CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND NATIONAL BORDERS

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Opening Addresses

On behalf of the Faculty of Arts, I would like to welcome both guests and colleagues to this two day conference on National identities and cultural borders.

I would like to begin by asking whether the choice of days for this conference was random, or whether it was considered appropriate to hold the conference directly after Sweden’s newly-instituted national holiday, 6 June. This is a holiday I have had very mixed feelings about in the past. My view was that Sweden didn’t need a national holiday, as Sweden had no history of freeing itself from another state. Moreover, I have tended to regard national identity as rather unimportant or irrelevant. As an example of an “imagined community”, according to Benedict Anderson, I thought it could be “imagined away”. I was an internationalist, so I believed it was relatively unimportant which passport you carried, where you voted in national elections, whether or not there were special letters on your driver’s license or not. My research interests in multilingualism in Sweden have led me to study the Swedish immigration and integration policies to some extent. Their goal has traditionally been intended to treat citizens and resident non-citizens in a uniform manner, although the ease or difficulty in becoming a resident or citizen have varied over time. This goal is laudable. My view was that Sweden didn’t need an occasion on which Swedes could wave the flag and express their satisfaction in being Swedish.

In 2001, I became a Swedish citizen myself and I changed my mind to some extent about the importance of national (in the sense of nation-state) identity, but the change was more emotional than rational. I experienced a very special feeling when I opened the envelope and pulled out my proof of Swedish citizenship, even though I said I applied for citizenship mainly for practical reasons. I was also thrilled when I went to vote in the national election of 2002 with my son, who voted for the first time, even though I had voted in the municipal elections numerous times previously. The 6 June holiday has also taken on a very inclusive quality, at least in the past couple of years. The sub-dean of the faculty, Martin Todtenhaupt, told me this morning of his experience at the ”new citizens” celebration in Kungsbacka yesterday. He was also
proud and thrilled to be the object of attention, together with other new citizens. Many other events arranged on the 6 June have been about diversity, with persons of other national origins featured in their capacity as Swedes. So I’m starting to change my mind about this holiday and perhaps also about the importance of passports and voting rights.

The question continues to occupy my thoughts as a researcher as well. I am currently writing a paper with a colleague in Stockholm for a volume entitled Handbook of Language and Space. There we argue that the assumed ”natural” connection between languages and nation states, territories, neighborhoods and communities, well, even the connection between languages and individuals must be questioned and thoroughly investigated. It is no longer the case that we can assume that a person who has grown up or who lives in country/region/neighborhood X speaks language X, nor that there is a sharp distinction between speaking a language natively or as a second language, between speakers and non-speakers of languages, between monolinguals and multilinguals. A simple, single connection between language and geographical space has been an ideal which has seldom if ever been realized on the national level nor, I would venture to say, on the local or even individual level. Variation and diversity in the relation between languages and spaces have been and continue to be much greater than previously acknowledged, even among researchers.

So I hope you all have a rewarding two days together discussing these and related questions and issues. I only wish my duties as Dean of the Faculty did not prevent me from participating actively in the discussions.

*Sally Boyd*
Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Göteborg University

Dear Colleagues and friends!
On behalf of the Centre for Research on European Affairs at Göteborg University I would like to wish you very welcome to this conference on Cultural identities and National borders.
The Centre is a multidisciplinary research network with the objective to strengthen research on European issues at our university. It includes researchers in humanities as well as social sciences and has over the years developed into a dynamic arena for academic communication and co-operation.

Ever since the rise of a European state system, the theme for this conference has been a central issue for European thought and debate on ideas for the structuring of society. In contemporary European debate, the issue has gained an immediate importance where lingual and other cultural specificities has gained weight as instruments for strengthening a perception of belonging to a collective. Cultural identities could thus be used as instruments for inclusion as well as exclusion; a strengthening of us in contrast to the others. Moreover, the strengthening of cultural identities could both emphasize and erode national borders. This is depending on to which degree the culturally identified us is congruent to the us as defined by national citizenship.

The ideas of identity and borders are also reflected on the level of the European Union in the ongoing debate on the definition of a Union identity. In this context, the formulation of a Union identity has become closely related to the question of future enlargement of the Union: Should the potential geographic scope of the Union remain undefined or ought the final borders be defined, thereby setting a clear limit to possible enlargement? This relation between the aspiration of formulating a Union identity and the geographic borders of the Union is well illustrated by the position expressed by the German chancellor Angela Merkel in her speech on European affairs before the Bundestag in May 2006. At this occasion Merkel argued strongly for the definition of a value based Union identity in order to strengthen internal cohesion and popular legitimacy for the process of integration within the Union. This, according to Merkel, presupposes the definition of the Union’s final geographical borders:

“In our interaction with other religions and cultures it will be important for us Europeans to be able to clearly define our cultural identity. This is what others expect from us. How can we defend our values if we cannot define them first? An entity that does not have borders cannot act coherently and with adequate structures. We must be aware of this and must therefore set out these borders.”

To my mind this shows the enormous power and contemporary importance of the issues that you will deliberate on today and tomorrow. It is my conviction that you will have stimulating and creative discussions that will further our understanding of the relationship between identity and borders, an understanding that seems to be crucial for the debates on the development of our common future.

Thank you.

*Per Cramér*

Director of CERGU, Göteborg University
Cultural identity and national borders

When the Berlin wall between Eastern and Western Europe fell the idea of a New Europe was declared. Europe was now to be a part of the world where the borders where disappearing. The borders induced by the split between communism on the one side and the combination of welfare capitalism and parliamentary democracy on the other, was indeed made into history. The process of the European Union also took turns that entertained the process of expelling the European borders, by calling forth the extension of the union, today including former Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union and extending relations and agreements with others.

We could stand happy with the conclusion that in the New Europe we do have extolled much of the former national borders. But perhaps the talking of a New Europe also should bring a suspicious mind. Such talk has been raised at several occasions through the 19th and 20th centuries. The idea of a New Europe was also declared at the congress of Vienna by the victorious powers, meaning a Europe where there should be a balance of the powers, thus building a Europe of nations state and with clearly drawn national borders. Then again, the idea of a New Europe was presented by Bismarck after defeating France and creating the German Reich which in fact left us with Germany as a nation state. More in line with the present idea was Churchills speech of a New Europe by the end of World War II, heading towards the Coal- and Steal-union and the Rome treaty of 1957.

As long as we are asking about the economic and legal borders there are no doubts that we do live in a Europe where the borders between the nation states are of less strength, There are less of them and they are becoming more soft, to use a word commonly in use these days. But at the same time one could argue that we do have a growth of borders in Europe, which mainly have cultural characteristics. It is to some parts not possible to generalize whether they are of administrative or cultural origin. As in the case of the regions of Europe one can compare the differences between the Catalonia with its historical and linguistically origins and the new region by the Swedish west coast which is clearly an administrative construction. If we look at the new nation states of former Eastern Europe there are clearly cultural aspects of their (re)constructions. Looking at the linguistic situation in Europe one is also struck by
the development of the last decades, with a growing number of spoken languages, partly due to the regional movements and partly to the immigration of new languages from other parts of the world. The importance of local languages has grown inside the European Union, where it is an integrated element in its search for legitimacy. Irish, a Gaelic language of practical importance to no one in an English spoken country (correct?), is symbolically used on the street signs on Ireland and will now have the statues as an official EU language. The overall statues for minority and regional languages have grown. Countries that we fifty years ago would look upon as mono cultural do now appear as multi linguistic. Spain has Catalan, the UK has Welsh and the Scandinavian countries have Lappish. Germany has Turkish, Arabic is spoken over great parts of Europe, as are Hindi and several African languages.

Thus, we do see a New Europe, but the new landscape of cultural identities and national borders is not easy to put on a map. In contemporary Europe the ideal of culturally homogeneous states are radically put in question by migration and politics of identity. In the coming period, Europe will have to manage the clashes between different linguistic and national identities, as well as the need to reach beyond cultural borders as a consequence of the integration process. It is therefore of greatest importance to understand the cultural dimension in the making and remaking of borders.

**Identity and borders**
The makings of borders are often being looked upon in relation to linguistic and national identities. The ideal of a Europe consisting of homogeneous nation states has also been integrated part of the cultural and social sciences. In fact, it is part of the nation state paradigm that is a heritage of the 19th and 20th centuries. But when we today are focusing on the relation between cultural identities and national borders, we should be inclined to attain a position ahead of this paradigm, by studying how to reach beyond the borders of linguistic and national identities. We want to raise questions on culture, language and religion as creators and containers of present constructions of identity. How can multilingualism be promoted? How can cultural and religious diversity accomplish a broad legitimacy? How can cultural diversity go together with tolerance?
The two concepts that need to be elaborated are identity and borders, both central to the understanding of contemporary situation. For the scientist these should initially not be regarded as analytical concepts but as objects for study. Identity has two faces. On the one hand it is a process of learning through which the individuals appropriate norms, languages and other cultural characteristics of his or hers communities. In this perspective there is a well defined and nucleus of the identity. On the other hand identity is about making choices in order to establish borders that in one way or the other are inclusive towards a community and exclusive towards others. Here identity is a case for changes and ever ongoing constructions. Identity in the first sense is the natural object for the scientist within the paradigm of the homogeneous nation state and homogenous cultural identities. But it is identity in the second sense that today are becoming object of greater interest, as we witness the increase of cultural identities.

Borders are also a case of a changing object. The border concept of the nation state indicates a hard border, that also are of a cultural kind. Then the border is where the relevance of the national language ends, as where the legal and political community ends. This is a concept of border that was established in the period of the Enlightenment. The older concept originating in the ancient times was more open, looking upon borders as places for exchange and communication. The modern concept of border was illustratively manifested by the geographers of late 19th and early 20 centuries, searching for natural boundaries as mountains and rivers to be foundation for political and even cultural borders. We are now in a time when a more post modern (allow us just once to use this very vague denotation) concept of border is gaining ground, where borders are soft and manifold. In Europe there are now both the national and the European legal systems, and the same goes for politics. For the individual there are several layers of cultural borders, giving membership to different communities.

This indicates that we today have a situation of instability and reconfiguration of the cultural identities. The shaping of cultural identities has in present Europe entered a new phase. The English historian Peter Burke describe it as a period of cultural exchange and transformation and forecasts that we are seeing a new “Ökotypus”
being shaped. Our conclusion would be that cultural identities are formed as regional or local cases of a general European or even global pattern, with greater emphasis on cultural diversity and local cultural identity. This will be a cause for uncertainty also for the liberal democratic traditions of the European nation states as for the institutions of EU. It raises questions of legitimacy and political representation. It puts the cultural bases for citizenship in question. Put shortly, it is of outmost importance not only for academic purposes but also for broad democratic reasons that the questions of cultural identities and national borders will be thoroughly studied.

Questions of further research

With the aim to initiate and contribute to further research within the field of national identity we invited special scholars to present lectures and take part in a panel discussion at a conference on the theme “Cultural borders and national identities” in June 2007. The different perspectives and the distinguished presentations raised several questions and give a fertile ground for making some general remarks.

Firstly, there is both continuity and change regarding how the identity building works. The use of symbols seems to be as important as before. The using of cultural expressions and sports as cultural markers is also of continuing interest. The nationalists of the green island developed the typical Hurling and Irish kind of football by the late 19th century. Today Catalan nationalists are giving great appreciation to FC Barcelona. The present hype around football is used by nationalists to put their symbols on the scene. But this scene is not the same as yesterday; it is lately put in connection with globalisation. Thus it is the global scene of cultural expressions that are used.

The cultural borders do still have a manifold relation to existing institutions. They are gaining strength by relating to power or opposing power. It raises questions of prestige and of politics. But now it can relate to different levels of administration and politics, not only the national but also local, regional and European levels. The scheme of cultural borders is becoming a more complex one.

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2 Peter Burke Kultureller Austausch, 1998, s. 35-40. /Hittar i hastigheten bara en tysk utgåva /
Individualism and modernity vs cultural identities

An intriguing question concerns the European integration and the idea of European identity. European integration within the Union has mainly been economical and legal (to certain degrees also political). But since twenty years EU has also had the ambition to create a common identity, partly by attempts to establish common symbols as the flag, partly by establishing a European citizenship, and partly by attempts to define what the common European culture and identity consists of. At the same time there is this entertainment of an increase of cultural identities in Europe. Leena Huss points at the “language revitalization” and Fernand Fehlen states the paradoxical situation of less economical and legal borders but more borders of a cultural kind. So, what are we actually witnessing? What is the character of the cultural diversity? And the further question: what is the relation between European identity and cultural borders? Is the idea of European identity softening the cultural borders? Is the idea of Europe promoting legitimacy for cultural diversity or is it instead an obstacle?

To study languages and identities we apparently need a certain creativity and ingenuity. Ailbhe O’Corrain elaborates a model to analyse identity by using procedures of linguistics. Thomas Lundén introduces the concept of layers, giving a perspective of “different linguistic layers”. Fernand Fehlen mentions inadequacies of “methodological nationalism”, touching on the debate within social sciences on the methodological consequences of globalisation and integration. He explicitly develops Bourdieu’s concept of “legitimate language” into a concept of “legitimate multilingual language competence”. Leena Huss……… Miquel Strubell uses the specific symbol of the flag as a creatively developed example to discuss identity and cultural borders. All the speakers are in their practice elaborating concepts or theories to deal with issues on languages, cultural identities and borders. One general conclusion would be that there is a need of methodological development for the further research.

Mats Andrén, on behalf of the editorial board
WHERE, WHEN AND WHAT IS A LANGUAGE?
Ingmar Söhrman

Abstract

That at least one language plays a fundamental role in the life of each human being is a truism, but here the intention is to discuss three major points in the existence of a language and how these three points influence human society and the role of language/s/ in different sociolinguistic environments.
The focus will thus be on these three topics:

1. Geophysical situation (political considerations and economic situation)
2. Temporal limits
3. Self-awareness (self esteem of an ethnic group)

This could be summarized in three words like in the title – where, when and what. They are very much linked together as will be shown. I also intend to discuss the troublesome definition of language and dialect. However, it should be underlined that the language we speak is normally closely linked to our self-awareness and our identification of ourselves as persons and integrated members of a social context. This is the base for a language-based ethnic identity. The nation is furthermore a far more restricted concept than the idea of a country is. It is possibly not until school that we get acquainted with the idea of what our country (and our nation) is and that we are parts of it.

Introduction

A romantic, but not untrue definition of what a language means to its speakers (and others), is given in the Belarusian constitution:

“Language is not only a means of communication but also the soul of the nation, the main and most important part of its culture. When language lives, lives the nation. Every language, its living local or historical varieties is an invaluable richness, belonging not only to one people but to the whole of mankind.” (Gustavsson: 59)

It is, as we have seen, an unresolved question what a language is. A linguistic variety can be considered a language when it has achieved sufficient political and/or cultural prestige. When this prestige is lost what used to be considered a language might suddenly turn into a dialect again without any significant linguistic change. The process of becoming a language is a cognitive one that depends on the people’s own perception and recognition of it and in the case of minorities; it also depends on the majority’s willingness to recognize it as a language. This shows that in order to be considered a language a linguistic variety must be regarded as a language not only by its speakers but also by its neighbouring peoples and, not least important, by the authorities of that country. This recognition has much more to do with the political and cultural context than with purely linguistic considerations. The creation of the Bosnian language shows this clearly. It is fairly close to standard Serbian but for nationalistic (and religious) reasons, the use of oriental and Muslim words is promoted and the vocabulary is alienated from the old standard Serbo-Croatian language.
Nevertheless, there are criteria that indicate if a variety is a language or not. Of course these can be questioned, but at least the intent is to represent some kind of more scientific approach to a highly infected problem. Nevertheless, in order to sort things out it is fundamental to try to retain some kind of objectivity. However, there is no bipolarity language-dialect but rather a continuum where a clear presence of the following criteria implies that the linguistic variety is a language and the absence indicates that it is a dialect. This is not the whole truth if there is one, but it is part of it and explains in a reasonable way that a language could be defined as a linguistic variety that has prestige and a dialect as one that lacks this:

1. Difficulty in understanding speakers of neighbouring language/s/
2. Geographical isolation
3. An ethnically and politically well-established and strong group (of native speakers) uses the variety in their daily life
4. The existence of a political and historical tradition among the speakers of the variety
5. The existence of a written tradition
6. A rich literary tradition
7. A recognized standard language variety
8. The use of a language in schools
9. The recognition of a variety as an official language in a country or a region
10. High political and cultural prestige for a linguistic variety

These criteria are not of equal importance. The first four seem to play a more decisive role, and, of course, the first one, the difficulty in comprehension, has to be regarded as fundamental. What you cannot understand at all is surely considered a different language from a linguistic point of view, although the criterion is not unequivocal. It is in cases like Sámi (Lapp) and Norwegian or Breton and French, but the criterion becomes more relative when it comes to relations like Danish and Swedish or Finish and Estonian, where there exists a fairly high degree of mutual understanding. The linguistic variety could still be a dialect, but in that case, often, a dialect of another language that is not yours. However, politicians, especially dictators, tend to have their own idea of the linguistic reality. Thus Franco could declare Basque a Spanish dialect together with Galician and Catalan that linguistically are more related to Spanish (or Castilian). In this situation, ‘Spanish’ means ‘belonging to the state of Spain’ and perhaps just subordinating the dialects. They are not languages and therefore of lesser importance. The decay of these ‘dialects’ could then be seen as a good thing that the state would promote by forbidding their usage in all official dealings, since the promotion of one national and official language ‘unifies’ a country., at least from a centralistic point of view.

In many languages, there are dialects that without any pretension of becoming languages of their own are still fairly incomprehensible to the rest of the speakers of the language in question. There are even languages that lack a standard variety and only consist of some dialects like Sardinian in Italy and Tamazight (Berber) in northwest Africa (see Applegate 1970), although there is an ongoing process to create a unified Tamazight. This means that the first criterion can not be entirely decisive on its own.

The geographical isolation adds to the linguistic peculiarity. Isolated valleys or islands are ideal grounds for linguistic diversification. Faroese on the Faeroe Islands and Aranese in the Aran Valley in Catalonia are two examples of linguistic varieties that
have reached a certain level of official recognition due to their geographical isolation. Faroese is now considered a language and used in all situations on the Faeroe Islands, while Aranese is taught at schools and is used in local affairs, although it is still considered a dialect, but neither of Catalan nor of Spanish. It is related to Gascon (an Occitan dialect) in southwest France (Posner 1996: 190).

Together with this first criterion number 3 and 4, for political reasons, have a higher dignity and prestige than do the rest of the criteria. Eskimo-Aleut has, only recently received any official recognition of its status as an independent language. Still, its total difference from other languages spoken in its neighbourhood is sufficient to qualify it as a language. The clear fulfilment of this single criterion and the lack of other criteria stand out in the case of most Native American languages (Comrie et al. 1996: 120-143).

There has to be a fair number of criteria, especially the first, third and fourth ones that have to be present to a higher degree if we should consider a vernacular a language. The more clearly a certain criterion is fulfilled and the more criteria that are fulfilled the higher is the likelihood of a vernacular being considered a language. An important ground for the two political criteria (3 and 4) is the usefulness of a language. This usefulness could be economical, political or emotional, but it has to be recognized by the speakers. Otherwise, these fundamental criteria for a language will have no effect. Irish could be seen as a good example of an officially very well supported and guarded linguistic variety that has a long and outstanding tradition as bearer of an original culture that is important for the national feeling. Still, now that Ireland is a well established state and nation the Irish language has turned into more of a curiosity due to its lack of usefulness for its speakers outside the Gaeltachtaí (the region where it is spoken).

There is a striking example of the fifth criterion being the most important one. Chinese is considered a language and the four main varieties – Mandarin, Wú, Yuè and Hakka and their many subvarieties only dialects although the differences among them both in vocabulary and structure make them mutually unintelligible (Li & Thompson 1990: 811-813). In this particular case, the use of a logographic (character system) writing system helps the dialects to be unified since it is the same writing system that is used in all four ‘dialects’. The signs do not reflect the pronunciation at all, and in that way the same sign can be pronounced completely differently in different parts of China. This is also the explanation as to why Chinese people can be seen “writing” signs in their palm while talking to someone from another dialectal region. Of course, the third and fourth criteria are valid in the Chinese case as the writing system was used and promoted by the centralized imperial administration for millennia.

When a language has reached a level of high prestige like English or Spanish, it seems harder, if not almost impossible, to break it down into several new languages that emerge from the language of the colonial power. In the case of English, it could be argued that this is a reasonable consequence of the fact that since Great Britain kept its position as a great power with many colonies until after World War II. Spain, on the other hand, had lost its position as a great power when most of its colonies became independent at the beginning of the 19th century. The long and linguistically successful tradition as colonial powers explains why these languages became so widely spread, and now the number of speakers, as well as unified linguistic traditions and better communications seem to add strength to the idea of one English and one Spanish language. With the exception of a certain nationalistic idea of creating a new Argentinean linguistic norm (Guitarte 1991: 77-79), there has not been any real
attempt to split English or Spanish into different languages. It is true that Webster wanted to establish a different American spelling norm for the English spoken in America and also did so, but he had no proven intention of making it a separate language. The tenth criterion summarizes this discussion. The core criterion is a ‘high political and cultural prestige for a linguistic variety [that] makes it a language’ (Alvar 1961).

The geophysical situation in which a certain language is spoken

It is fairly evident that a geographical isolation of the speakers of a certain language promotes its usage within that area and gives it an undisputable position of prestige. It also means that if there is a superior political power this is geographically, and probably mentally, far away like the situation was in Greenland and the Faeroe Islands. However the questions where a language really is turns out to be bit more complicated than it might seem at first glance. Evidently, it is fundamental to know and acknowledge in which territory a language is spoken – and by whom, this latter question is of great importance as will be shown.

The status of the territory is of utmost importance for the speakers (cf. Laponce 1987). If it is a nation-state with a certain language as the official one, the situation is evidently the best possible, and there would be full use and support on all levels of society. If the language is only spoken in a region, the sociolinguistic situation of the population of this region is fundamental: Is it bilingual? Does the region have any autonomous status? Which language is used in schools and in mass media? – And who speaks it. The oppression might be the same but still the defence and promoting strength might differ a lot. Compare, for instance, the Catalan resistance through the centuries and the Sami resistance or the Rheto-Romance struggle. In the latter cases we have to do with mostly rural minority groups while the Catalans were (and still are) an economically and culturally leading part of the region.

When John Hofman investigated the usage of Shona in what was then Rhodesia he was told that “to be human one must have a tribe; to be a tribe one must have a language” (Hofman 1975). This statement is not entirely true, but it shows people’s attitude towards their language as a fundamental part of their cultural identity. This leads us to slightly different meaning of the word territory in the sense of social territory. The question is in which situations and where is a language used? At home, at school, at work etc.? This territorial aspect of language usage has to be combined with the temporal limitation if we want to achieve a good understanding of the existence and use of a certain language and we will return to this aspect of the problem.

As has already been pointed out the economic and political situation is fundamental to the prestige given to a certain language and the pride its speakers take in using it. Of course the geophysical situation is basic. What has been a long distance to the superior political power through the centuries is probably lesser now in the cybernetic modern life, but it is still a way to go from the central political power to the two Danish dominated regions Greenland and the Faeroe Islands as the Aran Valley in Spain and the Rheto-romance villages in the Grisson mountains in south-east Switzerland. In Latin America and New Guinea many indigenous tribes have lived isolated (and often happily) from their official government. Borders are often created in a very superficial way. The country borders in Africa unfortunately turn out to be good examples of this with very unfortunate
consequences, when tribes and historically united people have been divided into two or more countries. Nigeria and Uganda are just two of the worst examples of this. In a European perspective, border regions like Alsace and Lorrain are good examples of how people develop a ‘mixed’ culture that is questioned by both the neighbouring countries that during different periods dominate them and ask for full acceptance of that country’s core values (Söhrman 2006a). At present Belgium seems to be a sad example of how economic and invented cultural differences might lead to a split up of an already small country. The unwillingness to accept anything but the main values of the invented nation and its founding legend is the ‘irrevocable’ pretended true national legend for which many are willing not only to drastic political measures but also to shed blood of neighbours and family. This is what has so tragically been shown in former Yugoslavia (Magnusson 1996).

In the French case the conflict has resulted in the introduction of the two concepts of ‘Inner France’ and ‘outer France’ to which also Brittany belongs having been oppressed by French authorities since the revolution (Söhrman 2006b). The expression ‘défense de cracher par terre et de parler Breton’ (Forbidden to spit on the floor and to speak Breton) is just one centralistic testimony of this. Of course the examples are many.

As has been discussed above seas, forests, mountains and other geophysical realities keep certain regions isolated and free from government involvement to a certain extent. Or at least this has been the case until now. Different political influences throughout history have turned this situation upside-down on many occasions. Germany is a good example of how conflicting powers have changed the reality. There are many concepts that complicate the geographical idea of a country and the region of a language. What is the meaning of majority and minority? Very questionable are also the notions of nation and country. They are all polisemantic, i.e. they are taken for granted in one sense but have other meanings that make them acceptable for others, but this lack of consensus also leads to conflicts.

In Grissons (in Switzerland) German is the language of the majority, but in the village of Falera, for instance, Sursilvan (a Rheto-Romance variety) is by far the language of the local majority. In Spain Galician is a minority language but in Galicia it is the language of the majority. The meaning of the concepts obviously is very relative. To complicate the picture more we could just look at Alsace where we have a ‘supposed’ German minority which implies the right to use German at school, but the reality is that for most Alsatians their dialect, which is Alemannic, and differs considerably from Standard German, is not taught at school. The language they are taught is then another foreign language. And when it comes to the Celtic varieties in Brittany the situation gets even more complicated (Söhrman 2006b). In the Catalan-speaking parts of the Roussillon the linguistic oppression stands out so clearly in comparison with the present situation in Catalonia. However, it is not evidently so that Spain stand out as a good model, since it took many years to give the Catalan-speakers of Aragon (on the border with Catalonia) the right to learn Catalan at school (Söhrman 2006c). These are just examples of the complexity of the situation. Sweden has been very slow in respecting the linguistic rights of its minorities, many years after Norway and Finland (Huss 200?).

Another aspect of the relationship between the ‘majority’ and the ‘minority’ is political. In modern Estonia there is a considerable Russian minority that constitutes the majority in the north-eastern parts, but many of them were sent there by the Soviet authorities or are children of parents who were sent there in order to keep the Russian power in Estonia. Nowadays they are seen as fifth-colons and intruders representing
an old oppressive power whatever their own ideas might be. They are victims of the ‘ancien régime’ and have difficulty in getting recognized as a minority, since their language is that of the old oppressors. This is also the situation in many French dominions in the Pacific and in the Basque country just to mention a few examples from the European neighbourhood. This is also the suspicion of the more ‘nationalistic’ parties in Romania when the Hungarian-speaking population develops its constitutional rights. Where are their sympathies – with Romania or with Hungary? Exactly as in the Estonian case their motives however good and just are always questioned for being those of a neighbouring (and not always friendly) power. The attitude might be very wrong but the suspicion remains. This does not make things easier.

In the case of Romania it is also worth looking into the linguistic situation of the Republic of Moldova. After the independence the official language was Romanian. Stalin had declared Bessarabia a part of the Russia and thus the Soviet Union since the Transnistrian fringe was declared a part of Moldova. As this belonged to the Soviet Union it gave Stalin the excuse to invade and ‘recapture’ that part of Romania. As it turned out, Transnistria is entirely Russian but rich, and being the cause of the Soviet dominance Moldova does not want to give it up now. Modern Moldovan nationalists have returned to the old Soviet idea and declared the language Moldovan. This is, of course, another proof of the fact that the notion of language is political and not linguistic. Most linguists do not consider these two varieties different languages. On the other hand it could always be discussed whether Norwegian and Swedish really are two different languages, since the mutual understanding is almost perfect. This shows that we should not consider the idea of a language as anything else than a political concept, and if people want to consider their linguistic variety a language be it so.

Finally, it has to be mentioned that when the map of Europe changed in the nineties and many former Soviet republics became independent some new aspirations turned up. For instance the old conflict of standard Estonian came back, although the old conflict between the Tallinn variety and the traditionally stronger Tartu variety (Raag 1999) has been long solved, but the south-eastern võru-variety is being promoted as a language, when the Russian domination ceased. There is another Estonian group, the orthodox Setu-Estonians who speak a similar variety. This is something similar to the Rheto-Romance situation when the speakers of the south-eastern varieties, being Calvinists, ‘could not understand’ the north-western ones, since they were Catholics – and vice versa, until an active radio promotion made it clear that they understood each other quite well and had so much in common (Söhrman 1996).

All these cases try to define themselves as nations but not necessarily as countries. The proclamation of a linguistic variety as a language in its own right is often the beginning of a nationalistic movement to grant autonomy of some kind to a region. The sufferances of many minorities is often taken as an excuse to proclaim independence, but this is not as easily done as it might seem since there are always more languages and groups involved as when the Catalans wanted their rights and had to grant more or less the same rights to the Aranese, who speak an Occitan variety. This is a never-ending –story but what is important is to recognize that there are always different perspectives and the other one is never entirely wrong.

The existence of a language in time
Having discussed what a language is and where the temporal factor also has to be taken into consideration. ‘When is a language?’ Throughout history, we have seen languages appear and disappear. We find evidence for the existence of a language, and we can also see when it is not used in any official situation any more. When great cultures like the Sumer realm in Mesopotamia (aprox. 3,200 – 2,000 BC) succumbed to Assyria in about 2,000 BC, Sumerian also lost its position as a language of prestige and fell into disuse. However, it kept being used as a literary language for almost two millennia, which in itself is impressive. Later Akkadian was used in the same way, as was the case when Alexander the Great conquered the country and his realm later became part of the Roman Empire, although we do not know exactly when the last native speaker of Sumerian and of Akkadian died. These are evidently good examples of the temporal existence of a language, even if we do not know the exact moment of the languages’ appearances and disappearances. However, reality is more complicated than these examples show.

If we look at the creation of a language we are led to believe that a linguistic variety passes through different phases on its way to becoming a language in its own right. A simplified description of the creation process would be the following scheme:

Variety with certain peculiarities > subdialect > dialect > language

Could this process be reversed and a variety first change from being a dialect to becoming a language and then back to a dialect again and so on. From a purely linguistic classification, it would be hard to see this happen, but as the definition of what a language is has more to do with political and economic power than with pure linguistics, it does not seem contradictory.

Galician in Spain is one example of this. After the Moorish invasion of Spain in 711 AD, and the establishment of the economically and culturally flourishing centres in Southern Spain – Cordoba, Granada and Seville – the languishing North desperately needed a religious and political counter weight. Revenge and glory are not by themselves enough to create a nation. A marginalized people need something more prestigious to achieve that status. Historical tradition more than true history is a good base for the creation of an ethnic myth on which a self-conscious nationalistic feeling can be founded and lead to a struggle for independence and even expansion. This historical tradition can be based on political and cultural prestige or religious zeal and strength. The Spanish Reconquista, starting in 720 AC with king Pelayo in the Cantabrian Mountains, truly needed something prestigious to give strength and reason to its cause in order to fight the strong and rich Muslim realm. The economic strength of a territory is fundamental to the outcome of its fight for independence (Söhrman 2005).

Thus Saint Jacob’s body was conveniently found in Galicia and buried in Santiago de Compostela in northwest Spain. An enormous cathedral was erected, and the myth made Santiago the third most important pilgrimage site in the Christian world in medieval times. The political prestige gained from this new religious and economic centre helped the kings of Asturias and later as the kingdom expanded, kings of León and Castile in their efforts to unite the growing kingdom in its reconquering of lost territory.

This newly gained prestige also rendered valour to the Romance variety spoken in Galicia, and Galician poetry flourished and many non-Galician writers used the language for centuries to come. Galician changed from being a regional linguistic variety to being considered a language with a literary tradition in poetry especially.
However, the situation changed. The political power moved to Castile, and Galicia turned into a forgotten corner of an expanding empire. Galician fell into oblivion and turned into the vernacular of peasants and fishermen. It was once again a dialect (Söhrman 1993: 23-24).

Romantic ideas led to a resurrection of the language (with Rosalía de Castro as its figurehead) as in many other countries in the mid 19th century (Söhrman 1993:23). This short prosperous period ended in marginalization, and once again, the language was a dialect with a short comeback during the Second Republic in the thirties. When democracy was established after Franco’s death and according to the 1978 Constitution (Chapter 3:2), Galician once again was revitalized and declared a language (Miguel??; Söhrman 1993:40, 52-53, 63-65).

There are other examples of the same kind, Norwegian for instance. Common Scandinavian was split into different languages at the beginning of the Viking Era. Norwegian as a separate language is supposed to have existed from 800 AC. It remained closer to Old Scandinavian than did Danish and Swedish. In 1450, Danish replaced Norwegian as the administrative and official language of both Norway and Denmark, although this latter concept did not exist at that time. Norway had lost its independence to Denmark and was to remain Danish until 1814, when Sweden forced Denmark to cede the country after Sweden had lost Finland to Russia. Romantic and nationalistic feelings led to a more independent relationship between the two countries until Norway in 1905 was rightfully granted its independence. Of course, the inhabitants kept using different Norwegian dialects in their daily conversation, but the Danish influence was striking. It can almost be said that written Norwegian did not exist until the mid 1850’s. The written language was Danish, and Norwegian was just a number of spoken dialects. In an attempt to recreate the Old Norse of Norway, a new standard Norwegian, New Norwegian (Nynorsk), based on western dialects was developed. In this case, we see a language established in the early Middle Age turned into spoken dialects at the end of this era. Some 400 years later it comes back not as one but as two written languages. This particular situation has led to a liberal view on the use of dialects. As Geirr Wiggen points out ‘Local dialects enjoy a higher status and may be used more widely and freely in Norway than in most European societies’ (Wiggen 1995: 50). Although there are now two written Norwegian languages, there are also several dialects that are expanding and are accepted in an unusual way in Europe and not only as spoken but also as written as a language with a series of varieties. As a consequence there is no codified spoken standard language (Wiggen 1995: 49) and the two written standard languages are open to many dialectal both morphological and lexical variations.

A third example is Belarusian, which was not recognized officially until 1905 when the first newspapers and books were published in this language. In the 1920’s, a belorusification took place in the Belarusian SSR. The new administration was ‘Socialist in form, but nationalist in content’. Once Stalin had secured his power a Russification started, and Belorus became ‘Nationalist in form, but socialist in content’, and Belarusian lost its position in all official situations and in education, although not entirely. It was still recognized as a language, but existed as such only in restricted areas, and most people spoke a mixed Russian-Belarusian ‘semilanguage’, Trashanka (= mixed cattle-food). It rose to official recognition again after the independence of Belorus (Gustavsson 1995: 52-56). Nevertheless Belarusian is again loosing official ground now that the authoritarian populist president Lukashenka does everything to turn the country back to “good, old Soviet period” annexing it to a fairly disinterested Russia (Gustavsson 1995: 72-74). In this case, the language has been
considered a language ever since it was promoted from being seen as a Russian dialect to a language. Nevertheless, the status has been threatened considerably first during the Soviet time and now once more. During the Stalinist Russification and after the losses in World War II the language seemed to be fairly close to a slow return to a dialectal status. Since Belarusian and Russian are fairly close to each other, this would not be so surprising, and the existence of Trashanka shows how easily the two languages mix.

An interesting topic is also the question when a language ceases to be used (presumably as anybody’s mother tongue), and also to try to establish when it becomes so separated from other varieties that the speakers of these varieties do not easily understand the speakers of the first one any more. We can see this process of transformation that took place when spoken popular Latin slowly became so different from written Latin that this was not understood any more without previous studies. At the same time the different spoken varieties of Latin split up into different vernaculars that have to be considered languages at least at the end of the 8th century when we have the first examples of written French. The written testimonies of the existence of the other Romance varieties came later on. Of course, the spoken language must have reached a fairly high degree of difference from Latin before anybody would feel the need to write explanations of Latin words or other messages in French, Spanish and Italian among other Romance languages (Price).

Normally the process of change in the spoken variety of a language is usually slow, and in order to create a need (or a feeling of such a need) for a new written norm or variety and start using this new norm it is necessary that there exists a high degree of difference from the original language that is also strongly felt among the speakers. However, this process seems faster in the case of Creole and Pidgin languages (Bakker forthcoming). It is always difficult to say when a linguistic variety really becomes an established language. Furthermore, this must take place before the first written evidence can be given. We can only say that there are written evidences from a certain time and that from that date onwards we have a new language. The humanized metaphor would make us conclude that ‘giving birth’ to a new language is a complicated and extremely slow process of maternity. The same metaphor is used when a language ‘dies’, i.e. when it simply ceases to be used, at least in everyday life situations.

We sometimes know the exact moment when a certain language disappears from usage, like when Burbur, the last speaker of Dalmatian (a Romance language spoken on the Croatian coast), drowned in the early morning of the 10th of June 1898 (Lombard 1990: 109). Actually, you could say that a language ceases to be used when the last but one speaker dies. After that time there is no spontaneous communication between two people taking place in that language any more.

Before leaving the discussion about a language’s fall into disuse we must be aware of the fact that some languages keep being used, especially in written communication, by non-natives. Latin is obviously the most striking example. Does a known language exist when there are no more native speakers, even if there are quite a few scholars and others who study the language and know it well? Classical Arabic resembles Latin but is a more complicated case. It is the religious language of Islam, and although it is fairly different from all the Arabic varieties used in spoken and written language nowadays, all these varieties are still considered one language and Classical Arabic is still recognized as the official language of many states, but this official language is, as a matter of fact, a modernized version of classical Arabic. The spoken varieties are not really mutually understandable (Kaye 1990: 666-667). There are
officially only two Arabic languages – Arabic and Maltese, the language spoken on Malta (Camilleri 1997). The mere fact that the Maltese are Catholic made them establish their linguistic variety as a separate language. They did not have any religious reasons for maintaining the idea of a unified Arabic language, which is the case for Arabic speaking Muslim countries. Maltese is furthermore written with the Latin alphabet (Camilleri 1997 and Kaye 1990: 664).

When we are dealing with a language connected with a certain culture, it is easier to say that the language has ceased to be, when the culture has disappeared or changed considerably. Still Latin might constitute a problem. It was used, and still is, as a literary, scientific and administrative language for more than 1,000 years after the fall of Rome and the establishment of its Romance continuations (‘daughter languages’). Has it really ceased to be?

A more curious case is the usage of so called constructed languages, or languages created on purpose by someone in order to facilitate international communication (Edwards 1994: 43-47). The best-known example is Esperanto, spoken by at least a million people, possibly more (see Forster 1982). This language like many others of the same kind (like Ido, Interlingua, Volapük etc.) is almost never the mother tongue of anybody, but it is used by many that are fluent in this language. Of course, it exists, even if there are only a couple of hundred children to enthusiastic Esperantists who really grow up with this as their mother tongue. This language, however, is used in everyday life situations, and this might be a better criterion than being the mother tongue of someone when we decide WHEN a language really is.

