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Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines

Journal article
Authors E. Karagozoglu
Martin G. Kocher
Published in Experimental Economics
Volume 22
Issue 2
Pages 419-440
ISSN 1386-4157
Publication year 2019
Published at Department of Economics
Pages 419-440
Language en
Keywords Bargaining, Deadline effect, Disagreements, Reference points, Time pressure, integrative agreements, negotiation
Subject categories Economics


We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-context bargaining game with an induced reference point at the 2/3-1/3 distribution. Our results show that first proposals, concessions, and settlements are very similar for different time-pressure levels. Nevertheless, time pressure systematically influences the type of agreements reached: the likelihood of bargainers reaching agreements on the equal split is lower under time pressure. Furthermore, disagreements and last-moment-agreements (conditional on reaching an agreement) are more frequently observed under time pressure, though the effect on last-moment agreements disappears when disagreements are included in the analysis. Finally, the effect of time-pressure on the frequency of disagreements is stronger for those pairs with higher tension in first proposals.

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