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A New Era of Party Politics in a Globalised World. The Concept of Virtue Parties

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Introduction

Today, democratisation and transition to democratic government is features that characterise international politics. The process is taking place both in an incremental way where old democracies adapt to new procedures and in a more profound way where new states choose their democratic style of government. Political parties are still unavoidable agents in this process, by mobilising, aggregating, articulating and also taking place in parliament and government.

The kind of democratic models that are proposed and implemented are usually the market-oriented, individualistic and justice-oriented models that are frequent in Western Europe and also are at hand at the North American continent. In line with this also the struggle for freedom rights, legal justice and a defence of individual human rights has gone global. In new democracies these features has been especially prominent. Align with this, political parties over the world has taken up the challenge of promoting good governance, in terms of impartiality, equality, liberal rights, deregulating markets and anti-corruption policies. In both new democracies as the eastern European countries and in old democracies in Asia this issues have been visible features in election campaigns.

Here I will discuss investigate new parties that have been founded on a virtue basis, which means an ideological platform where a kind of political perfectionism is the main element. The concept of political perfectionism I a useful concept understanding the development of new parties founded on virtue basis. Michael Keren (2000) has divided political parties in three broad categories – those who advocate pragmatic solutions to satisfy their social groups, those who pursue profound societal reforms mainly in the environmental spheres (so called new politics) and those who are rooted in an imagined rather a real society. The last category is compound of parties that try to attempt human virtues; they are parties with more or less utopian goals. An example is the Swedish Pirate Party, which argue that all copyright should be banned and free down-loading of music and films allowed, another is pure religious parties with a religious state on their agenda. The globalised political agenda of today is much

more occupied with issues of virtue than before, not to say that issues of material goods are uninteresting.

This changing political and economic agenda should be seen as a consequence of both democratization and globalization. Through norms about democracy and wider communication between groups beyond national borders, the urge for “clean politics” or “political perfectionism” has grown stronger. Today corruption in the literature tend to be seen as a matter of state-corruption (ref) but the discussion on how clientilism, economic crimes, mafia and a wide range of bribes to brokers of all kinds middle-hands has influences national politics is much older. These processes were both an effect of older networks, based on family, inheritance, region or party, and in itself it also reproduced such networks. In an individualized world, where democracy is based on the idea of one man-one vote these networks are now challenged.

In a globalised world individualisation and destabilisation seems to be the two most central traits in both politics and society, internationally as well as within individual nation states. Internationally, individualisation manifests itself as an ever stronger position of human rights, at the expense of state sovereignty. Nationally, individualisation means, e.g., an increased importance of the specific competencies of the individual on the labour market and a decreasing interest in collective political activities.

Internationally, destabilisation manifests itself as a loosening up of the sovereignty of the nation state, increased importance of different types of transnational networks and a weakened position of the state sovereignty-based international law. Nationally, individualisation means a loosening up of the class structures of the industrial society and of the traditional professional roles and cleavages that came with the national and industrial revolutions (Bjereld & Demker 2006).

In this fragile and insecure world, where content, substance and truth are matters of subjectivity, citizens tend to turn to political institutions that guarantee predictability, transparency and impartiality. At least, they think, these qualities will give some stability and will be risk reducers in a destabilised and individualised society. This could, for voters and citizens, turn out to be the seeking of the perfectionist government and the perfect policy. And who could make this happen? Maybe political parties that promise to wash out corruption, clientilism, establishment ties and “old boys’ network”.

In old and new democracies the qualifications and conditions for parties to evolve and reproduce ideological dimensions differs radically. Old democracies have a party system where new parties have to fit in the competitions that characterise exactly this system. Success in elections is not enough. In new democracies new parties has a major chance of being the dominant party or at least the pole of the dominant party, just on the grounds of success in elections. Party systems in newer democracies also change more profoundly over time than democracies with parties that were initiated in the late 1800.

Virtue parties and party theory

The first mission to complete is therefore a conceptualization of *virtue parties*. Virtue parties are parties that are founded on a platform of perfectionist politics, and which main goal is to promote impartiality, freedom rights, transparency, anti-corruption and break old clientilistic structures. This type or category of parties has not been treated as a distinct ideological group.

