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The Partnership Paradox?

- Budget Support Effects on Anti-corruption
Organizations in Uganda

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Abstract

New modern aid was initiated during the latter half of the 1990s by most of the leading actors within the international donor community to make the whole aid-procedure more effective, more lucid and more on the receiving states' conditions. Budget Support is a tool within this "partnership-aid" transformation where the distribution goes directly to the receiver state's governmental budget and thus strengthens the institutions of the state. As the governmental institutions gain more power, other actors might gain less power than before. It is problematic if Civil Society gains less power because one prerequisite to obtain Budget Support is to have a well functioning Civil Society. So if Budget Support leads to a weaker Civil Society it undermines the initial prerequisites to obtain Budget Support in the first place. The core of this thesis is to see whether this possible paradox is a reality.

The target for this thesis is Uganda, a country which has been a pioneer in implementing new aid initiatives by the donor community, with an elaborate Budget Support framework. The study focuses on effects from Budget Support on Anti-Corruption Organizations (AC-CSOs) within Civil Society. To make the effects visual, the AC-CSOs' relation to donors and the Government of Uganda (GoU) after the Budget Support implementation is investigated. Qualitative research interviews are made with 16 AC-CSOs.

The findings show that most of the interviewed AC-CSOs are marginalized by the GoU after Budget Support implementation and almost half of them are marginalized by donors. Thus, Budget Support tends to be a part of the marginalization process for AC-CSOs. The direct distribution of funds to the GoU increases the government's power and the process tends to lead to a position/object relation with AC-CSOs. Also, donors tend not to give AC-CSOs the support to stop this process. In addition, donors favour Watchdog Organizations over Service Delivery Organizations. As Civil Society tends to be weakened with Budget Support implementation, the structure of Budget Support could be considered as unsustainable in Uganda.

Keywords: *Budget Support, Civil Society, Anti-Corruption Organizations, Government, Donors, Uganda*

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1. Introduction:

1.1. The subject and problem

This thesis explores the issue of Budget Support effects on Anti-Corruption Organizations (AC-CSOs). Budget Support is a tool in the new ideas of a “partnership-aid” structure, where the distribution goes directly to the receiver state’s governmental budget and thus strengthens the institutions of the state. As the distribution of funds strengthens governmental institutions, it is interesting to see the effects on actors in Civil Society. One requirement to obtain Budget Support is a well functioning Civil Society. But if Budget Support leads to a weaker Civil Society it actually undermines the fundamental prerequisites to initially obtains the support. If this paradox is a reality, Budget Support will become unsustainable in the long term.




Figure 1:1 Subject and Problem

1.2. Aim and Research Questions

The aim of this study is to discover effects from Budget Support implementation on Anti-Corruption Organizations (AC-CSOs).

To fulfil the aim, I have three related research questions:

1. What effects does Budget Support have on Anti-Corruption Organizations in Uganda?
2. Are the effects from Budget Support similar for different types of Anti-Corruption Organizations in Uganda?
3. Why have these effects occurred?

1.3. Disposition

After this short introduction, the background chapter (chapter two) explains the subject and problem in more detail. Then the theoretical approach (chapter three) presents different perspectives of possible answers for the research questions. These perspectives are used to develop 10 hypotheses, described in chapter four. Chapter five introduces the analytical

framework, where tools of operation are described and the methodological considerations thereafter explain how the empirical findings are collected. After that, the analysis of the empirical findings is presented (chapter six). Finally, the conclusions are explained, the research questions are answered and the aim is obtained (chapter seven).

2. Background:

The first two boxes in figure 1:1 illustrate the background of the problem whereas the last two boxes illustrate the actual problem of this thesis. To understand the problem, two issues must be reviewed. First, the function of Budget Support and its context of Uganda need to be explained in detail. Second, corruption and AC-CSOs in Uganda needs to be explained in detail. I have chosen to use the Anti-Corruption area to represent Civil Society because it is important, topically, and has a more focused approach than investigating Civil Society as a whole.

2.1. Budget Support

Budget Support is an initiative which is in line with the focus on “new modern aid” or “new partnership aid”. It is a form of programme aid that is not linked to specific project activities, but is instead channelled from donors directly to partner governments, so that the governments use their own allocation, procurement and accounting system (IDD et al 2, 2006:1). Ideally, with Budget Support as a financial tool, governments have a more independent role. Donors do not have the possibility to control the financial inputs, as much as they used to. By using Budget Support as a tool, improvements are supposed to be carried out in efficiency, transparency and accountability between governments, the countries’ parliamentary institutions and electorate (ActionAid & CARE 1, 2006:18). In order to understand Budget Support in its context, a brief introduction of foreign aid and the new structure is necessary.

Foreign aid is an initiative by rich countries to reduce poverty, stabilize and develop societies in the world. As these financial inputs are “donations”, a demand of efficiency is unavoidable. The aid system is often criticized for being inefficient. The rise of Budget Support is a reaction to the approach of the late 1990s, when the major bilateral and multilateral donors wanted a change in the aid structure. Traditional project support had not delivered the result

that was expected (ActionAid & CARE 1, 2006:9)¹. Instead, explanations for the causes of poverty were more focused on public spending. Therefore, the donors needed to work more directly with governments (ActionAid & CARE 2, 2006:3). The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was a recall for this system. The PRSP is an instrument that promotes national ownership of the development process (ActionAid & CARE 1, 2006:9). The aim of PRSP is to provide a crucial link between national public actions, donor support and development outcomes (*IMF1*, 2005). Derived from the PRSP, the ideas of Budget Support were initiated. Coordination by international donors has developed to an important issue of aid development to reduce the work and cost of often weak administrations of receiving states. Switches from plenty of small projects into fewer large projects and support to reforms and development programmes on sector- and national level are indicators to be used in the coordination strategy (Wohlgemuth, 1997:22). In 2005, the Paris Declaration was established which among other things decided that aid support should be distributed more on the conditions of receiver states, alignment where donors use receiver states' systems for delivery and a harmonization where donors cooperate and simplify the distribution procedures (*Paris declaration1*, 2005)². As a response to the demands of efficiency and the Paris declaration, Budget Support has been more and more established in the world.

There are two types of Budget Support, Sector Budget Support (SBS) and General Budget Support (GBS). SBS is earmarked to a discrete sector or sectors with related conditionality to these sectors, while GBS is disbursed to the receiving state's budget as a whole without claims of earmarking (IDD et al 1, 2006:6). This thesis concerns both of these types, which will be explored below in the context of Uganda.

2.1.1. Budget Support in Uganda

In the context of Uganda, one can understand the rapidly ongoing process with Budget Support in the country. The Government of Uganda (GoU) has since president Yoweri Museveni took power in 1986 established good relationships with the donor community. Uganda was the first country to qualify for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative

¹ The donor community believes in general that project support has evolved into a disunited support where it is hard for the donors to have an overview of all the aid initiatives that are in progress. Thus it becomes divided and confusing and it is hard to follow up projects. Furthermore, project support is also a problem because donors are in control of the money and have therefore a dominant position with the receiver. Thus it may cause a problem of democracy (Sida1, 2005).

² For more information on the Paris Declaration, see for example www.aidharmonization.org

(HIPC), debt relief, PRSP and the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC).³ All these initiatives have also made Uganda a pioneer in the implementation of Budget Support. It evolved through several innovations. In 1997, Uganda made their own PRSP called Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which is a framework of the government's own poverty reduction strategy⁴. Before PEAP, Uganda's aid was fragmented and poorly coordinated. Three innovative steps were made in the evolution process of Budget Support. First were the Sector Wide Approaches (SWAp), where the idea was to align donors and budget resources towards sector strategies. Joint Sectoral review processes were important for policy focused dialogue with donors, the GoU and Civil Society. SWAp was a platform for more flexible support, notionally earmarked SBS. Second was the Poverty Action Fund (PAF), which is a SBS that notionally is earmarked to finance five key PEAP programs⁵. PAF was made to improve budget management and enhance the accountability of expenditures. Quarterly PAF review meetings, which included Civil Society, were held to discuss PAF performance. PAF made donors shift from Project Support to Budget Support in Uganda. Third were the Partnership Principles introduced in the context of the new PEAP2 in 2001. Now, large donors like the World Bank and DFID moved to unearmarked GBS. The GoU set out its framework which among other things worked for further development of participation and coordination of all stakeholders, Civil Society included (IDD et al 2, 2006:7-17).⁶ Consequently, Budget Support has had a significant impact since it was first introduced in 1998:

(USD million)	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Total ODA	839,32	909,36	695,61	901,28	897,01	815,27	1076,47	1334,84
Total BS disbursement	0	66,43	39,16	175,86	311,20	369,00	404,83	408,80
BS as total ODA (%)	0	7,13%	5,63%	19,51%	34,69%	45,26%	37,61%	30,63%

Table 2:1 Aid Flows and PGBS to Uganda (IDD et al 2, 2006:180).

³ The HIPC initiative, made by IMF and the WB entails coordinated action by the international financial community, including multilateral organizations and governments, to reduce to sustainable levels the external debt burdens of the most heavily indebted poor countries (IMF2, 2007). The debt relief was an initiative to dismiss debts of poor countries which strategically work for development in line with the donor community. The PRSCs was initiated by the WB in 2001 and was the first attempt of unearmarked GBS (IDD et al 2, 2006).

⁴ PEAP has been revised twice, in 2000 and 2004.

⁵ Universal Primary Education, Primary Health Care, Safe Water and Sanitation, Agriculture and Rural Roads.

⁶ For more detailed information of the frameworks of PAF and Partnership Principles, see Appendix 3 and 4.

So Budget Support in Uganda is given in three different ways, through SBS, PAF and GBS. SBS is notionally earmarked to a particular sector, subsector or program within the sector whether inside or outside the PAF. PAF is nominally earmarked to the fund as a whole and not to individual sectors. Thus, PAF and SBS can be the same thing. GBS is completely unearmarked (IDD et al 2, 2006:18). When I refer to Budget Support, I include SBS, PAF and GBS.⁷ GBS represents the largest amount of Budget Support:

<u>Types of Budget Support</u>	<u>Number of Donors</u>	<u>Disbursed amount (USD million)</u>
Sector Budget Support (SBS) (1998/99-2003/04)	13	509
Poverty Action Fund (PAF) (1998/99- 2003/04)	5	145
General Budget Support (GBS) (1999/00-2003/04)	6	713

Table 2:2 Types of Budget Support (IDD et al 2, 2006:18)

Budget Support has increased from 26 percent of programme aid in 1999/00 to 99 percent in 2004/05. Programme aid as a proportion of total aid in Uganda has increased from 36 percent in 1999/00 to 56 percent in 2001/02 and it has stayed above 50 percent since then (IDD et al 2, 2006:22). 50 percent of the governmental budget (public expenditures) is taken from aid-flows. (IDD et al 2, 2006:s2). That makes Uganda a very aid-dependent country. Thus, Budget Support is having a significant impact on development assistance and the total expenditures in Uganda.

