Abstract

This article outlines the often countervailing forces and norms of state formation, statebuilding, and peacebuilding according to their associated theoretical approaches, concepts and methodologies. It introduces a new concept of ‘peace formation’ which counterbalances the previous concepts' reliance on internal violent or externalised institutions and agency, reform and conditionality. Without incorporating a better understanding of the multiple and often critical agencies involved in peace formation, the states which emerge from statebuilding will remain as they are—failed by design, because they are founded on externalised systems, legitimacy and norms rather than a

1 Oliver Richmond is a Professor in the School of IR, University of St. Andrews, UK, and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. He is also International Professor, School of International Studies, Kyung Hee University, Korea. His publications include Failed Statebuilding versus Peace Formation (Yale University Press, forthcoming 2013), A Short Introduction to Peace (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2012), A Post Liberal Peace (Routledge, 2011), Liberal Peace Transitions, (with Jason Franks, Edinburgh University Press, 2009), Peace in IR (Routledge, 2008), and The Transformation of Peace (Palgrave, 2005/7). He is the editor of the Palgrave book series, Rethinking Conflict Studies. He can be contacted on opr@st-andrews.ac.uk. This article represents the theoretical framework for a forthcoming book (Yale University Press, 2013). Thanks to Yiannis Tellidis and Sandra Pagodda for their helpful comments. All errors are the author's alone.
contextual, critical, and emancipatory epistemology of peace. Engaging with the processes of peace formation may aid international actors in gaining a better understanding of the roots of a conflict, how local actors may be assisted, how violence and power-seeking may be ended or managed, and how local legitimacy may emerge. It may also provide an understanding of how newly forming peaces may influence international order and the liberal peace.

Key Words: state formation, statebuilding, liberal peacebuilding, peace formation.

Introduction

Statebuilding, like liberal or neoliberol peacebuilding, is failed by design. This is firstly because the institutional frameworks are externally designed with a European or northern, developed and individualistic context in mind, do not include urgent responses to economic needs and fail to provide public services quickly enough to undercut currents of violence and root causes of conflict. Secondly, liberal forms of peacebuilding also follow this pattern in that the normative universe they operate from (institutions, donors, or INGOs based in New York, Washington, Geneva, Brussels, Paris, London, Tokyo, etc) rarely is commensurate with that of the specific context they are applied in (currently mostly in developing, post-conflict settings outside of the global north, with the exceptions perhaps of a few cases such as Bosnia or Kosovo). This has also been the case with the closely allied modernisation approaches aiming at development, which have also suffered from ideological prescriptions which are widely thought to undermine any short term peace dividend. Thirdly, and as a result of these problems, both state building and liberal peacebuilding strategies fail to connect with their target populations, end up buttressing problematic elites and their often chauvinistic, nationalistic, or personal interests, and so lack a connection in context, on the ground,
amongst populations which have their own understandings of identity, sovereignty, institutions, rights, law, and needs according to their own socio-historical and cultural traditions and context. Finally, while analysts are keen to focus on the normative of technical processes of such forms of intervention, they are rarely keen to consider the global as opposed to regional or local power structures in which they take place (particularly the unintended consequences of global capitalism on already marginalised states and their citizens). This dominant form, which for a while in the 1990s looked to be hegemonic, might be called the liberal peace, though at times its liberalism and its contribution to peace have been very questionable (Doyle, 1986). Despite this there has been a common consensus that statebuilding is crucial for broader peace and security, and many theoretical and policy contributions to improving its tools and mechanisms (Kapur 1998: 4; World Bank 1997; Chibber 1997: 17; US National Security Strategy 2002; European Security Strategy, 2003; US Department of Defence 2008; Fukuyama, 2004: p.17; OECD-DAC, 2007).

This essay begs to differ from the mainstream consensus, which came about far before the empirical evidence could be broadly assessed, was partly coloured by post-cold war triumphalism, rested on a crude form of capitalism and the erosion of citizens’ classical liberal rights and needs, therefore building states around a marginalised political subject whose main role was to be pacified, produce, respect private property and vote in a procedural manner. This subject was to be subordinate to international expertise, as with the colonial subject's relationship to the metropolitan centre in an early phase of anthropological engagement with political power structures of the early twentieth century (Asad 1973: 17). Indeed, many of these debates came about because of policy objectives to create a sustainable peace, but ironically without the involvement of the subjects of that peace in its many theatres around the world. These subjects may be termed the 'children' of western interventionism and humanitarianism (Paris, 2002). An alternative approach is now emerging, driven partly by local, peaceful agency (though often critical and resistant): ‘peace formation’ processes, by contrast, would see political subjects as formative of the state, economy, society, and the international community. A crucial dilemma which needs to be addressed is whether
peace formation processes, as seen in many post-conflict situations (and even in the current ‘Arab Spring’) and which often co-exist with violent state-formation processes, will create parallel structures to the neoliberal state internationals persist in trying to produce from Bosnia to Afghanistan, or whether the peacebuilding and statebuilding projects of the international community can be brought into line with such expressions of local agency.

This essay outlines the state formation and statebuilding arguments as well as the contours of the critique of liberal statebuilding/peacebuilding which has since emerged. It outlines the preliminary issues with local forms of peacebuilding- or ‘peace formation’ (Richmond 2011). These four concepts represent in fairly clear terms the contours of the relationship between different forms of conflict and peace. By looking at the smaller scale and often invisible local attempts at peacebuilding and peace formation it attempts to provide some answers to the pressing question of how large scale peacebuilding, often aimed at statebuilding, can be significantly improved and made more representative of the lives, needs, rights, and ambitions of its subjects – meaning the many citizens, individuals and communities, in post-conflict environments around the world. It does not aim to speak on their behalf, but to investigate ways in which their voices may become more visible.

