

SUPPORT FOR SWEDISH INTEGRATION POLICIES FOR IMMIGRANTS: ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS AND PARTY PREFERENCE

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Abstract

Following the peak of the European Immigration crisis in 2015, Sweden registered in 2016 the highest proportion of asylum applications and admitted refugees in Europe (per capita, Eurostat). In June 2016, the Swedish parliament voted for more restrictive migration policies and in the 2018 Election the Swedish Democrats – Sweden’s anti-immigration party – reached the highest level of support in a general election so far. The new Swedish social and political context indicates the importance of examining public opinion and policy support for integration policies for immigrants. Using original data collected by the National SOM Survey on the support for seven integration policies for immigrants in Sweden, this article shows the role of economic motivations and party preference on citizens’ support for these policies.

Sweden has been engaged in a new debate over immigration and integration following the 2015 European Immigration Crisis. The country received an amount of 150 000 immigrants during 2016, including all permanent or occasional permits, which is the largest amount in modern times in Sweden (Swedish migration agency) and in Europe in terms of the proportions (Eurostat). The immigration crisis resulted in a series of proposals submitted to the *Riksdagen* to reduce immigration, government expenditure on immigrants’ integration programs, and immigrants’ access to government services and benefits. The saliency of immigration in the Swedish context raises questions of whether the public support these policies, and whether economic motivations and party preference are related to support for specific integration policies for immigrants.

While most survey data allow for the study of the public’s support for allowing more immigrants into the country or the public’s perception of different immigrant groups, in this chapter we examine the public’s support for specific integration policies for immigrants using a battery of original questions included in the National SOM Survey in 2018. The period of study in which this chapter focuses coincides with a period of increased anti-immigrant sentiments in the country. Migration was during 2017 the most important societal problem mentioned by citizens in the National SOM Survey 2017. In previous Swedish elections, the issue of immigration received little attention (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011),

however since 2002 the electoral support for the nationalist conservative and anti-immigration party Swedish Democrats (SD) increased significantly. In fact, in the 2018 election the nationalist conservative anti-immigration party were the third largest party regarding receiving votes in the election, reaching an all-time high of 17 percent of the votes.

The present study examines the extent of Swedish public support for different integration policies and to what extent attitudes can be traced back to economic motivations and party preference. We begin by discussing the links between economic motivations and party preference on the one side, and the support for integration policies on the other. We then present our research design. In the empirical section we examine what factors influence the support for each policy.

What influences attitudes towards integration policies for immigrants?

Economic Motivations

Models of ethnic competition (Olzak, 1992) and relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966) posit that at the individual level economic threat increases opposition towards immigration. Group competition can result from macro or meso-level socio-economic conditions such as the availability of scarce resources and the effects of mechanisms regulating the distribution of scarce resources, yet they can also refer to micro-level competition between individuals that hold a similar socio-economic position in a given society. The individual theory focuses upon individual economic variables, such as individual income, social status, and employment status. It argues that people are concerned with their personal economic situation, and that perceptions of economic vulnerability and competition for resources may increase anti-immigrant sentiments. Individuals with economic security should feel less threatened by immigration. By contrast, individuals who are in direct competition with immigrants should have the most negative attitudes towards immigrants and their integration (Runchiman, 1966). On a study conducted examining attitudes towards immigration in the United States, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) examine the link between individual's position in the labor market and immigration policy preferences. The authors find that labor market competition plays a role in individual attitudes of low skill or low educational attainment are more likely to oppose immigration. A similar linkage has been observed in other contexts as well (see for example Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke & Sinott, 2006). The economic factors informing these attitudes may of course vary with the context and with self-perceived vulnerability (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2018). Citizens may feel insecure in relation to the housing market, the job market or the supply of government benefits (Hernes & Knudsen, 1992). Yet, economic security is achieved through having an economic advantage over immigrants such as education, skilled labor, or other financial and material resources. While the

focus of this paper is on attitudes towards integration policies for immigrants, existent literature has also examined the linkage between immigration and welfare attitudes more broadly, which shed light on a more nuanced relationship. Examining 17 affluent democracies, Finnigan and Brady (2017) do not find support for the hypothesis that immigration undermines public support for social policies. Yet, examining the case of Sweden, Eger (2010) finds that ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects support for social welfare. Furthermore, in the analysis of 13 European countries, Eger and Breznau (2017) measure the impact of immigration at the regional-level and individual-level support for redistribution, a comprehensive welfare state and immigrants' social rights. The authors find that regional percent of foreign born had a negative effect on support for the first two dimensions but not for immigrants' social rights.