A similar case is the existence of pidgin languages that are also the result of a more spontaneous creation of some kind of a more or less rudimentary mixed language used for specific, mostly commercial, communication over the borders (Romaine 1994: 162-190). Some of these Pidgin languages transform into fully developed languages, so called Creole languages (Romaine 1994: 162-190). These are usually based on a simplified grammar of one language to which is added a mixture of vocabularies from the basic language and at least one more language. Several Creole languages have become mother tongues of quite a few people, especially on many Pacific islands and in West Africa. A few Creole languages have even been recognized as official languages of some countries. A strange case is the island-state Vanatu where Bislama, a Creole language, is the official language of the country but it is not used in schools where only English and French are used (Romaine 1994: 185-186).

It seems that the everyday usage is the best criterion for establishing whether a language exists at a certain time. Although there might exist a good documentation of a language (texts, recordings etc.) if it has ceased to be used, it does not really develop any more. We can therefore consider it in disuse and more or less accurately establish its time as a used (‘living’) language. Latin is still a tricky case, since the Vatican keeps updating its vocabulary. Still its usage as an everyday life language is very limited.

We have seen how a variety can become a language and then ‘go back’ to being considered a dialect, but can a language fallen into disuse return to being a used language as a means of communication in everyday life? The example of a ‘resurrected’ and not only revitalized language that is mostly given is Hebrew. It was out of everyday usage for more than 2,000 years and brought back into usage at the end of the 19th century. This is now the official language of Israel. It is once again used as the mother tongue used in all situations by most Jewish inhabitants of Israel (Hetzron 1990: 686). This means that a language can ‘resurrect’ to successful usage
after a long period of disuse. However, it must be noted that it never fell into oblivion being the religious language of most Jews. Of course, in order to be ‘recycled’ a language must be recorded somehow or at least memorized. There must exist a special ideological reason for giving up one’s own language and start using a language that has been out of use as a new family language, thereby creating a new generation of native speakers of this old language. In the Hebrew case, the reason was religious and/or political.

This discussion about when a language comes into usage and when it disappears as the normal means of communication leads us to study the process of establishing a vernacular as a language, separating it from other related varieties. We have already discussed the criteria for regarding a linguistic variety a language. Some of these are of political nature. Now the question is what makes these political issues rise. What is the role played by a language, and how does it come into the process of creating a nation?

Laponce points out that a language ‘should be on par with nation as a definer of ethnicity’ (Laponce 1987: 48). This statement is only partly true, since it seems more probable that a feeling of ethnic unity comes first, being a more concrete feeling of unity of siblings and neighbours and the culture related to them. To make someone feel this unity with certain persons close to her/him and alienation to others, linguistic differences constitute one of the most important criteria. The more abstract concept of a nation that you have to learn (at school or elsewhere) must necessarily come later in the process, on the next level so to speak.

Sami, Basques, Welshmen and Mayans can prove their difference from the majority culture. This linguistic separation is often strengthened by the idea of a different history of the ethnic group - the ethnic myth, which is based on ideological concerns and tradition and, often, to a varying degree on historical reality. This does not make it less important. On the contrary, it represents a people’s concept of its own history and its historically based relations to its neighbours.

The romantic resurrection of languages and cultures in the 19th century was often limited to nostalgic and folkloristic studies of medieval cultures and languages with no modern political intention whatsoever. Most members of these cultural societies dedicated to medieval times were actually hostile to any political consequences of their interest and discoveries. This was obviously the case in Scotland and in Provence where the Félibrige-movement led by the Nobel Prize winner Frédéric Mistral had a short glamorous period. It was not really until the turn of last century that a radical political movement changed the image and provoked the autonomous development in many regions.

The most intriguing part of the Yugoslav example still remains. The combination of Pan-Slavic ideas and Serb predominance created the so-called ‘Yugoslav idea’ and caused the creation of the Unified Serbo-Croatian language. From a strictly linguistic point of view, there are four main Serbo-Croatian varieties or dialects of which two have real literary traditions. Three of these four varieties are spoken within what is Croatia today. Subdialects of one of these four varieties have been taken as the base for the modern Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian standard languages (de Bray 1981). The linguistic differences between these languages are not negligible, and with the rise of new states these differences have been stressed and developed. The latest result of this development is the Bosnian language. Thus, we have three languages on a sublevel to a dialect that belongs to a linguistic cluster consisting of four related dialects.
The Albanian speaking population of Kosova speaks a northern Albanian dialect, but accepted the Albanian standard language that is based on southern Albanian or Tosc (Kostallari 1973). The Albanian speaking population chose to unite with Albania, at least linguistically, possibly in order to strengthen their position in the conflict with the Serbs. Both in Kosova and Moldova there are political movements that favour the idea of unification with Albania and Romania respectively. In Kosova this political ambition is getting stronger all the time due to Serbian inflexibility and a growing self-consciousness that has gained internal support.

The acceptance of the idea that the concepts of language and dialect are temporally reversible due to the complications and definitions of the existence and usage of a language must be considered necessary for a better comprehension of when a language really exists as a language and what this might imply.

**The self-awareness of an ethnic group**

This last part might seem fairly uncontroversial, but it is not. The reality is that the language gives us away. We may opt for another language as our own but it is not as simple as that. Who is a ‘true speaker’ of a variety? After many years away from your native village, are you still a native speaker of that variety? And what about the person who came from elsewhere but have lived there for some decades? It is always trickier then you want it to be, which has been a good excuse for many populist and nationalistic simplification which in itself can lead to many disgusting conclusions. Some kind of standardized version of your own linguistic variety gives you a very important psychological advantage. If your first language is Guaraní and you come from Paraguay it shows your emotional sympathies when you say that Guaraní is your language. If it is not recognized (which is the case if you are a Guaraní-speaker from Brazil) or people keep asking you twice what your language is called, in the long run, this makes you feel inferior, just because ‘they’ do not listen – and might not care. In most situations people will know what Swedish is, but by prejudice it is considered a small language. It is one of the 100 most spoken languages of this earth. It is not that small. There are around 7,000 languages spoken today (please remember the criteria for what is a language and what is not). Of these only 1,000 are spoken by more than a thousand people. This perspective gives a lot of strength to Catalan for instance with around 7 million speakers, not to mention Swedish with more than 9 million. How important are these figures? If you speak a variety and feel happy about it and it works well in you neighbourhood, does it really matter if there are 2 or 15 million speakers more? The question arises rather when it comes to the question what an international language is. I would suggest that today, albeit Chinese (in its Mandarin variety) is the most spoken language English and Spanish are the international languages. French used to be one and it still is to a certain extent, but then there is nothing. Even a language as important in the EU as German is not an international language. What are then the criteria to establish a language as an international language? It is as simple as this. An international language is a variety spoken and used by not native speakers in communication with people from other linguistic cultures. Although Chinese is spoken by many more as their first language it is not as widespread as these two languages. Speakers of internationally recognized languages tend to not bother about other varieties, which has complicated the situation in Spain for instance. Either you speak the internally recognized Spanish language or you stay in you Basque/Catalan/Galician village. In France the idea of the superiority of the
French language is politically totally monocultural. In Switzerland that is often taken as a contrary example we are actually dealing with parallel cultures as the German varieties that predominate just by being the majority language. There is nothing wrong in this, but it has to be stressed – always – that the majority must look after its minorities if things are going to be solved. The minority normally has to learn the language of the majority, but the majority rarely cares to learn the minority languages. Cf. the situation in northern Scandinavia. How many Swedish-, Norwegian- and Finnish-speaking people care to learn Sami?

In order to create an ethnic group which is the beginning of a nation the language is important as it is so easily distinguishable. Religion, ethnic history (or rather ethnic myth) are evidently also important but not as easily distinguishable as the language. Thus the idea of a separate language is always easily distinguishable and thus an easily used criterion to figure out who is in and who is out. However it is more than questionable if this criterion is really valid in a more complex world where many people travel and have a lot of sympathies for different countries even if they do not speak the language. Things are not as they used to be in more static world that never was as static as some populist nationalists want us to think.

The situation could be illustrated with Greimas’ analysis of a play:

(Cause) External → Stability → Autonomy (Goal)

or internal threat

↑

(Support) Cultural unity → State/nation ← nationalist or regionalist of the majority

foreign powers (Hinders/enemies)

We can see how certain factor/s/ (cause) start a process in order to obtain stability (first goal) with the hope of reaching a superior goal which is Autonomy, but on the way there some factors promote the struggle like cultural (and linguistic) unity, a common history etc. while others try to stop this development, and here we find The political centre with a unified nationalist concept as its ground. Other regionalist, ideological or religious groups might want to prevent the development of an autonomous region or a separation. The Kurds in Turkey is a good proof of this where the ruling power is backed up both by ideological and religious groups to prevent the Turkish state formed by its ‘father’ Atatürk from changing and perhaps falling apart.

Conclusions

The perspective of this article is very vast, but the intention is not to lead to a satisfactory set of conclusions but to make the readers question a lot of concepts that are often taken for granted without any real fundament. It is just a question of old prejudices that are unconsciously transmitted from one generation to another without really discussing its content and its relevance for modern society and modern political thought. Unfortunately these obscure interpretations of nationalism and adjacent notions have been and are still used by an ever more eloquent populist movement both in order to promote a linguistic minority and to exterminate it or at least stop it. They might take the pride of the own culture away from people. And here it is important to
stress that culture is what is created in the confrontation of different traditions. The preoccupying thing about this is not an increasing populism that rejects these new ideas and blendings that we find in certain smaller parties but how these obscure ideas now enter the main political discourse both to the left and to the right in the more general political discourse. What is then left for a more objective and positive point of view on these basic human needs that a native language constitutes? It is a scaring perspective!!

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Identity as a Cognitive Code: the Northern Irish Paradigm

Abstract

Although the notion of identity is one of the central concerns of the human and social sciences and has been studied from a wide variety of perspectives, the concept itself evades ready definition. Furthermore, although the problem of identity within Northern Ireland has generated a vast amount of literature, much of this is subjective, contradictory and confusing. The aim of this talk is to propose a way of looking objectively at the notion of identity and, if possible, to draw some general conclusions from the Northern Irish experience. The fundamental premise is that if identity carries meaning, then it must possess some sort of structure. Applying the principles and concepts of linguistic analysis, this paper suggests that identity is a cognitive code, similar in structure to other codes such as natural language. A model is proposed by which the notion of identity may then be identified, quantified and analysed. The suggestion is that if identity is indeed a semiotic code, we should be able to examine it from the point of view of structural analysis. While the paper focuses in particular on identity within the context of Northern Ireland, the hope is that the principles and methodological framework which are outlined may have more general applicability.

The aim of this conference is to examine aspects of identity in the contemporary European context. This is an important area of investigation, since concepts of the nation state are currently undergoing fundamental reassessment and, in a number of countries, minorities which were previously prepared to acquiesce in the larger whole are reasserting their identity. Furthermore, although multiculturalism and plurality have been promoted within the European Union, since the events of 9/11 there seems to have been a growing emphasis in many states on security rather than openness and on social integration rather than diversity. It is not unreasonable to assume that these developments will lead to conflicts of identity in the future. It is important, therefore, that we investigate the notion of identity and examine areas of conflict so that we may learn from them.

In this talk, I want to look at the mechanisms of identity within the Northern Irish context. This is without doubt a timely subject of investigation and one that is particularly appropriate to the topic of this conference. In Northern Ireland we seem to have a community which is deeply divided across fault lines related to notions of identity, a situation that has given rise to a protracted conflict. Nevertheless, the recent establishment of a power sharing government has given rise to hopes of a lasting peace, and it is likely that Northern Ireland will prove to be an important exemplary case study in conflict resolution.

Examining the notion of identity within any social context is, however, no simple task. Matters relating to identity have given rise to animated debates within a whole range of the human sciences. Psychologists have studied the complex
processes involved in the formation and development of the individual persona. Sociologists have examined ‘subjectivication’ and how humans come to relate to others. Social psychologists have looked at the construction of group and national identity; and philosophical and literary thought has teased out the notion of difference and the power relations that permeate the social realm.\(^3\) The concept of identity remains, nevertheless, imprecise and resistant to easy characterisation. To the uninitiated, the arguments may seem arcane. We have, furthermore, no agreed theoretical or methodological framework by which identity can be determined, classified and empirically examined.

Matters become even more complex when we attempt to examine the operations of identity in specific socio-political contexts or in particular conflict situations. The observer of the Northern Irish situation is confronted by a bewildering mass of complex information and a large number of often contradictory studies, many lacking in objectivity. Just how does one ensure some sort of detachment that will preserve the integrity of the data and not prejudice one’s conclusions? It is with these considerations in mind that I approached, not without trepidation, an area that is somewhat removed from my normal concerns (the linguistic analysis of the Celtic languages). And in the search for some sort of rigour and objectivity, I have had recourse to the fundamental concepts and methodological procedures of linguistic analysis.

We might begin by reiterating the widely held assumption that in Northern Ireland we are dealing with two diametrically opposed communities (Stewart 1977, Whyte 1990, Fitzgerald 1982, Girvan 1986, Nic Craith 2002). This manifests itself not only in distinctions such as British and Irish, Protestant and Catholic, Unionist and Nationalist, Loyalist and Republican but also within a whole range of contexts such as in education (controlled schools versus maintained schools) sport (Celtic versus Rangers; Gaelic games versus so-called ‘foreign games’), parades and rituals (St Patrick’s Day versus ‘The Twelfth’), music and dance (traditional Irish versus Scottish), art forms (Loyalist and Republican murals) and even in personal names (English versus Gaelic) and colour coding (orange versus green). It has, moreover, often been pointed out that communal divisions in Northern Ireland seem to be binary or bi-polar in nature.\(^4\) Furthermore, that each community defines itself negatively and in opposition to the other community (Nic Craith 2002: 70, Wilson and Stapleton 2006: 12). How are we to make sense of all this?

As indicated above, the approach I have adopted here draws upon the techniques and methodological practices of structural linguistics. The premise which I have adopted is that if identity carries meaning, then it must possess an underlying structure. If this is indeed the case, and we can identify that structure, we should be able to examine the concept of identity from the point of view of structural analysis. Remarkably, this does not seem to have been previously attempted, although aspects of human behaviour in a variety of societies have, of course, been illuminated by a structuralist approach. The hope is that we might be able to identify some explanatory principles and formulate some general propositions.

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\(^3\) For some idea of the range of approaches to the concept of identity, see, for instance, Du Gay et. al. (2000) and Du Gay (2007).

\(^4\) For instance although there are in Northern Ireland many types of school (secondary, grammar, comprehensive, fee paying etc.), and many forms of segregation (by sex, by ability, by capacity to pay), ‘these further forms of segregation take place within the overriding Protestant/Catholic dichotomy’. (Whyte 1995: 48).
Fundamental to the analysis of language are the concepts of syntagmatic combination and paradigmatic contrast. Linguistic elements may be either combined on the syntagmatic (or horizontal) level or be in opposition to each other on the paradigmatic (or vertical) axis. For instance, certain words combine syntagmatically to create a sentence (a higher unit in the system) while the paradigmatic selection of a different word from the same class will create a different sentence. In the approach being suggested here, the cultural components mentioned above (ethnicity, religion, language, politics, education, sport, rituals, music etc.) will be regarded as the equivalent of linguistic units. As linguistic units combine on the syntactic level to create larger units, I am suggesting that cultural components such as these combine syntagmatically to create a larger unit of meaning, the concept of identity. On the paradigmatic axis, each component subsumes an inventory of variable options. We may tabulate as follows:

**Syntagmatic Components of Identity:**

Religion / Ethnicity / Politics / Language / Education / Sport / Names / Music / etc.

**Paradigmatic Variants within these Components:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of Ireland</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Church of Ireland</td>
<td>UUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>DUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Presbyterian</td>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>Free Presbyterian</td>
<td>PUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>SDLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>Sinn Féin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Women’s Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>N.I. Labour Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Music</th>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>Personal Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Controlled Schools</td>
<td>Rugby</td>
<td>Samuel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintained Schools</td>
<td>Trad. Irish</td>
<td>William</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated</td>
<td>Soccer</td>
<td>Seán</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bluegrass</td>
<td>Hockey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of syntagmatic components is, of course, potentially large and I have only given a sample here. One might also wish to include class, gender orientation and to take into account choice of occupation, settlement area, newspaper, television channel, radio programme and options within a wide range of social activities and ethical more.

The suggestion is, then, that identity is a function of the selections made by the individual (or group) from an inventory of options within sets of cultural components. Identity may, therefore, be seen as a code similar in structure to other codes such as natural language. The selections made by individuals and groups within a range of cultural phenomena are equivalent to paradigmatic choices made by individuals when constructing larger units of meaning within languages.

An approach such as this will facilitate the development of a model of identity in order to make this vague concept more concrete and more amenable to analysis. Thus, if we assign the letters A, B, C, D, etc. to our syntagmatic constituents, we might assign referential indices to the various paradigmatic variants:

**Syntagmatic Components of Identity** : / A / B / C / D / …

**Paradigmatic Variants of Identity Components:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a₁, a₂, a₃, a₄, a₅, a₆, a₇, a₈, …</td>
<td>b₁, b₂, b₃, b₄, b₅, b₆, b₇, b₈, …</td>
<td>c₁, c₂, c₃, c₄, c₅, c₆, c₇, c₈, …</td>
<td>d₁, d₂, d₃, d₄, d₅, d₆, d₇, d₈, …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, for instance:

(A) Religion = {Church of Ireland (a₁), Presbyterian (a₂), Free Presbyterian (a₃), Methodist (a₄), Baptist (a₅), Catholic (a₆), Jewish (a₇), Sikh (a₈), …}

(B) Ethnicity = {British (b₁), Irish (b₂), Ulster (b₃), Northern Irish (b₄), Scottish (b₅), Anglo-Irish (b₆), Not Irish (b₇), Scottish and Irish (b₈), …}

(C) Politics = {UUP (c₁), DUP (c₂), PUP (c₃), SDLP (c₄), Sinn Féin (c₅), Women’s Coalition (c₆), Alliance (c₇), Labour Party (c₈), …}
We will then be in a position to create strings representing the choices made by individuals and by groups: as strings within languages create sentence types, each of these strings may be thought of as describing a particular identity profile.

Identity Profiles:

(1) \( a_6 + b_2 + c_4 + d_2 + e_4 + f_5 \) i.e. (Catholic, Irish, SDLP, Irish Language, Gaelscoil, Gaelic Football)

(2) \( a_3 + b_5 + c_2 + d_1 + e_1 + f_2 \) i.e. (Free Presbyterian, Scottish, DUP, English, Controlled School, Soccer)

(3) \( a_6 + b_2 + c_7 + d_1 + e_2 + f_7 \) i.e. (Catholic, British, Alliance, English, Maintained School, Golf)

(4) \( a_4 + b_1 + c_1 + d_1 + e_3 + f_1 \) i.e. (Methodist, British, UUP, English, Integrated School, Rugby)

The aim, quite simply, is to provide the abstract concept of identity with a tangible structure. Fieldworkers would be required to compile a database of identity types based on the above. It would then be possible to analyse the database and determine the distribution of constituents, calculate the combinatorial frequency of components, ascertain the frequency of identity types and the probability of occurrence of various combinations and variants.

It should be pointed out that the ordering of the above constituents does not follow any principle. However, not all components of identity will be of equal status: there may exist relationships of dependency between them. Certain constituents will presumably have more primacy, in other words may have a greater functional load. For instance, the individual’s concept of ethnicity may be contingent upon his or her religion (or vice versa). In Northern Ireland, the religion constituent would seem to be a primary determining component of identity. Thus, depending upon whether an individual is born into a Catholic or Protestant family, selections made within other components will tend to vary considerably (for the close correlation between religious persuasion and choice of political party, see Whyte 1995: 72ff.).

Furthermore, the idea of selection, a technical term, needs to be explicated. In many cases, paradigmatic selection will entail conscious decisions made by the individual. In other cases, selections will be determined by factors beyond the individual’s control. One cannot, it goes without saying, choose the...
religious persuasion or social class of the family one is born into. Nevertheless, individuals can, and regularly do, break with their background and make selections which are at odds with preconceived social notions. People born into staunchly Protestant and Unionist families may choose Irish identity and/or make selections based upon republican ideals. Catholics may choose to regard themselves as British, adopt British names for their family and/or select controlled (i.e. predominantly Protestant) schools. Protestants may convert to Catholicism and Catholics may shift allegiance to reformed Christian churches. Based upon selections made within an indefinitely large number of constituents, identity profiles, like the sentences of languages, are potentially infinite.

It should be stressed, however, that the code of identity as exemplified in Northern Ireland is no mere formal abstraction: people who live in this part of the world constantly decipher its signs (both consciously and unconsciously). We may give a rather stereotypical illustration. An individual Samuel plays in a flute band, likes to wear a blue football jersey and has a daughter Victoria whom he sends to Wellington Secondary. The operative components of the code in this example and the selections made, relate to (1) ritual and musical preferences (2) sporting allegiances (3) personal names and (4) choice of schooling. The message this conveys in Northern Ireland will, however, be universally interpreted in more or less the same manner. Samuel is a protestant and (by rules of implicature) it may be concluded that he votes Unionist and regards himself as British rather than Irish. Like language, the code must be learned by children and by outsiders: the uninitiated will simply not understand the signs. The code is also context sensitive: in another socio-political context, it will lose its signification (it will have little meaning in Sydney or California or in the South of England, very different socio-political matrices which presumably manifest their own distinct codes of identity).

An approach such as this will create the possibility of applying the principles and techniques of structural analysis to the Northern Ireland situation. For instance, the whole concept of ethnic allegiance in Northern Ireland is a highly complex issue and a recent examination of Protestant identities (Wilson and Stapleton 2006) has discerned at least eight different categories (1) not Irish (2) British (3) British but not English (4) Scottish (5) Scottish but not Irish (6) Scottish but not English (7) partly Irish and (8) Scottish and Irish. This provides a useful contribution to our inventory of variants within the ethnicity component. However, to my mind, one needs to go further. Firstly, this categorization deals with only one component of identity (the ethnicity component) without taking into account the rest of the code. Secondly, to gain a deeper understanding of what is going on, we need to analyse how these variants in ethnicity relate to each other (and to other possible variants). Confronted with a complex range of oppositions, our approach would ask the analyst to determine the significant variants, the *functional oppositions*. For instance, when we compare the above designations, it becomes apparent that the common denominator is that they are not simply ‘Irish’ (which many Catholics would regard themselves) or are in some sense ‘non-Irish’. Seen from a structural perspective, these categories are variants of a single term, and in phonological analysis, they would be called allophones of a particular phoneme. The significant or functional opposition within ethnicity is, quite simply, ‘Irish’ versus ‘non-Irish’. A similar phenomenon is evident in matters of religion. While there is a very broad range of

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5 For earlier surveys, see Rose (1968), Boyle et al. (1976), and Moxon-Browne (1983). For a summary, see Whyte (1990: 67ff.)
religious groupings within Northern Ireland, the system reduces them to two opposing terms: the functional opposition is Catholic versus Protestant. (While this configuration may seem obvious to those born and reared in Northern Ireland, it may not be automatically clear to others and, as we shall see, it has not always been the case in the past.) Though intrinsically very different from each other, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist are, within the Northern Irish code, allophones of the one phoneme or, we might say, variants of the one identeme. The fact that other denominations (even Jewish, Sikh, atheist, agnostic etc.) are forced into the underlying functional structure may be illustrated by means of the old anecdote overheard in a Belfast pub:

Tom: ‘Is your man over there a Catholic or a Protestant?’
Harry: ‘Him over there, oh he’s a Jew’.
Tom: ‘Yes, but is he a Catholic Jew or a Protestant Jew?’

People in general, irrespective of their true religious affiliation, are categorised within the fundamental opposition operative within the code. In contexts new to the analyst, a structural approach such as this should prove to be a useful means of determining significant features within different codes of identity.

An approach such as this will also let us determine aspects of markedness (an analytical principle or technique used within linguistics to identify the neutral and non-neutral members within pairs of oppositions). For instance, within the ethnic component of identity, in the opposition between Irish and non-Irish, the extra complexity of the latter would tend to suggest that it is the ‘marked variant’. 6 Unusually, although those within Northern Ireland who regard themselves as Irish are in a minority, Irish it would seem, is the neutral term. This is perhaps indicative of significant changes within the socio-political matrix: in the past, certainly in the larger UK context, Irish identity would have been considered very much a minority category. 7 Indeed, in the late 18th century, Irish identity seems to have been to some degree derivative and been constructed largely in juxtaposition to a dominant British identity (the GAA as a substitute for British sports; Irish dance as a replacement for English modern dances; Irish language and literary modes as an alternative to the dominant English models, etc.). It would be of great interest to determine the marked variants within the paradigmatic oppositions throughout our components of race, religion, politics, language, sport, colour etc. and I think it should be possible to do this.

The hypothesis that identity is a semiotic code with a structure which is amenable to analysis would seem to be borne out by other evidence. As we saw above, it has often been observed (usually as something of a puzzle) that the communities in Northern Ireland define themselves negatively and in relation to each other (Nic Craith 2002: 70). In particular, it has been suggested that Protestant expressions of identity are somehow singularly negative (Wilson and Stapleton 2006: 12). However, if identity is, in essence, a relational system, then this is precisely what we should expect: terms within any systematic code can only be defined in opposition to other terms, and all elements of the code will be essentially negative in nature. Building upon the insights of Derrida (1981), Laclau (1990) and Butler (1993), Hall (2000) correctly asserts that ‘it is only through the relation to the Other, … that the

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6 The more complicated pattern of Protestant identification in different situations is noted by Trew and Benson (1996).
7 For an insightful study of the construction of a British identity, see Colley (1992).
positive meaning of any term – and thus its identity – can be constructed’. The Northern Ireland concept of Britishness/unionism may indeed be ‘predicated primarily on what it is not … rather than what it is’ (Wilson and Stapleton 2006: 12) but a structuralist analysis would suggest that this will also be true of Northern Ireland Irishness/nationalism. The proposition that identities are ‘inherently unstable, divided and haunted by the liminal presence of those ‘Others’ from whom they seek to distinguish themselves’ (Redman 2000: 10) is indeed particularly apposite within the Northern Ireland context. However, it is not something peculiar to Northern Ireland. It is, one suspects, a function of the fact that identity itself presents as an essentially structured organism.

We also noted that the divisions in Northern Ireland are often seen as binary or bi-polar (Whyte 1990: 114) and we have demonstrated that many of the variants outlined above may be reduced to essentially dual oppositions. The varied and complex types of school, as we have seen, can be reduced to a Catholic/Protestant dichotomy. The Northern Ireland political system can be broken down into a dual opposition between Unionist and Nationalist. Each of these opposing blocs is, in turn, resolved into a further binary opposition: on the Unionist side between the UUP and the DUP and on the Nationalist side between the SDLP and Sinn Féin. Again, seen from the perspective of relational structures, this is not something unexpected, since binary oppositions are an essential feature of human and natural systems. Within phonemic structure, selections made on the paradigmatic axis are binary in nature. The binary principal is, furthermore, to be seen in the division of cells, the pairing of chromosomes – right down to the pairs of molecular strings in that ultimate code, the DNA double helix. Binary oppositions, rather than being somehow exclusive to Northern Ireland, are a cardinal feature of coding systems.

In the light of these facts, we would seem to be dealing with something fundamentally systematic in nature. In relational systems, the defining factor is the interrelationship and interdependency of opposing elements. If identity is, indeed, a structure similar to other semiotic systems, this has implications for our understanding of the nature of Northern Ireland society: Northern Irish Catholicism will, in some fundamental sense, be determined by Northern Irish Protestantism. Conversely, the particular brand of Protestantism found in Northern Ireland will be determined by Northern Irish Catholicism. Again, this seems to fit rather well with the facts. The peculiar symbiosis between these two communities is particularly apparent in the shifts which have taken place in the correlations between religious persuasion and ethnic identity. As Walker (1996: 110ff.) has demonstrated, in the late 18th century, with Catholics having virtually no political power, ‘the Irish nation’ referred solely to protestants (more specifically Anglicans) and the descendants of English settlers had come to see themselves as Irish and objected to being called English. However, in the early 19th century, the emergence of a powerful movement for Catholic emancipation led to claims that Catholics were the ‘real Irish’ and in the late 19th and early 20th centuries this was further promoted by the ‘Irish Ireland’ movement. This growing tendency to identify Irish ethnicity with Catholicism was mirrored by a gradual move away from Irish identity among many Protestants and the emergence in the north of a new Ulster identity. Conversely, the development of an Ulster identity among Northern Ireland Protestants somewhat to the exclusion of Catholics has contributed in no small measure to the Ulster Catholic’s heightened sense of Irish identity.8 The

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8 Changes of ethnic identification are apparent in surveys between 1968 and 1992. See also Trew and Benson (1996) and Whyte (1995).
attitude towards ethnicity exhibited by these groupings demonstrates a striking degree of interrelationship and a co-dependence which is typical of relational structures.

It follows that the most informative investigations of identity markers will be those that examine correlations of equivalence and contrast. To give just one small example, although extremely useful historical and anthropological studies have been made of identity markers such as Protestant parades (Bryan 2000) and Catholic parades (Jarman and Bryan 1998), the cardinal consideration should, perhaps, be how these rituals relate to each other. When we determine their invariant properties and their distinctive features we will uncover their internal logic.

We have been looking at the Northern Irish identity system as it currently manifests itself (i.e. synchronically) but a force which must be factored into our model is that of time. A diachronic analysis of the Irish context demonstrates that codes of identity, far from being fixed, are liable to change radically. It can be demonstrated that through time not only have the components of identity changed but the functional oppositions within these units have also altered significantly. Although religion is often seen as some sort of absolute within the Irish context, early oppositions relate not to religion but rather to ethnicity (for instance Norman-English versus Irish). The dominant component (in structural terms, the component with the highest functional load) was, at this juncture, race or ethnic background. However, subsequent to the reformation, when religion becomes a factor and new groups are introduced into the equation, the paradigm changes radically and earlier adversaries combine in resistance to new arrivals. Thus, in the 17th century the Old English and the Irish become allies under the common banner of Catholicism in opposition to the newly arrived English Protestants (we note once again the tendency for a complex social situation to resolve into an essentially binary dialectic).

At other periods, further realignments occur not within the ethnicity component but within the religious component: in the 18th century the so-called Protestant Ascendancy was really an Anglican hegemony (Hanna 2000: 27) with Catholics and dissenters alike suffering under the Penal Laws. As a consequence, the relationship between Catholics and Presbyterians became ‘in some ways closer than between the Protestant sects’ (Darby 1983: 16 quoted in Nic Craith 2002: 58). A structural analysis would conclude that in the identity system of the late 18th century, the functional opposition was not Catholic versus Protestant but rather Anglican (Church of Ireland) versus non-Anglican.

The conclusion is that the units of identity (race, religion, language etc.) are ultimately arbitrary. Again, observation from other socio-political contexts bears this out: there are many instances of conflicting identities where race is not an issue (e.g. Shia versus Sunni in Iraq), others where religion is not an issue (e.g. Basque versus Castillian in the Iberian peninsula) and yet others where language is not an issue (e.g. Black versus White in the USA). If these signifiers are arbitrary, then that which is signified must also be arbitrary. In other words, identity itself is an arbitrary construct. It need hardly be pointed out that the idea of race has no basis in the human genetic code. Race, like other identity markers, is a social notion rather than a scientific category. The creation of human identity would seem to be predicated upon the tendency exhibited by individuals to form themselves into groups and seek to advance their position by distinguishing their group from others, by various means of demarcation (cmp. social identity theory, Tajfel 1982).  

The main identity markers

9 For the application of social identity theory to psychological research on conflict in Northern Ireland, see Cairns (1982) and Trew and Benson (1996).
will vary depending upon context. Ultimately, the formation of territorial boundaries and socio-political entities would seem to be a function of this primary human urge.10

Nevertheless, as we have seen, the components of identity will not necessarily be of equal status. We would therefore want to introduce into our model the concept of hierarchy (as between word classes). Some components will be more fundamental than others: gender, race, religion, language and class are presumably more basic to many codes than sport, art and music. Roman Jakobson (1990) has shown the importance of stratification in how the child learns systems of language and it is quite possible that we have similar stratifications in the development of the individual identity. It is interesting that in aphasia, those systems and elements which have been learnt last are the first to be lost and the more fundamental are retained. It is quite possible that the same is true of codes of identity.

We are maintaining, then, that identity may be defined as a cognitive system consisting of constituent elements in combination on the syntagmatic level and an inventory of oppositions on the paradigmatic level. While I am not proposing that the manifold complexity of human behaviour can be reduced to a simple determinism, I am suggesting that there is a fundamental logic to human behaviour and that we should, consequently, be able to identify behavioural patterns. We must attempt to discover the constant amidst the ‘noise’ of variation. It is then that we will be able to develop rules of implication and formulate some general postulates.

The above emphasis on oppositions and dualities leads us to the much-asked question: are we really dealing with two communities in Northern Ireland? As in other areas, commentators are completely at odds on this issue and range over a broad continuum from those who see community divisions as being almost total (Burton 1978, Jenkins 1983, Nelson 1984) to those who regard differences within the so-called two traditions as being almost negligible (Glassie 1982, Buckley 1982, 1988, Akenson 1988). The attitude of analysts would seem, furthermore, to be to some degree determined by their respective disciplines. As Darby (1986) has pointed out, political scientists and historians seem to emphasize division and difference. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to stress the homogeneity of Northern Ireland life:

There are no distinctively Protestant or Catholic dialects, nor agricultural practices, nor house types, nor pottery techniques, nor styles for cooking. Family life is much the same on both sides, as indeed is the broader social morality. (Buckley 1988: 54, quoted in Whyte 1998:15)

I would suggest that one reason for this disparity depends upon whether or not commentators concentrate on areas of identity high up the ‘componential hierarchy’ or take into account a broad range of constituents. If, in studies of Northern Irish society, we concentrate solely on religion, ethnicity and politics, we will be led inexorably to the conclusion that we are indeed dealing with a diametrically divided community. However, we have suggested that identity, like culture, is composed of an indefinitely large number of social and ethical components, including choices within a whole variety of human activities, only some of which we have tabulated above.11 It

10 For the ‘symbolic construction of similarity’ and the social organisation of difference, cmp. Jenkins (1996).
11 ‘Self-concept or “Self” refers to all the characteristics a person believes they possess, the meaning of these characteristics, and the way they are organised (Trew and Benson 1996: 125).
would seem that anthropologists tend to investigate those areas which come further down the hierarchy while political scientists and historians concentrate on the higher order entities. The conclusion is surely that the further one looks beyond these high order entities, the less striking are the differences between the so-called two traditions.

Moreover, even within those units of identity where there would seem to be an obvious dichotomy, deeper scrutiny may well indicate fundamental unity. We may take sport as an example. Many members of the Irish/Catholic/Nationalist community support Glasgow Celtic. Conversely, many of the British/Protestant/Unionist community support Glasgow Rangers. The common denominator is, of course, the abiding interest of both ‘traditions’ in football. On FA Cup Final day, if you go into any bar in Catholic West Belfast or any club in Protestant East Belfast, tennis or golf or cricket or ice-hockey will certainly not be the focus of interest: the clientele will, in Belfast parlance, all be ‘glued’ to the FA Cup Final. A superficial division may, therefore, conceal a more fundamental unity. The identity profiles of Northern Irish individuals and groups as outlined above will indeed be different. However, they are founded upon common principles and are constituted in accordance with a common underlying code – in many ways they are isomorphic.

The above may have some implications for our understanding of the nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland (and perhaps of conflict in general). Observers are prone to ask what the conflict is really about. Is it about race or religion or politics (or something else)? I have argued that race, religion and politics are ultimately arbitrary elements which combine to create a code of individual and group identity. One might conclude that the conflict is ultimately about something extraneous to the code of identity. Presumably, it is about power (and the corollaries of power: position, possessions and profits).

We may be able to draw some further conclusions and indeed formulate some general principles. As we have seen, individuals will seek to organize themselves into groups and groups will define themselves in opposition to others by means of what we have referred to as a code of identity. While, depending on the context, this code will consist of a range of ‘components’, these are ultimately arbitrary. Some elements will, however, be more fundamental and it should be possible to determine a hierarchy and distinguish the primary determining aspects of identity within any given social context. Each identity component will consist of a number of options and identity may be characterized as a function of the ‘selections’ made by the individual from these options. Identity may, therefore, be seen as something essentially structured. In the nature of structured codes, these options will tend to resolve into oppositions of a binary nature. Once again, however, such oppositions are arbitrary and are liable to change through time. Somewhat ironically, especially in close-knit social contexts, the relationship between opposing groups will be symbiotic: they are to some degree determined by each other.

Group antagonism may, of course, lead to open conflict as has happened in Northern Ireland and it is likely that this will result in increased polarization. In conflict situations, people retreat into polarized group identity: there is a shift towards the extremes. The best prospects for the resolution of conflicts of identity (the evidence from Northern Ireland would suggest) will entail the extremes being brought together in a process of dialogue and negotiation, rather than simply those in the centre ground. This process should involve the politicization of those engaged in

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12 Note, further, that although schooling is segregated on denominational lines, ‘the two systems are more similar to each other than either is to the systems in, say, England or the Irish Republic’ (Darby and Dunn 1987: 95, quoted in Whyte 1990: 46)
violence and there should be as few preconditions to negotiation as possible. The situation in Northern Ireland demonstrates the importance of having independent brokers with the capacity to offer inducements to dialogue and to apply sanctions if negotiations fail (the brokers in this case being the British, Irish and American governments). It is important in this process that either side is able to retain their own sense of identity and each side must feel that they are furthering their ends by negotiation and within the political process. Furthermore, in conflicts of identity, the concept of majority rule may need to be reconsidered. The prospect of lasting peace in Northern Ireland has been realized by the bringing together of diametrically opposed groups in a power sharing arrangement.

The Northern Ireland conflict, which is often characterized as being in essence a clash of identities, may be progressing to some form of resolution. As such, it should be possible for the international community to apply the lessons learned to other conflict situations. However, we will only be able to do so effectively if we develop objective methods of assessing the complicated mechanisms involved. It is hoped that the above approach might help to make the complex notion of human identity a little less vague and a little more amenable to empirical investigation.

References

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For an excellent and succinct synopsis of lessons to be learned from the Northern Ireland negotiations by two American diplomats who were directly involved, see Haas and Mitchell (2007).
Gower, Aldershot, 105 – 34.
LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY IN MODERN SPAIN: SQUARE PEGS IN ROUND HOLES?

MIQUEL STRUBELL

Abstract: In this paper, after an initial discussion about what identity means and how to measure it, a review will be made of studies in Spain in which identity issues arise. The conclusion will be reached that identities in Spain, in regard to people’s relationship with Spain itself, with the Basque country, with Galicia and with Catalonia, are by no means shared, and the level of both stereotyping and prejudice, on the one hand, and of collective insecurity (even “self-hatred”) on the other, are, it is claimed, higher than in the consolidated nation-states of western Europe, with the partial exceptions of the United Kingdom and Belgium.