In their seminal article Katz and Mair’s discuss the concept “cartel parties”, which are parties depending on state subsidies and power positions, often associated with each other (Katz & Mair 1995). Virtue parties could instead be seen as the opposite to cartel parties, rather a sub-group of anti-establishment parties (Abedi 2004) because of their explicit dissociation from the state. Normally anti-establishment parties are populist parties and quite often also right-wing. But the

parties which promote perfectionist policy are rarely populist or right-wing, rather liberal and market-oriented. First and foremost these parties have to be theoretically conceptualized.

For party theory the most urgent question is how virtue parties affect party systems. Which consequences do virtue parties have promoting cleavages about just processes rather than cleavages about ideological substance? I argue that a global change of politics that put security, safety, risk and trust first and foremost has taken place. Could it then be said that old cleavages (as left-right) have been overthrown by new ones? Or is it instead so that old cleavages still structures new policy issues by challenging old parties to engage in new issues? These empirical questions will not be answered in this text, but they are challenge me to try to conceptualize the virtue party as a first step in such an investigation.

Party theory and theories about party systems has several seminal works, nearly all of them from the 1950s or 1960s. Maurice Duverger gave in his book “Parties politiques” from 1951 a taxonomy but also implications of causal links between party organisation and ideological substance. He also foresaw that the mass party organisation would be the usual type of party, something that was right but has since then developed one step further. In his argument he mention the so called contagion from the left, by which he meant that the moderate left parties had an organisation that would be attractive to more conservative parties. Otto Kirchheimer gave us in 1966 the concept of “catch-all-parties” which meant parties that has reduced the ideological baggage to a minimum and by that tried to reach out to nearly every voter. In these parties the mass party has transformed to a party organisation which also has left behind deep ideological cleavages, something that reduces the members to election-workers more than mobilised citizens. Richard Katz and Peter Mair has contributed to this organisational research tradition in many ways, and their concept “cartel party” which they introduced in the very first number of the journal “Party Politics” in 1995 has been a widely used one. The cartel party is the party that is so intertwined with institutional power that the member organisation has been

reduced and the party instead relies on state subsidies and positions in administration.

Party systems literature begins virtually with Seymour Martin Lipset's and Stein Rokkan's contributions about social cleavages from 1967. Putted in a quite simple way they pointed out two remarkable processes – the national revolution and the industrial revolution – that has shaped the party systems in Europe. These two processes produced cleavages between church and state and between centre and periphery (national revolution) and cleavages between agrarian and commercial way of producing and between workers and owners (industrial revolution). Because the cleavages precipitated democracy they also came to shape the party systems. Being the ground for political dimensions (as the left-right-dimension) these cleavages has reproduced themselves until our days. The dimension still most important is the left-right-dimension.

Discussing competition in the party systems both Anthony Downs in (1957) and Giovanni Sartori in (1976) has been epoch-making. Downs pointed out, in a rational choice perspective, that competition in a multiparty-systems and a two-party-systems differed in theoretical ways. He also argued that opinion was the main force in shaping party systems (and should also be so). Sartori discussed how and when party systems became fragmented and put effort on which kind of competition that took place in the party systems. Before him most researchers has treated the party system as a matter of numbers, but after Sartori they discussed the mechanisms for competition between parties.

In later works political scientist now emphasise that issues and policy proposals are more determinant for political dimensions that are social cleavages. In the Manifesto research Group (led by Ian Budge) the relation between party ideology and policy issues has been investigated. As David Robertson showed in (1976) parties are sharply restricted by their ideology. On the other hand research has shown that issue dimensions tend to be more salient and more spread over nation boundaries than are ideological dimensions (Warwick 2005). Although

the theory of issue voting, or voting according to saliency, has been sharply contested by the directional hypothesis no-one deny that political parties has been more issue directed. The directional hypothesis is more interested in the voters choice among ideological packages, where special issues and pregnant policy positions could be of help for the voter. (Narud & Valen 2007)

In their pregnant and analytical article “Cleavages, issues and parties: a critical overview of the literature” Josep Colomer and Riccardo Puglisi draw our attention to a point in Lipset’s and Rokkan’s work that maybe could be a theoretical bridge builder between the social cleavage-model and the issue-model (Colomer and Puglisi 2005). Colomer and Puglisi cite Lipset and Rokkan when they stated that we should “consider the possibility that the parties themselves might establish themselves as significant poles of attraction and produce their own alignments independently of the geographical, the social and the cultural underpinning of the movements” (p 503f). What this say is that parties reproduce themselves, if and when they have come to the position that they mobilised a cleavage and transformed into a pole on an ideological dimension.