2.1.2. Institutional prerequisites for obtaining Budget Support in Uganda

Demands related to Budget Support are to follow the recommendations of PEAP 1-3, SWAp, PAF and the Partnership Principles. The visions of these initiatives shall be integrated in meetings and decisions. The PRSC in 2001 was the first full Budget Support instrument in Uganda, made to support the implementation of PEAP as a whole⁸. This includes increased transparency, participation and reduced corruption with help from Civil Society (IDD et al 2, 2006:200). Sector Working Groups are central for process and planning. Representatives within sectors and other stakeholders, including Civil Society are represented (IDD et al 2,

⁷ I follow the recommendation from the evaluation report on GBS made by IDD, that SBS and PAF only are notionally earmarked and not real earmarked. Real earmarking demands clear pre-agreed budget lines, while nominal earmarking releases parts from the demands because of successful innovations, in Uganda the completion of sector reviews. Thus, SBS, PAF and GBS are all included in the concept Budget Support (IDD et al 2, 2006:23).

⁸ See Appendix 5

2006:23). Sector Working Groups are examples of the demand of participation which PEAP and the other initiatives have created.

Clearly, donors have demands of a well functioning Civil Society to receive Budget Support. Therefore it is important that also donors give space for Civil Society to do their work. The responsibility is not just the GoU's concern but also the donors.

2.2. Corruption and Anti-Corruption Organizations (AC-CSOs)

Corruption⁹ is a major obstacle for development, especially in poor countries. Despite high relevance and progress on many fronts, 70 countries scored less than 3 on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 2005. 10 indicates a highly clean rate and 0 indicates a highly corrupt rate. Almost 3 billion dollars are spent on bribes every day (*Transparency International-CPI*, 2006). However, corruption is now taken more seriously on the international arena than before. The "UN Convention against Corruption" and the "OECD Anti-Bribery Convention" are examples of relatively recent developed anti-corruption strategies. To combat the corruption problem, several areas are important in the process; foreign aid and Civil Society included. As anti-corruption nowadays is of great concern, it is interesting to use AC-CSOs as targets for this thesis, representing Civil Society.

Corruption is an old concept. Bribes and extra payments for services were common in the Roman Empire, the Middle Ages as well as under the colonial years and it still is today. But it has not been criticized in a serious manner until recently. Since the middle of the 1990s, a debate on what corruption is and how it can be reduced in the best way has emerged. Before that, the problem has been given little attention, been ignored or even not been seen as a problem. As the debate on corruption has grown stronger, so have also AC-CSOs, both in numbers and capacity (Berg, 2005:2). A great part of the literature on corruption indicates problems in governmental, Civil Society and international donor community work. Susan Rose-Ackerman sees governmental misuse as a cause of corruption. The governments are investing too much in large-scale projects which are overpaid and often the wrong kind (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:38). Larry Diamond defines African states as "swollen states". The larger the state gets in controlling resources and regulates economic activities, the greater will the level of corruption be (Blundo et al, 2006:60). In my opinion, Diamond's pessimistic ideas of governmental work might be too radical but the critics of governmental work are essential

⁹ A definition of corruption is hard to give as it depends on opinion. My definition is in line with the national encyclopaedia of Sweden's definition: "An abuse of a given position for ones own benefits" (www.ne.se)

in the development work of Africa. If there is political will, there will be participative opportunities for positive development. Johnston means that political will has to include an active political process and a strong leadership so corruption can be fought effectively. Fighting corruption is difficult in an environment without political will (Johnston, 2005:83ff). To reach this environment, the governments need to include Civil Society. High corrupt countries tend to have Civil Societies which are weak, divided or intimidated (Johnston, 2005:xi). Effective reforms are made when major parts of society are involved, but citizens of African countries have often not held their governments accountable because the accountable-mechanism is not operating well (Johnston, 2005:73f). This accountable-mechanism is a Civil Society mechanism. Furthermore, a way to maintain a major part involvement is to create coalition buildings, which unfortunately are not common in Africa. Usually, Anti-Corruption reforms are separately driven, often by Government with no involvement from Civil Society (Johnston, 2005:86). Thus, a strengthening of Civil Society is important for reducing the corruption in Africa. Civil Society is also essential to put together the international donor community to work more effective. 90 percent of public investments and 30 percent of ongoing state expenses in Sub-Saharan Africa derive from aid generated by donors. No involvement is neutral and many projects and initiatives feed corruption, overpaying bureaucratic cooperatives at national level (Blundo et al, 2006:57). Johnston argues that sustainable reforms in Africa must be integral to the domestic agenda and not driven by international donors. The reforms must come from within and African citizens are often cynical about the international assistance because funds continue to flow to the countries even though there is often misrule and high-level corruption (Johnston, 2005:88ff). If AC-CSOs are more involved in the process, watching the donors' investments, corruption could be controlled. Thus, AC-CSOs play a crucial role with both government and donors in the fight against corruption.

2.2.1. Anti-Corruption work and AC-CSOs in Uganda

Even if corruption has different meanings in different regions, countries and societies, one can see that Africa is a continent where corruption has been prevalent. In the CPI rating for 2006, only two countries, Botswana and Mauritius, were scoring above five in the African region (*Transparency International-CPI*, 2006). African societies are well embedded in the corruption process and citizens often take bribes and political and economical misuse for granted. Uganda is not an exception. Even if some improvements have been made and last

year’s scoring never has been higher in the past decade, the illustration in table 2:3 shows us that corruption is highly prevalent in Uganda.

Uganda	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
CPI	2,3	1,9	2,1	2,2	2,6	2,5	2,7

Table 2:3 Corruption in Uganda (Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International)

The GoU has launched several efforts to fight corruption. In 1998, 25 Anti-Corruption principles were drawn up to combat the problem (Johnston, 2005:82). Institutional efforts like the Inspectorate General of Government (IGG) was established in 1998 and is empowered to investigate, arrest and prosecute corruption cases, take preventive measures, advise government and report to the parliament (IGG, 2007). The institutional office of the Auditor General has a role to provide an independent oversight of government operations through financial and other management audits (OAG, 2007). These are the most important but the GoU has established seven institutions in total, including several articles in the constitution and put in place over 10 legal frameworks to reduce the corruption level (CBR, 2006:appendix). However, the political will is still questioned. The Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU) and Andrew Mwenda highlight several initiatives made from the IGG which simply have been ignored by the GoU and all the Anti-Corruption institutions have been constantly under-funded, which has affected their work negatively. The GoU spends 1.1 percent of its budget on accountability institutions while security officially gets 14 percent (ACCU, 2006:4ff and Mwenda, 2002:240f). Furthermore, the GoU has decided to treat the Auditor General’s reports with secrecy (CBR, 2006:vi). Excluding the public from official information is a lack of political will in dealing with the corruption problem.

The GoU, with support from the international donor community, is beginning to engage Civil Society in Anti-Corruption work. Cooperation between Civil Society, parliament, government officials and donors is a growing trend in Uganda’s struggle against corruption (Mwenda, 2002:245). But to gain a positive result, the cooperation among the stakeholders has to work properly. According to the ACCU, it does not. The role of Civil Society is either minimal or non-existing. The environment is hard. Civil society can make pronouncements but there is a lack of political will to act (ACCU, 2006:11). But Civil Society is also criticized. CBR’s report sees AC-CSOs in Uganda as too liberal to impact in the corruption process. They do

not create credible threats on their own. Furthermore, an increasing number of them are corrupt themselves (CBR, 2006:33).

The international donor community's role is important. Around half of Uganda's budget is donor funded. As Uganda is a very corrupt country, one cannot take away the donors' role in it. Even if the donor community has made many efforts in the area, CBR and Blundo argue that they have a special responsibility. When they pump in aid funds to Uganda, they have to demand from the GoU a stronger support in Anti-Corruption issues. Uganda is seen as a success story, which has helped government officials to get away with the high corruption. Around 30 percent of the aid money is swindled. Thus, the international donor community is still lacking in their efforts against corruption in Uganda (CBR, 2006:34f and Blundo et al, 2006:57f).

AC-CSOs play an important watchdog role in regards to the GoU and donors in their work against corruption. When it comes to Budget Support implementation, AC-CSOs' role is to be a transparent, participative actor in ensuring that good governance rules, so that the flexible support which Budget Support is, will be used properly. PEAP PILLAR 2 mentions that to ensure Good Governance, which is important to receive Budget Support, Uganda needs to reduce corruption with help from Civil Society (IDD et al 2, 2006:200). Corruption is an important issue within PEAP and AC-CSOs are the most suitable actors from Civil Society dealing with that issue. This includes being a part of how Budget Support shall be distributed to effectively decrease the corruption level.

2.3. Re-introducing the problem

As described above, Civil Society and AC-CSOs play an important role in the Budget Support implementation, through PEAP, SWAp, PAF, Partnership Principles and PRSC. An inclusive Civil Society which actively participates in decision-making and dialogue, especially on Anti-Corruption issues, is important for donors to receive Budget Support. But according to some stakeholders, for example the ACCU, Civil Society's relation to the GoU and donors is not working properly. If this is true, the flexible distribution of Budget Support creates a weaker Civil Society, which is a fundamental factor for not implementing Budget Support in the first place. This thesis is investigating Budget Support effects on AC-CSOs, to see if the structure of Budget Support is sustainable in Uganda.

3. Theoretical framework:

In this section, several theories are introduced which are believed to be possible explanations of what is happening with AC-CSOs when Budget Support is implemented. The theories will be the basic ground for the hypotheses. The first part of this chapter highlights three theories which describe how Budget Support affects AC-CSOs and why. The second part describes theories within the concept of Civil Society, to make differences in Civil Society visual and thus show that different types of organizations are influenced differently by Budget Support. I gravitate towards a neutral vision when I describe and use the theories. Hence, I do not think some theories or hypothesis are more reliable than others.

3.1. Three alternative theories for describing Budget Support effects on AC-CSOs.

3.1.1. Weber and Marginalization

Max Weber is called the father of sociology. Under his lifetime, 1864-1920, he became the most important and influential scientist of what he defined as a science which describes, translates and explains social action (Boglund et al, 1981:89). Weber's work touches on a great variety of social actions that describe society. The part of Weber's science which is relevant for this study is his "typology of authority", a theory on power and authority. According to Weber, power (macht) is a situation of a position- and object-relation, where the actor who is in a higher position has a possibility to settle his/her will on the actor who is in a lower position and thus controls his/her actions. With power comes authority (herrschaft) which is the eventual possibility for the actor with a higher position to find obedience and compliance from the actor with a lower position on specific demands (Boglund et al, 1981:100f). Weber describes three ideal typifications for power to be claimed and to be subordinated by the power. First, the rational legitimized ground, where the authority is based on beliefs of the legitimacy of a fixed order and the authority of having the right to govern to maintain the order from the subordinated. Second, the traditional legitimized ground, where beliefs are lying in the inviolability of traditions and the legitimacy of traditional ways of appointing authorities. Third, the charismatic legitimized ground, where societal processes are braked off and transformed in a new way because of beliefs in individual persons (Boglund et al, 1981:103f). Here Weber highlights legitimacy of power and how it can be implemented. Clearly, power can be maintained in several ways.