1. Introduction

Non-Spanish researchers and mere observers of the Spanish political scene may be surprised to see the level of acrimony in some aspects of relations between Spaniards and Catalans. Some of these controversial areas involve issues that affect people’s everyday lives in Catalonia: the abundance of toll motorways there, compared to the much greater mileage of dual carriageway freeways in nearly all of the rest of Spain (Torrent 2007a 2007b); the fiscal drain of Catalonia, amounting to a very high percentage of gross domestic product (Pons & Tremosa 2004); the 111 bilateral treaties Spain signed with other countries between 1991 and 2003, forcing their national airlines to use Madrid airport exclusively, and thus forcing Barcelona airport into a marginal position (Portabella 2007); the collapse of essential public services in Catalonia, such as the centralised metropolitan railway service (Calderer 2006), etc. In this paper we shall look not at such topics, for the author is no specialist in the issues at stake, but rather at various examples of a completely different level, related to issues of identity and symbols. The reader will soon realise, it is hoped, that such issues can give rise to heated debates, and incidents can easily end up in the courts. To illustrate the symbolic level we shall look at animals, flags, sports, and Eurovision song contest; and the results of several research projects on stereotypes, identity and self-identification will, it is hoped, help to provide context for an understanding of the underlying processes.

2. Symbols

2.1. Animals

Observant visitors to Spain, and particularly to Catalonia, may be surprised to see cars driving around with stickers on them depicting either a donkey or a bull. The bull has become, over a period of perhaps 30 to 40 years, a symbol of Spanishness. It originated in an advertising campaign by a Jerez-based brandy maker, Osborne, to market its leading product, Veterano. An advertising agency, Azor, designed the bull in 1956 and in the following years wooden bulls were assembled all over Spain,

14 Torrent points out that Catalonia has six times less mileage of toll-free motorways than do the two regions of Castile, while it has four times more mileage of toll motorways than do Madrid o Andalusia.
15 http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toro_de_Osborne
gradually growing from 4 metres to 7 metres and eventually to almost 14 metres in height. In 1988 the Highways Act forced Osborne to remove the lettering from the bulls, and the Spanish government gave them a 1,000,001 peseta fine on February 4th 1994 for failing to comply with article 24.1 of the 1988 Highways Act as regards a 11.50 x 5.40 metres bull placed 365 metres from the Gijón-Avilés motorway, in the northern region of Asturias. In the same year (15th November 1994) the Infraestructures and Environmental Committee of the Spanish Congress of Deputies (the lower parliamentary chamber) gave its unanimous support to a Motion calling on the government and other public authorities to take measures to ensure the survival of the Osborne bull on Spanish roads, in the context of the legislation on the protection of Spain’s cultural and artistic heritage.

Osborne took the case to the Supreme Court, who on December 30th 1997 turned down the government’s objection and fine on account of what it calls the bull’s “æsthetic or cultural interest”, even though it had to acknowledge that the image falls within the European concept of hidden or subliminal advertising, that is, a verbal or visual exhibition of the brand of a manufacturer of goods or provider of services, with a publicity aim (Directive 97/36/CE). Its reasoning hardly sounds encouthed in legal terms:

In objetive terms, it is evident that the figure no longer conveys a direct message to the observer. There is no text or graphic to indicate the identity of a product or service, for the explicit reference which had previously been made to a particular brand of brandy has been removed. At this moment, for the general citizenry that contemplates it, even if they were aware of its original meaning, it has ceased to be the emblem of a brand, to become something decorative, integrated in the landscape. Even though it may remind some people, indirectly, of the symbol of a commercial firm, the initial visual impact it makes on most people is that of an attractive silhouette, superimposed on the surroundings, which rather than que induce consumption, is a pleasure to the eye, reminds one of the "fiesta", and highlights the beauty of the strong animal. (author’s translation).

Following this the bull (of which there are still over 90 in Spain, according to Quílez, 2007) has come to be correlated with a rather aggressive, masculine, primitivist Spanish identity, and can be found on cars, shirts, posters, etc. Years earlier, in Catalonia, the wooden bulls had been broken by Catalan nationalists, and it was believed that the last one, strategically placed just by the Bruc tunnel, about 40 km from Barcelona on the main dual carriageway to Madrid, had disappeared once and for all after being destroyed in October 2002 and then broken in half at the end of June 2003. Each time this bull had been reconstructed or replaced (by the brandy firm Osborne).

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16 Ley 25/1988, de 29 de julio, de Carreteras.
17 Ref.: Id Cendoj: 28079130031997100322. http://www.poderjudicial.es/jurisprudencia/pdf/28079130031997100322.pdf?formato=pdf&K2DocKey=E%5BSentencias%2020030912%280791%2031997100322.xml@sent_supremo&query=%28Osborne%29%3CAND%3E%28%3CYESNO%3E%28fecha_resolucion+%3E%3D+19971201%29%29%3CAND%3E%28%3CYESNO%3E%28fecha_resolucion+%3C%3D+19971231%29%3CYESNO%3E%28fecha_resolucion+%3C%3D+19971231%29%29%28%3CYESNO%3E%28fecha_resolucion+%3C%3D+19971231%29%29
The last bull in Majorca was reported to have been pulled down by vandals in July 2004, after a number of previous attacks which had been repaired (Cantallops & Nicolau 2004). There was apparently one remaining one in Catalonia, near the town of l’Aldea, which had been hidden for several decades behind a line of fir trees that had probably been deliberately planted in front of it in order to hide it. At the end of July 2005 it was reported that the trees had been chopped down and the newly-discovered bull decapitated and defaced. Since then Osborne rebuilt the Bruc bull in July 2007, but within a few days it was pulled down yet again.

What is it about a symbol such as this that can bring anyone (in Catalonia) to wish to destroy it? And how did the Catalan population react to the increasing presence of the bull as a symbol of Spain? The answer to the first question would be too complex, probably, to fully explain at this juncture, and might indeed require further research. But the second one has a much more straightforward response which I have already mentioned: the Catalan donkey.

This peaceful animal can be found on hundreds of thousands of cars in Catalonia, as a light-hearted and satirical reaction to the Spanish bull. It was originally designed by Eloi Alegre as the logo for an Association Afrac (an association for the recovery of the Catalan race of donkeys). In 2004, Jaume Sala and Àlex Ferreiro altered it slightly and started selling it commercially. I doubt they dreamed how successful it was to become. Some people, particularly outside Catalonia, have reacted as if it was a serious campaign (Murillo 2004), rather missing the point in the process.

The Catalans are not the only people in Spain to have deliberately organized a counter-offensive as a reaction to the omnipresent Spanish bull. The Galicians, whose dairy farms are famous, brought out their Galician cow. On March 6 2002 a Galician football club, Deportivo de Coruña, defeated Real Madrid, in Madrid, and won the Football cup that year (which was their centenary year, moreover). A designer, Antón Lezcano, sold over 200 Galician flags with a cow painted over it, as a reaction to the "ultras", or rightwing Spanish nationalists (to be more accurate, extremist supporters of Real Madrid). Even the Basques joined in, equally light-heartedly, inventing a sheep, Ardílatxa representing their authochtonous strain.

2.2 Flags

But there are other symbols associated with identity in Spain. One typical one is the issue of flags. What do young Spaniards think about the Spanish flag, as compared to...
their “regional” one? This question was put to young respondents in a fairly recent study (Moral & Mateos 1999).

Graph 1: Flag with which young Spanish respondents identify most (Moral & Mateos 1999).

The differences between regions are striking. Whereas 56% of youngsters in Madrid and 54% in the surrounding region to the immediate north (Castilla y León) said they identified most with the Spanish flag, only 6% of Basques, 13% of Galicians and 19% of Catalans said the same. In all three of these regions (and especially in the Basque country) the regional flag was clearly more popular.

In case anyone thinks that no-one really attaches much importance to flags anymore, it is worth pointing out that the largest flag in the world was hoisted in a central Madrid square not five years ago. It has been said that no washing machine is large enough to be able to clean it.

This institutional event is in no way comparable to the long-standing sport of burning flags, a sport that across the world has tended to focus on the stars and stripes. The Spanish state gives a special place to its flag. A person can be sent to prison for insulting it... or burning it. Perhaps begrudgingly, this sentence can also be applied if a "regional" flag receives similar attention. Regional politicians are also forewarned, in case they fail to fly the Spanish flag alongside the regional flag on public buildings they are repsonisble for (regional ministries, city and town halls, etc.). I might add that hundreds of Catalan local councils fail to obey this aspect of the law. Indeed, in Catalonia an organisation, Un País, Una Bandera, actively promotes the flying of

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24 [http://www.mde.es/notasp/fotos/bandera_izado_colon_061204_m.jpg](http://www.mde.es/notasp/fotos/bandera_izado_colon_061204_m.jpg)
25 [http://www.estil.net/pais/](http://www.estil.net/pais/)
just one flag on town hall buildings: and it seems to have been very successful. However, it is also illegal to add to the Spanish flag the symbols or initials of political parties, trades unions, associations or private organisations. Moreover, the Penal Code lays down severe penalties for insulting the Spanish flag (and those of Autonomous Communities).

So much for flags. Or not. To link up to the next section, it is worth pointing out the outcry caused in some of the Spanish press when a Catalan motorcyclist won a Grand Prix on his home race course, and rode round the course bearing a Catalan flag. I have been unable to find even a single photograph of this on the internet, because I am fairly certain the (Spanish) sponsor did its best to minimise press coverage of this fact, as well as threatening to withdraw its sponsorship should such an “incident” be repeated. So here you have the Spanish flag!

And here is a final example in this section. In 1985 a Catalan team reached the summit of Mount Everest and planted the Catalan flag there, but no Spanish flag. A Spanish nationalist web site, “Libertad digital” (arguably a misnomer) remembered the event 20 years later (Vázquez-Rial 1999), complaining about the absence on that occasion of the Spanish flag, claims to quote Pasqual Maragall, who at the time was Mayor of Barcelona and was later to become President of Catalonia, as having said (in the serious Barcelona daily La Vanguardia): “There was no space, physical or moral, for the Spanish flag at the top of Everest. Spain should understand that we cannot easily bear in our hearts the flag that replaced ours by force.” Strong words, strong sentiment. And someone filed them away for fully twenty years before reproducing them in an article. Are flags “just” a symbol?

2.3. Sport

As can be seen, sport is another powerful means of expressing, and indeed feeling, one’s own identity. This issue, like others of course, is not limited to Spain. Thus, after studying the use of sport by governments to help manage identity Houlihan (1997), concludes that while sport possesses a powerful symbolism that can be exploited on occasion to great effect, the malleability of sports symbolism often undermines its capacity to exert a lasting effect on national identity. Nevertheless, what he has to say about cases in which sportsmen finding themselves being able – or  

26 Artículo 8
Se prohíbe la utilización en la bandera de España de cualesquiera símbolos o siglas de partidos políticos, sindicatos, asociaciones o entidades privadas. Ley 39/1981, de 28 de octubre, por la que se regula el uso de la bandera de España y el de otras banderas y enseñas (BOE núm. 271, de 12 de noviembre). http://www.la-moncloa.es/Espana/ElEstado/Simbolos/Legislacion/BanderaLey39-81.htm

27 Artículo 4
En las Comunidades Autónomas, cuyos Estatutos reconozcan una bandera propia, ésta se utilizará juntamente con la bandera de España en todos los edificios públicos civiles del ámbito territorial de aquélla, en los términos de lo dispuesto en el artículo sexto de la presente ley.

Article 10
1. Los ultrajes y ofensas a la bandera de España y a las contempladas en el artículo 4 del presente texto, se castigarán conforme a lo dispuesto en las leyes. ...
2. Los ultrajes y ofensas a las banderas a que se refiere el artículo tercero de esta Ley, se considerarán siempre como cometidas con publicidad a los efectos de lo dispuesto en el citado artículo 123 del Código Penal.
forced – to play for different national sides, is both interesting and relevant to my paper.

The overlap between British and English identity is clearly evident in sport. While there is only an English soccer team at international level, track and field athletes will compete for England in the commonwealth Games, but for Britain in the Olympics.... In soccer the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland have separate teams, but in hockey and rugby union the teams are drawn from all thirty-two counties (Houlihan 1997: 121)

Spain has almost always sought to prevent the Catalans, in particular, from having their own national teams. Take Rugby Union, for instance. The Catalan Rugby Federation was founded in 1922, just a few years after the sport was exported by northern Catalan clubs (that is, in France) into Spanish Catalonia. In 1934 the International Federation of Amateur Rugby was set up in Paris, the members being France, Italy, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania and … Catalonia. The Spanish Federation protested vehemently and managed to join the International Federation thanks to the auspices of the Catalan Federation; but ill will was so great that the Spanish Federation expelled clubs in the Catalan federation from the Spanish league. It took a Fascist dictator to “put things in their rightful place”, from a Spanish nationalist point of view; and sad to say 30 years of democracy have not been enough to restore things to the way they were before the war.

Another sport which is extremely popular in Catalonia is roller skate hockey. Thanks to the good offices of the (Catalan) president of the International Federation, Catalonia had been provisionally admitted to the Federation of Roller Sports in 2004 – and won the world “B” championship in Macau. But in the days leading up to the plenary in Fresno (USA) the Spanish government brought its diplomatic weaponry out to ensure that the ratification of Catalonia’s membership would be rejected, despite the fact that the International Federation is (like all the others) a totally private (and in formal terms, non-political) organisation. Some of its manoeuvres came to light. The representative of the Chilean federation accused the Spanish federation of pressuring the south American countries against the admission of Catalonia: members of the Spanish federation had travelled to South American just two weeks before the FIRS Congress and once there they promised many countries help in exchange for voting against Catalonia. He also claimed that it sent loads of faxes and emails telling them how to vote, under the threat of losing some of the economic help that they provided. The Czech Republic representative also admitted that his federation received pressure from the Spanish government. The German representative admitted that she had been contacted by the German politicians responsible for sport, who asked her to make sure she was coming back from Fresno with a "no" against Catalonia. Moreover, a letter from the Spanish Council for Sports (CSD) to the Colombian federation (and other South American federations) in which they asked for a vote against Catalonia’s admission was also made public. In it the CSD claimed that the recognition of Catalonia would alter the national unity of Spanish sport (!) and would create a bad precedent.28 In the event the Assembly vote against Catalonia was a farcical manipulation, and was later annulled by the disciplinary organisation of

international sport. How the story ended is of no special relevance. What I am interested in pointing out here is that, indeed, States such as that of Spain may be willing do their utmost, at whatever expense, in order to maintain the status quo, and to prevent nationalities from being able to benefit, especially in identity terms, from having their own national teams.

A more successful Catalan sport is Futsal, indoor football. Catalonia was admitted to the International Federation quite recently. Significantly, no Spanish Federation was there to bring its weight to bear against Catalonia’s candidacy. Secondly, the sport is almost totally European, so there was no South American lobby to be mobilised. In view of all we had seen, then, it is perhaps not surprising to know that there is a private organisation whose main objective is to achieve international recognition for Catalan national sports teams, in the respective federations, the so-called Plataforma Pro Seleccions Esportives Catalanes.  

Though you may not have been aware of it at the time, the Barcelona Olympics were also the scene for frantic backstage negotiations in the months leading up to the celebration in the summer of 1992. Was Catalan going to figure in a leading position visually, during the ceremonies, alongside the “official” Olympic languages, English and French, and the Spanish language whose presence was taken for granted from the start. Hargreaves and Garcia-Ferrando (1997) concluded their study by claiming that the Olympic games “not only polarised relations between Catalonia and Spain, they also served to accommodate antagonism between them and thus to maintain a delicate, fragile balance of power in the new “España de las autonomías”. (Hargreaves and Garcia-Ferrando 1997: 65)

2.4. Eurovision

So much for sport. Another very interesting area which is related to identity is the Eurovision Song Contest. An interesting study by a group of engineers and physicists (David Fenn et al. 2005) looked into the voting patterns of each country. They concluded, perhaps not surprisingly, that there were considerable bilateral correlations in votes between Cyprus and Greece, between Denmark and Sweden, between Ireland and the UK, between Croatia and, oddly, Malta... The “dendrogram” shows the voting clusters within the Eurovision network. As the rescaled distance increases, the clusters become less correlated. Greece and Cyprus, as we have just noted, form the most correlated cluster. Despite the British tendency to feel distant from Europe, their analysis shows that the U.K. is remarkably compatible, or ‘in tune’, with other European countries. Equally surprising is their finding that some other core countries, most notably France, are significantly ‘out of tune’ with the rest of Europe. In addition, the analysis enables them to confirm a widely-held belief that there are unofficial cliques of countries – however these cliques are not always the expected ones, nor can their existence be explained solely on the grounds of geographical proximity.

What I cannot give an opinion on is the Spanish voting pattern therefore, and far less the Catalan one. Andorra is interesting to an extent: it gave it top marks in 2007 to Spain, for whom only one other country gave any votes at all (Albania!).

29 http://www.seleccions.cat/home/home.asp
3. Self definition

Let us move on to a completely different issue: how people define themselves, rather than what symbols they identify with. An interesting study already mentioned (Moral & Mateos 1999) gives us a lot of information about how youngsters see themselves in identity terms. When asked what makes a person definable as belonging to one’s region of residence, there are significant differences, young people from Madrid simply expecting the place of residence to be enough. Ethnic criteria are cited by over 10% of respondents in Valencia, Andalusia, Madrid and Galicia, which is interesting because in general it is the Basques and the Catalans that are portrayed by others as being “closed” in on themselves.

A sense of belongingness is highlighted as being a defining feature by a half of the Basques, the Catalans and the Galicians, but barely over a quarter of the Madrid youngsters. Secondly, youngsters were asked about the allegiances. Did they identify only with Spain, more with Spain than their region ... and so on. Though in all cases a mixed identification was claimed, it is interesting to see high proportion claiming to prefer the ”regional” identity in the Basque country and, to a lesser extent, in Galicia and Catalonia; while in over 30% of cases in Madrid and in the surrounding region of Castile and Leon, it is the Spanish identity that is chosen.

Thirdly, Moral and Mateos asked their samples how ”proud” they were to be Spanish, and the same for their region. Though the questions were separate, a simple comparison is possible: and while in all but one of the regions studied over 80% claimed to be ”very proud” or ”quite proud” of being from their region, as far as pride in being Spanish was concerned, barely 30% of Basque youngsters, and under 70% of Catalans, did so. If we look more closely at results from Catalonia, intersecting patterns emerge when we break down the sample by, for instance, first language. A dual identity is claimed by only 15% of Catalan-speakers, as against 54% of Spanish-speakers in the sample. How they see Spain also varies according to their first language, few Catalan speakers describing it as ”their nation” or ”their country”, unlike Spanish-speakers, just over half of whom chose these descriptions.

3.1. Self-identity and cultural attributes

Let us look in a little more detail at these Catalan-speakers and Spanish-speakers. Is the language, when it comes to the crunch, the independent variable, or is it merely correlated with another, more powerful variable? We have another more recent study in Catalonia (IDESCAT 2007), commissioned by the Catalan government in which, among other things, it asked about the place of birth of the interviewees’ parents.

Table 1: Language usually spoken at home and place of birth of subjects’ mothers (IDESCAT 2007; items 43 and 38)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Could you tell me where your mother was born?</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No reply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is perfectly clear that the place of birth of the mother (and the same can be said of the father) is a powerful predictor of the language spoken by the (adult) interviewees. 597/946 (64%) of interviewees whose mothers are Spanish-born speak just Spanish at home; 622/798 (78%) of interviewees whose mothers are Catalan-born speak just Catalan at home.

Note that the place of birth of the subject is not as good a predictor as the place of birth of the mother, because many of those born in Catalonia belong to first-generation Catalan families in which, of course, it would be quite unreasonable to expect a high proportion of Catalan-speaking families in this group (with the exception of a fair number of families of mixed origin).

There is also, according to this study (among others), a clear and strong correlation between one’s self-professed identity and one’s place of birth, as the following table shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catalonia</th>
<th>Rest of Spain</th>
<th>Rest of the world</th>
<th>No reply</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just Spanish</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish than Catalan</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Spanish and Catalan</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Catalan than Spanish</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Catalan</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1318</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1827</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 2: Self-professed identity among Catalan-born subjects (IDESCAT 2007)
The two graphs show extremely clearly how the place of birth and one’s self-professed national identity are very closely correlated. As might in any case be expected only 6% of those born outside Catalonia (the calculations have been made on the basis of the Catalan-speaking lands, not just Catalonia) claim to feel more Catalan than they do Spanish. Conversely only 5% of those born within the Catalan-speaking lands (and many of these are first-generation Catalans) claim to feel more Spanish than they do Catalan.

This shows that identity in Catalonia has an objective basis (geographical and, one might add, cultural origin), and we can safely conclude, then, that there is an ethnolinguistic factor in Catalan people’s self-definition in terms of national and/or regional identity.

3.2. Identity and political behaviour.
But identity goes beyond mere allegiance to symbols. There is one area in which it affects social behaviour, though democracy ensures that such behaviour is secret: voting patterns. The same survey also allows one to see how self-identity affects (self-reported) voting patterns.

Before describing the findings of the survey, it will be useful for the reader to have some background on each of the six political parties that were voted into the Catalan Parliament on the last occasion (November 2006).

a. PPC. The Partido Popular (People’s party) is a Spain-wide conservative party, which was in power from 1996 to 2004 (despite doing poorly in Catalonia)

b. CiU. Convergencia i Unió is a coalition of two moderate nationalist parties, the liberal Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya and the Christian democrat Unió Democràtica de Catalunya. It held power in Catalonia for six straight legislatures, from 1980 to 2003, when it was toppled by a coalition of leftist parties.

c. ERC. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya is the only independence party in the Catalan Parliament. It took third place in the last elections, and belongs to the current Catalan government.

d. PSC / PSOE. The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya is the Catalan Socialist party, which won power in Catalonia in 2003 thanks to its heading a post-electoral coalition of leftist parties.

e. ICV – EUiA. Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds and Esquerra Unida i Alternativa - is the coalition of Green and former Communist parties, and has been the minority partner in the last two Catalan governments.

f. Ciutadans. Partido de la ciudadanía. Founded recently as a purportedly “non-nationalist” party, it is new to the Parliament. It opponents regard it as a Spanish nationalist party.

Table 3: Distribution of votes in the last regional elections (2006) by self-identity (IDESCAT 2007; items 9 and 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>With which of the following sentences do you feel most identified with?</th>
<th>PPC</th>
<th>CiU</th>
<th>ERC</th>
<th>PSC / PSOE</th>
<th>ICV - EUiA</th>
<th>Ciutadans</th>
<th>Other parties</th>
<th>Null votes</th>
<th>Blank votes</th>
<th>Didn’t vote</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just Spanish</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Sp. than Cat.</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Sp. and Cat.</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Cat. than Sp.</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First of all, identity has an influence on whether a person takes part in the election or not. It is perfectly clear that among those who feel “Just Spanish”, the majority simply did not vote at all (58.7%), whereas only 24.5% of those who feel “Just Catalan” chose not to vote.

Secondly, there is an evident correlation between self-identity and voting patterns, not just in the decision whether or not to vote. Thus a high proportion of those who feel Spanish voted for two State-wide parties (Conservatives – PPC or Socialists – PSC-PSOE) or else for a new Spanish nationalist party founded in Catalonia, “Ciutadans”: 34.0% of those feeling “Just Spanish” and 45.1% of those feeling “More Spanish than Catalan”.

These parties got only 6.9% of the votes of those feeling “Just Catalan” and 11.9% of those feeling “More Catalan than Spanish”, while these two categories voted massively for CiU (a moderate Catalan nationalist party) or for ERC (the Catalan independence party): 59.6% and 44.8% respectively.

A crucial question in any study that includes language is: is the subjects’ first language a stronger or weaker correlate of voting patterns than is their self-professed identity?

**Table 4: Distribution of votes in the last regional elections (2006) by language used at home (IDESCAT 2007; items 9 and 43)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Could you tell me what language you usually speak at home?</th>
<th>PPC</th>
<th>CiU</th>
<th>ERC</th>
<th>PPC / PSOE</th>
<th>CiU / PSC</th>
<th>Ciutadans</th>
<th>Other parties</th>
<th>Blank / Null vote</th>
<th>Didn’t vote</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catalan</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish &amp; Catalan</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>3.4%</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.6%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1827</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here the discriminatory power of one’s language is also very clear. 48.4% Catalan-speakers vote for the two Catalan nationalist parties, and only 11.3% for the three Spanish parties; they participate actively at the voting station (70.8% go to vote).

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30 Partido Popular (PPC), the Socialists (PSC/PSOE) and Ciutadans. Partido de la Ciudadanía.
According to this survey, only a very small share of the vote of Spanish-speakers (8.5%) goes for the two Catalan nationalist parties, while 32.1% vote for the two Spanish parties (and only 49.4% of Spanish-speakers go to vote).

3.3. Attributed identity and social traits: stereotypes.

Identity is not only self-attributed but also imposed, in detail, from outside the group, in the form of regional stereotypes. In Spain they are extremely, even aggressively, vivid. In fact, they surprise many foreigners. Catalans are seen as stingy, as mean, for instance. You can find whole sets of jokes about the Catalans, on the web: just look for “chistes” and “Catalanes” using Google.

“What do Catalans do when they’re cold?”
“They sit beside the stove”.
“And what do Catalans do when they’re VERY cold?”
“Then they light the stove!”

These stereotypes are so powerful that they crop up in unexpected places. When a Catalan was listed as a possible successor to the leader of one of the main Spanish parties, on the negative side of his traits was quite simply that he was a Catalan. The last Catalan prime minister (perhaps the only one, in fact) made his fame as a general, but was assassinated, while still in power, in 1870: Joan Prim.

As is well known, politics have had an enormous impact on the main trait of the Catalan people, their language. The Franco regime not only used just Spanish: Catalan (and Basque and Galician) were banned even from schools, for over 30 years. The use of languages other than Spanish was seen as anti-patriotic (Mar-Molinero 1997: 12; Strubell 1999).

Regional stereotypes have been studied several times (Rodríguez Sanabra 1963; Sangrador 1981, 1996; Chacón Fuertes 1986).

Chacón (1986), for instance, studied the stereotypes shared by people from Madrid. Catalans were described by over half his sample as tacaños” (stingy, mean), “orgullosos (proud)”, “cerrados” (closed), “separatistas” (separatists), and (at last something positive!) “trabajadores” (hard-working). On the other hand, Andalusians were seen by over half of the same sample as 1 “juerguistas” (revellers, binge-lovers), “alegres” (jolly, playful, fun); “abiertos” (open), “exagerados” (exaggerated), “graciosos” (funny), “hospitalarios” (hospitalable), and “charlatanes” = charlatans. Only the last adjective of the seven is clearly negative. Galicians were described as “supersticiosos”, the only adjective chosen by half the sample. The Basques were seen as “fuertes” (strong) and “separatistas (separatists)”. The Madrid sample described “Spaniards” as a whole as “hospitalarios” (hospitalable) and “abiertos” (open), traits also attributed to the Andalusians. Finally, a sample of people from outside Madrid saw “Madrileños” as “chulos” (insolent, pimps), “abiertos” (open); and “hospitalarios” (hospitalable, welcoming).
As you can see, therefore, Catalans really evoke a strong stereotype, which is both negative and widely shared not only by Madrileños (as seen in this study) but in general across Spain. In terms of attraction-repulsion, Sangrador (1996) showed that the Basques and, even more markedly, the Catalans were the two least positively scored (in all seventeen cases, interviewees’ scores for their own region were excluded from the calculation). Both were well below all the others.

**Graph 4: Average scores of attitudes towards citizens from other regions of Spain (Sangrador 1996)**

Sangrador sums up the findings as follows:

“It is worth underlining that the attitude towards Catalans is, systematically the lowest in the the autonomous regions studied here, even among Basques and Valencians […]; so much is it the case that feeling towards Catalans is systematically lower than that expressed towards Europeans.” (1996: 178. Author’s translation)

“As far as the Catalans are concerned, their image is probably the most interesting one in the analysis, for a strange bipolarity emerges: a mixture of positive traits (hardworking, resourceful) with others that are clearly negative […] in the field of en psychological traits: stinginess, pride, selfishness, antipathy…). Paradoxically, the image obtained of Catalans is much closer to that of Europeans, which implicitly places them further from Spaniards” (1996: 179. Author’s translation)  

Strange as it may seem, these stereotypes have an impact on language. Most Catalan businessmen wishing to sell their products in the rest of Spain would never dream of

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31 Note that the first group of traits are related to the “status” factor, and the second group, to the “solidarity” factor.
putting the word “Cataluña” on the labels of their products, or the address of this correspondence. Let alone label them in the four languages of Spain.

4. Conclusion

Let us return to this title of this paper: “Language and identity in modern Spain: square pegs in round holes?” For perhaps four centuries there has been unresolved tension between two conceptions of Spain, one based on Castile as the model which was destined to absorb the other cultures in the peninsula (including, of course, the Portuguese); and another which is much more respectful of the multinational and multicultural – not to say multilingual – nature of the same territory. In some quarters any attempt to enhance the presence of cultures other than the Castilian-Spanish culture has, over this long period, been regarded with suspicion if not outright hostility (Mar Molinero 2000: 163). Turning specifically to language, it is clear from many studies, and even by casual observation, that the use of Catalan is a strong marker of identity for Spaniards. “Estamos en España” (We’re in Spain) is for some a good enough reason to expect only Spanish to be used in a social context, for instance; though nowadays, few would claim out loud that they believe that Catalan is publicly used (even when overheard) as an offensive way of establishing an ethnolinguistic distance. But many across Spain react to its use quite differently to the use of, say, Portuguese. Catalans are still asked why they speak the language to their children… But language choice among Catalans is a double-bind situation. Describing the situation in Catalonia itself some years ago, Strubell and Webber (1991: 23) wrote about

“… the tendency to equate 'non-Catalan' with monolingual, which sometimes makes Catalans respond in Castilian when addressed by a person speaking Catalan with a non-Catalan accent. Such a response, which can be termed 'ethnolinguistic accommodation', is often experienced by those learning Catalan as a second language who regard it (understandably, although incorrectly) as aggressive and exclusive. The difficulties for language-planners are exacerbated by the fact that many Catalans switch languages in such circumstances automatically and are therefore unconscious of their own behaviour.”

Things have not significantly improved since then. So indeed, the almost automatic shift from Catalan to Spanish can also be viewed as a gesture of in-group exclusivity. Either way, it would seem, Catalan-speakers are faced with dilemmas. There seem to be very deep-rooted stereotype of Catalans that they cannot cast off (by the very nature of attitudes and their resilience to change). But are such examples of prejudice new? By no means. On the three occasions Catalonia strived to achieve (some level of) home rule in the 20th century, in some parts of Spain that was heated opposition (going so far as to making calls for boycotts of Catalan products). But the problem goes far back in time. Toni Strubell, in a personal communication, describes how in García Cárcel’s (1985) opinion, King Philip IV of Castile devised a cultural policy explicitly designed to stir Castilian public opinion against Catalonia in the lead-up to the so-called Guerra dels Segadors (or War of the Harvesters, 1640-1659). The campaign consisted basically of paying Castilian playwrights to include immoral Catalan characters in this plays, and according to García Cárcel this happened regularly in the works of a wide range of authors. The effectiveness of the theatre, a
very lively sociocultural feature of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, and with highly acclaimed playwrights, was intended to ease the way up to a war against Catalonia, a war that the chancellor, Count-Duke Olivares, had apparently strongly recommended to him.

It would thus seem that the psychological borders between Spain and Catalonia have certainly not disappeared, and as is wellknown in social psychology, it is not the Catalans that can change the prejudice and stereotypes that are shared by most of the Spanish population, and which are constantly revived in the media and by some Spanish political parties. Significantly, it is Spaniards that have not contact with Catalans that display the most negative attitudes, while the views of those who have direct knowledge of the situation are, in the main, more favourable. For over twenty years there has been talk (and indeed, projects) of "pedagogy" in Spain on the part of Catalonia, but this has proved quite fruitless. Moreover, wedges have been dug into internal borders, so that pressure has constantly been applied on many Catalan-speakers in Valencia (about 2 million) and Aragon (about 50,000) to persuade them that what they speak is not Catalan at all.

Can this Catalan-Spanish psychological border be overcome? Time of course will tell, but in my view what is needed is a greatly enhanced visibility of Catalan in Spanish-speaking Spain, for instance the long sought-after introduction of interpretation systems in the two houses of the Spanish parliament (Congress of Deputies and Senate) so that the many dozens of Catalan-speakers can use it freely in debates. The expansion of the visibility of a language that can be spoken by over nine million people (Querol 2007)\textsuperscript{32} is however held up, in Spain, by the argument that if Catalan is to appear on, say, consumer product labels, alongside Spanish, than Galician and Basque should also be added, and this would (it is claimed) greatly complicate the design of such labels.

To conclude, a number of measurable behavioural and cognitive traits are clearly correlated with identity. The field is wide open for comparative field research. I am sure that the vigour and passion with which national and regional identities are felt in Spain are somewhat alien to Scandinavians (though all round the world, people from the neighbouring village tend to be regarded as odd in one way or another!) and are a strong stimulus for researchers to study this fascinating subject.

References


\textsuperscript{32} http://www6.gencat.net/llencat/socio/estadistica.htm


A NEW NATIONAL FLAG FOR LUXEMBOURG
STRUGGLING OVER IDENTITY IN A SMALL MULTILINGUAL SOCIETY

FERNAND FEHLEN

Abstract:
A recent debate over the changing of the national flag in Luxembourg will be analysed as the symbolic reflection of the economic and social changes the Grand-duchy has known the last twenty years. As Luxembourg’s economic success is based on its capacity to advocate open-mindedness towards foreigners as well as on the exploitation of economic niches, xenophilia has been practically made a state doctrine and xenophobic movements cannot declare themselves openly as such and have to express an “us vs. them” sentiment in a highly euphemistic way. Nevertheless, the campaign for the Red Lion flag shows that a non-negligible part of Luxembourgers is receptive to linguistic patriotism and an ethno-cultural definition of national identity. The principal cleavage in Luxembourg’s public debate is the opposition between modernists and traditionalists, but it has to be overcome by compromises as a precondition to “selling Luxembourg to the world” as an attractive place for businesses and foreign investments.

Introduction
Luxembourg\textsuperscript{33} may seem like the land of plenty from afar, boasting a GNP per capita unequalled anywhere else in the world and a cosmopolitan and multilingual population living in peaceful harmony. A haven of material well-being and full employment that compares favourably with neighboring Germany, still carrying the marks of a gloomy economic climate, France, torn apart and paralysed by the political divide between right and left, and Belgium, prey to the rifts between the Flemish and Walloon communities. But the extraordinary economic growth of the past twenty years brought not only immense wealth to Luxembourg, but also modified its social fabric. Thus, behind a facade of well-being, Luxembourg is in the throes of a modernization and growth crisis and seems to break apart in a core society of the nationals and different communities of newcomers.

The aim of this contribution is to show how the transformation of the society is echoed by a search for a new identity that seeks to define the roles assigned to the different communities living and working in the Grand-Duchy. This is the real challenge in the discussion about national identity or as Bourdieu (1991: 221) stated: “Struggles over ethnic or regional identity (...) are a particular case of the different struggles over classifications, struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups.”

The first chapter dedicated to Luxembourg’s nation building shows how sovereignty was embodied in a strong patriotic and linguistic identity; a second chapter depicts the economic and social changes of the last twenty years. It is against this background

\textsuperscript{33} I would like to thank Sonja Kmec for her help with the English version of this article and for her insightful comments.
that a recent debate over the changing of the national flag will be analysed in the main body of this contribution as a symbolic reflection of these social changes.

**Constructing national and linguistic identity**

Modern Luxembourg was founded at the beginning of the 19th century when a new romantic relationship emerged between nation-state and national language; a relationship that has been perceived as organic and that connects the linguistic loyalty of the individual with citizenship and national belonging. Just as there are languages that have existed before "their" state came into being, there are also states that have pre-existed “their” language. The Luxembourgish nation-building process is an ideal-typical example for the invention of a national language and Luxembourgish is a typical Ausbau-Sprache in the sense of Kloss (1952): A Germanic dialect becomes a language because it has, over time, assumed the functions of a language in the small community. This process is still on-going, for written Luxembourgish in particular still remains excluded from certain domains, the most important one being the teaching of reading and writing at school.

Created as an independent state in 1815, the Grand-duchy of Luxembourg was given a somewhat precarious status: It was bestowed "entirely in property and sovereignty" on William I, king of the United Netherlands, and incorporated into the German Confederation. The fortress city of Luxembourg was occupied by a Prussian garrison. Proof that the creation of Luxembourg as a modern state preceded any national sentiment may be found in the popular enthusiasm for the Belgian revolution in 1830. Luxembourg only survived as a state because it suited the geopolitical interests of the great powers, although the outcome of the crisis led to the amputation of its French speaking part, which was given to the new kingdom of Belgium. As a result Luxembourg became in 1839 a country, which, from a linguistic point of view, was not much different from the neighboring Rhenish territories. Ordinary people spoke a Germanic dialect, Moselle Franconian, the elite used German, but also French, the European language of culture. French had been the administrative language of Luxembourg at the time of the Département des Forêts and the local elite remained largely in place after 1815. In order to set themselves apart from the Prussian garrison, which was omnipresent in the capital, the bourgeoisie cultivated French, which became the language of the high administration. The creation of a Luxembourgish nationality, distinct from that of the Netherlands, in 1841 and, above all, limited access to civil service, which has ever since been reserved for nationals, have contributed to the development of a Luxembourgish national sentiment and of the Luxembourgish language.

At the end of the 19th century, intellectual patriots invented a Luxembourgish national history, beginning with 963 and drawing a line of continuity from the medieval powerful House of Luxembourg to the modern state. The centuries during which the current national territory was part of Burgundy, the Spanish or Austrian Netherlands and later France where described as a parenthesis of “foreign rule”. (Margue 2007) Luxembourg gained in 1867, after the withdrawing of the Prussian garrison, its

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34 This section is developed in Fehlen (2008b). Newton (1996) still has to be considered as the comprehensive introduction to Luxembourgish language history and situation.

35 The year the name Lucilinburhuc was mentioned the first time in a charter, an act of purchase of a rock spur on which count Siegfried build a castle that would develop through the centuries to become the future city of Luxembourg (Péporté 2007).
“perpetual independence and neutrality”, as stated in the Treaty of London. In 1890 the Grand-duchy passed from the kings of the Netherlands to the House of Nassau-Weilburg and had so “its own”, but still “German” dynasty. It was only during the 1930s, confronted with annexationist pan-germanism, and during the Nazi occupation that the Luxembourgish language definitely became a rallying cause for patriots and focal point for the resistance. Collective memory still considers as founding act of national solidarity a population census, which the Nazi administration had planned to carry out on 10 October 1941. This census aimed at collecting information about people's mother tongue and ethnic group belonging among other things. The questionnaire insisted on certain "scientific subtleties", for instance that "a dialect such as Luxembourgish" did not count as language. Despite the threats that were being made, an overwhelming majority of participants answered "Luxembourgish" to the three categories "citizenship", "language" and "ethnicity", turning thus the census into a referendum in favour of their language and their independence.

