The Institutional Sources of Statehood
Assimilation, Multiculturalism, and Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa
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To my mum, Yvonne,
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Anna Persson
The state of taxation

Overall objective

Today, almost all states are, or at least claim to be, nation-states. As such, they subscribe to the legitimating doctrine of national sovereignty and claim to derive state power from, as well as exercise it for, a nation, a people.1 Yet, despite great similarities in terms of juridical statehood, empirically, states still vary a lot in terms of how successful they are in governing their societies.2 In the world today we find, on the one hand, states that have the capacity to extract huge amounts of revenues from their populations, adopt highly functional policies to avoid human tragedies such as mass starvation and civil war, and protect their borders from external, as well as internal, threats. On the other hand, there are a large number of states that do not have the capacity to do any of these things – states that are faced with prolonged and bloody civil strife, a weak state bureaucracy, dysfunctional policies, and low levels of economic growth. There are even states that stand on the edge of state collapse – Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Angola, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo are some of the most recent examples of such a development. In fact, states today are more varied in their capacities and capabilities than they ever were.3 As a result, real states vary considerably in how closely they fit Max Weber’s ideal type of a state, understood as an organization that, at least in part

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2 See Jackson & Rosberg 1982 for a further discussion about the juridical and empirical in statehood.
3 Rothberg 2003: 2.
Chapter 1

through a monopoly of violence, has the authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people in a given territory.\(^4\)

The main issue of this study is state capabilities and their lack. How can we understand the varying abilities of states to consolidate supreme state authority over their claimed territory?\(^5\) Why do some states have such difficulty in becoming the organization in society that effectively establishes the rules of behavior and is able to claim the monopoly of violence while other states find such a task much easier? In particular, this study concerns the question how we can understand the varying abilities of states to collect taxes. Taxes have been argued to be the prerequisite for any governance as such.\(^6\) It has moreover been argued that there is no better measure of a state’s reach than its ability to collect taxes.\(^7\) In line with this argument, taxation is most commonly understood as a collective action dilemma that is most effectively solved by quasi-voluntary compliance.\(^8\) Quasi-voluntary compliance is a conditional form of voluntarism in the sense that noncompliant behavior is subject to coercion if the noncompliant is caught.\(^9\) The extent to which states are able to mobilize its population to quasi-voluntarily comply with tax demands is in turn argued to depend on the successful establishment of two social contracts, which respectively form the nation and the state that together make up the nation-state. First, the vertical contract relies on the perception among taxpayers that there is a bargain between the government and citizens according to which the government provides public goods that are positively valued in exchange for tax payments. Secondly, the horizontal contract defines the relationship between citizens and builds on the perception among taxpayers that, if they themselves comply with tax demands, they can trust others to comply with such demands too.\(^10\) In the end, compliance is contingent on both

\(^4\) See Migdal 1988: 19 for a similar understanding of Weber’s definition. In more exact terms, Weber understands the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946: 78).

\(^5\) As defined by Herbst 2000: 3. See Migdal 1988 for a similar understanding of the concept.


\(^7\) Migdal et al. 1994; Herbst 2003: 167. However, the extent to which taxation outcome is a suitable indicator of state-society relations in communist polities can be questioned. As put forward by Lieberman, in communist states, the state’s role in the economy is so large that it virtually eliminates the private sphere of the economy. As a result, there is in effect no taxation in such countries as the state controls the means of production and need not gain cooperation from non-state actors in order to obtain resources (Lieberman 2003: 35).

\(^8\) Levi 1988.

\(^9\) ibid.

\(^10\) ibid.
contracts - tax evasion is hence a result of that one or both of these contracts are breached.

Yet, while there is growing consensus that states vary in their effectiveness to collect taxes based on their ties to society, there is considerably less agreement regarding the factors that can account for why states are not equally successful when it comes to establishing the vertical and horizontal contracts needed to solve the collective action dilemma of taxation. The major aim of this study is to contribute to the further understanding of this puzzle. In order to do so, building on theories emphasizing the decisive role played by a shared identity for solving national collective action dilemmas such as the one of taxation, I provide an institutional explanation to varying taxation outcomes, highlighting the importance of foundational moments when notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ get socially constructed, shaping the logic of political competition for long periods of time. More specifically, I develop and test an argument that relates the official definition of the national political community (i.e. the formal criteria for citizenship), articulated by elites during formative periods of state development – and ultimately specified in key legal documents typically including the constitution, various laws, and national policies – to the further development of notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately, the tax state. For the purpose of the study, the tax state is understood as “[…] the aggregate of a set of relationships between the state executive and state bureaucracy on the one hand, and citizens or taxpayers on the other, manifest in a set of national tax policies and administrative practices”. The formal boundary of the national political community is an issue that manifests itself in the answer to three questions: Who is a citizen? Among citizens, who has what privileges? And whose norms and practices (i.e. identity) are symbolically aligned with those with the state?

This study focuses on the third question and in particular it focuses on the degree to which states officially recognize ethnic diversity, i.e. the degree of multiculturalism manifested in key legal documents and policies.

To test the historical institutional argument that varying national trajectories of tax state development are the result of the degree to which leaders officially recognize ethnic diversity during formative periods of state development, I conduct a comparative case study of Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda. The reason for choosing these three cases is that they cover a

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12 As defined by Lieberman 2003: 39.
spectrum of different potential paths of tax state development – primarily measured by central government income tax collections as a share of GDP – and hence provide the variation in tax regimes that could enrich theory. More specifically, despite significant similarities with regard to patterns of taxation at the time of independence, the three countries have followed radically different national trajectories of tax state development after independence. Moreover, the three states vary in a way quite different from what we would expect with the point of departure in established theories about the relationship between natural resource abundance and taxation. As such, the three cases today run the gamut of possibilities from one comparatively very weak tax state, Uganda, to one relatively strong tax state, Botswana, Zambia falling somewhere in between being an average sub-Saharan African state in terms of central income tax collections as a share of GDP. Accordingly, if the degree to which citizenship is associated with ethnic group rights matters for how notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ get constructed and sub-sequent paths of tax state development, we should expect the respective states to have officially recognized ethnic diversity to a varying degree at the time of independence. That is, the three states should vary in terms of the number of pre-existing ethnic cleavages (i.e. linguistic, regional, tribal, and religious cleavages) that were officially recognized at the time of independence.

The results of the comparison reveal that the degree to which citizenship got associated with ethnic group rights at the time of independence has in fact played a decisive role in shaping notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately, tax state development in the three countries. More specifically, the results of the study reveal that, while an assimilative approach is comparatively more conducive to the development of a shared national identity and the tax state than an overall multicultural approach, a multicultural approach recognizing a larger number of ethnic cleavages (i.e. a multidimensional multicultural approach) still promotes less conflict along ethnic lines than does a multicultural approach recognizing only one dimension of ethnicity (i.e. a one-dimensional multicultural approach). As such, the results of this study at least partly contradict the prevalent assumption that ‘the more multiculturalism, the worse’. Furthermore, by providing evidence that the number of ethnic cleavages officially recognized

14 On average, the GDP-to-total tax ratio in sub-Saharan Africa is around 21 percent, compared with the OECD average of about 32 percent (Fjeldstad & Rakner 2003; Kangave 2005). Between the years 1999 and 2003, average central government income tax collections as a share of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa were 7.1 percent. During the same period, the GDP-to-income tax ratio was 26.4 percent in Botswana, 7.2 percent in Zambia, and 2.4 percent in Uganda.
is comparatively more important to subsequent social and political developments than the type of cleavages recognized, the results of the study challenge the commonly put forward assumption that some types of ethnic cleavages are more indivisible than others and hence more of a threat to the nation-state project. More specifically, in the study, I demonstrate how, while all three countries of concern have partly followed a ‘neutrality’ approach (i.e. an assimilative approach which do not recognize any ethnic affiliations whatsoever) since the time of independence, the Botswanan official approach, leaning to a comparatively greater extent towards the pure assimilation of political minorities into the political majority, eventually allowed for the development of a comparatively stronger sense of a shared national identity and a comparatively stronger tax state. In Zambia, on the other hand, the recognition of ethnic group rights along multiple ethnic cleavages (tribe, region, and language) at the time of independence led to an outcome characterized by a comparatively rather complex dynamics of ethnic self-definition and ascription. Consequently, notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in Zambia have been characterized by considerably more complexity compared to in many other African countries. While ethnicity matters for politics, ethnic identities are not necessarily indivisible. As such, they do not constitute an absolute threat to the identification with and support for the nation state. This partly also explains Zambia’s middle position in terms of taxation outcome. Finally, I demonstrate how Uganda – once known as the ‘Pearl of Africa’ – to a comparatively greater extent leaned upon a one-dimensional multicultural framework, recognizing primarily regional differences through the adoption of a federal political system within the framework of which some tribal territories gained full federal status and others semi-federal status. Despite attempts later on to reduce the political impact of regional cleavages, such cleavages have continued to be the most important bases for political mobilization in Uganda throughout the independence period. Partly because of this, Uganda remains a comparatively very weak tax state.

