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Honesty and informal agreements

Journal article
Authors Martin Dufwenberg
M. Servatka
R. Vadovic
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
Volume 102
Pages 269-285
ISSN 0899-8256
Publication year 2017
Published at Department of Economics
Pages 269-285
Language en
Keywords Agreements, Negotiations, Communication, Temptation, Experiment, Game theory, self-control, bargaining problem, focal points, cheap talk, communication, contracts, games, promises, reciprocity, temptation, Business & Economics
Subject categories Economics and Business


We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but suffer costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions - split-the-difference and deal-me-out - to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are two natural ways to do this, leaving us with 2 x 2 models to explore. In the experiment, a temptations-constrained version of deal-me-out emerges as the clear winner. (c) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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