**State formation, statebuilding, peacebuilding, and peace formation**

State formation debates offer a negative peace mainly maintained through power sharing and balance of power arrangements within and between states, dictated by a security dilemma and the relative power of various factions (Tilly 1985). It offers a crude version of conflict management in first generation, victor’s peace form (Richmond 2008:40-57). Thus state formation is a constantly contested process and the negative peace that emerges represents a victor’s peace or an uneasy truce, meaning it is inherently unstable. Peace is made by local elites who desire, often for predatory reasons (social, political, economic and international), the capacities the state offers to them. This process occurs within and between states at the regional level. Statebuilding approaches
offer a more sophisticated concept of peace that the negative and realist version that state formation offers. This is still a first generation conflict management approach but it sees the possibility of a status quo which is fairly solid as long as the state is sufficiently well designed and prosperous. Statebuilding approaches offer the possibility of achieving a liberal peace, but they are more concerned with institutional and legal design as well as market access and less concerned with the normative architecture of peacebuilding (Kapur 1998:12; Chandler 2010:15). Peace is made via collaboration between a range of international actors concerned with regional stability rather than normative agreement or standards and local elites who maintain control of the state often to pursue and satisfy personal or family agendas. This approach to making peace is also inherently unstable because the state rests on international support and elite compromise, lacking local legitimacy in many cases. Liberal peacebuilding is a third generation approach which offers a peace built with twin anchors in international norms, law, and institutions, and the liberal democratic and ‘marketised’ concept of the state. It offers a liberal peace which may range from conservative, relying on external support and internal power-sharing, to orthodox, which as envisaged by the UN rests on human rights, civil society, democracy and the rule of law, to a more emancipatory version where issues of social justice and identity are the focus (Richmond 2005). Peace is made internationally within this framework, with as much local participation as possible, but this is not necessarily its driving force. This peace should on paper be extremely stable, though in practice it is often complex, prone to stalemate and to elite hijack. It is also prone to limitations brought about by a lack of coordination and consensus amongst its international supporters, and a lack of their material support for its range of programmes and innovations.

It has long been clear that the international 'liberal peace' project – now often called statebuilding – has been undermined by a series of crises (Chandler 2006; Pugh 2008; Pugh, Cooper and Turner 2008; Pugh 2005; Cooper 2007; Jahn 2007; Duffield 2007; Mac Ginty 2008; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007). These have emerged in its application to many post-conflict countries since the end of the Cold War. 'Failed statebuilding' has been the result. By this I mean that states have
come into being, as a result of a mixture of local and international dynamics and intervention which are effectively failed by design. Such states lack core capacity (as defined by the World Bank) in many crucial areas, partly because internationals prefer this or because their standards and norms are ill suited, causing potentially fatal flaws in their design and weaknesses in their local legitimacy.

However, there have been some unanticipated and very interesting consequences, not least in the redevelopment and evolution of the western backed and propagated (by key donors, the UN system, international NGOs and agencies, and international financial institutions like the World Bank) liberal peace project itself (Richmond 2011:186-216). In response, local actors, often in association with select international actors have begun to design their own versions of peacebuilding relevant to their own locations, states, cultures, histories, needs, and expectations. This process has been difficult to describe and the policy and academic literature has struggled to find an appropriate language to capture its variety, not least because it stands as a challenge to many of the policy instruments and concept many hold dear. It has often been called ‘grass-roots peacebuilding’, ‘civil society oriented’, and ‘donor supported’. Yet this area has become so important that such terminology no longer does justice to its significance, especially in relation to external policies and goals and the emergence of new donors. I call this ‘new’ area ‘peace formation’ (it is of course, not new, but instead an attempt to unite a scattered range of significant efforts in this direction which already exist). The agency it rests on is varied and complex. It has not been the result of direct resistance or action – such as violent demonstrations, but more a result of quiet capacity drawing on locally resonant social practices and critical discourses, understandings of peace drawing on history, myth, religion, social and customary institutions and patters of governance. It sometimes expresses itself via resistance, opposition, civil disobedience, foot dragging, flight, non-compliance, limited cooperation, rhetorical resistance, or other ‘hidden acts of resistance’ which have represented a lack of local legitimacy for a particular strategy, or stymied its progress (Scott 1985). In some cases direct opposition has emerged as with the ‘Kosovanisation’, ‘Timorisation’, and ‘Afghanisation’ campaigns against encroaching international trusteeship
In general, it can now be taken as read that wherever a peace process, peacebuilding, statebuilding, or development occurs, attempts to localise it will also occur.

Peace formation can operate as hidden and individual attempts to maintain everyday life, its security, economic, and political, social, and customary needs, as well as some form of modernisation or progress. This can be in the form of refusal or what have become widely known as hidden forms of resistance as Scott has termed these processes (Scott 1985). This private transcript has unexpected impacts as it is often multiplied across a wide range of different actors and context. More obvious forms of mobilisation through various groups involved in civil association also add to its repertoire, whether through customary governance and law, or customary conflict resolution processes, church or religious groups, trade unions, sports or social associations, or political parties, newspapers, lobbying organisations and a range of CSOs and NGOs, which involve significant constituencies which political leaders and internationals must reach for legitimacy to be maintained. Political and civil association offers similar opportunities for refusal, cooptation, modification and acceptance, in disaggregated and private spaces or, more broadly, in terms of more recognisably organised forms of mobilisation. Private and passive resistance to more active resistance, lobbying and social displays have an impact as forms of representation upon administrative and political actors involved in statebuilding, especially where they offer platforms for discussions of a broader peace, even if elites find such requests impracticable (for example, requests for equality, or for a revision of customary practices not in line with human rights).

These dynamics of peace formation may have been spurred on by the slow progress, sometimes inability, sometimes reluctance of statebuilding to engage with deep rooted causes of conflict, from indigenous issues, the need for dignity as well as rights, ideological opposition to the liberal peace or neoliberal markets between local factions or international agendas, inequality and poverty, custom and culture, land tenure and ownership, identity or religious divisions, or elite predation. Increasingly, as earlier during the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico, there has been a perception that international intervention, whether for security, peacebuilding, development, or
statebuilding, does not provide self-determination, is not pluralist in its engagement with difference on the ground, does not provide social justice, and rejects local autonomy. It may not even be that democratic if local consensus is blocked in this way (Harvey 1998).

