To the top

Page Manager: Webmaster
Last update: 9/11/2012 3:13 PM

Tell a friend about this page
Print version

Intentional cooperation a… - University of Gothenburg, Sweden Till startsida
To content Read more about how we use cookies on

Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body

Journal article
Authors Olle Blomberg
Published in Mind and language
ISSN 0268-1064
Publication year 2020
Published at Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science
Language en
Keywords group identification, intentional cooperation, joint commitment, joint intentional cooperative action, shared cooperative intention, team reasoning
Subject categories Practical philosophy


According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of himself or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action of which they would be parts. This latter version of the move manages to capture the cooperative character of joint intentional cooperative action, and does this without requiring of participants that they act on higher‐order interlocking intentions.

Page Manager: Webmaster|Last update: 9/11/2012

The University of Gothenburg uses cookies to provide you with the best possible user experience. By continuing on this website, you approve of our use of cookies.  What are cookies?