In sum, by demonstrating the pervasive impact of early official manifestations of ethnic diversity – as ultimately specified in key legal documents and policies during the formative years around independence in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda – on patterns of political competition between ethnic groups and, ultimately, taxation outcomes, the study provides a strong defense of historical institutionalism. However, before developing this argument further, in the remainder of this chapter, I first motivate the study of taxation. As will be clear from the discussion, the study of taxation is of great interest from both an empirical and a theoretical standpoint. Secondly, I offer a further conceptualization of
taxation. As I have already argued, there is growing consensus that a state’s tax abilities are contingent upon some degree of voluntary cooperation on behalf of citizens. However, while the degree of quasi-voluntary cooperation with tax demands for sure affects the ability of states to collect taxes, such an account still has a few shortcomings, perhaps the most important one being the fact that we still know very little about what makes people quasi-voluntarily comply with tax demands in some countries but not in others in the first place. In an attempt to fill some of this empirical gap, building on theories about the important role played by a shared national identity in shaping collective action outcomes such as the one of taxation, I develop a historical institutional argument that relates the official manifestation of ethnic diversity articulated by the leaders of the state during formative periods of state development – and ultimately specified in key legal documents typically including the constitution, various laws, and national policies – to the further development of notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately, the tax state. My main argument is more thoroughly developed in section three of this chapter. After this brief summary of the main argument of the study, I discuss research design and case selection. What can the experience of tax state development in Botswana, Zambia and Uganda teach us about tax state development in other regions? And perhaps even more importantly: What can it add to the theory of taxation? In the chapter I moreover offer an overview of alternative and complementary explanations of why states vary in terms of taxation outcomes. Finally, in the end of the chapter, I present a plan of the study.

Taxation in perspective

In 1918, Joseph Schumpeter declared that “The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare – all this and more is written in its fiscal history, stripped of all phrases. He who knows how to listen to its message here discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than anywhere else.” Following this view, the main objective of this study is not so much to provide increased insight about the technicalities of tax collection, but rather it is an attempt to further understand and develop Schumpeter’s proposition to use taxation as a lens onto broader social and political problems.
The importance of taxation

In her 1988 book ‘Of Rule and Revenue’, Margaret Levi declares that “The history of state revenue production is the history of the evolution of the state.”\(^{16}\) In Europe, as noted by Schumpeter, taxes not only helped create the state, they also helped to form it.\(^{17}\) Douglass North goes so far as to even include taxation in his definition of the state, understanding the state as “…an organization with a comparative advantage of violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax constituents.”\(^{18}\) In sum, the collection of taxes has throughout history been one of the most central, and yet one of the most difficult, social and political enterprises conducted by states. States that have been able to regularly collect taxes from a wide range of societal actors have generally also been able to govern effectively in a wide range of other areas, while the inability of a state to generate significant revenue through taxation has often been a precursor to state failure, or even collapse.\(^{19}\) As such, the capacity to tax forms the ‘sinews’ of the state and is in many respects a prerequisite for any governance as such.\(^{20}\) Whatever the rulers’ ends, revenue is necessary to attain them.\(^{21}\) In addition, studies have consistently found that better performing governments are larger and collect higher taxes, while poorly performing governments, in contrast, are smaller and collect fewer taxes.\(^{22}\) This claim is further supported by recent interpretations of the relationship between taxes and the quality of institutions in Britain and France in the 18th century, as well as in post-communist states.\(^{23}\) Furthermore, a large number of recent studies have pointed to a potential relationship between governments’ dependency on unearned income from natural resources and low-quality governance, understood as, among other things, un-democratic methods of governance and high levels of corruption.\(^{24}\)

\(^{16}\) Levi 1988: 1.
\(^{17}\) Schumpeter 1991 (1918): 108.
\(^{18}\) North 1981.
\(^{19}\) Alesina & La Ferrara 2000; Bergman 2003; La Porta 1999; Lieberman 2003; Tilly 1990.
\(^{20}\) Pierson has called taxation the “touchstone of the politics of the modern state” (Pierson 1996: 33).
\(^{21}\) Levi 1988: 3.
\(^{22}\) La Porta 1999. The term ‘better performing governments’ refers to more successful paths of economic development.
\(^{23}\) Brewer 1988; Finer 1997; Johnson et al. 1997. See La Porta 1999 for a further discussion.
\(^{24}\) For a review of some of this literature, see Moore 2007.
Despite the historical appeal of taxation, in many ways, the comparative study of taxation has never been more relevant than it is today. That is, far from being a new question, the emergence of new states, continuing industrialization, globalization of economic and political institutions, changing migration patterns, and the spread of ideas through similar processes, are constantly challenging earlier assumptions and conclusions about varying taxation abilities across countries, as well as within countries over time. While previous studies of state building have focused mainly on the experience of the European great powers, with only sporadic application to specific cases outside this part of the world, recent world developments have partly changed this. In fact, as argued by Lieberman, as new states emerge at the same time as older states are subject to significant change, the need to understand the process of state development – and the development of capacities to collect taxes in particular – is probably more pressing than ever. Since 1914, the number of recognized national polities has increased from 55 to 192 (the state claiming its independence most recently being Kosovo in February 2008) making the number of independent nation-states today greater than any other time in world history. In addition, never before have states had the responsibility for so many lives. After growing very slowly for most of human history, the world’s population more than doubled in the last century and reached the number of 6.6 billion people in 2007, the poor and developing regions being home to almost 5.4 billion people.

Moreover, as a consequence of significant reductions in international solidarity, over the last years, modern states have increasingly come to depend upon tax revenues to finance security and welfare functions such as social policy, health care, unemployment compensations, infrastructure, and education. Without the ability to raise revenues effectively, states are also limited in the extent to which they can provide security, meet basic needs, or foster economic development.

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25 For this argument, see Thies 2004: 53.
28 Currently, approximately 76 million people are added to the world population each year. By 2050, projected numbers show that the developing regions of the world will be home to 7.8 billion people (UNFPA 2007).
29 Lieberman 2003: 7. According to Lieberman, over the last years, the world has witnessed significant reductions in international solidarity especially in terms of decreased levels of foreign aid, tight credit, and a policy orthodoxy against state ownership of enterprises.
30 Bräutigam 2008.
problem, state weakness may furthermore have devastating consequences for the international community. It has commonly been argued that the ways in which so many of the globe’s younger nation-states waver precariously between weakness and failure make some of the more desirable international norms such as stability and predictability more difficult to achieve.\textsuperscript{31} From this perspective, the September 11 attacks in 2001 and subsequent developments have been argued to have served as a reminder that state weakness is not only a local problem, but a global one.\textsuperscript{32} How best to understand the nature of weak states, how to restore the functionality of failed states, as well as how to maintain the strength of comparatively strong states, are as such among the most urgent policy questions of the twenty-first century. Yet the political economy of taxation in general and in African countries in particular – in general among the weakest states in the world – remains a neglected area of study.\textsuperscript{33}

Conceptualizing taxation

In addition to the empirical importance of the subject, as argued by Lieberman, taxation provides an attractive focus for research theoretically since the real world challenges associated with tax collection are intimately linked to many of the central analytical concerns within the field of political science, including questions about state building, power, citizenship, identity, collective action, and distributive justice.\textsuperscript{34} According to the World

\textsuperscript{31} Rotberg 2003; Krasner & Pasqual 2005.
\textsuperscript{32} See Fukuyama 2004 for this argument.
\textsuperscript{33} For a similar critique, see Therikildsen 2001. However, despite the importance of taxation, it is necessary not to confuse the strong tax state with the good tax state. A strong tax state is not an inherently good thing. Neither are necessarily the processes through which states strengthen their capacities and capabilities. Migdal has emphasized the potential dangers of the uncritical support for increased state strength within all areas, pointing to the fact that the processes leading to increased state capacities and capabilities have often been accompanied by attacks on the identities and lives of the most vulnerable elements in society (Migdal 1988). Leo Kuper has noted that the modern state’s monopoly of sovereignty over a territory that was, in reality, culturally plural and economically stratified, created both the desire and the power to commit genocide (Kuper 1981). Similarly, Roger Smith has argued that genocide has in many cases been a deliberate instrument of modern states in their aim to strengthen themselves (Smith 1987. See Mann 1999 for a further discussion). In a recent book, Lieberman argues that varying paths of tax state development among so called ‘fragment’ societies is the result of varying degrees of official exclusion of some groups in society (Lieberman 2003). What the fragment societies share are political traditions in which a European-descended group retained political, economic, and administrative control of territories simultaneously inhabited by themselves and other groups understood as belonging to different, inferior races. They also share a set of pseudo-scientific claims and myths about racial difference that have been used to legitimate patterns of white or European racial domination.

\textsuperscript{34} Lieberman 2003.
Bank, taxes are “unrequited compulsory payments collected primarily by the central government.” Taxes are furthermore “levied on a particular base and paid to the government to provide certain public goods or services or to redistribute income or purchasing power within a society – but without provision or promise of any specific good or service in return for payment.” Since the classical definition of a public good implies the properties of non-excludability and non-rival consumption – i.e. if one person consumes such a good, others cannot be excluded from consuming it and the consumption of such a good by one person does not diminish the amount available for consumption by anyone else – the conclusion has been that no one will, out of free will, contribute to such a good. That is, the model assumes non-compliance a strictly dominant strategy. Yet, despite this, people still pay taxes. In fact, in our time, tax revenues collected by states amount to more than one-fifth of total global economic production. The interesting theoretical puzzle hence becomes how we can understand this?

