set for the start of negotiations. Turkish government was anxious to get a date partly to invigorate domestic public opinion support to continue with the human rights reforms towards fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria, i.e. conditions for starting negotiations, and partly because of the consideration that it would become more difficult to get such a date when the ten new members formally joined the EU. Although Turkey was declared “a candidate destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states” at the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999, Ankara was not sure if it really had a place in the EU.

Turkey’s place in the EU became an issue hotly debated in and around the recent Copenhagen summit also because, the head of the EU’s constitutional convention, the former president of France, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing said in an interview published a month before the summit that Turkey was not an European country, and that it would be “the end of the European Union” if Turkey was allowed to join.¹ He also said that those advocating Turkish membership were “enemies of the EU”, in a thinly veiled attack on the US and Britain who were both lobbying for Turkey to be given a date.

Giscard referred to Turkey’s Muslim population and high birthrate, and said the country had “a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life... Its capital is not in Europe, 95 percent of its population live outside Europe, it is not a European country.” If Turkey was admitted, according to Giscard, other Middle Eastern and North African states, starting with Morocco, would demand to join. He

(1) ¹ Le Monde, November 8, 2002.

also went on to effectively say that the constitutional convention would not take into account the prospect of Turkey's joining the Union. "We are basing everything on a Europe of 25 plus 2 – period", he said, in a reference to ten countries due to formally join in 2004, and plans to admit Bulgaria and Romania later in the decade.²

Giscard was certainly not the first European politician to express doubts about Turkey's place in EU. A meeting of Christian Democratic parties in Brussels in March 1997 led by Helmut Kohl, the German chancellor at the time, stated flatly that Turkey could not hope to join the EU despite 35 years of talks. The EU Luxembourg summit meeting in December the same year found Turkey not eligible for candidacy, triggering a row between Brussels and Ankara, and leading Ankara to freeze political dialogue with the EU that lasted for about a year. Former German Social Democratic chancellor Helmut Schmidt was perhaps the first prominent European leader to openly and strongly express objection to Turkey's candidacy by saying that "Turkey should never be allowed to join the EU", while at the same time questioning EU's wisdom in inviting 12 other countries to join.³ Earlier last year Edmund Stoiber, the Christian Democrats' unsuccessful challenger for chancellor in Germany's recent elections, openly stated that Turkey should not be allowed to become an EU member. He said there must be a recognition that Europe as an entity has geographic limits, and that these limits do not extend to the Turkish – Iraqi border. He added that if Turkey was to join, the EU would become nothing more than a free trade area.⁴

Few days prior to the EU Copenhagen summit Stoiber elaborated his position on Turkey at a CSU party conference: "Europe is a community that is based on western values. As a community of shared values, Europe has to deal with the question of its borders. These borders must be based on shared values, culture, and history. Turkey's membership would breach these borders." His remarks were supported by the party leader Angela Merkel.⁵

A few weeks prior to Giscard's statements Hubert Vedrine, a former French minister of foreign affairs, said that Turkey could not join the EU, because it was not in Europe "but in Asia Minor." If Europe does not draw the line, he suggested, "we will end up with a union of 40 countries including Russia, the Ukraine, Turkey, the Balkan States and North Africa."⁶

There is little doubt that these leaders have voiced what many European politicians privately believe, but what was particularly remarkable and confusing about statements made by Giscard was that he holds an official EU position as chairman of the convention which is to propose a constitution for the EU, where Turkey alongside other candidate countries is also represented.

² International Herald Tribune, November 9, 2002

³ Reuters, August 6, 2001.

⁴ Reuters, May 21, 2002.

⁵ Reuters, December 8, 2002

⁶ Guardian, November 27, 2002.

The Turkish reaction to Giscard came first from Mesut Yılmaz, one of the three Turkish delegates to the convention and deputy prime minister in the outgoing Turkish government. Reminding that Turkey had been invited to the European Convention on equal footing with other candidate states, he called for Giscard's resignation, saying that "It is a pity that such a person is chairman of the convention. Mr. Giscard belongs to a minority group within the EU which still considers the EU as a Christian club."⁷

The European Commission distanced itself from Giscard's comments saying that EU's policy towards Turkey remained unchanged. Various spokesmen from the EU member states commented that Giscard was expressing his private views, and not speaking in any official capacity. A British government spokesman stated that, "Turkey is a European country that has every right to join if it meets the conditions", while the Irish president of the European Parliament, Pat Cox called Giscard's statements "ill advised" and "distinctly unhelpful".⁸

Giscard's statements triggered an unprecedentedly intense debate in the European and American media overwhelmingly supportive of Turkey's bid for membership. The case for Turkey was perhaps best reflected in the British newspaper *Guardian's* editorial: "The problems of Turkish EU membership are many and should not be minimised. It is a relatively poor country with a large population whose assimilation will be long and complex. But the basic, largely unspoken, arguments against rest on prejudice, ignorance and selfishness. In the end, Europe cannot be defined solely by geography, income, religion, or strategic calculation. Europe is an idea. And Europe in the 21st century is what we make it, freed from the chains of history and united by a common future vision. There is no good reason why Turkey should not share in that."⁹

Giscard's comments met the hardest critique from American commentators. Perhaps most outspoken in this context was the prominent American journalist of Muslim, Pakistani origin Fareed Zakaria, who in response to Giscard's statements concerning the "enemies of EU" who advocate Turkey's membership, wrote: "It was Charles de Gaulle who supported Turkey's claim to be part of the European Community in the 1960s. It was Europe that invited Turkey to apply for membership in the 1970s, an invitation that Turkey foolishly declined at the time." In reference to the approaching Copenhagen summit, he commented: "Europeans often complain that America's strategy in the war on terror is one-dimensional. It's military might with little effort to engage the Islamic world in a constructive way. They point out that unless we help Muslim countries prosper, all the F-16s and predators in the world won't stop the flow of terror. It's a valid criticism, but the single biggest push that could

⁷ *Hurriyet*, November 10, 2002.

⁸ *Guardian*, November 9, 2002.

