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Effective Opposition Strategies: A Foundation for Improved Quality of Government*

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Modern understandings of democracy typically encapsulates Dahl's dictum that democracy requires not only popular participation but also competition (or, contestation as Dahl would have it).ⁱ Democracy is not only a "regime in which those who govern are selected through contested elections"ⁱⁱ but more fundamentally "a system of government in which parties lose elections."ⁱⁱⁱ Multiparty elections grant citizens a powerful weapon to use against unresponsive elected officials: the ability to "throw the rascals out"^{iv} and turnovers has been shown to reinforce the legitimacy of political institutions and deepen democratic consolidation.^v Yet, the mechanism of vertical accountability whereby the principal (the people) can hold the agent (elected politicians) responsible,^{vi} depends on political opposition providing voters choice.^{vii} In other words, elections must include credible opposition parties in order to serve as "instruments of democracy."^{viii}

Democratic vertical accountability also has a direct relationship with the underdevelopment in Africa.^{ix} If voters reward politicians with loyalty in exchange for private goods, politicians are incentivized to siphon off resources from the state in order to provide more clientelistic rents.^x Electoral citizens-politician linkages characterized by clientelism can then undermine rather than strengthen development.^{xi} Averting this suboptimal outcome requires pivotal voters to emphasize collective goods provision when making a decision at the polls. Over a series of successive elections, such emphasis would force politicians to become more of developmental agents and less of private goods providers *as long as* there exists a credible opposition. Consequently, we expect successful opposition parties to be necessary not only for democracy to function but also for making politicians provide development rather than clientelism. It is therefore imperative that we gain more knowledge about what makes for strong opposition parties that can win elections in Africa's new and emerging democracies.

Our empirical focus is on the preferences of the voters that parties seek to catch ^{xii}. The question is, are voters in democratic Ghana continuing to be beguiled by clientelism thus undermining both democracy and development, or do they now reward politicians who focus on

collective goods provision? Using two surveys carried out before and after the election on December 7 2008 in Ghana, we analyze voters' retrospective sanctioning and prospective selection of incumbents and opposition candidates. We use this case to explore one of the most important topics in contemporary Africa: What "works" for opposition parties in Africa, clientelism or development that can lay the foundation for better quality of government? We find that the main opposition party managed both to collect a large share of the undecided voters but also managed to win over some persuadable voter from the government side. These voters were casting their vote based on retrospective evaluation of collective goods to a greater extent than clientelistic goods. This finding is different from Lindberg & Morrison's studies of the same constituencies in Ghana in 2003 and indicates that clientelism may be a feature of emerging democracies in Africa that diminishes over time as voters gain more experience and there is a longer track record which they can use to base their vote on. This may be how the repetitive processes of democracy contributes to improved quality of government.

A Note On Opposition in Africa

The small and weak opposition parties in several African countries have made some observers see a return of semi-authoritarianism,^{xiii} or "big man" clientelistic politics even the context of multiparty elections^{xiv}. Regarding the underdevelopment of political parties, the literature suggests that opposition and incumbent dispositions vary in several ways because political parties may reflect the structural cleavages of society^{xv}; be impacted by incentives of electoral systems they face^{xvi}; or differ in their nature as office-, voter-, or policy-seeking parties.^{xvii} Many political parties in Africa allegedly lack clear political objectives, platforms, and "brand names"^{xviii} and they have had little success in removing incumbents from office.^{xix}

A prevalent explanation for this is structural: Africans are assumed to vote ethnically and elections are often viewed as little more than ethnic censuses propelling relevant cleavage

structures of society into the public sphere.^{xx} Partisan identities are limited and seldom constitute “cross-cutting cleavages” that assuage ethnic divisions.^{xxi} Thus, ethnic identities become a primary mechanism for mobilizing political support.^{xxii} More than one incentive can provide the foundation. Voters receive “psychic benefits” for supporting candidates like themselves^{xxiii} and in lieu of clearly defined policy aims, use ethnicity as a cognitive shortcut to estimate similar electoral preferences.^{xxiv} Responding to such incentives citizens can be expected to vote along ethnic lines and thus elections in Africa's developing democracies can result in censuses of salient ethnic identities.^{xxv} Even if one accepts the argument that these ethnic identities are multi-faceted and it has been demonstrated that their make-up and intensity can change over time,^{xxvi} ethnic patterns hardly explains dramatic changes in voting patterns such as between the 2004 and 2008 elections in Ghana.