There is growing consensus that states’ tax abilities are contingent upon some degree of voluntary cooperation, and that they are hence not only a function of the subjective perception of being detected and sanctioned as is held by purely rational economic accounts emphasizing forced compliance. A large number of empirical studies support that claim. Andreoni and collaborators have for example found evidence that the expected penalties found in tax enforcement systems are never large enough to make compliance a dominant strategy for the population. Even with considerable coercive power and effective techniques of measurement and monitoring, a ruler could never achieve total compliance. In a comparative study of Chile and Argentina, Bergman demonstrates that a successful tax policy to a significant extent relies on the population’s degree of voluntary tax compliance. Scholz and Pinney, as well as Scholz and Lubell, account for varying degrees of tax compliance as at least partially explained by a sense of duty on the behalf of citizens. Added to this, the Hobbesian solution of coercion to the social contract between the state and

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36 Lieberman 2003: 43.
37 ibid.
39 Andreoni et al. 1998.
40 Bergman 2003.

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society is a costly and economically inefficient method to enforce compliance, and is as such not a desirable solution to most states.\textsuperscript{42} Following this line of thought, the model that has influenced most research on the political economy of taxation, including this study, is Margaret Levi’s model of taxation as a collective action dilemma that is most effectively solved by quasi-voluntary compliance.

The collective bargaining model of strategic action for understanding varying taxation outcomes is largely inspired by rational choice models of choice and action, but is distinct from pure rational choice models by giving a central role to interaction.\textsuperscript{43} Following Levi, to understand varying levels of taxation, we should begin with the assumption that rulers are ‘predatory’ and, as such, revenue maximizers. That is, if rulers refrain from extracting the greatest amount of revenue they could in principle extract this does not mean that they are refraining from maximizing behavior. Rulers instead refrain from extraction “primarily because of the constraints to which they are subject”, i.e. from the constraints of their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis constituents, their transaction costs, and their discount rates.\textsuperscript{44} Transaction costs are the positive costs of bargaining a policy and of implementing a policy once it has been bargained. The most important transactions costs are those of negotiating agreements, measuring revenue sources, monitoring compliance, using agents and other middlemen, punishing the non-compliance, and creating quasi-voluntary compliance. In the end, a policy is not viable if the transaction costs are too high.\textsuperscript{45} Rulers’ discount rates are in turn related to how much present value future returns have for them. Rulers with high discount rates care little for the future while rulers with low discount rates have an interest in securing future revenues and will as such extract revenue up to the point at which further extractions would put future output at risk.\textsuperscript{46} In the end, the relative bargaining power of states and, ultimately, the state’s ability to solve the collective action dilemma of taxation depends on two implicit social contracts. The first contract concerns what has been called the quid-pro-quo of taxation, i.e. if taxpayers perceive they get sufficient public goods in exchange for the taxes paid and if they get the public goods mix they prefer. This is also what is referred to as the \textit{vertical} contract, i.e. the social

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{42} Levi 1988.
\textsuperscript{43} Checkel 1999.
\textsuperscript{44} Levi 1988: 4, 10.
\textsuperscript{45} ibid: 23.
\textsuperscript{46} ibid: 32-3.
\end{flushright}
contract between society and the state. The second contract, i.e. the *horizontal* contract, concerns the question of whether the other constituents will keep their bargain. That is, if people expect others to comply, they will themselves comply, but if they expect others to evade or avoid taxes, they will try to do so themselves.\(^{47}\) No one wants to be a ‘sucker’.\(^{48}\) Compliance is contingent on both contracts; tax evasion is hence a result of that one or more of these contracts are breached. What explains compliance and, in the end, varying taxation outcomes is, in other words, the fact that individuals have dual utility curves: one material and one non-material.\(^{49}\) As such, the quasi-voluntary tax system rests mainly on the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the system, and not on coercion. In order to generate significant amounts of tax revenue, the state must provide a contract or a bargain that is considered fair. Failure to achieve quasi-voluntary compliance in the end constrains states’ abilities to extract revenues.\(^{50}\)

Following Levi’s argument, it seems like the puzzle of explaining variation in taxation outcomes in fact merely reflects one aspect of a larger question of explaining the degree to which particular states are successful in their attempts to mobilize the support of their respective populations through the successful establishment of cooperative vertical and horizontal social contracts. That is, in addition to being a necessary condition for the survival of the state, taxation seems to be an indicator of how successful states are in their attempts to impose uniform authority over groups within society. As such, while Levi’s argument in many ways makes sense, a number of issues still remain unsolved, the perhaps most important one

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\(^{47}\) ibid.

\(^{48}\) ibid: 53; Rothstein 2005.

\(^{49}\) Levi 1991.

\(^{50}\) According to Levi, tax compliance is *voluntary* because taxpayers choose to pay and *quasi*-voluntary because noncompliant behavior is subject to coercion if the noncompliant is caught (Levi 1988). Migdal provides a similar understanding as he argues that the ability of states to mobilize the population and, ultimately; govern their societies, can be argued to be reflected in a scale of three indicators. At the most elementary level, the consolidation of states rests on gaining conformance, or compliance, to their demands by the population. At this most elementary level, compliance often first comes with the use of the most basic of sanctions, i.e. force. At a second level, leaders of the state organization seek more than compliance, they seek participation. At this level, leaders seek to gain strength by organizing the population for specialized tasks in the institutional components of the state organization and, as such, participation also implies repeated voluntary use of and/or action in state-run or state-authorized institutions. At the third level comes legitimation. According to Migdal’s argument, legitimation is the most potent factor accounting for the strength of the state since it is an “acceptance, even approbation, of the state’s rules of the game, its social control, as true and right.” That is, whereas compliance and participation may result from calculations by individuals of the array of rewards and sanctions at hand, legitimacy includes the acceptance of the state’s symbolic configuration within which the rewards and sanctions are packaged (Migdal 1988: 32-3).
being the fact that we still know very little about what makes more and less cooperative vertical and horizontal contracts develop in the first place.\textsuperscript{51} As argued by Lieberman, a better specified model of taxation behavior would therefore incorporate also the prior factors that affect the bargaining power of actors, their discount rates, and the associated transaction costs of making and enforcing bargains with the state.\textsuperscript{52} Without such additions, it becomes all too easy to make claims about the sources of these rather general analytical variables in a post hoc manner.\textsuperscript{53} Building on Levi’s argument, what we want to understand is, in other words, variation in tax state development (see Figure 1.1).

\textbf{Figure 1.1. The tax state}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{tax_state_diagram}
\end{figure}

Following Lieberman’s definition, the concept of the tax state can best be understood as the “aggregate of a set of relationships between the state executive and state bureaucracy on the one hand, and citizens or taxpayers on the other, manifest in a set of national tax policies and administrative practices.”\textsuperscript{54} In turn, these relationships respectively form the nation and the state that together make up the nation-state. In addition to being inspired by Levi’s work, the conceptualization of the tax state offered by Lieberman in much builds from the neo-Weberian state-in-society approach outlined primarily by Migdal.\textsuperscript{55} This approach differs from the

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{51} See Kjaer et al. 2002; Lieberman 2003 for a similar critique.
\textsuperscript{52} Lieberman 2003: 25.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. This is a more general critique directed towards rational choice approaches trying to account for variation in political behavior.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid: 39.
\textsuperscript{55} Migdal 1988; Migdal 2001; Migdal et al. 1994.
Weberian approach in that it takes empirical variation in the actual fulfillment of state functions seriously and asks how we can understand the gap between state aspirations and achievements. By taking the different ways in which the state’s attempts to impose a uniform authority may be challenged, shaped, and reconfigured by various actors in society seriously, the state-in-society framework makes room for political explanations of cross-national variations in taxation outcomes. More specifically, similar to Levi’s model, according to the state-in-society approach, states vary in their effectiveness based on their ties to society. Events and struggles on the local level can consequently have a momentous impact on both the state and the goal of state predominance. Furthermore, interactions of state and society are mutually transforming, meaning that while the results of the engagement and disengagement of states and other social forces are tangible, even momentous, outcomes rarely reflect the aims and wills embedded in either. In the end, the ability to mobilize the society’s population to quasi-voluntarily comply with state demands is hence what separates stronger from weaker states since the process of state development is an iterative one that responds to relationships forged within society. As such, similar to Levi’s argument, in line with the neo-Weberian approach, the ability of states to collect taxes can ultimately be understood as a collective action dilemma. That is, it rests on that people define their goals collectively and are willing to sometimes sacrifice short-term individual/group good for the collective good.