⁹ *Guardian*, December 6, 2002.

shift events in this direction lies not in America's hands but Europe's. And it is about to blow it. In December the EU is likely once again to dissemble, delay and deceive Turkey about its prospects for membership."¹⁰

Richard Holbrooke, a former American ambassador to the United Nations, and President Clinton's special envoy for Cyprus between 1997-99, wrote: "By saying in public what many Europeans have long said in private, Giscard inadvertently did the Turks an enormous favor. Since his comments, almost every other public figure in Europe has been scrambling to disagree with Giscard, and to deny that anyone in Europe could possibly harbor racist feelings toward Turks or other Muslims. Yet the furious Turkish reaction to Giscard's comment only served to underscore Europe's dilemma: Keep Turkey out and risk the eventual creation of a radical or fundamentalist regime at the very gates of the EU."¹¹

The High Representative of the EU for foreign and security policy Javier Solana wrote the following in an article published in the days leading to the Copenhagen summit: "Turkey has already booked a place in Europe. In December 1999, the European Council recognized Turkey's full-candidate status... No one can challenge it today on the grounds of geography", and went on to say that "if Turkey wishes to assume its place in Europe" it must not only meet the criteria of membership, but also agree to a settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's plan, and "no longer stand in the way of cooperation between the Union and NATO" referring to Turkey's effective veto of EU's prospective Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) by denying it "assured access" to NATO capabilities unless it received guarantees that the force would never be used against its interests.¹²

The differences between EU and Turkey over the issue of RRF were overcome at the Copenhagen summit, when Turkey was provided written assurance by the EU that the RRF would not be used against its interests, and Cyprus would be excluded from the force. It may be argued that had Ankara also given the green light to the settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan plan, Turkey might have indeed achieved getting a date for the start of accession talks. Hopes for a settlement, however, failed although an agreement had seemed to be in reach.

The Copenhagen summit concluded that "Turkey is a candidate destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states", and that "If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay." It was also decided that accession strategy for Turkey would be strengthened.

It was thus confirmed that Turkey has a place in the European Union if it fulfills the membership criteria, and Turkish accession process appeared to be on track. It certainly remains, however, to be seen whether Turkey will eventually join the EU

¹⁰ Newsweek, November 25, 2002.

¹¹ The New York Times, November 2, 2002

¹² The New York Times, December 8, 2002

or not. The outcome depends not only on Turkey's ability to fulfill the conditions of membership, which can indeed be interpreted in various ways, but also on whether the peoples and parliaments of possibly 27 member states will eventually approve of Turkey's membership. According to the most recent Eurobarometer polling only about 31 percent of EU voters say they are in favor of Turkey's membership, making Turkey the least popular of all candidate countries.¹³ Although that percentage is not as low as one would expect considering the fact that neither the EU Commission nor the member countries have spent any efforts to promote the idea of Turkey's eventual membership while promoting enlargement eastward.

The question as to whether Turkey belongs to Europe, apart from the seemingly settled question as to whether Turkey is entitled to membership in the EU, has great bearing on the debate concerning the borders and identity of Europe. This is primarily why the question of Turkey – EU relationship is drawing increased attention, and provoking considerable controversy, not only among the Europeans, but also between Europeans and outsiders, primarily Americans.

Turkey's large population, current democratic deficiencies, and relative underdevelopment means that all the parties concerned, including the Turks themselves, agree that even if all goes well it will take many years, a decade if not more before Turkey can be ready to join the EU. Turkish membership in the EU is indeed a long term project. Why then, the prospect of Turkish membership has assumed such importance in the debate concerning EU's future?

In the first place Turkish membership seems to have become the test case for which of the future visions of Europe will eventually prevail in the EU. If EU's borders are going to be defined geographically, it will be difficult to define Turkey out. The argument advanced by Giscard, Vedrine and others that "if Turkey is accepted, it would be impossible to say no to Morocco" is not likely to convince, because the comparison between Turkey and Morocco is simply not valid. From a geographical point of view Turkey *is* a European country, whereas Morocco is not. Part of Turkey, albeit a small one (covering eastern Thrace and western Istanbul which is about one thirtieth of the country's land area inhabited by about one tenth of its population) is in Europe by all geographic conceptions. Turkey's European part is small relative to its size, but larger and more populous relative to many old and new member states of the EU. The founding treaties of EU state that "any European country", and not those countries who have the totality of their land and population in Europe, are entitled for membership. Turkey's application for membership in the European Communities in 1987 was rejected not because it was not entitled to apply, but on the grounds that it was not yet ready to join.

It may indeed be impossible to say no to Morocco, as Giscard and Vedrine fear, not because of Turkey, but because of Cyprus and Malta, two island states due to become full members on May 1, 2004, which are not part of Europe defined on the basis of geography. Accession of Cyprus and Malta can indeed be argued to open

¹³ Guardian, November 27, 2002.

the prospect of EU membership to states out of geographically defined Europe. One wonders indeed why Messers Schmidt, Giscard, Stoiber, Vedrine, and others have not objected to EU membership of Cyprus or Malta.

If EU is not based on geography but on an “idea”, a “peace project for Europe”, or “a union based on the shared values of human rights and democracy”, it is obvious that Turkey has increasingly become a part of that “idea” since the beginning of the Cold War. The first step was Turkey’s membership in 1949 in the Council of Europe which was founded to protect and consolidate democracy in Western Europe, and which according to some observers has now assumed the character of a kind of “waiting room for the EU”. The members of the Council of Europe today include not only Russia, but also Armenia and Azerbaijan, countries geographically to the east of Turkey.

In 1952 Turkey became a member of NATO, the military alliance of Western democracies, and has greatly contributed to the defense of Western Europe throughout the Cold War period. Turkey signed and ratified the European Convention of Human Rights (adoption of which is a condition of membership in the EU) nearly 50 years ago in 1954, recognized the right of individual appeal of its citizens to the European Court of Human Rights in 1987, and the binding character of the decisions of the Court in 1990, although admittedly the country’s performance in terms of respect for basic rights and liberties has not been in full compliance with the convention.

Turkey’s association with what has become the EU in 1991 begins with the signing of an association agreement (which foresaw eventual full membership) with the European Economic Community nearly 40 years ago in 1964. As already mentioned, Turkey’s membership application to the EC was rejected in 1987, but a Customs Union agreement (involving industrial products) was signed with the EU in 1995, which will soon be broadened to include the service sector according to the recent EU Copenhagen summit decisions.

The first Progress Report Toward Accession by the European Commission on Turkey was published in October 1998, a year prior to the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 which declared Turkey to be a candidate country. It can be said that Turkey is likely to be involved in the European Defense and Security Policy, now that it has withdrawn its objections to EU Rapid Reaction Force’s “assured access” to NATO capacities.

