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Equilibrium design for concurrent games

Conference paper
Authors J Gutierrez
M Najib
Giuseppe Perelli
M Wooldridge
Published in Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
ISSN 1868-8969
Publication year 2019
Published at Department of Computer Science and Engineering (GU)
Language en
Links drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/20...
Keywords Games, Model checking, Nash equilibrium, Synthesis, Temporal logic
Subject categories Theoretical computer science, Computer Science

Abstract

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance, an equilibrium satisfying a given temporal logic property – a problem that we call equilibrium design. We base our study on a framework where system specifications are represented as temporal logic formulae, games as quantitative concurrent game structures, and players’ goals as mean-payoff objectives. In particular, we consider system specifications given by LTL and GR(1) formulae, and show that implementing a mechanism to ensure that a given temporal logic property is satisfied on some/every Nash equilibrium of the game, whenever such a mechanism exists, can be done in PSPACE for LTL properties and in NP/ΣP2 for GR(1) specifications. We also study the complexity of various related decision and optimisation problems, such as optimality and uniqueness of solutions, and show that the complexities of all such problems lie within the polynomial hierarchy. As an application, equilibrium design can be used as an alternative solution to the rational synthesis and verification problems for concurrent games with mean-payoff objectives whenever no solution exists, or as a technique to repair, whenever possible, concurrent games with undesirable rational outcomes (Nash equilibria) in an optimal way.

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