This critique is not merely based on a view of understanding how to further spread democracy, the rule of law, free trade or civil society. Peacebuilding and statebuilding themselves also need to be more accountable, democratic, and law governed, with higher ethical and methodological standards than at present. As importantly, we also need to understand how civil society (and what lies beyond this often Westernised social artifice) makes peace at its own level, but also how the small scale and often low-level efforts made beneath state, often in hidden or marginal spaces, have actually been silently modifying the grand liberal peace and liberal statebuilding project. Peace formation may lead to different political forms, rights, and institutions, which need to be understood, accommodated and mediated. This indicates the need to evaluate what such 'hidden' modifications to the liberal peace mean for understanding peace itself in its multiple forms, and whether they offer greater sustainability for the liberal peace, or other and alternative types of peace, or may be sowing the seeds of future conflict by deviating from the liberal peace, or from the goal of social justice. To achieve this requires a political sociology and ethnography peace formation, drawing on a range of examples from around the world to address the following questions:

1. What do local voices suggest is inadequate about liberal peace and statebuilding projects they have been the subjects of and how they respond? How does their political subjectivity develop as a result of such contact?

2. Do local actors (NGOs, social and labour movements, customary institutions or groups, religious or identity actors) work to modify the liberal peace or donor strategies, to make them more democratic, accountable, ethical, or do they resist them and mount their own counter efforts to make peace? What does this version of peace represent? A clear
alternative or hybridity?

(3) How successful have these strategies been, with what effect on local forms of peace and on the international liberal peace project itself?

(4) What are the dynamics of peace formation and how do they encounter the liberal peace, and the emerging new donors (including BRICS/ MIST actors)?

Peace formation draws on second generation conflict resolution approaches and fourth generation approaches, with the latter seeking to empower local agency and international enablement of a hybrid form of peace. Peace and justice are intertwined, difference and social justice are enabled and different life worlds meet (Boege and Curth 2011), creating a contextual legitimacy via a set of relationships and networks which has so far been lacking for the liberal peace system in some of its aspects at least (especially dealing with non-western cultures, in its advocation of capitalism, and its construction of rights, the state, and norms in the international rather than contextual spheres). Peace is made locally in this framework, perhaps individually in hidden and public spaces across a wide range of everyday life activities, but is supported internationally. This support would engage with political, social, economic, and identity needs and rights as they are both locally and internationally understood. It might be thought that because of its contextual legitimacy such a peace might be inherently stable. Though this may be true, it is often at this level that the roots of the conflict are most acutely experienced. Furthermore peace formation is necessarily small scale and so large scale mobilisation to shape norms, law, and the state, procure resources, and security, as well as international recognition does not occur quickly or directly. Yet, without doubt this level is quietly influential of other levels of the peacemaking process, in that it provides the raw agency, legitimacy, consensus, and capacity which make them aggregate into the state, norms, law, government and governance, institutions and international organisations necessary for a wide ranging peace.
Local Agency

Firstly, it is important to note that ‘local agency’ should be seen in relation to peacebuilding in a complex way. The local might be seen as transnational, transversal (grassroots to elites), traditional and modern, liberal and non-liberal, simultaneously (Appadurai 1996:178; Massey 1994). It represents fluid identities and movement, rather than static and fixed identities. ‘Agency’ refers to capacity related to critical, discursive agency and social praxis (Foucault 1976:184). It is often critical, hence the term 'critical agency' whereby discourses encounter the politics of peace and attempt to shape them (Richmond 2011:1-21). This might be of individuals to help themselves and to shape their political environment, to negotiate with international actors, to take on international norms, to operate the liberal state, to form their own contextual institutions of peace, and so forth. It might imply large scale and organized political mobilization. It might also imply individual, community, and alternative forms of civil society organizations (in a ‘local-local’ context [Richmond 2011:13] below the western induced artifice of ‘civil society’), and their ability to act. Both imply a mutual construction of the local, state, and international.

This may be hidden and disguised from potential sanctions from predatory elites, it may be fragmented, atomised, and not representative of mobilisation on a large, industrial scale. Yet, it is well known in anthropology, ethnography, and sociology, as well as in more radical versions of political theory that small, hidden, often individual actions, not coordinated in any way, add up to a sum which is greater than their parts even if they are not the product of large scale and coordinated mobilisation (Scott 1985). Thus, peace formation can represent significant mobilisation of local actors or it may be small scale and fragmented, hiding itself to escape sanction. It may take place in traditional, customary, religious, or other culture venues. It may be simultaneously liberal and modern and localised and contextual (not to introduce a somewhat artificial dichotomy between tradition and modernity) (Boege 2011:433). It implies a mediation between its different facets, and also with the ‘international’. In this way the might of international statebuilding is modified by the
actions of its many recipients in diverse contexts, from Afghanistan to Timor Leste where peace formation is inevitably occurring. Many of these recipients also now construct international and local peacebuilding simultaneously. This may represent non-compliance (or stagnation) as in Bosnia or more outright resistance as in parts of Central America. It may also lead to wholesale adoption of international agendas, with a twist, as in the ‘authoritarian democracies’ which have emerged in Namibia, Mozambique, and Rwanda. It modifies those agendas via the introduction of concepts like 'local ownership' and participation in World Bank, IMF, and UN policies (Richmond 2012). It is certainly political.

The international approach, in terms of peacebuilding and statebuilding at least is defined by its liberal norms, laws, and institutions, harking back to liberal internationalism in the 20th Century, and the liberal institutionalism which represents the UN, humanitarians, donors, and other international agency. This also defines its social dynamics. Its economic dynamics are mainly neoliberal in its intent for post conflict states, though of course its exercise of material resources via centralised institutions and donors is more in the view of centralized economic planning. This underpins the liberal peace, and its security, institutional, constitutional, and civil dynamics, formulated within the frameworks of states and their liberal domestic character, and their membership of an ‘international society’.