Turkey is part of Europe in all possible *political* contexts, including membership in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe since its founding conference in Helsinki in 1975. If EU is a “peace project for Europe” or if it means Europe integrating on the basis of values of human rights and democracy, than Turkey belongs to Europe beyond all doubt.

Does Turkey belong to Europe defined as a historical - cultural entity? If the EU is to be conceived as a “Christian club”, that is as a union of countries with majority of their populations adhering to Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox variants of Christianity, Turkey does of course not belong in the EU, since only about 1 percent of its

population is Christian, although it is a secular state since 1928. The idea of EU as a “Christian Club” is, however, clearly rejected by all EU treaties, although Mr. Giscard d’Estaing and other European leaders who oppose Turkish membership on grounds that Turks have a “different culture, approaches, and way of life” seem to subscribe to such a conception of the EU. If the EU is, on the other hand, truly the unification of Europe on the principles and values of democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for cultural diversity, and market economy, then the EU has a lot to gain by Turkey’s membership. That would prove, before all, to itself, and also to the world at large that it is as well in practice as in theory not a “Christian club”, and that its behavior cannot be explained in terms of the so-called “clash of civilizations” paradigm. The fact that the prospect of EU membership has provided a very strong inducement for Turkey to further modernize and democratize is perhaps the best proof that the idea of the EU as Europe integrating on the principles and values of democracy is a very strong idea indeed.

There is, on the other hand, no doubt that Turkey is strongly anchored in European history. It is the successor state to the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the Balkans for 600 years as one of the three big empires of Eastern Europe. The Ottoman Turks for a long time perceived their Empire as genuine successor of the ancient Roman Empire. Interestingly, a Danish historian argues that “this is one of the reasons why Turkey keeps knocking on Europe’s door”.

In its declining age the Ottoman Empire was called the “sick man of Europe” and not of Asia. The impact of the Ottoman Empire on the political and cultural history of the Balkans and Central Europe, and present Turkey’s historical and cultural ties to the region cannot be overestimated.

Turks have throughout their history been oriented towards the West. For both Ottoman and Turkish reformers modernization meant Europeanization. Turks chose to Westernize on their own, and not on the imposition of any colonial power, since they were never colonized. Turkish elites since the Ottoman rulers, whether Young Turk, Kemalist, socialist, liberal or Islamist, have all been strongly influenced by ideas and movements originating in Western Europe. Turkey, clearly is a society with multiple identities, sharing a historical-cultural heritage not only with Europe, but also with Turkic Central Asia, and Muslim Middle East. There is little doubt, however, that the European heritage weighs heaviest.

It seems that the issue of Turkey’s eventual membership in the EU also has much bearing on the alternative visions of the future EU. One approach gives priority to a “deepening” of integration which would culminate in the formation of a federal, United States of Europe. The Foreign Minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer, has been the most explicit advocate of the federalist vision among European leaders so far. The speech he made at the Humboldt University in Berlin in the spring of 2000, outlined his vision of a federal EU, and sparked the debate between federalists and those who oppose such a vision.¹⁴

¹⁴ The New York Times, May 15, 2000.

Those who subscribe to an intergovernmental or a confederalist vision of the EU, prefer the EU to broaden but not deepen. The motor of EU integration so far, the German – French axis, seems to favor the federalist option with support mainly from the Benelux countries, although there seem to be some differences between the German and French perspectives. Britain, on the other hand, seems to be the leading country in the confederalist camp with mainly the Nordic members of the EU following suit. It may be argued, however, that the future of EU will assume the form of a compromise between the federalist and the confederalist perspectives, whereby member states will integrate at different speeds.

Turkey which, despite its falling rate of population growth is likely to reach a size of over 80 million people by year 2020, does fit well with the Franco-German vision of an ever-deepening, federal EU. Turkey by the time it joined would be the most populous member state, and therefore occupy the largest number of seats in the representative organs of the EU. Turkey is clearly not likely to assume such a prominence in the case of a confederal or intergovernmental EU.

The support provided by Britain and the Southern European countries, i.e. Italy, Spain, and Greece, who pressed for a definite date for the start of membership negotiations with Turkey at the recent Copenhagen summit may be related with these countries' preferences for an intergovernmental EU. Similarly, the lobbying of EU capitals by the George W. Bush administration in favor of a date for Turkey, can also be said to fall in line with US government's preference for a confederal EU that would not grow out of the North Atlantic alliance. US and Britain who seem to be united in their long term preferences for the EU, may be said to have provided strong backing for Turkey's bid at the Copenhagen summit also in the expectation of greater cooperation from the Turkish government in the event of a military intervention in Iraq.

The question as to whether Turkey should become part of the EU has naturally been subject to an intensive internal debate ever since Turkey's association agreement with the EEC in the early 1960s. Until mid-1980s mainly the center right parties were, if mildly, interested in European integration, while both the center left and Islamist parties opposed any deepened relationship with the emerging EU. The center left parties in the mid-1980s, and the Islamists in mid-1990s have, however, changed their stance and adopted pro-EU platforms.

Today there exists broad support for eventual EU membership among the Turkish public, with about two thirds of respondents to opinion surveys expressing positive attitudes. There is also near consensus among the Turkish political and economic elites and mainstream political parties in favor of EU membership. Groups which oppose the EU have been greatly marginalized after the u-turn taken by the Islamist movement on the issue of EU in mid 1990s. It was first the Welfare Party which converted to a pro-EU stance during its coalition with the center right True Path Party that was in power between 1996 and 1997. The Islamist movement has ever since provided consistent backing for EU-reforms. Justice and Development Party (acronym AKP), founded in 2000, following the banning of first Welfare and later Virtue

parties by the Constitutional Court on charges of anti-secularist activities, has adopted an impressingly liberal programme that sets EU membership as the basic aim for the country. AKP which has openly rejected an Islamist agenda, and defines itself as a “Conservative Democratic” party, won the recent parliamentary elections held on November 3, 2002 with a landslide victory, and is pressing hard for EU reforms, and membership.