It seems as we could hypothesise that the lesser importance of social cleavages for party politics the more interest for parties to mobilise voters on the ground of issues. But ideological baggage tends also to be reduced when the old cleavages decrease in importance. In a world where safety and security is put first and where politics is seen as a kind of insurance system securing our individual life styles freedom rights as impartiality, transparency, anti-discrimination, anti-corruption, judicial issues and immaterial rights has been political issues that are more and more prominent in political life.

Conceptualizing the virtue party

In the party literature the notion of party families are a core element. In an evaluation of this concept Peter Mair and Cas Mudde (1998) concluded that the most adequate way of categorizing parties understanding what they are rather

than what they do, are connected to the parties origin and their ideology. Party families or “familles spirituelles” are the most common ground of comparing parties over national boundaries. In their work Jean Louis Seiler (1980) and Klaus von Beyme (1985) categorized parties on the ground of Stein Rokkan’s model of European political cleavages.

During the years more families have been included and the last family to be included is perhaps the right wing populist parties. Over the years there have also been harder to distinguish between the party families because they seek to find their voters in new marketplaces. Parties in a modern media-centred multi-party system are maybe more governed by vote-maximizing than by policy outputs in the parliamentary arena and internal cohesion. (Sjöblom 1968) But in their evaluation Mair and Mudde argues that origin, which tracks its roots from Rokkan’s cleavages, and ideology, which tracks its roots from David Robertson and Ian Budge’s Manifesto project. Mair and Mudde argues that the genetic origin of the parties is a relevant comparative ground for diachronic comparison (long time study) between party families, while an ideological categorization is a relevant comparative ground for a more synchronic analysis where variations over national could be explained. Here they must be interpreted as opposing the literature that propose an analysis concentrating on parties in terms of their timing, as for example “new parties” and “old parties”. (Lucardie 2000)

During the last decade it has been a matter of dispute to what extent populist parties forms a family or not. Populism is notoriously hard to define, although there have been several good attempts (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, Widfeldt & Rydgren 200X, Betz 1994). The minor common element is seeking to win the support of voters by treating the nation as a homogenous group, the people, where social divides and controversies are of minor political importance. Populism is a communication style where the party is calling for specified policy lines on the grounds of a uniting history and a common cultural heritage. Populism is, almost always, a form of anti-establishment movement where the cleavage between ordinary people and governing elites is emphasised. The

combination of anti-establishment ideas and a populist rhetoric often results in a right-wing or nationalist ideology. (Eatwell & Mudde 2004) But in recent year's new parties has emerged, and have successes, especially in eastern and central Europe that are both anti-establishment and populist, but not could be treated as populist or nationalist right-wing parties. (Bågenholm & Johansson 2005)

In an overview, Peter Ucen has described these parties as directed against all previous configurations of the ruling elite, and they blame the entire establishment for misrepresentation, immoral conduct and poor governance. Instead they offer increasing living standards, safeguarding western orientation and fighting corruption. (Ucen 2007) These parties often disappear after one or two elections, but some of them has had great success and/or transformed to established parties. Ucen argues that there are two kinds of populist, anti-establishment parties in the eastern and central Europe: nationalist right-wing parties and centrist, pure populist parties.

In Western Europe though, no distinctions between two kinds of populist anti-establishment parties has been done in later years. It is noticeable since several west European countries saw anti-tax-parties born in the 1970s. These parties where populist and anti-establishment as were the new parties in east and central Europe, but they where not right-wing or nationalistic parties. Some of them – in Norway and Denmark – went over in new forms where they developed an anti-immigrant ideological platform. In recent years we can see a new wave of anti-establishment, more or less populist, parties in western Europe that advocates and defend the right of free speech and communication, deliberative democracy and civic rights. In Sweden Piratpartiet is one of them, in France Mouvement Democrate is another. And the Pim Fortuyn list in the Netherlands was, before it went anti-immigrant on the right-wing, more or less a centrist populist party.

