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Managerial myopia and entrenchment in industrial firms

Conference contribution
Authors Taylan Mavruk
Evert Carlsson
Published in Mistra programme Sustainable Investments workshop May 7-8 in Gothenburg
Publication year 2010
Published at Department of Business Administration, Industrial and Financial Management Group
Centre for Finance
Department of Economics
Language en
Keywords Incentives, ownership concentration, managerial myopia.
Subject categories Business Administration

Abstract

This paper provides direct evidence on the influence of ownership concentration and bonus payments on firms’ investment horizon. Using a fixed effects model, the paper analyses a sample of industrial firms that are listed on Swedish stock exchange market between the years 2000 and 2005. The results show that managers of large firms and firms with higher ownership concentration invest in long-term projects. An incentive system in terms of annual bonus tied to accounting performance leads managers to invest in short-term projects.

Page Manager: Webmaster|Last update: 9/11/2012
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