In the case of Uganda, the GoU’s work tends to be legitimized. The NRM has ruled for 21 years now without any coups d’état to change the rule. Thus, the power is characterized by the subordinate who accepts the role of authority. If we look at how the GoU exercises its power, there are tendencies of Civil Society marginalization. In ActionAid’s and CARE’s report “Where to now?”, the authors argue that the primary assumption where Budget Support is seen as a key to improve transparency and accountability to parliament and institutions, and in turn strengthen democratic accountability and Civil Society, is misleading. The GoU tends to ignore NGOs’ inputs and recommendations. Thus there is a cooperation failure which is characterized by mutual mistrust and suspicion. The NGOs believe they are excluded from essential dialogues with donors and the GoU. If the policy process is not open enough for non-state actors, one can not call Budget Support a tool for strengthening democratic accountability (ActionAid and CARE 1, 2006). Furthermore, the GoU has introduced an NGO law, which demands all the NGOs in the country to have been registered. The registration is approved or denied depending on the will of the GoU. Thus, NGOs gain less independence (Hansen & Twaddle, 1998:149ff).

As Budget Support input is strengthening the power of the state’s institutions, it is also strengthening the role of the GoU. The indications of ignorance and domination described above may be incidents which can be explained by Weber’s theory of marginalization. The GoU receives a more dominant position because of Budget Support and uses the asymmetrical power to maintain a higher position of power in the relationship with AC-CSOs. In this scenario, donors play a crucial role, not stimulating AC-CSOs enough to maintain the position of a strong and active Civil Society actor. If the GoU marginalizes AC-CSOs because of their dominant position, donors have failed to uphold the primal demands of Civil Society. Donors can also use their power directly to maintain their higher position on AC-CSOs.




Figure 3:1 Weber’s theory of Marginalization

3.1.2. Norm Socialization Process and the Boomerang Effect

Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink explore in their anthology “The Power of Human Rights” if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, established in 1948, are observed in present time. The editors investigate under what conditions Human Rights principles influence state behaviour towards their citizens and under what circumstances international human right norms are internalized in domestic work (Risse et al, 1999). The anthology does not only focus on the human rights area. The essence of the book is how norms are implemented differently in diverse contexts and why. Budget Support and Anti-Corruption as well as Human Rights principles are examples of norms, drawn up by Western international regimes, which other regimes must live up to. Thus, using Risse’s, Ropp’s and Sikkink’s ideas to investigate why Budget Support influences AC-CSOs in Uganda as they do is a possible step to fulfil the aim of the research.

Risse, Ropp and Sikkink argue that the diffusion of international norms in the Human Rights area crucially depends on how networks between domestic and transnational actors are established and sustained. The networks can have three purposes; first, to put norm-violating states on the international agenda, second, to empower and legitimate claims of domestic opposition groups, social movements and NGOs, and third, to challenge norm-violating governments by creating transnational pressures on the regimes. This procedure where international norms are internalized and implemented domestically is called a norm socialization process (Risse et al, 1999:5). The norm socialization process is distinguished in three parts; First, the instrumental adaptation to pressure governments, where strategic bargaining is essential. The receiving countries are told that norms like for example Budget Support and Anti-Corruption are important factors to focus on for receiving more funds from the international donor community. Second, the process of an argumentative discourse. Here moral conscious-raising, argumentation and persuasion are essential elements to create pressure on a deeper level. The first two parts of interaction can together or separately develop the norm to the third part of the process, which is institutionalization and habitualization of the norm. In this part, there is an acceptance of the validity of the norm and there are more engagements in dialogue about the norm-implementation. This can shape identities, interests and behaviour that mirror the idea of the norm.




Figure 3:2. *The process of socialization (Risse et al, 1999:12)*

As Budget Support and Anti-Corruption are principle ideas created as international norms, the norm socialization process can capture its implementation. If the three steps are successfully achieved, Budget Support as well as Anti-Corruption work shall be internalized and accepted by the stakeholders, and there shall be more focus on these matters. Consequently, as the focus on Anti-corruption work at the same time coincides with Budget Support, AC-CSOs should be gaining more attention and support from both donors and the GoU after Budget Support implementation. Thus, the underlying cause of such a scenario is the norm socialization process.

To go from the theoretical arguments to empirical analysis, the authors have shed light on several “boomerang effects” in different phases of norm implementation. A boomerang effect is when domestic groups in a repressive state go around their state and directly search out international allies to bring pressure on their state from the outside. In this way, domestic and transnational groups can pressure the states “from above” and “from below” to accomplish transformations. The domestic opposition, social movements and NGOs put direct pressure from below and indirect pressure from above, with help from international allies. When excluded domestic groups in a repressive state go around their state and search for international allies to create pressure from the outside, a boomerang effect has been made (Risse et al, 1999:17f).

In this case, if the cooperation or communication does not work between the GoU and AC-CSOs in Uganda (1st step in figure 3:3), as a result of the more independent distribution of

funds to the GoU which Budget Support creates, the AC-CSOs have to work in another direction (2nd step). For example, an International Non Governmental Organization (INGO) can help and use its international network to put pressure on an aid-giving donors (3rd step). The donors can in turn threaten with Budget Support withdrawal (4th step), to create a dialogue with the GoU (5th step). If this is the case, the Local AC-CSO changes strategy to achieve their commitments and they avoid the marginalization.




Figure 3:3, a boomerang effect

Consequently, Budget Support marginalizes AC-CSOs but because of a strong international network, a boomerang effect can be made which maintains the AC-CSOs position. Thus, the existence of strong international networks influences Budget Support effects on AC-CSOs.




Figure 3:4 Norm Socialization Process and Boomerang effect

The norm socialization process and the boomerang effect create a double pressure on the GoU. First there is the underlying norm socialization process, where Budget Support and Anti-Corruption gain more attention as they are international norms. Second, if the attention is missing, a boomerang effect, with help from an international network can change the negative effect from Budget Support on AC-CSOs and they can maintain their position. The donors have an important role here, as they are the central actor for the change of action. If AC-CSOs are gaining more attention after Budget Support implementation, or maintain their position because of using boomerang effects, they have a good working relationship with the donors.

3.1.3. Patronage and Clientelism

“Patronage and clientelism” is a broad reaction to the ideas that political development and bureaucratic universalism are forms of an evolutionary event made up of Western liberal values. Operations of modern institutions are not as simple as those liberal values, which are embedded in societies without traditional hierarchical cultures (Roniger & Günes-Ayata, 1994:3).

The relationship of patronage and clientelism is described as a sort of commitment between two actors, where political and economic support and protection from the patron are delivered and, in return, the client gives the actor loyalty and different favours (Törnquist, 1996:62). This sort of asymmetrical power is combined with solidarity. Even if the client has access to power, he does not use it. He is neutralized by the patron’s position. But at the same time, the patron’s control is never totally legitimized. He is exposed to be attacked by social forces committed to universal principles, forces that are excluded from the clientelistic relations, or other competing patrons (Roniger & Günes-Ayata, 1994:4). The patronage is built on a vulnerable situation for the client. The patron protects the client and the client must feel the support for a sustainable loyalty. He must feel expectation and satisfaction with the protection from the patron and a loss of individual needs if the patron closes their relationship. A decrease in the client’s vulnerability will lead to a loss of the patron’s control which in turn leads to a lack of demand for the patron’s resources and services and a fragility of clientelistic commitments (Roniger & Günes-Ayata, 1994:11). Thus, patronage and clientelism is a sort of dual commitment, where the hierarchical order is mutually beneficial.

Patronage and clientelistic relationships have always been present in society. The traditional patronage system was a hierarchical commitment, mostly known as the landlord-peasant relationship. It was structural, permanent and unquestioned. The modern form of patronage system is more equal in its character even if the structure still is unequal in its exchange. The client allows the asymmetrical relationship only if it is founded in a communitarian ideology and open for the patron. The client can make threats to the patron and sometimes take collective actions against him, if he is not effective enough (Roniger & Günes-Ayata, 1994:23f). Consequently, patronage and clientelism continue to play an important role in present time but in a different way. Nowadays, patronage is less effective in controlling access to basic productions and economic markets in developed societies than in developing societies, even though patronage still is effective in developed countries (Roniger & Günes-

Ayata, 1994:210f). In a society based on legal principles, it is harder to use a patron/client relationship to a greater extent, because forceful and observed laws can prevent the patron/client-relationship's possible radical outcomes. Thus, in developing countries like Uganda, where legal principles sometimes are abused, the patron/client-relationships are more prevalent in the society than in developed countries.

If there are patron/client relationships in the case of Uganda, the GoU and donors are in most cases the patrons, supporting AC-CSOs (clients) for loyalty in return. The GoU is vulnerable to forces of universal principles like Human Rights and democracy, or by other actors who are not in the relation, for example donors. The AC-CSO feels it is satisfied with the relationship with the GoU. Thus, they are loyal. Otherwise, the relationship would be broken. Sometimes it is instead the AC-CSO who is patron and the GoU who is client, for example when a strong international AC-CSO like Oxfam¹⁰ is supporting the GoU in some project. Donors can also be the client when strong international AC-CSOs demand issues of their work. Donors are also vulnerable of international critics, for example if the aid is bound too strong by conditions. If that is the case, the patron/client relationship can be wrecked because of a broken loyalty. Thus, the activities by both donors and the GoU can show results of a patron/client relationship.

Everything is running as it always has, autonomous of the Budget Support. It is business as usual. The underlying bonds are impregnating the society. Thus, Budget Support does not have an effect on civil society.




Figure 3:5 Patronage and Clientelism

The three alternative theories are summarized in table 3:1

Theory	Causal Mechanism	Predicted Result
Weber's typology of authority	Marginalization	Gain less power
Risse, Ropp & Sikkinks theory of Norm diffusion	Norm Socialization Process	Gain more power

¹⁰ Oxfam works with a huge spectrum of issues, among other things Anti-Corruption (Oxfam, 2007).

Risse, Ropp & Sikkinks theory of Norm diffusion	The Boomerang Effect	Maintained power
Theory of Patronage & Clientelism	Patronage and Clientelism	Maintained power

Table 3:1 Summary of theories

3.2. Theories explaining differences within the Civil Society concept

The term Civil Society is a diffuse and complex term. It can comprise so much or exclude so much depending on how one defines it. To be able to answer Research Question two, all components must be clearly viewed. Therefore, an outline of the Civil Society debate and an integrated description of the context of Africa and Uganda will be introduced here.