In 2018 Sweden's unemployment rate was 6.3 percent, scoring the lowest national unemployment rate since 2008 and lower than the European Union average (6.9 percent) (World Bank) however differences on employment rate levels and types of contract are observed across genders, age groups and industries (Labor Force Survey, 2018) leading to a differential in income. Moreover, there were reports of housing shortage in 243 of 290 municipalities (Boverket; Bostadsmarknadsenkäten 2018) and the crisis is even more prominent in large cities like Stockholm or Göteborg. Taking these contextual factors into account, we hypothesize that economic-self-interest will play a role on respondents' attitudes towards integration policies for immigrants. Supporting that public resources are set aside for integration measures is a distinct political choice that is not necessarily tied to a respondent's attitude towards welcoming refugees. It is rational to welcome refugees, and migrants for other motives, and still do not find it feasible to reserve or subsidize their integration through public measures. Our question here is rather if there are patterns of economic or status competition playing a role in the perspective on integration. Our first hypothesis therefore reads as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Those who may be in more direct competition with migrants will be less supportive of integration policies for immigrants.

Party Preference

Explanations of anti-immigrant attitudes might as well depend on the mobilizing efforts of party leaders and parties in a given context (Rule, 1988). Parties may play a mediating effect in attitudes formation on immigration policies. Existing studies point at different mechanisms of how parties can influence these attitudes. Examining European democracies, Pardos-Prado (2011) finds that broad ideological structures in terms of left-right self-placements are important determinants of attitudes towards migrants when direct competition between native populations and immigrants for scarce resources is weaker. Lower levels of (perceived or real) competition imply more limited concern and attention to immigration and inte-

gration policies, in such cases political predispositions (like left-right placement) are needed in order to articulate attitudes towards migration that are coherent with these orientations. By contrast, individual and contextual socio-economic vulnerability increases the attention and saliency on the immigration issue, reducing the effect of ideological predispositions as voters are more informed about immigration issues which helps them form opinions on these matters.

Contrasting with the focus of Pardos-Prado on the role of broad ideological structures, it has also been advanced that there is a relationship between a party's position on immigration and immigrants' integration and attitudes. For instance, examining the Australian case, Mughan and Paxton (2006) show that there is relationship between party preference and policy preferences on how to deal with immigration: voters choose parties they feel can translate their fears into government policies if elected to office (Mughan & Paxton, 2006). Moreover, examining fourteen European democracies, Schmidt and Spies (2013) emphasize the critical role of issue saliency. In their study, they show that in countries where parties accentuate more the issue of immigration, citizens with more anti-immigration attitudes show less support for welfare policies. Policy changes from the parties also tend to lead voters to, on their part, an attitude change (Vrânceanu & Lacjat, 2018). Parties in the far-right play a moderating effect by rising fears of immigrants' abuse of the welfare system and stressing the primacy of cultural homogeneity within the national boundaries.

Complementing the economic-motivation approach that we advanced in the previous section, we examine whether there is a relationship between the position of the party of a voters' preferred on immigrants' integration and attitudes towards integration policies in Sweden. In previous Swedish elections, the issue of immigration received little attention (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2007; Demker, 2014:69) however since 2002, as the electoral support for Sweden Democrats (SD) increased significantly, the saliency of the issue increased in the Swedish party system (Volkens et al., 2018). Grounding on these changes, we hypothesize a relationship between the position on integration of the preferred party of a respondent and attitudes towards integration policies for immigrants. As a result, our second hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Supporting a party that opposes immigration and integration is linked to stronger opposition to integration policies for immigrants.