For all those who experienced this period of precariousness and deprivation and even for those born in the post-war area, national belonging and linguistic patriotism – going hand in hand with Anti-Germanism – remain until today the major frame to "locate, perceive, identify, and label" occurrences within their life and the social world (Goffman 1974 : 21). Kristine Horner’s (2004: 300) analysis of a corpus based on letters to the editor comes to the conclusion that “the nation of Luxembourg is frequently 'imagined' in ethnic terms and is linked directly to the Luxembourgish language, especially in 'folk' discourse.” In this perspective, a true "Luxembourger" is someone whose native language is Luxembourgish.

In 1984 Luxembourgish became the national language by virtue of a law that had been pushed through by the lower middle classes and schoolteachers against the Francophile – though Luxembourgish speaking – elites of the country. That law also declared French to be the language of jurisdiction and French, German and Luxembourgish to be accepted as languages of the administration. Luxembourg's linguistic market is thus really multilingual and governed by a legitimate multilingual language competence requiring a subtle understanding of the three languages officially in use in Luxembourg and, in addition, of English as foreign language. In the last years Luxembourgish has been further upgraded and developed (in the Klossian sense), especially as written language and French is being challenged by English as prestige language. The status of German is rather ambivalent: stigmatized as competitor and antagonist of Luxembourgish, it remains – at least in print media – the mostly used written language.

A small society in the age of globalization

Sociological tradition tends to equate the society or the social space it studies with the nation-state. Only recently, through the impetus given by migration studies, has the

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36 It is important to notice that the concept of “official language” is avoided and that the administration has some latitude to decide which one is used. Normally official documents and forms will be in French and German.

37 The conceptual framework of Bourdieu’s Language and Symbolic Power is the nation-state, more specifically the monolingual French context. To transpose his concept of legitimate language – the yardstick determining the value of the linguistic capital – in a plurilingual linguistic market Fehlen (2002) uses the concept of legitimate multilingual language competence.
importance of “conceptualizing social positions on a world scale” (Weiss, 2005) been
recognized, given that what has been called “methodological nationalism” has
become increasingly inadequate in a globalizing world.

The creation of Luxembourg’s financial place since the 1970s has brought an
unexpected economic prosperity making Luxembourg the richest country in the
world. As this wealth stems to a large extent from the redistribution of the profits
made by the 155 banks presently established in Luxembourg, the Grand-duchy is one
of the spearheads and one of the main beneficiaries of globalization. During the last
15 years, the total number of foreigners has increased by 70%, while the number of
non-EU nationals has tripled. Today 42% of Luxembourg’s resident population are
foreigners. Furthermore, about 70% of the active population are foreign nationals, due
to the fact that many inhabitants of the neighboring regions of France, Belgium and
Germany cross the border daily to work in Luxembourg. Public opinion either pities
these transborder commuters for their long journeys to work or blames them for their
lack of interest in the Luxembourg society.

Next to the Luxembourgers, who form the centrepiece of society – not to say the core
society –, other “communities” have established themselves, the largest one being the
Portuguese community, which makes up 14% of the overall population. Others, such
as the "eurocrats" or the managerial staff of the banking sector, do not constitute
"national" communities.

The Luxembourg labour market is split into four different (yet overlapping) segments
according to the recruitment space of manpower: Two of them are non located social
spaces, which draw from an international labour market, but vary in terms of
recruitment: The managerial staff of international companies belongs to a spatially
autonomous transnational upper class, whereas officials of E.U. institutions come
from European countries and have been recruited according to a quota system, based
on nationality and native language. These officials, at least those of senior rank, are
also members of national elites. Even though the number of these officials is certainly
smaller that in other cities, say Brussels, Strasbourg, Geneva or Paris, their weight in
the Luxembourg economy, where they represent 4% of the active population
(according to the last census of 2001), is more important.

A third segment can be described as regional labour market, in the sense of locally
circumscribed but transnational market overlapping the national borders. Transborder
commuters made up 43% of the wage-earning population in 2006. Half of them come
from France, 27% from Belgium and 22% from Germany. This increases the presence
of the French language in Luxembourg.

There still is a national labour market, the core of which is civil service and some
related sectors such as postal service and railways. I do not mean to imply that
employment in these sectors is reserved for nationals, but that this segment of the
labour market follows the laws of reproduction of the national society. This is not the
case for the regional market; a difference that may be explained by looking at the
Luxembourg school system.

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38 At least if we take the GDP per capita as indicator. This seductive image must be put into
perspective. First of all, this indicator is partly biased by statistical artifacts based on the small size of
the country. Secondly, one has to take into account other elements in order to depict a realistic image of
the well-being of its population. For example, in the U.N.’s Human Development Index, Luxembourg
ranked at 12 in 2006.

39 More then 40% of active Luxembourgish nationals are occupied in public administration and
associated sectors, 22% are civil servants.
The national education system encourages social reproduction not merely by transforming culturally inherited capital into diplomas sanctioned by the state and recognized by the labour market, but also by defining as a legitimate culture precisely the one that has been served as yardstick in this selection process. In Luxembourg a very specific multilingual competence is the main selection criteria. But many (foreign) companies do not accept the definition of legitimate culture, as defined by the Luxembourgish school system, and prefer to recruit according to their own criteria, which are often those of their country. Even within the national territory, Luxembourgish (private or public) schools no longer have a monopoly on education. They are in competition with different international schools, i.e. a European School (that has gone beyond its original call, tending to the offspring of European officials) and schools set up by certain national communities. A final feature of the Luxembourg educational landscape is that many children attend schools abroad.

The service industry, whether retail or food service, any company in fact that deals with a local clientele is confronted with a linguistic dilemma. If Luxembourgers with a strong cultural capital and thus comfortable using foreign languages (especially French) are happy to show their linguistic competence, less educated Luxembourgers will be ill-at-ease if they have to speak French to do their shopping. Not so much because they can't express themselves or communicate with the staff, but because they don't feel up to the norms school has inculcated in them. They will thus prefer shops where they are being served in their own language. On the contrary, foreigners who settle in Luxembourg and experience multilingualism, expect to be understood by administrative and retail staff when they speak French or German, even English. This explains the fast growing – but largely unanswered – demand, on all levels, for employees who not only speak Luxembourgish, but are multilingual.

This situation is the source of a latent linguistic conflict that has not broken out openly, because – at least as long as the economic situation does not deter – the overwhelming majority of Luxembourgers, non-national residents and transborder commuters profit from a win-win situation that allows everyone to develop specific strategies for social ascension. So, the counter-strategy of the established population against the perceived threat to their or their children's employment is to secure work in the national sector of the labour market, where jobs are generally well paid. Virtually all political parties and all media praise the country's capacity to take in newcomers and advocate open-mindedness towards foreigners. They know that these elements, together with social peace and the exploitation of economic niches are at the base of Luxembourg's economic success story. Accordingly, xenophilia has been practically made a state doctrine and xenophobic movements cannot declare themselves openly as such and have to express an “us vs. them” sentiment in a highly euphemistic way.

The number of Luxembourg nationals who feel left out, because they do not profit from the redistribution of the manna of the financial place, is growing. As they are often poorly educated, they have nothing but their mastery of Luxembourgish to compete with against better trained transborder commuters. They highly value therefore their language and believe that they need to defend it: For instance, by promoting language purism against corruption by borrowings from German grammar as well as vocabulary; by requesting to establish Luxembourgish as national language in the constitution and to make it an official EU-language. This last request was given a significant boost as Malta accessed to the EU and the Maltese language gained the status of an official language.
This is the context of the flag debate that we will analyse as the expression of a soft xenophobia in a country, whose official discourse is openness and hospitality.

**The flag debate**

**An unreckoned initiative**

The passionate debates surrounding the constitutional treaty of the E.U. were ebbing, after the treaty had eventually been accepted in a referendum by a majority of only 56% – a meager result considering the enthusiasm the European idea is traditionally said to generate. Calm seemed to have returned to the country of consensus until Michel Wolter – a member of parliament representing the Christian Social party, current president of the parliamentary group of that party and former minister of the Interior – proposed to replace the national tricolored flag (red, white, blue) with a new flag featuring the heraldic Red Lion (Roude Léiw)\(^{40}\), a symbol evoking the ancient greatness of a medieval past, on a background of narrow white and blue horizontal stripes. The argument put forward was that the Luxembourgish and Dutch flag were too similar. A weak or even insincere argument, since the Luxembourg tricolor uses the same shading of light blue as the United Nations' flag, while the Dutch tricolor uses a dark blue color as in the flag of the European Union. So, even on black and white pictures, the two flags can hardly be confused.

The law proposition\(^{41}\) the MP submitted on 5 October 2006 initiated a debate that held the country spellbound for almost a year. The argument was carried out in the letters to the editor, via the internet\(^{42}\) and with a carsticker campaign. First appeared stickers with the new Red Lion flag and the statement “I’m in favor” followed by tricolored stickers. This inspired diverse parodical stickers with fantasy flags showing different animals on a white-blue background: i.e. a black ox, a pink panther or a blue belling deer. While the internet petition for the Red Lion quickly claimed to have raised 26,500 signatures, the rival one supporting the tricolor only gathered 1446.\(^{43}\)

**The history of the flag**

To calm down the debate the government asked its heraldry commission, the existence of which practically nobody had been aware until that moment, for an advisory opinion (Commission 2007). Even if the Red Lion is linked by the collective memory to the ancient dukedom of Luxembourg and if it is one of the most known lieux de mémoire – in the sense of Pierre Nora, those places and spaces of shared

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\(^{40}\) The detailed description in the language of heraldists: Barry of ten Argent and Azure overall a lion rampant, open clawed, lampassed and crowned with gold, queue forchy and noved gules, crowned, armed and langued or.

\(^{41}\) Published in the Official Journal: J-2005-O-0796 5617/00: Proposition de loi portant modification de la loi du 23 juin 1972 sur les emblèmes nationaux.

\(^{42}\) One of the numerous discussions, which are generally conducted in Luxembourgish, can be found on the forum of the DNR radio-station: <http://www.dnr.lu/acceuildet/156> (last consulted on 12 Dec 2007). Also an article in the German Wikipedia is dedicated to the subject: <http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flagge_Luxemburgs> (last consulted on 12 Dec 2007).

\(^{43}\) This figures have to be put in relation with the total number of electors, which was 220 717 at the referendum of 2005.
memory we all inhabit—, specific knowledge about this period is very poor. The advice of the commission not only brought some precisions to the history of medieval use of the coat of arms, but it drew also the attention to largely ignored origins of the national flag.

Almost all Luxembourgers are persuaded that the tricolor was inherited from the Netherlands with which Luxembourg shared its sovereign for the first 75 years of its existence (as Grand-duchy). But the origin of the national flag goes back to the end of the 18th century and the cockades which were in vogue at the dawn of modern age amongst the bourgeoisie to show their allegiances. The three colors appeared the first time in 1787 when the citizens of Luxembourg-City wore tricolored cockades to celebrate the revocation of an unpopular law by Emperor Joseph II, ruler of the Habsburgs lands to which Luxembourg belonged. In a decree issued by municipality on 24th June 1787 red, white and blue were said to be the colours of the ancient duchy of Luxembourg and all other cockades, especially the black-yellow-red of Brabant, the symbol of the anti Habsburg revolt, were banned. In the middle of the 19th century, the national tricolored flag was definitively institutionalized and it was considered to be the abstraction of the medieval coat of arms. So its origins are “genuinely” Luxembourghish and the resemblance with the Dutch flag is accidental. At the same time, the Red Lion was sometimes used as flag and also as symbol in patriotic songs (“Red Lion guard your field”). The battle cry: “Red Lion attack” (roude Léiw huel se) stayed popular in all sorts of sports.

While facing the threat of annexation by Nazi Germany, Luxembourg lived at the end of the 1930’s moments of patriotic enthusiasm, expressed, among others, by the demand of a new flag. The argument put forward was that the Red Lion “links our present destiny with our longstanding, glorious millennial history.” (Governmental document from 5th January 1939, as cited by Commission 2007: 10). At the same time, Luxembourgish language was used for the first time in official speeches and its knowledge was considered an “absolute precondition” to Luxembourg citizenship. (Scuto 2007: 256). The legislative process to change the flag as well as the rules of procedure to define the linguistic prerequisite of the Luxembourgish citizenship that were underway at the beginning of 1940 were stopped by the Nazi occupation and forgotten after the liberation.

In 1972 the tricolor was declared national flag by law, but the Red Lion was established as the flag of the army and of the civil navigation. In 1982 the precise tones of the red and blue bands where more precisely defined: especially the light blue to make a difference with the Dutch dark blue. Nevertheless the Red Lion banner was still used especially by sport fans and it has grown increasingly popular over the last years.

The Heraldry Commission also argued that “the Red Lion evokes the past grandeur, the national myth and the differentiation from the ‘Other’ “and comes to the conclusion that “to take as flag a symbol of strong national identity can only polarize the Luxembourgish society.”

**Pros and cons**

Most of those who signed the petition in favour of the new flag would strongly disagree with this interpretation. Indeed xenophobic and nationalistic arguments were

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44 Following Nora a team of historians has edited a book of the Luxembourgish realms of memory (Kmec e.a. 2007) one of which is the Red Lion (Margue 2007).
45 Count Henry V of Luxembourg, who died in 1281 was the first to use a Red Lion as seal and banner.
rather marginal in the letters to the editor and other articles published in newspapers. The most frequently stated reasons being the risk of confusion between the Dutch and the Luxembourgish flag, and also the beauty, the originality and the uniqueness of the Red Lion. The principal reason against a change of the flag was that there was no use at all for a change and that other more important social problems had to be debated and solved. The fact that almost identical Red Lion flags were already in use by the Belgian Province of Luxembourg and by some cities, was also mentioned. In internet blogs and forums the argumentation of the Red Lion supporters was less subdued than in the printed press. The threatening presence of the numerous foreigners was often linked to the supposed regression of the Luxembourgish language. The country's pride and the lack of respect displayed by foreigners with regard to the Luxembourg identity (see below) were also major arguments, as was the loss of sovereignty by the construction of the European Union. This last argument can be illustrated by the allusion to the Euro in a very short statement published on the forum of a broadcasting station DNR. It is typical for the elusive, almost speechless form of argumentation: “Hello DNR. I am absolutely in favour. The Red Lion is the only thing remaining of our country; we have no more currency, our language is not well off and so on … Sonja.”

Surviving in the political field

Notwithstanding the culturalist belief in “primordial identities” – that is, identities that exist by themselves and travel down the ages unperturbed – the Red Lion debate shows that identities are not given to us by way of nature. They are the result of a more or less conscious construction. Identity strategies are put into action by identifiable actors. In the present case, the debate was initiated by Michel Wolter, the chairman of the parliamentary group of the Christian Social party, the most influential and hegemonic party in Luxembourg. Wolter had been Minister of the Interior until the elections of 2004, when he lost his portfolio.

The Luxembourgish electoral system, known as panachage, is a combination of the proportional representation of lists with the possibility for the voter to pick up individual candidates by giving them preferential votes. Consequently, the voter and not the party decides the composition of the parliament and even of the government, since those with the best results usually become ministers (Dumont e.a. 2008). As Michel Wolter was the forth in his constituency and the first three were made ministers one has to consider the post of chairman as a consolation gift. He submitted a law proposition to change the flag without any prior consultation with the party establishment. This personal initiative has annoyed the party leaders and Jean-Claude Juncker, its current prime minister; for it does not correspond to the modernist image the Christian Social party wants to give of itself.

The starting point of “the flag war” was thus the initiative of a politician lacking momentum who went against his party's interests by putting a non politically correct topic on the agenda. No matter the outcome of his initiative, Wolter will have gained in popularity – for the number of signees of the pro-Red Lion petition corresponds to 12% of the electorate. Sympathy with his initiative seems even larger. In a survey sponsored by Michel Wolter himself, a majority of 55 % favoured the new flag, while only 19% were against it. 21% had no preference and 5% ignored that there was a debate. 50% of Luxembourgish nationals supported the Red Lion. The enthusiasm for the Red Lion

46 <http://www.dnr.lu/acceuildet/156> (last consulted on 12 Dec 2007).
was particularly high with young people (76% of the 15 to 25 years old) and the less educated (71% of those with basic education). The support declined with increasing education; only 35% of the university graduates where in favour of a new flag. The denial of any nationalist and xenophobic agenda was the precondition of the popular success of the Red Lion with foreigners (i.e. Portuguese 74%).

**Fostering communitarism**

The hypothesis that the enthusiasm for the heraldic beast may also be understood as the expression of social unease translated into insecurity of identity has been corroborated by another opinion poll published in Le Jeudi, a French written weekly newspaper, owned by a socialist trade union and with close links to the Socialist party. Published in the context of the national holiday, an opinion poll addressed only Luxembourg nationals, but had pretentions to scrutinizing the cohabitation of the different communities. It has been largely criticized for its tendentious questions. For instance, asked about the respect that foreigners pay to Luxembourg’s national identity, 60% of the surveyed Luxembourgers replied that their national identity was not being respected by foreigners living in the country and 72% even stated that it was not being respected by transborder commuters … Nobody seemed to worry about what this “non-respect” concretely entailed and what "national identity" was supposed to mean.

As a paper aimed at the French speaking community Le Jeudi does not arouse suspicion of xenophobia, but has nevertheless an intrinsic interest in fostering communitarism, in the French acceptance of this word, which means emphasizing the interest of distinct communities over those of society as a whole. In an infelicitous programmatic article, published at the launch of the weekly paper, the editor in chief had defined the target audience as educated French speakers, explicitly excluding thus Portuguese workers. This lapsus reminds us that most language conflicts are hiding social conflicts.

The same editor published, during the last football World Cup in July 2006, in the tageblatt—a daily newspaper and the flag ship of the same news group, mostly written in German and aimed at the general Luxembourgish speaking public—a leading article about flags as an expression of national pride. When Portugal made it into the semi-finals of the World Cup, many inhabitants of Portuguese origins showed their support by displaying their national flag. Some Luxembourgish people took offence at that and saw in this flight of football enthusiasm a rejection of the host country and a refusal to integrate. This argument was picked up in an editorial published in the tageblatt. The ensuing controversy was carried out by this newspaper and its rival, the Wort, close to the Christian Social party. The quarrel was not only ideological but also commercial in nature, for both publishing houses issue a weekly paper in Portuguese and did not want to lose their readership to the rival paper. Perhaps this quarrel can also be seen as prefiguration of the Red Lion debate.

**The opinion of the Lion enthusiasts**

The Jeudi survey also included a question about the Red Lion. It reads: “Do you agree with the following statement: The introduction of the Red Lion as a national

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47 N=1000. Our cumulation of two opinion polls conducted by TNS-ILRES (www.tns-ilres.com)
48 21 June 2007
49 All quoted results are statistically significant. For details see Fehlen (2008a).
flag will reinforce national identity?” At least this question is very clear about the meaning of changing the flag, it is about reinforcing "national identity". We can suppose that the overwhelming majority of those 56% of the interviewed Luxembourgers giving an affirmative answer to this question are supporters of changing the flag\textsuperscript{50}. We shall refer to them as the \textit{Lion enthusiasts}, whereas the other shall be named \textit{Lion sceptics} (abbreviated as Lion+ and Lion-). These two groups have different opinions on many issues. \textit{Lion enthusiasts} are more numerous than other interviewees to believe that "foreigners don't respect their identity" (66% versus 56%), that “Luxembourgish identity is about to be lost” (73% versus 55%), that “one has to know Luxembourgish to feel as a Luxembourger” (91% versus 84%).

To incite foreigners, especially of E.U. origins, to become Luxembourg citizens, the government wants to introduce double citizenship. Among the \textit{Lion enthusiasts}, the number of those who oppose such a measure is higher than average and those who favour it, wish at least to extend the duration of residence in the country (Figure 1).

\textbf{Figure 1 – Are you in favor of a double citizenship?}

To the question “What does it mean to be a Luxembourger” 27% of the overall sample replied: "To speak Luxembourgish". As second and third answers were possible, the following results are based on an addition of all three answers: 71% make the connection between citizenship and national language. The second most common answer (50%) is “To appreciate the living conditions in Luxembourg”, followed by "to be born in Luxembourg" (44%), "to have Luxembourgish parents"\textsuperscript{51} (30%), "to have lived in Luxembourg for several years" (26%), "to have a Luxembourgish passport" (23%) and "to know Luxembourg’s history"\textsuperscript{52} (19%) etc..

\textsuperscript{50} Some rare respondents may be against the flag change precisely because they think that the new flag would increase reinforce a sentiment of national identity and because they wish to avoid this.

\textsuperscript{51} 10\% answer “To have one Luxembourgish parent”. We have grouped these two answers in figure 2.

\textsuperscript{52} 7\% answer “To know Luxembourg’s institutions”. We have grouped these two answers in figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that *Lion enthusiasts* favour an ethno culturalist definition of identity (insisting on the country of birth\(^53\), filiation, language), whereas *Lion sceptics* tend to have a more pragmatic approach.

Figure 2: The three most important characteristics of being a Luxembourger

According to the last Eurobarometer\(^54\) dealing with the question of the national pride, 90% of Luxembourgers said to be proud of their country, a slightly higher percentage than the EU25 average of 87%. The proudest people are Fins and Cypriots (97%) and the least proud Lithuanians, Belgians (84%) and Latvians (83%) preceding Germans who occupy a place apart with 69%. 25% of them declare to be not proud of their country, compared with the UE25 average of 11%. In Sweden and Denmark the percentage of people proud of their country is the same as in Luxembourg (90%); the percentage of those who are not proud is 8% in both Scandinavian countries, slightly higher than the Luxembourg 6%.

The *Jeudi* survey offers a similar result, but once again there is a very strong link between that question and people’s position concerning the flag. Figure 3 shows that 94% of *Lion enthusiasts* but only 82% of *Lion sceptics* are proud to be Luxembourghish.

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\(^53\) The context shows that this is not an opinion in favor of a birthright citizenship (*ius soli*), but a euphemized rejection of immigrants (of the first generation).

Compromise
The controversy over Wolters’ legislative proposal did not turn into a governmental coalition crisis opposing the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Labour party, since both parties comprise political forces promoting openness and modernity and others, less numerous, trying to fend off societal changes in the name of an immutable identity. A compromise had to be found, rendering thus homage to the golden calf of the Luxembourgish society, the culture of the consensus. On 6 July 2007, the government presented its answer: The national flag would be maintained, but the Red Lion could be used interchangeably at cultural and sport events, but only within the national territory. As the Premier declared at the press conference: “The red-white-blue flag remains and must remain because we are what we are. The Red Lion is added because our people have always accepted the two flags as their flag, also in their hearts. The two flags are not fighting each other. They belong together”.

The old flag is linked by Juncker to the traditional rallying cry of Luxembourgish patriotism “we want to remain what we are” stemming from the first national anthem written in 1859. By personalizing the two flags he acknowledges the emotional and romantic conception of history. The compromise has the advantage of avoiding the disastrous impression a flag change would have had on the international community, while the nationalist symbol is allowed for domestic use. Michel Wolter, the initiator of the debate, reacted with satisfaction, accepting the compromise and the refusal of his initial proposition, saying that he would await the reaction of the citizens before deciding his course of action. The compromise was overwhelmingly approved by the press and, if it weren’t for the remaining carstickers, the urge to change the flag would be forgotten. The legislative proposal of the government has been submitted to the parliament on 10 August 2007 and the legislative process is on the way … a long way which should last at least one year.
Luxembourg 2007 - European Capital of Culture

Selling Luxembourg to the world

By pure coincidence, in the fall of 2006, when the flag debate took off, blueprints for a future agency for the development and promotion of Luxembourg's financial centre were announced. A crowned Lion adorns its logo and the Lion appears also in the title of an (English) article in *Paperjam* – a local manager magazine aimed at the international business community in Luxembourg – which is supposed to present the concept of the new agency. Under the headline “National Branding: Making the *Roude Léiwen* Roar” (Carey 2007) Luxembourg’s Minister for Economy stigmatizes in an interview “a certain ‘We want to remain what we are’ attitude” persisting in the country. “Sometimes we can feel a breeze of change, but without a real political will to motivate people to embrace new thinking, Luxembourg’s image will continue to be murky or non-existent to the rest of the world.” To put Luxembourg on the map “you cannot start by explaining that there are nice castles here.” The concept underlying national branding, as well as the actors involved in this process seem to be poles apart from the preoccupations discussed in the previous section.

National branding programs are primarily aimed at the international community to improve the nation’s image to attract businesses, foreign direct investments as well as tourists. In this perspective Luxembourg is presented as “A World of Advantages”. As this national branding initiative is primarily directed at two audiences it has clumsily been labeled *Luxembourg for Finance* and *Luxembourg for Business*. Hence the headline of the political opposition's newspaper: *Luxembourg for Luxembourg*. Another initiative of city branding is aimed at the inhabitants of the immediate neighboring regions and the transborder commuters. It seeks to present Luxembourg capital as a cosmopolitan metropolis with high cultural and luxury shopping standards. While governmental technocrats and advertising specialists tinker with a modernist image to sell Luxembourg on a globalized market, we have to address the question Simon Anholt, the pioneer of national branding, asked in a programmatic paper: “How to get the populace behind it and make them ‘live the brand’.” (Anholt 2002: 230)

The principal cleavage in Luxembourg’s public debate is the opposition between modernists and traditionalists. While the populist party ADR is clearly rooted among the latter, all major parties are divided amongst themselves. This cleavage and the gentlemen's agreement all mass media adhere to, which consists in playing down xenophobic expressions explain why xenophobia it is not explicitly dealt with in in

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55 “Luxembourg is internationally renowned for its numerous advantages such as: Political, Economic, and Social stability; Attractive tax framework; Strong legal environment; Easy access and close proximity to local authorities; Sophisticated expertise in local and global finance; Multinational, multilingual, professional workforce; Competitive business costs; Geographical situation; Innovative and flexible legislation; Climate of confidentiality.” <http://en.luxembourgforfinance.lu/> (last consulted on 12 Dec 2007).

56 A new internet site presents “good ideas” for shopping in Luxembourg. Note the cities Luxembourg is compared to, in a rather immodest way, in this randomly chosen example: “Inspired by a kind of urban sense of style also found in cities such as Paris, London, Amsterdam or Berlin, this new boutique offers three different sections: a book section entirely devoted to the world of street art, painting and graffiti. (…) A section dedicated to street wear collections (…) and a gallery featuring vivacious expositions of flowing lines and colours melting into each other.” <www.goodidea.lu> (last consulted on 12 Dec 2007).
electoral campaigns. The subject is treated euphemistically, as we have seen in the flag debate. One of the strongholds of traditionalism can be found in the Ministry of Culture and we shall conclude this contribution with another ambiguous compromise between the advocates of an ethno-cultural identity and the technocrats; the later accepting that a topos of the imagined national history, widely forgotten by the young generations, has been introduced as sort of Trojan horse in a national branding campaign.

An imagined colony

As we have seen, Luxembourg-city has become the center of an employment market largely surpassing the borders of the nation state. Thus, Luxembourg could become the capital of a new European region comprising parts of four countries, called the “Greater Region”. This regional impact was reinforced in the past ten years by massive investments in the cultural field, such as a concert hall and a museum of contemporary art. In 2007 it was the turn of Luxembourg-city to become the European Capital of Culture. The ad-hoc committee decided to associate the whole "Greater Region" with this initiative. The official website explains that

For the first time the area of the Capital of Culture will be extended across a whole region – in addition to Luxembourg the whole Grand Duchy of Luxembourg as well as the French and the German-speaking Communities of Belgium, Lorraine in France and Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland in Germany. This concept gives the Capital of Culture 2007 a special touch: promoting mobility and the exchange of ideas, crossing borders in all areas, physical, psychological, artistic and emotional.

Driven by an intense desire to move the existing geographic, cultural and imaginary borders, an unprecedented cooperation has taken place to design a multi-disciplinary and undreamed of cultural programme that offers unequalled opportunities. As pioneers of a new cultural exchange these cross-border projects eliminate all doubts about cultural and linguistic barriers. 57

This discourse and the fact that 130 of a total of 489 projects were regional projects seek to cast Luxembourg as model student of the European integration and forerunner of new regional policy fostering transborder cooperation.

Sibiu in Romania, a city far off from the “Greater Region”, was also associated. The objective was not to welcome an accession country and to help its integration in the European Union. This was a tribute to the ethno-cultural fraction of the administration pretending that Hermannstadt, today’s Sibiu, had been founded by Luxembourg immigrants in the 12th century and that the Saxons, a German speaking diaspora living in the surrounding region of Transylvania, are their descendants (Fehlen 2007). This myth is based on linguistic theories drawn up at the end of the 19th century, which have been proven wrong a long time ago (Dahmen and Kramer 1992). But science is powerless against the spin the state has put on this supposed kinship of the two communities and the money invested in the festivities and infrastructures in Rumania". 58

* The flag debate as well as the fascination with the invented colony in Romania indicate that a non-negligible part of Luxembourgers is receptive to an ethno-

58 600 000 Euros alone for the Casa Luxembourg, a cultural embassy set up in Sibiu with a number of rooms reserved for those who would want to study precisely this linguistic kinship.
cultural definition of national identity. By imagining a greater spatial dimension\(^59\) and an historic depth to the young micro-state they try to immunize the country against any social and political change in the name of a normative cultural identity, in the sense of the German *Leitkultur* (culture of reference). By doing so the "ethno-culturalists" negate the small dimension of their country which makes Luxembourg’s culture necessarily an intermixture of neighboring influences and a major part of Luxembourg nationals the result of past immigrations\(^60\).

Those who fear being "swamped" by foreigners and being unable to compete with them on the labor market forget that – to safeguard today’s wellbeing and the future of the pension system\(^61\) – there is no alternative for the Luxembourg micro-state but to increase the working population by immigration and by the attraction of still more transborder commuters. Thus, the small country is engaged in a spiral of growth, which appears, to the most skeptics, to be a Ponzi scheme. The dependence of Luxembourg’s economy from the finance industry renders the Grand-duchy vulnerable, especially because the decision-making power of the State, vis-à-vis the financial actors, is only marginal. So, the question how Luxembourg will cope with a financial world crisis is a real one, but the ethno cultural discourse and the withdrawal into oneself, into one’s own identity as the French put it (*repli identitaire*), is certainly not a valid answer.

**References**


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\(^59\) The alleged medieval precursors of the actual Grand-duchy are bigger and the 19th century immigration to North and South America has created communities which are sometimes thought of as putative colonies. *Luxembourg 2007* also helped with its funding to actualize the remembrance of the Luxembourg speaking community of the United States: The very rare offspring of the third or forth generation of Luxembourg immigration to the US who cultivate their roots in a folklorist way were subsidized and presented in the touching documentary *Luxemburg USA*. Even if not intended by the film-makers, more then one viewer has acclaimed them examples of patriotism for all Luxembourgers … while immigrants to the Grand-Duchy are supposed to assimilate.

\(^60\) In a survey 45% of Luxembourgers declared (Fehlen 1998: 60) that at least one of their parents or grand-parents was born abroad.

\(^61\) A report issued by the International Labour Organization in Geneva has shown that the precondition to maintaining the pension system would be an annual growth of 4% of the GDP and an annual job creation of 2% which will lead in 2050 to a resident population of 700 000 inhabitants. This number, mentioned for the first time in 2001, means a doubling of the population in 70 years. This study has also shown that in a short period of time Luxembourgish nationals (which today represent 58.4% of the population) would become a minority.
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LANGUAGE LANDSCAPES AND STATIC GEOGRAPHIES IN THE BALTIC SEA AREA

THOMAS LUNDÉN

Abstract:
The linguistic landscape of the Baltic Sea region shows a number of different relations between state territory and language, ranging from complete split at the state boundary to different forms of overlapping or mutual comprehension. It also encompasses a number of small language groups and even formerly large languages in stages of dissolution, as well as landscapes of language extinction. The article discusses in what ways and to which extent the language situation in areas is influenced by the political status of locally existent languages and dialects. In the Baltic Sea area, certain cases were found to be most prominent: Abstandsprachen (mutually unintelligible languages) with (virtually) no spatial overlap Ausbausprachen (closely related languages) with two standardised languages but dialectal gradualism. Different official Abstandsprachen, but local overlapping of spoken ones. Recognised linguistic minorities on one or both sides speaking the state language of the neighbour. The same autochthonous linguistic minority occupying both sides of the boundary area.

The language landscape of the Baltic Sea area is heavily influenced by geopolitical actions, but the relation between state and language is not a direct one. Obviously, the language policies of the existing territorial states influence the linguistic situation. But not always in the way decision-makers intended. Historical legacies play an important role in both the governmental policies and the attitudes of the population. Formal obstacles to communication can be overcome through political or economic incentives, but areas of similar speech can be divided by political pressures, resulting in a formal split into divergent languages. The political geography of languages must take the contextuality of communication into account if we are to understand the reality of language choice.

Introduction
Communication is the way to disseminate information. States use communication in order to function. Laws, rules, orders and other information deemed necessary for keeping the citizens loyal are being communicated either directly by the state or though dependent or independent media. In turn, most states depend on communication from its citizens (through ballots, polls, debates etc.) in order to adjust its policies to some decided relation to ‘the will of the people’.

In spite of some exceptions, ‘independent states’ are among the best defined spatial distributions in the world.
States mostly communicate through language. Language is also part of the rules system of the state, e.g. through the legislation concerning the use of an official, mostly standardised variant of speech and writing. There is thus an official landscape of languages strongly tied to the territorial system of states.

But besides being a communications vehicle, language is also a cultural phenomenon, reproduced by decisions by parents and peers, in compliance or in contradiction to state rules. Two landscapes thus appear: The territorial mosaic structure of the standardised state languages and the ‘wild’ and mixed terrain of actual language use.

The two interact and influence each other, with different directions and intensities under different political and societal circumstance, causing a spatial distribution of language use.

**Aim and definitions**

The aim of this article is to discuss and try to explain the distribution of languages in the Baltic Sea region in relation to the state territories and their policies related to language and national identity.

**Definitions**

A *language* is a dialect with a government, some scholars or a lobby group which have accomplished a political decision to make a language out of a dialect. (A travesty of *A schprach iz a dijalekt mit an armej un a flot*, written by Uriel Weinreich 1945 and ascribed to Joshua Fishman)\(^{62}\). A *landscape* according to the Swedish National Encyclopedia\(^{63}\) is ‘our physical environment in a wide sense’. In an old version of Roget’s Thesaurus\(^{64}\) the word appears in relation to words such as appearance, scenery etc. Language obviously appears in the landscape in the form of signs and symbols, but also in a less visible form as the spatial distribution of languages spoken and used\(^{65}\).

*Static* refers to stability, but obviously also to the state\(^{66}\), a stable realm which is defined as the organization that has monopoly on the legal use of violence.

*Geography* is a science aiming at the explanation of location and spatial relations, but as a school discipline also the description of location and space used for ‘national’, i.e. state or governmental indoctrination.

*National* is a word originally referring to a common origin of a people \(^{67}\) but, as a result of nation-state indoctrination, often used in a meaning of ‘encompassing the state territory and its population’\(^{68}\).

*Border*, in British English, refers to an *area*. Webster adds, ‘A border is that part of a surface lying along its boundary line’\(^{69}\). In American English, a border is usually referred to as the boundary of an independent state. And to make this even more

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\(^{62}\) Hansson et al. 2006

\(^{63}\) Nationalencyklopedin, band 12, p.95

\(^{64}\) Rodget’s (1953), p.137 (no.448: Appearance)

\(^{65}\) Lundén, 1993

\(^{66}\) For a discussion of the concepts of state and nation, see e.g. Taylor, 1999

\(^{67}\) Gardt, 2005


complicated: In US American English, a state is usually referred to as a nation, probably because the US ‘provinces’ are called states.

**Introduction: Identity, social communication and the spatiality of language**

In the standard dictionary of concepts, Roget’s Thesaurus, *identity* is under the section *Relation: Absolute relation*. As concepts related to identity are mentioned nouns, e.g.: sameness, homogeneity, unity, coincidence, coalescence, equality, self. Verbs, adjectives and adverbs reflect the same set of words.

Identity clearly reflects some relation. But in the context of this article, identity is not sameness, but the fact that people refer themselves to a group of people or to an organization to which they think, or say, they belong. This group of people could be ‘a people’, but also a religious group, a class (in the Marxist or the school sense of the word) or just a network of individuals with the same interests, e.g. radio amateurs or Esperantists. This group identity is strongly facilitated by the existence of a set of speech norms understood by all members of the group.

Karl Deutsch’s work on nationalism posits *social communication* as a prerequisite for a functional ‘nation state’. Inhabitants form overlapping formal and informal information networks which tend to forge the inhabitants of a state territory together. In other words, in this ideal situation, continuous (territorial) space and network space coincide. As a corollary to this, these networks abruptly cease at the territorial boundary. Here the concept of linguistic understanding is important.

The fact that language has a *spatial impact* through communication is much overlooked by social scientists and linguists alike. Languages have distributions which include both spatial and functional dimensions. Peter Trudgill in an article in 1975 pointed at the fact that when linguists after the second World War tended to become interested in the relation between language and social differentiation (metaphorically called ‘space’), the interest in ‘real space’ tended to wane. But, as Trudgill remarks, ‘the interplay of geography with factors such as age, sex, ethnic group and social class means that full descriptions of linguistic features are difficult to obtain, unless social factors such as these are taken into account’. To this we might add, the political status of languages. The combination of distribution and status results in a virtual ‘landscape’ of languages, where the actual use of one or several languages in different contexts is influenced by the political geography of the area.

The question to be discussed here is *in what ways and to which extent the language situation in a location is influenced by the political status of locally existent languages and dialects.*

Dennis Ager has analysed the way in which the state (government) has formulated language policies from a number of aspects: Identity, ideology, image, insecurity, inequality, integration and instrumentality. My intention here is not to explain the

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70 Rodget’s, 1953, p.5 no.13.
71 Deutsch, 1953
72 Mikhalchenko & Trushkova
73 Trudgill, p. 229
74 Laponce 2003, Lundén 1993
75 Ager 2001, p.3
motives behind each state’s language policy. Nonetheless, Ager’s analysis may help
us understand the attitudes of border dwellers in relation to the local language
landscape:

A speaker or sender intending to communicate in a specific ‘speech event’ does
so from within a setting of which he or she is consciously aware to a greater or
lesser extent. Senders understand, and in their message make more or less
deliberate use of, environmental characteristics like time, geography and setting,
each of which has possible effects on the form as well as the content of the
message.

Linguistic comprehension is obviously necessary for meaningful communication
across borders and boundaries. But between the two extremes of two mutually
unintelligible languages, and a total similarity of languages on either side of the
boundary, there is a vast array of possibilities. At an open boundary there is almost
always some kind of communication. At a closed boundary, by contrast, the same
language may develop in two different directions, as was perhaps the case of the two
German states. Language is thus both a medium and an object in boundary
relations.