3.2.1 The complexity of Civil Society

Civil Society is an old concept but it has not been questioned and debated in a sufficient manner until recently, when the political liberalisation and democratization in Latin America and Eastern Europe took place in the 1980s and early 1990s (Sjögren, 1998:7). In the debate today, one can see two different descriptions of the term. Howell and Pearce (2001) call them “the mainstream approach” and “the alternative approach”. Sjögren (1998) identify them as “liberal traditions” and “Marxist critical traditions”. I prefer to describe them as “the Liberal Mainstream View” (LMV) and “the Critical Alternative View” (CAV).

LMV discusses the role of the individual, state and society and bases the idea from the rise of capitalism and industrialization. They argue that Civil Society can be a component necessary to any society in the process of economical and political transformation as long as the rule of law is well-functioning. The conception of Civil Society creates an ethical order for capitalism, so that commercial society and capital growth emerge together with social development. The sphere is important for reconciliation of differences within a whole modern society as well as for inclusion and equality of every group of citizens. Furthermore, Civil Society should increase the stock of social capital¹¹. Norms, trust and networking are tools for a high degree of social capital which creates a healthy civil society, and in turn a democratic state to develop (Howell & Pearce, 2001:17-26). One of LMV’s protagonists, Alexis De Tocqueville, defines civil society as follows:

¹¹ The idea of social capital is outlined by Robert Putnam in his book “Making Democracy Work”.

Three types of virtues are attributed to Civil Society – as a counterweight to state power /.../, an institutionally democratising force and finally a sphere for elaborating or transforming normative notions of fair systems of governance (Sjögren, 1998:11f)

One can notice that LMV sees Civil Society as an unproblematic component of a democratic society, but is this realistic? An alternative group of Civil Society literature, the ACV, has emerged because of what they call the deficiencies of the LMV. Basically, the idea is that Civil Society is more complex and problematic than what the LMV suggests. ACV acknowledges the importance of social differentiations, power and conflict in its conception of Civil Society (Howell & Pearce, 2001:32). An historical and materialistic understanding of Civil Society, rooted in Hegelian, Marxist and Gramscian ideas, are explored by ACV. They argue that the roots of Civil Society are to be found in political economy and it is always reshaped, although in an indirect and complex way, through a restructuring in the material sphere (Sjögren, 1998:12). Thus a critique of capitalism is embedded in ACV. Gramsci argues that Civil Society and the state are embedded in a capitalist system. This system is reproduced through hegemony¹² and authority within Civil Society and the state. Civil Society is an instrument for the ruling class to reproduce the capitalist system through CSOs, so citizens become influenced by capitalist norms by the elite (Chambers & Kymlicka, 2002:90f). One has to understand that Civil Society looks different in different types of regions and contexts. This is often the problem for the writers; they assume that Civil Society organisations are similar and that their relations with the states always have the character of a countervailing power (Van Roy, 1998:135). ACV is sceptical of LMV's stress on consensus rather than conflict. They reject the homogenisation and sees Civil Society as an agency for social change. NGOs are valued by LMV for its links with poor and grassroots organizations and are useful for anti-poverty programs. At the same time there are many NGOs who try to hang on to their autonomy in order to create a change defined by themselves rather than be used as agents for the implementation of donor visions of development (Howell & Pearce, 2001:33ff). Thus, there are different types of NGOs or CSOs within Civil Society. Adam Habib distinguishes three different blocks, based on Civil Society in South Africa. These blocks have different relations to the state and donors. The first is formal service related NGOs, which have a partnership with or are subcontracted to by the state. These organizations have a more engaged and collegial relation to the state. Often they provide services that the state is supposed to deliver. In opposition of service delivery organizations are critical organizations

¹² Hegemony is a position of supremacy where the power not necessarily has to be violent.

with grounds from social movements who actively challenge neo-liberal structures. Their relationship with the state is more controversial. They are engaging the state in an attempt to persuade it through lobbying, court action or even resistance. They act as a sort of watchdog, watching that the state is behaving in a fair and democratic way. In between these types of organizations is situated a third type; the informal survivalist organization, mainly in marginalized communities. They assist people in trying to survive the ravages of neo-liberalism. They receive no resources or recognition from the state (Habib, 2005:9).

In the case of Africa and Uganda, much of the literature on the African Civil Societies is pessimistic over the focus on Western ideals. Africa is a good example of the deficiencies of LMV's homogenization of the Civil Society concept. For example, the Western assumption that Civil Society is above all a countervailing power to the state does not fit in to the African society. Political resources are often not fairly distributed and the boundaries between state and Civil Society often blur in to each other. One must see how the state uses the civic sphere and civic institutions as vehicles for its hegemonic project, shrinking sectors of Civil Society that do not fit their interests. As a matter of fact, much of the weakness in Civil Society organisations in Africa has to do with the states active role in fragmenting those they distrust. Informal CBOs are often ignored by the state. Furthermore, Civil Society in Africa is often severely restricted by registrations of society laws, made by the state for their hegemonic project (Van Roy, 1998:134ff).

The Civil Society of Uganda has been and still is fragile and weak. During the colonial years, NGOs were only active in humanitarian and missionary fields. Under the dictatorship of Idi Amin most of the organizations fled the country because of brutal repression, but after the overthrow of Amin the NGOs came back, focusing on disaster relief (Hansen & Twaddle, 1998:147). The years to come were strongly affected by guerrilla war and civil war until Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) took over power in 1986. In this time, only a reduced form of Civil Society emerged, much weaker than other parts of East Africa (Brock et al, 2004:56). With this background, one can understand that the context has undermined the development of strong independent organizations. But in recent years the number of NGOs has increased tremendously in Uganda. Over 700 organizations are now registered in the country. But the reason for the increase is the reawakened interest from foreign donors rather than an emergence of political stability (Hansen & Twaddle, 1998:147). Improvements have been made but the state of Uganda is still fragile. The power depends on

well resourced repressive equipments and access to foreign resources (Brock et al, 2004:62). The GoU is aware of the situation and has been courting the donor community for decades which has resulted in a good relationship, high availability of funds and high levels of trust. But the GoU is still dependent on service delivery NGOs because they perform duties that the government does not have the capacity to do. Thus the government gains legitimacy from service delivery NGOs. The weakness has generally generated a situation where donors demand Civil Society to hold the government accountable for democratic ideals. This shows that Civil Society is going from a service delivery role to a watchdog function in a stronger manner than before. Advocacy work and evaluation has been more common. But this progress also reflects the power of the donor community. NGOs depend on their donors and they tend to be more accountable to them than to their own local people. Projects have a tendency to concentrate on efforts which generate quick results for the donors (Hansen & Twaddle, 1998:153f).

The relation between the GoU and Civil Society in Uganda is still problematic. NGOs tend to be tolerated as long as they continue to function in an apolitical and non-confrontational way. The major way of controlling the NGOs is through the NGO registration board, established in 1989. The board registers, monitors and guides the activities of the organizations. The organizations' applications can be rejected by the board and thus the NGOs gain less autonomy. Some NGOs prefer to remain apolitical and non-confrontational and not adopt an advocacy role (Hansen & Twaddle, 1998:149ff). The registration act has been developed in recent years. In 2001, registration of NGOs was introduced for the parliament as a bill to become a law. This law was established as an act of parliament on the 7th of April 2006, the NGO Act. The act is seen by many NGOs as a way for the regime to consolidate their power over them (Uganda National NGO Forum1, 2006).

One thing that can be outlined here is the diversities of organizations in Uganda. Over 700 organizations are registered, including "service delivery" organizations and "watchdog" organizations, as well as other types of organizations. The GoU may like some types of organizations better than others. For example, as they are in need of having organizations with the service delivery function, they might prefer their existence before others and therefore promote and help their work more accurately. As Budget Support is a tool which gives the authority of distribution to the GoU, there may be certain organizations that have a better chance to receive funds than others. Also donors may prefer certain organizations more than others, for example advocacy organizations may be preferable because there is an

international consensus for supporting advocacy issues. Thus, Budget Support influence on AC-CSOs may give different results if the integrated factor of organization differences is included:




Figure 3:6 Differentiation effects

The theories of Civil Society are summarized in table 3:2:

Theory	Describing Mechanism	Predicted Result
Liberal Mainstream View	Homogenization	No differences
Alternative Critical View	Heterogenization	Differences

Table 3:2 Summaries of Civil Society theories

4. Exploring the effects of Budget Support implementation:

4.1. AC-CSOs’ relation to Donors and the GoU

According to the literature review above, the question about what effects Budget Support has on Anti-Corruption Organizations in Uganda can take four different answers: a) Either Anti-Corruption Organizations have gained less power since Budget Support was implemented, based on weberian ideals; or b) Anti-Corruption Organizations have gained more power, based on ideals of the norm socialization process; or c) Anti-Corruption Organizations have maintained their power, based on ideals of the boomerang effect; or d) Anti-Corruption Organizations have maintained their power, based on patron/client ideals.) .

To reach an answer on the effects, I measure AC-CSOs’ relation to Donors and the GoU. More specifically, I measure how the relations between them have changed since Budget Support was implemented. Generally, I investigate the changes over the past 5 years, because the first full Budget Support implementation was made in Uganda in 2001. There are several ways to measure the effects, but there are four indicators in this essay which are used for this purpose;

- **Funds:** The financial input is an element to see how interested donors and the GoU are in the relationship with AC-CSOs. If the financial inputs have increased, it indicates a stronger relationship and vice versa.

- **Gain a hearing:** To make a voice and get feedback of that voice is important in a good working relationship. If donors and the GoU listen to issues from AC-CSOs and respond actively on the issues, there is a tendency of a stronger relationship, and vice versa.
- **Transparency:** A transparent working environment is essential for an effective working result. If the procedure of the work between AC-CSOs and donors and the GoU are relatively clear, and if donors and the GoU do not intend to slow down the process of AC-CSOs' work, it indicates a stronger relationship, and vice versa.
- **Independence:** A free and autonomous relationship with respect to the other part as a sovereign is important if the work shall be effective. If AC-CSOs are bound to donors and the GoU's ideas and can not express their own values, it indicates a weaker relationship, and vice versa.

4.2. Differences between Civil Society Organizations

If the study finds that Budget Support has had effects on Anti-Corruption organisations, the next question to answer is whether the effects from Budget Support are similar for different types of Anti-Corruption Organizations in Uganda. The theories previously mentioned argue either that: a) Effects of Budget Support are diverse for different types of organizations, based on the Alternative Critical View¹³, i.e. that effects of Budget Support are diverse between watchdog- and service delivery organizations; or b) that effects of Budget Support are not diverse for different types of organizations, based on the liberal mainstream view.