Integration policies for immigrants in Sweden

Traditionally Swedes have been more supporting concerning refugees and migrants than other European countries. In fact, until 2015 there was a constant trend towards less restrictive attitudes. But, since 2016 the trend is broken and the proportion of restrictiveness in 2018 was as high as it was in 2004 (Demker, this book). Integration

policies for immigrants is a multi-dimensional concept that comprises numerous policies designed to facilitate immigrants' integration into a country's society and education system, the labor market, and the political community. In this chapter we focus on seven Swedish integration policies for immigrants:

1. *Housing*: Accommodation in different Swedish municipalities was prepared for migrants after a new compulsory policy in 2016 which imply that that all municipalities should accommodate newly accepted migrants, who are assigned for the municipality by the authorities, for at least two years.

2. *Elementary Swedish language program for adult foreigners (SFI)*: official language policy part of an integration policy ensuring all immigrants the right to free language tuition implemented in 1965. Today, the emphasis on SFI as a labor-market instrument is mirrored in an increasingly strong demand that SFI should focus on work-related communication skills. Consequently, many municipalities now put great efforts into organizing periods of practical work experience and courses targeting rapid employment, even in the early stages of SFI (Lindberg & Sandwall, 2007)

3. *Orientation courses*: in 2010 the regulation on social orientation for some newly arrived immigrants was passed and the municipalities were then required to offer courses on social orientation to the target group. For other groups of immigrants, societal orientation is also offered as a voluntary and free introduction to Swedish society.

4. *Mother tongue teaching*: Since the mid-seventies teaching in migrants' mother tongues have been a corner stone in Swedish integration policy. Though the teaching was introduced combined with teaching in Swedish, the aim was to increase the capacity to participate in both a setting from the country of birth or family and the setting in their new homeland Sweden (Dahlström, 2004:128ff).

5. *Internship programs for immigrants*: A way to get into the Swedish workforce is to get an internship at a work place which provides vocational experience, orientation and experience in working life. The Swedish internship system for immigrants is a compound of programs designed for different immigrant groups.

6. *Reduced entry wages for immigrants*: This policy was proposed by the Liberal and Conservative opposition parties and approved in 2017 aims at creating incentives for employers by lowering the salary they have to pay for foreign workers which is complemented by a state subsidy.

7. *Anti-discrimination policies*: On 1 January 2017, amendments were made to the Swedish Discrimination Act (Sw. Diskrimineringslagen, 2008:567). As of this date, employers and educational institutions have a duty to take “active measures” in relation to all so called “protected characteristics” in order to prevent and counteract discrimination within the organization.

Data and methods

The main source of public opinion data utilized in this study is the 2018 National SOM Survey which was conducted in fall following the 2018 Swedish General Election. The Chapel Hill Expert FLASH Survey (CHES) (Polk et al, 2017) provided data to measure the position of Swedish parties in the period prior to the election.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables examine the support for integration policies for immigrants. We designed a battery of questions that ask respondents their support for different policies. *Housing* measures the support for housing for immigrants. *SFI* captures the support for Swedish as foreign language courses for immigrants, while *Orientation in Swedish* about support for orientation courses in Swedish and *Mother Tongue Teaching*, about opinions on courses on the native language. We also measure the support for policies aimed at the economic integration of immigrants: support for *Internship* programs for immigrants and *Reduced Wages* opinions on the policy designed to promote reduced entry wages for immigrant workers. Last, *Anti-discrimination Measures*, taps into the support for policies aimed at reducing discrimination of immigrants.

All seven items were incorporated into the National SOM Survey following the question: ‘*How much do you support*’. Respondents had six possible answers. (1) ‘*Very good proposal*’, (2) ‘*Pretty good proposal*’ (3) ‘*Neither good nor bad proposal*’, (4) ‘*Pretty bad proposal*’, (5) ‘*Very bad proposal*’. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, in the analysis we have reversed the scale from very bad proposal (1) to very good proposal (5). Respondents also a sixth answer option: ‘*Don’t know*’ that we have excluded in the analysis.