The mediation of local and liberal pits modern aggregations of material and epistemic power against local and atomised resistant and critical agencies. Yet, this ‘dark matter’ has a significant capacity to influence, modify, resist, co-opt, accept, and ultimately hybridise the liberal peace representing as it does both the forces of conflict and peace formation and external intervention (Richmond 2011:186-216). Its aim is not merely to create a liberal peace where it has clear deficiencies, but also to lead an advance in peace formation more generally, towards a more emancipatory and empathetic form of peace in both local and international contexts (Richmond 2008). In this way it is a form of critical agency and resistance which goes beyond the production of a new metanarratives, based on social practices, autonomy, and self-determination (Pickett

**Formation versus building**

Peace praxis and theory have certain problem-solving limitations and 'local' blockages built into their own theoretical and methodological biases and into their very concrete dimensions in practice. On the one hand, no longer is 'peace' an abstract concept which cannot be created other than through historical chance, but on the other its very construction is fraught with pitfalls. This has underlined the conceptual limitations of a literature now dominated by peacebuilding, statebuilding and state formation concepts. Statebuilding has not become the antidote to state formation dynamics of violence; nor has peacebuilding in its liberal form connected with local forms of political legitimacy, with their social, cultural, political, and economic requirements. Failed statebuilding has been the result of externalised states being based on blueprints determined by de-contextualised and depoliticised agendas for states which provide security, political rights, and institutions, and market access but little in the way of political rights. Nor have they been proficient at developing a social contract, meaning they have led to virtual forms of peace. This 'failed by design' type of statebuilding has also come about because of confusion in the literature, which has fed expediency in international policy towards post-conflict, post-development contexts. This can be rectified by disaggregating, and examining the relationships of, state-formation, statebuilding, peacebuilding, and peace formation, following some conceptual remodelling of the various conceptualisations of peace and conflict available. A new model would have four cornerstones as follows:

1. *State formation* describes the formation of the state through indigenous or internal violence between competing groups and their agendas, which often turn the state into a criminal and predatory, elite racket a la Tilly (Tilly 1985). This perhaps leads ultimately to internal balances of power and power-sharing arrangements. Through this process of
shifting alliances and force often associated with forms of identity, parochial or national, the nature of the resultant state is determined often in the favour of authoritarian elites. Statebuilding is an externalised process focussed on the role of external actors, organisations, donors, IFIs, agencies, and INGOs and their key role in building liberal institutions for security, democracy, markets, and creating basic infrastructure and services. This role rests on international technical expertise and capacity. They also attempt to persuade or force local elites to comply with liberal institutions as they are under construction. It is normally aimed at producing the basic framework of a neoliberal state in a procedural and technocratic sense, and less interested in norms or civil society.

(2) *Statebuilding* is an externalised process focused on the role of external actors, organisations, donors, IFIs, agencies, and INGOs and their key role in building liberal institutions for security, democracy, markets, and creating basic infrastructure. This role rests on international technical expertise and capacity. They also attempt to persuade or force local elites to comply with liberal institutions as they are under construction. It is normally aimed at producing the basic framework of a neoliberal state in a procedural and technocratic sense, and less interested in norms or civil society. It is ideologically biased towards neoliberalism and self help in the economic realm, meaning a small state, though it requires significant security capacity also. This combination means the state that comes into being is externally dependent.

(3) *Peacebuilding*, especially in its liberal guise, focuses on external support for liberally oriented, rights-based institutions with an especial and legitimating focus on norms, civil society and a social contract via representative institutions embedded in a rule of law. This support is legitimised by international norms. In its earlier form it was more focused on localised dynamics of peace. However, its contemporary neoliberal variation, now dominant, highlights the importance of free markets and capitalism, liberal property rights, freedom, and competition. It parallels statebuilding but is normatively broader, more
focused on peace than singular understandings of security and sovereignty though they are inevitably intertwined. The two alternative modes of liberal peace lead to different types of state in theory- the liberal mode implies social democracy and so a strong/ large and interventionist state focussed mainly on material redistribution and rights while the neoliberal mode focuses on a weak state supported by private enterprise, globalised capital, and rights, except in the realms of its security where it is often very able (or dependent on outside provision).

This much has been extensively theorised in the literature. There is a missing link in all of this, however, arising from the inherent biases of northern, rational, compliance oriented, problem-solving theory. If statebuilding and state formation represent different ends of the same spectrum and liberal peacebuilding parallels statebuilding, all resting on the application of force, liberal interventionism, or softer forms of external agency, such as conditionality, then this points to an obvious omission in an emerging four sided matrix representing the architecture both of the contemporary state and peace praxis. This implies the following.

(4) *Peace formation* processes can be defined as ones where indigenous (Mac Ginty 2008) or local agents of peacebuilding, conflict resolution, development, or in customary, religious, cultural, social, or local political or local government settings find ways of establishing peace processes and the dynamics local forms of peace, which are also constitutive of state, regional and global hybrids. They may do so in relation to local understandings of politics and institutions, welfare and economics, social and customary resonance and identity, law and security, framed also by external praxes of intervention. This occurs through non-violent, politicised processes, representing resistance and critical agency, as well as co-optation and compliance. They offer some socio-historical continuity but are also aimed at
transformation, drawing on external influences. This is not to romanticise the local or its related peace formation processes, of course (Richmond 2009a).