The typical explanation of vote shifts that *do* occur in Africa is a sort of simple, distributive clientelism benefitting the incumbent party^{xxvii} that that elites can use to subvert the logic of democratic accountability^{xxviii} and in order to gain credibility where parties and records of accomplishments are lacking.^{xxix} In the case of Ghana, it has been shown that Members of Parliament (MPs) spend tremendous amounts of time and resources providing personal assistance to voters, paying health and educational expenses, attending funerals, distributing jobs and other benefits, as well as handing out “small chops.”^{xxx} A number of scholars attribute such patterns to poverty.^{xxxi} For the poor, immediate improvements in their often precarious material conditions take priority and the cost of buying political loyalty from a poor person can be assumed to be much lower than beguiling the rich.^{xxxii} Political competitiveness also affects the cost and benefits of clientelistic strategies since the value of the marginal voter, hence the acceptable price of a *quid pro quo*, is much higher in competitive districts than in safe havens.^{xxxiii} Yet, candidates can also use clientelistic goods to drive up turnout (i.e. mobilize rather than persuade).^{xxxiv} Without seeking here to adjudicate between these arguments, it remains that if the most successful strategy for

parties to win elections is providing and promising private-clientelistic goods, the supply of collective and public goods (i.e. development) will suffer.

Perhaps the most prevalent explanation of the lagging development in Africa is 'big man politics', or clientelism. Politicians use state and private wealth to reward supporters with private, clientelistic goods in order to maintain power.^{xxxv} With heightened political competition under multiparty electoral democracy, the pressure to increase both the scope and penetration of clientelistic distribution should increase. Development should suffer in contexts such as those in Africa with a history of prevalent clientelism. The possible antidote is found among voters. If sufficient number of pivotal voters demand a greater supply of collective and public goods, politicians presumably will have to follow suit in order to stay in power.

Using two rounds of original survey data from Ghana, the present paper provides some evidence on two questions. The first concerns what factors drive voters to support opposition parties at the polls, laying the foundation for alternations in power. Second, by comparing what voters said before the election would make them switch their vote with evidence from a post-election survey on why they eventually voted they way they did, we demonstrate to what extent voters are "farming clientelism" or creating incentives for politicians to be agents of development.

Case Selection and Methodology

Ghana is a good case for exploring the issue at hand. Since 1992, there have been two alternations in power across five national elections and both of the two main parties have managed to make a "comeback" after losing. The NDC's share of legislative seats has changed from 96% in the first parliament down to 41% after the elections in 2004, and up again to 51% in the fifth parliament. The changes in NPP's share of seats has almost mirrored this going from 0% in the first legislature to 56% in the fourth and down again to 46% in the fifth and current parliament. Volatility has been even higher than these figures suggest however, with the share of new MPs after the first

legislature took its seats, ranging from 68% in the second parliament to 40% in the fifth making an average of less than 52%.^{xxxvi}

Electoral volatility in the presidential elections have been less pronounced but nevertheless substantial. In the last election in December 2008, the two-term ruling party that lost a presidential election run-off by less than one half of one percent of the vote^{xxxvii}, gracefully accepted defeat. In doing so, the National Patriotic Party (NPP) ensured that Ghana experienced a second alternation in power. After democratically ousting the NDC led by former authoritarian ruler and President J. J. Rawlings in 2000, the NPP was in turn forced out of office by the ballot box. In other words, Ghana had finally passed the classical “two turnover test.”^{xxxviii}

While Ghana’s experience may not be typical yet for Africa, it can give us a first take of what makes opposition parties win and incumbent parties lose in Africa when democracy survive and get established. Ghana is not entirely unique, however, as Table 1 demonstrates. As of 2010, 33 of the countries in Africa has held at least three successive elections without a coup, civil war, or other interruption. More than 20 countries have held four elections or more in a row and 12 has completed a an uninterrupted sequence of five multiparty elections. Among the countries that have held at least three successive elections, we find no less than 15 clearly democratic regimes while another four or five countries are competitive electoral authoritarian regimes with relatively good prospects of becoming democratic in the future: Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and perhaps Gambia Moreover, that about a third of the countries in Africa have experienced legislative and/or executive turnovers of power makes the Ghanaian case less atypical than one might first think.^{xxxix}

<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>

We use two unique surveys conducted by one of the authors in collaboration with CDD-Ghana in August 2008 and July 2009. The first survey was conducted almost four months before Ghana's concurrent presidential and legislative elections on December 7. At this point, the primary

elections for both legislative seats and presidential slots were over and the revision of the voters' registry just completed, but the campaigning had not really got started yet. This provides a good time to collect data on performance-based evaluations of Members of Parliament (MPs) independent of campaign influences. The second survey was fielded in July 2009, six months after the installation of the new government and legislature. We opted for this timing trying to find a balance between two main considerations. First, it was essential that respondents would have at least some minimum level of information on the behavior of their MP after taking office in order to be able to provide meaningful evaluations of new MPs. From this perspective, a longer period between the election and the survey was desirable. Yet, it was important that post-election events did not overly influence respondents' memories of rationales for voting a particular way. Balancing these two concerns, we judged that the six months interval would present a reasonable middle ground between the two.