Language change through migration and political coercion

The actual spatial extension of languages in the Baltic Sea area is a result of different
processes of expansion and decline. In its simplest form, language has followed the
migration of language bearers. Low German and, later, High German spread through
the colonisation of areas populated by speakers of Slavic, Baltic and Finno-Ugric
languages. In some of these areas, especially along the southern coast of the Baltic
Sea, the coloniser’s language became dominant, in others, German speakers formed
separate classes without mingling with the local rural population. The two German
languages also strongly influenced the Nordic (Scandinavian) languages through
commercial and industrial contacts but language bearers were eventually assimilated
into the local speech. In the Lithuanian-Polish state, immigrant groups were
welcomed, creating religious and also linguistic minorities; Jews, Tatars, Calvinists,
Karaims and others.

Religion influenced the language situation, first in the creation of written languages
based on the Latin script mainly by Catholic monks. In areas adopting the Protestant
reformation (16th century), state and church became united. The Bible and other
religious texts were spread in local languages chosen by the then existing states.
Lithuanian and Polish religious books were published in protestant Königsberg. In
the German case, High German was chosen at the expense of Low German. Further
east, the Orthodox Church used Church Slavic while the Russian, Belorusian and
Ukrainian languages were developed in the 17th Century. In the eastern borderlands of
Lithuania-Poland and Russia, religion more than language was a denominator of
‘nationality’.

76 Praxenthaler
77 Lundén 2004
78 Maciejewski, p. 162 f.
In the early 19th century, under the influence of romanticism and ethnic revival (as inspired by Herder), intellectuals and educationalists started to cultivate the rural dialects, developing them into standardized languages. With industrialisation and urbanisation began a formation of ‘nationalities’ or nations, groups of people demanding autonomy or even statehood for the ethnic territory. This in turn was met with repression and attempts at assimilation by the dominant states in the area, Germany, Russia and Sweden. Especially the repression of the Polish-speaking areas created a link between the language and the Catholic Church that weakened the national allegiance of Polish-speaking Protestants (Masurians).

The aftermath of the First World War created a radical shift of territories, the birth of 4-5 ‘nationalising states’ and plebiscites in ethnically mixed or questionable areas of the loosing states. Even with an ’ethnic principle’ in the delimitation of the new states, there were substantial ethnic minorities in all of the states of the Baltic Sea area.

The Second World War and the Nazi occupation of eastern central Europe brought about an almost total eradication of the Jewish population of the former Lithuanian-Polish commonwealth and a weakening of the other autochthonous groups of the area, to be supplanted by Russian speakers. The outcome of World War II brought further changes of both population and territories. Instead of plebiscites, the victorious powers, especially the Soviet Union, annexed the three Baltic States and a considerable portion of Poland and German East Prussia, forcing large portions of the local population out of the area. The population of former Eastern Poland were forced to occupy the new western territories, in turn forcing its German population to leave. Likewise, the Soviet annexation of Eastern Finland caused a mass exodus of Karelian Finns. Some 45 years of Soviet power in the Baltic States resulted in a great influx of population from the other part of the Soviet Union, mainly Russian speakers.

History matters. The memories and myths of ethnic cleansing live on and are used as arguments for and against minority language rights.

Language situations in the Baltic Sea Area
As a result of the political and demographic development, the linguistic landscape of the Baltic Sea region shows a number of different lateral and hierarchical relations ranging from complete split at the state boundary to different forms of overlapping or mutual comprehension. It also encompasses a number of small language groups and even formerly large languages in stages of dissolution, as well as landscapes of language extinction.

Complete language split

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79 Lundén, 1979.
80 Kossert, 2006
81 Lundén 2006
In most cases where completely different languages are used on either side of the state boundary one finds a previous history of deportation or ethnic cleansing. Finland and Russia have a long history of shifting boundaries and mutual language influence. After the Soviet take-over of Finland’s eastern borderlands in 1940 and 1944, however, the newly-annexed areas were repopulated with Russian speakers from various parts of the Union. One part of the area was attached to the Soviet Republic of Finno-Karelia (later degraded into the Autonomous Republic of Karelia). This particular area was officially bilingual, but because the resident Finns had been expelled and replaced by immigrating Russian speakers, the only remaining Finnish and other Finno-Ugric speakers were in the areas east of the previous boundary, which is far from the present borderlands. Finnish is no longer an official language of the Karelian Republic in Russia and the state boundary is an example of a total split between two mutually unintelligible languages.

A similar situation exists at the German-Polish borderlands. The new Oder-Neisse (Odra/Nysa) boundary was established in 1945 through what had for many centuries been a German (or Germanised) river basin. Since Poland took over the administration of the eastern side, however, that area was repopulated with ethnic Poles, Ukrainians and Belarusians, most of which had been driven out of what had formerly been Poland’s eastern territories, which were taken over by the USSR. The East German regime officially regarded Poland as a friendly neighbour. Nonetheless, restrictions were put on cross-border contacts and movements, and the knowledge of the neighbour’s language was and remains negligible although commercial interests lead to a greater number of Poles knowing German than vice versa. This history of division and resettlement is clearly reflected in the attitudes and cross-border contacts of people in the borderland. There have been attempts to create bi-lingual schools for pupils from both sides of the boundary on the German side. Some have been abandoned because of lack of interest from German parents but in other cases a school has been kept in order for it to survive at all in an area of depopulation.

A different reason for a total language split at the boundary is the fact that the boundary was, in fact, drawn according to the criteria of language. This was the situation when boundaries between the three republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were created in 1919-1920. This was carried through - aside from a few unavoidable exceptions - without marooning any language minority on the ‘wrong’ side.

When two bordering linguistic groups do not understand each other at all, the role of formal education becomes important. The teaching of a common foreign language, e.g., English, may facilitate border communication. On the other hand, resorting to a foreign language will obviate the proximity effect and alienate the border population from what actually unites the area - landscape, traditions and symbols. In the twin

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82 Hakamies
83 Engman
84 Stokłosa
85 Rada.
86 For a discussion of such exceptions, see Ščerbinskis
town of Valga/Valka on the Estonian-Latvian border, the two autochthonous groups, Estonians and Latvians, are distinctly separated by the boundary. Their attitudes towards each other can be described as positive or neutral. If they communicated, it was through Russian - increasingly, today, replaced by English\textsuperscript{87}.

**Border language overlap**

In many cases a language’s territorial dominance does not correspond to the boundary of ‘its’ nation-state. Here, we can discern two types of cases, having to do either with antecedent population or with recent immigration. In the case of antecedent population, the boundary was either drawn according to principles other than those of language differentiation, or cut through an area in which two or more language groups were living interspersed, something that rendered a water-tight linguistic delineation impossible.

When the Finland – Sweden border area was delineated in 1809, it was defined by three rivers, Torne, Muonio and Künkämä. The only town affected; that of Torneå/Tornio, on the western side of Torne River, was delivered over to the victorious Russian side and included in the Great Duchy of Finland under Russia. The language boundary, however, runs further west. This left a large slice of the Finnish-speaking area within Sweden’s borders. In this area, Finnish was used in local schools and churches up until the 1880s. Thereafter, during the strengthening of nationalistic demands throughout Europe (which also resulted in, e.g., Russian attempts to russify Finland), the Finnish language was more or less ousted from Sweden’s official life, to be replaced by Swedish\textsuperscript{88}.

The result today is that the whole local population of the area speaks Swedish, while a decreasing and ageing number also speaks Finnish. The variety of Finnish spoken is, however, a combination of the old local river dialect of Finnish, added with Swedish words which are incorporated into the very different grammar structure of Finnish. This locally-spoken Finnish is an example of what Kloss terms a ‘wild dialect’\textsuperscript{89}, that is, a version of the language which is unsupported by knowledge of or instruction in the standardised version of the same language. This accounts for a situation in which border residents on the Swedish side show different stages of bilingualism, ranging from standard Finnish to no Finnish at all, while the residents of the Finnish side of the boundary speak little or no Swedish. The bilingual school in Haparanda, Sweden, recruits pupils from both sides of the boundary, but most of its ‘Swedish’ pupils are of ethnic Finnish origin\textsuperscript{90}. Politically, on the Finland side the local river dialect ‘tornion murre’ was developed into a closer relation to standard Finnish while in Sweden the same speech changed into a ‘wild dialect’ unofficially called Meänkieli, “Our tongue”. In the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century, and after a long public denial of the value of the dialect, two solutions for the local area of Sweden crystallized:

\textsuperscript{87} Zalamans
\textsuperscript{88} Elenius
\textsuperscript{89} Kloss, 1952, see also Hansson et al, 2006, p. 36: another, and more neutral expression is ‘Dachlose Mundarten’, dialects without ceiling.
\textsuperscript{90} Lundén & Zalamans, Lundén 2004
a) An acceptance of standard Finnish as an official minority language including the ‘wild dialect’ was recommended by a state commission of experts and politicians (with a reservation by a small minority)\(^91\)

b) This minority called for a formal split between standard Finnish and the local version, ‘Meänkieli’ to be recognised as a minority language in its own right.

The ‘remiss’ process, (that is an official request for opinions about the commission’s proposal, version a), was marked by a very selective pick of opinions\(^92\). The proponents of Meänkieli convinced the Ministry of Culture to propose to the Parliament the ‘split version’ (b), thereby establishing a new ‘language’ developed with state subsidies with a standard grammar, lexicon etc\(^93\). The result has been an unfortunate split between on one hand, the interests of Finland and of the major town of Haparanda, proponents of standard Finnish, and small but vociferous groups of Meänkieli adherents in the northern municipalities and in a small academic network in the south of Sweden\(^94\).

Another case of language border overlap is represented by the case of Denmark-Germany, where there is a certain balance of long standing autochthonous minorities. In this case, the status of ‘national minority’ is more important than the minorities’ actual use of language. Both minorities are locally well integrated into the states in which they reside, but they also follow developments in their kin-nationality states and cultivate their kin-nation state language\(^95\). On the Germany side of this area, however, the linguistic status of Low German and North Frisian, while sociologically quite weak, has been legally strengthened by Germany’s decision to adopt the Council of Europe’s definition of autochthonous minorities.

The eastern areas of southern Estonia and of Latvia have an ethnolinguistic setup deviating from standard speech and ethnicity. In Estonia’s Võru district a rather different dialect is spoken, sometimes launched as a language\(^96\), and the Setu ethnic group living in the Petseri area on the Russian border speak a similar dialect heavily influenced by their Orthodox faith\(^97\). Latvia’s eastern province of Letgallia had long been characterised by an ethnically diverse population, consisting of Latvians (speaking a dialect rather different from standard Latvian\(^98\) plus minorities of Russians, Belarusians, Poles and Jews (most of whom were exterminated or fled during the Second World War).

\(^91\) Steg mot en minoritetspolitik, (1997)
\(^92\) For a heavy criticism of the handling of the ’remiss’ answers, see Lundén, 1999
\(^93\) Proposition 19978/99
\(^94\) For opposite views on the language question see e.g. Hansegård and Winsa
\(^95\) Kühl et al.
\(^96\) Raag, 2004
\(^98\) Bengtsson 2001
In the latter case; that of immigration, members of a neighbouring state’s dominant language group has recently ‘spilled over’ and settled on the side of another majority language state. A very specific case is posed by the immigration of people representing an occupying neighbour. In the Baltic states, the Soviet period – occupation and annexation - 1940/1944 - 1991 brought an enormous influx of a mainly Russian-speaking population, which was settled in the major industrial centres and sites of strategic importance. Since then, the north-eastern part of Estonia has been dominated by Russian speakers who are directly linked through contacts and family relations to the St. Petersburg agglomeration in neighbouring Russia. While the city of Narva did have a significant ethnic autochthonous Russian minority before World War II, the entire population was replaced by a new immigrant population and their descendants, which is almost 100% Russian-speaking and usually monolingual\(^99\). Both Estonia and Latvia declared their respective languages and alphabets the only official media of communication. Both of the two Baltic States require residents to learn a certain amount of the official state language in order to qualify for citizenship\(^100\). This behaviour is typical of ‘nationalizing states’\(^101\) representing a period of ‘nationalisation’ which may occur at different junctures in geo-history. It should be remembered that the overwhelming part of the Russian speakers are defined as immigrants and are not included in the definition of linguistic or cultural minorities in the charters of the Council of Europe, and that in addition each state has the right to define what is a minority.

As mentioned before, in neither the Estonian nor the Latvian case did more than a minority of the immigrants and their descendants learn the national language\(^102\). Since they make up a considerable portion of each country’s population, their loyalty to their new states of residence is being questioned. In the boundary area, the ability to partake of Russian media and a feeling of being neglected tend to isolate this Russian-speaking population, hindering its integration into Estonian or Latvian society\(^103\) as the riots in Tallinn in 2007 about a monument to a liberating or re-occupying Soviet soldier has shown. In the border town of Valga/Valka in Estonia/ Latvia, the Russian immigrants settled without consideration for the republic’s territories. Their networks of acquaintances cross the state boundary, but now they are increasingly being separated and assimilated into each ‘nation-state’\(^104\).

**Borders of semi-communication**

The German sociolinguist Heinz Kloss made a distinction between *Abstandsprachen* and *Ausbausprachen*\(^105\). While *Abstandsprachen* are clearly distinct from and unintelligible to each other, *Ausbausprachen* either derive from a specific version of a particular language or have been developed out of one or more of a number of closely related dialects. From a communications point of view, *Abstandssprachen* should


\(^{100}\) Lundén, 2004, Zalamans

\(^{101}\) Brubaker

\(^{102}\) Gardt, Mikhalchenko & Trushkova

\(^{103}\) Kronenfeld, Novikova

\(^{104}\) Zalamans

\(^{105}\) Kloss 1952
rather be translated ‘barrier marking languages’ and Ausbausprachen ‘languages with conquerable barriers’\textsuperscript{106}.

While communication between mutually unintelligible languages necessitates translation or learning a second language, relations between related developed languages represent a situation of ‘semi-communication’\textsuperscript{107} where the actual amount of communication may depend largely on attitudes and interest. In an early work, Nebensprachen (1929), Kloss pointed out how bias affects the relations between closely related languages. German speakers tended to look upon Dutch as a dialect or jargon. This was reflected in the fact that - at the time when Kloss wrote - most Netherlanders spoke or at least understood High German quite well, whereas virtually no Germans understood (or cared to understand) Dutch (unless they happened to speak Low German, which is very close to, or a variant of, Dutch)\textsuperscript{108}.

The Norwegian-Swedish boundary formally marks the difference between two languages, but in another historical setting they might have been termed dialects or versions of each other. As in the case of Germany-Netherlands and e.g. Russia-Ukraine, however, communication and understanding is rather one-sided. The smaller community is usually relatively more open to influences from its larger neighbour\textsuperscript{109}.

In situations of semi-communication, the spread of standardised single languages inherent in the technological development of media and in higher and more extensive levels of education may in fact widen the communications gap and decrease understanding of the neighbouring language\textsuperscript{110}. In this case, the attitudes of the border population are often decisive, although these are often, in turn, strongly affected by territorial indoctrination exercised by the national mass media and state schools.

The occurrence of semi-communication depends, thus, not only on individual incentives but also on official language policy. Belarus is an example of fluctuating attitudes to a language. During the inter-war years, when parts of Belarus were a Soviet republic, large areas of Belarusian speech were located in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. The Belarusian language was favoured by the Soviet authorities, mostly for irredentist reasons (and this can be compared to the situation with Romanian/Moldavian and Finnish/Karelian in other parts of the Soviet borderlands). With the annexation of those irredenta areas after the Hitler-Stalin agreement in 1940 and the heavy population losses in World War II, the Republic of Belarus became more russified. Belarusian was maintained (but also made more similar to Russian), as a symbolic rather than a living language. With Belarus’s sudden independence in 1991, Belarusian was revived and established as the sole official language. The Lukashenka regime, however, soon reintroduced Russian as one of the two official languages. In reality, indeed, Russian is the language used by most Belarusians in

\textsuperscript{106} Thanks to Matthias Vogt for this suggestion (vogt@kultur.org)
\textsuperscript{107} Haugen
\textsuperscript{108} Kloss, 1929
\textsuperscript{109} Søvik, 2007
\textsuperscript{110} Lundén 2004
their commercial, private and official communication. Today, Belarusian is mainly spoken and used by minorities in Belarus’s western border states. As long as it is being taught in Belarus, it is also a means of acquiring an understanding of Polish and Ukrainian. Thus, like Irish in the twentieth century, Belarusian is increasingly a language used by poor peasants and by ethnically conscious intellectuals. Belarus’s relation to its neighbour state Russia is thus in reality one of equal language, its relation to Poland and Ukraine one of semi-communication, and to Lithuania and Latvia and, in part, Poland, one of language equality only in communication with minority groups.

Overlapping autochthonous stateless minorities

Several European minority ethnic groups have no kin-nation state. Some of these groups have areas of settlement that cover boundary areas. The Sámi of northern Europe, for instance, live in Norway, Finland, Sweden and Russia. This alone would seem to hinder communication; but from a perspective of linguistic communication the situation is even worse, as the Sámi language(s) consists of up to ten different variants, most of which are mutually unintelligible. Moreover, the division into dialects does not follow the state boundaries. Rather, it crosses them, so that South Sámi is spoken in Norway and Sweden and Northern Sámi in Finland, Sweden and Norway. For a small language which consists of even smaller sublanguages, territorial division into areas that correspond to national boundary restrictions (at least historically, with repercussion that reach into the present) and into areas with different regulations and legislation has caused substantial harm to the ability of the Sámi to communicate with each other. One recent example of this is the introduction of a spell-check, as used in word processing, for the North Sámi language. Only Norway has agreed to provide financial help for its development. Another example of the difficulties of inter-Sámi communication is the daily television news programs, broadcast jointly in North Sámi by Sweden, Norway and Finland. These encounter problems in subtitling and translation, as many of the interviews have to be rendered in one of the three state languages, which are, in their turn, divided into two extremely different language families.

In the southern part of the Baltic Sea area, a number of small ethnic minorities keep an emotional relation to languages more or less forgotten, mostly remnants of groups admitted to the area in the time of the Lithuanian-Polish republic: Yiddish, Tatar, Karaim and Roma. While these group form networks of adherents in the neighbouring states, the Kashub semi-language, a border language of Danzig and Poland in the inter-war period, is now appearing in Poland, so far without ethnic pretensions.

‘Archaeological’ linguistic landscapes

Because of the rapid population changes of the Baltic Sea area, especially 1914-1991, there exists a landscape of place names and inscriptions different from the speech of

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111 Ioffe
112 For a discussion of the language problems of linguistic minorities, see, e.g., Lundén 1979 and Laponce 2003
113 Maciejewski
the existing population. There might even be several linguistic layers, as in northwestern Poland, where a Slavic layer was replaced by Low German eventually succeeded by High German and finally Polish. In former East Prussia a Baltic Prussian layer visible in many Germanised place names was almost totally eradicated and in the Kaliningrad area replaced with place names commemorating Soviet generals, soldiers and even railways. In the former Lithuanian-Polish republic the presence of a large Jewish population is visible in partly destroyed cemeteries in Hebrew and commemorating plaques in Yiddish. In Grodno, Belarus, a plaque in Belarusian commemorates the house of Zamenhof, the inventor of Esperanto, the hope for understanding among a population of half-polyglots. A cemetery in the neighbourhood shows graves all in Polish erected in the war year of 1944.

While relics mind of lost language landscapes, recent language indications may give a false impression of language use. In Narva of today, as in most of the Russianized areas of Estonia and Latvia, almost everything public is in the official language of the respective nation-states. But the recognition of minority languages may also give a false impression. In the area around Cottbus/Chośebus south of Berlin, the Low Sorbian language is officially recognised, but the reality is one of language decay and partly language death. It is remarkable that in the Protestant Low Sorbian area the language died faster than in the High Sorbian Catholic area around Bautzen/Budušin. The Cottbus area in the marshy Spreewald near Berlin was long isolated, but the Brandenburgian administration and the Protestant church were effective in Germanizing the population long before Nazism, while the Saxonian Catholic Sorbs kept their language in defiance of a Protestant ruler. The strong political and financial support given to the two languages by the GDR did not help its survival; it rather caused resentment among non-Sorbian neighbours114.

Summary and conclusion
Judging from a number of Baltic Sea area borders, one can classify the relations between the territorial state languages and the actual spatial distribution of speech and linguistic symbols (geosociologically rather than linguistically) as follows:

Abstandsprachen with (virtually) no spatial overlap:
In these cases trans-boundary communication requires learning a foreign language, either that of the neighbouring state or a third, ‘neutral’ language. In most cases, the non-overlapping distance situation derives from a relatively recent population ‘cleansing’ on at least one side of the border, which further creates a situation of conflict, or at least a lack of interest in developing contacts, between the two neighbouring states.

Ausbausprachen with two standardised languages but dialectal gradualism
There is a sliding scale, here, from minor differences between the languages, to the complete mutual unintelligibility of Abstandsprachen. Attitudes towards the other language, and/or rewards for using it, obviously play an important role here, as

learning can begin by immersion without formal learning. Here, problems can be posed by a state’s official refusal to recognize the status of the trans-boundary, standard language, as in the case of, e.g., the attitude of the Bulgarian state towards Macedonian.

**Different official distance languages, but local overlapping of spoken ones**

In most cases in which state official languages overlap, the minority’s overlap language is not officially recognised. Despite its frequent use as a means of communication, the language tends to have an inferior status. It tends, further, towards development into a wild dialect which is not accepted by the state representatives of either majority language. In later years, we have seen the development of wild dialects into, at least, demands for recognition as independent languages. It is hardly a coincidence that such developments have been strongest in states where the minority language was long oppressed as German Alsatian in France, Slovene Windisch in post World War I Austria and Finnish Meänkieli in centralist Sweden. In all cases, the “kin-language state”, Germany, Slovenia and Finland, have chosen not to intervene, but there is, in my opinion, a concealed Finnish scepticism against the creation of standard Meänkieli. In Finland, Meänkieli is seen as a way to weaken the status of the Finnish language in Sweden by dividing it into two versions, which in turn weakens the arguments of Finland Swedes for a stronger support of the respective language minorities.

**Recognised linguistic minorities on one or both sides speaking the state language of the neighbour**

This situation is often a legacy of the German and Soviet tradition of recognising minority languages. However, while formally protecting the minority, this legal status may tend to stigmatize the minority and make it appear as ‘foreign’ to the majority population of the country of residence. Poland and Lithuania have overlapping language minorities, and in spite of some formal difficulties, mainly because of the rigidity of language and language legislation, the reciprocity calls for easier settlement of conflicts. In the Poland-Belarus case, however, the same situation of reciprocity of minorities has rather strengthened official conflicts. A Polish ethnologist, Slawoj Szynkiewicz\(^{115}\) has shown that at the 2000 census most Polish minorities, as a result of self-reporting ethnicity, reached much lower figures than expected by their organisations – with one remarkable exception – the appearance of an unexpected group – Silesians.

**The same autochthonous linguistic minority occupying both sides of the boundary area**

It is hard to find a border where the situation of a ‘double minority language group’ is similar on both sides of the border. Usually, each of the states exerts pressure on the autochthonous minority to demonstrate allegiance to its state of domicile by adopting the state language. This decreases these minorities’ ability to provide trans-boundary interaction. In spite of the efforts of the Sámi to co-operate across state boundaries,

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\(^{115}\) Szynkiewicz
the development is running at different paces especially in the case of Norway-Sweden, where boundary relations in Sápmi, the Sami area are even strained.

As this analysis hopefully shows, the language landscape of the Baltic Sea area is heavily influenced by geopolitical actions. But the relation between state and language is not a direct one. Obviously, the language policies of the existing territorial states influence the linguistic situation. But not always in the way decision-makers intended. In spite of state oppression the Polish language survived, helped by religion. The GDR regime, by actively supporting the Sorbian languages, actually assisted its decline. And the official recognition of Meänkieli divides the Finnish speaking areas of northern Sweden into two fighting factions.

Language matters. Formal obstacles can be overcome through political or economic incentives. Similarly, areas of similar speech can be divided by political pressures, resulting in a formal split into divergent languages. But in spite of political efforts from above, there are counter tendencies, spurred by value systems and financial rewards. On one side, people fear the risk of being stigmatized as minorities, deviating from the nation state unity. On the other, if a state has a liberal policy towards minorities, new ones may appear when the benefits are clear, as with the Silesians. We can see this in the development of ‘new’ languages all over Europe, supported by cultural subsidies.

The political geography of languages must take the contextuality of communication into account if we are to understand the reality of border life.

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The Idea of Europe will be fulfilled by Muslim Turkey: Nurculuk arguments

Klas Grinell

Abstract

This article examines the articulation of an idea of Europe by the most important writers within the Turkish nurculuk movement. The movement is shown to be one of the most important actors in Turkish debate around the relation between Islam and European modernity. Three generations of founding and leading writers, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Fethullah Gülen and Ali Ünal, are analysed.

The article has two aspects. It presents how three generations of representatives of the nurculuk movement argue when they see Muslim Turkey as a possible fulfilment of the idea of Europe. It also suggests an interpretation of the presented thinkers and their texts as border thinking. It argues that a theory of borderland identities opens for a more complex understanding of the idea of Europe.

For every generation it becomes increasingly difficult to pin the nurculuk proponents to an Islamic tradition. It is shown how they take their arguments from Western philosophers and scientists as well as from the Islamic theological tradition. The objective is to take all the positive aspects of the Idea of Europe and fulfil it by reuniting it with the spirituality and respect for the creator that Islam contains.

The idea of Europe turns out to be something very vague and opaque. There can be very different interpretations of the content of this idea. An Islamic positive idea of Europe like the Nurculuk’s is shown to be a possible alternative.

“A community’s survival depends on idealism and good morals, as well as on being able to reach the necessary level in scientific and technological progress”, says the Turkish preacher Fethullah Gülen. He and millions of others in what is called the nurculuk movement argues that the dominant Western civilization has lost the good morals, and that many Muslim movements lacks the necessary interest in science and technology.

In this presentation I have two objectives. The main one is to present how three generations of representatives of the nurculuk movement, one of which is Fethullah Gülen, argue when they see Muslim Turkey as a possible fulfilment of the idea of Europe. My other objective is to suggest an interpretation of the presented thinkers and their texts as a kind of border thinking. That could contribute to the theorizing on borderland identities and open for a more complex understanding of the idea of Europe. My hope is that this will shed some light on the debate on Turkey’s place in Europe and the European Union.

Turkey identifies itself as a European state. The official identification has also been strongly secular. But the majority of Turkey’s citizens have always identified themselves as Muslims. These differing identifications have come to the front in the coverage of Turkey’s negotiations to become a member of the European Union. But is there really an opposition between these identifications? Can Turkey not be a Modern Muslim European state, whose citizens identify themselves as Muslim and European? Many, among them for example French president Sarkozy, seem to have a firmly negative answer to that question. In Turkey there are more and more people that are involved in formulating such a European Muslim identity. One important actor in this process is the nurculuk movement that engages at least six million people in Turkey today. And they are gaining more participants, in Turkey and around the world.

The founder of this movement was the Kurdish imam Ustad Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1877-1960). Said Nursi was deeply involved in the transformation from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, but as the Republic grew more and more laicist-secularist he came to be considered a threat and was put in house arrest up to his death in 1960. During all those years in exile Said Nursi composed a work of several thousand pages called the *Risale-i Nur*. It was distributed in secrecy and gained many devoted readers and students. The movement called nurculuk is not an organisation with members, nurculuks are all those that regularly get together in study groups to read and discuss the *Risale-i Nur*. It is of course very hard to estimate their number.

The most influential nurculuk preachers today is Fethullah Gülen (1938-). Gülen has a very strong position in the “religions dialogue industry” in the United States, and is one of the most widely spread Muslim preachers world wide. He got his stately imam licence in 1959. In the 1960ties he was one of the leaders of the Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey with close ties to right wing nationalistic organisation the Turkish Hearth (*Türk Ocağı*). But he distanced himself from their connections to political violence and as Said Nursi before him instead worked outside politics to change people’s minds to build a better society. For every year he has attracted more and more followers and has become more and more international in his approach. In the 1990ties he stated to stay in Pennsylvania and since 1999 he lives there. With an increasing professionalism the different actors in the nurculuk movement spread there specific Modern Turkish interpretation of Islam over the

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117 On the ruling Justice and Development party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) as an actor in this process, se Duran, Burhanettin, “JDP and Foreign Policy as an agent of transformation” in M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.), *The emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2006.


world through books and the internet. One of the more prominent in the new generation is Ali Ünal, who among other things has produced an English translation of the *Qu’ran* with extensive interpretations.

Said Nursi’s and Fethullah Gülen’s works are read by millions of people in over 20 languages. There are over 250 schools outside of Turkey that are run according to the educational ideas of Gülen, mainly in Central Asia and the Balkans, but also in most countries in South East Asia and one in almost every Western country. The nurculuk connected daily *Zaman* is one of Turkey’s leading news paper, with a daily English edition, it is also published in over ten countries in their respective languages. But it is important to stress that nurculuk is not a religious order or an organisation. It is very hard to say who represents who and what the connections between different activities are.

**Bediüzzaman Said Nursi’s Damascus sermon 1911**

Like a whole line of contemporary thinkers in Arabic contexts, like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Qasim Amin and Rashid Rida, the Kurdish imam Ustad Bediüzzaman Said Nursi talks about the need for Islam to regain its fundament and realise that it is as much its own short comings that has made Europe into the leading power in the world. One of his first appearances infront of a larger audience was at the Sermon he held in the Ummayad mosque of Damascus in early 1911. The sermon was published in Damascus the same week and republished in Arabic in Istanbul in 1922. In 1951 Said Nursi himself translated it into Turkish with additional comments, and included it in his collected work *Risale-i Nur*. My presentation of Said Nursi’s thought will build on that Turkish version from the 1950s. According to Islam there are two main paths to knowledge: the Qu’ran and the Creation. Modern science has woken man and shown him the true nature of humanity and the Creation; it has done this by using reason in the way that the Qu’ran again and again urges us to do.

Therefore, in the future when reason, science and technology prevail, of a certainty that will be the time the Qu’ran will gain ascendancy, which relies on rational proofs and invites the reason to confirm its pronouncements.

In the early twentieth century Said Nursi saw that the spread of scientific thinking in Europe had made the Europeans get rid of their ignorance, barbarity and their bigotry.

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125 [www.zaman.com](http://www.zaman.com).
in religious matters. Now Europe could finally be open to the Qu’ran’s rational proofs of its truth. If we sharpen his formulations just a bit we might say that the Enlightenment was merely a step on the road to the Islamisation of Europe. The Enlightenment was needed to make the Europeans rational enough to understand Islam and become Muslims. But the spread of science was a progress also for those who had been Muslims for a long time. Many within Islam had lost their contact with Islam’s fundamental message and sunk into superstition and ignorance. Said Nursi’s task was to show that there was no opposition between science and Islam. Even if the European civilisation had given birth to modern science and thereby could explain how the Creation functions, it wasn’t built on virtue and righteousness. It was built on “lust and passion, rivalry and oppression”. European civilisation as a whole has been dominated by evil powers that have led it to try to dominate the rest of the world for its own gains.

A just and good civilisation can be brought about only when the scientific and technological progresses made in the West are put under the guidance of Islam and within the limits of the Shariah that ensures a peaceful future for everyone. The Shariah bears the ideals of constitutionalism and opposition to despotism; that is not something Islam has to learn from Europe. Said Nursi thought that such a civilisation could come about in a reformed Ottoman Empire that took Islam as its national unifying principle and symbol. In the period up to the formation of the Turkish Republic he was an active political voice arguing that the only road to national unity and a constitutional state was by having the Shariah as the state’s foundation. Islam is above politics, Said Nursi says, but all politics could and should be a tool for Islam and its truths, as long as Islam never becomes reduced to a tool for politics. When the modernistic groups gained control over the political process he abandoned politics and used all his strength to save and further spirituality on an individual level, rather than a political one. When the democratic party won the elections in 1950 the circumstances changed and Said Nursi once again tried to gain influence in the political sphere. No matter what period in his life one examines he always holds forth the positive importance of science for true Islam, and he always emphasises that it has to be conducted within the limits of the Sharia. Thus can a civilisation taking the best from Europe and Islam be created and the true Idea of Europe be fulfilled.

Fethullah Gülen: Towards a global civilisation of love and tolerance
The most influential propagator for Said Nursi’s teachings during the last 20 or 30 years has, as already mentioned, been Fethullah Gülen. His message is in many ways an updated and more accessible version of many of Said Nursi’s foundational ideas. One important change is that the good civilisation to be created with the merging of European an Islamic Ideas with Gülen has become much more Turkish. Gülen often points to Turkish Islam with its Sufi strands as being more focused on tolerance and love than the Arabic interpretation of Islam. This makes Turkey into a place with unique possibilities to complete the developments that so far have taken place separately in Europe and in Islam, and create a global civilisation of love and tolerance.

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129 Ibid., p. 38.
Gülen have grown up and been educated in the secular Turkish Republic. He has thereby had a natural relationship with Western culture and philosophy and relates to it closer than Said Nursi who speaks about the importance of science to understand Islam correctly in general terms.

Throughout his writings Gülen tries to construct a contrapuntal Western scientific canon representing true progress. He builds a platonic tradition more responsive to the spiritual dimensions that positivism has denied, with devastating outcomes, according to Gülen.

Bergson, Eddington, J. Jeans, Pascal, Bernhard Bavink, and Heisenberg are just as important in Western thought as Comte, Darwin, Molescholt, Czolba, and Lamarck. Indeed, it is hard to find an atheist scientist and philosopher before the mid-nineteenth century.

Gülen doesn’t say much about what it is in these writers’ and scientists’ works that he thinks is important. There are names that give his argumentation legitimacy and strength and they fill a rhetorical rather than a theoretical function. Here it is important that he speaks about Europe as a something to admire and follow, but also as something lacking certain qualities that the Islamic tradition can contribute with. Materialistic conclusions drawn from European philosophy and European scientific developments are not only contrary to the message of the Qu’ran, but they are not scientifically valid or representative of the big philosophers of European modernity such as Descartes, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, Gülen states.

Ali Ünal: Islam addresses contemporary issues
Ali Ünal explains that there are different kinds of laws governing the world, those that should govern the life of the Islamic ummah are in the Shariah, those that shall govern nature are the laws that God has placed in nature and that the scientists call natural laws. It is important to see that the natural laws are divine laws, and to realise that they are Gods way of keeping order in the Creation and that they therefore do not stand above Gods active involvement in the Creation. Ünal also claims that there is a difference between absolute, general and relative truths. Absolute truths are about such matters as for example god’s existence. Scientific laws are general truths, they have exceptions and are mere theories about Creation that will develop and be adapted to according to their time and place. Relative truths are those truths that are totally dependent on the perspective of the beholder, they re only true in relation to one specific place, time and disposition.

Ünal develops his arguments in a closer relation with the canonical figures of the West, and also uses Western critique of positivism to argue that religion, and in particular Islam, is the future. The interest in religion is growing everywhere, while modernity is instead gaining more and more critics and opponents. Many claim that religion leads to fanaticism and violence, Ünal writes. But since the eighteenth

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132 Ibid. p. 149.
century all extermination and most of the killings in the world have been in the name of entities like modernity, progress, the white race, and communism. The most important factor behind western science and technology is the resources that the colonial conquest of the world gave the West, Ünal says. To say that religion is the source of violence in modern times is considered historically wrong.  

If handled in the correct way science and technology are positive values that can create wealth and wellbeing and lead us into a happy future. For this to be, they have to be held back by a respect for Creation. This will be the case in a Islamic modernity. “Seeing religion and science or scientific studies as two conflicting disciplines is a product of the Western attitude toward religion and science.”¹³⁵ It was already with Paul that the Christian relegation of nature and this world to a lesser domain started, claims Ünal and traces the denial of this world through Western Christian history and argues that this led to a rift between rationality and religion. There is also a somewhat closer discussion about Descartes role in the development of this dualism, which leads him to a different opinion than Gülen. For Gülen it is important that Descartes was a Christian, for Ünal it is more important that he strengthens the dualism that leads to materialism and Western modernity’s disconnection from religion.¹³⁶ This is a disconnection that he claims never have taken place in Islam. “More than 700 [Qur’anic] verses urge people to study natural phenomena and to think, reason, search, observe, take lessons, reflect, and verify.”¹³⁷ The temporary civilisatory backwardness of the Islamic world came about because the Muslims forgot this and left scientific studies to materialistic scientist in the West. With environmental disasters and ruthless militarisms it has now became clear what devastating results this division between reason and spirituality leads to. It is high time Islam takes on the civilisational lead and fulfils the Idea of Europe and puts progress in the service of man as a whole: with body, spirit and soul. That is Ünal’s message.

Nurculuk and border thinking
Are the nurculuks modern? Is that a question that can be answered? Is it even a meaningful question? I think it is a strange question that is asked all too often, and the questioners don’t really seem to have thought about what they are asking for. Are they reliable? Are they dangerous? Or: are they like us?

The organisation of the nurculuk movement can be seen as an almost too fitting example of network societal organisation. They are very successful on the internet. They dress modern; they speak in the modern lingua franca of English. They are (more and more) well versed in modern science and technology. From these perspectives they are very modern, or even post modern.

But the interpretation of Islam they have is in many ways traditionalistic. They are conservative in the way that they want to draw attention to certain lost strands of the Islamic tradition. They say there is no such thing as Modern Islam; that Islam doesn’t have to become modern to be acceptable or good.

¹³⁴ Ibid., pp. 46 and 63.
¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 58.
¹³⁶ Ibid., pp. 79.
¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 81.
A good way to analyse the nurculuk views on the relation between Islam and Europe is to see them as an example of border thinking. It is a way to create a new global design from the perspective of a local Turkish history. Walter Mignolo has argued that every global design is controlled by a local history, even if it often tries to put itself forward as a universal perspective. Modernity has so far been dominated by the local histories of North-western Europe, Islam from Arabic local histories. Nurculuk can be seen as an attempt to establish a new global design from a Turkish local history. And that Turkish or maybe better Anatolian locality has for a very long time been a borderland where European and Islamic influences have intermingled and mixed in the different layers of local traditions.

Said Nursi can be seen as a border thinker that from his Kurdish background propagates for an Islamic nationalism and shariah based constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire. To further these interests it was important for him to keep the Arabic writing as a pan-Islamic identity marker and link to pan-Islamic communication. To communicate his message about nationalism, scientific rationalism and constitutionalism, values that can be seen as European ones, he used the Turkish language. But his Turkish is a more Islamic one, rich in Arabic and Persian words and forms. At the same time he is thinking from the borderland of Islam and Western positivistic modernity. He was all his life involved in a struggle over Turkey’s border identity, whether it was Muslim or modernistic, or both?

In contrast with Nursi, Gülen and Ünal are rather located in a borderland between European/Global and Turkish/Islamic. They both live in the United States and lead their lives along very different borders than Nursi did.