It may be argued that the prospect of membership in the EU, has not only provided a great incentive for democratic reforms in Turkey, but also contributed to the ideological transformation in the Turkish Islamist movement, which, in fact, has from the outset adhered strictly to parliamentary politics, and a moderate stance compared to Islamist movements elsewhere. The prospect of EU membership has indeed united Turkish society on an unprecedented scale. The Kemalist secularist establishment regards EU membership as a guarantee against an eventual Islamist takeover, while the liberals and conservative turned Islamists see EU membership as the greatest external support for the replacement of a state dominated political system by a society dominated one, and for the achievement of broader rights and liberties including the freedom of conscience and religion.

It is remarkable that even the illegal Kurdish Workers Party (acronym PKK, recently renamed as KADEK) which waged a violent separatist insurgency against Turkey between 1984 and 1999 has changed its stance on the issue of Turkey’s EU membership. The PKK which previously demanded punishment by exclusion of Turkey by the EU for suppressing the rights of the Kurds, has changed its stance, since the capture of its leader Abdullah Ocalan by Turkish security forces in early 1999. It claimed to have given up separatism and violence in favor of political struggle for the achievement of democratic rights for the Kurds, and assumed a policy supportive of Turkish membership.

The main representative for Turkish ultra nationalists, the National Action Party which was a partner in the previous government headed by Mr Bulent Ecevit, declared support for the “state policy” towards EU membership. Its opposition, however, to EU reforms which it regarded as threatening to Turkey’s national unity, triggered the events that led to the dissolution of the Ecevit government, and holding of the recent elections.

There are still radical Islamist or ultra nationalist groups who are opposed to EU membership. The former claim that the EU is a “Christian Club”, while the latter argue that EU is pursuing a hidden agenda towards dismemberment of Turkey and / or supporting Islamists to topple the secular regime. The anti-EU groups, however, are extremely marginal, and have little influence over the public, although their tough talking spokesmen are exploited by the sensationalist broadcast media for rating purposes.

Turkey may or may not join the EU in the future. It is, however, certain that the efforts to join the EU have already greatly helped Turkey to modernize and democratise towards a modern market economy and a truly liberal democracy. Many, both in Turkey and Europe, fear that an eventual exclusion of Turkey from the movement

for European integration may lead to a nationalist backlash with grave consequences for Turkish society, negative effects of which would certainly be felt in Europe due to Turkey's growing interdependence with the EU especially on a societal level.

Stabilization and strengthening of fragile democracies is one of the main reasons for the current enlargement of the EU to include Central and Eastern European countries, as it was for the enlargement of the EC towards the south to include Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the 1980s. Many liberals and democrats in Turkey strongly feel that Turkey also deserves an equal treatment.

7. Russia and Europe. Looking for a Formula of Relations

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I would like to start by actually explaining why I entitle my presentation “Russia *and* Europe. Looking for a Formula of Relations”. Does that mean that I believe that Russia is not a European country? No, nothing of the kind. I firmly believe that Russia *is* a part of Europe in terms of culture, history, and religion. It was not an integral part of Europe, it was the Other, only during the Cold War. Even 1917 was not the threshold. Throughout the 1920s contacts in various spheres were rather intense, and the role that Soviet Russia played in Europe in the 1930s was, in a way, a continuation of the role czarist Russia had played before. Only after 1945 the born superpower was sealed from inside and contained from outside and people ceased to think of themselves as being part of the continent. However, in the morning session we discussed the distinction between Europe and the European Union. We perceive the European Union as a major actor which, at least in some policy areas, is dominating the European space. The European Union is governed by a certain set of rules, norms, regulations, and laws to which Russia does not adhere. So, in operational terms, it makes good sense to emphasize *and* rather than *in*.

I shall try to look into the future and speak about a time period which is twenty years ahead. Before I do that, let me remind you of an old principle of a naval look-out: “Never try to look further than you can see”. In the next twenty years the European Union, in my opinion, will, to a very large extent, become synonymous with Europe in legal, economic, and many other terms. Russia will be an outsider. I do not know what will come later. What is the attainable maximum within these twenty years? I think it is institutionalised partnership. In a way, if this level is reached--whatever other factors are important at that time--Russia will be half a step from membership. Institutionalised partnership would, in real terms, imply harmonisation of laws and the introduction into the Russian daily life of the present European legal system and economic practices. I realize that this is only a possibility and, maybe, not more than that. However, it seems to be attainable provided that the political will on both sides is present and that there is also a certain amount of healthy political ambition demonstrated by both sides. It is easier for both sides not to do anything, but it would be much more rewarding to take the challenge of integrating Russia into the European Union seriously.

Which factors make an institutionalised partnership possible?

The first factor I would like to stress is that, from my point of view, contrary to the 500 years of its previous history, Russia is now becoming a nation-state. I do not know the figures of the census conducted in October 2002; they will soon be published. However, I suspect they will not be much different from the census of 1989 as far as the ethnic composition is concerned; that census showed 82 percent of the population of the Russian Federation were ethnic Russians. If you add to that the heavily Russified Ukrainians and Belarussians living in Russia, you will get 85 to 86 percent of the eastern Slavic population identifying itself with Europe, although they do not necessarily know of what kind of Europe they are thinking. So, the Ural mountains, where the famous sign about which William Wallace told us is located, do not matter much in this regard; if you compare people living in Samara, which is in the European part, with people living in Omsk, which is situated in Siberia in the Asian part you will find that their views--their self-identification--are very similar. If you travel to Khabarovsk or Vladivostok and ask people whether they identify themselves with Asia, you will be viewed strangely. You might even find that their European self-identification is stronger due to the fact that they witness more of Chinese immigration than, e.g., people living in Central Russia. Finally, we must take into consideration that, although I would like to be a bit cautious with the figures, out of the approximately 145 million people living in Russia, only 16 million live east of the Urals. These citizens have rather strong feelings about their historic roots, as well as their cultural and religious belonging.