Each survey included 1600 or more subjects who were recruited through clustered, stratified, multi-stage area probability sampling procedure. They were not national probability samples but because the surveys are part of a larger project that runs over a decade, they were conducted in ten strategically selected constituencies^{xi}: One each from nine out of the ten regions in Ghana and reflecting a wide range of districts from safe havens to hotly contested constituencies.^{xii} Each survey consisted of a number of questions that probe a subject's past voting behavior, exposure to campaign activities, past and future evaluations and expectations of members of Parliament, the nature of interaction with local and national political authorities, as well as a host of demographic probes, such as ethnic identity and religion. Open-ended questions also sought to capture the full range of rationales why a individual decided to vote for a different party in the last election. These answers were post-coded informed by theories of clientelism and collective/public goods to generate the truest possible representation of people's self-reported behavior while being interpretable in relevant theoretical terms.

Characteristics of Ten Constituencies in Ghana's 2008 Elections

The first task is to illustrate the characteristics of the NDC victory across the constituencies in the 2008 pre-election survey. The selected constituencies vary in terms of electoral competitiveness, which permits us to compare the performance of the political opposition, over two elections. Table 2 provides evidence that the NDC managed to overcome a number of obstacles facing opposition parties making this election a relevant case to study factors contributing to making opposition parties viable contenders for power. The selected constituencies thus constitute a sample where we can study which opposition party strategies were effective. While not necessarily a nationally representative sample of constituencies, they nevertheless seem like a good selection to study this particular issue. The NDC captured three constituencies previously held by the NPP while holding onto their own turf. As Table 2 shows, the opposition party performed particularly well in close electoral contests winning all three of the competitive "battleground" constituencies. In Cape Coast, for example, this means that the NDC turned a 6.7% deficit in 2004 into a 4.9% victory margin in the 2008 elections, representing a gain of over 11% of the votes in the constituency. Second, even in the NPP "safe havens" (Kwabre East and Akim Swedru), the NDC was able to pick off a number of voters.

<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>

In the remainder of this article, we seek to ascertain why voters choose one political party over another: Are these choices based on retrospective evaluation of incumbent performance or prospective policy promises, or instead on personalistic ties and private enticements for political support? In short, which strategies did the opposition party use that worked?

The Opposition Captured Undecided and Persuadable Voters

Before electoral campaigns started, the incumbent government's party NPP appeared to be in relatively good standing even in the most competitive constituencies with as strong support as the main opposition party. Eventually, the opposition captured an average of 54% of the votes in these areas whereas the ruling party got only 37%. While the ruling party held on to their own safe havens, they still seem to have lost voters there as well. What could explain then the eventual success of the NDC? While it is possible that sampling and measurement errors in the survey could be the source of some of the differences reported here, we believe the main answer to rest on two factors: As demonstrated by Table 3, a substantial portion of respondents reported being undecided in the August 2008 survey, meaning that they were still "up for grabs" and a vast majority of these seems to have voted for the opposition.

<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>

Secondly, a large portion of voters who reported an intention to vote for a particular party's candidate nevertheless had a substantial propensity to "vote one way or the other." The column labeled 'Persuadable' in Table 3 shows the share of each party's voters that report to be open to vote for other party's candidate if such a candidate convincingly promises to deliver community development ("pork'), provide executive oversight, or voice constituency concerns on the floor of parliament. Given that projected NDC voters also consisted of a substantial share of 'swing voters' this indicates that the NDC effectively won over many NPP swing voters, while minimizing their own losses to the NPP. NDC's success in capturing these voters is evidenced by the difference between the actual election results of the December 7 2008 elections and the projected vote choices from the pre-election survey. In competitive constituencies the main opposition party increased their share of voters from the projected vote by 23% while the ruling party only gained 8%. In the safe havens, the opposition increased its share of votes by 15-22% while the ruling party lost 2% across the board.

In short, the results in these ten constituencies seems to illustrate rather well what happened more generally in Ghana's 2008 election. NDC's electoral success can be attributed to its ability to win over sets of undecided and swing voters. In the next section, we analyze the reasons for these voters to choose the NDC over the candidates of other political parties' candidates.

Prospective vs. Retrospective Voting

Table 4A presents evidence on whether retrospective performance evaluations of incumbent MPs on being patrons in clientelistic networks ('Personal Assistance'); being providers of small-scale collective, or 'club' goods ('Constituency Service'); and being representatives producing broader collective goods ('Law-Making'), had an impact on projected vote choice in August 2008.^{xiii} The table shows, most importantly, that projected opposition voters held a more negative evaluation of incumbents' performance compared to those who intended to vote for the incumbent government's candidates. At first, it might seem that these differences are rather small; for example, 44% of NDC supporters see incumbent performance in constituency service as bad or very bad, compared to 40% of NDC supporters. The differences are statistically significant, however, and since the elections were close in a number of these constituencies a 4 percent difference in performance evaluation may have heavily affected election results. Table 4A also shows that undecided voters are more critical of incumbents' provision of both clientelistic and collective goods, compared to respondents who indicate support for a political party. Voters who contributed to the success of the NDC in the December 2008 elections were unsatisfied with the performance of the incumbent regime across a wide range of roles an MP can perform. Table 4B provides even stronger evidence of this showing the results if we include only subjects who were in constituencies where the incumbent MP belonged to the ruling government. Across the board, we also see that undecided voters were far more critical of the performance of the incumbent government's MPs in terms of both clientelistic and collective goods provision.