The concept of borderland must be read deconstructively. Turkey may be a typical borderland between Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. But any region is a borderland in some aspects. There are no uncomplicated national identities, there are always cultures living without care for national borders. All thinking is in some way border thinking. It is a myth that there are people that have ever felt themselves altogether at home in European rational modernity. To understand this we could make a broad use of the concept of intersectionality.

Intersectionality is a concept developed within feminist theory, at first by women of colour as a way to show how mainstream feminists have tended to universalise the experiences and conditions of white middle class women in theories of gender oppression. To stress the fact that there are factors besides gender that make up the specific way any person is oppressed feminists of colour developed the concept of intersectionality. Categories like gender, race and class are simultaneous and intersecting, and any one of them cannot be said to be prior or more fundamental.


They always intersect in any particular and localised situation. Many of those who use the concept of intersectionality also stress that categories aren’t fixed – the understanding of gender or race are always construed in complex relation to other factors. The different factors in play always constitute each other. A broader use of the concept of intersectionality have been criticised because it often misses that the concept was used to analyse oppression and power. It is a concept to see and analyse the intersections of different power structures, not merely a metaphor for multicultural identities.140

I want to use the concept to bring in power as a factor in the analysis of the borderland. Along some axis the Nurculuk border thinkers speak from above, along others from below. They are all male and partake in a patriarchal discourse from the dominant perspective. But they are Muslim, and as such from the unprivileged side of Turkish official identification. Nursi is from a Kurdish minority, Gülen from the Turkish majority, and so on… Very few persons are privileged in all sections, a binary opposition between in and out is to coarse, and an underdog perspective on one axis cannot be universalised as a representation of the oppressed as such. This application of the concept of intersectionality is not all together true to its feminist intentions; the gender axis is to invisible in this article. With that acknowledged I still think the concept is important to high light the power relations in the borderland.141

Seeing Turkish thinking as border thinking must not lead to an exotification of Turkey. The borderland is plurilingual, and at least every one that does not have English as a mother tongue is a border thinker by necessity. There is no difference of kind between different borders, but there are important differences of degree between every specific borderland.

What is the idea of Europe, then?

I hope I have been able to show that it for every generation becomes increasingly difficult to pin the nurculuk proponents to a specific tradition. They take their arguments form Western philosophers and scientists as well as from the Qu’ran, the Hadiths and Islamic teologists and thinkers. They say studying chemistry is as important as reading the Qu’ran. In the texts I have discussed here they often sweep over traditions rather than engage in discussions about details. That is way it is hard to know exactly how their global civilisation of love and tolerance is meant to be. They claim to take all the positive aspects of the Idea of Europe and fulfil it by reuniting it with the spirituality and respect for the creator that Islam contains.

Still, after reading this article, the idea of Europe is something very vague and opaque. It is obvious that there can be very different interpretations of the content of this idea. Otherwise it would be impossible to understand how it can be used by so different camps. The pietistic Muslim missionaries of the Nurculuk use the same

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141 This is also relevant since Gloria Anzaldúa, although she doesn’t use the concept intersectionality in Borderland/La Frontera,, is an important reference within that field. See Gillman, Laura, “Beyond the Shadow”.
positive symbol as those saying that Europe and the European Union cannot contain Muslim Turkey.

What are the different aspects of the idea of Europe? Often we take Europe to be a geographical concept. But where are the geographical borders? They do not coincide with existing national borders. They never have. In the southeast the Ottoman Empire and its heir Turkey blurs the European lines. Most of the riches, the administrators and the cultural elite of the Ottoman Empire came from its oldest parts around the preconstantinopolitan capital of Edirne in Thrace and the Eastern Balkans – geographical Europe. In that respect the Ottoman Empire was a European empire. It was never, until its very last two-three years a confessional state. But the Ottoman sultan was the guardian of Islam, the caliph, and the majority of the land he controlled where Muslim lands outside of Europe. But he lived in Europe, on the northern shores of the Bosporus. Geography turns out to be a difficult delineator of Europe.

The aspect of religion then arises, as it does in any effort to understand Turkey’s Europeanness. Those wanting to keep Turkey outside of Europe say that the idea of Europe is closely tied, and even born within, Christianity. Without Christianity there is no true European identity. The Nurculuks alter this argument just a little to state that the idea of Europe is closely tied to, and even born within, Abrahamitic religion. But many of today’s representatives of Europe have denied this fact. They think Europe means positivism and unreligious, even anti-religious, rationalism. The Nurculuks say their way is more in tune with the idea of Europe since it is a religious way, an Abrahamitic way. Theirs is the true way of Jesus, they say. The meaning of Europe’s relation to religion also becomes complex and contested.

Another important aspect of the idea of Europe is scientific and technological progress. These are positive values for most defenders of Europe. But today many people say that this belief in, and dependence on, progress leads to disastrous effects on nature and now threatens our lives. In green political circles this can lead to a disconnection from the idea of Europe. The idea of Europe is essentially destructive and has to be abandon. This is not the Nurculuks argument. The destructiveness is not something contained in science; it is an effect of the materialistic ideologies misunderstanding science to be the only valid way of understanding life. Science has always needed the guidance of religion. The true and original idea of Europe contained this knowledge and the Nurculuk’s message is in accordance with this true Europeanism, they state.

Democracy, constitutionalism, human rights and such values are often perceived as European, and they might be central in the idea of Europe, but that fact must not be misunderstood as implying that they only exist in the European tradition. They are as Muslim as they are European, Nursi said, they are the core values of the Shariah.

These are only some examples. Meeting the Nurculuk’s message can make us see the tensions and complexity in the idea of Europe clearer. ‘Europe’ is a contested concept, we could say, or within other theoretical frames it can be called a floating signifier that can be attached to different chains of references according to different

politic
al and spiritual aims. There is no direct link between the signifier and any
signified object, the signifier rather gets its meaning in relation to other signifier in a
certain discourse and ideology within which the signifier seems to have a specific
meaning. But that meaning is ideological, and political debate is a mean to make it
seem as if ones own understanding of the signifier is the only possible one. Saying
that Turkey is not European, or that it is European, are both political statements.143

There are many different ideas about what Europe is, and there are no objective
criteria to judge whose idea correspond with reality. The Idea of Europe is so complex
that even opposing views can find support for their argument within it. Reading
Nurcululuk writers can make this clearer to us, as it gives an insight into how Europe
can be perceived from a Turkish perspective. Is it plausible to see Muslim Turkey as a
fulfilment of the idea of Europe? It is at least possible.

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143 This is a sweeping application of the language of Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal,


National identity and the ethnographic museum
The Musée du Quai Branly Project: a French answer to multiculturalism?

Maud Guichard-Marneur

Abstract
Ethnographic museums are sites where the definition of 'the other' turns a mirror upon the collective 'we.' The Musée du Quai Branly (MQB) project, a revamped ethnographic museum in France, has been presented by its champion, the former French President Jacques Chirac, as the incarnation of a French new attitude towards ethnographic objects and the cultures that they represent. This article analyses the museum project by deconstructing the surrounding political discourse accompanying the project, and the MQB’s first exhibition, *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas*, on display at the Musée du Louvre. This article identifies the discrepancy between the political discourse, itself at times flawed, and the exhibition narrative. It is argued that both the project framework and the exhibition fell short of challenging a collective 'we,' in a multicultural and globalised France.

Scope of the analysis
There has been a growing trend in Europe to re-invent its ethnographic museums. They are now presented as museums of world culture(s). Particular examples of this trend include the National Museum of World Culture, Gothenburg, Sweden, and the Musée du Quai Branly (MQB) in Paris, France, which respectively opened their doors in December 2004 and in June 2006. The MQB is re-presenting ethnographic objects that were previously presented and stored at the Musée de l’Homme and the Musée des Arts d’Afrique et d’Océanie, which were both created during the colonial period and closed as part of the MQB project.

Although deprived of a building of its own until 2006, the MQB has manifested its intellectual bias and has been anchoring its existence and legitimacy to its first exhibition, which opened in 2000, at the Pavillon des Sessions, a section of the highly symbolic Musée du Louvre. The national political discourse has been echoed in the MQB’s communication strategy, the exhibition *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas*.
The present article focuses solely on the MQB project prior to the opening of the MQB museum building in June 2006.

Museums and nation building

Historically, museums have been understood as symbolically displaying and representing their nation-states. They were meant to represent the highest levels of society’s evolution and thus inspired the citizens’ pride. The emergence of the nation-state in the Western world has been concomitant with the development of democracy as a political organisation since the eighteenth century. The birth of the individual elector in a democratic regime required the assertion of a common 'national' identity. This assertion was necessary in order to legitimize a political power that represented a defined population. Museums and state schooling have been understood as playing a strong role in defining national identity.

Museums and globalisation: understanding the French case

How do museums in Western Europe, and in this case France, adapt to the phenomenon of globalisation which questions some nation-statist principles such as permanence, authenticity and grand narratives?

While the MQB project is part of a common trend partaking in the same choir and singing the song of muticulturalism, understood in its multiple variants, the messages it carries and broadcasts are culturally and nationally formatted.

Therefore, in order to understand the MQB project, it is necessary to be able to deconstruct the national, cultural, political, ideological context in which this ethnographic museum has been re-invented. Indeed, ethnographic museums although dedicated to 'the other' are of major interest as they simultaneously define a collective 'we.' So what does the MQB communicate about 'the other' and about 'we,' the French people?

In order to investigate this question, an analysis of the communication strategy and the key concepts that have accompanied the naissance of both the museum and its first exhibition at the Louvre, is necessary. The museum project is approached as a
museum of ideas rather than a museum of objects, since it is considered that MQB project federates a way of thinking rather than a collection of objects.\textsuperscript{vi}

A negation of cultural differences?

The MQB’s communication strategy draws connections between the equality of cultures, the universality of art and cultural diversity. These concepts were a constant in Jacques Chirac’s speech throughout the creation of the project.

To understand these concepts, we must analyse them in the context of contemporary France. It is argued that the MQB project is as much a conservative reaction to multicultural France, strongly re-asserting an idealised self-perception of the French national identity, as an attempted answer to a changing society. An analysis of the exhibition *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas* highlights how the concepts of equality of cultures and universality of art are translated into both the exhibition display, paradoxically leading to a negation of cultural differences.

The MQB project: a background

The MQB project was brought into being in 1995. Jacques Chirac, then newly elected President of the French Republic, decided that, like his predecessors, he would give the nation a new, remarkable cultural institution that would represent and advertise French culture nationally and internationally; and which would be attached to his name.\textsuperscript{vii}

From the outset, this project has created heated debates. The drafting of a project such as the MQB meant the closure of two colonial museums since the Musée de l’Homme and the Musée des Arts d’Afrique et d’Océanie were judged, perhaps wrongly, too rooted into the French colonial history to be considered for any renovation project.\textsuperscript{viii}

Another debate focuses solely on the MQB museographical project, which has formed around the opposition between an ethnographic reading and an aesthetic reading, a debate rightly considered outdated by some. Museums in the widest sense of the term have been investigating many more different representational modes to cultural objects. \textsuperscript{ix}

The MQB: a celebration of the First Arts or the trap of ‘representational myth’

“The idea of the museum as authority and state agent in representing unitary narratives […] has been discredited in theory but only slowly undermined in practice.
Elite ways of looking at heritage and practices that reflect unitary ideologies continue at all levels." (Susan Ashley)¹

The MQB has been advertised nonetheless as an institution breaking from past museum practices but also as carrying evidence of and/or prompting renewed relationships with former French colonies.

Below is an excerpt from Jacques Chirac’s speech given when he inaugurated the opening of the Pavillon des Sessions exhibition in April 2000 xi:

"We have built new relationships with these countries, relationships based on understanding, mutual respect, dialogue and exchange. [...]"

"The time had come to bring greater visibility to these new relationships, under the sign of recognition, sharing, and fraternity. It is for this reason that I was keen that the early arts should in the year 2000, find their rightful place in the museum institutions of France."xii

The communication strategy of the museum project has used a range of successive nominal terms for the cultural objects it administers: Primitive Arts, Early Arts, and First Arts. In fact, these denominations are only variants of the same idea. All these terms imply that cultural objects are 'art' and that they are 'primitive,' or to be more politically correct, they came 'first'. The denomination of First Arts (as lately used) condenses two ‘representational’ myths together; the first one being a set geography which locates the ‘origin’ of First Arts as being everywhere else but in Western Europe; the second being a set linear timeline parting the developed world from the original world.xiii

I argue that the formerly colonised as well as the developing world are, indeed, in France and that the political discourse surrounding the MQB project and the exhibition Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania and the Americas is an attempt to provide an adapted grand narrative to respond to a multicultural France. During a visit of the French President to the MQB job-site in October 2004, Jacques Chirac pronounced,

"I wish that this museum will be the instrument for a renewed citizenship. [...]. But I wish above all that it will be an instrument of peace which fully testifies of the equal dignity of cultures and human beings,"xiv

The Indigenous of the Republic
In autumn 2005, France was the site of serious riots that originated in the suburbs of Paris and extended to large cities all over France. Cars were burnt and a state of emergency was declared by the French government utilising the law n° 55-385, created when the now called 'War of Algeria', then a French colony, began.

Earlier in 2005, "the manifesto of the indigenous of the Republic\textsuperscript{xv} was published and a march was organised on 8 May 2005, in Paris, at the Square of the République. The manifesto’s reference to the indigenous of the Republic is a reminiscence of the administrative status of Algeria under French rule when the country was considered French but not its autochthones, hence under the indigenous status. Consequently, this manifesto points out and denounces a stratified French society depending on ethnic origins and skin colours, which is contradictory to the French idealised melting pot.

France is a challenged nation-state where expression of cultural differences within the public space\textsuperscript{xvi} may be considered a threat.

Ten years earlier, in 1995, the very year when the MQB project was first formulated, the black and white film "Hate" by Mathieu Kassovitz created a commotion in France. The film is a parable of the French political, cultural and economic situation. It depicts life in the suburbs and the clash of communication between the people living in the suburbs and the people who represent the authorities, the police. It shows an ethnic France too often confined to the suburbs where skyscrapers were built around the city centre to accommodate immigrants. This film is about social exclusion, a taboo topic in the country known as the country of the Declaration of the Rights of Human Beings and of the Citizen, with for philosophical background the universality of human beings. Segregation is thought as only existing across the Atlantic, where the notion of 'difference,' like in the United States of America, is understood as part of the contract of a 'living together.'

At a time when social cohesion is at political stake, does the MQB project challenge the representation of national identity? The former French President, Jacques Chirac, had repeatedly waved the fact that the museum project is built around the notions of acknowledgement, respect and dialogue of cultures.

"Facing the risks of fanaticism and obscurantism, intolerance and identity fold, against those who advocate for confrontation, violence and hatred, I form the wish
that the Musée du Quai Branly carries far the humanistic message of *respect, of diversity* and of *the dialogue of cultures.*

How is this discourse of intent translated into the MQB’s first exhibition, *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania and the Americas,* which opened in April 2000 at the Musée du Louvre?

**De-naturalising the MQB’s first exhibition *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas***

To celebrate the third anniversary of the opening of the exhibition *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania and the Americas,* in 2003, the MQB launched a new advertising campaign with one poster entitled ‘Together at the Louvre.’ The poster shows three cultural objects belonging to the MQB’s collection alongside a painted representation of a Venus-Magdalene, an iconic representation of Western Culture. This visual association clearly reiterates the wish of the MQB’s project and first exhibition to symbolically break the walls between the Western culture on display at the Louvre and these 'ethnographic objects.'

The entry of cultural objects at the Louvre may be interpreted as a positive enterprise; a strong statement showing that what is different from eurocentric mainstays of art is not necessarily a lesser achievement. Nevertheless, this acknowledgement of the equality of cultures, via the art concept, simultaneously erases, as argued in this article, all notions of cultures and their various expressions, as embodied by the cultural objects themselves. This interpretation provides a sanitised, glossy euphemism for a Western, and particularly French audience, unwilling or unable to jeopardise their aesthetic sensitivities or to confront their collective colonial history and multicultural present. Therefore it is pertinent to ask, to whom is the visitor paying tribute and who is actually presented and represented in the exhibition?

I visited the exhibition *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania and the Americas* in February 2004. The exhibition is 1400 square meters and spans four continents: Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas. After approaching the exhibition as a visitor, the author undertook an analysis of the display technique.

The rich, saturated colours, the red or blue of the wall coverings, the gold of the frames, the brown-yellow of the wooden floor, dominant in many galleries at the Louvre, contrast with the starkness of the exhibition *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania and*
The exhibition features a clear space with a pristine atmosphere and lighting, in beige tones. When entering the exhibition space, visitors face a huge stone wall. This free standing wall with no architectural connection to the rest of the building is visually mimicking a remnant of an old building, hence giving a sense of historical legitimacy despite being brand new. Within the display area there is no clear division of space, except for the interpretation room. The display technique is varied. Small objects are presented in glass cases, while larger objects, perhaps less fragile, are protected by metallic boundaries. There is a tendency to provide a glass case for each object, thus enhancing each object’s uniqueness.

The exhibition location at the highly symbolic Musée du Louvre and the display technique leaves one under the impression that there is a wish to introduce a new grand-narrative that both substitutes for and erases the previous narrative(s) while suggesting the continuity of the grand-narrative or truth. The wish for permanence is suggested and translated into the exhibition space by the monument-like stone wall, engraven with the title *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania and the Americas*. The stone wall and engraving may be interpreted as a symbol of the institutionalisation of the political discourse and eternal present. There is a *mise-en-abîme* of the monumental: a monument within a monument, a monumental exhibition in a monument such as the Louvre. The entry wall conceals what is behind and compels visitors to walk towards the left where a showcase displays a single stone sculpture from Egypt, dated from 5th-4th millenium BC, while the Egypt of the Pharaohs is presented elsewhere in the Louvre as the ancestor of the Western culture. Nothing has been disrupted within the galleries at the Musée du Louvre, the exhibition *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania and the Americas* was simply added to an existing corpus.

**The ambiguity of the equality of cultures**

At the Pavillon des Sessions, forty-six cultural objects represent Africa, xx six cultural objects for Asia, 28 cultural objects represent Oceania and 34 represent the Americas for a total of 114 objects. The display by geographical area on the continental scale deems a very traditional way of mapping the world. France - whose the Louvre may be considered a cultural window - is stylised as the *axis mundus* within this framework. There is an enormous discrepancy between a palatial museum dedicated to a small part of the world (mostly Europe) and its representation of Africa with 46
sculptures. As a consequence, the display of the exhibition Art of Africa Asia, Oceania, and the Americas, calls for abstraction. The arrangement by geographical area becomes merely an abstract representation of the mind. xxi This phenomenon is reinforced by the grouping of objects that span from the 4th millennium BC to the 19th century-20th century AD and of which origins expand from Egypt to South Africa creating an illusion of the eternal-present and of an undifferentiated geography. xxii While Western art is displayed with a detailed account of different schools and trends respecting a historical timeline, 46 sculptures originating from opposite parts of the African Continent from different historical periods re-present ‘Africa.’

The presentation and perspective are such that visitors are more likely to be receptive to the homogenous, artistic display than to any geographic or cultural distinctions no matter how broad. The exhibition design and layout encourage an artistic reading as much as, or more than, the cultural objects themselves. The expensive materials used to enclose the objects create a sense of heightened value. No text panel can be found on the display case or close to it, thereby suggesting to visitors that they should view the objects in regards to their formal, aesthetic attributes.

It is mentioned that the purpose of the exhibition is "to put each visitor in an adequate environment to perceive in the most rightful way the act of creation." As a matter of fact, text panels are placed on the surrounding walls, as far as possible from the display cases. It is actually claimed, by the MQB representatives, that the coherence of the exhibition holds to the "quality" of the objects on display, and that visitors should receive an "emotional shock" when visiting the exhibition. xxiii

The exhibition’s communication strategy becomes ambiguous through a retrospective film in the interpretation room. xxiv This film shows Jacques Kerchache, an art consultant and art dealer, also curator of the exhibition, as a young man, in Africa, in quest for objects to bring back to Europe. Excerpts of the film show him surrounded by native people acting as porters. Therefore, one may wonder, to whom are we paying tribute? To the cultures who created the objects or to the art dealer? Is this praising a colonial past when people collected extensively without any cultural sensitivity towards the importance of the object for a given society? Is this a way to show that without the colonial collecting methods, the Musée du Louvre, and the MQB, would not be able to possess or display these treasures, which, of course, only the Western world can recognise and appreciate at their true value?
The MQB: a French synecdoche

Following Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, museums are political minefields as objects may become "the proxies for the persons." The museum and the objects it displays can be thought of as a synecdoche, where the museum acts as a substitute for the whole French society, while symbolically solving "what the society does not manage with the people associated with the objects."xxv

Nélia Dias, in an essay entitled "A Place at the Louvre," analyses how the exhibition at the Pavillon des Sessions was communicated through posters showing photographs of cultural objects chosen to be displayed at the Pavillon des Sessions with written underneath: "I am at the Louvre."xxvi All the objects chosen for the advertisement campaign presented some recognisable anthropomorphic attributes which reinforce the emergence of a subject from the object. Dias points out that it is typical of human nature and thus a risk in museum practices, that a will or human traits be attributed to objects. By this, she underlines the two possible readings of the personal pronoun "I" in the assertion: "I am at the Louvre," 'I' the object and 'I' the maker/source culture.

Cultural objects endowed with speech confuse the object and the culture it represents and jams the attribution of intentionality. Who actually says "I am at the Louvre," and whose intention is it to be at the Louvre? This analysis sheds a particular light on the nature of the MQB project within the French context, which is not exempt of cultural and identity claims. The emergence of a subject - at least a virtual subject - is counter-balanced by an official discourse on the artistic value of the cultural objects. This process erases the cultural identity of the objects and the potential for them to be vectors for different communities' voices. Consequently, a further understanding of how French national cohesion is understood would be helpful to gain a better grasp of some of the argued contradictions of the museum project.

France, multiculturalism and cultural diversity

Multiculturalism has long seemed to be ideologically rooted in a particular concept of 'living together' where differences are institutionalised. In France, multiculturalism has been considered philosophically contradictory to the French notion of the 'melting pot' or 'acculturation,' which assumes that cultural differences disappear in favour of a common French identity. Today, the looser and less historically loaded term of cultural diversity has been introduced in the political discourse in France and largely
in Europe. At a time when "one in every ten persons in the developed regions is a migrant," the French 'acculturation' principle deems to deny cultural expressions to French citizens. xxvii The cultural diversity approach is considered to lead to interculturalism that supposes not only the celebration of cultural differences but also their meeting and exchange thus allowing for a better integration. xxviii

Despite a new discourse, the MQB project deems to resist change. In order to understand the factors of resistance, I propose to investigate the French national self-perception and the role that culture is supposed to play in the French nation.

Republican universalism is the principle at stake in the creation and perpetuation of the French nation-state. This principle was born in the aftermath of the 1789 French Revolution and assumes that whoever wants to become French can do so if such is their will. The French nation is thought of as a contract between the state and each individual. This point is of major importance since it gives an insight into France’s difficulty and resistance to think in terms of communities and a fortiori in terms of community representatives. xxix Ernest Renan’s quotation, "The nation is a plebiscite of everyday," is often referred to when describing the French nation. xxx According to Herman Lebovics, drawing upon the works by Gérard Noiriel and Eugen Weber, French republicanism supposes a national unity which equates to a cultural unity; "French republicanism interpreted the logic of the nation-state as requiring that political boundaries approximate cultural ones, or more exactly, that to share in the life of the nation one had to be part of the national culture." xxxi From this, it may be deduced a French intolerance towards expression of cultural differences as it is interpreted as a threat to what constitutes the foundation of the nation. Viewed from this light, one can understand why the MQB’s first exhibition is more about homogeneity than about diversity.

The separation of church and state (laïcité) increases the difficulties to integrate cultural individuals/groups for which religion holds an important social status. As a matter of fact, the 'laïc' state goes hand-in-hand with a strong dichotomy between private and public space; and personal beliefs are expected to be kept to the private sphere.

Consequently, the public sphere is, as previously mentioned, dominated by the diffusion of "the national culture." Following Herman Lebovics' theory, the French exception emerges from a France that has always ensured the maintenance of a
national culture at the heart of the nation-state. France has worked hard in presenting and imposing itself as the "cultural capital of Europe", if not the world.\textsuperscript{xxxii}

According to Herman Lebovics, France has historically presented itself as the protector of the arts by bringing art from Italy and Greece to the French capital. Napoleon during his military conquests brought back twenty-five classical sculptures to Paris. Consequently, a day of celebration was held on 27 July 1798, in honour of liberty (in reference to the French national motto: Liberty – Equality – Fraternity). In front of the procession, a banner read "Monuments of Antique Sculpture. Greece gave them up;/Rome lost them;/their fate has twice changed;/It will not change again." Afterwards, "the art from each new shipment from Italy was put on display in the Louvre."\textsuperscript{xxxiii}

Quoting Patricia Mainardi, Herman Lebovics offers an interesting insight into the concept of French universalism: "[...] their history was used not only to justify their appropriation by France, but also to deepen the claim that France – not Italy, or any of the other major powers – was the cultural capital of Europe. By taking possession of the historically multilayered – culturally wrapped – art of the past, France validated its aesthetic-political universalism."\textsuperscript{xxxiv} This seems to be an on-going process in post-colonial France, where control over cultural objects/artworks parallels a control over the nation and ensure its dominance.

Soon after the opening of the MQB’s new museum building in 2006, Aminata Traore, writer and former minister of Culture and Tourism in Mali, questioned the museum’s paradoxes and declared in the daily newspaper, Libération, "Our artworks are granted the right of city when we, as a whole, are denied the right of abode."\textsuperscript{xxxv} In the same newspaper, researcher Patrick Pradonewspaper asked: "Where are, Quai-Branly, the children of these masters that we, today, call 'artists'?"\textsuperscript{xxxvi}

**Conclusion: an unchallenged national imaginary**

The political message surrounding the museum project and the museum’s first realisation can be interpreted as a political tool to re-assert 'the national identity/national culture' boundaries. Through the art concept, the MQB’s first exhibition avoids to consider both France’s history and contemporary multicultural France.
As a matter of fact, despite a discourse around cultural diversity, dialogue, and mutual respect, it is argued that the MQB’s first exhibition is full of silence; a silence imposed by the "emotional shock" a visitor is intended to experience while visiting the exhibition at the Pavillon des Sessions. Cultural diversity has been translated into the absence of differences by taking for granted and combining the Western concepts of the essence of humanity and the universality of art. The artistic reading of ethnographic objects counter-balances a discourse around cultural diversity, and is in keeping with the particularity of the French nation, which persists in believing that to be French requires partaking in the national culture.

Achille Mdembe, discussing French multiculturalism, considers that "[...]by hint of taking the republican model for such a long time as the achieved vehicle towards inclusion and the emergence of individuality, we have made of the Republic an imaginary institution, and underestimated the original capacities of brutality, discrimination and exclusion."xxxvii Reinforcing this statement from another perspective, Jean-Loup Amselle analyses how the assimilation process embedded in the French republicanism is ambivalent since, following his analysis, it is tightly combined to raciology and racism. He shows how France during its civilising mission understood assimilation as regeneration through 'métissage.' It was considered that the white race could be regenerated physically through métissage, while Europeans had a mission to "morally and intellectually" regenerate "the Negro race."xxxviii From this point of view it is worthwhile to consider a new reading of the poster "Together at the Louvre" advertising the third anniversary of the Pavillon des Sessions exhibition in 2003. The right half of the poster creates a straightforward visual association between opposite sexes, between a painted representation of a Venus-Magdalen representing Western culture and a male figure, a Toba Batak cultural object from Indonesia.

The reading of cultural objects in contemporary France is institutionalised although it is a partial, ephemeral and instrumental reading. Expressions of different voices from different communities are still considered a threat to the French national coherence and culture. This attitude ostracises French museological practices from a more community oriented museology as practised in many other countries.xxxix
Mytbildning om den utländske författaren och en reflektion om främlingsidentitet: Exemplet Stig Dagerman i Frankrike och Italien


Litteraturens interkulturalitet

I den internationella cirkulationen av idéer utgör översättningen av böcker ett oumbärligt redskap. Anthony Pym, en av de främsta företrädarna för Translation studies, skriver ”att studera översättning innebär ögonblickligen att bli involverad i frågor om hur kulturer interagerar”:

Although frequently sidelined as a technical problem of interest only to linguists, the activity of translators should be a privileged field for study of how cultures interrelate. The simple fact of translation presupposes contact between at least two cultures, and does so in relation to language use, the social activity that perhaps most effectively and insidiously weaves

144 C.f. Périlleux, 1982
relations of cultural identity. To look at translation is immediately to be engaged in issues of how cultures interrelate. (2000, s.2)


C’est à travers la centralité de Paris notamment (mais qui, grâce à « l’européanisation » de la consécration d’Henrik Ibsen perd son caractère territorial) que l’universel littéraire s’accomplit et qu’on parvient à cet oubli paradoxal des conditions historiques du processus d’universisation qui est la condition d’apparition d’un véritable universel. (2002, s. 80)148

Att studera receptionen av utländsk litteratur är egentligen att kartlägga olika böckers resor, hur litterära verk förflyttats från ett land till ett annat och hur de blir mottagna och förstådda i de nya länderna. Det för oss in på geografins område. Att geografi också spelar en viss roll i litteraturen har Franco Moretti visat. Han har skrivit (och ritat) en Atlas över den europeiska romanen i syfte att etablera ”en litteraturens geografi” (”Verso una geografia della letteratura”). Moretti förklarar:

145 Casanova, 2002
146 C.f. Bourdieu, 1992, s. 235
147 Casanova, 1999, s. 336
Un atlante del romanzo. Dietro questo titolo, c’è un’idea molto semplice: che la geografia sia un aspetto decisivo dello sviluppo e dell’invenzione letteraria: una forza attiva, concreta, che lascia le sue trace sui testi, sugli intrecci, sui sistemi di aspettative. E dunque, mettere in rapporto geografia e letteratura – cioè, fare una carta geografica della letteratura: poiché una carta è appunto un rapporto, tra un dato spazio e un dato fenomeno – è cosa che porterà alla luce degli aspetti del campo letterario che fin qui ci sono rimasti nascosti. (1997. s. 5)\(^{149}\)


\(^{150}\) C.f Casanova, 1999, p. 232: ”[…] la Suède est le pays du Nobel, très convoité, et qu’il est devenu de ce fait le carrefour de toute la littérature mondiale qui cherche à se faire connaître de l’Académie suédoise.”
Mitt syfte är att reflektera kring dessa frågor – inte besvara dem, då det kanske inte går att ge entydiga svar på frågor av sådan natur.

Främlingsidentitet och författaren som främling

Att behandla författaren som främling fordrar en reflektion kring främlingen, dennes språk och identitet. Jag har identifierat tre olika typer av främlingsidentiteter: att vilja bli sedd som främling, att inte vilja bli sedd som främling samt att inte veta om att man är främling (exempelvis i det postuma mottagandet av en utländsk författare). Integration är en process som går åt två håll: främlingen integralisera den främmande kulturen i sig, samtidigt som den främmande kulturen integraliserar främlingen. Detta sker i takt med att det främmande avtar i båda riktningar, dock sällan helt. Ofta vill främlingen behålla en identitet som främling (t.ex. genom att fortsätta att bryta på sitt modersmål) eller så vill den främmande kulturen, dvs. omgivningen, behålla en identitet av främlingen som främling och inte helt acceptera den sistnämnde i den nya kulturen. Båda dessa processer kan vara frustrerande för främlingen.


151 Till exempel har de båda lingvisterna Pfaff och Perecman visat på hur tvåspråkiga personer ibland medvetet använder vissa ord från modersmålet när de talar sitt andra språk för att visa sin "etniska identifikation": "There is a tendency for function words [etc.] to be realized in the first language even in a predominantly second language sentence."Such forms function socially as markers of ethnic identification" (Pfaff citerad av Perecman, 1989, s. 231)
152 Jag använder alltså begreppen "modersmålstalare" respektive "främmande talare" för vad engelskspråkiga lingvister kallar "native speaker" och "non-native speaker".
153 Några av de identifierade strategierna (Obs. L1, L2 = First and Second Language):
"Use of all-purpose words: extending a general, 'empty' lexical item to contexts where specific words are lacking (for example, the overuse of thing, stuff, make, do as well as using words like 'thingie', 'what-do-you-call-it', 'what's-his-name', etc.)
Use of non-linguistic means: mime, gesture, facial expression or sound imitation
Literal translation: translating literally a lexical item, an idiom, a compound word or structure from L1 to L2
Foreignizing: using an L1 word by adjusting it towards the L2 phonologically (that is, with a L2 pronunciation) and/or morphologically (for example, adding a L2 suffix to it)
Code switching: including an L1 word with L1 pronunciation or an L3 word with L3 pronunciation in L2 speech" (Cohen & Dörnyei, 2002, s. 179-180)
Car souvent l’étranger loquace et « libéré » (malgré son accent et ses fautes grammaticales, qu’il n’entend pas) peuple de ce discours second et secondaire un monde fantomatique. Comme dans une hallucination, ses constructions verbales – savantes ou scabreuses – roulent sur le vide, dissociées de son corps et de ses passions, laissées en otage à la langue maternelle. En ce sens, l’étranger ne sait pas ce qu’il dit. (1988, s. 49)  


sedan 60-talet som en av medlemmarna i Tel Quel\textsuperscript{156}. Hennes beskrivning av främlingens tillstånd kan appliceras på dennes identitet. Kristeva skriver om den olycklige främlingens frustration, som väl kan överensstämma med identiteten som främling:

Car l’étranger, du haut de cette autonomie qu’il est le seul à avoir choisie quand les autres restent prudemment « entre eux », confronte paradoxalement tout le monde à une a-symbolie qui refuse la civilité et ramène à une violence mise à nu. […] N’appartenir à aucun lieu, aucun temps, aucun amour. L’origine perdu, l’enracinement impossible, la mémoire plongeante, le présent en suspens. L’espace de l’étranger est un train en marche, un avion en vol, la transition même qui exclut l’arrêt. \textit{(ibid. pp. 17-18)}\textsuperscript{157}


Qu’il soit balayeur maghrébin rivé à son balai ou princesse asiatique écrivant ses mémoires dans une langue d’emprunt, dès que les étrangers ont une action ou une passion, ils s’enracinent. […] La flamme qui trahit son fanatisme latent apparaît seulement lorsqu’il s’attache : à une cause, à un métier, à une personne. Il retrouve alors plus qu’un pays : une fusion où il n’y a pas deux êtres, mais un seul qui se consume, total, anéanti. \textit{(ibid. p.19)}\textsuperscript{158}

Kristeva förklarar att när främlingen ”fäster sig i ett kall, i ett yrke eller i en person” så återfinner hon eller han ”mer än ett land”. Den främmande talarens identitet handlar, som alla identiteter, både om självbild och om andras bild av en (eventuellt ens bild av andras bild av en). Det är inte säkert att dessa bilder eller uppfattningar stämmer överens med varandra. Den främmande talaren kan se sig själv som en del av den nya kulturen eller landet och inte som en främling, medan omgivningen kan se

\textsuperscript{156} Tillsammans med Roland Barthes, Philippe Sollers med flera.

\textsuperscript{157} ”Eftersom främlingen, från högheten av denna autonomi, som han är den ende att ha valt när de andra stannat försiktigt nog ”hos sig”, konfronterar paradoxalt alla med en a-symbolik som vägrar artighet och som leder till ett avslöjat våld.[…] Att inte tillhöra någon plats, någon tid, någon kärlek. Det förlorade ursprunget, den omöjliga rotheningen, det dykandet minnet, nuet förfusset. Främlingens rum är ett tåg som går, ett plan som flyger, förflyttningen själv som utesluter stoppet.”

\textsuperscript{158} ”Oavsett om han är en nordafrikansk gatusopare, som håller fast i sin kvast, eller en asiatisk prinssessa, som skriver sina memoarer på ett lånat språk, så förfråmlingarna har en aktivitet eller en passion, så rota de sig. […]”

123


Men de allra flesta utländska författare blir utländska genom översättning. De blir mottagna som de främmande författare de är i de nya länderna, men någon annan har transformerat deras litteratur till det nya språket och ofta kan de inte – såsom Kundera på franska – bedöma om översättningen ger rättvisa eller inte åt deras poetik. Vissa författare blir översatta och mottagna i ett nytt land först efter deras död. De kan då inte själva påverka bilden som skapas av dem som främmande författare. De är främlingar utan att veta om det, inte ”étrangers à nous-mêmes” (främlingar för sig själva) som Kristeva skriver, utan ”étrangers contre nous-mêmes” (främlingar mot sin egen vilja). Så är det i Stig Dagermans fall i Frankrike och Italien. Översättningen av Dagerman till franska och italienska har emellertid inte inneburit någon

159 « [le traducteur] n’a pas traduit le roman; il l’a réécrit », Kundera, 1985, s. 460
ytterliggare problematisering i mottagandet. Dagermans stil med korta meningar och tydliga formuleringar gör honom till en relativt lättöversatt författare.

**Dagerman som myt i Frankrike och Italien**

Stig Dagermans mottagande i Frankrike börjar 1956, två år efter hans död, i samband med översättningen av romanen *Bränt barn* och fortsätter fram till idag med nyutgåvor och ständiga uppsättningar av hans dramer på franska teatrar. Hans verk är översatt till franska i sin helhet, vilket är ovanligt för en nordisk författare. Dagerman är, som jag redan påpekat, objekt för en mytifiering i Frankrike. Huvudteman i denna mytbildning är ångest och självmord, vilka sätts i samband med författarens ursprung Sverige – eller som man så ofta läser i de franska recensionerna mer mystiskt – ”le grand Nord”


Dagermans självmord diskuteras ofta när man talar om honom i Frankrike. Det går inte att nämna Dagerman utan att gå in på hans död. ”Suicidé” blir hans främsta titel, till den grad att det verkar fylla funktionen av ett litterärt pris för att presentera honom. I franska artiklar om Dagerman är det i regel det första som

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160 Min pågående doktorsavhandling behandlar just Dagermans mottagande i Frankrike och Italien och baseras på en korpus av recensioner och artiklar om Dagerman från fransk och italiensk press och litterära tidsskrifter (1956 - 2000).

161 Dagerman presenteras till exempel av kritikern Granjon 1995 som « écrivain suédois au "besoin de consolation impossible à rassasier” », och av Diatkine 1993 « Stig Dagerman que le besoin de consolation, "impossible à rassasier”, mena au suicide à 31 ans. ».


163 Dagerman hann under sitt korta liv inte få något litterärt pris som har någon större internationell genomslagskraft, han tilldelades dock Svenska Dagbladets litteraturpris 1946.
framgår, att han tog sitt liv och gärna tillagt: ”på höjden av sin framgång”, eller ”vid 31 års ålder”. Det blir också porträttet av den evigt unge poeten som har en viss tilldragande charm, likt en litteraturens James Dean. En annan aspekt är den själviobiografiska läsningen av Dagermans verk i Frankrike som ofta görs utifrån hans självmord. Man undrar hur hans verk hade tolkats och om han överhuvudtaget hade blivit läst i samma utsträckning om han inte hade tagit sitt liv.