The organizations have a great variety in structure, design, history, etc. This may be important when it comes to the relationship with the GoU and donors. Differences can be investigated on many indicators, for example differences in years of operation or if the organization is rural or urban. But I have chosen to focus on a structure related indicator; if there are differences between Watchdog Organizations and Service Delivery Organizations, based on Adam Habib's theory of Civil Society.¹⁴

Watchdog Organizations, which mainly work with advocacy and evaluation issues, might be more uncomfortable for the GoU than Service Delivery Organizations, because these issues hold the GoU accountable. The GoU has to uphold ideals based on democracy, Human

¹³ Hypotheses 5.1 is further explained in 5.2, p 23

¹⁴ As no Informal Survivalist Organization was interviewed, that category is removed from the study.

Rights, Anti-Corruption etc. At the same time, advocacy and evaluation are requested by the donor community. These issues are important for donors in order to uphold an effective funding mechanism. Therefore, the probability is stronger that Watchdog Organizations tend to be more marginalized by the GoU than Service Delivery Organizations, whereas the probability is weaker that Watchdog Organizations tend to be more marginalized by donors than Service Delivery Organizations. Instead, the probability is stronger that Watchdog Organizations tend to be more strengthened by donors than Service Delivery Organizations.

4.3. Analysing the observed effects

Finally this study looks at the reasons behind changes in the work of Anti-Corruption organisations, given that Budget Support has had effects on Civil Society. According to the theories presented above, the answers can take the following forms: a) Anti-Corruption Organizations are marginalized, following Weberian ideals; b) they are increasingly strengthened, following the norm socialization process; c) they are using a boomerang effect with help from their international network, and have maintained their strength; or d) they are tied to a patron/client relationship and are not influenced.

5. Method

5.1. Study design

In order to discover effects from Budget Support implementation on AC-CSOs, a number of methods can be used. One way is to use a qualitative text analysis, focusing on documents from AC-CSOs, donors or the GoU. Another way is to do a quantitative study. However, there is lack of data for the specific subject. Effects due to the implementation of Budget Support are hard to measure in statistical terms. The only way would be through a survey approach to collect the data. But as the research questions of this thesis are investigating effects and why the effects have occurred, both methods are deficient. To go beyond the measured results, one has to interact with people and their opinions. So the best alternative is a qualitative method where interviews with actors from AC-CSOs in Uganda are used. This method is the best way to capture the core of the investigation, namely the transformation. It can partly be investigated with documents, for example if an organization has received fewer funds since the Budget Support implementation. But the personal opinions of the transformation will be missed. With interviews, “the transformation factor” is easier to capture.

The outline of the case-study will be disposed by tracking down the role of the Anti-Corruption Organizations' work, evaluating the result with the hypotheses. I will compare the role of AC-CSOs before and after the implementation. It can be carried out in two ways, either by asking relevant actors about the past or by building up points of comparison based on literature about politics in Uganda, to understand the role of AC-CSOs before the Budget Support implementation. Thus, the study consists of two analytical time-observations of one occasion and therefore it is not a pure case-study based on one observation of one occasion. But the study is still carried out in only one context, so it can not be referred to as a comparative study (Esaiasson et al, 2004:119f). A comparative study could have been used, comparing the successful case of Budget Support in Uganda with an unsuccessful case, for example Malawi¹⁵, in order to see how differences are shaped in Civil Society because of variations in the independent variable. However, I did not have enough financial resources to do that. It can also be difficult to find enough relevant interview objects from both the successful and unsuccessful cases to make a generalizing result. So the best alternative is a case study. This study thus does not have the aim of generalizing empirical findings because it is a case study. However, there might be some lessons to learn, especially concerning the question on whether the structure of Budget Support is sustainable in the African context.

In order to obtain research material, I interview central actors in the Civil Society who work against corruption in Uganda. I exercise informant interviews to use the persons as observers over how the reality of the problem described above is disposed (Esaiasson et al, 2004:253f).

5.2. Sampling

The population of the thesis is AC-CSOs in Uganda. To investigate the population, strategic samples were used. Random samples are normally exercised when you want to analyse a large number of units. Uganda has not enough AC-CSOs for random samples to be useful. To use strategic samples, one must specify and intensify the samples so that the objects interviewed have the right backgrounds to measure the effects (Esaiasson et al, 2004:288). The first step was to map out the organizations. I started with outlining the members of the Anti Corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU), which include 50 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that are unified to effectively work against corruption. Here, I could have intensified the sampling by only using pure AC-CSOs. But as my second research question wants to see the varieties of

¹⁵ See the report *Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994 – 2004* by IDD et al (2006)

Budget Support effects in different types of organizations, I choose not to intensify the samples further. Instead I use the “snow-ball method”¹⁶ to outline a larger variety of types of organizations, related to Anti-Corruption work.

5.3. The interviews

The material findings were obtained during a field trip during almost two months mainly spent in Kampala, Uganda. The fieldtrip was financed by a Minor Field Study (MFS) Scholarship. Altogether I made 16 interviews with AC-CSOs. I also collected some documents and other valuable sources of data during this time.

The confidentiality aspect was problematic for this thesis. There is a conflict between the demand for confidentiality and a control of inter-subjectivity (Kvale, 1998:110). Some respondents demanded confidentiality, which is why their names have been left out. I can still, however, categorize different types of organizations and therefore also answer research question two.

5.4. The interview guide

An interview guide of high-quality is founded in theory and has both thematic and dynamic dimensions. Thematic in the way it relates to the subject, dynamic in the way it interacts with the respondent (Kvale, 1998:121f). I was trying to capture this dual dimension. The dynamic dimension with the specific questions used in the interviews links back to the thematic questions created from theory, illustrated in table 6:1¹⁷.

Theoretic Dimension	Thematic Dimension	Dynamic Dimension
- Marginalization	1) Relation to Budget Support?	1) Is BS a positive or a negative initiative for AC-CSOs in Uganda?
- Norm Socialization Process	2) Relation to Donors? 3) Relation to the GoU?	2) Has donor funding risen or fallen over the past 5 years? 3) Is it easier or more difficult to deal with the GoU today than 5 years ago?
- Boomerang Effect	4) Relation between Donors, the GoU and AC-CSOs?	4) Do AC-CSOs have influence over the agenda with Donors and the GoU?
- Patronage and Clientelism	5) Level of International Network?	5) Does your organization have international actors who help you in your work?

Table 6:1 Dimension of Interviews

¹⁶ A snow-ball method is when an informant/respondent points out another informant/respondent and so on (Esaiasson et al, 2004:286)

¹⁷ The numbers in table 6:1 show the relation between the thematic- and dynamic dimensions. The questions in the dynamic dimensions are only examples. The interview guide with all questions used is shown in appendix

The questions in the thesis are partly inspired by questions from the report “Where to now?” by ActionAid and Care International (2006). In the end of the interviews, I always made space for the respondent to add something which he/she felt was important to highlight.

5.5. Delimitations

In Research Question two, only Weber’s theory of marginalization and the Norm Socialization Process were used, leaving the theories of the Boomerang Effect and Patron/Client out of it. There was no space for using all theories and the interviewed organizations applied on the Boomerang Effect and Patron/Client theories turned out to be too few. Also, there was no organization who applied the Norm Socialization Process with the GoU, so that part was left out as well. Furthermore, Adam Habib’s three block theory was used, but Informal Survivalist Organizations (CBOs) was left out because I did not manage to make interviews with such organizations during my fieldtrip. However, Watchdog- and Service Delivery Organizations were the important indicators to answer Research Question two because of their polarized positions.

6. Empirical findings and analysis

6.1. Organization 1 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
Funds	+	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+/-	+/-
Transparency	+/-	-
Independence	-	-

We can see two different tendencies for O1 in their relation to donors and the GoU. First, donors are increasingly pumping in money but O1 becomes more dependent in return. The donors’ increased awareness of Anti-Corruption has helped O1. It is a strategic way to implement the international norm focused on “Anti-Corruption”. Thus, O1 is embedded in the second part of the donors’ norm socialization process using argumentation and persuasion to implement the norms. However, even if O1 normally are invited to paternal meetings between the GoU, Civil Society and Donors, they are not given participation on the same level as donors and the GoU. Donors want to implement their own ideas on O1’s work which influence their space of independence negatively. Second, the GoU has made the relationship

with O1 more problematic since the Budget Support implementation. The NGO law and their hostile attitude is a way of marginalizing O1. They are in a position and object relationship with the GoU, following Weber’s theory.

7.2. Organization 2 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
Funds	-	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+/-	+/-
Transparency	-	-
Independence	+	+

O2 is gaining its independence at the cost of lower level of funds. O2 drive their own agenda with both donors’ and the GoU, but as donors’ focus has change from dept relief to other areas and O2’s initial focus was debt relief, they gain less funds. Moreover O2 find it hard to cooperate with both the GoU and donors. The transparency and attention by donors and the GoU on O2 are problematic. O2 is invited to parternal meetings but both donors and the GoU use strategies which delay and complicate O2’s participation, especially when they are negotiating loans. For example, sometimes O2 is given information on the agenda for a meeting too late, so O2 cannot commission their own independent research and inform their position and views. This creates a situation where donors’ and the GoU have taken a more dominant position. Thus, O2 is marginalized by the GoU and donors, following Weber’s theory of position and object relationship.

7.3. Organization 3 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
Funds	+	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+	+
Transparency	+/-	-
Independence	+	-

O3 has gained less power in their relation with the GoU since BS implementation. They are given space and opportunities by the GoU and at the same time the GoU work against O3. If they are crossing some lines, for example if they highlight a sensitive question of corruption, they are threatened or even killed. This oppression leads to a marginalized relationship to the GoU, following Weber’s ideals of position and object relation. O3 has gained more power in their relation to donors since BS implantation, even though the competition of funds is hard

and donors are too hasty to get results. O3 has extended its positive reputation on an international level and the funding is four to five times higher than five years ago. As O3 is a pure Anti-Corruption organization and this directionality has focused from the international community, there is a tendency of acceptance of the norm. Thus, O3 is in the third part of a norm socialization process.

7.4. Organization 4 (Service Delivery)

	Donors	Government
Funds	-	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+/-	-
Transparency	-	-
Independence	-	-

O4 has been more marginalized by both donors and the GoU since BS implementation in all the indicators that are used in this thesis. The funding from donors has significantly fallen as the focus has turned to conflict prevention, which is O4’s directionality. It is a serious problem for O4 as they are very dependent on donor funding. O4 play a periphery role in the whole partnership with the GoU and donors. They are called partners but when it comes to major issues, they find Civil Society standing at the very extreme end O4 is therefore a clear case of an actor in a lower position being used by stronger actors so that they can remain in power. O4 mentioned this quite clearly: *“I think it is a political issue really, the current government has stayed in power for so long so they are using all the tactics to continue survive in power...”*

7.5. Organization 5 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
Funds	+	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+/-	+/-
Transparency	-	+
Independence	+/-	No answer

O5 see their relation with donors and the GoU as positive, but at the same time they are working in line with their policies. Funding has increasingly risen for O5 since BS implementation and they are invited to important meetings between Civil Society, the GoU and donors in their district. But O5 cannot participate on the same permits because their lack of capacity and the fact that donors are holding the carrot when it comes to interest-areas and procedures on different issues. O5 believe they are more independent from donors than before BS implementation but at the same time their focus has changed in the same direction as the

international community. Thus they are in line with donors' interests. Consequently, as they are a rural organization and do not have an international network to build capacity on, they tend to be the client in a patron/client relationship.