The second factor, which I will describe in more operational terms, concerns the public attitude regarding future membership in the EU. The majority of the population of Russia answers affirmatively to the question: "Do you think Russia should join the European Union?" It should be noted that there exists quite a high level of uncertainty regarding the consistency of the answers given to different polls. It should also be taken into consideration that many of the citizens in Russia do not know what the answer "yes" stands for. One reason behind their positive answer probably is that they hold a general impression of the EU as "a success story". Fluctuations in the results of the polls are common, but, presently, positive attitudes prevail. Elite attitudes show the same general pattern. If you refrain from entering into a more complicated discussion and just put very simple questions to the public, you probably will receive the answer that Russia has to move closer to Europe for a simple reason--Russia has no

other alternative. The only source of modern technologies and investment capital is the West; Europe is closer and more likely than the US to react to Russia's needs. The real choice for Russia lies between siding with Europe; making strong efforts to become an important partner for Europe, thereby moving to a higher position in Europe's hierarchy of interests; or probably irreversibly sliding into the Third World group. The reason being, if you look at the societal risks facing Russia, they are exactly the same kind faced by Third World countries. So, the choice is not whether Russia wants to be a great power in Europe, a great power in Eurasia, or a great power in the world; it is for the Russian leaders to make the choice either to establish normal development for the people and the country or find Russia in a completely different category of countries ten years from now. Although many people do not like to admit this harsh reality publicly, they are well aware of it. I guess now the time is particularly inspiring in this regard, because this is the logic by which President Putin is driven. He will be in power for at least another five years; five years is a rather long term to launch a development strategy that, provided the policy decisions are pushing in the right direction, will create a positive environment for extended cooperation after 2008.

Economic development

The third positive factor is that the logic of economic development strengthens the positive interdependence. It is now quoted everywhere that nearly 35 percent of Russian foreign trade is with the European Union. After enlargement it will be more than 50 percent. When a single partner--in this case the EU—dominates external trade to that extent, it constitutes an important factor which influences Russia's room for political and economic manoeuvring. On the other hand, the European Union has, at the moment, very few, if any, alternatives how to meet its energy demands ten years from now, if not by reaching agreements with Russia. There are simply no ways other than an increased production in Russia and increased deliveries to the European Union, particularly as far as natural gas is concerned (regarding oil there are some alternatives and there is less clarity). Actually, if we continue this line of thought logically, we can arrive at a conclusion that one day the European Union might consider Russian membership as the way to include a new net-contributing state.

Common security threats

The fourth factor, which is gaining more and more attention both in Russia and Europe, concerns what used to be labelled “common security threats”. This label has been used for more than twelve years now, referring to “hard security” and “soft security” while not actually giving much thought to the content of these concepts. We are now in a situation when the multilevel destabilisation in the world is a realistic concern because, regarding specific risks, very few people are able to present prognoses on what kinds of security threats will appear and where. What I want to emphasize here is that the United States, regarding, e.g., narco-traffic is mostly concerned with Latin American sources, while countries of the European Union and Russia primarily feel threatened by the growing drug-trade from Afghan and Asian sources. This is certainly more important than people who do not study these issues may think, because cooperation here becomes a must and the law enforcement agencies of certain individual countries of Europe and Russia have extended their cooperation to a much higher level of intensity than normally is assumed. As another example, I could mention that despite all the problems in the relationships between Russia and the Baltic States the cooperation between border guards works very well. This is so since both sides know that cross border crime activities pose a real challenge for them and they promote swift action to come to grips with the situation.

What reduces the interest for cooperation?

Having spoken about positive factors, I will now try to show you the other side of the coin; namely, what drives the interest for cooperation down in Russia as well as in the European Union. The list of factors I will present to you under this heading is even longer, and no less impressive, than the previous presentation of factors driving cooperation between Russia and The European Union.

The first fact that needs to be emphasized is that the Russia-EU relationship is completely asymmetrical. It should be understood that it is not the level of economic development of Russia that is a particular impediment. The level of economic development in Russia is, of course, expected to improve. It is now popular to joke that under Khrushchov the Soviet Union wanted to catch up with the United States, and now Russia wants to catch up with Portugal in twenty years. This is the reality. However, we still do not know how the Russian economy will perform. The forecasts say that it will grow--at a

slower speed than the Russian government and the Russian people would like, but still growth is expected. So, the problem is not the different levels of development between Russia and the EU, it is the asymmetries. The European Union is an economic giant. A trade percentage of 35 percent for Russia corresponds to 3 percent for the European Union--energy trade included. After the completion of the next enlargement of the EU, this asymmetry will be even more noticeable. On the other hand, and again it is a frequent quotation, the European Union is an economic giant and a political pygmy, which Russia is not. All the decreased influence in the world considered, there still are issues where Russian influence is noticeable. If you look at the United States, which is now trying to build not only coalitions of the willing, but also coalitions of the capable, the potential of Russia and the perception of Russia as one of the capable affects the scenario and adds to the asymmetry.

On the other hand, the relationship is asymmetrical as long as present patterns of trade make Russia primarily a source of raw material for the European Union and hardly anything else. This causes enormous concern in the country, because people believe that, in exchange for the energy, Russia should be able to import modern technologies, and that the extended relationship with the European Union should be aimed at promoting modernisation in Russia. This is not what is seen to take place. The best example of this would be the developments under the EU program labelled "The Northern Dimension". This program was initially met positively in Russia, but now scepticism prevails because it is still concentrated on energy trade.

Another fact that should be mentioned, because it complicates the relations between Russia and the EU, is that the European Union is afraid of big states. This is relevant, e.g., in the case of Turkey, and it is also relevant for Russia. The EU is, in my opinion, by definition afraid to deal with big states, whether they fulfil the membership criteria or not.

Another factor which I would like to mention is that the momentum for promoting and developing the Russia-EU relationship presently is not very good on the EU side. This is due to the fact that the EU currently is concerned primarily with how to manage the enlargement process and how to carry out the institutional reform project. Everything else is not even secondary; it is of "I-do-not-know-what" order of importance. Objectively, if you analyse the challenges for the EU of the current wave of enlargement, which is decided very much upon political grounds, it is obvious that there are a number of countries which are about to join but are not fully prepared. This will be reflected in the length of transitional periods of many issues. Nevertheless, the decision is taken. So, managing the enlargement will demand a lot of econom-

ic and human resources--and a lot of bureaucratic skills--from the EU institutions, as well as from the member states.

The fact is that the concentration on enlargement and institutional reform will, by default even more than by design, deepen the already established divide on the Eastern border of the enlarged Union. I will mention not only Russia, but also Ukraine and Belarus. In Belarus, the interest directed towards the European Union is maybe less manifested, but in Ukraine it is strong. More than two thirds of the Ukrainian population would like the country to join the European Union. But preoccupation with internal affairs, I am afraid, will impede the necessary degree of attention to be given by the EU to Ukraine, and also to Russia.