Independent Variables

We include three variables that measure the social status of an individual in a given society. (1) *Education*: Education is likely to determine the socio-economic status of an individual and her feelings of economic vulnerability. *Education* is a categorical variable: (1) primary, (2) middle-school, (3) high-school, (4) university. (2) *Income*: Individual’s income is an indicator of a person’s economic status. *Income*, measures the total annual household income of a respondent in SEK. The variable is divided into three income brackets :(1) 0–300 000 SEK, (2) 301 000–700 000

and (3) over 700 000. The item also includes the option “Don’t Know”, which we exclude from the analysis. (3) *Metropolitan Area*: Stockholm, Göteborg or Malmö are the most populated cities in Sweden with over 1,5 Mio, 500 000 and 300 000 residents respectively. Migrants are over-represented in urban areas which can intensify competition for economic and state resources. Therefore, we include a dummy variable *Metropolitan Area* measuring if respondents live in Swedish metropolitan areas. One indicates that a respondent lives in any of the following metropolitan areas: Stockholm, Göteborg or Malmö. Zero is coded if the respondent lives in any other area. Over one third of the respondents in the National SOM Survey reside in metropolitan areas.

Party of Preference Policy Position

Our main independent variable to measure party preference is the position on integration of the party of a respondent’s preferred party. The National SOM survey asks respondents about their preferred party. We use the Chapel Hill Expert FLASH Survey (CHES) (Polk et al., 2017) to code the position of each party on the multicultural-assimilation dimension¹. CHES has been chosen over other existent datasets for the reason that it included a survey item on immigrants’ integration policies and was available for the year 2017. Experts are asked to locate parties’ position on a 10 points scale in which 1 = multiculturalism and 10 = assimilation².

Control Variables

To control for individual’s socio-economic background, we use the National SOM Survey questions about age and gender. *Age* indicates the respondents age. The dichotomic variable *Female* indicates the respondent’s gender, where one is female and zero male.

We also control for factors that may affect the linkage between party preference and attitudes towards integration policies. *Saliency*, measures the saliency of the issue of integration for each party. The dummy variable *Government* codes as one all those parties that were in government for the electoral period 2014–2018 (Social Democratic and Green parties) and zero for parties in the opposition.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the models shown in the next section.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics, 2018

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Housing	3.2	1.01	1	5
SFI	4.7	0.6	1	5
Orientation in Swedish	4.5	0.7	1	5
Mother Tongue Teaching	2.8	1.17	1	5
Internship programs for immigrants	4.1	0.91	1	5
Reduced Entry Wages for Immigrants	3.06	1.21	1	5
Anti-discrimination policies	4.2	0.86	1	5
Education	2.7 ³	1.06	1	3
Income	2.09 ⁴	0.74	1	3
Metropolitan Area	0.37	0.48	0	1
Party Position: Multiculturalism/Assimilation	5.6	2.3	1.42	9.94
Age	52.1	18.7	16	85
Female	0.51	0.49	0	1
Saliency	7.07	0.77	6.61	9.38
Government	0.34	0.47	0	1

Sources: The National SOM Survey 2018, Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014.

Modelling strategy

We run a series of multiple regression models in which the units of analyses are the survey respondents, the dependent variables are support for each of the seven integration policies for immigrants and the independent variables are economic motivations and party preference.


Support for integration policies for migrants in Sweden

Our chapter provides insights on attitudes towards immigration that go beyond what most previous studies have examined. We address public opinion towards specific integration policies for immigrants rather than more generalized attitudes towards immigration, immigrant groups or immigrants' integration.