7.6. Organization 6 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
Funds	+	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+/-	-
Transparency	-	-
Independence	-	-

Because O6 have changed strategy to be in line with the international community's policies, the funds have risen As O6 are a national network and represent many people of Uganda, they are invited to attend important meetings with donors and the GoU. But they do not influence the agenda. The GoU does not believe in AC-CSO's ability and they think they are corrupt themselves. So O6 must be careful of what they say to the GoU at these meetings. Both donors and the GoU are difficult to deal with for O6 and BS has made this even worse. Civil Society worry over BS implementation because their achieving terms are very restrictive and difficult. O6 believe the GoU was listening to them and the grassroots five years ago but nowadays they ignore them. O6 has been marginalized by the GoU because of its advocacy role. The marginalization has increased since BS implementation because of among other things the NGO amendment act. This follows Weber's theory that the GoU uses its higher position to control O6. Furthermore, O6 is following the donors' strategies and is therefore more funded than before. But O6 has problems with donors shifting focus. Thus O6 is in the second part of a norm socialization process, where argumentation and persuasion is made by donors to implement their norms. BS has made O6 even more dependent on donors because the restrictiveness of accessing these funds.

7.7. Organization 7 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
Funds	-	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+	+/-
Transparency	+/-	-
Independence	+/-	-

An unstable political environment, where the GoU changed the constitution, created a situation where donors pulled out. When BS was introduced, O7 did not get support from the GoU anymore. These two events have made the funding decrease for O7.

O7 participate and influence actively in local meetings with the GoU and Donors. They are “*recognised as partners in the stabilization of democracy by the GoU*”. But at the national level, the GoU is not participating so much. The NGO law has troubled the work for O7. The GoU has been very restrictive and bureaucratic in their relation to O7. O7 is worried about the rule of the country which becomes more dependent on the power of the President. The system is slowly sliding to “a strong man state”. Higher demands have made O7 more dependent on donor activities. But as O7 focuses on Anti-Corruption and monitoring, they are in line with donor issues.

BS tends to have badly affected O7, especially with the GoU, which has taken the opportunity to marginalize O7, following Weber’s idea of position and object relation. The transformation towards a strong man state can be applicable of Weber’s theory that authority is based on traditional ways to govern. And as Uganda in the past has had experience of dictatorship, it is easier for the President to get away with these actions. As O7 is in line with donor ideals, they have a communicative relation even if the support has declined. Thus, it is in the third part of the Norm Social Process, where there is an acceptance of the donor norms.

7.8. Organization 8 (Service Delivery)

	Donors	Government
Funds	+	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	-	-
Transparency	+/-	-
Independence	-	-

Funds have risen over the past five years for O8, but it is shifting over time and O8 do not think BS has had effects on these matters. There are no real forums that bring together Donors, the GoU and O8. Each donor has its own arrangements on how they want to have it. Donors are marginalizing O8. They give the GoU 5-10 years contracts while O8 get 1-2 years. Donors prefer LNGOs rather than O8. The GoU is also marginalizing O8 with the NGO law among other things. Donors and the GoU do not have a forum to engage with O8. Thus, donors and the GoU use their higher position to demand their ideas of action on O8, based on Weber’s theory. The President uses his power to secure his authority and that lies in the tradition. According to Weber’s second ideal type, authority is based on traditional ways

when it comes to appointing and accepting a leader. This tends to be the case in Uganda, according to O8, as President Museveni uses an undemocratic and repressive attitude and gets away with it. The troubled history of Uganda with dictatorship and civil war can be an explanation for why he can govern as he does. It lies in the tradition.

7.9. Organization 9 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
Funds	-	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	-	-
Transparency	-	-
Independence	+/-	+/-

As donors believe the 2006 election was not democratic, some of them have decreased their funding and O9 is affected by that. O9 is invited to parternal meetings with the GoU and donors, but they are not interested in the people of the grassroots and consequently not interested in O9. As the donors are not interested in O9’s focus on women and gender, they have a difficult relationship. That is also the case with the GoU because of the NGO law. The donors that still are available for O9 are few. That makes O9 vary dependent on them. But they believe they still are positioning themselves.

O9 has not a transparent or a participative relationship with neither donor nor the GoU. They gain less attention since BS implementation. Thus it is a tendency of marginalization. Their ignorance can be explained by Weber’s position and object theory.

7.10. Organization 10 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
Funds	+	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+	-
Transparency	+/-	-
Independence	+/-	-

Because of effective and successful work, there has been an increase in projects for O10 and consequently an increase in donor funding. When it comes to the level of influence, the GoU gives no space. They are increasingly dismissive of NGOs. O10 gives the example that there is a board regulating the NGO sector where there is no representation from the NGOs. O10 expresses difficulties in dealing with donors, because of BS, as certain funds are not available directly to NGOs as the case was before. But basket funding has also helped them to gain

support for their strategic plan. It is a more independent distribution. But O10 still has difficulties in dealing with the GoU, because they are keen to work with service delivery NGOs rather than advocacy NGOs and the NGO law narrows the space. The NGO law also makes O10 more dependent on the GoU. So O10 has a good relationship with donors on many levels, even if they face some difficulties. Human Rights is a focus in line with donors' ideals, even though some difficulties are visual. So there is a tendency of a norm socialization process, but there are some disagreements in the relationship. Thus, O10 is in the second part of the process, they know that their norms are important and that their relationship reaches an argumentative level,. Their relation with the GoU is bad. They act repressively, ignore them in meetings and control them with the NGO law. Thus there is a form of marginalization.

7.11. Organization 11 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
Funds	+	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+/-	-
Transparency	+	-
Independence	+	-

O11 has a close relationship with their donor. The funds have consistently risen because of an increase in activities and programs for O11. O11's attention on corruption is not answered by the GoU. O11 can generally speak with donors, but O11 believe they are a part of the GoU's marginalisation of NGOs because they do not react against it. O11 believe donors are easy to work with and that it really depends on the quality work by the organizations. But O11 do not think that their relation with the GoU is transparent, especially if O11 is pushing a different agenda contrary to that of the GoU. O11 is a strong organization and implements activities based on their own principles. O11 sets the agenda of activities. Thus they are relatively independent of donors. O11 implements ideas from donors on LNGOs. But O11 has a relatively dependent relationship with the GoU, because the NGO law controls them. Consequently, O11 are within the norm socialization process with the donors, where norms are adapted at the local level, a step towards institutionalization. The GoU's lack of transparency and pushing with the NGO law creates a marginalized relationship with O11, based on Weber's ideals.

7.12. Organization 12 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
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Funds	+/-	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+	+
Transparency	+/-	+/-
Independence	+	+/-

O12 is a big international organization which has had a temporary income decline but funds for humanitarian work has always been on a high level. As O12 is a strong international actor they gain a hearing from both donors and the GoU. Sometimes they are donors themselves. The relationship with the GoU used to be transparent but it has had some difficulties lately because the GoU thought O12 was interfering too much. O12's big capacity makes them independent from donors in their distribution. But the NGO Act makes their relationship with the GoU more dependent. However, O12's international confederation office in New York mark positions for the local office in Uganda, and put pressure on the GoU if necessary. Thus, boomerang effects are used to maintain their position.

The conclusion must be that O12 is in the third part of a norm socialization process. There is an acceptance of the norms and there are more engagements about how to implement. O12 is such a strong actor, so when they speak, the GoU listens. There have been some difficulties in their relationship, but they use a boomerang effect with help from international partners, so they cannot be marginalized by BS like other AC-CSOs. Or as they put it themselves; "*O12 is not affected by BS, we are too big*".

7.13. Organization 13 (Service Delivery)

	Donors	Government
Funds	+/-	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+/-	+/-
Transparency	-	-
Independence	-	-

Funding from donors to O13 has remained on the same level over the past five years. Not every donor did join the BS initiatives and some of them support O13s work. So direct BS has not had much impact on O13's level of funding. O13 is invited to a number of committees but they are not as participative in actions as donors and the GoU are. They listen but do not take action in most cases. Dealing with donors has become increasingly difficult for O13. Donors' transaction costs are too high in the case of dealing with small organizations and there is a tendency that big organizations take advantages of that. O13 believe the NGO law is a threat to their relationship with the GoU. O13 is concerned about a more dependent situation with

the GoU because of donors' new focus. They believe BS only is a good initiative for organizations with several donors, but it is not good for organizations that are dependent on the same donor. Both donors and the GoU have used the BS mechanism to marginalize O13. Thus, they use their higher position on O13, who is in a lower position, based on Weber's theory.

7.14. Organization 14 (Watchdog)

	Donors	Government
Funds	-	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+/-	-
Transparency	-	-
Independence	-	-

Global dimensions makes donors shift focus, for example the focus on the crisis in Darfur. Because of the shifted focus, the funding to O14 has declined. O14 is not invited to parternal meetings with both the GoU and donors but donors sometimes invite them themselves. The shift to BS has made it easier for donors to work at the cost of AC-CSOs, as they only have to look after one stakeholder (GoU). It is more transparent for donors but not for AC-CSOs. The relation with the GoU is also increasingly problematic because of the new political system with political parties. Before 2006, it was one political movement. Now there are several political parties. When O14 raise an issue, they believe that people think they are against the GoU. As BS increases the GoU's power of distribution, they use the political system as a tool to make the relation to O14 more problematic.

As BS is distributed directly to the GoU, donors often say that O14 should go to the GoU for money. So O14 is dependent on a donor who wants to gain them independence from the GoU. And O14 is not independent from the GoU. If an organization provides services it is not a problem, but as an advocacy organization it is difficult. " *You can't easily bite the hand that feeds you*".

Consequently, O14 is marginalized by both donors and the GoU, following Weber's theory of position and object relations.

7.15. Organization 15 (Service Delivery)

	Donors	Government
Funds	-	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	-	+

Transparency	-	-
Independence	-	-

Half of O15's budget has fallen this year as donors have changed focus. In contrast to other AC-CSOs, O15 sometimes gets attention from the GoU and they were invited to conferences concerning water and sanitation. The GoU asked O15 to give them their view because O15 know the grassroots. But donors do not seem to be interested in conversing with O15 so much and BS makes it harder for O15 to access funding because donors prepare for basket funding and consequently they cannot give answers about future funding. Also, the multiparty system makes it harder for O15 to deal with the GoU, because if they go against the GoU, they are seen as a political organization, supporting the opposition. O15 is one of the most donor-dependent organizations in this study. They only have one single funder. And as they have changed their focus to education, it risks the whole existence of O15. The GoU also has a tightened grip on O15 with the help of the NGO law. O15 say that they have to get permission from the GoU before they take their positions. So O15 is marginalized by both donors and the GoU, even though O15 has a better relationship with the GoU than with the donors.

