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Government effectiveness, regulatory compliance and public preference for marine policy instruments. An experimental approach

Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift
Författare Niklas Harring
Björn Rönnerstrand
Publicerad i Marine Policy
Volym 71
Sidor 106-110
ISSN 0308-597X
Publiceringsår 2016
Publicerad vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
Sidor 106-110
Språk en
Länkar dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.05...
Ämnesord Environmental steering instruments, CPR management, Governmental effectiveness, Regulatory compliance, Fisheries, Scenario experiment, Sweden, management, trust, corruption, attitudes, Environmental Sciences & Ecology, International Relations
Ämneskategorier Statsvetenskap

Sammanfattning

Democratic governance of natural resources requires democratic accountability. To explore the antecedence of public preference for marine policy instruments, this study revisit previous research findings linking inefficient political institutions to demand for more coercive policy tools. Thus, the aim of this study is to investigates the influence of 1) effectiveness of authorities and 2) regulatory compliance among resources users on the public preference for marine policy instruments. A 2 x 2 between-subject scenario experimental approach was utilised, where the effectiveness of authorities and regulatory compliance of shrimpers varied. Respondents were asked to rank three different marine policy instrument: 1) tougher penalties for noncompliance, 2) dialogue between authorities and resources users and, 3) tradable quotas. The results from the scenario experiment demonstrate that ineffective authorities increase the preference for tougher penalties. A potential explanation for this finding is that regulation implies less discretion, and hence regulation is preferred when public institutions are inefficient. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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