Earlier studies has shown that it is possible to divide the populist voters between protest voters and ideological voters. (van der Brug & Fennema 2003) And, more, European investigations show that anti-immigrant parties gain successes mainly

through their ideological direction, not as a party for a marginalized socio-economic category. A study of thirteen European anti-immigrant parties over ten years implicates that a group of socioeconomic marginalized citizens is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the success of right-wing parties. (van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie 2005) In order to explain party system change, party strategy, voting behaviour and policy outcome it should therefore, reasonably, not be un-important to make a distinction between populist, anti-establishment parties with a nationalist, right-wing ideology and populist, anti-establishment parties with a universalistic, centrist ideology. The latter I would call virtue parties.

A new party family? Cleavages and ideology

Following Mair and Mudde the family of virtue parties should be defined from the parties origin in socio-economic cleavages and from their ideological stance. Political cleavages are formed gradually and through conflict. In political sociology, the seminal work of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan entitled “Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments” from 1967 continues to dominate the discussion on political cleavages. (Mair 1990)

Lipset and Rokkan identified four primary cleavages emerging from the national and industrial revolutions. When nation-states were formed, conflicts emerged between the central elite and local opposition (center-periphery conflict) and between the religious and secular authorities (church-state conflict). When the industrial revolution spread throughout Western Europe, conflicts arose between those engaged in the primary form of production – agriculture – and those who relied on the secondary industry (rural-urban conflict), as well as between those who owned the means of production in industry and those who owned only their labor (capital-labor conflict). From these four conflicts, Western Europe has developed four primary cleavages based on region, religion, rural-urban and class.

In most countries, the strongest cleavage has been the class-based left-right distinction, but many countries have and have had crossing cleavages. Political parties normally express some of these cleavages and are forced to adapt themselves to the dominant cleavages in the country.

There is a controversy about how to define the concept 'cleavage' so that it promotes an understanding of societal conflicts. Douglas W Rae and Michael Taylor, both political scientists, argue that there are three different types of cleavages. (Rae & Taylor 1970) The *ascriptive* or *trait cleavages* regard different decided categories that are possible to belong or not belong to, based on for example sex (man-woman), religion (catholic-protestant), ethnicity (hutu-tutsi) or class (capitalist-worker). The *attitudinal* or *opinion cleavages* regard differences between individuals or groups in a society. The *behavioural* or *art cleavages* regard different forms of behaviour or acting as for example voting or membership in organizations.

But Rae and Taylor's classification has met strong objections, most distinctly formulated by the two political scientists Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair. Bartolini and Mair emphasize that every political relevant cleavage has a socio-economic base and that Rae and Taylor's three cleavages actually are three aspects of one and only cleavage. (Bartolini & Mair 1990) In addition, Bartolini and Mair argue that every cleavage has three levels: an *empirical* element, which can be defined in socio-economic terms (e.g. social class), a *normative* element, regarding a collective identity (e.g. the feeling of belonging to a social class) and an *organizational/behavioural* element, (e.g. class based parties or labour market organizations) regarding the growth of parties and organizations on the ground of a collective identity.

Here I address, by using the concept 'cleavage', *the pattern of conflicts between groups of people*. These patterns should have a *social base* and also have had taken the form of *value differences* and some kind of *behaviour*, like organizing a party, interest group or social movement, or political protests as demonstrations

or campaigns, and other ways of promoting one's interests. A cleavage therefore demands some kind of conflict of interest or perceived conflict of interest, with base in social conditions.

The national revolution and industrial revolution – using Lipset's and Rokkan's concepts – had profound consequences for how European and western democracies developed. I argue – maybe not too surprisingly - that the communicational revolution is the third step in this democratic development, and it will have as profound consequences as the earlier two steps. The communication revolution has – through the development of transportation and information technology – changed the meaning of territory in relation to power and identity. The changed significance of territory, in our view, constitutes the most central element of the globalization process. (Held & McGrew 1999) The changed significance of territory drains the power base of the nation state, which is based on sovereignty over a limited territory. At the same time, non-state actors play an ever-increasing role in international politics.