The building blocks of the tax state

The aim of this section is to take a closer look at how the tax state is constructed and provide the theoretical framework for how the tax state can be studied empirically. In line with the conceptualization of the tax state offered above, the business of extracting taxes can be argued to involve mainly two sets of tasks: the establishment of a set of tax policies

57 Migdal et al. 1994.
58 ibid.
59 See, among others, Krasner 1977; Migdal 1988; Migdal 2001; Migdal et al. 1994; Lieberman 2003. Mobilization in this context refers to the channeling of people into specialized organizational frameworks that enable state leaders to build stronger armies, collect more taxes, and complete any other number of complicated tasks (see Migdal 1988: 21-2).
that codify what the state is entitled to collect, and the implementation of those policies in the form of administration.\textsuperscript{60}

More specifically, the tax policy of a given country is primarily concerned with the design of a tax system that is capable of financing the necessary level of public spending in the most efficient and equitable way possible.\textsuperscript{61} As such, following Lieberman’s understanding of the concept, it can, by and large, be understood as “a set of laws and/or codes that ultimately define the potential tax revenues that may be collected by the state from the economy.”\textsuperscript{62} The set of codes and rules that is in place in a given year is, in other words, intended to provide answers to the questions of who is responsible for paying, and how much. As such, the tax policy of a given country can be defined in terms of the tax base, the tax rates, various tax exemptions, and the specification of the taxpayer.\textsuperscript{63} Within this framework, the tax base is broadly understood as the set of economic stocks and flows, or tax handles that will ultimately generate a tax liability for taxpayers. That is, the tax base is the resources being subject to taxation in a specific polity. As argued by Lieberman, individuals themselves may constitute a tax base (often referred to as a head tax), but in modern economies, economic units more often constitute the base.\textsuperscript{64} However, depending on which aspects of the economy the tax base covers, practitioners, as well as scientists, principally distinguish also between different forms of taxation. Most basically, there can be argued to be seven categories of tax revenues: income tax, social security contributions, taxes on payroll and workforce, taxes on property, domestic taxes on goods and services, taxes on international trade and transactions, and ‘other’ taxes.\textsuperscript{65} Each of these revenue streams, in turn, varies in terms of directness, visibility and progressivity. Following from this, as will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section, they also vary in terms of the capacity, the degree of collective action, and willingness among the population to redistribute resources needed for the state to extract them. That is, they vary in terms of how well-suited they are as empirical indicators of tax state development.

\textsuperscript{60} Lieberman 2003: 44; Burgess & Stern 1993: 797.
\textsuperscript{61} Tanzi & Zee 2000: 3.
\textsuperscript{62} Lieberman 2003: 46.
\textsuperscript{63} ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} IMF 2006.
Tax rates determine the share of the base that will constitute the tax burden. As argued by Lieberman, rates may be differentiated within a group of taxes – for example, higher rates for income beyond a certain threshold. Rates may furthermore be expressed either as a share of the determined value of the tax base, or as a fixed sum for a given quantity of the taxable base.

In addition to the establishment of a certain tax base and the specification of tax rates, the tax policy framework commonly identifies certain sets of tax exemptions, incentives, or expenditures. Such policies identify certain types of taxpayers or tax bases that are offered special treatment with respect to their tax liability. As argued by Lieberman, typically, such policies are employed to create incentives for certain types of investments, to promote certain social goods, or simply to favor some groups over others. For example, investors in certain regions may receive tax holidays, those who provide job training may enjoy reduced tax rates, those who make charitable donations may be able to deduct such transfers in the calculation of their tax liability, those with dependents may receive special deductions, or those with outstanding tax liabilities and penalties may receive amnesty.\textsuperscript{66} In the end, the removal of exemptions, loopholes, and concessions is often associated with a simplified administration and reduced evasion.\textsuperscript{67} That is, taking a systematic view of the tax system, rationalization, simplification, and the removal of anomalies should have the effect of reducing the administrative costs of identification, assessment, auditing and enforcement.\textsuperscript{68} Finally, tax policy designates who is ultimately responsible for transferring the money to the state agent by specifying the taxpayer. In the case of income tax for example, individuals may pay this tax on their own, or their employer may withhold part or all of the tax from their wages. When consumers pay taxes on products, this tax is typically paid to the government by the retailer. Whoever is designated as a taxpayer becomes the target of government attempts to collect the tax through a process of bureaucratic engagement.\textsuperscript{69} In the end, there are arguably two different forms of taxation depending on who is the designated taxpayer: direct taxation which directly fall on citizens and indirect taxation which are levied by intermediaries (e.g. retail business).\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{66} Lieberman 2003: 50.
\textsuperscript{67} Burgess & Stern 1993: 797.
\textsuperscript{68} ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Lieberman 2003.
\textsuperscript{70} ibid: 99-100.
Having defined tax policy, the real tax system facing people and business in most developing countries is seldom what a quick reading of the tax law might suggest but also results from how that system is implemented in practice.\[71\] As argued by Bird and Zolt: “The best tax policy in the world is worth little if it cannot be implemented effectively. [...] What can be done may to a considerable extent determine what is done in any country.”\[72\] In a similar vein, Casanegra de Jantscher has argued that, in a very real sense, tax administration in fact is tax policy.\[73\] That is, in contrast to many industrialized countries, the problem of taxation in the developing world is often less one of policy-making than of administration.\[74\] As such, having defined what is meant by tax policy, we still need to take into account the other building-block of the tax state, namely; tax administration. Yet, one weakness of the current theoretical literature on revenue mobilization is the often implicit assumption that, once decided on, policies are necessarily implemented.\[75\]

The central goal of tax administration is to convert potential tax revenues into actual tax revenues. As such, at the most basic level, tax administration is best understood in terms of the actual operation of revenue collecting institutions, i.e. the instruments of tax policy implementation.\[76\] In the end, tax administration affects a tax system’s yield, incidence, as well as its efficiency. According to Lieberman, the administrative process of collecting taxes can be defined in terms of several steps on the part of the state executives and the bureaucracy. More specifically, tax administration comprises three inter-related activities; the registration of taxpayers, the calculation of liabilities and the actual collection of taxes.\[77\]

The first task of the administration involves the registration of taxpayers. At this stage, the state executives and bureaucracy must make citizens aware of their obligations while gathering information about their activities, and maintaining such information through various information management systems. As argued by Lieberman, the registration of taxpayers is often a resource-demanding task, subject to a large number of potential leakages,
perhaps the most obvious source of leakage being the inability of the state to register all of the taxpayers liable for the tax.\textsuperscript{78} The potential inability of the state to register taxpayers could, in turn, depend on a number of different factors. Among other things, citizens or firms could for example hide their existence from the state and escape the registration process altogether. Individuals or firms could in addition hide part of their income, while registering other parts.

A second key task in the process of tax administration involves \textit{calculating the tax liability} for specific taxpayers. This involves measuring the size of the taxable base associated with each taxpayer and identifying appropriate rates and exemptions as defined in the tax policy framework. Such calculations or assessment may take place either on an annual or more regular basis. Tax liabilities are calculated by individuals, firms, and/or tax intermediaries and submitted to the bureaucracy, or the necessary information for making such calculations is submitted directly to the bureaucracy for assessment. In both cases, tax auditors employed by the state may review the assessments and the underlying information supporting the calculations to determine the accuracy of the assessment.\textsuperscript{79} In Table 1.1, I summarize the most important tasks of the tax policy and tax administration respectively. In the end, since both tax policy and tax administration are potential areas for negotiation, conflict and resistance from groups within society, varying paths of tax state development can be argued to reflect the state’s ability to carry out both these sets of tasks.\textsuperscript{80} That is, both the enactment and the administration of tax policy provide multiple opportunities for political competition within society, and between the state and its society.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{78} Lieberman 2003: 52.
\textsuperscript{79} ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} ibid: 50.
\textsuperscript{81} ibid: 45.
Now when we know more about the building blocks of the tax state, how can we empirically differentiate between more and less successful paths of tax state development?

### The empirical manifestations of the tax state

Having conceptualized the tax state as being made up of two social contracts, manifest in a set of tax policies and administrative practices, and having specified the building blocks of the tax state, this section of the study is concerned with the question of how we can best capture variation in tax state development empirically.

As previously argued, varying paths of tax state development can be argued to reflect the state’s ability to both enact and implement tax policy since both these sets of tasks provide multiple opportunities for political competition within society, as well as between the state and its society. As such, in order to be able to capture variation in the tax state empirically, we need indicators that reflect the quality of both the vertical relationship between states and societies, and the horizontal relationship between citizens. A large number of indicators can be argued to do this. The extent

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### Table 1.1. The building blocks of the tax state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVERALL TASK</th>
<th>TAX POLICY</th>
<th>TAX ADMINISTRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To establish a set of laws and/or codes that define the</td>
<td>• To convert potential tax revenues defined by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>potential tax revenues that may be collected by the state from the</td>
<td>the tax policy into actual tax revenues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>economy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MORE SPECIFIC TASK</th>
<th>TAX POLICY</th>
<th>TAX ADMINISTRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish the tax base</td>
<td>• Register tax payers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Specify the tax rates</td>
<td>• Calculate the tax liabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify tax exemptions, incentives, and tax expenditures</td>
<td>• Collect tax liabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Specify the tax payer (i.e. specify who should hand over the</td>
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Now when we know more about the building blocks of the tax state, how can we empirically differentiate between more and less successful paths of tax state development?
to which states are constrained by economic factors can, for example, be captured by the degree of tax avoidance and tax evasion or even, in extreme cases, defection (i.e. either that taxpayers take shelter in the informal economy or that they resort to capital flight). Potential political constraints that states face in their attempts to collect taxes could, in turn, be captured by taxpayers’ political actions aimed at inducing the government to modify the tax legislation or preventing it from reforming the tax systems. Yet, as pointed out by Boesen and Therkildsen, since the collection of taxes is the ultimate goal of every tax state, in the end, a revenue-collecting institution can only be said to have a high capability to raise revenue if it generates a high output. That is, the degree to which a particular state has been successful in the enactment and implementation of a tax policy can in the end only be measured by the outcome that is produced in terms of actual tax collections. Following this logic, it is the actual output that will be the main empirical focus of this study. More specifically, in order to capture variation in tax state development, I have primarily used quantitative measures in terms of central government income tax collections as a share of GDP. Below, I further discuss this measurement.