7.16. Organization 16 (Service Delivery)

	Donors	Government
Funds	+	Not existing
Gain a Hearing	+	+
Transparency	+	+
Independence	+/-	+/-

O16 has almost doubled their budget since last year and has consistently risen over the past five years because they have developed a strategy based on reputation, commitment, open monitoring and focus on attractive areas. O16 is often invited to meetings with donors and the GoU and increasingly gain a hearing. The reason is that they are stakeholders and have been around for a long time. O16 also thinks it is easy to deal with donors and see no differences since BS implementation. Furthermore, O16 argues that it is mostly up to AC-CSOs themselves to create a good working relationship with the GoU and donors. O16's relationship with donors and the GoU can be seen as independent and transparent because they work closely together, but one can also say that they are dependent because they are so bound to the GoU and donor activities. They do not set their own agenda. They mostly do service delivery work. If they were acting more as a watchdog, the relationship might not

have been so good. Consequently, one cannot say that they have become more or less dependent, but they have created a transparent relationship.

But there are tendencies that O16 is a part of a patron/ client relationship, where O16 is the client and donors and the GoU are patrons.

7. Conclusions

In this last section, I answer the research questions and connect the results to the overall discussion, concluding if Budget Support is sustainable in Uganda. One thing of great importance is that the conclusions are based on tendencies. However, the results generate a deeper knowledge of the Budget Support implementation and the effects on AC-CSOs.

7.1. What effects does Budget Support have on Anti-Corruption Organizations in Uganda?

The analysis shows problematic consequences of Budget Support implementation on AC-CSOs, especially the relation between the GoU and AC-CSOs.

Thirteen out of sixteen AC-CSOs show tendencies of marginalization by the GoU. Thus, there is a strong tendency that AC-CSOs gained less power since Budget Support was implemented, based on Weberian ideals. As the distribution goes directly to the GoU, they receive more power and in turn they marginalize AC-CSOs. This is shown through the NGO law, their lack of transparency and their repressive attitude towards AC-CSOs and their actions. Many quotes from the interviews demonstrate great problems with the relationship, for example dependence, death threats and murder. Thus, the GoU undermines the idea of Budget Support. The picture that emerges is that since Budget Support was implemented, Anti-Corruption Organizations have gained less power. The GoU uses its extended power to settle their will on actors with a lower position (AC-CSOs) based on Weber's theory. It has hence been shown that AC-CSOs have not maintained or gained more power through either norm socialization, the boomerang effect, or patron/client theories since budget support was implemented.

The tendencies are not strong if we look at the relation to donors. Seven out of sixteen AC-CSOs show tendencies of gaining less power. Thus, they tend to be marginalized by donors while an equal number of AC-CSOs show tendencies of gaining more power, being in a norm socialization process. Hence, the probability is stronger that donors marginalize AC-CSOs,

based on Weber’s theory, or use them in norm socialization processes rather than being in a patron/client relationship or AC-CSOs using boomerang effects on donors, according to the results.

7.2. Are the effects from Budget Support similar for different types of Anti-Corruption Organizations in Uganda?

There are no strong differences in the results of whether the AC-CSO is a Watchdog- or a Service Delivery Organization. Both types tend to be strongly marginalized by the GoU. Thus, the results show that the hypothesis that Watchdog Organizations tend to be more marginalized than Service Delivery Organizations by the GoU does not hold.

Type of org. (16 in total)	Marginalized by Government	Not Marginalized by Government
Watchdog (11)	9	2
Service Del. (5)	4	1

Table 8:1 GoU effects of Marginalization

The results do not show a tendency of differences within Civil Society and the idea of heterogenization by the Alternative Critical View is given a weaker credibility.

Type of org. (16 in total)	Marginalized by Donors	Not Marginalized by Donors
Watchdog (11)	3	8
Service Del. (5)	4	1

Table 8:2 Donors effects of Marginalization

There are differences in AC-CSOs’ relation to donors. Eight out of eleven Watchdog Organizations do not tend to be marginalized while four out of five Service Delivery Organizations tend to be marginalized. Thus, the results show that there is an increased probability that Service Delivery Organizations tend to be more marginalized by donors than Watchdog Organizations. The results show a tendency of differences within Civil Society and thus the idea of heterogenization by the Alternative Critical View is given stronger credibility than before.

Type of org. (16 in total)	Strengthened by Donors	Not Strengthened by Donors
Watchdog (11)	7	4
Service Del. (5)	0	5

Table 8:3 Donors effects of Norm Socialization Process

Moreover, seven out of eleven Watchdog Organizations tend to be in a Norm Socialization Process, while not one Service Delivery Organization tends to be in such a process. Clearly, there is a tendency that Watchdog Organizations more easily than Service Delivery Organizations adapt the norms created by donors and then implement them to transform

Ugandan society. Of course, Watchdog Organizations like Human Rights Organizations and pure Anti-Corruption Organizations are often in line with international norms from the beginning. One can not draw the conclusion that Watchdog Organizations are strengthened by donors. Some Watchdog Organizations are marginalized. But the organizations strengthened by donors are all Watchdogs. Thus, the idea of heterogenization by the Alternative Critical View is given stronger credibility than before.

Therefore, the hypothesis that the effects of Budget Support are different on watchdog- and service delivery organizations is given a weaker credibility in the relation to the GoU effects of marginalization, following the Liberal Mainstream View; but the hypothesis is given a stronger credibility in the relation to donors' effects of marginalization and donors' effects of Norm Socialization Process, following the Alternative Critical View. Thus, according to the result the answer is two-parted. The GoU tends to marginalize organizations, regardless of their structure. Donors tend to marginalize Service Delivery Organizations more than Watchdog Organizations and strengthen Watchdog Organizations more than Service Delivery Organizations. The probability has increased that advocacy- and evaluation indicators, which Watchdog Organizations are based on, is more important for donors than service related indicators, which Service Delivery Organizations are based on, because the former are more in line with the new idea of partnership principles that the donor community is focusing on. When donors provide Budget Support, they allow receiving states to use their own allocation, procurement and accounting system to simplify the procedures. To maintain an effective funding mechanism, advocacy and evaluation are cornerstones in the Budget Support process. To evaluate distribution is important so the funding is not swindled. Therefore, donors tend to be more interested in Watchdog Organizations.

However, there is a bias in objects investigated. Watchdog Organizations were interviewed more than double compared to Service Delivery Organizations. If the numbers would have been more equal, the result might have been different. Consequently, one can not draw too heavy a conclusion out of this.

7.3. Why have these effects occurred?

Many quotes from the interviews, shown in chapter 6, indicate a marginalization of AC-CSOs by the GoU. The quotes show actions from the GoU which can be applied to Weber's theory. The GoU uses its power as position- and object relation, where the GoU has the position and

AC-CSOs are the objects. As the GoU is in a higher position than AC-CSOs, the GoU settles its will on AC-CSOs, for example with the help of the NGO law. Ten out of the sixteen organizations expressed negative concerns over the NGO law and it is a serious problem for the relationship between Civil Society and the GoU. Clearly the GoU abuses its power over the AC-CSOs to maintain their higher position.

The first two of the three ideal typifications by Weber can describe the situation in Uganda. The rational legitimized ground, where the authority is having the right to govern to maintain a fixed order is applicable in the case of Uganda, where the GoU has stayed in power for over 20 years, much because they have relatively stabilized the situation compared to the civil war that Uganda was in before. The GoU's ability to implement Western ideals like PRSP, HIPC and PAF, has contributed to a poverty reduction in the country. This has also helped them to consolidate their power. People accept their way to govern, even the marginalization of AC-CSOs, because of this. The second ideal type, where authority is based on traditional ways of appointing a leader is also visual in Uganda. As dictatorship is the traditional way of power, one can see that repressive and volatile actions are based in the tradition of authority in Uganda. This is shown in Uganda with the NGO law and the disrupted democratic demonstrations for example. The long-term governance, the stabilization, the implementation of Western ideals and the traditional culture of authority are processes that all in some ways lead to an outcome of marginalization, with repressive attitudes and actions against AC-CSOs. The third ideal type, where authority is based on a charismatic legitimized ground is not visual in the result of this thesis, even though President Museveni might have these abilities. Thus, the tendency of marginalization once again gives the Weberian ideals stronger credibility over the hypotheses of the norm socialization process, the boomerang effect, or patron/client relationships.

There are no strong tendencies in the relation to donors. Nearly half of the AC-CSOs are marginalized and nearly half of them are increasingly strengthened. So the best answer to give is that donors use their power to position themselves as the authority against the objected AC-CSOs, based on Weberian ideals. But donors also are strengthening AC-CSOs by implementing international norms into their agenda in order to transform the society. The strengthened organizations are far-reaching in the process. They are all in the second or third part of the Norm Socialization Process and the norms are accepted and internalized in most of

the cases. Thus, the processes of Norm Socialization and Weberian ideals appear to be played out by different donors.

The diverse answer in research question three can be explained by the result of research question two; there is diffusion among Watchdog - and Service Delivery Organizations. There is a tendency that the former more easily than the latter adapt the norms created by donors and then implement them. Donors also tend to marginalize Service Delivery Organizations rather than Watchdog Organizations. It can also be explained by the fact that donors are several in numbers comparing to the GoU, which make them dissimilar. Therefore, the outcome may depend on which type of donor that is influencing the AC-CSOs. However, one must remember that almost half of the AC-CSOs interviewed tend to be marginalized by donors. Thus, donors do not give AC-CSOs the possibility to stop the marginalizing process. They are not doing enough to maintain a well functioning Civil Society. So they tend to undermine one original purpose of Budget Support by their actions.