As you probably already have noticed from what I have said so far, we do not know how successful the European Union will be in managing the two tasks of institutional reform and enlargement. If it fails, the EU will lose its image of a success story or success project in Russia. This might promote the development of a kind of a vicious circle: reduced willingness to join the EU among the present outsiders will lead to less need to respond to external pressure for EU decision-makers. Lack of attention given to Russia, and Ukraine, in the coming years will most certainly turn out to be discouraging for the citizens of these countries. I do not want to deceive anyone in the audience, but the average citizen in Russia is not constantly occupied with the question about when Russia will join the European Union. They do not feel the call of Europe. This is true not only of the people living east of the Urals, but also of those in large parts of European Russia. Presently there is a "window of opportunity" to appeal to these people, to talk with them, and to try to persuade them. I am afraid that five years from now this will be much more difficult.

The last factor that I would like to mention is that of the existence, on both sides, of old perceptions and ideas about Russia and the EU. In Russia, there exists the view that it has a number of interests that are different from those of the European Union. Usually, people point to the special Russian interests in the Far East and Asia. However, it is more complex since it also concerns interest, ideas, and possibilities of establishing some sort of special relationship with the United States--although this will not necessarily be long term and sustainable. Regarding the EU, I have already mentioned the fear of big states, not to mention the perceptions of Russia that emerged mostly during the Cold War years and positioned Russia as the constituent Other.

Future scenarios

What kinds of future scenarios are possible? I would say, in a very primitive way there are only two possibilities. One is positive and preferable. It presupposes that Russia and the European Union will find a formula for cooperation that would enforce Russian economic development and political stability and ensure that Russia eventually harmonises its legislation and its economic practices with those of the European Union. Twenty years is probably a sufficient time for that. It also presupposes that developments can be pursued at variable speed. There obviously are fields of cooperation where harmonisation is easier to achieve and there are those fields where it is much harder to achieve. It would, in my opinion, be preferable to start and proceed with high speed, and hopefully create success stories, in those areas where it is easy to find routes to positive development rather than to wait until a full harmonisation program could be set up.

In twenty years it may be realistic to consider Russian membership in the EU. Taking into account the new role of China, we do not know to what extent the EU will need, or have a concrete interest in, Russia in twenty years, both in security and economic terms. As far as the whole sphere of combating new security challenges is concerned, we do not know to what extent Europe will be interested in having Russia “in the same boat”, but I would hope for that. In order to be able to respond to the new challenges, the capabilities for extended cooperation should be created as soon as possible.

At the same time, I am afraid that a more likely scenario is that we are going to see a continuation of the “muddling through strategy” we have been experiencing over the past three to four years. In one recent Russian report, the Russia-EU dialogue was characterized as acquiring the trend toward becoming “an empty discussion” (“приобретал тенденцию к бессодержательности”). That is, from my perspective, exactly what it is. People have gotten together and made several nice declarations, and the next morning they have found themselves unable to have done the smallest concrete thing.

The so-called compromise reached on the Kaliningrad transit question, as one example, should not be deceptive. It was not the compromise the parties concerned needed, and the real problems still lie ahead. The real problem is not whether, or where, the trains should stop on their way between the Kaliningrad region and the main part of Russia, but how the Kaliningrad regional economy performs. By giving Russia consensus on visa-free travel for two more years, the European Union at the same time sent a clear message saying that it was not going to do much to help to develop the regional economy. This means that in five years soft security challenges emanating from Kaliningrad

towards Lithuania and Poland are likely to be much greater than now because the socio-economic divide will grow wider, not narrower.

Existing concepts do not look far-sighted enough. In Russia, decision-makers seem to like the idea of selective approximation of laws. The idea is to pick up whatever laws, rules, or norms one likes and to disregard the need to formulate a comprehensive policy, assuming that it suffices to harmonize a part of the legislation to make the system more effective. In my opinion you also find examples of this behaviour within the EU. Take, e.g., the nice concept of “new neighbours”. As it has not been specified what is meant by “new neighbour”, I do not know what the European Union wants to achieve. In Slavic languages the word “neighbour” is a rather neutral word. You can be a “good neighbour” and a “bad neighbour”. You can be an “irrelevant neighbour”. Neighbour means simply somebody in your geographic vicinity; it is a much weaker word in comparison with “partner”, which appears in most of the documents concerning Russia-EU relations starting from 1994.

There are other examples. What kind of a concept is the concept of “Common European Economic Space”? I am not an economist, but when I talk, for example, about the free trade area I know what is meant. And I also know that the Common Economic Space that the CIS was trying to establish for ten years ended nowhere. Most of the agreements were never implemented and the free trade area is still beyond the horizon. I am afraid that there is a growing risk the same thing will happen with Russia’s relations with the European Union.

Let me conclude by saying I believe, however, that nothing is impossible in Russian relations with the European Union. Whatever Russia--and the EU--aims at no doubt is reachable. The general situation is, at the moment, not ideal; it probably will be worse in five years unless we devote more energy now to solve these questions. The tasks the EU must take on should be realistic, but they should be rather ambitious as well. Otherwise the paradigm of Russia *and* Europe will stay with us forever.

Discussant's comments
on the presentations by

Dennis Smith
Sahin Alpay
Arkady Moshes

8. Discussant's comments on the presentations by Dennis Smith, Sahin Alpay and Arkady Moshes

Elisabeth Özdalga

Department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment on Dennis Smith's paper. Dennis Smith is as you know a prolific writer. From before, I especially know his book *Capitalist Democracy on Trial: The Transatlantic Debate from Tocqueville to the Present*. It was published in 1990, when the Soviet Union still existed and it was still possible to talk about 'West' in contrast to 'East'. In the paper that we discuss today, his first point concerns the dissolution of both concepts. In a footnote he adds that today the counterpart of 'West' is 'North'. More is not said, and I somewhat regret this silence, because I am sure that the tensions between US and the European Union that is here focused upon can be seen in a somewhat different light if we realize that both US and Europe are part of the 'North' but in a slightly different way. The colonial European past is far from extinct, and especially important is today the European attitude to immigrants and refugees. In Dennis Smith's comparison, I have the feeling that the EU comes out too much as a relatively idyllic part of the world. Most members of the EU, however, are still nation states with an attitude to immigrants and, especially, refugees from other parts of the world that is not far from xenophobic. The EU itself has built walls to protect its interior from people from Africa and, to some extent, from Asia. The US is still a country of immigrants, where the newcomers are important both for high-tech jobs and for extreme ill-paid jobs in the service sector. In a few years, Europe will experience a shortage of people in many sectors due to the coming to age of a substantial part of the population. Very little, however, is done to prevent this situation. At best, authorities and politicians want to have people from outside that have already a very good education, paid for by poor countries in Africa and, especially, Asia. Hence, the EU wants to compete with the US in the brain-draining of other parts of the world.

