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Lies in disguise - A theoretical analysis of cheating

Journal article
Authors Martin Dufwenberg
M. A. Dufwenberg
Published in Journal of Economic Theory
Volume 175
Pages 248-264
ISSN 0022-0531
Publication year 2018
Published at Department of Economics
Pages 248-264
Language en
Links dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.01...
Keywords Cheating, Lying, Costs, Audience, Perceived cheating aversion, Psychological game theory, lying costs, dishonesty, honesty, behavior, communication, violations, conformity, decisions, games
Subject categories Economics

Abstract

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Follmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.

Page Manager: Webmaster|Last update: 9/11/2012
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