Through individualization and destabilization a potential political cleavage, following the communicational revolution, between transnational networks and national states is established. Transnational networks promote universal rights, liberal democracy, freedom of speech and a universal ethics in politics. National states on the other side defend themselves from external pressure, exercise their sovereignty and demand attachment to a common national history and culture. This cleavage can be transformed into a national party system where new parties advocate international norms of what I earlier called perfectionist policies while other new parties make efforts to defend the country from these norms. As mentioned above a cleavage must have a social base, a value divergence and effects on behaviour. These are empirical questions which I will not answer here, but they will be addressed in the continuing work. Virtue parties then have their origin in the new global cleavage of international network vs national states.

What then about ideology? Party ideology is both used to gain support and to genuinely define the party. (Demker 1997) As an element of the party's identity ideology is also a restriction on behaviour. (Robertson 1976) Party ideology is often analysed as programmatic standpoints, election platforms or media rhetoric. (Budge & Farlie 1983, Jagers & Walgrave 2007) But ideology could also be treated as a two-level organized world of ideas. On the surface the party hold some signifying standpoints which is targeted to the main group of voters and possible to change on elections bases. On a more fundamental level the party have some principled beliefs and world views that are not open to fast change. (Demker 1993)

Virtue parties advocates all kind of liberal freedoms, civic rights and individual rights. Their ideological stance is centrist, but derives from the human rights discourse which have been massively influential since the turn down of the Berlin wall. They are genuinely anti-establishment as they criticize the ruling elite of authoritarianism, corruption or other misuses of power. These parties are also genuinely populist as they address ordinary people to join a kind of social movement regardless of class, sex or ethnicity. They also use a communication style where they direct themselves to all voters and treat all citizens as a homogenous group regarding how the proposed policies would affect the life of the voters. They differ from catch-all parties because they have an ideological baggage, though adapted to broad layers in the society.

The virtue party holds liberal rights and individual freedom as key principles in their fundamental ideology. Norms of universal ethics as equality, impartiality, freedom of speech and thought as well as individual rights to exercise your way of life is in the heart of the virtue party's fundamental principles. On the standpoint level they usually advocates more transparency, claims of responsibility from establishment, a defence for individual integrity, implementation of anti-corruption strategies and/or more participatory processes in the political decision-making.

Virtue parties then differ from populist right-wing parties in all ideological aspects. At the same time there is also resemblance. Both party families could be seen as originating from the same cleavage, and they also is very well adapted to a society where fast and wide communications is implemented through internet, web logs and chat sites. It has been put in question if the European populist right-wing parties could be explained through the traditional socio-economic model, where primarily the demand side of politics is focused. The answer has hitherto been no. (van der Brug, Fennema, Tillie 2005) Maybe it is a more fruitful attempt to explain both virtue parties and right-wing parties as originating from the new political cleavage between on one hand the spread of norms through transnational networks and on the other the defence of the nation state?

Virtue parties in the real world: some examples

Mair and Mudde suggest (1998) suggests that party families should be compared by their origins and by their ideology. This approach is concerned with what parties *are* rather than what they *do*. In a long-term study ideology is crucial, but in an study like this the party's origin would be the most essential. Virtue parties all are mobilised along the same side of the same cleavage (transnational networks and nation state) while on the other side of this cleavage we have right-wing nationalist parties which defend the nation state.

In Europe I have found at least three real examples of what I call virtue parties and these are *Res Publica Party* in Estonia, *The Other Russia* in Russia, *Piratpartiet (The Pirate Party)* in Sweden and *Mouvement Démocrate (Democratic movement)* in France.

Res Publica was founded in December 2001 but was preceded by a political club by young politically engaged Estonians. The club was formed already in 1989. In June 2006 Res Publica and the other conservative party Pro Patria were united in a common party. After the 2007 elections this united party got 18 percent of the votes. This result was a disappointment though the parties have had over 30

percent of the votes in the election of 2003. Despite this electoral loss the united Res Publica and Pro Patria party joined the Estonian government in April 2007.

Res Publica Party then had its heydays from 2002 until 2006. The party's origin lies in the transitions from the Soviet system. Professor Rein Taagepera – who is both a natural scientist and a political scientist – has written about how he came to accept to be a leader of the new Res Publica party. He writes that the context for the rise of the Res Publica Party was “openness in intra-party dealings and finances” and “a code of political ethics”. (Taagepera 2005) Res Publica Party was founded, according to Taagepera, as a response to disillusion, corruption and lack of interpersonal trust, all explained by the long Soviet repression.