In an agonistic way these four corner-stones of this matrix, representing several phases of an interdisciplinary and inter-methodological dialogue spanning at least forty years about the state and peace, point to the same thing – peaceful order rather than one resting on structural violence and identity discrimination, or even a benign hegemony. Sociology, anthropology, development studies, post-colonial and subaltern studies, as well as economics, politics, and international relations all have played a role in this debate and its inter-woven methodologies (Geertz 1973; Asad 1973; Escobar 1995; Bhabha 1994; Spivak 1988; Kapoor 2008). It points to a hybridised epistemology for peace in simple terms. Which one of these four corner-stones dominates determines the character of that order, the state it creates, and the quality of the 'peace' that emerges. Understanding peace formation in its relation to the other three dynamics is key to the sustainability of any peace and state that emerges, yet is also the most challenging aspects of the whole process of creating a viable and legitimate order or peace. A peace dominated by the processes of peace formation also connected to externalised peacebuilding is likely to be more viable, particularly if both actively shape the other – as many current examples show. One that is dominated by statebuilding or state formation is likely to be very conservative, security oriented, and is unlikely to survive in the long term because it will lack both international and broad local legitimacy and resonance (because the state will tend to be elite dominated and authoritarian). A peace dominated by liberal peacebuilding is likely to rest on external support and international rather than local legitimacy. The following diagram outlines these dynamics.
Figure 1: A Contemporary Matrix of Conflict and Peace

State Formation
Indigenous forces use violence to shape/contest the state, according to territory, identity, custom, culture, and material resources. At best a virtual/conservative peace is achieved.

Statebuilding
External agencies construct the state, according to international standards, procedures, material resources, and capacity. The aim is a liberal state embedded in global norms and markets. An orthodox peace may be achieved, but more likely a virtual peace.

Aim is:
- the provision of basic security (especially for dominant groups) and territorial sovereignty
- access to material resources
- the protection of identity and culture
- based on patronage, neopatrimonialism
[Conservative Peace/first generation]

- Regional and domestic stability is the focus for peace
- SSR, Governance and capacity building are key
- the creation of legitimate institutions (Human Rights, RoL, Democratisation, Marketisation)
- Focus is on creating a neoliberal state
- based on external intervention, support, and programming
[Conservative or Orthodox Peace/first or third generation]

- Peace is founded on liberal norms and rights, domestically and regionally
- Focus is on creating a liberal state
- Institutions, Civil Society/Social Contract are key based on external intervention, support, and programming
[Orthodox Peace/second and third generation]

- Everyday peace is the focus
- Local Autonomy, Agency, Resonance, Legitimacy
- Rights and needs, as they are locally constructed and experienced
- Institutions which reflect local-liberal hybridity
-[Emancipatory Peace/second, third and fourth generation]

Peace Formation
Indigenous groups use peaceful methods to build a polity/state and institutions, according to particularistic rights, needs, identity, custom, culture, and material resources. An emancipatory peace is possible, especially with sensitised external support.

Liberal Peacebuilding
External agencies focus on a similar role to statebuilding but emphasise civil society, norms, and a social contract. These tend to remain virtual, leading at best to an orthodox peace, unless there is significant local support.
The above diagram could also be represented as a triangle with statebuilding and peacebuilding at its apex, and state formation and peace formation at its two other corners. However, statebuilding is a praxis mainly focused on technical and programmatic aspects of state design based on rationalism, individualism, and self-help, whereas peacebuilding has become far more focused on a normative framework for politics within the state, including rights and a social contract, therefore some sense of community and legitimacy. To some degree, the above diagram presents artificial distinctions between the four concepts, and it is important to note the many connections and overlaps between them. These overlaps represent the synergies and relationships via which a hybrid form of peace may emerge.

The four cornerstones in Figure 1 prevent an elision of statebuilding and peacebuilding into a securitised, hegemonic, or predatory model for politics, and instead retain a focus on emancipation, empathy, rights and a social contract which ultimately point to a more emancipatory form of peace. Each cornerstone implies a range of actors, interests, dynamics, institutions, structures, and agencies. Taken together in the range of relationships the diagram implies, different forms of peace, state, politics, and development may arise.

Statebuilding is both a narrow version of peacebuilding, with its focus on institutions and security as a way of taming state formation, whereas peace formation is the essential source of local legitimacy for the international norms and interests that statebuilding and peacebuilding represent. International norms and law have mainly been constructed on the basis of a Euro-Atlantic (though widening in the post-colonial context) understanding of international relations and the requirements for order since the early Twentieth Century. As the numbers of voices expand – from emerging states to citizens newly empowered in different ways –, the more international legitimacy needs to be reconsidered and to be made more locally inclusive. It is in the process of peace formation that mediated forms of identity, custom, culture, political rights and economic needs emerge at an institutional level, shaping the state and making it both representative, resonant, and providing sufficient support and legitimacy from its citizens to enable a plausible and self-sustaining peace. It
is from this understanding that peace can be externally facilitated, in the dual role of taming the violence of statebuilding processes, and enabling a peace that reflects needs, rights, and identity to emerge. This also captures the essence of liberal peacebuilding (now shorn of its totalising tendencies) and the need for a more concrete institutional framework that statebuilding aspires to. Peace formation implies a reconstruction of political community, the state, and international organisations from the ground up, if they are to be representative, democratic, and responsive to the situations of their subjects, in local, state, regional, and global contexts. Ultimately, peace formation processes also connect to a post-colonial civil society. Such resistance and critical agency can be seen as a local and international conversation about the impact of hegemony, colonial praxis, the global economy, and the reconstitution of rights, needs, and identity. This conversation is carried along transversal, transnational networks and merges both the liberal and the local, the global north and south. These are driving the emergence of new forms of hybrid peace- post-liberal peace- in subtle and unscripted ways (Richmond 2009b). However, these networks, in post-colonial fashion, normally transcend the state as well as any northern consensus through dynamics of networked agency that operate via the international system itself, through communications, trade, civil and global civil society, donors and agencies, IFIs, NGOs, and even academia where such critical agency is now exercised on both a global and a local scale (Kahler 2009). They are dynamic and offer legitimacy at both levels, in cultural, social, political, and economic terms (Knoll 2008; Barker 1990). They draw on local and international forms of legitimacy and operate from platforms which the state – when not representing the consensus of its citizens or international norms – finds difficult to engage with or countermand. Increasingly they place international organisation, financial institutions and donors in a negative light, reminiscent of the subaltern critique of imperialism (Spivak 1988; Bhabha 1994).

