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Self-selection in school choice

Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift
Författare Li Chen
Juan Sebastián Pereyra
Publicerad i Games and Economic Behavior
Volym 117
Nummer/häfte September 2019
Sidor 59-81
ISSN 08998256
Publiceringsår 2019
Publicerad vid Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik
Sidor 59-81
Språk en
Länkar https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019....
Ämnesord Incomplete information, School choice, Self-selection, Serial dictatorship mechanism, Strategyproofness
Ämneskategorier Nationalekonomi

Sammanfattning

We study self-selection in centralized school choice, a strategy that takes place when students submit preferences before knowing their priorities at schools. A student self-selects if she decides not to apply to some schools despite being desirable. We give a theoretical explanation for this behavior: if a student believes her chances of being assigned to some schools are zero, she may not rank them even when the mechanism is strategyproof. Using data from the Mexico City high school match, we find evidence that self-selection exists and exposes students especially from low socio-economic backgrounds to strategic mistakes. Correcting these mistakes leads to an increase in participation of students from low socio-economic backgrounds. These findings question the effectiveness of equal access provided by school choice, and we argue it can be improved by changing the timing of submission.

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