In short, I think that European countries have a well-founded bad conscience about people in the south, whereas the US has a much less well-founded clear conscience in the same respect. Many of the crises in the world, and especially in West Asia – the so-called 'Middle East', as the very Eurocentric expression is – are still marked by former European policy. The Israeli-

Palestinian conflict can be understood only against the background of the horrors of European anti-Semitism from the Dreyfus Affair to Hitler. The terrible problem and trauma it shaped have been exported to West Asia, where the Palestinians are the scapegoats of old European sins.

The Americans have still their old colonial past in fresh memory and see themselves as the first and most successful example of an ex-colony now much more powerful and wealthy than the old colonial powers. Somehow they seem incapable of having any bad conscience concerning non-American people. When Robert McNamara some years ago apologized for the Vietnam War – a war where the US took up the already lost French colonial war – his apology was only directed to American victims and he didn't even mention the millions and millions of Vietnamese that were killed or wounded and whose country was devastated by American weapons.

In short, I think that the relationship between the EU and the US can be fully understood only if their different roles in the 'North' against the 'South' are taken into account.

Another point that I will shortly discuss here is the concept of anti-Americanism that Dennis Smith uses several times in his paper. At first it is remarkable that this concept plays such a dominant role in political debate today. This is not only a proof of the dominant position of the US in world policy today. If even modestly criticising Berlusconi's Italy, you are not immediately called an anti-Italianist. As it is used in so many contexts also in Europe, it is quite clear that US has a unique position not only as an object of criticism but also of deep affection.

The concept "anti-Americanism" is used both about fully-fledged hatred and of modest sympathetic criticism. Dennis Smith talks about the "the anti-Americanism to which we are all prone and which is deeply resented the other side of the Atlantic". First of all I want to stress how important many Americans are to European critique of US policy – and here I have not only in mind Chomsky, Said and others of their kind, but also modest magazines of a slightly leftist touch. I myself have fed my anti-Americanism by reading e.g. articles on American policy and American economy in *The New Yorker*.

Today, I find it difficult not to be critical of American policy today. In an interview in the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*, the well-known Norwegian social scientist Johan Galtung talks about the risky combination of energy and stupidity that is typical of President Bush.

At the end of his paper, Dennis Smith opens a fascinating perspective of different "possible global pathways" as he calls it. Four different scenarios are built up from three tendencies in the contemporary world – multilateralism, multipolarity and militarization. The best scenario is the one where the two

'multi's' are combined a de-militarization of the world. According to Dennis, this can be brought about only by supporting the kind of institutions that the US has worked so hard for to build – he mentions among others the NATO, the OECD, the GATT and indirectly also, in fact, the EU or at least its precursor, the EEC. If I understand him right, he sees this as the only possible way where all alternatives are worse. The Europeans have to be – I quote - “a candid and friendly neighbour who is neither too arrogant nor too obsequious”. I have two questions to put here:

1. Does this mean that we all have to be restrained and moderate as soon as we talk about the US? Does it mean that popular protests against a possible war must be seen as dangerous? – Or does it only mean that the political leaders in Europe must be temperate? – In the last case, I can understand the point. In the first, I think the argument is dangerous, the freedom to discuss, to meet and to move that the West has so long been so proud being a victim in such a process. We can already see that it is threatened in the so-called war against terrorism.

2. I would like to know more about the institutions you have in mind. Some are not mentioned –e.g. the so-called Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. But exactly those institutions have played an extremely important part in constituting the US hegemony in the world, especially in the Third world, and they are now very much under attack from a young radical generation. I would like to know more about your view of them. – As far as I can see the United Nations is also omitted in the enumeration. But once more, so many people are again seeing this institution as a least a potential peace-maker in the world. – NATO, on the other side, is prominent in your presentation. In this country, only a small minority, mostly very conservative, support a Swedish membership in the NATO. I would like have your comment here – do you think that a country like Sweden ought to join the NATO?

“A Common European Home or a New Iron curtain?”

Per Månson

Department of Sociology, Göteborg University, Sweden

First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Moshes for his clear and well-structured overview of possibilities and problems in the relations between Russia and the European Union. In my opinion, the importance of this subject for the question “Whither Europe?” has been greatly underestimated in the debate inside the union; because where and how post-communist Russia will have her place in the future Europe will be of utmost importance also for the development of the union itself. To put the question simple: Will there in the future be a new intra-European border that again cuts the continent in two halves, or can the whole of Europe find a way to a “peaceful co-existence”? It is enough to take a fast glance at the map. Most West Europeans has not noticed that the geographical centre of Europe actually is situated close to Minsk in Byelorussia, and that even the enlarged EU is only half of the continent. So, if the relations between the Western and the Eastern halves of Europe don’t find acceptable solutions to both partners, there is a great risk that a new kind of an iron curtain will be raised “from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea”.

One way to summarise Dr. Moshes’ contribution is to say that, on the one hand, there now exists an opportunity to create, what he calls an “institutionalised partnership” that could work for the foreseeable future. According to Dr. Moshes, this partnership can be based on the fact that Russia will develop a European legal system and economic practices. The possibility for this kind of future rests, first, on the fact that Russia now has become a “normal” nation-state with a homogenous ethnic population which consider itself European. Second, there is for the moment a general positive attitude towards the European Union in Russia. Third, there are important trade patterns between both partners, and, fourth, there are common security threats that force Russia and the EU to co-operate in legal, police, and, maybe, also military matters. But, on the other hand, as Dr. Moshes emphasises, there are many factors that work against a rapprochement. To summarise the most important factors: The trade pattern is very asymmetrical, Russia “is to big”, EU is primarily concerned with its own internal reforms and the enlargement, and old stereotypes from both sides makes the rapprochement harder to achieve.