Yet current policy and intellectual understandings of the relationship of state formation, statebuilding, and liberal peacebuilding indicates that statebuilding is now the antidote for the often violent processes of state formation. This also ironically implies that peacebuilding in its liberal
form is seen as an antidote for peace formation where this achieves a form of peace which is not commensurate with liberal norms. This problematic understanding of peace in general undermines its salience even where it is supposed to be the objective of theory, analysis, and policy. Instead, peacebuilding should align and support peace formation. But it is probably true to say that local processes of peace formation are often in opposition to statebuilding and liberal peace processes, as well as to state formation.

Processes of formation, including violent state formation or peace formation are in a relationship with both externalised and elite dynamics of statebuilding and liberal peacebuilding. Yet, this is a relationship of tension most often where one tries to constrain the other, though there may also be complementarities. Clearly, peacebuilding should facilitate peace formation and vice versa and be very wary of prejudging it, on normative grounds especially. State formation should probably not inform statebuilding by contrast. Mediating it is a different matter, as long as power relations are not brought to bear by external or elite actors, and material needs, identity and culture of citizens are taken into account on their own terms. This means that citizens or subjects represent their own understandings of peace formation and the way that peacebuilding can assist its various dynamics, but that they also do this in the knowledge of the possibilities peacebuilding represents (including its liberal and neoliberal ideological leanings). This leads to a local-liberal, post-liberal peace (Richmond 2011). This is not to re-inscribe the international, national or local with new forms of colonialism or with local power dynamics posing as ‘local knowledge’ (Mohan 2001:153). It is not to see hybridity as mere mimicry. Instead, hybridity is a site of possible radical possibilities for peace (Bhabha 1984).

It is notable that Tilly's work on state-formation was a precursor to his later work on civil society organisations. Similarly, many development studies scholars, anthropologists, and political theorists have tended to move from an analysis of the failures of systemic, institutional, state, or market focused led research to focus on the local, agency, and local organisation- often counter-organisation of the sort partially envisaged by Foucault, and later by Scott (Scott 1996:445-7). The
following diagram illustrates the various issues, dynamics, and actors involved in the ‘formation’ and ‘building’ approaches.
### Figure 2: Related Issues, Actors, and Dynamics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State-Formation</th>
<th>Statebuilding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence/ Crime/Force</td>
<td>Governance/ Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Sovereignty</td>
<td>Soft Sovereignty,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weberian state</td>
<td>Weberian state embedded in region and international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>security complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State autonomy/ Security</td>
<td>international security complex; Regional security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Governance</td>
<td>Elite but also representative Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Stratified/ Class</td>
<td>Merit based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony and Domination</td>
<td>Emancipation through Security and Markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites, Military, and Militias, Allies</td>
<td>Major Regional Powers, Donors, UN, World Bank, Agencies, INGOs etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Conflict Resolution processes</td>
<td>Institutions manage conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Generation Approach</td>
<td>1st/3rd Generation Approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Formation</th>
<th>Peacebuilding (Liberal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social dynamics/ agency/ capacity/ Identity</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual and legitimate</td>
<td>International legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony/ Difference/ Merit/ Patronage/ Patriarchy</td>
<td>Shared Norms/ Merit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local agency and organisation</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan norms, institutions, law, social contract, civil society, humanitarianism mainly rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for peace, including institutions, rules, norms, rights and needs</td>
<td>Liberal versions of emancipation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Localised understandings of emancipation</td>
<td>Liberal government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual governance</td>
<td>Liberal government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local actors, CSOs, NGOs, Trade Unions, Customary Institutions</td>
<td>UN, WB, Agencies, INGOs/ Religious, Church, NGOs, Donors, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual/Customary conflict resolution</td>
<td>Conflict resolution derived from liberal norms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 4th/3rd Generation Approach             | 2nd/3rd Generation Approach                           |
Figure 2 illustrates how force, governance, government, actors and social dynamics are central to this quadripartite model of the basic elements of peace, order, and violence, and how easily each element can be conflict or peace inducing. It also aligns each of these elements of order and peace to the four generations of thinking about peace and conflict I have outlined in earlier work (Richmond 2002). This makes clear that the process of peace formation offers levels of legitimacy and understanding of context necessary for peacebuilding, for the attempt via statebuilding to tame the processes of state formation, and which should also strongly influence any externally led intervention or statebuilding process.

This same four-cornered understanding of the underlying dynamics of peace and order also has implications for the nature of democracy, rights, needs, civil society, the construction of the rule of law and constitutions, as well as for the type of property rights and economic system that emerges in the form of the state. While peace formation (and all of the cultural, historical, social, economic, and political dynamics it implies) has an impact on but is also mediated by the state and the broader compromises any pluralist constitution entails, it also has an impact on the international. Thus international practices shift as they learn about the local engagement’s impacts and shortcomings. The state adjusts to both international and local pressures for legitimacy as well as to elites power-sharing arrangements, in the interests of placating them and holding them accountable. Meanwhile local understandings of legitimacy are communicated, as local voices find ways of navigating upwards, towards the state and the international. This implies peace formation in its multiple and diverse forms around the world influences the construction and form of the liberal peace (and its emerging BRICS plus reorganisation) including the family of organisations, international and regional, international financial institutions, the diversifying groups of donors, and the increasingly transnational nature of NGOs and civil society organisations. In effect, it implies the democratisation of the international as well as more direct forms of redistribution, as well as a pluralist openness to difference in a more participatory democratic local context. Yet, at the same time, it problematises many of the unitary concepts, actors, and the boundaries that an
understanding of IR in late modernity implies. This also creates a debate about any retrogressive aspects of the local (or overbearing aspect of the international). So the influence of peace formation is not merely significant for a replication of pre-existing institutions and norms, but for a process of consensus building whereby these are transformed, along with peace praxis, whether statebuilding, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, or the role of the UN and donors more generally. Ultimately what it illustrates are the multiple processes and agency which produce a hybrid peace as a new structural form.