<TABLES 4A & 4B ABOUT HERE>

Substantial shares of voters in a new democracy like Ghana seems to make the choice between supporting the ruling government and voting for an opposition party based to a significant extent on assessing the performance of an incumbent in terms of both collective and private goods provision. The space here does not allow us to engage the debate on the role of ethnicity in this article but we want to make know that these results are not driven by tribal affiliations.^{xliii} Contrary to much of the established notions in the literature on African politics, a significant portion of citizens in our survey are retrospective voters ready to punish the incumbent for poor for performance.

Table 5 looks at the importance of prospective considerations. Subjects were asked to consider reasons for which they might be willing to change their vote in the future. Unlike in Tables 4A and 4B, there is very little variation across supporters of the ruling party and the opposition, and undecided voters. The differences in Table 5 are not even close to achieving statistical significance.^{xliv} While some Ghanaians are indeed prospective voters in the sense that they consider future gains in either collective and private goods when choosing their candidate, but these voters do not systematically end up supporting one particular party. The tables above taken together, gives evidence that the success of the NDC in ousting the incumbent NPP was based on both collecting a number of undecided voters and on picking off some from the NPP camp, and these individuals were basing their vote primarily on retrospective evaluation.

<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>

These voters, however, did not differ in their consideration of prospective promises when selecting their preferred candidate. These results are substantially different from Lindberg & Morrison's (2005, 2008) earlier findings where many more voters were prospectively oriented. A plausible interpretation is that a longer record of accomplishment enables a voter to evaluate

politicians and parties retrospectively. African voting behavior may after all be more similar to Western democracies than we once thought.

The Road to Opposition Victory: Collective, *Not* Clientelistic, Goods

We now move on to introduce the second set of data collected six months after the 2008 elections. While the two surveys do not produce panel data, they draw representative samples from the same constituencies with the same random procedure. This allows us to make direct comparisons between voters in these constituencies before and after the elections.

We presented evidence above that voters seemed inclined to use their ballots as a means of punishing or rewarding past performance of political incumbents. Using data from the post-election survey, we explore here the differences between actual incumbent and opposition voters in terms of *how* they evaluated the MP on private and collective goods provision and how these evaluations directly affected vote choice. In Table 6A and 6B, we present results from the 2009 post-election survey where respondents were asked to provide the reason they think a particular MP was elected for office, in terms of private and collective (club and collective) goods provision. Items are arranged to reflect levels of the “collectiveness” of a good, ranging from the most private to the most public.

<TABLE 6A and 6B ABOUT HERE>

Table 6A analyzes the entire sample of 1,490 valid responses. There are statistically significant differences between those who ended up voting for the then ruling NPP and opposition NDC voters. Supporters of the incumbent NPP regime more readily point to private goods provision as a means of being elected. This finding accords with the literature that addresses incumbency advantage including the difficulty facing opposition parties to meet the needs of individuals and thus to be seen as supporting members of the constituency. Interestingly, we also see a significant portion of NDC voters who feel attending private events like funerals the most important strategy

MPs use to be elected. This finding runs contrary to much of the clientelistic literature which assumes that private goods provision is a strategy available primarily to incumbents by suggesting that an opposition party can provide certain symbolic private goods like appearances.

Table 6A also demonstrates that voters who put the NDC back in power place higher value on collective goods, like delivering development to the constituency, and representing the constituency on the floor of the parliament. While some of these differences may appear small, they are by no means statistically trivial or substantively unimportant. Indeed, the differences across groups capture the variation encapsulating the voting shifts leading to the victory of the opposition party in 2008. As a robustness check, we conducted the same analysis restricted to constituencies that the NDC won (Table 6B). The findings hold within NDC winning constituencies. What we in the end cannot completely resolve, however, is the exact nature of causality: To what extent the patterns we find are due to voters demanding these goods and therefore the opposition provided them in order to win the election, or if parties impose strategies on voters that are only consumers, or a combination of both. The bottom line nevertheless is that the analysis shows that among voters of the opposition, an emphasis on collective goods trumped clientelistic goods provision and this provided the avenue to power for the party in opposition.