Figure 1 illustrates the support for the different integration policies. We have arranged the different policy areas as follows: housing, education, economic integration and anti-discrimination measures. One third of the respondents (38 percent) stated that the government measures regarding the housing program was good, while the majority of respondents (44 percent) stated that the policy was neither good nor bad. Public support for integration programs targeted to the education of newcomers is higher. Over 95 percent of the respondents stated that they considered that the long-standing SFI, the Swedish courses designed for

immigrants' program, was a good measure while over 90 percent did so for the program to provide integration courses. Opponents to these measures represent below 2 percent. By contrast, the Swedish public did not find that teaching in mother tongue language was generally a good proposal as less than 30 percent supported the proposal. Views on the programs designed for economic integration was also mixed. While almost 80 percent of the respondents indicated that the internship programs for immigrants was a good policy, only the half (only 40 percent) considered the same regarding lowering the minimum entry wages for immigrant workers. Last, there was a broader consensus on the anti-discriminatory policies, over 80 percent of respondents expressed support for these policies.

Figure 1 Support for integration policies for immigrants, 2018 (percent)



Note: The proposals is listed in the appendix and the response alternatives were 'Good', 'Fairly good', 'Neither bad nor good', 'Fairly bad' and 'Bad'. Only participants that have answered the full question is included in the base for calculations. The total number of responses to the current question is 1 718 and varies between 1 644 and 1 703 responses to each proposal.

Source: The National SOM Survey 2018.

The role of economic motivations

Next, we present a series of multiple regressions examining the relationship between respondents' economic motivations and their support for integration policies for immigrants. Table 2 presents the regression coefficients of seven multiple regression models in which we look at the relationship between economic motivations and the public's perceptions of the different integration policies for immigrants, which are presented in Models 1–7. Each model has as outcome variable one integration policy, the three main independent variables measuring economic motivations are respondents' education, income and area of residency. In the models, we also control for a respondents' age and gender.

Model 1 presents the results of the multiple regression examining the relationship between economic interests and the support for the housing policy for immigrants implemented by the Swedish government. While in this model we don't observe a significant relationship between respondents' attitudes towards providing housing to immigrants and two of our three economic interest indicators, education and income, the regression coefficients show a negative and significant coefficient for respondents living in Metropolitan Areas ($p < 0.05$). This finding indicates that residents of densely populated areas such as Stockholm, Göteborg or Malmö in which there is housing shortage and where also immigrants tend to concentrate, are considerably less supportive of this governmental housing policy that gives priorities to newcomers over Swedes to access housing. This finding suggests that concerns over limited resources (in this case Housing) can affect the public's views on redistributive policies.

Moreover, in Models 2, 3 and 4 we examine the linkage between respondents' socio-economic characteristics and their support for educational programs for immigrants. Model 2 examines views about the SFI program, Model 3 views on orientation courses in Swedish, and Model 4 opinions on the state provision of mother tongue teaching. The regression coefficients indicate that higher incomes are associated with support for the SFI program ($p < 0.01$) and for Orientation Courses for immigrants ($p < 0.05$). At the same time, we also observe that respondents with higher levels of education are more likely to consider that mother tongue teaching is a good policy proposal ($p < 0.001$). The results of these models suggest that characteristics that closely associated with economic vulnerability (education and income) are associated with support for education integration programs for immigrants. Individuals that have a more economic security tend to show more positive views on these policies while individuals that have more economic vulnerability (lower levels of education and lower salary) show significantly less support for educational programs for immigrants provided by the state.

We next examine views on governments' policies to foster immigrants' economic integration. Model 5 examines attitudes towards internship programs for immigrants and Model 6 support for entry wages for immigrant workers. Our empirical analysis

shows that education and income are associated with more positive views on the internship program that allows immigrants to gain professional experience. The regression coefficients show a positive and significant relationship between education ($p > 0.001$) and income ($p < 0.05$) and support for this policy. Respondents that have higher levels of education and higher income see on more positive light the government's initiative to facilitate immigrants' economic integration by means of facilitating the access to the Swedish job market. At the same time, in Model 6 we see that a respondents' income has a highly significant and positive relationship with positive evaluations of the government's program aimed at fostering the economic integration of immigrant workers by lowering the minimum entry wage. The regression coefficients indicate that respondents with higher incomes are more likely to support this policy ($p < 0.001$). In terms of the hypothesis we advanced in relation to the association between economic motivations on evaluation of integration policies for immigrants, these two models show that education but mainly income matters for job market policies for immigrants. Respondents that have lower incomes – and that are economically vulnerable and in more direct resource competition with immigrants – consider that these are very bad proposals while educated and wealthier respondents have opposite views.