Le regard de l’écrivain n’a rien pourtant de funéraire. Son style regorge d’attention tendre et patiente, traçant des inscriptions runiques sur fond de rues enneigées, d’archipelisses, de soleils refroidis.164

Delbours har alltså fått in associationer till runor, snö, skärgårdar och kyla i en enda mening.

Mohrt, som redan nämnts, recenserade även L’Enfant brûlé (Bränt barn) 1956 i Le Figaro littéraire. Han skriver då apropå romanfiguren Bengts självmordsförsök:

Nous sommes en Suède, et tous ces sentiments horribles mijotent dans un chaudron de sorcière rempli d’aquavit. Punir, venger, faire justice, battre les chiens à coups de fouet, cingler les visages avec le même fouet, s’interroger sans cesse : notre héros déchiré tourne en rond au cours des mois d’un éternel hiver. Il est fatal qu’il en arrive à vouloir se punir soi-même, dans le suicide.165

Idéerna om ”Sverige” och ”fruktansvärda känslor” är alltså sammanförda med hjälp av ett magiskt element ”häxkittel”, som i sin tur är kopplad till en stereotyp svergingeassociation: akvaviten. Det är ingen slump att Mohrt låter aktiviteterna ”ideligen ifrågasätta sig själv”, ”straffa” och ”hämnas” inträffa under den nordiska vintern, den ”eviga vintern”.

Idéerna om ”Sverige” och ”fruktansvärda känslor” är alltså sammanförda med hjälp av ett magiskt element ”häxkittel”, som i sin tur är kopplad till en stereotyp svergingeassociation: akvaviten. Det är ingen slump att Mohrt låter aktiviteterna ”ideligen ifrågasätta sig själv”, ”straffa” och ”hämnas” inträffa under den nordiska vintern, den ”eviga vintern”.

164 ”Författarens blick har dock inget begravningsaktigt över sig. Hans stil svämmar över med öm och tålmodig uppmärksamhet, som ristar in runor, skärgårdslika som kallnade solar mot en bakgrund av igensnöade vägar.”

165 ”Vi befinner oss i Sverige, och alla dessa fruktansvärda känslor bubblar i en häxkittel fylld med akvavit. […] Straff, hämnas och göra rättvisa, slå hundarna med en piska, piska ansiktens med densamma, ideligen ifrågasätta sig själv: vår sönderslitne hjält klättrar på väggarna under månaderna av en evig vinter. Det är oundvikligt att han slutar med att vilja straffa sig själv, i självmordet.”
Det italienska Dagermanmottagandet har i stort sett samma teman som det franska mottagandet (ängsten, självmord och den svenska nationaliteten) med skillnaden att Dagerman inte i alls samma utsträckning mytifieras. Hans nordiska ursprung är emellertid föremål för viss mytbildung även i Italien. En recension av Bränt barn (Bambino bruciato) i tidningen Il Paese (4/3-95) har till exempel som titel: ”Dal gelido Nord la luce e la passione di ‘Bambino bruciato’”, alltså ”Från den iskalla Norden, ’Bränt barns’ ljus och passion”. För att presentera den nordiska författaren använder även många italienska kritiker adjektiv som är associerade till Nordens klimat under vintersäsongen. Felicetti, litteraturkritiker på magasinet Moda (december -94), har som titel på sin Dagermanrecension ”Scritti sul ghiaccio” (”Skrifter i isen”). Artikeln är publicerad i ett reportage om Sverige som heter ”Il grande freddo” (”Den stora kylan”). Att kalla en recension ”skrifter i isen” – som om nordiska författare ristade in sina texter i is – visar på en vilja att presentera boken som om den kom från en mycket annorlunda och främmande plats.

Mytbildningen av Stig Dagerman i Frankrike och Italien visar således på att en mycket stereotyp bild av Sverige, men ger trots det ett mycket positivt mottagande, det intresserar och attraherar läsarna.


Även om lokala artister också mytifieras så är det något speciellt med utländska, främmande artister som stimulerar vårt intresse, men som också lätt skenar iväg i fantasier. Oavsett om författarens ursprung egentligen är exotisk eller inte, så gör man gör det exotiskt. Det är en del i mytbildningen.

**Sammanfattning**

Att vara utlänning, en främling, innebär en osäker status och en vacklande identitet. En artist, i det här fallet en författare, i rollen som främling ger ett intressant perspektiv på främlingsproblematiken.


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166 C.f. Dahl, 2007
kritikerna ord som spinner vidare på teman om mörker, natt, kyla och vinter. Den utländske författarens ursprung sätts samman med hans stil, med teman i hans romaner och med hans biografi. Dagermans självmord dominerar myten om honom och är sannolikt dess utlösende faktor. De franska och italienska kritikerna förstärker författarens eventuella exotism. Det är tydligt i uttrycken som vittnar om en bild av att det råder ständig vinter i Norden ("l'hiver éternel") och jämförelser som den med att Dagermans texter vore skrivna i is ("scritti sul ghiaccio") – en liknelse som skulle vara otänkbar i Sverige. Receptionsestetikern Jauss myntade det berömda begreppet förväntningshorisont (Erwartungshorizont)\textsuperscript{167}. De franska och italienska läsarnas förväntningshorisont på Dagermans böcker bestod i stor del av föreställningar om svensk kultur som anses starkt påverkad av ett svårt klimat med mycket hård (och evig) vinter där det råder kyla och mörker. I sin tur leder detta till att svenskarna ses som ångestladdade och även självmordsbenägna. Det senare är en stereotyp som länge varit gällande på grund av bristfällig statistik eller snarare olika traditioner och sätt att se på och föra statistik över svårt klimatet. Förväntningshorisonten bestod också av associationer till andra ångestfyllda uttryck av svensk och skandinavisk kultur (som August Strindberg och Ingmar Bergman) som förstärkte dessa föreställningar. Dagerman uppfyller många av de förväntningar på Sverige och svensk litteratur som fanns hos läsekretsen redan innan hans litteratur blev översatt.

Statusen som främling är komplicerad och styrs av ambivalenta krafter både inifrån främlingen själv (som kan vilja både integreras och hålla fast en stark identitet till hemlandet) och utifrån omgivningen (som kanske både välkomnar främlingen och understryker främlingskapet hos den andre - måhända för att de önskar en exotisk dimension i sin egen vardag). Samma mekanismer kan konstateras i mottagandet och läsandet av utländska författare. Läsning av utländsk litteratur karakteriseras ofta av både av nyfikenhet och av mytbildning som stryker medhårs redan existerande stereotyper om landet i fråga.

English summary:

**Mythmaking of the Foreign Author and a Reflection on the Identity as a Stranger: The Case of the Swedish Author Stig Dagerman in France and Italy**

Artists have a tendency to be mystified and mythicized: we can easily think of numerous poets and painters surrounded by myths. Foreign artists tend to be mythicized even more so; one reason being the fact that they come from elsewhere which is sometimes a distant and even exotic place that the receptors are perhaps not familiar with and which they often have stereotyped ideas about.

The aim of this paper is to shed light on the mythmaking of the foreign author, and in particular the myth of the Swedish author Stig Dagerman in France and Italy, which is characterized by an emphasis on his angst and suicide. These elements are connected to his nationality which reveals some stereotyped representations of the North of Europe.

In the international circulation of ideas, the translation of books is an essential device. The foreign author exists primarily due to translation but is often a forgotten figure in research. To investigate the foreign author and more generally to reflect on national borders in literature, it is helpful to use the 70’s and 80’s aesthetic of reception as well as more recent research about literary interculturality.

\textsuperscript{167} C.f. Jauss, 1977
Being a foreigner, i.e. a stranger often means a troubled status and a non-static identity. Furthermore, there is an identity connected with being a non-native speaker. My hypothesis is that there are two main identities among non-native speakers: 1) that of being a person who speaks a foreign language 2) that of being a foreigner. The choice of identity depends on how one situates oneself in the new culture and to which extent one feels integrated.

An artist, in this case an author, in the role of a stranger provides an interesting perspective on the questions concerning strangers. The foreign author as a non-native speaker (a speaker in written texts) is an interesting case to study since it is documented: the speech itself (the text) and the readers’ reactions to it (for instance literary reviews). Very few authors write in a foreign language. They generally become foreign through translation. They are received in the new countries as the foreign authors they are, but somebody else has transferred their literature to the new language. Often they cannot judge for themselves if the translation is fair or not to their fiction.

Some authors, however, become translated and received only after their death. In that case they are not in a position to influence the image that is created of them as foreign authors. They are strangers without knowing it, not “étranger à nous-mêmes” as Julia Kristeva puts it, but “étrangers contre nous-mêmes”. Such is the case of Stig Dagerman in France and in Italy.

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Vår glokale kommissarie – Kurt Wallander på film och tv

Daniel Brodén

"Har jag något program är det att skriva om vår egen samtid, att försöka förstå den tid vi räcker leva i”, förklarade Henning Mankell i en av alla de intervjuer, som han gav apropå sina storsäljande kriminalromaner om Kurt Wallander (Jernberg 1993).


En transnationell kriminalgenre?


169 "Det senmoderna samhället" är ett begrepp som ofta har använts av samhällsvetare för att beskriva de stora förändringar i generella ekonomiska, sociala och kulturella samhällsstrukturer som har skett under den senare delen av 1900-talet (jämför Johansson 2006: 208)
Kriminalfilmer är i dag inte bara specifikt nationella angelägenheter, då thriller från olika världsdelsar också ingår i globala kulturella kretslapp (jämför Desser 2004). De berättar spännande historier om grov brottslighet och ond dödsrätt som många åskådare kan relatera till, oberoende av nationalitet, samtidigt som de sätter fokus på samtidens skuggsidor och sprickbildningar. Kriminalfilmer handlar sålunda bara om vad som är lagligt och olagligt eller gränsdragningar mellan ”gott” och ”ont”. De problematiserar också allmänna föreställningar och konventioner genom intriger som bygger på kritiska och kaotiska situationer, där vardagens regler och trygghet är satta ur spel (se exempelvis Rubin 1999 och Leitch 2002). Det finns till och med forskare som argumenterar för att fascinationskraften hos berättelser om brottsbekämpning i dag har ökat, i och med det så kallade ”Risksamhällets” uppkomst (Mason 2003: 4-5).\(^\text{170}\)


Utöver detta är Wallander-filmatiseringsarna dock att de dramatiserar samhälleliga och globala missförhållanden i relation till en vilsen och sökande hjältefigur. Den medelålders kommissarien grubblar och våndas, men han har märkbara svårigheter att begripa sig på sin egen tid.

**Senmodern melankoli och déjà disparu**


\(^\text{170}\) Risksamhälle är ett begrepp som sociologen Ulrich Beck (1998) och många efter honom, har använt för att beskriva hur tillvaron i det moderna samhället inte bara har blivit mer bekväm, utan att den också fömörkas av en ökad medvetenhet om ständigt hotande faror och risker.


Som Lars Wendelius skriver gestaltar berättelserna om Wallander en tomhetsupplevelse och ett främlingskap inför tillvaron: ”Det människorna vart sig att tro på har visat sig ohållbart och inget nytt kommer i dess ställe” (1999: 190). Wallanders melankoli och känslor av frånvaro, nostalg och förgänglighet är betydelsefulla i sammanhanget. Figuren förkroppsligar en sorts *déjà disparu*: det välfaerdssverige som han trodde sig leva i är redan försvunnet. Det enda som tycks återstå är hans egna klicheartade föreställningar.172 Han vill något omöjligt; att hålla fast vid det som redan har gått förlorat – men det är faktiskt tveksamt om det ens har funnits. Bland annat har den ängslige kommissarien svårt att förlita sig med de försvagade solidariska kontaktytorna, utan att riktigt inse att även han själv har fjärmats sig från sina medmänniskor. Då Svedberg mördas i *Steget efter*, våndas Wallander över hur dåligt han kände kollegan: ”Han har ju för helvete jobbat här i över 20 år! Någonting måste vi väl veta om honom?”


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172 Jämför med hur kulturforskaren Ackbar Abbas använder *déjà disparu* för beskriva en känsla av förlorad kulturell identitet i film och litteratur från Hongkong inför upplösningen av den brittiska kolonin (1997).
kontaktsökande och försök att ta hand om sin lillebror och alkoholiserade mor. *Vilospår* slutar tragiskt och ångestladdat med att den unge seriemörderen blir ihjälkörd under en biljakt. Wallander kan bara handfallen se hur Stefan ligger död i en blodpöl på den våta asfalten, medan pojkens svårt psykiskt sjuka syster skrider hysteriskt.

**Det globala genom det lokala**

Henning Mankell har inte bara pretentioner att kritiskt skildra tillståndet i Sverige genom att använda kriminalromanen som språkrör, utan underhåller också en framtoning som världssmedborgare genom att leva och verka både i Sverige och Moçambique.


Genomgående gör kriminalfallen Wallander medveten om världens orättvisor. I *Hundarna i Riga* och *Den vita lejoninnan* bevittnar han dem på plats: korruptionen i


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This article analyzes the popular film and television adaptations of Henning Mankell’s crime novels about inspector Kurt Wallander (1995-2006). The stories paint a bleak picture of Sweden as a collapsing welfare state, and part of a globalized world plagued by postcolonial injustices. I argue that Wallander’s melancholia and confusion can be described with the term déjà disparu, and that the social criticism can be related to a wider tendency in international film and television drama – towards a focus on the personal as a way to dramatize the complexities of late modern society. Also, the adaptations articulate both a pragmatic and an idealistic idea of solidarity in a fragmented world without borders. Wallander is constantly surprised to discover that globalization is present in his local community, the small town of Ystad. But despite the limits of his understanding, our ”glocal” police hero has a good heart, and struggles to help the weak and the oppressed in a world he does not fully understand.

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Att studera ”gömda flyktingar”, staden & medborgarskapet med utgångspunkt i Lefebvres spatiala triad

Gränsen går inte vid gränsen

In an era of widespread transnational migration, national political communities necessary face questions of where to draw the boundary between insider and outsider. Significantly, however, these boundary questions are not confined to the territorial border; rather, they reach deep into the heart of the national political community, and profoundly affect the nature of relations among those residing within. (Bosniak 2000:967)

I en värld där människors rörlighet och möjlighet att kommunicera bara ökar har själva nationsgränsen blivit allt mer symboliskt laddad. Mediebilder av flyktingar som i små båtar försöker korsa hav eller i skydd av mörkret ta sig över hårdbevakade murar skapar en föreställning om att det är här skiljelinjen mellan medborgare och icke-medborgare går. I praktiken lever dock världen över stora grupper av människor utan uppehållstillstånd inom olika staters territorium. För majoriteten av dem var förmodligen själva passagen över gränsen relativt odramatisk; i en svensk kontext har de flesta som idag lever i landet trots att de fått beslut om avvisning tagit sig hit med hjälp av passhandlingar, äkta eller falska. ”Outsiders” blev de först när de fick avslag på sina asylansökningar eller eventuellt när deras turistvisum gick ut.


"gömda flyktingar" är både etiskt problematiskt och teoretiskt ointressant. Nicholas De Genova skriver (2002:422):

It is necessary to distinguish between studying undocumented people, on the one hand, and studying "illegality" [...] on the other. The familiar pitfalls by which ethnographic objectification becomes a kind of anthropological pornography – showing it just to show it, as it where – becomes infinitely more complicated here by the danger that ethnographic disclosure can quite literally become a kind of surveillance, effectively complicit with if not altogether in the service of the state.


Grovt sammanfattat menar Lefebvre – som jag valt att tolka det – med rumsliga praktiker människors användning av rummet. Med rummets representationer avses hur arkitekter och stadsplanerare tänkt sig att rummet ska användas och uppfattas, och med representationernas rum, slutligen, direkt upplevda rum som fått mening genom olika representationer. Centrala poängen i teorin är att hur en plats kommer att användas och uppfattas av människor inte kan bestämmas ovanifrån, att rummet aldrig blir färdig utan att förskjutningar ständigt sker, samt att dessa förändringar inte är slumpartade utan resultat av politisk kamp.

Med hjälp av denna spatiala triad kan man, menar jag, koppla samman analyser av hur människor som lever under hot om avvisning använder staden, hur de lokala myndigheterna ifråga hanterar deras närvaro och hur föreställningar kring "gömda flyktingar" som grupp och om staden som plats konstrueras. Avslutningsvis diskuterar jag hur triadens komponenter kan integreras. De empiriska exemplen är hämtade från min pågående avhandlingsstudie där jag fokuserar på "gömda flyktingars" vardagsliv i Göteborg.

Rumsliga praktiker: "Gömda flyktingar” som de facto-invånare?

What is spatial practice under neocapitalism? It embodies a close association, within perceived space, between daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, 'private' life and leisure). This association is a paradoxical one, because it includes the most extreme separation between the places it links together. (Lefebvre 1974/1991:38)

Jag har intervjuat 15 personer som trots avvisningsbeslut stannat i Göteborg alternativt fått upprepade avslag och snart riskerar att hamna i denna situation. Materialet är motsägelsefullt. Å ena sidan framträder en bild av en grupp människor som på många vis lever sitt liv som människor ur regeringen runt omkring dem. Å andra sidan återkommer berättelser om psykisk ohälsa och upplevelse av utanförskap och skam. Två personer uttrycker sig såhär:

"Men på något sätt kände jag inte för att samla burkar, men jag var tvungen. Jag tror också att jag undvekt att någon såg mig samla burkar, men jag var tvungen."

"Det finns en känsla hela tiden som säger att 'Du är en annan person, jämfört med dom andra i samhället. Samhället räknar inte dig som en vanlig människa i samhället'. Och det är ju så egentligen."


Inom urbansociologin har frågor kring migration och integration alltid varit centraala, detta eftersom städer genom historien varit platser där nyanlända – från landsbygden eller andra länder – utgjort en inte oansenlig del av invånarna. I de mest kända etnografiska studierna som under 1920-30-talet genomfördes av


[W]hile national citizenship is generally defined in terms of a formal demarcation of national belonging (such as the possession of a passport and the ability to vote), urban citizenship – that is, the right to belong to the city – cannot rely on one-dimensional and homogeneous notions of 'home' or imagined community but depends on the practical recognition of the internal plurality and diversity of forms of life that inhabit the spaces of the city.

En annan teoretisk medborgarskapsmodell som liksom det urbana medborgarpskapet kopplas till en lägre nivå än det nationella är det lokala medborgarpskapet, vilket på många sätt grundas på liknande föreställningar som det nationella. Utgångspunkten är ett lokalsamhälle (community), ett folk, en politisk och/eller kulturell gemenskap, en grupp som definierar sig som ett "vi" (se t ex Andrén 2005). Eftersom stora grupper "papperslösa" i västvärlden återfinns i storstäter och med tanke på att människor i staden inte självklart kan anses utgöra något stabilt lokalsamhälle argumenterar många samhällsvetare idag i Lefebvres anda att rätten till medborgarpskap i denna miljö bör grundas i närvaro – att man är med och ”gör” staden. Saskia Sassen skriver (2005:85):

Individuals, even when undocumented immigrants, can move between the multiple meanings of citizenship. The daily practices by undocumented immigrants as part of their daily life in the community where they reside – such as raising a family, schooling children, holding a job – earn them citizenship claims in the US even as the formal status and, more narrowly, legalization may continue to evade them.

Diskussionen kring urbant medborgarpskap väcker många frågor. I ett försök att överblicka debatten konstaterar Monica Varsanyi (2006:234) att det är enkelt att som många teoretiker på fältet i generella termer diskutera hur ett urbant medborgarpskap skulle kunna råda bot på ett demokratiskt underskott, men svårare att i detalj reda ut

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Vad som i efterhand kom att kallas ”Chicagoskolan” var en grupp sociologer som vid Chicago universitet inom ett relativt enhetligt forskningsprogram mellan åren 1915 och 1935 studerade staden och dess invånare (se Andersson 2003).
hur ett sådant system skulle kunna införas och administreras. Här behandlar jag inte huruvida införandet av ett urbant medborgarskap är realistiskt och vilka konsekvenser det i så fall skulle få. Jag menar dock att idén om medborgarskap som praktik är analytiskt användbar i studier av illegalitet eftersom fokus med dess hjälp hamnar på rumslig närvaro. Liksom de teoretiker jag utgår ifrån använder jag begreppen ”medborgare” och ”icke-medborgare” i en vid och relativt symbolisk mening, alltså inte som specificerade juridiska begrepp.

Rummets representationer: Göteborgs kommuns roll

[Representations of space are] conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a social type of artist with a scientific bent – all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived. [...] This is the dominant space in any society (or mode of production). (Lefebvre 1974/1991:38f)


175 Å ena sidan antas vissa av dem som klassats som ”avvikna” ha lämnat landet på egen hand. Å andra sidan är det troligt att ett många människor som fram tills att de ”avvek” levde på mindre orter runt om i landet därefter sökt sig till störstäd som Göteborg och alltså inte ingår i denna statistik.
angående Storstadssatsningen176 betecknas asylsökande i eget boende som en "okontrollerad inflyttning" (Justitiedepartementet 2004, avtal mellan staten och Göteborgs kommun, bilaga 1, s. 2) och Göteborgs kommun har på senare år legat på Regeringen om att slopa denna boendeform (Prop. 2004/2005:9). Kommunstyrelsens ordförande har också uttalat sig offentligt i frågan:


Eftersom det inte finns något anläggningsboende i Göteborg skulle asylsökande om det egna boendet avskaffades ha små möjligheter att kunna bosätta sig i här.

Rummets representationer kan ses som rumsvisioner riktade mot framtid (Franzén 2003:54). Paradoxalt nog verkar Göteborgs kommuns mål trots att inströmningen av nyanlända ska minskas vara att regionen ska växa, och det ordentligt:


Representationernas rum: Berättelser om "gömda flyktingar" och Göteborg

[Representational spaces are] space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users', but also of some artists and perhaps of those, such as a few writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do more than describe. This is the dominated – and hence passively experienced – space which imagination seeks to change and appropriate. (Lefebvre 1974/1991:39)


Ett sätt att förджupa sig i hur olika platser får mening för stadens invånare och huruvida olika gruppers närvaro kan sägas lämna några avtryck i det urbana rummet är att arbeta med en metod som kallas ”walk-along” alternativt ”walking whilst talking”, vilket innebär att promenera tillsammans med människor och på så sätt få kunskap om hur de i sitt vardagsliv upplever och använder sin närmiljö (Kusenbach 2003, Anderson 2004). Antagandet är att forskaren genom att tillsammans med människor besöka platser de återkommer till får tillgång till andra historier kopplade till miljön ifråga än om samtalet ägt rum någon helt annanstans (se även Elwood & Martin 2000).

I min avhandlingsstudie har jag bett personerna jag intervjuat att ta med mig till platser som betydde någon för dem och där ta en promenad. Många gånger handlade det om för mig redan världiga rum, som vid det vid en walk-along som jag sammanfattat så här:

Mediebilden av ”gömda flyktingar” är mycket entydig. Bilder på människor bakom neddragna persienner återkommer (t ex Gustafsson 2007, Stockholm City 7/6), vilket skapar en föreställning om att gruppen lever sitt liv i det fördolda, inte i det offentliga rummet bland stadens övriga invånare som mannen ovan (Coutin 2005:8f).

Platser förknippas med människor och människor ses som hörande till platser. I anteckningarna från mina walk-alongs anas, liksom i intervjuerna, diskurser kring exempelvis ”svenskar”, ”invandrare”, ”östeuropéer” och ”muslimer”, liksom om ”Göteborg”, ”Bergsjön”, ”centrum” och ”förorten”. Ofta hänger de samman. Dessa föreställningar är på ett sätt endast konstruktioner, men får samtidigt praktiska konsekvenser, inte bara för hur personerna uppfattar världen utan också för hur de lever sitt liv. De platser där en person antar att de människor som kan tänkas ange eller skada henne/honom befinner sig undviks exempelvis i högsta möjliga mån (jfr Caldeira 2000).


**Triaden som helhet: Att studera ”gömdhet” i svensk storstadskontext**


Lefebvre menar som sagt att platser konstitueras genom ett evigt pågående spel mellan rumsliga praktiker, rummets representationer och representationernas rum (Franzén 2003:56). I beskrivningar av hur denna process går till börjar man ofta med de rumsliga praktikerna eftersom de i den ursprungliga framställningen av triaden näms först, vilket gör att det riskerar att framstå som att dessa föregår de andra två komponenterna. Modellen är dock inte kronologisk och hade den ritats upp med hjälp av pilar hade dessa gått i alla riktningar; delarna både påverkar och påverkas av varandra. Hur människor använder staden beror på dess fysiska utformning och på den betydelse olika platser kommit att få, men har samtidigt inverkan på hur nya områden konstrueras och leder till att platser menings över tid i någon mån förändras, och så vidare.

Vad gäller situationen i Göteborg kan ett antal möjliga länkar mellan triadens komponenter lyftas fram, så som att det faktum att Göteborg inte har något anläggningsboende för asylsökande bidrar till den trångboddhet som i sin tur gör att asylsökande (och gömda) skuldbeläggs i integrationsdebatten. Lägenheternas brister (de är inte anpassade efter så många som bor där) riskerar att förvandlas till brister hos de boende (Popoola 1999:40), vilket i det här fallet i praktiken innebär fördomar
om ”invandrare”, vilket mina intervjuupplaga sedan måste förhålla sig till i sin vardag. Ett antal av dem vittnade om rasistiska påhopp i det offentliga rummet. Ett annat exempel är hur stadsbyggnadskontorets oreflekterade förstånd om vilka Göteborgs invånare är gör att de ”alla” som ska garanteras ett gott liv inte inkluderar ”gömda flyktingar”. Detta bidrar förmodligen i någon mån till att gruppen är frånvarande i den mer konkreta planeringen (även om det faktum att kommunen inte har något formellt ansvar för dem naturligtvis är den mest avgörande faktorn). Kommunen kan dock inte helt blinda för gruppens närvaro; i Göteborg lever exempelvis barn under långa tidsperioder utan självklar rätt till utbildning. Uppsala kommun har, med hänvisning till barnkonventionen, hittills valt att erbjuda dessa barn skolgång (Westin 2005) medan man i Göteborg låtit skolorna hantera frågan som de velat (Alling 2005). Gruppen har alltså i just detta fall inkluderats i planeringen. När det talas om att ”gömda” lever ”under jorden” och ”utanför samhället” skapas som jag tidigare diskuterat en illusion om rumslig avgränsning. När ”gömda” barn syns i skolorna utmanas i någon mån denna vanligt förekommande bild.

Avslutande kommentar


Att stora grupper av människor idag under långa tidsperioder lever innanför staters gränser trots hot om avvisning gör gränsen mellan medborgare och icke-medborgare allt mer svårdragen. Linda Bosniak skriver (2000:982, min kursivering):

The debates over the justifiability of discrimination on the account of alienage status raise important questions about the precise nature of the relationship between citizenship status and community membership. Among them: To what extent should community membership be understood to require formal admission into the status of citizenship, and to what extent should residence and participation and contribution to the life of the community provide a sufficient basis for membership?

Det faktum att diskussionen kring ”gömda flyktingars” rätt till medborgarskap är begriplig och engagerande hänger samman med detta. Även om den svenska lagstiftningen inte främst tar hänsyn till vistelsetid är det troligt att dessa människors krav på juridisk inkluderande att högre grad uppfattas som legitima ju längre tid de – och i viss mån gruppen som helhet – kan visa att de levit i landet.

I och med det nya asylsystemet fick asylprocessen ett tydligt slut. Idag finns det i stort sett inga möjligheter för en person att få någon ytterligare prövning av sitt

Man kan se ”gömda flyktingars” existens som en konsekvens av det politiska och ekonomiska systemet och människors möjligheter att kommunicera och förflytta sig världen över, artikulerad på olika vis i skilda nationella kontexter. Eftersom några avgörande politiska förändringar inte verkar vara på gång internationellt sett är det högst troligt att gruppen även framöver kommer att återfinnas inom staters gränser – oftast i större städer – trots fortsatta försök att på politisk väg i olika instanser ”reda ut problemet”. Hur svenska politiker kommer att hantera denna fråga framöver är osäkert, att de kommer att vara tvungna till det råder det sammanfattningsvis inga som helst tvivel om.

Det jag i denna artikel har argumenterat för är att det för forskare som vill studera ”gömda flyktingars” situation av etiska skäl kan vara en god idé att studera illegalitet snarare än ”illegala”, samt att detta exempelvis kan göras med hjälp av Lefebvres spatiala triad. Jag har även pekat på att stora grupper av människor utan uppehållstillstånd världen över verkar söka sig till större städer och att det därför är motiverat att fokusera på den urbana miljön i studier av detta slag, något som även användningen av Lefebvres modell uppmuntrar. Med utgångspunkt i den aktuella sociologiska diskussionen kring behovet/framväxten av ett urtalt medborgarskap kan dessutom – fortfarande inom samma teoretiska ramverk – olika aspekter av gruppens paradoxala närvaro i staden lyftas fram, vilket i sin tur möjliggör en bredare diskussion kring tiden och samhället vi lever i.
English summary:

Studying “undocumented immigrants” in the city with Lefebvre’s spatial triad as a point of departure

While people’s opportunities to move and communicate globally have increased drastically over the past decades, the national border has become more and more loaded with symbolic value. There is a persistent notion that the dividing line between citizens and non-citizens is to be found here, even though large groups of people around the world live their lives within the territorial borders of countries where they lack the formal right to reside. The presence of this group – often referred to as “undocumented”, “irregular”, “illegal immigrants” or “clandestines” – calls attention to issues regarding citizenship status and community membership (Bosniak 2000:982). Although politicians around the world are trying to solve this problem there are few indications that the situation is about to change. Consequently, they will most likely have to keep addressing this issue in years to come. It is, however, an open question how this will be done.

In this article, I argue that for researchers who want to study the living conditions of “undocumented immigrants” it could, for ethical reasons, be a good idea to study illegality rather than “illegals”. This could, moreover, be done using Henri Lefebvre’s spatial triad, introduced in The Production of Space (1974/1991) – spatial practice, representations of space and representational spaces. My aim is to illustrate how this model might be used in studies on this topic. The empirical examples used come from my doctoral thesis in progress, in which I focus on the everyday life of “undocumented immigrants” in the city of Göteborg.

Furthermore, I emphasize that throughout the world large groups of people without residence permit resort to big cities, which makes the urban environment the key site when studying these issues (Sassen 2005:90). I also suggest that with the current sociological discussion about the need for, or rise of, an urban citizenship as a point of departure – still within a Lefebvrian framework – different aspects of the paradoxical presence of “undocumented immigrants” in the city can be highlighted.
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Digging for Legitimacy: modes of thought in late 19th and early 20th century archaeology

Abstract
Archaeology has often been used to defend national rhetoric’s. However, the use of archaeology in politics and national projects is more complex than often believed. By comparing three famous archaeologists, from different national settings, a preliminary idea of the intricacies involved are illustrated. Osckar Montelius (1843-1921), Swedish archaeologist, was hevily influenced by the archaeology in other countries, notably Britain, France and Germany. While he is particularly interested in Britain and France in the beginning of his career, he slowly moves to a more German oriented archaeology. Montelius does consider his archaeology national, a defense of an existing national unit, Sweden. Gustaf Kossinna (1858-1931) German archaeologist, explicitly intervenes in a political process, trying to help in the construction of a “renewed” German national project. Kossinna explicitly rejected any comparison with people in other parts of the world. John Lubbock (1834-1913), finally, worked with evolutionary concepts, trying to defend British Imperial politics by incorporating the aboriginal inhabitants in the colonies, but in terms of the inferior at an evolutionary ladder.

Archaeology has played a certain role in creating different modes of thinking nation and culture, though it has, of course, never been one of the major factors. Still, it merits some attention, when we wish to address culture, language and nation in Europe. In recent archaeological debate, the role played by archaeology in forging national identity has often been stressed (cf. Diaz Andreu & Champion 1995). It is beyond doubt that archaeology has had such a function, and examples can be taken from different time periods and different contexts. However, and this is our major argument in this small contribution, archaeology has been used to argue different kinds of identity, and the “folk-nation” model has not always been the only one, or not even the most important one. To illustrate our point, we have taken three cases, three major names in late 19th century and early 20th century archaeology. Limiting our discussion to these individuals will not give an accurate picture of the complexities involved, which will have to be developed elsewhere. However we believe that these three cases may help to elucidate a kind of ‘ideal-types’ that may serve at this initial step of our research, which has only recently

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begun (cf. Cornell et al 2007). We are fully aware of the shortcomings of this form of argument, but we believe it will help make our case. Future empirical studies will substantiate it or demonstrate its shortcomings.

The three cases are related to slightly different time periods, and to different national frames. The first is taken from late Victorian British context, the second from Swedish archaeology 1900, and the third, on which we will expand somewhat, is from German archaeology in the early 20th century. As will become evident, there was an exchange of ideas in between these areas, and the archaeological thought of one area often exerted an influence over the other. The difference in the conception of archaeology – in particular in Britain and Germany – is of great interest, but the intricacies of this question will not be discussed at any depth in this text. Future studies will help to elucidate how these conceptions were forged, and dig more into the questions of differences between nations.

**John Lubbock, British archaeologist**

John Lubbock (1834-1913, 1st Baron Avebury) distinctively belonged to the upper class, and was a major archaeologist of the British Victorian age. His most famous contributions to the archaeological field are synthetic studies, general summaries of human development, addressing the European Stone Age and the means to get information concerning this period. He travelled around in Europe, visiting major excavations exhibiting Stone Age materials, in particular the Swiss Lake Dwellings and the so-called Kjökkenmödding excavations in Denmark. In general terms, Lubbock was an enthusiastic archaeologist, who is palpable in his texts, and he was prepared to go very far in order to get information. An example of the latter is the fact that he learned Danish to be able to read about the Kjökkenmödding excavations.

Lubbock presents an explicit evolutionary approach. He is sceptical to the use of traditional written sources, which he understood as superstitious and false. Old sagas and folklore had no value whatsoever to Lubbock; we are, according to him, for the Stone Age, “relieved” from this embarrassing influence (cf. 1872 [1865]:427). He referred to the archaeological record as the main source of information. However, he also believed in the use of another source, namely ethnographic reports and similar types of descriptions of the life of non-European groups of humans. In particular, he was interested in groups not practicing agriculture. These cases could be taken as examples of what he called ‘modern savages’. The use of the term modern is interesting; it is not an evident choice. It seems that modern is used as equivalent to “contemporaneous”. In Lubbock’s own lifetime, the term modern often carried other, more complex, implications.
In several articles, Lubbock presents a large number of examples of ‘modern savages’ (cf. 1872; 1870). He discusses Maorians, the Tahitians, the Vedas on Ceylon, South American Indians, and several other cases. In Lubbock’s way of thinking, these savages lived a life roughly similar to that of the people of the Stone Age in Europe. The basic idea is that all human evolution goes through a set of given stages. Even if there is some variation, the main content of each stage remains the same, independent of place and time. Thus, the Stone Age in Britain many thousand years ago had been roughly the same as the Stone Age in Australia in the 19th century. Some people have remained at the level of the Stone Age, while some, notably the Europeans, have advanced far beyond this level. Studying ‘the modern savages’ will, according to Lubbock, thus help us elucidate the life of prehistoric European Stone Age People. The modern savages are to archaeologists what the “opossum and the sloth are to the geologist”, fossils from another epoch (Lubbock 1872: 428).

When addressing the savages, Lubbock does not condemn them morally. He explicitly expands on this question, and states that they must be judged in their context. In certain cases they can even be said to have a high moral standard (cf. e.g. Lubbock 1872: 567). Thus, Lubbock did not wish us to look down at the savages in general terms. Further, he wrote that ‘the modern savages’ if “left to themselves” would probably have developed indigenous civilization (Lubbock 1872: 529). He also argued interestingly on the similarities between different groups of savages, stating that these similarities “go far to prove the unity of the human race” (Lubbock 1872: 557). But Lubbock was also keen at pointing at the hardships in life experienced by the savages, and their life in what he describes as constant war (cf. Lubbock 1872: 595, passim).

As a tentative hypothesis, we suggest that this kind of thinking, in which different kinds of peoples may be accepted, but are placed at different steps of an hierarchical ladder to civilisation, suits an expanding empire (in this case the British Empire), in which different kinds of people were integrated as subjects to the same royalty, in Lubbock’s time Queen Victoria. All were supposed to be loyal subjects, but they were not the same, they were at different points of social evolution.

However, and this is a tricky part in Lubbock’s argument; there are also savages living “in the midst of the civilised world”. He mainly refers to examples from Britain, notably England, and speaks of criminals and prisoners. They are, he states, “mere savages”. These savages are not to
be defended. Rather, they are parasites, living “at the expense of the civilised world” (Lubbock 1872: 600). They are, it seems, to Lubbock among the lowest of all beings. At this point Lubbock explicitly makes a moral judgment, and creates a palpable hierarchy of different sorts of people. It can be interesting to note, briefly, that an opposite view on the “savage in the civilized world” came to be popular in Lubbock’s own lifetime. To pick only one example, Friedrich Engels discussed the virtues of the working class and their moral standards in terms of sexuality and marriage (Engels 1892 [1845]; cf. Marcus 1975). Engels was also interested in prehistoric worlds and ethnography, as demonstrated in his book on the Origin of the Private Property, the Family and the State (1884), and linked this discussion to the conditions of the working class of Britain. There is a similarity and a dissimilarity of argument here. Lubbock and Engels share certain common notions, but at the same time they differ completely.

In general terms, Lubbock’s vision is linked to a hierarchical understanding of the world. Similar hierarchies can be found among other British evolutionists from this period and up to the 20th century. In Frazer’s Golden Bough, for instance, there is a very strict hierarchy of humans, in which few are understood as belonging to the truly ‘civilized world’.

**Oskar Montelius, Swedish archaeologist**

By 1900, Swedish archaeology was still dominated by the figure of Oskar Montelius (1843-1921). He spent much of his life working as a state official, and became eventually the head of the Swedish National Board of Antiquities (Riksantikvarieämbetet). Montelius was, in the 1870’s, inspired by John Stuart Mill, John Lubbock (cf. Arwill-Nordbladh 1998) and other British scholars. Like several other scholars in this period, Montelius took up the idea of evolution, and tried to apply it on human artefacts. The Montelian approach, the typology, or typological chronology, came to be the model for this type of approach. The basic idea behind this method is that types of artefacts changed their form slowly, making it possible to reconstruct typological chains, which represented their chronology. In his lifetime, Montelius became an acknowledged scholar with certain fame in European learned circles.

According to Montelius, he had applied Darwin’s ideas in his method. This might well be the result of a misunderstanding of Darwin; Montelius method resembles Spencer more than Darwin (cf. Schroll-Fleischer 1983, on Darwin and Spencer). But the evolutionary idea is
evident. An interesting aspect in Montelius’ chains is that the first object is very simple, followed by a successive increase in complexity, while the last objects have a tendency to regression. Montelius himself commented on this, and spoke of cyclical processes.