Conclusion

In many new democracies, opposition parties find it hard to win elections. In some countries in Africa, this is mainly due to fraudulent electoral processes. From Nigeria to Togo, Equatorial Guinea, DRC, Ethiopia, and notably Zimbabwe, opposition parties have simply been prevented from winning elections. Even in many emerging democracies, such as Liberia, Zambia, South Africa, and Namibia, opposition parties have so far been unable to persuade voters. Notwithstanding these examples, in almost a dozen countries from Kenya and Lesotho to Senegal, Benin, and Ghana the opposition has triumphed in either legislative or executive elections, or in both. This testifies to

the fact that real political competition is becoming more common on the continent and as it does, citizens priorities should translate into imperatives for politicians who wish to get re(elected).

We started with one overall concern. Do elections in Africa's new democracies funnel politicians investing in collective goods furthering development, or do they contribute to the erosion of development by rewarding the use of political clientelism? This question translates what makes opposition parties win elections? This paper analyzes data from two unique exercises conducted in Ghana as pre- and post-election surveys to the decisive December 2008 election in which NDC came back to power after eight years as opposition party. We find the pivotal voters rewarded politicians who had performed well on constituency development and representation, while punishing those who had acted more as patrons trying to buy votes.

While we are acutely aware of the tentative nature of our findings, they are nonetheless encouraging. Ghana's voters had the privilege of an uninterrupted sequence of four consecutive general elections when they went to the polls. Comparing our results to earlier findings from the same country, the changes are indeed in the right direction. Political clientelism may be consuming more resources than ever before in Ghana and the country's development record still leaves much to be desired.^{xlv} However, it is also clear that the citizens of Ghana are no longer easily lured by cheap vote buying tricks and simplistic clientelism. Voting is becoming based on retrospective evaluation of developmental records of accomplishment even when distribution of clientelistic goods is pervasive, and for that many of the incumbent NPP candidates seems to have suffered defeat in the last election. Politicians tend to do what they have to in order to stay in power and, in Ghana, this message should be clear.

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xxxiii See, for example, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds, *Patrons, Clients and Policies*.

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xxxv Joel D Barkan. "Legislators, Elections, and Political Linkage," in Barkan and Okumu, *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania* (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 64-92, Jean-Francois Bayart. *The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly* (New York: Longman, 1993), Goran Hyden. *African Politics in Comparative Perspective*. (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg. *Personal Rule in Black Africa*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), Richard Joseph. *Prebendalism and Democracy in Nigeria*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Richard Joseph. "Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives" *Comparative Politics* Vol. 16, No. 3 (1997), p. 363-82. , William Reno. *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), van de Walle 2001.

xxxvi Staffan I. Lindberg (with Young-Mei Zhou) "Co-Optation Despite Democratization in Ghana." Chapter 5 in Barkan, Joel (ed.) *Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), p. 147-176.

xxxvii The presidential election was decided in a second round and a subsequent rerun in one constituency (Tain) after the first round on December 7 failed to produce a winner. The NDC won the presidential race with 50.23% of the votes translating to a margin of 40, 586 votes. The total number of rejected votes was almost twice the size of the margin of victory (92,886) illustrating how close and potentially contested the outcome was.

xxxviii Huntington 1991.

xxxix Staffan I. Lindberg "The Power of Elections in Africa Revisited." Chapter 1 in Lindberg, Staffan I. (ed.) *Democratization by Elections*, p. 37.

xl This is following a procedure established by Lindberg and Morrison Staffan I. Lindberg & Minion K. C. Morrison. 'Exploring voter alignments in Africa: core and swing voters in Ghana', *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 43, No. 4 (2005): 565-86, Staffan I. Lindberg, & Minion K. C. Morrison. 'Are African voters really ethnic or clientelistic?: survey evidence from Ghana', *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 123, No. 1 (2008), p. 95-122. The strategic selection of constituencies was done in this project in order to get enough respondents from each constituency in order to make valid inferences possible about particular areas. This procedure involved first stratifying constituencies in the 2008 elections by Ghana's ten regions. Since random selection procedure could lead to inclusion of extreme outliers, one constituency was strategically selected from nine of the ten regions (two from Greater Accra) by weighting a number of both quantitative and qualitative indicators in order to ensure a representative selection of constituencies as far as possible. Within each constituency, we used polling stations as sampling frame, and 16 of them were selected at random by a computer. The final stages of sampling were guided by Afrobarometer standard household methodology protocol (Afrobarometer Survey Methods 2009).

