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Motivational internalism and folk intuitions

Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift
Författare Gunnar Björnsson
John Eriksson
Caj Strandberg
Ragnar Francén
Fredrik Björklund
Publicerad i Philosophical Psychology
Volym 28
Nummer/häfte 5
Sidor 715-734
ISSN 0951-5089
Publiceringsår 2015
Publicerad vid Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori
Sidor 715-734
Språk en
Länkar dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.89...
Ämnesord Belief, Folk Intuitions, Moral Judgment, Motivational Internalism, Shaun Nichols, Understanding
Ämneskategorier Praktisk filosofi

Sammanfattning

Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral thinking, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority of subjects were willing to attribute moral understanding to an agent lacking moral motivation. However, our attempts to replicate this study yielded quite different results, and we identified a number of problems with Nichols' experimental paradigm. The results from a series of surveys designed to rule out these problems (a) show that people are more willing to attribute moral understanding than moral belief to agents lacking moral motivation, (b) suggest that a majority of subjects operate with some internalist conceptions of moral belief, and (c) are compatible with the hypothesis that an overwhelming majority of subjects do this. The results also seem to suggest that if metaethicists’ intuitions are theoretically biased, this bias is more prominent among externalists.

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