Figure 3 illustrates how hybridity emerges and what its dominant form is depending on where its main influence arises from, whether state formation, statebuilding, peacebuilding or peace formation.
Figure 3 Dynamics of Hybridity

Resistance
(Violent for state formation/ peaceful for peace formation: Local-liberal hybrid form of peace)

Hybridity and its permutations

Compliance: Liberal Peace
Figure 4  Formation of, and Building, a Hybrid Peace

Local 'Formation
State Formation
Local Dynamics
Local Legitimacy
Local Actors
Local Peace

International 'Building
State Building
International Dynamics
International Legitimacy
International Actors
International Peace

Outcome = Hybrid forms of state/peace: formation versus building

Figure 3 shows how international and local forces produce peace through an agonistic interaction, which contests and reformulates legitimacy and the dynamics and institutions of peace. What this diagram also makes clear is that if local peace formation dynamics align with international statebuilding and liberal peacebuilding, peacemaking should outweigh the violent processes of state formation. This tends not to occur, however, as the 'international' is so often the starting point for liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding because their assumptions of normative and technical superiority and limited capacity to engage with the local. If this can be rectified so that peacebuilding is locally driven and externally supported, then, a local-liberal form of peace, or at least a local-regional/international form might emerge, representing a hybrid and post-liberal form of peace with high levels of local and international legitimacy, as opposed to the now failed statebuilding praxis of the contemporary era rectified so that peacebuilding is locally driven and
externally supported.

Without a counterbalancing, context sensitive, understanding of peace formation and local forms of critical agency, international statebuilding and peacebuilding have little to guide them about how local and international forms of peace and legitimacy interact to mitigate state-formation dynamics. Statebuilding strategies may mitigate state formation while peacebuilding should support peace formation.

A practical example of peace formation and its interaction with statebuilding and peacebuilding has been recently developed in relation to lessons learned in the Solomon Islands, where RAMSI has been conducting a formal statebuilding mission which has had difficulty in moving beyond an abstract position, revolves around three main elements. These are broadly generalisable and include recognising local knowledge, work with local capacities, building relationships and partnerships. These requirements are based on an understanding on the part of internationals of what local knowledge involves, and that it entails both agency and legitimacy for peace - in other words, that bottom up relationships with these can be created. This facilitates an everyday form of peace which also holds peacebuilding and statebuilding accountable to its local subjects and their evolving understanding of peace across generations, in their local context, resonating with both socio-historical experience and liberal peace norms and standards (Boege and Curth 2011:12). Indeed, it often appears that local legitimacy, for all of its difficulties, is stronger than that of the state or the international community. This can be observed from Kosovo to Timor, even if it is also heavily contested in each local context. Indeed localised tensions, even including issues such as class, caste, or gender inequality (as particularly in Afghanistan with the Taliban acting as interlocutors), are more likely to be resolved in context through a consensual process than solely by international or state led prescription. It has a stronger chance of dealing with difference because it is locally grounded, and together with international support, a better chance of establishing a social compact between citizens and state. What is more, and as has been realised in the Balkans, society can be called such because it has ways of offering and maintaining ‘patchwork’
systems of formal and informal support in material and identity ways, including care and empathy, including jobs, justice, education, and health (all significant components of an emancipatory peace) (Richmond 2008:149-165). This occurs through families, kin, charities, and community allegiances which connect informal networks to formal or professional networks (Fischer, 2006: 305). However, such processes also need international and state support, enablement and facilitation, whereby alliances with a range of local actors, police, politicians, bureaucrats, NGOs, social movements, with state and international level actors are mutually constituted, converge and become complementary, though this must be driven by a balanced understanding of both local and international legitimacy.

The result should not be such as that in Bosnia Herzegovina where the OHR, EU, UN, and OSCE have driven statebuilding without gaining a broad consensus on the ground, or in Kosovo where a dominant group have taken over the institutions of state thus marginalising other minorities, including Serbs, with international support, or in Afghanistan, where an embryonic state has been limited to the capital, has failed to make headway in negotiating with the Taliban, who have continued their violent and discriminatory strategies. In these cases, local knowledge was often ignored, capacities where not identified and supported, and partnerships where limited and selected on the basis of external interests rather than with the aim of achieving a sophisticated peace.

It is from contextual and mediated, local, state, regional, and international legitimacy that the agency for peacebuilding (and peace formation) arises in parallel. International actors have long been aware of the legitimacy of such a move with their appeals for local participation, local ownership, community peacebuilding, and bottom up approaches, even if they were mainly only rhetorical. Informal and social agencies are what make everyday life bearable in such difficult post-conflict environments, in both practical ways and also in offering signals as to how internationals may facilitate the development of peace. The signals lie in critique, demands, or resistance to certain strategies, in their acceptance or attempts to modify them, expressed through local leaders,
NGOs, identity and religious groups, trade unions, professional groups, religious communities, media, peacebuilding and human rights organisations, women’s groups, veteran groups, and so on. But the mere existence of such signals indicates that there are local peace formational agencies already in operation. In Guatemala, South Africa, and Northern Ireland, the importance of civil society actors, NGOs, local leaders were paramount in the peace process, as was their support by international donors and/or the UN system (Fischer, 2006: 291). Functions that were crucial to such processes include alternative media venues for reporting, monitoring elections, human rights, and the political process, community work, educational support, supporting cultures of peace, gender issues, DDR and SSR, documenting war crimes, dealing with trauma, dialogue and reconciliation. None of these functions can be carried without local participation and support, and perhaps more importantly local consent and legitimacy. This indicates the most obvious form of peace formation, but one mainly internationally scripted, providing opportunities and space for local actors and processes to connect with them. Peace formation also has an indigenous and locally based character, which may connect with these or may maintain its autonomy.