xli Three constituencies reflecting safe-havens for the two dominant parties in their geographical strongholds. Kwabre, in the heartland of the Ashanti region for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and Ho West in the Volta region for the National Democratic Congress (NDC) respectively. Akim Swedru in the Eastern region is another safe haven chosen to capture

that region but also reflect the fact that the NPP have almost double the number of safe havens compared to the NDC. Besides being safe havens, each of these constituencies has a diverse population of urban and rural residents engaged in trading, farming and education. Lindberg and Morrison 2005. Three competitive districts were also selected. The Central region and the Greater Accra region have been contested regions for both parties in several elections. Both Cape Coast and Ablekumah South had been NPP constituencies over the last three election cycles but with radically decreasing margins and both were eventually lost to the NDC in 2008. Both have a combination of fishing, farming, trading, and small-scale cottage industry communities, and a mixture of urban and rural communities. The last competitive area is Bolgatanga in the far north of the country. In addition to contributing to geographical representation of the country and inclusion of some minority ethnic groups from the North, it is a constituency where one of the small parties has won a seat in the past. During the time of the survey, the PNC was holding the seat although it was lost to the NDC in the 2008 election. In addition to the six constituencies above, four semi-competitive constituencies were selected. Kpone-Katamanso lies on the outskirts of the Accra/Tema metropolitan area with a mixed population of various occupations who often work in the capital but live outside. Evalue-Gwira is located in the Western region and a traditional strong-hold of the CPP, which is the party with the strongest historical link to the country's founding father Kwame Nkrumah. Jaman South is located in Brong-Afaho region and while somewhat competitive, has been held by the NPP since 1997. Tamale Central constituency in the Northern region is also relatively competitive but has been held by the NDC since 1993.

^{xlii} We understand clientelism in the original sense of the word defined as a patron-client, unequal power-relationship based on a system of particularistic and private reciprocity sustained by face-to-face exchanges. The delivery of 'pork' to a constituency thus is not clientelism but the provision of small-scale collective goods. See Powell, John D. 1970. "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 64 No. 2, p. 412; Powell. See also Scott, James C. 1972. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia". *American Political Science Review* Vol. 66 No. 1, p. 91-113; Lande, Carl H. 1983. "Political Clientelism in Political Studies: Retrospect and Prospects". *International Political Science Review* Vol. 4 No. 4, p. 441; Kaufman, Robert F. 1974. "The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-Politics: Prospects and Problems". *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol. 16 No. 3, p. 284-308.

^{xliii} For a detailed analysis of 'persuadable voters' that does include an analysis of ethnicity, see Keith R. Weghorst and Staffan I. Lindberg 2010. "Are Swing Voters Instruments of Democracy or Farmers of Clientelism? Evidence from Ghana". Working Paper 2010:17 University of Gothenburg: Quality of Government Institute.

^{xliiv} We also tested this using a 3 valued variable, which separated "Maybe" and "Yes" responses, and found results that were virtually the same: in no instance does our measure of prospective voting near statistical significance.

^{xliv} Lindberg 2003, Lindberg 2010.

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TABLE 1

Number of Elections Held and Political Rights (Freedom House) as of January 1, 2010

<i>No</i>		<i>1st</i>		<i>2nd</i>		<i>3rd</i>		<i>4th</i>		<i>5 or more</i>	
<i>Elections</i>	<i>PR</i>	<i>Elections</i>	<i>PR</i>	<i>Elections</i>	<i>PR</i>	<i>Elections</i>	<i>PR</i>	<i>Elections</i>	<i>PR</i>	<i>Elections</i>	<i>PR</i>
Eritrea	7	Angola	6	Burundi	4	Cameroon	6	Burkina F.	5	Benin	2
Somalia	7	CAR	5	RoC	6	Chad	7	Cape Verde	1	Botswana	3
Swaziland	7	DRC	6	Guinea Biss	4	Comoros	3	Eq. Guinea	7	Gabon	6
		Guinea	7	Rwanda	6	Djibouti	5	Ethiopia	5	Ghana	1
		Ivory Coast	6	Sierra Leone	3	Gambia	5	Kenya	4	Mali	2
		Liberia	3			Lesotho	3	Malawi	3	Mauritius	1
		Mauritania	6			Nigeria	5	Mozambique	4	Namibia	2
		Madagascar	6			Niger	5	Sao Tome	2	Senegal	3
						Sudan	7	South Africa	2	Seychelles	3
						Uganda	5	Tanzania	5	Togo	6
										Zambia	3
										Zimbabwe	6
Mean PR	7.0		5.6		4.6		5.1		3.8		3.2

