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Family owners with control enhancing mechanisms: Evidence from accruals-based and real earnings management

Paper i proceeding
Författare Niuosha Samani
Publicerad i European Accounting Association Conference
Publiceringsår 2019
Publicerad vid Företagsekonomiska institutionen, Redovisning
Språk en
Ämnesord Family ownership; Control enhancing mechanism; Dual-class shares; Earnings quality
Ämneskategorier Företagsekonomi

Sammanfattning

This study examines earnings management in family firms that are characterized by having control enhancing mechanisms, including dual-class shares and pyramidal ownership structures. Based on a sample of firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (2005-2014), the results provide evidence of different effects of family owners on earnings management in firms depending on: the extent of excess voting rights held by family owners, whether family owners control firms through pyramids, and whether the founding family serves as CEO. Specifically, I find that the extent of abnormal accruals increases in family firms as the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights increases, while the extent of real earnings management is lower in family firms even with the presence of control enhancing mechanisms.

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