**Tax revenue data as indicators of variation in tax state development**

As previously argued, taxes can be understood as ‘unrequited compulsory payments collected primarily by the central government’. Taxes are also “levied on a particular base and paid to the government to provide certain public goods or services or to redistribute income or purchasing power within a society – but without provision or promise of any specific good or service in return for payment.” As such, what distinguishes taxes compared to other sources of government revenue and make them a suitable indicator of state-society relations is that there is a free-rider problem associated with taxation. In order to generate significant tax revenues, the state must find a way to solve this dilemma.

As argued by Lieberman, using tax revenue data as indicators of tax state development entails multiple choices and tradeoffs. Mainly three sets of tasks are at immediate stake. First, which streams of revenue should be included in the indicator? Should all potential tax revenues be included, only specific revenues, or a combination? Secondly, what should tax

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82 Fauvelle-Aymar 1999: 397.
84 Lieberman 2003: 43.
85 Lieberman 2002: 94.
revenues be measured in relation to? That is, to best capture variation in tax regimes, should the denominator be total tax revenue, GDP or some other measure? Thirdly, we need to know what level of government that is of greatest interest for the study.

First, in terms of what forms of revenues that should be included in the empirical study of the tax state, most analysts would probably agree that the purest form of taxation includes those taxes levied on income, profits, and capital gains and taxes on property. Such taxes are paid to the state directly by individuals and firms. They are also among the most progressive (i.e. everything else being equal, the more the individual earns the higher the percentage of those earnings that will be paid to government as income tax), most difficult to administer, most visible, and least required of any government revenue streams. As such, higher levels of income taxation and property taxation are generally associated with greater levels of state capacity, collective action, and redistribution between different groups in society. In other words, taxes on income and property mirror both the vertical contract between states and societies and the horizontal contract between different groups in society. In addition, since such taxes constitute the most visible form of taxation, they are suitable indicators of the degree to which citizens actually (quasi-)voluntarily comply with the state's demands for taxation.

The collection of trade taxes such as duties and tariffs are, on the other hand, often argued to require the least capability. Such taxes are generally paid to the state by the agents transporting commercial goods (or services) over national borders. In certain ways trade taxes exhibit the same properties as consumption taxes such as VAT. This is due to the fact that they tend to be much more regressive than for example income taxes. Since sales taxes and export taxes are not very

86 ibid: 94-110.
87 ibid: 99-100; Burgess & Stern 1993. However, taxes on property play a very small roll in the financing of virtually all central governments and are, in this sense, not a very important measurement. In fact, taken together, wealth and property taxes constitute the least important form of taxation in developing countries (in 1993 they contributed to a mere 0.5 percent of GDP). Their importance in industrial countries is also negligible (Burgess & Stern 1993).
88 Lieberman 2002. See in addition Peters 1991 for a discussion about different forms of taxation as indicators of state-society relations.
89 Especially personal income taxes have been linked to cooperative state-society relations and increased state capacity (Schumpeter 1991 (1918); North & Weingast 1989; Tilly 1990). However, for reasons that will be further discussed in the section on case selection, I will use both personal and corporate income taxes as a measurement.
91 Lieberman 2002: 103.
92 ibid.
visible in kind, high reliance on them can furthermore be argued to provide evidence that there is a low degree of (quasi-)voluntary compliance with tax demands among the population.

However, levels of income tax collections in one country are only useful as a measurement if we have the ability to compare them with levels of income tax collections in another country. In other words, as important as deciding what forms of taxation that best capture the phenomenon we want to study is the question of how comparisons across different countries in terms of tax state development can best be standardized. Three different alternatives in terms of potential denominators can be argued to exist: national income measures, total revenue, or no denominator at all. As argued by Lieberman, by far the most prevalent measure used to standardize tax collection revenue indicators across time and space is national income.\textsuperscript{93} It is also this denominator that will be used in this study.\textsuperscript{94} The motive for using national income as the denominator is equivalent to the motives of other researchers. First, the challenge for states is first and foremost to collect a portion of the total economy in tax revenues. Secondly, independently of the impact of other factors, the opportunities and constraints on taxation for policy makers and the bureaucracy are ultimately determined by the size of the country's economic output.\textsuperscript{95} In addition, there are large problems involved with the use of the two other alternatives. In terms of total revenues, such a denominator risks giving a very distorted picture of state-society relations since countries collect different levels of taxation and revenue overall in relation to, for example, national income.\textsuperscript{96} The option to use no denominator at all is, on the other hand, problematic since it leaves too much to the author in terms of interpretation with reference to the specific context.

Finally, in order to make cross-country comparisons of variation in tax state development we must have an idea about how to interpret the levels of taxation at different levels of government. Since the point of departure of this study is empirical variation in statehood, it becomes interesting to

\textsuperscript{93} ibid: 106.
\textsuperscript{94} Problems may arise with this measurement, however, if one considers that states may choose to levy fewer taxes than they actually can. Some scholars have therefore used the notion of ‘tax effort’ indices that measure the ratio of actual tax share to the predicted tax share based on a set of economic variables. However, these indices are still in their infancy as tools of comparative political analysis (see Fauvelle-Aymar 1999; Hood 2003).
\textsuperscript{95} Lieberman 2002.
\textsuperscript{96} For this critique, see ibid.
The state of taxation

explore and compare taxation outcomes primarily with reference to the central level of government. However, also collections on the local levels of government may give us a hint about the comparative strength of central states. In fact, it is possible to imagine three different potential scenarios in terms of different tax collection outcomes with regard to the relationship between the central and local levels of government. The central government may be a stronger tax collector than local governments, a weaker tax collector than local governments, or central and local governments may be equally strong. Considering these three potential outcomes, it is in relative terms relevant to think of the first alternative as reflecting the greatest central level tax capability, the second as reflecting the lowest central government tax capability, and the third as reflecting a medium case.

The argument

The conceptualization of the tax state as a collective action dilemma most effectively solved by quasi-voluntary compliance implies that, if a positive path of tax state development is to be achieved, two sets of cooperative relationships need to be established: a vertical relationship between society and the state, and a horizontal relationship between citizens. What seems to be at stake for the modern tax state is, in other words, to forge a sense of meaning and belonging among the people living within its territorial borders – to help people separate those with whom they feel safe, for whom one has clear expectations for how they will behave, from others. Furthermore, the modern tax state needs to establish itself as the most legitimate political organization among its juridically defined population. Yet, while this understanding of taxation in many important ways makes sense, our knowledge concerning the prior factors that can explain variation in state-society relations and, as such; variation in tax state development, remains more limited.

Since the policy area of taxation is as complex as it is, it is reasonable to assume that individual-based information about costs and benefits is so imperfect that it is simply beyond comprehension that any actor could make an accurate assessment of how these compare and choose to comply or not based on this information. Rather, it is relevant to assume that most members of society will pursue their interests in line with those of the most

politically relevant groups to which they belong. Building on this insight, in an attempt to further the understanding of varying national trajectories of tax state development, this study takes its departure in Levi’s theory about the important role played by the bargaining power of states vis-à-vis their citizens for achieving positive paths of tax state development, but aims to add specificity to Levi’s model by exploring the various ways in which taxation can also be affected by socially constructed factors, such as the political mobilization of ethnic group identities. More specifically, building on theories about the decisive role played by a shared national identity for solving national collective action dilemmas such as the one of taxation, this study provides a historical institutional explanation to varying taxation outcomes, highlighting the importance of foundational moments when notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ get socially constructed, shaping the logic of political competition for long periods of time. More specifically, as illustrated in Figure 1.2, I develop and test an argument that relates the degree of official recognition of multiculturalism –– as ultimately specified in key legal documents typically including the constitution, various laws, and national policies during formative periods of state development –– to the further development of notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately, the tax state. As such, while this study highlights the importance of the relative bargaining power of states vis-à-vis their constituents in order to understand variations in taxation outcomes, it goes beyond Levi’s model by making her key analytic variables – such as the bargaining power, transactions costs, discount rates, and the perceptions of fairness – endogenous.