TABLE 2
Official 2008 Election Results, by Constituency

<i>Constituency Type</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>2004</i>			<i>Turn-over</i>	<i>2008</i>		
		<i>Winner</i>	<i>% of Votes</i>	<i>Margin of Victory*</i>		<i>Winner</i>	<i>% of Votes</i>	<i>Margin of Victory*</i>
Competitive	Ablekuma South	NPP	52.1%	7.7%	Yes	NDC	51.3%	4.8%
	Cape Coast	NPP	51.2%	6.7%	Yes	NDC	48.8%	4.9%
	Bolgatanga	PNC	38.6%	4.5%	Yes	NDC	57.7%	37.5%
Semi-Competitive	Tamale Central	NDC	55.8%	17.2%	No	NDC	65.7%	34.2%
	Jaman South	NPP	57.2%	18.5%	No	NPP	55.8%	55.4%
	Evalue-Gwira	CPP	49.7%	20.3%	Yes	NPP	57.7%	26.8%
	Kpone Katamansu	NDC	53.8%	20.8%	No	NDC	63.0%	30.5%
Safe Havens	Ho West	NDC	82.5%	65.6%	No	NDC	87.5%	76.0%
	Kwabre East	NPP	84.1%	68.2%	No	NPP	75.1%	55.3%
	Akim Swedru	NPP	67.4%	36.4%	No	NPP	63.6%	27.9%

*This compares NPP to NDC directly, except for Bolgatanga in 2004 where the NDC candidate came second with 34% of the vote and Evalue-Gwira in 2004, where the NDC placed second with 29.4%

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana; *Know Your MPs (2009-2013)*

TABLE 3.
Projected Legislative Vote vs 2008 Results

<i>Type</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Declared Vote,</i>		<i>'Persuadable'</i>		<i>Election Results,</i>	
		<i>Aug. 2008</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>(% of Total)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Dec. 2008</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Competitive Constituencies	NPP	29%	120	22%	27	37%	8%
	NDC	31%	126	28%	35	54%	23%
	Others*	40%	164	18%	30	9%	-31%
	Total	100%	410	22%	92	100%	
Government (NPP) Semi/Safe Havens	NPP	65%	341	23%	79	63%	-2%
	NDC	15%	78	32%	25	30%	15%
	Others*	20%	107	26%	28	7%	-14%
	Total	100%	526	25%	132	100%	
Opposition (NDC) Semi/Safe Havens	NPP	27%	111	30%	33	25%	-2%
	NDC	50%	208	22%	45	72%	22%
	Others*	23%	93	27%	25	3%	20%
	Total	100%	412	25%	103	100%	

*Include voters saying they were undecided, did not want to disclose their vote intention, or intended to vote for one of the smaller parties.
Source: Lindberg Survey August 2008.

TABLE 4A:
Retrospective Evaluations of Incumbent MPs, By Declared Vote in Aug. 2008

	<i>NPP</i>	<i>NDC</i>	<i>Undecided</i>	<i>Other Parties</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Sign.</i>
<i>Personal Assistance</i>						
Very/Bad	43%	46%	55%	48%	46%	Chi-square= 24.5117 p=.002 df=8
<i>N</i>	195	156	97	47	495	
Neither	19%	13%	16%	12%	16%	
<i>N</i>	85	43	29	12	169	
Very/Good	38%	42%	29%	39%	38%	
<i>N</i>	174	143	51	38	406	
Total	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	
<i>N</i>	454	342	177	97	1,070	
<i>Constituency Service</i>						
Very/Bad	40%	44%	51%	40%	43%	Chi-square= 26.8019 p=.001 df=8
<i>N</i>	218	171	111	43	543	
Neither	15%	8%	13%	16%	13%	
<i>N</i>	84	33	29	17	163	
Very/Good	45%	48%	36%	44%	44%	
<i>N</i>	250	188	80	47	565	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
<i>N</i>	552	392	220	107	1,271	
<i>Law-Making</i>						
Very/Bad	21%	26%	38%	25%	25%	Chi-square= 33.487 p <.001 df=8
<i>N</i>	100	85	64	23	272	
Neither	11%	12%	11%	15%	12%	
<i>N</i>	52	40	18	14	124	
Good/Very	68%	62%	52%	60%	63%	
<i>N</i>	328	207	88	56	679	
Total	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%	
<i>N</i>	480	332	170	93	1,075	

Source: Lindberg's August 2008 Survey

TABLE 4B:
In NPP Constituencies: Retrospective Evaluations of Incumbent MPs, By Declared Vote in Aug. 2008

	<i>NPP</i>	<i>NDC</i>	<i>Undecided</i>	<i>Other Parties</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Sign.</i>
<i>Personal Assistance</i>						
Very/Bad	40%	64%	72%	59%	51%	Chi-square= 40.5499 p<.001 df=8
<i>N</i>	117	84	49	17	267	
Neither	23%	14%	18%	24%	20%	
<i>N</i>	66	18	12	7	103	
Good/Very	37%	23%	10%	17%	29%	
<i>N</i>	108	30	7	5	150	
Total	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	
<i>N</i>	291	342	68	29	520	
<i>Constituency Service</i>						
Very/Bad	34%	67%	59%	56%	47%	Chi-square= 64.8064 p<.001 df=8
<i>N</i>	126	99	54	18	297	
Neither	17%	10%	16%	19%	15%	
<i>N</i>	62	15	15	6	98	
Good/Very	49%	23%	25%	25%	38%	
<i>N</i>	178	34	23	8	243	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
<i>N</i>	366	148	92	32	638	
<i>Law-Making</i>						
Very/Bad	16%	38%	47%	44%	27%	Chi-square= 59.152 p<.001 df=8
<i>N</i>	53	50	35	14	153	
Neither	11%	19%	9%	16%	13%	
<i>N</i>	37	25	7	5	74	
Good/Very	73%	43%	44%	41%	60%	
<i>N</i>	239	57	33	13	342	
Total	100.0%	100%	100%	101%	100%	
<i>N</i>	330	132	75	32	569	

