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| Authors |
Peter Martinsson E. Persson |
|---|---|
| Published in | Scandinavian Journal of Economics |
| Volume | 121 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1473-1499 |
| ISSN | 0347-0520 |
| Publication year | 2019 |
| Published at |
Department of Economics |
| Pages | 1473-1499 |
| Language | en |
| Links |
dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12321 |
| Keywords | Experiment, minimum level, public goods, voting, voluntary provision, impure altruism, hidden costs, punishment, sanctions, participation, behavior, rules, Business & Economics |
| Subject categories | Economics and Business |
We investigate experimentally the role of institutional formation on the implementation of a binding minimum contribution level to a public good. Groups either face the minimum level exogenously imposed by a central authority, or are allowed to decide for themselves by means of a group vote whether a minimum level should be implemented. We find that a binding minimum contribution level has a positive and substantially significant effect on cooperation. Interestingly, we do not find an additional positive effect of democracy in the context of our experiment; the minimum-level intervention is as effective when exogenously implemented as when endogenously chosen.
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