7.4 Final discussion

The aim of this thesis was to discover effects from Budget Support implementation on Anti-Corruption Organizations (AC-CSOs). The results show that most of the organizations are marginalized by the Government of Uganda (GoU) and almost half of them are marginalized by donors. Clearly, donors tend to prefer AC-CSOs who have a Watchdog function rather than a Service Delivery function, because Watchdogs are generally more in line with the ideals of the international donor community. But as the marginalization factor overshadows other factors, the conclusion must be that Budget Support tends to undermine its purpose in Uganda. The long-term governance, the stabilization, the implementation of Western ideals and the traditional culture of authority are processes that have lead up to a weaker and fragile Civil Society. The outcome has been a repressive attitude toward AC-CSOs and their actions. The NGO law is an example of that. The results show tendencies that Budget Support is part of that process. As the distribution of funds goes directly to the GoU, they receive more power. The process leads to the outcome of a problematic relation with AC-CSOs. One important factor for Uganda to obtained Budget Support was to have a well functioning Civil Society. This thesis shows tendencies that Civil Society, or AC-CSOs to be specific, has become weaker since Budget Support implementation. Thus, the structure of Budget Support is not sustainable in Uganda

Appendix:

Appendix 1: Abbreviations and Acronyms

AC-CSOs	Anti-Corruption Organizations
ACCU	Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda
BS	Budget Support
CAV	Critical Alternative View
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organization
GBS	General Budget Support
GoU	Government of Uganda
IDD	International Development Department, University of Birmingham
IGG	Inspectoral General of Government
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non Governmental Organization
LMV	Liberal Mainstream View
LNGO	Local Non Governmental Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OAG	Office of Auditor General
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAF	Poverty Action Fund
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
SBS	Sector Budget Support
SWAp	Sector Wide Approaches
WB	World Bank

Appendix 2: Interview guide

Start/Introduction:

1. Explanation of my aim of study
2. Ask if it is ok to tape the interview
3. Explain that IP will be anonymous
4. Ask if IP has any questions before I start the interview

The Organization: (Only asked when I do not have the information)

5. Tell me about the organization?
 - What are the core issues?
 - How are your organization financed? What actors are receiving the funds (donors/government)?

The relation to Budget Support:

6. Is budget support a positive initiative according to anti-corruption organizations in Uganda? How do you experience budget support?
7. Has your organization been transformed since budget support was implemented? If so, how?

The relation to Donors:

8. What main sources of donor funding are available for your organization? (Only asked when I do not have the information)
9. a) Has donor funding risen or fallen over the past five years?
b) What are the factors behind this change?
c) Is your organization satisfied with this outcome?
10. a) Is it generally easy to access funds from donors? (What major obstacles does your organization have to confront in this process? How complicated are the application forms, monitoring- and reporting requests?)
b) Is it easier to access funds from donors today than five years ago?
11. What type of activities comes with the donor funding for your organization to undertake? Is the activities different comparing to five years ago?
12. Has your organizations work and structure been transformed in response to changes in donor funding and policies? If so, how has this affected your work with the core issues?

The relation to Government (GoU):

13. a) Is it generally easy or difficult to deal the government? (What major obstacles does your organization have to confront in this process? How complicated are application forms, monitoring- and reporting requests?)
b) Is it easier or more difficult to deal with the government today than five years ago?
14. What type of activities comes with the government funding for your organization to undertake? Is the activities different comparing to five years ago?
15. Has your organizations work and structure been changed in response to changes in government policies? If so, how has this affected your work with the core issues?

The relation between Donors, Government and Anti-Corruption Organizations:

16. a) If we look the relationship between Donors, GoU and AC-CSOs in Uganda, what role does an organization like yours playing?
b) Was the role the same for five years ago?
c) Is the role of anti-corruption organizations satisfying for donors and GoU or do they want to change it?
17. a) Map out the most important meetings between Donors, GoU and AC-CSOs in Uganda.
b) Is your organization invited? Why/Why not?
18. a) Do AC-CSOs have influence on the agenda with Donors and GoU? Does your organization have it? Is your core issues ignored or not? Why/why not?
b) Do you feel that you can participate on the same permits? What actor/actors have most power? Was it different five years ago?

Level of International Network:

19. If your core issues are excluded from the dialogue with GoU or donors (or in some other way are feeling ignored), how does your organization work for the issues?
20. Does your organization have international actors who help you in your work with the core issues? Who are they? How do they help?
21. If you will put pressure on your government or donors, what strategy will you use? Will you receive international help?

Finish:

22. Is it something you would like to add?
23. Can I contact you again if I have any more questions?
24. Are you interested in observing my final result when they are done? To what e-mail address can I send it?

Thank you!

Appendix 3: Results of Budget Support effects on AC-CSOs

Organization:	Donors	GoU
1	Norm Socialization Process	Marginalization
2	Marginalization	Marginalization
3	Norm Socialization Process	Marginalization
4	Marginalization	Marginalization
5	Patron/Client	Patron/Client
6	Norm Socialization Process	Marginalization
7	Norm Socialization Process	Marginalization
8	Marginalization	Marginalization
9	Marginalization	Marginalization
10	Norm Socialization Process	Marginalization
11	Norm Socialization Process	Marginalization
12	Norm Socialization Process	Boomerang Effects
13	Marginalization	Marginalization
14	Marginalization	Marginalization
15	Marginalization	Marginalization
16	Patron/Client	Patron/Client

Appendix 4: Elements of the Poverty Action Fund in 1997/98

- **Special treatment** – The PAF identified and gave special treatment to specific pro-poor sector/sub-sector/programmes in the budget.
- **Matching resources to expenditures** – a PAF table matched specific resources from HIPC, donors and the government to the budget allocation for PAF programmes.
- **Additionality of resources** – PAF resources were shown as additional to the government's own budget allocations to PAF programmes in the 1997/98 budget.
- **Protection of disbursement** – PAF programmes were protected from cuts during budget implementation.
- **Reporting and transparency** – there were specific requirements for the government to report on disbursement on PAF programmes, and progress in implementation. Reports were made public and discussed in open quarterly meetings, where **Civil Society**, the press and donors were present.

- **Monitoring** – 5 % of PAF fund were set aside for enhanced monitoring and accountability

Source: (IDD et al 2, 2006:16)

Appendix 5: Prerequisites for Partnership Principles (PEAP2 2001)

Governments will:

- Continue to increase its focus on poverty eradication
- Continue with the increased tax effort
- Assume full leadership in donor coordination
- Decline any offers of stand alone donor projects
- Strengthen monitoring and accountability
- **Continue to improve transparency and combat corruption**
- Continue to strengthen district capacity
- Develop comprehensive, costed and prioritized sector wide programmes, eventually covering the whole budget
- **Further develop participation and coordination of all stakeholders (including parliamentarians)**
- Strengthen capacity to coordinate across government

Donors will:

- Jointly undertake all analytical work, appraisals, reviews
- Jointly set output/outcome indicators
- Develop uniform disbursement rules
- Develop uniform and stronger accountability rules
- Ensure all support is fully integrated into sector wide programs and is fully consistent with each sector program's priorities
- Continue to increase the level of untied sector budget support
- Increase the level of delegation to country offices
- Abolishing topping up of individual project staff salaries
- End individual, parallel country programs and stand alone projects
- Progressively reduce tying of procurement

Source: PEAP Volume 3, Annex 1, 2001(in IDD et al 2, 2006:17)

Appendix 6: PRSC Objectives

PRSC1 (2001)	PRSC 3 Matrix (2003)	PEAP 3 Matrix – PRSC 5 (2005)
<p>PEAP PILLAR 1 – Framework for Economic Growth and Structural Transformation.</p> <p>PRSC objective: Efficient and Equitable Use of Public Resources:</p> <p>Allocation and actual expenditures, Intergovernmental Transfers, results orientation</p> <p>Number of actions: 6</p>	<p>PEAP PILLAR 1: Framework for Economic Growth and Structural Transformation.</p> <p>PRSC objective: Efficient and Equitable Use of Public Resources:</p> <p>Allocation and actual expenditures, Intergovernmental Transfers, results orientation and monitoring and evaluation, financial sector</p> <p>Number of actions: 12</p>	<p>PEAP PILLAR 1: Economic management:</p> <p>Macroeconomic stability consistent with rapid private-sector led growth.</p> <p>Number of Actions: 24</p>
<p>PEAP PILLAR 2 – Ensuring Good Governance and Security.</p> <p>PRSC Objective: Improve service delivery through cross-cutting reforms:</p> <p>Improving management systems in the public sector: Public service management, procurement, financial management, M&E.</p> <p>Increase transparency, participation and reduce corruption.</p> <p>Transparency, civil society, corruption, legal and judicial reform.</p> <p>Number of actions: 21</p>	<p>PEAP PILLAR 2 – Ensuring Good Governance and Security.</p> <p>PRSC Objective: Improve service delivery through cross-cutting reforms:</p> <p>Improving management systems in the public sector: Public service management, procurement, financial management, M&E.</p> <p>Increase transparency, participation and reduce corruption.</p> <p>Transparency, civil society, corruption, legal and judicial reform.</p> <p>Number of action: 33</p>	<p>PEAP PILLAR 4 – Good Governance:</p> <p>Strengthened Political Governance Improved Human Rights Public Sector Management and Accountability</p> <p>Number of Actions: 42</p> <p>PEAP PILLAR 3 – Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster:</p> <p>Protection of persons and their property through elimination of conflicts and cattle rustling, resettlement of internally displaced persons and strengthened disaster management.</p> <p>Number of actions: 15</p>
<p>PEAP PILLAR 3 – Directly increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes. No PRSC Objectives:</p> <p>Plan for Modernization of</p>	<p>PEAP PILLAR 3 - Directly increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes. PRSC Objective: Promotion of Enabling Environment for Rural</p>	<p>PEAP PILLAR 2: Production, Competitiveness and Incomes:</p> <p>Increased, more efficient Private Sector Production; agriculture</p>

<p>Agriculture.</p> <p>Number of Actions: 0</p>	<p>Development:</p> <p>Research and technology, Ag. Advisory Services, Rural Finance, Agro Processing and Marketing, Natural Resources Management, District Roads.</p> <p>Number of Actions: 12</p>	<p>production; sustainable forestry production non-agriculture goods and services.</p> <p>Strengthened infrastructure</p> <p>Strengthened Env. And natural resources management regime.</p> <p>Strengthened financial sector in support of production.</p> <p>Number of Actions: 62</p>
<p>PEAP PILLAR 4 – Direct improving the quality of life of the poor. PRSC Objective: Improve Delivery of Basic Services:</p> <p>Improve quality of education: successful sector review, primary education, cost efficiency.</p> <p>Improve quality of health care: successful sector review, healthcare financing, procurement capacity and policy, human resources, health infrastructure.</p> <p>Improve Access and Equity in Water and Sanitation: access to rural water and sanitation, access in small towns, access in urban areas.</p> <p>Number of Actions: 19</p>	<p>PEAP PILLAR 4 - Direct improving the quality of life of the poor. PRSC Objective: Improve Delivery of Basic Services:</p> <p>Improve quality of education: successful sector review</p> <p>Improve quality of health care: successful sector review.</p> <p>Improve Access and Equity in Water and Sanitation: access to rural water and sanitation, access in small towns, access in urban areas.</p> <p>Number of Actions: 13</p>	<p>PEAP PILLAR 5 – Human development:</p> <p>Better educated Ugandans.</p> <p>Healthier Ugandans.</p> <p>Improved water and sanitation systems.</p> <p>Inclusive and Empowered Communities.</p> <p>Number of Actions: 55</p>
<p>Total Number of Actions: 46</p>	<p>Total Number of Actions: 70</p>	<p>Total Number of Actions: 201</p>

(IDD et al 2, 2006, table 3C.1, s200)

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