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The need for a deeper empirical understanding of how the degree of officially recognized multiculturalism affects (tax) state development could not be more urgent. The degree to which constituents share a national identity has commonly been argued to be one of the most decisive factors accounting for variation in state-society relations and, consequently, in collective action outcomes such as taxation. According to this argument, regardless of potential inequalities and exploitative behavior within the nation, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.\textsuperscript{99} It is also the fraternity of the nation –– derived mainly from the common set of symbols and cognitions shared by the people belonging to it –– that ultimately makes it possible for so many millions of people to pay the taxes to, or even willingly die for, the ambitions of the state.\textsuperscript{100} As such, in the words of Emerson, the nation is a “terminal community –– the largest community that, when the chips are down, effectively commands men’s loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those that cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society…”\textsuperscript{101} According to the same logic, it has also been argued that when various ethnic identities become mobilized within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state, this usually generates an important and non-universalistic set of views concerning appropriate collective goods and standards of fairness.\textsuperscript{102} Yet, despite the fact that almost all states today are,  

or at least claim to be, nation-states and hence subscribe to the legitimating
doctrine of national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{103} Very few states have nations in terms of
what the word actually implies; i.e. “an intergenerational community, more
or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland,
sharing a distinct language and history.”\textsuperscript{104} While it in the past was perhaps
feasible to divide countries into those with ethnically homogenous societies
and those societies defined by ethnic diversity, over the last half century,
such polarities have been eliminated.\textsuperscript{105} Accordingly, today more or less all
sovereign nation-states, including more well-established states in the
industrialized parts of the world, are ethnically diverse.\textsuperscript{106}

Along with this ‘new’ reality, the discussion concerning how diverse
states should best be governed has grown increasingly loud and infected.
While, for some observers, the general lack of fit between political and
ethno-cultural boundaries is at complete odds with the very idea of the
nation-state, and hence argued to mean a threat to the strength and survival
of the nation-state \textit{per se},\textsuperscript{107} the general debate on the subject has rather
been concerned with the varying ways states may deal with ethnic diversity
within the framework of public policy and law-making as to best forge a
sense of nationhood. Being the official definition of the national political
community, the formal criteria for citizenship (such as the degree to which
citizenship is associated with ethnic group rights) are truly at the heart of
the idea of the national political community and intimately linked to
common values and a shared identity. As such, according to the tenets of
institutional theory, the formal criteria for citizenship provide an
extraordinary opportunity for the state to tie people to specific geographic
entities, as defined by territorial boundaries.\textsuperscript{108} Depending on how
citizenship gets defined, certain identities, including ethnic identities, have
the potential to become more important as a basis for the formation of

\textsuperscript{103} Brubaker 1992: 28.
\textsuperscript{104} As defined by Kymlicka 1995: 18.
\textsuperscript{105} Banting 1998.
\textsuperscript{106} ibid; Kymlicka 1995. However, neither Western European states, which have by and large served as
models and ideal-type nation-states, were natural from the beginning. As among others Mann (Mann
1999) has pointed out, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and the reordering of territorial borders all served as
means to establish ethnically homogeneous states at the time for Western European state formation. As
such, the fact that Western-European nation-states are ethnically diverse is actually hardly a new fact
despite the tendencies in the media and literature to view them as such.
\textsuperscript{107} In a study from 1986 for example, Freeman predicted that immigration would lead to the
“Americanization of European welfare policies”. Alesina and Glaeser, in a study from 2004, worry about
whether the generous European welfare state can really survive in a heterogeneous society.
\textsuperscript{108} Herbst 2000.
political interests, as well as for political action, than others. This may happen via a variety of different channels (apart from the specifications in the constitution, various laws, and national policies), including the media, museums, the census, and maps. Furthermore, because of the costs of inventing new bases for political mobilization are likely to be high, political entrepreneurs have strong incentives to preserve existing patterns of political organization. The idea that some people are insiders and some outsiders, that some groups are allies and some are adversaries, hence becomes a natural part of political life in a given society, shaping reactions and counter-reactions to particular political orders. In fact, even while the exact idioms used for politics have changed the institutions that remain in form of the ideas and myths that sprung from the initial conditions may still be reinvented and adapted to new circumstances over time, hence setting in motion path-dependent processes of state development. Yet, while communitarians and liberals have time and again engaged in philosophical discussions over the importance of individual and group rights, pluralism, self-determination, and nationalism as means in order to forge a sense of community and belonging among diverse populations, these debates have only rarely engaged empirical social science research. As a result, we still have a poor understanding of which policies, or combination of policies, that have the greatest potential to generate a sense of solidarity. With this study, I hope to fill some of this empirical gap, and more specifically hope to do so by comparing the Botswanan, Zambian, and Ugandan cases. At the time of independence, these three African states were all ethnically diverse along multiple cleavages. Furthermore, mainly as a result of British policies of indirect rule, in all three states especially tribal-territorial ethnic loyalties were to a significant extent politically mobilized. As Geertz wrote upon observing the lack of integration of the “new states” of the Third World, “we have not just competing loyalties, but competing loyalties of the same general order.” Consequently, the true challenge to the newly independent African states came from the competing institutional claims to sovereignty which their states harbored. As a result, a large number of citizens and politicians alike came to conceive of the post-colonial African

109 See Skocpol 1992 for a similar argument.
110 Anderson 1983. See also Lieberman 2003.
112 ibid: 14.
113 For a similar critique, see Banting & Kymlicka 2004; Lamont & Molnár 2002.
state as not so much the outcome of a social contract, an instrument of collective action based on ‘common ideological convictions’\textsuperscript{115} or a shared national identity, but rather as an ‘alien’ institution.\textsuperscript{116} That is, they did not agree on the rules of the political game or that the political game should be played at all. Yet, even though in a direct comparison most African states are considerably weaker in terms of their capacity to govern their societies than are most other states, there is still wide variation in terms of state capacity in general, and taxation abilities in particular, across the African continent. Considering the overall precarious initial position of African states at the time of independence, if we can understand which factors that can explain why some African states have been able to develop more cooperative relationships to their societies than others, we should be significantly closer to a fuller understanding of varying paths of tax state development in other parts of the world as well. In the next section, I further discuss research design, material, and case selection.

Research design, material, and case selection

Conducting comparative case study research

The study is a comparative historical case study of the relationship between official manifestations of ethnic diversity and tax state development in Botswana, Zambia and Uganda. More specifically, I explore the causal relationship between the degree of official multiculturalism and tax state development. The empirical analysis draws on qualitative data in the form of official manifestations of ethnic diversity, as ultimately specified in core legal documents such as the constitution, laws, and various national policies at the time of independence.\textsuperscript{117} In particular constitutions have been argued to enjoy a special place in the life of any nation since they regulate not only the exercise of political power, but also the relationship between political entities and between the state and persons.\textsuperscript{118} As such, as the former Chief Justice of South Africa, Justice Ismail Mohammed, once observed, a constitution is not simply a statue which mechanically defines the structures of government and the governed, but it is “[A] mirror reflecting the

\textsuperscript{115} North 1981: 44.
\textsuperscript{116} Englebert 2000b.
\textsuperscript{117} Measurement and categorization validity will be further discussed when I develop my analytical instruments in chapters two and three.
\textsuperscript{118} Hatchard 1998.
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national soul, the identification of the ideals and aspirations of a nation; the articulation of the values binding its people and disciplining its government.”119 Being the supreme law, the constitution sets out the rights and duties of the citizens and is expected to survive for a lengthy period. Thus its makers do not intend it to be amended in the same way as acts of parliament, but it is rather protected by special and often rather complex amendment procedures.120 In addition, constitutions get written during moments of great political change, when the very foundations of political life have been shaken. During such periods, political elites negotiate the definition of the nation. Since there is no natural or genetic basis for nationhood, rules defining the terms of citizenship are contested. Of course, as argued by among others Lieberman, the definitions of citizenship may be revised to adapt to new ideas and/or circumstances, but at certain critical moments, truly novel definitions are advanced and accepted in the form of political settlements that become accepted as basic rules of the game within society.121 Subsequently, such definitions of the nation tend to cast a long shadow on the future, even once the initial conditions have changed. That is, the institutions that remain and endure after the change of the initial conditions set in motion path-dependent processes of state development.

However, since there is a risk that what is written in core legal and policy documents is not implemented in practice and does not, as such, necessarily reflect how politics is pursued ‘on the ground’, in order to make the analysis as thorough as possible I will take into consideration also the degree to which laws and policies have actually been implemented. That is, in addition to the analysis of law and policy documents, I will analyze the extent to which laws and policies are visible in ancillary institutions such as the national media, public schools, and national censuses. The analysis of the study as such follows in the footsteps of researchers such as Anthony Marx who have argued that while the degree of institutionalization of the national political community may vary across societies and over time, this generally increases as particular identities, rules, and common-sense frameworks are taken for granted as the perceived reality of politics, that is; when embedded in everyday life.122 The importance of not only studying written law and policy, but also the degree to which laws and policies have

119 As cited in Hatchard et al. 2004: 12.
121 Lieberman 2003.
122 Marx 1996c: 207.
actually been implemented has in addition been put forward by Hammergren who argues that while “[i]t is true that constitutions and legislation often accord enormous powers of control to central governments…[the] question remains whether this control is actually exercised or exists only on paper”.\textsuperscript{123} Following this view, the greater the extent to which a particular state’s official approach towards ethnic diversity is reflected not only in key legal and policy documents, but in ancillary institutions too, the more institutionalized it can be considered to be.