Last, we examine if economic motivations are also associated with views on anti-discrimination measures designed to reduce discrimination against immigrants, ethnic and religious minorities. Model 7 presents the results of the last regression model of this section examining views on anti-discrimination measures for immigrants showing a positive and significant linkage between a respondents' education and her support for anti-discrimination policies ($p < 0.001$). This model indicates that while individuals' income and place of residency does not make a difference in terms of whether anti-discrimination policies are a good or bad, education is significantly associated with the outcome variable. Respondents with lower levels of education consider that this is a bad state policy, while those with higher levels of education show very favorable views.

Overall, the evidence we have presented in this section suggests that economic factors, defined in terms of individuals' education, income and place of residency, play a major role in the assessment of all the policies designed to facilitate the integration of immigrants in Sweden. Although this conclusion is not surprising, it provides support for Hypothesis 1 and shows that policies regarding migration and integration is of the same kind as are taxation or infrastructure; they tend to co-variate with social-economic factors. Furthermore, it is worth noting that a respondents' age and gender are significantly associated with support for integration policies. Overall, older respondents and women tend to show greater support for these policies. These findings makes us ready to take the next step ahead; namely to examine whether party preference plays a role in the public's support for integration policies for immigrants.

Table 2 *The estimated relationship between economic motivations and support for integration policies for immigrants, 2018 (multiple regressions)*

	Model 1 Housing	Model 2 SFI	Model3 Orientation in Swedish	Model 4 Mother Tongue Teaching	Model 5 Internships	Model 6 Reduced Wage	Model 7 Anti- Discrimination
Education	0.0436 (1.56)	0.0115 (0.69)	0.0302 (1.56)	0.133*** (4.29)	0.149*** (6.13)	-0.00744 (-0.22)	0.0780*** (3.30)
Income	0.00839 (0.21)	0.0486* (2.05)	0.0744** (2.71)	-0.0288 (-0.65)	0.0788* (2.27)	0.206*** (4.38)	-0.0166 (-0.49)
Metropolitan Area	-0.112* (-1.97)	-0.0451 (-1.35)	-0.0704+ (-1.81)	0.0185 (0.30)	0.0553 (1.12)	0.0141 (0.21)	0.00359 (0.08)
Age	0.00364* (2.42)	0.00310*** (3.49)	0.00852*** (8.28)	-0.0120*** (-7.28)	0.00211 (1.62)	0.0112*** (6.30)	-0.000522 (-0.41)
Female	0.184*** (3.37)	0.0263 (0.81)	0.00685 (0.18)	0.376*** (6.23)	0.198*** (4.15)	-0.0452 (-0.70)	0.214*** (4.64)
Constant	2.863*** (20.38)	4.434*** (53.33)	3.916*** (40.59)	3.023*** (19.53)	3.295*** (27.03)	2.082*** (12.57)	3.961*** (33.55)
R2	0.016	0.011	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.03	0.02
N	1,418	1,458	1,458	1,452	1,446	1,433	1,442

Note: *t* statistics in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: The National SOM Survey 2018.

The role of party preference

In contexts like the Swedish 2018 election in which the issue of immigration was highly salient and mobilized by parties during the electoral campaigns is possible that party leaders and parties will affect how citizens perceive the government should deal with immigration and immigrants’ integration. Table 3 presents the results of a series multiple regressions for the seven policies of interest in which we examine the relationship between the position of a respondent’s party on the multiculturalism-assimilation dimension and perceptions of integration policies for immigrants. In these models we include the variables that we used to examine economic motivations and we include as controls the saliency of the issue of integration for each party, opposition or not, age and gender.