At this time, the idea of evolution was not only used in archaeology to reconstruct past times, but also as a general methodology. The evolutionary perspective impregnated large parts of the discipline. It is, however, probable that Lubbock played a larger role than Darwin for Montelius’ general arguments on prehistory (for a discussion on Montelius and Darwin cf. Gräslund 1974, pp. 207-216; 2006). Like British Imperial archaeologists, Montelius was also interested in archaeology from all parts of the globe – he did not limit his interest to Northern Europe (Cornell 1997).

But Montelius was not only worked on the concept of evolution. While Lubbock downplayed the role of diffusion, arguing that similar inventions were made by different peoples at different moments in time, but at the same evolutionary level, Montelius came to give diffusion, and the geographical distribution of culture, a greater role. Particularly in his old age, the latter used diffusion as a major concept, and British ideas of an Indo-European origin. Diffusionism had come to be an important line of argument in British archaeology at this time. From approximately 1910, extreme diffusionists, such as Grafton Elliott Smith (e.g. 1911), played an important role in the debate. Hypothetically, we argue that the idea of large-scale diffusion in a sense suits an Empire well, as do the evolutionary ladder. The expansion of the British could be understood as a positive cultural diffusion, lifting people from a lower step on the evolutionary ladder.

The interest in diffusion is particularly notable in Montelius work on Megalithic tombs (1899). In this study, Montelius suggests that the megalithic burials originally emerged in India, and came to Europe through a slow diffusion through West Asia. The idea of using India as an European archi-origin works very well with some Indo-European arguments of the 19th century. Such arguments Montelius could find in Britain or France. Words like the Indo-Europeans would fit well into the Montelian archaeology.

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178 The grave chronological errors in Montelius study need not preoccupy us in this connection (but cf. Renfrew’s classic, 1973, with a slightly kossinian touch).
Montelius created a special type of archaeology. On one hand, by stressing Sweden and the particularities of Swedish prehistory, his work suited the Swedish state, and Swedish nationality. However, he was also interested in wider questions, and had an intention of making Swedish archaeology relevant in a wider scene. Sensible to currents of the time, Montelius started out as an evolutionist, while he later embraced the concept of diffusion, and finally oriented himself explicitly towards German cultural trends. In the next section we will look a bit closer at the German prehistoric archaeologist par excellence of the epoch, Kossinna.

**Gustaf Kossinna, German archaeologist**

Gustaf Kossinna (1858-1931) was interested in languages and history before he ventured into archaeology. He was born in a small town close to Lithuania. Kossinna had a deep impact on German archaeology, far before 1908, when he launched the journal *Mannus*, which became very influential. The *Siedlungsarchäologie* was largely his creation. In a sense, Kossinna created the breakthrough of a spatial method; he was instrumental in making a ‘spatial turn’ in archaeology. The word *Siedlung* had to do with geographical location, the place on which (in this case) a particular Culture or a particular People (Volk) lived, or a particular Tribe (*Stamm*) within a People. The term *Siedlung* should in this case be read as similar to that of *Heimat*.\(^{179}\) The question of *Heimat* is strongly linked, in this period, and not least in Kossinna’s case, to Blut and to *Boden* – to blood and earth. The issue of the earth – the soil – is paramount, and should be interpreted in a very palpable way in Kossinna. There must be terrain, earth, soil, linked to any true People.

Kossinna plotted archaeological findings, particular types of objects (flint axes, or certain types of ceramics, for example) on maps. These maps were generally of such a scale that large parts of Northern Europe were depicted, and the amount of artefacts plotted relatively small. Given some knowledge (or supposed knowledge) on chronology (often taken from Montelius), these maps were taken to indicate the origin and spread of a particular Culture or ‘People’. A certain artefact was, often without presenting any arguments, taken to represent, say ‘Germans’ during the Stone Age.

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\(^{179}\) Lenz novel *Heimatmuseum* (1981) [1978] gives a good idea of the importance of this concept in 20\(^{th}\) century history.
Kossinna explicitly wrote that archaeology only had to do with Europe, and particularly Germany. He *a priori excluded other regions of the world* as topics for archaeology (Kossinna: 1911; 1928). This trait of exclusion is a very important element in his conception of archaeology (and the world, it might be added). On this point, Kossinna differs considerably from both Lubbock and Montelius. However, Kossinna’s way of thinking was not foreign to German scholars in this period. To quote but one example, Martin Heidegger spoke about the danger of African ethnography to the German Being in his *Being and Time*, published in 1927 (1977:177-178).

Kossinna wrote political pamphlets, notably at the end of the First World War, in which he used his archaeology for immediate political purposes. As an example of political intervention, we can mention the article on the region around the river Vistula (Poland today), which was, in Kossinna’s words, an old ‘Heimatboden’ for Germans, visible, he stated, in Neolithic ceramics. This article on the Heimat in ‘Weichsel’ from 1919 has been reprinted on various occasions, for example in 1940 (Kossinna 1940).

Kossinna did not construct his method out of nothing. Kossinna’s approach had taken up many ideas, particularly on mapping, from geographers and others working in the Humboldtian tradition, and also, probably, from the *Kulturkreislehre*, an approach developed mainly by ethnographers (but also by archaeologists). Further, many scholars used the concept of People in the 19th century, also archaeologists, but it was a rather diffuse term. Often, in analysing stratigraphy, each major stratum was taken to indicate the presence of a new People, taking over a specific area from another People. Kossinna also benefited from racist theory and racist ‘science’, already existing at this time (in Britain, France and Germany). The development of racial arguments in biology played an important role. Kossinna, and a major German biologist working on ‘race’, Eugen Fischer, shared many interests (cf. Gessler 2000). Fischer himself even ventured, at times, into archaeology, and Kossinna at times dwelled on human skulls and their alleged racial characteristics.\(^{180}\)

Kossinna, however, created a particular blend, which became the Siedlungsarchäologie. He did not like general ideas of human evolution.

\(^{180}\) Already by 1869/1870, in relation to the French-German war, racial arguments were used in academic and national disputes. The French scholar Hamy insisted that the Prussians were a particular race, and asked all Germans to unite with the French in a battle against the Prussians. Wirchow and other Berlin based scholars reacted strongly, and advocated a more “pan-German” position. However, this is another story.
Instead, the particularities of Heimat, and the connection to earth, soil, and blood, should be stressed.

To illustrate Kossinna’s way to argue, we will briefly summarize his view on the origin of the Germans in an important book from 1928 (*Ursprung und Verbreitung der Germanen in vor- und frühgeschichtlicher Zeit*). The argument in this book summarizes several previous studies by Kossinna, for example from 1909/10 and 1912 (1914). Kossinna dedicated a large part of his 1928 study to arguments on racial characteristics, comparing contemporary population to Stone Age skulls, identifying, he believed, various groups in Germany, Friesland and the Nordic countries. He then continues with a discussion on archaeological material from the younger Stone Age, in which he dedicates his main effort to ceramics and stone axes and to some extent, various types of burials. He departs from various ‘cultures’ that he believes to have identified in this archaeological material, and presents arguments concerning their chronological position. It is, it must be said, often hard to see how he connects empirics to his pre-historical reconstructions. Nevertheless, his scenario runs more or less as follows.

First, there is a primitive hunter-gatherer population, which is replaced by an *Indo-Germanic* population. The latter group has its centre in Jutland (today’s Denmark) and Schleswig-Holstein, and later expands into parts of Southern and Western Sweden and into Germany. This Indo-Germanic population appears at the end of what we today call the Mesolithic period (the so-called ‘Ertebölle’ phase), and eventually starts building megalithic monuments. In Kossinna’s archaeology, migrations is a main element, and the Indo-Germans made several migratory movements in various waves, also far down in today’s Germany.

Then, there arrives from the north an ‘Arctic Dobbertinner pre-Finn’ culture (survivors of the old hunting-gathering population). This arctic population is particularly well adapted to cold climates and they are very tough and good warriors. This population settles in Jutland and southern Scandinavia, and eventually mingles with the Indo-Germans of these areas. From this mix, the *Finno-Indo-Germans* emerge (1928:216), and comes to dominate in southern Scandinavia and Denmark, while ‘pure’ (previously migrated) Indo-Germans survived in Germany, for instance, in the region of Halle. The Finno-Indo-Germans used Boat Axes and Corded Ware ceramics, and buried their dead in individual burials of relatively simple construction (as compared to the Megaliths). The Finno-Indo-Germans eventually migrate to Germany and there is a second mix, between Finno-Indo-Germans and pure Indo-Germans in Germany. From this mix the Germans emerge, a culturally unified
People, in 2000 B.C., shortly before the beginning of the Bronze Age (Kossinna 1928:297).

The Germans, thus, was a mix created out of two distinct Nordic populations. Two observations should be made. One is that Kossinna believed certain particular cultural and racial mixes to be positive. However, in the case of the Germans, there is a higher percentage of Indo-Germans, and a smaller element of the “pre-Finns”. The other observation – and this is a key point – is that Kossinna had a lot of hyperborean beliefs; he really had a sort of ‘Nordische Gedanke’ (Nordic thought). What is good comes from the north. The idea of the Nordische Gedanke was common in the German speaking countries at this time, and of course not only in archaeology. It became an important element in Nazi ideology. Many scholars adhered to various brands of Nordische Gedanke.181

The Nordische Gedanke was not a coherent field, but what unified several thinkers at the time, particularly in German speaking countries – and Kossinna is a good example –, was the idea of a pure original Nordic race and culture, which had been created without ‘external’ elements, and which subsisted by their own capacity. Of major importance was the idea that the Nordic people was chosen, that they had to fulfil their historical destiny. Any major external influence was thus negative, and a threat to the authentic Nordic spirit, and indeed envisioned as a physical threat to the Nordic race.

Kossinna elaborated a particular version of Nordische Gedanke. The ‘pre-Finns’ lived, according to Kossinna’s maps, in what are today areas of Norway, Sweden and Finland. It is interesting that he uses the term Finns. It is a complex term. Kossinna, of course, knew of Finland, as well as of Finnmark in Norway. Kossinna makes a point in separating pre-Finns from the Finno-Ugrians, which appeared later – another mix (more ‘negative’ in Kossinna’s opinion). The use of the term Finns was certainly intentional.

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181 Particularly extreme adherents to the Nordische Gedanke were Hans F. K. Günther (1891-1968), an influential race theorist in Germany, Hermann Wirth (1885-1981), a scholar from the Netherlands who was popular in Nazi circles, particularly in the first half of the 1930’s, and the art historian Josef Strzygowski (1862-1941), working in Vienna, Austria. Günther (1922) believed the Nordic Race to be above all others, while Wirth (1928), and Strzygowski (1937, 1940) spoke of a Nordic ‘Ur-Kultur’ in the Arctic (for an elaborate discussion on the Nordische Gedanke see Lutzhöft 1971, and Dahl 2006 for some interesting comments). At another level, scholars like Walter Wüst (1901-1993), the specialist on ‘Aryan Civilisation’, who came to be particularly influential in the Nazi period, worked within the Nordische Gedanke, and accepted much of Kossinna’s argument, but was also interested in other parts of the world, especially Iran and India (Wüst 1942; cf. Arvidsson 2000: 199-207).
The 1928 book by Kossinna certainly helped in stabilizing his career. But it also carried political intentions, which are rather evident, and these largely coincide with his career aspirations. The book opens with a photograph from 1915, at which Kossinna gives a lecture for the General Field Marshall Hindenburg. In 1928, Hindenburg was Reichspresident of Germany.\textsuperscript{182} The closing words of the book also relate to the Germany of the 1920’s. Hindenburg is mentioned, and Kossinna speaks of the Germans of the Neolithic, characterized by beautiful weaponry (axes and daggers), as a ‘weapon-happy’ and ‘weapon-proud’ People (“ein waffen-frohes und waffenstoltzes Volk; 1928:302). He even writes, “Also today, only weapon-proud can our poor People get their lost freedom back” (“Nur Waffenstoltzes kann auch heute unserem armen Volke die verlorene Freiheit wiedergewinnen”; 1928:302). There is no doubt: To Kossinna, archaeology is not only a reflection of, or a support for a German national project, but a vital and constructive element in the making of that national project.

We can also add that by 1928, Kossinna was a member of the \textit{Kampfbund für Deutsches Kultur} (cf. Grünert 2002), which was under the protection of Alfred Rosenberg, later the minister of culture in the NSDAP (the Nazi) government, and also the protector of the \textit{Reichsbund für Deutsche Vorgeschichte}.

A general observation on Kossinna is that he is extremely keen at stressing the role of the \textit{Nordic}, and even, in a sense, at the expense of the southern parts of Germany, like Bavaria.\textsuperscript{183} Kossinna could never have been whole-heartedly accepted in wide circles in catholic Bavaria. There is rather something of a Prussian to Kossinna. The whole scenario of the Nordic development, in his view, took place in the North, and in a quite limited area (the Nordic countries, northern Germany, Friesland, the Baltic countries). There was no major ‘external’ element. The Deutsch was the Nordic Deutsch.

\textbf{Concluding discussion: Lubbock, Montelius and Kossinna}

Comparing these three giants of archaeology is a task requiring an in depth study. At this point, we can only briefly touch upon a few issues.

\textsuperscript{182} Cf. Berger 2004 for a general view on Germany in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

\textsuperscript{183} The importance of the Nordic Thought in Nazi-German propaganda is, at first sight, rather strange. How come Bavarian or Austrian Nazis accepted this argument, which made their earthly ‘homelands’ secondary in the official historical perspective? Bavaria was a stronghold for Nazism, so this point should be studied more in detail. The Nordic Thought evidently contained some very important message also in Bavaria and Austria.
We will start by discussing Montelius and Kossinna, and then proceed to some summarizing remarks comparing Lubbock and Kossinna.

Just like Gustaf Kossinna Oskar Montelius defended a national project, i.e. the Swedish. But his intention was not so much to contribute to the creation of the nation as to reflect upon it and, possibly, support it. He was intensively interested in archaeology of all parts of the globe (Cornell 1997), and he was as enthusiastic about Indians of South America as the archaeology of China. Looking at the publications of Oskar Montelius, there is no title of any article or book using the words Heimat, Germans, Indo-Europeans, Indo-Aryans, or Indo-Germans up to 1913. Kossinna, on the other hand, used these terms frequently in titles, even prior to launching *Mannus*. However, in Montelius’ last publications these terms appear. Why is this so? The general historical development is one reason. Montelius seems to have re-evaluated some ideas in the light of historical events. In particular, the First World War, its prelude and its aftermath, had a deep impact on him.

In 1913, Montelius seems to get a deeper interest in Germany. He is one of the founders of a Swedish-German Association (*Svensk-Tyska föreningen*), which is a parallel to a German-Swedish Association founded in Germany at the same time. And, if we look at some of his later articles, Montelius is particularly interested in the concept ‘Indo-Germanic’. In 1919, he published an article in *Mannus*, in a special volume made to celebrate Kossinna at his 60th birthday. The article is called *The Forefathers of the Germans*. The article addresses directly key issues in Kossinna’s intellectual edifice. Montelius uses here the concept of race, and the concept of ‘Volk’. He also accepts to put a sort of German origin to the area of the Baltic Sea (“as some researchers argue”, he wrote). So, to a large extent, Montelius shared important ideas with Kossinna at this time. But there is also a certain dissonance between them. Montelius introduces a notion of a distant geographical origin of the Indo-Germans; they had to Montelius a non-Nordic origin.

Here in the Scandinavian Norden we have the Heimat of the Germans, but not the Heimat of the Indo-Germans, to seek. (1919:70)

What Montelius writes is not directly against Kossinna, but Montelius does use a way to express himself that could hardly have pleased Kossinna, and there is a divergence of opinion. Kossinna could not have approved of these wordings. Montelius ends his article stating that the

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184 Hier in skandinavischen Norden haben wir die Heimat der Germanen, aber nicht die Heimat der Indogermanen zu suchen.
Germans, a People (Volk) who have written on so many of the pages of culture history, will

I hope – also in the future /.../ have a major task in the for all peoples common work for the good of all humanity. (1919:70)\textsuperscript{185}

This remark must also have annoyed Kossinna, since, as mentioned, his archaeological world is much more restricted and \textit{excluding}.

It seems, however, that Montelius moved yet closer to Kossinna. In 1921, in a speech in Berlin he is reported to have said that Swedes and Germans were actually one common People ("ein Volk"), a very strong statement to make in 1921. The speech is summarized in the publication of the German-Swedish association, the \textit{Deutsch-Schwedishe Blätter} (1921).

When it comes to comparing Lubbock and Kossinna, things become trickier, but also more interesting. The two men had – to our knowledge – no contact, immediate or indirect, with one another. There are interesting similarities. Both gave the "savage" a role in prehistory; saw in them certain positive assets. But while Lubbock ruled the savage out as parasites in a civilized world, Kossinna gave the savage a part in the modern German, one third of the German to be more specific. Lubbock believes all peoples pass through savagery. But civilized people have left that behind. Kossinna on the other hand believes the (Nordic) savage has an active value as a component of the modern German. However, we postulate that these scholars represent two different ways of thinking archaeology and the nation. In Lubbock’s archaeology, the Empire is in focus. In the Empire there might be various parts, as far as they all accept to be subjects to the Queen. Lubbock’s hierarchical evolutionary ladder is an ideal format for Imperial archaeology. All people belong to the Empire, but they exist at different levels of evolution and, therefore, have different positions in a hierarchy. In Kossinna’s archaeology, the unified People are in the centre of attention. The Germans is one People with different Tribes. Although there are leaders, the People are unified, and there are no hierarchical divisions. The People of the Germans are, in Kossinna’s understanding, unique. Thus, comparative studies are meaningless (since there are no other People that the German People could be compared to) and the rest of the world is excluded from any interest or attention.

References


\textsuperscript{185} - wie ich hoffe – auch in der Zukunft eine grosse Ausgabe in der für alle Völker gemeinsamen Arbeit für das Wohl der Menschheit haber wird.


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Recasting Swedish historical identity

Erik Örjan Emilsson

Abstract
That the concept of Swedish identity and its relation to Swedish history is deeply problematic has become increasingly obvious over the last few years. Several books, articles and a TV series have been devoted to such questions. In this article the problem is discussed within the context of two contrasting standpoints: on the one hand a Romanticist nationalist construction of an ‘ancient racial community’ (a myth recently dissected by Maja Hagerman), and on the other, an identification with the present and the future, rather than with the past. This tendency has been characteristic of the Swedish welfare society, and here it is discussed in connection with Berggren-Trägårdh’s analysis of the specifically Swedish combination of radical individualism and a strong reliance on the state.
Within this context different interpretations of the ‘People’s home’ (folkhem) ideal are discussed, and different attitudes to immigration. The article concludes that if the dynamics of Europe depend on its diversity, then every national peculiarity may be seen as a contribution to these dynamics. In the Swedish case: an acceptance of perpetual change, a moderate rate of inequality, a deep aversion to warfare, a tradition of constant negotiation and an ambition to search for points of consensus.

Recasting Swedish historical identity
In a country which has transformed itself from one of the poorest countries of Europe, to one of the richest; from an extremely militarized society to a world record holder in unbroken peace, and from a draconically enforced religious conformity to an almost complete secularization186 – in such a country we should not be surprised to notice a lack of consensus about national identity, about what it means to be Swedish.
In this article the recently reawakened interest in such questions is discussed in the context of two competing traditions.
During the later part of the 20th century – and in some respects already from the 30’s – Swedish nationalism tended to become a less and less fashionable subject. The programmatic modernism and international reputation of the Swedish welfare state encouraged a focus on the present and the future, rather than the past, and on the international context rather than the internal. Despite the rather low intensity of nationalist discourse, Sweden was regularly cited as one of the few real-life examples of the nation-state ideal before the post-communist resurgence of national separatism in Europe187.

187 Normally six to eight countries used to be mentioned, including Iceland, Portugal and Albania.
Are we then to conclude that Sweden’s national homogeneity was so self-evident that it was unnecessary to assert? And that the absence of nationality problems was a precondition for identifying with modernity?

Not really. Nationalist ideas had flourished throughout and beyond Sweden’s 19th century, and the modernist paradigm won out only slowly. There are still traces of an unconscious or at least unspoken nationalism in the ways many Swedes view the world. If you are convinced that you really live in the best country in the world it would be tactless to spell it out.

Also, on such a subliminal level of discrete nationalism old national myths have been able to survive unexamined. And if we start to examine them, homogeneity may appear much less self-evident. I will presently return to these aspects.

After Sweden’s hesitant and somewhat reluctant entry into the European Communities – and likewise as a consequence of international migration – we have been more closely confronted with people having a much more explicit and assertive relationship with their historical pasts. This has – at long last – forced us to begin reconsidering Swedish history and Swedish national identity. In the last year¹⁸⁸, several books, articles and an ambitious TV series have been devoted to questions of national identity and related issues.

During the later 1990’s the resurgence of interest in Swedish history was becoming obvious. When history had disappeared from the list of compulsory school subjects within Swedish secondary education in 1991, this had only been the final step in a long devaluation of history as an item of social necessity¹⁸⁹. At least from the Stockholm exhibition in 1930, and even more so after the publication of Marquis Childs’ book *Sweden: the Middle Way* in 1936, Sweden had begun to enjoy a growing international reputation as the homeland of modernity – ‘the country that shows the rest of the world what the future will be like’, to quote a once popular American cliché.

If a nation is an ‘imagined community’ in Benedict Anderson’s famous expression¹⁹⁰, Sweden’s collective imagination had by this time turned its focus onto the present and the future, rather than on its past. The conservative nationalist tradition that had grown in strength throughout the 19th century did not give in easily, but the identification with modernity proved to be more attractive in the long run, at least until Sweden started to drop from its taken-for-granted top positions in international ranking lists of economic performance, political stability and high living standards. Paradoxically, the high scientific standards of a newer generation of Swedish historians challenging the conservative nationalist historians during the interwar period, ultimately may have served to undermine the public interest in history. Their dedication to uncompromising source-criticism led them to undertake a severe deconstruction of national mythologies, but the paucity of early historical sources in Sweden made large parts of Swedish history look like empty gaps after their revisions. A lacklustre history was no match for a glorious present.

In the early 19th century, when Swedish nationalism had taken shape, the situation had been quite the reverse. A lacklustre present was compensated for through glorifying the past.

¹⁸⁸ This was written in early 2007.
¹⁸⁹ The devaluation of the history subject is described in Hans Albin Larsson: ‘Consigning history to the past.’ *Axess Magazine* 2006.
Today, when we are faced with the necessity of a thorough reappraisal of our latent national myths, it is to their point of formulation we have to return. When modern nationalisms were being constructed in the early 19th century, they were needed to solve quite different versions of the national identity problem. Where the French nation had to try and strike a balance between a recent revolutionary formulation of common citizenship, and the returning principle of dynastic legitimacy, the British had just been confirmed in their national pride and their self-image as international upholders of law and order. Within parts of Europe now clearly relegated to second-rank status, German and Italian nationalists were beginning to assert themselves on the basis of linguistic communities and dreams of resurrecting bygone empires. Influenced by Romantic German nationalism, young Swedish poets, journalists and historians embarked on a similar venture. But in a very different situation.

For the early German nationalists, the linguistic and cultural community they were striving for was, at the time, beyond their reach. Only very different political realities would later make a German nation-state a feasible project, but in the truncated Sweden a linguistic homogeneity which would have been unthinkable in the polyglot Swedish Empire had already entered the domain of possibility. However, this had come about not through victorious warfare (as when the German nation-state was finally realized, in 1871) but through defeat, and along with it the definitive loss of Great Power status. Therefore the bygone glory could be referred to only in very general terms, as they still are in the words of the national anthem, but any explicit nostalgia for the Imperial Age was evaded. The loss was still too painful. Instead these young nationalists returned to the faraway myths that had once occupied the imaginations of the Great Power kings: the distant Gothic origin claimed for the Swedish nation. Only this time the warlike Goths were imagined to be the ancestors not only of royal dynasties, or aristocracies, but of the peasantry as well. Here a new myth was taking shape, an ethnic as well as civic nationalism claiming a bond of shared bloodlines between lords and peasants, between kings and subjects.

This is a fiction that is still alive and kicking: the notion of a racially homogeneous population was over the 19th century turned into a pseudoscientific basis for Swedish national cohesion, and into an explanation of that Swedish tradition of personal freedom which is still treasured as a national heritage. How this came about is vividly described in Maja Hagerman’s recent book: Det rena landet. Konsten att uppf finna sina föräder. (“The pure country. The art of inventing one’s ancestors.”) The poet-historian Erik Gustaf Geijer invented two national archetypes: the viking and the odalbonde (yeoman). Geijer’s odalbonde is conceived as a hard-working small-scale self-owning peasant, proud and independent. He is envisioned as the backbone of Swedish society, in contrast to the impatient viking adventurer, who might yet have been his brother. That the strong political position of Sweden’s peasantry can be explained as an unbroken heritage from the Viking Age, is pure myth. That peasants did have a stronger political position in Sweden than in other countries is no myth, though, but originally, land ownership had nothing to do with it. That their early civic status depended on land ownership, is a misconceived back projection from the 19th century. By that time, more than a century of market-oriented agriculture had finally segregated the peasantry into either proprietors or

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191 With the suddenly shattered dreams of forcibly leading the world into modernity thrown into the balance, it is no wonder that the better part of a century had to be spent in the effort.
proletarians. These are not Hagerman’s arguments, however. She concentrates on the lack of archeological evidence of an egalitarian society, and on the construction of European racism, where, she shows, prominent Swedish scientists, historians and authors took an active and important part.

What, then, about the presumed racial homogeneity? Hagerman shows how archaeologists and anthropologists from a surprisingly narrow social circle – people who were each other’s pupils or teachers, ate breakfasts together and married off their children to each other – succeeded to create an ideal image of Sweden as an Eden of racial purity. This was achieved in a close dialogue with the international pioneers of racist theory, and eventually they succeeded to sell this idea to the Swedish public through museum exhibitions, encyclopedia articles and massive popular campaigns. That Sweden became the first country to create an institute of Racial Biology was therefore no inexplicable aberration, but a measure of the success of the pure-blood lobby, and of their scientific prestige. Few people today would talk about a national treasure of unmixed Aryan blood, but the notion of Sweden’s homogeneous population is by no means eradicated. For instance, I have quite recently been criticized in an international review by a Swedish professor for neglecting the importance of the homogeneity factor in my discussions of Swedish history within a comparative European context.

To evaluate the realism of the homogeneity notion, it is necessary to look even further back in history. To the extent that it is meaningful to talk of ethnic identity except in a quite subjective sense, there existed several different ethnic groups within the late 18th century Swedish realm. Even if we would surmise that patriotic propaganda and the uniquely efficient centralization of the early-modern Swedish state would by this time have succeeded in welding together the earlier regional identities – Westgothians, Dalecarlians, Smallanders, Northlanders and so on – into a unitary Swedish identity, there were also seven recently conquered provinces populated by Danes and Norwegians.

Today these provinces are considered totally Swedish, but by the time Geijer and his associates started to formulate a Swedish nationalist discourse, they had only been under Swedish rule for a century and a half. An efficient carrot-and-stick policy of harsh indoctrination and civic integration had turned their population into Swedish citizens, but this result can hardly be interpreted as ethnic homogeneity. Political or civic homogeneity, perhaps, but it is the ethnic discourse I am questioning. And still I haven’t even mentioned the Finnish people or the aboriginal Sami. Finland had been an integral part of Sweden for the better part of a millennium, and their peasants were represented in the Diet along with those from present-border Sweden. Their noblemen and burghers were often of non-Finnish descent, but also within Sweden, these estates contained a considerable proportion of foreign origin: Noblemen and burghers of German, Baltic, Polish, Scottish, Dutch or French extraction. At the other end of the status spectrum, there were social outcast categories like gypsies and tattare

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193 The evidence invoked largely consisted of cranimetric statistics interpreted as indications of language-group affinities; in this way prominent Swedish archaeologists and historians could claim to have proved the descent of contemporaneous Swedes from stone-age Germanic ancestors. As the databases were manipulated to exclude ‘untypical’ skulls at both ends of the time spectrum, the similarities are hardly surprising.
The Jewish element in Sweden has up to the very recent been largely invisible due to earlier religious discrimination and later wariness of antisemitism, but the European Union has now given Yiddish minority language status in Sweden, along with Romani, Finnish, two Sami languages and the Swedish-Finnish borderland idiom Meänkieli. To what extent this kaleidoscopic mixture could be considered more homogeneous than the populations of any other European country seems highly uncertain. I consider it an unproven national myth. To the extent that Swedes have been convinced by this propaganda, it may have created a subjective homogeneity, but this is surely no ‘national treasure’. On the contrary, it is a national danger, as it may impede adjustment to reality. The large proportion of recent immigrants might not have the chance to choose freely between individual and collective integration, or whatever personal mixture of these strategies they might come up with, if they are always contrasted with a massive imagined conformity.

In this context another important recent reconsideration of Swedish identity should also be mentioned: År svensken människa (“Are Swedes human?”) by Henrik Berggren and Lars Trägårdh. Their discussion concerns the Swedish self-image – the title is borrowed from one of their examples out of the large Swedish self-castigating literature – and their principal and quite convincing thesis is that the Swedish culture is at the same time extremely individualist and strongly reliant on the state. The explanation of this seeming paradox, is that the state guarantees our independence from other collectivities and thus leaves us free to choose our own commitments – and even more important: our non-commitments. Of course this is more of a utopia than a description of reality, but an important point is that to many outsiders this type of freedom would not seem all that attractive. Surprisingly, the authors trace the development of this radical individualism from the same writer, Erik Gustaf Geijer, who is cited by Hagerman as the leading inventor of Swedish conservative nationalism. In his old age Geijer had astonished the Swedish public by converting to liberalism, and it is the radical old man, not the young conservative, that is discussed by Berggren-Trägårdh. Carl Jonas Love Almqvist, Ellen Key and Alva Myrdal mark the most important further steps toward statist individualism, although Strindberg and Astrid Lindgren are also discussed. The statist-individualist analysis is complemented by something the writers term “the Swedish theory of love”. According to this ‘theory’ true love can exist only where the lovers are completely independent of each other. Stated in such a stark form it sounds almost frighteningly demanding and existentialist, but it is hard to deny that the line of reasoning sounds familiar to a Swede.

This whole story may sound totally unrelated to Hagerman’s, and in many ways it is. It is a mentality consistent with the modernist paradigm that is reconstructed by Berggren-Trägårdh, while Hagerman strives to uncover the hidden remnants of the old reactionary nationalism. Still, both of these studies are deeply concerned with the relevance for the present of notions from the past, and in that respect they are complementary.

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194 Which has earlier in general been considered a Finnish dialect, although this official recognition should support its pretentions to language status.
195 The late (14th century) abolition of slavery in Sweden, and the important role of Swedish vikings in the European slave-trade.
196 The Swedish literature on Geijer is voluminous. For a detailed discussion in English of his role in formulating Swedish nationalism, see Peter Hall: The social construction of nationalism. Sweden as an example. Lund 1998.
A consistent statist-individualist immigration policy would give every immigrant the chance of formulating his or her own individual version of integration and would therefore tend to attract those presumptive immigrants who would appreciate a free choice, whatever their cultural background. This would be in sharp contrast to the different versions of cultural essentialism, where people are identified with their cultural background and either are expected to conform to it or demanded to give it up in favour of full assimilation. The first of those alternatives resembles the British policy criticized by Amartya Sen\(^{197}\), who makes a forceful case for respecting the individual identities of immigrants and minority members, as against Tony Blair’s strategy of negotiating with so-called ‘responsible leaders’ for immigrant communities. The second alternative resembles the Danish, where the demand for full assimilation leads to the need of unequivocal criteria for what you are expected to conform to, and thus to the construction of an increasingly monolithic version of Danishness. As both of these uncomfortable alternatives correspond to tendencies articulated also in the Swedish debate, the statist-individualist position might be a constructive basis for a third way. This should also be more compatible with the ideology of the Swedish welfare state. This is still often envisioned in the terms of the folkhem (‘people’s home’) vision from the 1928, when Social Democrat chairman and eventual prime minister Per-Albin Hansson formulated the almost utopian notion of society as a ‘good home’ for the people: a home where there are no mistreated stepchildren or pampered favourites. Eventually, a surprisingly broad consensus formed around this ideal, which was hardly seriously questioned before the Thatcher revolution started to make an impact on Swedish politics. In the present-day debates the limitations of this vision has often been stressed, and Maja Hagerman at times seems to suggest that the notion of a ‘people’s home’ was only possible because of the imagined consanguinity. This is by no means the only possible interpretation though. Today the folkhem ideal is most conspicuously propagated by two diametrically opposed political parties: on the one hand by the avowed internationalists of the Left-wing Party, and on the other by the crypto-racist isolationists in the Sweden Democrats. To claim that the people’s home ideal is premised on the exclusivity of a narrowly bounded nationalism, may amount to a self-fulfilling cynicism that concedes the victory before the match has started. That the vision is compatible with a racist world-view doesn’t mean that it is a racist notion. From the very beginning, the concept has been ambiguous and contested. Per-Albin Hansson picked up the catchword from conservatives like Rudolf Kjellén, and re-charged it with an egalitarian content\(^{198}\). In Hansson’s formulation, the edge was turned against class injustice, but it might just as well be given an anti-racist interpretation, if gipsies and travellers are to be counted among the ‘stepchildren’ that deserve an equal place at the table. The ‘people’s home’ idea was contested from the beginning, and could be given a radical turn as well as a conservative one. The struggle over the right interpretation continues, and if we view it in the light of the Swedish modernist tradition, it would be most natural to see it as mutable and redefinable. The open-door version of the ‘people’s home’ ideal that can be found in Olof Palme’s rhetoric may seem hopelessly idealist and out of date, but even within the context of the European Union, something along the same lines could offer a much better comparative advantage to Sweden than would any version of an ethnic

definition of Swedishness. Swedish self-understanding has always had a strong civic component, resembling the American version of nationalism in that freedom and democratic participation has been envisioned as a national heritage. Whatever the level of exaggerated idealization involved in that viewpoint, there are several characteristics of Swedish society and culture that are remarkable in a comparative context, and have deep historical roots: broad popular participation, a high level of legitimacy for the state, a tradition of constant negotiation, a search for consensus, a deep aversion to warfare, a moderate rate of inequality and a positive view of change. If Berggren and Trägårdh are right we could also add a more specific characteristic: a positive view of the state as the guarantee of our right and ability to be truly individual.

If Sweden no longer heads the ranking-lists in standard of living or economic growth, we still seem to embrace modernity – or what is now often described as post-modern values – to a higher extent than most other countries. When we discuss Swedish culture and Swedish traditions, we should not forget that perpetual modernization has by now become one of our most distinctive traditions. When I have studied and compared different contemporary theories about Europe’s historical rise to world dominance, I have found only one real point of consensus. In one way or another, everyone stressed the dynamic importance of the simultaneous interaction and independence of the societies that together constitute Europe. If we would accept diversity as a fundamental characteristic of Europe – perhaps even the most fundamental one – then every national or regional variant of the European development should be expected to present its own peculiarities, which would constitute their respective contributions to the diversity of Europe. Such a perspective might lead to a wariness about unnecessary harmonizations (which could weaken the dynamic properties of multiplicity), but on the other hand, it would certainly offer no support for isolationism.

If the search for Sweden’s role in a changing and expanding Europe would make us turn back towards the conservative nationalism of the young Geijer and abandon the radical individualism which the old Geijer paved the way for, we would have adapted to eurosclerosis and missed the opportunity to take an active part in the modernization of an entire continent, or more. For a country that was once described as the social laboratory of the world, that would be a sorry ending indeed.

199 Clearly visible already in the rhetoric of the Peasant Estate during the 17th century: ‘We know that in other countries, the commonalty is held in thrall, and we fear that the same will befall us, who are yet born a free people.’ (my translation).
The exhibition *Art of Africa, Asia, Oceania and the Americas* at the Pavillon des Sessions, Musée du Louvre, Paris, is still standing in 2007. Former President Jacques Chirac wanted the exhibition to be permanent although it aroused at the time some strong resistances.

The present article is based on the research that I undertook for my Master’s thesis, *Does the Musée du Quai Branly tell more about the objects it houses or about France?*, Maud Guichard-Marneur, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, June 2006, http://www.museion.gu.se/Museumstudies/Past_dissertations/ [accessed 19/05/2007].


The adjective "nation-statist" is used by Sharon Macdonald in her research and re-used by the author of the present article. For more information on the topic of museums, representation, and identity, please see Macdonald Sharon, particularly:


The Musée des Arts d’Afrique et d’Océanie was created after the colonial exhibition in 1931. The Musée de l’Homme was created in 1937, with objects inherited from the former Ethnographic Museum in Paris.


The italics in the quotations of Jacques Chirac’s and Emmanuel Désveaux’s discourses are the author’s highlights.

Jean-Loup Amselle considers this "aesthetic primitivism" as "the product of a repression of history and politics." For more details, please see his article:


xvi Public space or 'espace public' is understood, here, both as public, common space and as in Jürgen Habermas's sense where citizens can gather to discuss and formulate a public opinion.


xix It is interesting to note that from a semiotic perspective, ‘the left’ is heavily connoted: it is the unclean, the corporeal, the darkness, and associated with satanic forces.

xx All the cultural objects originate from sub-Saharan countries except for the pre-dynastic cultural object from Egypt. The list of country of origins is as followed: Egypt, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Burkina-Faso, Ivory Coast, Republic of Benin, Nigeria, Mali, Cameroon, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, and South Africa.

xxi For a more thorough insight of the idea of "conceptual present," see James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture, especially Chapter 9. Histories of the Tribal and the Modern: "In this relegation of the tribal or primitive to either a vanishing past or an ahistorical, conceptual present, modernist appreciation reproduces common ethnographic categories,” p. 201.

xxii The pre-dynastic cultural objects from Egypt dating from 4th millenium BC is in close proximity to a Zulu cultural object from South Africa dating from 19th-20th century.


xxiv It is of interest to note that a room has been dedicated to a so-called interpretation of the cultural objects on display, although the room is spatially isolated from the objects.

xxv Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara, reflections, unpublished commentary on the conference Exhibiting other: Museums of Mankind and the politics of cultural representation, Paris, Centre allemand d'histoire de l'art.

xxvi Dias, Nelia, "Une place au Louvre," Le musée cannibale, GHK, 2002


xxviii For a more in-depth analysis of the three terms of 'multiculturalism', 'cultural diversity' and 'Interculturality', as understood in the French context, see Culture et Recherche n°106-107. Articles by Dominique Piot-Morin, Claude Rouot and Pierre Mayol.

xxx Renan, Ernest, Qu'est-ce-qu'une nation?, speech given at the Sorbonne, Paris, 1882.


xxxix I would like to thank the team at Museion, University of Gothenburg. A special thank to Anna Nilsson for her encouragements to Staffan Lundén for supervising the research I undertook for my Master's thesis and to my colleagues, Hilary MacDonald, Brittany Wheeler, and Jacob Thomas for their valuable comments.