As a party Res Publica was founded outside the parliament by a group of politically engaged young citizens. The party came out of a political club for discussions and seems not to be connected directly to other political organisations during the initial stage. Res Publica built up an extensive membership base and tried to develop an internal democracy that was not seen before in Estonia. But the party was also strongly dependent on the financial support from private contributions that gave way for extensive campaigning. (Sikk 2004)

After the first experience in parliament and government the party joined another more conservative party and is still in government. The first coalition government, led by Res Publica, broke down after less than two years (in March 2005) because of too strong opposition against Res Publica's policy on anti-corruption. The interior minister Ken-Martti Vaher got a confidence vote against him in the parliament (54/101) and Prime Minister Juhan Parts decided to step down.

The main purpose of the party was to change the political culture and the political practice of Estonia. And new politics is here to be interpreted as ethics, anti-corruption and trust between leaders and citizens. Ideologically the party was

mainly, as the name hints, occupied with the *general interest*. The party wanted to be a political “purifier”. (Taagepera 2005) Res Publica had an ideological base of bridging between extremists, avoiding personal financial interests in politics and promoting expert knowledge. In the new party programme from 2006 for the united party Res Publica-ideology is traced in issues as emphasis on long-term analysis of political effects, protection of citizens and property from the arbitrariness of state and state officials, transparency, efficiency and implementation of clearly defined goals in economic matters.

Res Publica than had its origin outside parliament, in a group of young engaged citizens arguing for a new ethics in politics after the Soviet repression. The ideology of the party puts forward issues of personal freedom and responsibility, transparency and anti-corruption but also efficiency and justice.

The other Russia is an umbrella coalition and is something in-between a party and a social movement. (<http://www.theotherrussia.ru/eng/>) They are although convinced that they will put up candidates in the next presidential election in 2008. The other Russia has some visible leaders as former check world champion Gary Kasparov. Kasparov is a leader of an organisation called “United Civil Front”, founded in 2005 and one of the main organisations in the umbrella coalition. Other organisations under this umbrella are “Centre for the development of democracy and human rights”, “Moscow Helsinki Group” and Republican party of Russia”. The umbrella organisation The Other Russia was founded in 2006, originally during the G8-meeting in Moscow. Several western diplomats were attending the inaugural conference. In 2006 and 2007 The Other Russia has managed to perform a number of protest marches under the name of “March of the Discontented”.

Kasparov tries to rally groups which are opposing president Vladimir Putin with democratic means. They all oppose the financial funds from business oligarchs that 1996 helped Boris Jeltsin to win over the popular communist candidate Gennadij Zyuganov. In this election they argue that Russia sold out its

democratic future in fear of extremism. Instead, says Kasparov, democracy is about upholding regulations and having a legitimate transfer of power. (Time March 29, 2007)

In their closing statement from July 2006 The Other Russia states that the aim to “restore civil control” of power in Russia and that citizens should be protected from “the dangerous impulses of the representatives of power”. The statement also emphasise accountability, responsibility and free information. In an interview with internet site Al-Jazeera in April 2007 Kasparov says that The Other Russia wants to take Russia out of the hands of “the corrupted bureaucracy”. (Al-Jazeera 2007) This process includes free and fair elections, control of corruption and no censorship. The issue of a free press, free television and unbiased information is one of the most profiled issues of The Other Russia.

The marches performed by The Other Russia has nearly always been neutralised by police and army forces. In April 2007 two marches in Moscow and St Petersburg were heavily destroyed and Kasparov himself was arrested for a short time. Politically they have not achieved any gains yet, but they have had much attention in foreign press. Through this attention the marches has been more and more successful and they have also been supported by round tables and discussions.

The origin of The Other Russia is outside parliament, through a forum for discussions between several groups for protecting democracy and human rights in Russia. The foundation was also more or less supervised by western diplomats from the US and Great Britain. Choosing a time when the G8 were resembled in Moscow also hints that The Other Russia promotes internationally held norms about transparency, democracy and the rule of law.

The ideology is somewhat more difficult to define because we have here an umbrella coalition. But the minor common denominator is liberal freedoms. In many meetings and marches not only democracy but especially the freedom of

information and speech are prominent features. Kasparov himself accuse the Putin-regime of corruption and non-democratic rule, and The Other Russia itself is very careful in distancing itself from populist and anti-democratic means of overthrowing the regime.