In Model 8, we examine how party preference relates to views on the state’s housing policy for immigrants. The regression coefficients indicate that respondents that prefer a party that supports multiculturalism (meaning that is closer to 0 in the multiculturalism-assimilation scale) are more supportive of the housing policy for immigrants than voters that prefer parties that emphasize assimilation ($p < 0.001$).

Models 9, 10 and 11 examine perceptions about the three education programs for immigrant examined in this chapter, namely SFI, orientation courses in Swedish and mother tongue teaching. Respondents that prefer parties that are more favorable to multiculturalism show more favorable views about mother tongue teaching (Model 11, $p < 0.001$) while party preference does not seem have an association with the public's perception of SFI and orientation courses in Swedish, which are more established policies and find greater agreement across party lines.

The associations between party preference and support for policies designed for immigrants' economic integration, are presented in Models 12 and 13. Model 12 examines views on internships for immigrants, Model 13 perceptions of lowering the minimum entry salary for immigrant workers. Party preference is clearly associated with both economic policies. Supporting a party leaning towards multiculturalism is associated with more positive views about the internship policy for immigrants ($p < 0.001$). At the same time, respondents whose preferred parties scored higher on an assimilationist approach towards integration, were significantly more likely to have positive views on the policy to reduce immigrant worker's entry wage ($p < 0.001$). In Model 13, we observe that supporters of governing parties were more likely to consider that lower entry wages for migrants was a bad proposal which makes perfect sense as this policy was proposed by the opposition.

Last, party preference also seems to co-vary with support for anti-discrimination measures. In Model 14 we present the coefficients of a regression examining perceptions of anti-discrimination measures for immigrant minorities. Our findings show that respondents that prefer parties that strongly favor multiculturalism over assimilation were significantly most likely to consider that this was a good measure.

The examination of attitudes towards seven integration policies for immigrants in Sweden we presented in the last two sections allows us to conclude that economic motivations and party preference are associated with the views respondents have on such policies, providing evidence that support the two working hypotheses we advanced in this chapter. Considering the two set of explanations, we find that when we incorporate the party indicators into the models, the R^2 increases in most models. As the proportion of the variance of the dependent variables explained by the independent variables is larger in the models incorporating the economic and party indicators, we can conclude that both set of variables are important to explain the public's support for integration policies for immigrants. This is also supported by the fact that the associations between the variables metropolitan area residency and income and the outcomes variables does not change substantially when we incorporate the party variables. The association between education and support for integration policies is the most affected by the incorporation of the party explanations, but yet in a manner that is not too unexpected.

Table 3 *The estimated relationship between economic motivations, party preference and support for integration policies for immigrants, 2018 (multiple regressions)*

	Model 8 Housing	Model 9 SFI	Model10 Orientation in Swedish	Model 11 Mother Tongue Teaching	Model 12 Internships	Model 13 Reduced Wage	Model 14 Anti- Discrimination
Multi-culturalism/ Assimilation	-0.0989*** (-4.51)	0.0105 (0.76)	0.0204 (1.28)	-0.156*** (-6.70)	-0.0681*** (-3.53)	0.116*** (4.47)	-0.0958*** (-5.18)
Party In Government	0.0970 (1.64)	0.0216 (0.58)	0.0123 (0.29)	0.0976 (1.56)	-0.0604 (-1.16)	-0.502*** (-7.20)	0.00562 (0.11)
Issue Saliency	-0.108 (-1.57)	-0.00371 (-0.09)	0.0261 (0.52)	-0.136+ (-1.86)	-0.167** (-2.75)	-0.0131 (-0.16)	-0.108+ (-1.86)
Education	0.00555 (0.21)	0.0144 (0.86)	0.0391* (2.01)	0.0724* (2.55)	0.110*** (4.70)	0.0237 (0.75)	0.0380+ (1.69)
Income	0.0344 (0.91)	0.0483* (2.03)	0.0716** (2.60)	0.00108 (0.03)	0.0903** (2.71)	0.161*** (3.61)	0.00367 (0.12)
Metropolitan Area	-0.110* (-2.04)	-0.0437 (-1.30)	-0.0697+ (-1.79)	0.0285 (0.50)	0.0546 (1.16)	-0.0163 (-0.26)	0.00607 (0.14)
Age	0.00541*** (3.74)	0.00292** (3.24)	0.00812*** (7.80)	-0.00934*** (-6.13)	0.00360** (2.85)	0.00983*** (5.80)	0.00125 (1.03)
Female	0.107* (2.06)	0.0307 (0.94)	0.0240 (0.64)	0.250*** (4.52)	0.131** (2.86)	0.0459 (0.75)	0.140** (3.20)
Constant	4.212*** (8.99)	4.395*** (14.95)	3.589*** (10.58)	4.936*** (9.92)	5.022*** (12.18)	1.741** (3.14)	5.340*** (13.52)
R2	0.11	0.013	0.05	0.25	0.14	0.14	0.14
N	1,418	1,458	1,458	1,452	1,446	1,433	1,442