Source: Lindberg's August 2008 Survey

TABLE 5:
Share of Voters that Would Switch Party for Offers* (By Projected Vote Choice August 2008).

	<i>NPP</i>	<i>NDC</i>	<i>Undecided</i>	<i>Other Parties</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Sign.</i>
Small Handouts	7%	9%	14%	7%	8%	Chi-square=3.294 p=.553 df=4
<i>Total N</i>	<i>569</i>	<i>410</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>109</i>	<i>1,117</i>	
Job Offer	23%	22%	28%	25%	23%	Chi-square= 1.2477 p=.870 df=4
<i>Total N</i>	<i>569</i>	<i>411</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>109</i>	<i>1118</i>	
Better Constituency Development	30%	31%	41%	33%	31%	Chi-square= 4.9211 p=.295 df=4
<i>Total N</i>	<i>570</i>	<i>412</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>108</i>	<i>1,119</i>	
Good Lawmaking	25%	24%	29%	25%	24%	Chi-square= 2.980 p=.573 df=4
<i>Total N</i>	<i>566</i>	<i>410</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>107</i>	<i>1,111</i>	
Vigilant Executive Oversight	20%	21%	18%	13%	20%	Chi-square= 6.2346 p=.182 df=4
<i>Total N</i>	<i>562</i>	<i>410</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>104</i>	<i>1,104</i>	

* Percent answering "Maybe" or "Yes, probably". Source: Lindberg's 2008 Ghana Survey

TABLE 6A:
Reason for Actual 2008 Vote Choice

<i>Type of Goods</i>		<i>NPP</i>	<i>NDC</i>	<i>Others*</i>	<i>Total</i>
Private	Personal Financial Assistance	27%	23%	34%	25%
	<i>N</i>	157	185	34	376
	Attending Weddings, Meetings, etc.	4%	5%	5%	4%
	<i>N</i>	21	39	5	65
Narrow Collective	Donations to Vulnerable Groups	2%	2%	2%	2%
	<i>N</i>	13	14	2	29
	Party Loyalty	9%	4%	5%	6%
	<i>N</i>	49	36	5	90
Collective	Constituency Development	54%	58%	46%	56%
	<i>N</i>	309	476	46	831
	Parliamentary Representation	2%	3%	1%	3%
	<i>N</i>	10	28	1	39
Public	Making Goods Laws	>0%	>0%	0%	>0%
	<i>N</i>	1	3	0	4
	Government Oversight	0%	>0%	1%	>0%
	<i>N</i>	0	3	1	4
	Other	2%	4%	6%	4%
	<i>N</i>	14	32	6	52
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<i>N</i>	574	816	100	1490

* Includes other parties and independents

Chi-square= 48.8574 P = 0.029 df=32

Source: Lindberg's June 2009 Survey

TABLE 6B:
Reason for 2008 Vote Choice, Constituencies Won By NDC

<i>Type of Goods</i>		<i>NPP</i>	<i>NDC</i>	<i>Other*</i>	<i>Total</i>
Private	Personal Financial Assistance	24%	19%	36%	21%
	<i>N</i>	48	105	18	171
	Attending Weddings, Meetings, etc.	6%	6%	4%	6%
	<i>N</i>	12	34	2	48
Narrow Collective	Donations to Vulnerable Groups	3%	2%	4%	2%
	<i>N</i>	6	9	2	17
	Party Loyalty	6%	4%	6%	5%
	<i>N</i>	13	21	3	37
Collective	Constituency Development	55%	59%	42%	57%
	<i>N</i>	112	327	21	460
	Parliamentary Representation	2%	4%	0%	3%
	<i>N</i>	3	24	0	27
Public	Making Goods Laws	>0%	>0%	0%	>0%
	<i>N</i>	1	3	0	4
	Government Oversight	0%	0%	2%	>0%
	<i>N</i>	0	2	1	3
	Other	4%	5%	6%	5%
	<i>N</i>	8	26	3	37
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%
	<i>N</i>	203	551	50	804

* Includes other parties and independents

Chi-square= 48.8574 P = 0.029 df=32

Source: Lindberg's 2009 Ghana Survey