The Pirate Party in Sweden was founded in Christmas time 2005 through an internet site where everybody could protest against criminalizing downloading copyright-protected material from the Internet. The party was formerly registered at the Swedish Electoral Authority (Valmyndigheten) in February, 2006. During the electoral campaign before the 2006 election in Sweden the party got nearly 10 000 members but afterwards the membership has went down to 5 900 members. In the election the Pirate Party only got 0,63 percent or 34 918 votes, but the party is still very active. (<http://www.piratpartiet.se>)

The party came out of an organisation called “The Pirate Bureau” and founded in 2003 which has taken seriously the task of defending the rights of all downloader’s. Through the internet-site The Pirate Bay hundreds of copyright-protected commodities (films, music and software) were shared by users all over the world. This organisation argued for a revised copyright-jurisdiction and for sharing information, music, films and other cultural artefacts on the Internet. The Pirate Party has its origin among a group of mostly young men with liberal political views where issues on personal integrity and individual freedom are prominent. They do not favour either right or left in the choice between the two block, but wishes to join the coalition that can give the most influence to issues on personal integrity.

The Pirate Party has its origin outside parliament and none of the founders had any parliamentary experiences before. The party is the only one of the discussed which was initiated on the Internet. But both The Other Russia and the French Democratic Movement wishes to use internet as a channel for mobilising support, spreading information and gathering ideas from members and supporters. The Pirate Party was more or less an initiative from the founding father Mr Richard

Falkvinge, but in 2007 the party has several district sections and a growing cadre of leaders around the country.

In the spring 2007 the party decided to put up a youth organisation “Young Pirates” as a consequence of the remarkably success in the Swedish school elections in 2006 (a kind of test elections for students) when the Pirate Party had about 40 percent of the votes in some schools. The Pirate Party is not as an urban phenomenon as could be expected. Instead they seem to have more members in provincial towns around Sweden as Tidaholm and Markaryd, but also small university cities as Lund and Uppsala.

The ideology of the Pirate Party can be concluded in three principles; that personal integrity should be protected, that products of culture as books, films, theatre and so on must be free for sharing and that patent and private monopoly are harmful for society. (<http://www.piratpartiet.se/principer>) As a consequence the Pirate Party safeguards the private life of every citizen, leading to opposition to most forms of surveillance and control of both electronic communication and other communications. The Pirate Party is also favouring that the so called immaterial rights should be abandoned so that all kinds of copyright is reduced both in time and scope. In the extension of this argument the Pirate Party is also against private patent for example in the medical industry and all kind of private monopoly and oligopoly. Patent and monopoly harm the free market, according to the party, and the state controlled sector should counteract private monopoly through their economic agreements.

The origin of the Pirate Party is outside parliament, and the party had a predecessor in the organisation “The Pirate Bureau” through which the decision of founding a party was taken. Through an electronic membership the party has managed to get a broad support and has also had the strength to carry on after an election that was a bit of a disappointment.

In its ideology the Pirate Party relies on traditional liberal freedoms of speech and information, very much alike The Other Russia, but also lay emphasis on market oriented stuff as copyrights, patent and monopoly. The ideology is a more or less extreme variant of liberal individualism, but where the personal freedom should be protected not only through market forces but through jurisdiction and state intervention. Here the Pirate Party rely heavily on the same kind of liberal individual principles as international organisations as Humans Rights Watch and Freedom House.

The *Democratic Movement (Modem)* in France was founded in May 2007. In the presidential election 2007 Francois Bayrou, with his political roots in Christian democracy, presented himself as a centre-candidate. He had about 18 percent of the votes in the first round and was defeated. The conservative Nikolas Sarkozy was elected president. But after the presidential election Bayrou founded Mouvement Démocrate (Democratic Movement) taking his sight in the parliamentary elections in June 2007. In a few weeks he had around 75 000 sympathizers through his website at <http://www.bayrou.fr>. In the parliamentary elections the party got only three mandates, including Bayrou himself.

The democratic party was founded by parliamentarians, primarily Bayrou, but not as a party grouping in the parliament. Rather the opposite. Bayrou founded the party as an opposition to the huge liberal-conservative group Union pour le Mouvement Populaire which consists both of the old Gaullist party and the liberal forces from the old Union pour la Democratie Francaise (UDF). Bayrou wanted to oppose the left-right cleavage in French politics and wanted to give the voters an alternative to conservatives and socialists.