It could be claimed that an institutional perspective is inappropriate in the African context since many would argue that the lack of stable and strong political institutions is precisely what characterizes many African states. Stephen Krasner has for example argued that “Most developing countries have very weak domestic political institutions.”\textsuperscript{124} While such scepticism towards adopting an institutional perspective in the context of developing countries is perhaps understandable at a first glance, there are still a number of problems with such an approach, the most important being that there are in fact strong institutions in place in most African states.\textsuperscript{125} Yet, the question of whether an institutional perspective is appropriate or not in the African context is, in the end, more than anything else an empirical question. By exploring whether the official definitions of the ethnic boundaries of citizenship specified in key legal and policy documents at the time of independence have in fact served as critical junctures\textsuperscript{126} in the sense that they have structured notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately, tax state development in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda for a long period of time, this study can be considered a rather tough test of institutional theory in general and historical institutionalism in particular. Accordingly, if the political institutions under investigation in this study – i.e. the formal criteria for citizenship, and more specifically, the degree of officially recognized multiculturalism – matter for social and political development in the context of the comparatively weak states of sub-Saharan Africa, such institutions are most likely important for social and political development in the context of comparatively stronger states too. Yet, since the impact of political institutions is often heavily mediated by

\textsuperscript{123} Hammergren 1977: 449. See Migdal 1988 for further examples.
\textsuperscript{124} Krasner 1985: 28.
\textsuperscript{125} Therkildsen 2001: 109.
\textsuperscript{126} More generally, a critical juncture can be understood as a "period of significant change, which occurs in distinct ways in different countries…and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies" (Collier & Collier 1991: 29, as cited in Lieberman 2003: 13).
features of the overarching political and historical context, the question of whether assimilative and multicultural approaches towards citizenship will have exactly the same effects in other countries is still open for empirical investigation. At the time of independence, the Botswanan, Zambian, and Ugandan states were all comparatively very weak states. Consequently, it could potentially be the case that the adoption of similar policies in comparatively stronger states such as the modern Western European ones will produce a rather different outcome in terms of tax state development. In addition, the historical institutional perspective adopted in this study attaches a great deal of importance to issues of timing and sequencing. That is, when things happen, or the order in which different processes unfold, can itself be an extremely important part of the causal story.

The comparative case study method is of course but one of several ways of doing social science research. As a method, it has often been criticized in terms of what has been perceived as a limited ability to make generalizations. This critique is, by and large, associated with the fact that comparative case studies (similar to this study) often rely on a practice known as ‘selecting on the dependent variable’. King, Keohane, and Verba have for example argued that the best intentional design “selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable without regard to the values of the dependent variables.” In a similar fashion, Geddes has argued that while the study of cases selected on the dependent variable may be “ideal for digging into details” of a situation, it cannot by itself “test the theories they propose, and, hence, can not contribute to the accumulation of theoretical knowledge.” It has furthermore been argued that truncating case selection on the dependent variable leads to an underestimation of the effects of the independent variable in the sense that it leads to a flatter regression line than would be produced if cases were selected from among the whole population. Yet, this critique directed towards the case study method is not without its problems. In fact, much of the critique could presumably be successfully avoided if the people practicing the method, as well as the critics, were more careful in terms of differentiating between ‘statistical’ generalization and ‘analytic’

127 Katznelson 1997; Ragin 1987.
129 Pierson 2000b.
130 King et al. 1994: 140.
131 Geddes 1990: 149.
132 King et al. 1994.
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generalization.\textsuperscript{133} In contrast to how cases are viewed within the field of statistical research, cases within the field of case study research are not sampling units and should therefore not be chosen for this reason. Instead, within the field of case study research, it is more fruitful to consider cases to be like multiple experiments. Accordingly, case studies, like experiments, are generalizable primarily to theoretical propositions, and not to populations or universes.\textsuperscript{134} That is, if two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed.\textsuperscript{135} In this sense, case studies can be argued to be able to produce the evidence in order to make generalizations about the necessary, rather than the sufficient, conditions for certain events to take place.\textsuperscript{136} In addition, as argued by, among others, Bennett and Elman, the truncation critique only applies if the author works with a pre-constituted population to which the purported causal relationship applies. If the author is not working with such a population, then addressing the question of selection bias before establishing an appropriate population could more or less be considered equivalent to putting the cart before the horse.\textsuperscript{137}

While many of the issues discussed in relation to which comparative advantages there may be with regard to choosing cases on the dependent or on the independent variable respectively are in many ways interesting and important, the discussion so far has by and large ignored a perhaps even more important issue, namely; which question we want to answer with the method used. The overall objective of this study is to understand and explain variation in tax state development. That is, it is variation in the dependent variable that is in focus of the study. Only after this variation has been described can we consider why the variation has occurred. With this in mind, there are at least two reasons for why choosing cases on the dependent variable is not only perfectly fine, but in fact the better alternative. First, if the cases had been selected on the independent variable rather than on the dependent variable, the research question would need to be reformulated in quite a different manner. More specifically, instead of asking “How can we understand variation in tax state development?” (which is how the question is posed now), we would instead need to ask the question “How do official manifestations of ethnic diversity affect tax state

\textsuperscript{133} Terms borrowed from Yin 1994: 31.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid: 10.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid: 31.
\textsuperscript{136} Dion 1998: 129.
\textsuperscript{137} Bennett & Elman 2006.
development?” Even though I in fact will be able to answer also this second question in the study (which is yet another argument for why choosing cases on the dependent variable is, for the purpose of this study, the superior method and not merely a good one), putting the question in this second manner would still lead to a quite different study. More specifically, asking the second question, the tax state – and not the political mobilization of ethnic identities – would be the focus of the empirical analysis. That is, taking its beginning in the political mobilization of ethnic identities, the main focus of the empirical analysis would be differences in tax systems between the three countries rather than various political constructions of the national political community and resulting patterns of notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as is the case now.

Secondly, an additional but related argument in defense of the procedure of selecting cases on the dependent variable would be that, in case the ambition had in fact been to make the rather different study described above, there would have been an overarching risk of biased case selection since there is data available on taxation, but by and large no data available on the extent to which sub-Saharan African states have officially recognized ethnic diversity. From this perspective, one might argue that an additional and, in fact, a main contribution of this study, is the comprehensive classification of three countries in terms of official definitions of the ethnic boundaries of citizenship, making future comparisons having their point of departure in the independent variable easier to visualize.

In sum, by offering a structured, in-depth comparison of the causal relationship between official manifestations of multiculturalism, notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and tax state development in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda, this study has the potential to add to theory a large amount of general and comprehensive knowledge about the institutional sources of statehood. As such, the analytical leverage gained by the methodology and research design employed in this study goes beyond both the knowledge we would gain from a large-N statistical analysis and the ad-hoc explanations that are otherwise characteristic of many historical case studies.138

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138 Scharpf 1997; Scharpf 2000. Making a cooking metaphor, Pierson argues that while cross-sectional statistical analysis is frequently based on the assumption that it does not matter in what order the different ingredients were introduced into the pot; the analyst is simply measuring for their relative presence or absence at some point in time, the historical institutional perspective has a greater potential to add to theory a greater knowledge about the actual causal relationship between different factors (Pierson 2000b).
The cases in perspective

Why should Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda be the focus of this comparative case study? As previously mentioned, there are in principle two main reasons. First, despite great similarities in terms of tax state development before independence, today, the three cases provide the differences in tax regimes that could enrich the theory of taxation. Secondly, with the point of departure in widely acknowledged theories about the relationship between natural resource abundance and taxation, the three states of concern vary in a quite unexpected way. According to such theories, we should expect states rich in natural resources like oil, gas, and minerals to be characterized by lower levels of taxation than states less rich in natural resources.139 The underlying reasons for this negative relationship between unearned income and taxation outcome are at least twofold. To begin with, since states that gain substantial incomes from external sources do not rely on domestic taxes for their survival and/or for public goods provision, the incentives for such states to establish cooperative relations to their societies are not very strong. In fact, a large number of studies have rather pointed at a positive relationship between rentier income and non-accountable, even authoritarian, rule.140 In other words, there seems to be a strong relationship between taxation and the vertical social contract between states and their societies as captured in the American revolutionary dictum: “No taxation without representation”.141 Secondly, abundance of natural resources has been argued to weaken the horizontal social contract between citizens too since different groups want to benefit from the natural resources to the greatest extent possible. In line with this argument, a large number of studies relate the abundance of natural resources to intra-state conflict, and even civil war.142 That is, abundance of natural resources seems to weaken the willingness among the population to cooperate around national development goals and to

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139 The concept of the rentier state and the relationship between unearned income, state-society relations, and taxation was first postulated by Hossein Mahdavy with respect to pre-revolutionary Pahlavi Iran in 1970 (Mahdavi 1970). The idea has since been appropriated especially by a community of Middle East Specialists in their discussion of the Arab world. However, more recently, the discussion on rentier states has also been extended outside the Arab world (for excellent reviews of the rentier state literature, see Cooley 2001; Ross 1999).

140 Karl 1997; Ross 1999.

141 See Yates 1996: 34. As an anecdote it can be mentioned that, on the front of the Ministry of Taxation in Washington D.C., it can be read that “Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society” (Oliver Wendel Holmes).