Note: *t* statistics in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Source: The National SOM Survey 2018, CHES 2017.

Conclusion

Our chapter provides insights on attitudes towards immigration in Sweden and goes beyond what most previous studies have examined. First, our empirical analysis relies on multiple regression analyses examining the importance of economic motivations and party preference on individual attitudes. Second, in this study we address public opinion towards seven integration policies for immigrants rather than more generalized attitudes towards immigration, immigrant groups or immigrants' integration. Third, the originality of our data makes it possible to

understand more in detail what integration policies in Sweden are more contentious and what factors seem to influence these attitudes.

Overall, we find that economic motivations, understood as relative perceptions of individual economic vulnerability, are associated with support for integration policies for immigrants. Our empirical analysis shows that factors such as area of residency, education and income play a major role in respondent's assessment of different state policies aimed at helping immigrants integrate, including housing, different types of education programs, job market integration and anti-discrimination measures. Perceptions of direct competition with immigrants for limited resources are negatively associated with support for these policies.

Yet, economic motivations are not the only factors influencing the public's support for such policies in Sweden, political parties play a major role as well. Our results show an association between a respondents' preferred party and support for different policies, in general a respondent support increases if her preferred party has shown support or promoted a given policy. Our evidence also shows that certain policies such as SFI and orientation courses in Swedish, which are long established in Sweden, are less partisan than other areas suggesting that maybe some of the new integration policies adopted following the 2015 European immigration crisis, could in the future achieve a similar level of inter-party agreement.

Overall, we find that different integration policy dimensions are associated with on one hand socio-economic factors and on the other party preference. Structural societal policies are mainly related to party preferences and economic and labor market policies more directly associated with economic status. Last, cultural and linguistic policies are mainly associated with other individual characteristics and not so much with socio-economic and party factors.

Notes

- ¹ At the moment in which this chapter was written there was no other party-level data available that would allow to measure the position of parties on this issue <https://www.chesdata.eu/our-surveys>
- ² We also run a series of robustness check including other measures of party position namely, position on immigration and general left-right placement. The results are consistent.
- ³ Respondents' education was distributed as follows: 14% primary school (group 1), 29% middle-school (group 2), 22% high-school (group 3), 32% higher education (group 4).
- ⁴ Respondents' household income was distributed as follows: 23% max 300,000 SEK (group 1), 43% between 301,000 and 700,000 SEK (group 2) and 33% over 700,000 SEK (group 3).

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APPENDIX

Table A1: List of parties included in the analysis, position and government status

Party	Position Multiculturalism/ Assimilation	Saliency Multiculturalism/ Assimilation Saliency	Government (2014–2018)
V	1,89	6,61	No
SAP	4,94	7,28	Yes
C	3,89	7,67	No
FP	5,67	7,11	No
M	7,11	8,11	No
KD	7,53	7,67	No
MP	2,00	7,28	Yes
SD	9,94	9,39	No
FI	1,43	7,50	No

Source: Chapel Hill FLASH Survey, 2017.