Although the parliamentary election must have been a disappointment with only three parliamentarians and 7,6 percent of the votes, the party goes on. Bayrou and the Democratic Movement are positive to European integration and have supported the new constitution for Europe more whole-heartedly than other political groupings in France. In June 2007 the party pronounced its disaffection

with the new accord among the EU because of all the national restrictions that still is at hand. But in France Modem first and foremost tries to counterbalance the vast majority around president Sarkozy.

In his foundational speech May 24, 2007 Francois Bayrou accentuated that the Democratic Movement would be an ethical force in French politics. He argues that French citizens have lost their confidence in their representatives because of their misconduct in not respecting elementary regulations about financing elections and getting personal subsidies. He also emphasised that politics is an intellectual activity. In the same way as Res Publica in Estonia he argues that an intellectual and long-term reflection should be the usual ground for decision-making. But where Res Publica would like to have expertise and professionals in specific fields, Bayrou advocates that for example artists, intellectuals, scientists and farmers would be invited to reflect on decision outside their own branches from their point of view.

The principle of movement is also essential for Movement Democrate. Bayrou promotes politics which is not penetrated by the ideology of left and right, but instead by solving problems. He says that “in the field of democracy we do not have any enemies” and by that he admits that pragmatic solutions that could be accepted are better than radical ideological reforms that are implemented by authority. He also marks that democracy is the boundary for these solutions, and by this also the values associated with democracy.

The Democratic Movement in France has its origin both outside and inside parliament, but the party has not been successful in the elections in June, 2007. The party has its roots in the liberal centre, but opposite the three earlier parties it has its roots mainly with one man, Francois Bayrou, and his political mission. Ideologically the party favours ethics, transparency, trust and responsibility. In its programme it has some resemblance with Res Publica, but is more occupied with balancing left and right in an old regime. Res Publica did not need to relate in such a way to old political democratic boundaries.

Finally, there are some more examples that could have been discussed here. The so called “Ny Alliance” (New Alliance) in Denmark which is an intraparlimentary outbreak from The Radikale Venstre (right-wing liberal party) could be a virtue party, but it is too early to tell yet.¹ Also the successful party “National Movement Simeon II” in Bulgaria or maybe “Forza Italia” in the beginning of its era could be of interest here. But I would argue that the party family of virtue parties should be established as such before we examine the party systems in our hunt for virtue parties.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the emergence of a new party family called virtue parties. I have argued that in a globalised world a cleavage between transnational networks and national states has been created. Along one side of this cleavage the virtue parties are mobilised, along the other side the right-wing nationalist parties are mobilised. I have also argued that old and new democracies have different conditions for these parties to arise.

Virtue parties I have argued promotes mainly impartiality, freedom rights, transparency and tries to break-up old politics. These parties opposing old party systems and are therefore interpreted as opposing the former cartel parties, discussed by Katz and Mair in 1995. Mair and Mudde have suggested that party families should be traced through what parties *are* rather than through what they *do*. In that mission they argue that origin and ideology should be the key elements in deciding and analysing party families.

I have above suggests that the parties Res Publica in Estonia, The Other Russia in Russia, The Pirate Party in Sweden and The Democratic Movement in France is examples of virtue parties. Two of these parties have arise in old democracies

¹ The party has changed its name to “Liberal Alliance”.

(Sweden and France) and two has arise in new democracies (Estonia and Russia). The parties all advocates personal freedoms and build their ideology on universally promoted democratic rights. They also put a special emphasis on individualism, integrity, responsibility and ethics.

The parties in the older democracies try to counter-balance the left-right-axis, while the parties in the newer democracies try to counter-balance the ruling elites. In both cases the virtue parties want to be critical alternatives and criticising the power structures in the state using ideological baggage from universal human rights. Three of the parties are founded outside the parliament and these three are founded out of non-established channels as discussions and dialogue between citizens in political clubs, organisations or forums. The fourth party (Democratic Movement) is founded through established channels. My examples are all from Europe, but nothing restrict the party family from being in place in other parts of the world.

I would argue that it is probable that we during the first years of the new millennium also have been introduced to a new party family; the virtue party.

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