So, the question is whether Russia – or more broadly, the “new Eastern Europe”, east of the borders of the enlarged European Union – can be integrat-

ed into a “common European home” as Gorbachev expressed it, or if the two halves of Europe will draw a sharp dividing line between them. As is well known, this question is not new. There is a long discussion if Russia is a part of Europe, belongs to Asia or is a unique Eurasian civilisation. This debate has raged in Russia, both in her history and now, however, less in Western Europe. During certain phases of her history Russia has played a more prominent role in common European affairs – for example from the Napoleon wars to World War I – while during other phases she has turned inwards or used the whole world as an arena, not least when she was a superpower. For many West Europeans, Russia has an image of something “threatening”, something that has to be kept at distance, because of her reactionary – or during the communist phase, revolutionary – international role in politics and also because of her threatening huge size.

One of Dr. Moshe’s arguments for the possibility of developing an institutionalised partnership is that the new Russian Federation already is, or is developing towards a “normal” nation-state. But even if this is the case, will Russia be satisfied with being “just another normal state” in Europe”, including the new Eastern Europe? Here I have some doubts, because I think that Russia by her size and political influence in the future wants to be “the foremost among equals” in her area of interest. The asymmetrical relation Dr. Moshes mentioned in the trade patterns between Russia and the EU has its reversed parallel on the political level. But, for the sake of the argument, let us say that Russia is a normal nation-state. How, then, should Russia treat the European Union? As another “normal” nation-state, which means that Moscow should only negotiate with the “capital of the Union”, i.e., Brussels. Or are the Russian leaders more interested in negotiations with one by one of the nations-states in the Europe Union? This seems still to be the dominant pattern. And what about if Russia is conceptualised as a federation – which, by the way, she actually is? Is it then possible that Moscow and Brussels will take care of “high level negotiations” and let different parts or regions of the Russian Federation and different countries or regions of the European Union make there own agreement, on a lower, more “practical” level? The Finnish initiative with “The Northern Dimension” could have developed in such a direction. Sadly enough, however, none of the centres of the Union or the Federation were interested in a deeper cooperation between their respective northern parts.

My point is that neither Russia, nor the EU for the moment is what can be called a “normal” nation-state, and that this fact is one of the main obstacles for a deeper and a more workable relation between them. They are both “too

big” and too little integrated entities to find a working relationship between them. Nobody can say if Russia in the foreseeable future will change into a Western European country, and nobody can believe that the European Union will open her borders to the still “uncivilised” new east Europe. Even though Russia needs Europe as a trade partner, and even though EU needs Russian energy, there is a deep embedded tradition of mutual distrust between them. This can partly be seen in the interest both Russia and the EU show in playing an important part in world affairs, Russia as an ex-superpower and the EU as a supposed superpower in the making. It can also be seen in the difficulties to solve the Kaliningrad question. If the Russian and the Baltic border guards have managed to work together on many issues, maybe it would be better to solve some of the problems with Kaliningrad’s status inside an enlarged European Union if Poland and Lithuania will take a more active part in the negotiations? Of course, any result of this kind of “local negotiations” has to be confirmed by both Moscow and Brussels, but I think that one way to overcome this “muddling empty talks” Dr Moshes talked about is to involve lower levels in the search for solutions. One reason for the difficulties to solve practical problems on high political levels is that these levels often have a tendency to make just “high level politics” of most questions. It is, so to say, in their nature to defend the interests of their own level. In Russia, as well as in the European Union, the “people in the capital” are not the most trusted people to solve problems in the peripheries.

Another problem that emanates from the political constructions of both EU and Russia is the problem of identity. I think that more than a decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia at least has developed a new national collective conscience. Much of president Putin’s policy is clearly aiming at that. But there is still a huge problem with Russia’s place in the world. Should she try to be a superpower, a great power, a regional power or just “another normal nation-state”? What does it mean to be normal could, of course, be discussed, but the identity of a nation-state is also determined by its relation to other nation-states. The same problem exists on the other side, in the European Union. It is true, like Dr. Moshes says, that the EU “is an economic giant and a political pygmé”. But now a discussion is going on in the European Union how to change this imbalance, that is, how to make the union to also a political giant. The question what kind of political entity EU should be is, however, still unsettled. Should the union try to become a new superpower that could match the US? Some people want it, mainly among the political elite. Or should EU try to become just a great power, whatever it could mean? EU is clearly already aiming at becoming a regional power. The discussion about a common military force for peacekeeping in for example the former Yugoslavia is a part

of that. But could EU ever become a “normal nation-state”. I doubt it strongly, especially in the time horizon Dr. Moshes suggests.

Moreover, in the next years most of USSR's East European “buffer states” and the former Soviet Baltic republics will probably be a part of the European Union. The relations between Russia and these nations are even more complicated than between Russia and the contemporary states of EU. Because Russia, in the shape of Soviet Union, were occupying the East Europe states after World War II, both many politicians and a general attitude among the people have a “suspicious wait-and-see policy” towards Russia. At the same time, the attitude in Russia towards her former “colonies” is ambivalent, both among the leaders and the common man. If this mutual suspiciousness and ambivalent attitudes will remain and even be stronger, it is hard to see how the borders between the East Slavic states and the new EU states can avoid developing into a new strong boundary dividing Europe. This division will be of both an economic and a political nature, but even religion can play a part in it. Not in the sense that we will see a new “clash of civilisations”, but more of a mutual misunderstanding of each other's cultures and ambitions, which, of course, makes co-operation more difficult. Also, the relations between Bulgaria and Romania and the European Union will effect the future role of Russia in the new Europe.

So, basically I agree with Dr. Moshes in his theses, except on the question of nation-states. It is true that most people living in Russia now have a much stronger feeling of what it is to be Russian. But, sadly enough, this new Russian identity is for millions and millions of Russians connected with a miserable life, and basically I think that the question of Russia's relation towards EU has a low grade of importance in their lives. If it could mean a hope for a better life they would be more interested, like the people in the candidate states who regard EU as a mean to improve their lives. The relations between Russia and the European Union will therefore more be based on a high political level co-operation. Therefore, and accepting “the empty talk theses” from Dr. Moshes, I think that there are rather bad prospects for an “institutionalised partnership” in the foreseeable future. This is a realistic prognosis, especially if it is true what a Russian, who has spend much time in Brussels, trying to talk with the European Union bureaucracy, told me: “It is impossible to get something done with these European negotiators; they are so bureaucratic.” And, remember, a Russian diplomat who spent long time in the Russian bureaucracy said this.

Sven-Erik Liedman

Department of History of Ideas and Theory of Science, Göteborg University, Sweden

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