These aspects should be represented in the formation of political institutions whether, state or international. There has long been hints of this in related literatures, from Chambers’ *Rural Development*, Cernea’s *Putting People First* in development studies, Burton’s focus on Basic Human Needs in IR, to earlier Marxist literatures focussing on class and ownership issues, and general shifts in anthropology from cataloguing the exotic for the benefit of power to an understanding of social dynamics and alterity for their own sake (Chambers 1983; Cernea 1985; Burton 1990; Asad 1973). Studies on peace matters have also long been aware of the needs of bottom up approaches, including issues related to custom and society (Zartman 2000:1-11). UN and World Bank policy, setting an example followed by many donors in the 1990s, also adopted such discourses. Reaching further back in time, policies and writings about the creation of peace and order have long recognised the basic capacities of individual agency, group mobilisation, and their tendency to be concerned with rights and needs, governance and international order. It is surprising
therefore that appropriate conceptual, theoretical, and methodological approaches have not emerged as distinct to those which already engage with the international as a construct of states, norms, power, and resources. Such an approach would deal with root causes of conflict which impact on everyday life as well as responses constructed by those suffering the consequences with assistance by external actors. It would need to be able to build relationships with citizens, subjects, the oppressed and marginalised on their own terms, offering them a form of peace as emancipation or liberation which they would recognise and cooperate with. This would mean bottom up rather than merely top down, empowerment of local and marginal actors, communities, and individuals, caution about institutional and state power and their ideologies’ and biases’ unintended consequences for rights and needs, and an attempt to connect with local epistemologies of peace. It would be a process of enablement and liberation rather than a process of intervention and governance (or governmentality in Foucaultian terms) (Foucault 1991:87-104).

**Conclusion**

Political mobilisation around the liberal state project differs in scale, scope, and ambition to the smaller scale, localised political projects that are now emerging in post-conflict polities. These are also transnationally networked via critical agency forming an emerging post-colonial civil society (Richmond 2012). The latter has the potential to make a more locally resonant and sustainable form of peace, even if on a smaller scale, and contradicting or weakening the western notion of a rational, strong, productive and secure state. Indeed the western notion of the state, when exported, has only really attracted the interest of predatory elites who were able to exploit its weak points with little accountability to their citizens or to internationals. Political and civil society actors have often been attracted by liberal reforms but internationals have not offered sensitive and long term support. So the process underway of designing local forms of political, institutions, accountability, prosperity,
security and law, with reference to local and international standards, should be supported rather than ignored. At the moment many such efforts are wasting time and energy trying to combat the heavy handed unsuitability of liberal statebuilding. Instead the international community could be seeking out local peace agencies in a wider range of areas, and becoming involved in extended and supportive relationships with them, using action and ethnographic methodologies and ethical guidelines. They should be much more focused on improving the everyday life and potentials for individuals and communities in post-conflict states, rather than on the states themselves. This raises a range of important issues, in which local agency, needs, capacity and expectations would need to be treated: including supporting local-local political, legal, social, cultural, class and economic systems, norms, processes, and institutions, especially in the realms of needs, rights, culture, identity, and religion. The support of such processes in order to stabilize the polity would also engender contact, reform, and modification of both local and international processes, so as not to compromise each other’s standards.

Local peace formation agencies operate in parallel or related to, or even despite the liberal statebuilding project of mainly western donors and the UN system, raising two key issues. The first is what type of peace emerges in each context via the interplay of international and local processes of peacebuilding. The second relates to what impact international and local approaches have on each other. Over the last twenty years the contact between both has significantly modified the international liberal peacebuilding/ statebuilding project and the local contextual projects for peace. Post-liberal forms of peace represent (unequally) both liberal and local contexts in a hybrid form. Both have been pushed hard to examine, comply, and advance each others’ standards, norms, processes, institutions, and objectives. Sometimes the outcomes have been retrogressive, seeming to support warlords, patriarchy, and isolation, but more often this mediation of local contexts and global ambitions have had positive and mutually transformative implications.

There have emerged as a result more grounded versions of security, implicit in the human security concept which has become mainstream (even if mainly rhetorical). This concept has faced
lots of resistance and the international level, but it has been very difficult to dismount because it ties into local expectations of security which engages with military, welfare, identity, and rights issues, rather than just ‘hard security’ regional or state level matters. Hybrid notions of law and transitional justice have also emerged. Democracy has advanced from the previous international focus on elections to more of a participatory, grounded ethic and framework for long term politics. Human rights frameworks have engaged with questions of context and dignity beyond externalised legal shells. Development and marketisation have been forced to confront and engage with local poverty, lack of access to resources and facilities, and structural inequality, not least in the global political economy and north south relations. Concepts such as local ownership, participation, human security, Responsibility to Protect, sustainable development, ‘do no harm’, and others have emerged. They illustrate the legitimacy, agency and capacity of the local over the supposedly hegemony liberal peace model, and represent glimmers of the emerging post-liberal peace, which will be heavily contextualised in a local, transversal, transnational sense; develop new international and local standards, will differ from place to place, and makes peacebuilding clearly a political act, rather than a potentially colonial process. Of course, they also represent international responses to their own failures or weaknesses on the ground, indicating a confluence of interest, local and international, reconstituting peacebuilding and the state, not to mention international strategies for peace and development. This represents the birth of the post-liberal peace in response to post-colonial forms of civil society now emerging. It is crucial to the current effort to increase the legitimacy and sustainability of peacebuilding and statebuilding in the context of addressing global structural inequities, which often undermine attempts at making peace even as they gather pace. Only then with the critical agencies of peace formation, the state, and international peacebuilding converge on a more plausible and pragmatic peace process.
REFERENCES


MASSEY, DOREEN. (1994) Space, Place and Gender. Minneapolis: Minneapolis University Press.