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redistribute resources, in the end constraining the state in its demands for progressive forms of taxation (such as income taxes). Yet, quite contrary to what theory predicts, while compared to Zambia and Uganda, the Botswanan state today stands out as the one depending most heavily on unearned income from natural resources (mineral export constituted 35.1 percent of GDP in 1995),\footnote{Ross 2004.} it has still successfully avoided the resource curse and been able to establish a social contract between the citizens and the state, as well as between citizens, that allows it to extract a comparatively large amount of taxes, especially in the form of progressive individual and corporate income taxes. As a result, Botswana today defies the picture of the ‘weak’ African state and is considered a success case not only in African comparison, but also by global standards. In fact, Botswana has one of the most effective and progressive tax systems of all the former British colonies in the region with a total tax-to-GDP ratio of 32 percent and income tax collections mounting up to a total of 26.4 percent of GDP.\footnote{World Bank 2005b; World Bank 2005c, own calculations.} Quite contrary to Botswana, Uganda –– the only country in the sample not being classified as a highly mineral-dependent state\footnote{According to Ross’s classification, countries that have mineral exports worth more than 5 percent of GDP are referred to as mineral-dependent countries while countries with mineral exports worth more than 20 percent of GDP are referred to as highly mineral-dependent states (Ross 2004).} – experienced a long period of political violence and state failure after independence and even today the country remains an archetype of the weak state. In terms of taxation abilities, Uganda is far below the sub-Saharan African average with total tax revenues mounting up only to about 10 percent of GDP, and income tax collections to about 2.4 percent of GDP.\footnote{World Bank 2005c, own calculations.} Compared to the tax systems in Botswana and Zambia, the Ugandan tax system is in addition considerably more regressive. Finally, Zambia falls somewhere in between Botswana and Uganda both in terms of dependence upon unearned income (in 1995 mineral exports constituted 24.97 percent of Zambia’s GDP)\footnote{Ross 2004.} and taxation abilities. Zambia hence provides a good example of a middle-range case, not only in a comparison between the three countries of interest for this study, but in a comparison of all the former British colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. Today, total tax revenues in Zambia amount to about 18 percent of GDP, and income tax collections to about 7.2 percent of GDP.\footnote{World Bank 2005c, own calculations.} Below, I further discuss
patterns of taxation in the three countries before and after independence with reference to the empirical indicators of tax state development discussed earlier in this chapter, such as central government income tax collections as a share of GDP, size of the informal sector, the force needed for the state to be able to collect taxes, as well as the degree of tax evasion. As argued earlier in this chapter, since the collection of taxes is the ultimate goal of every tax state, the critical factor separating the cases, and the primary basis for case section, is central income tax collections as a share of GDP.

Pre-independence convergences

After the scramble for Africa, the territories that were later to become known as Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda, all became British protectorates. Until the early post-war period, the major concern of the British colonial authorities was to establish and maintain an effective administration. In general, priority was given to tax collection, the maintenance of order, and the provision of rudimentary roads and water supplies. Especially in the protectorates tax collection was a major concern since they were meant to be self-sufficient. With this in mind, as soon as colonial hegemony was established, the British set up so called 'extractive states'. The main purposes of the extractive state were twofold; to solidify control and to facilitate the extraction of resources. However, while in Western Europe warfare against external enemies largely functioned as a unifying and legitimizing bond that enabled states to impose high levels of direct taxation, such external driving forces were essentially absent in Africa. As a consequence, progressive taxation of personal and company incomes in Africa was in general relatively underdeveloped at the time of independence. Instead, most African states relied primarily on indirect forms of taxation such as, for example, trade taxes. This was, by and large, the case also in terms of the three cases of interest for this study, Zambia

\[149\] In most territories of the African continent, a formal and organized system of taxation apart from tributes paid to chiefs had been absent before the colonial period (Herbst 2000: 116).

\[150\] Johns & Riley 1975.

\[151\] See, for example, Mogalakwe 2006.

\[152\] Acemoglu et al. 2001.

\[153\] ibid.

\[154\] See, for example, Herbst 2000; Herbst 2003.

\[155\] For a further discussion about the tax structures of African states just before independence, see UN Economic Commission for Africa 1961.
perhaps being somewhat of an exception. More specifically, figures of tax collections as a percentage of GDP collected just before independence reveal that central government direct tax collections contributed to as little as 3 percent of GDP in Botswana, 2 percent in Uganda, and 5 percent in Zambia by the end of the colonial period.\textsuperscript{156} Central government indirect tax collections, on the other hand, contributed to 4 percent of GDP in Botswana, 6 percent in Uganda, and 1 percent in Zambia.\textsuperscript{157} That is, with some exception of Zambia which taxed company income already in 1921 and as such managed to extract more revenues in the form of direct taxes than most other states in British colonial Africa,\textsuperscript{158} the collection of direct taxes in all three countries was made up almost exclusively of regressive head, hut, and poll taxes. In fact, in Botswana a graduated income tax was not introduced until 1949 after a long period of opposition and negotiations,\textsuperscript{159} and throughout the colonial period it remained rather

\textsuperscript{156} Figures are from 1960 for Botswana and Uganda, and from 1963 for Zambia (collected from: UN Economic Commission for Africa 1968; UN Economic Commission for Africa 1971, own calculations).

\textsuperscript{157} UN Economic Commission for Africa 1968; UN Economic Commission for Africa 1971 (own calculations). Except for figures on taxes on foreign trade as a share of GDP for Uganda, which are from 1963, figures are from 1960 for Botswana and Uganda, and from 1963 for Zambia.

\textsuperscript{158} In fact, in this, the Zambian colonial government was very unusual; elsewhere in British colonial Africa there was no income tax at all before 1945, except in Nyasaland (1921-), Nigeria (1927-, but not for companies until 1940), and Kenya (1920-22, 1937-). However, even though the Zambian case in some regards can be argued to have constituted an exception at the time of independence, the copper industry was only a direct source of revenue to the extent that it made a gross profit over and above the costs of production, and these included royalties which had to be paid as long as copper was produced and sold above a certain price, regardless of profitability. Thus not only did royalties accrue to a private company; they considerably diminished the taxable income of the mining industry. Furthermore, as argued by Roberts, since the operating companies had their headquarters in London, they were reliable to taxation in Britain as well as in Northern Rhodesia. This meant, in the end, that Northern Rhodesia lost about three-eights of the revenue which it could otherwise have levied from the copper mines. However, income taxation continued to play a comparatively important role in Zambia at least during the first period of colonial rule, and in 1941 the tax burden on the copper industry was increased when excess profits taxation was introduced. The effect of this new policy was the doubling of the mining companies’ tax contribution to the Northern Rhodesia colonial government. However, with the creation of the Central African Federation in 1953 (embracing the territories that would later become Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi), Zambia could no longer determine its own rate of income tax. (Roberts 1982: 351-3).

\textsuperscript{159} At this stage, the income tax was a basic tax at 28 shillings and a graded tax based on property and earnings. 35 percent of this was, in turn, to be retained by the tribal treasuries, including the entire graded tax, a tax on horses and tax on employed professional women and minors owning more than 20 head of cattle. The lowest income group was proposed to be fixed at 2 shillings. However, when this matter was discussed with taxpayers, regional responses varied. As a result, the graded tax proclamation was amended in 1953 to create an advantage of flexibility permitting any one district or tribal area to vary its own rates from time to time in accordance with the circumstances and the financial requirements of its treasury. In 1954 Africans in the African Advisory Council also successfully rejected a government suggestion to introduce income tax on African traders (Makgala 2004).
unevenly applied.\textsuperscript{160} In addition, theft and embezzlement of tax money remained a problem.\textsuperscript{161}

In Uganda too, the introduction of a graduated income tax proper was rather late. Yet, it was still introduced somewhat earlier compared to in Botswana; in 1945.\textsuperscript{162} Within the Ugandan income taxation framework, all African groups – farmers, wage-earners, and businessmen – were meant to pay a graduated tax at 5-7 percent of income.\textsuperscript{163} However, as in Botswana and Zambia, the Ugandan income tax remained rather unevenly applied throughout the colonial period.

In sum, with regard to income tax collections, even though there were nascent structures allowing for the collection of graduated income tax in all three countries before independence – and in Zambia perhaps to a somewhat larger extent compared to Botswana and Uganda – the head, hut, and poll taxes played a more important role as sources of direct taxation during the colonial period. In fact, until the mid-1940’s, the three states collected direct taxes almost exclusively in the form of head, hut, and poll taxes from the African population.\textsuperscript{164} In Botswana, the head (hut) tax was introduced in 1899 and came to account for a total of 40 percent of total revenue between 1900 and 1930 (in some years it even comprised as much as 60 percent of total revenue).\textsuperscript{165} In Zambia, a similar tax was imposed in the northeastern part of the territory in 1900 and in the northwestern part in 1904 by The British South Africa Company, and also here it quickly

\textsuperscript{160} For example, in Molepolole it was decided by a vote to fix the lowest income group at 5 shillings. At Kanye, the people concurred with the proposal of the African Advisory Council. In Serowe, it was cautioned that since the main source of graded tax would be cattle, account would have to be taken that collections would fluctuate due to catastrophes such as an outbreak of cattle disease. In Maun, while people accepted the proposal they were unhappy with the increase in taxation above the pre-war level, especially since their Kgosi had promised that all wartime increases would be over after the war (ibid: 301).

\textsuperscript{161} For a further discussion on the income tax in Botswana during the colonial period, see ibid.

\textsuperscript{162} However, already before 1945, a sliding rate for non-Africans had been introduced in which the minimum tax was 30 shillings for incomes less than £200 and the maximum £500 for incomes in excess of £10,000 (Jamal 1978: 428). Within the Uganda income taxation framework, on top of the flat-rate poll tax collected by the central government, a graduated tax was instituted to be collected by local governments. Rates were set to take account of the boom in the agricultural sector and their effect was to double the average rate of taxation on Africans (Jamal 1978: 428-9). For a more detailed discussion on income taxation in Uganda, see Jamal 1978; Elkan 1938.

\textsuperscript{163} Jamal 1978.

\textsuperscript{164} In fact, in most colonial territories the bulk of the revenue came from this tax at least during the construction phase. As such, the head tax can be argued to have been the mortar with which, block by block, the colonial state was built (Young 1994).

\textsuperscript{165} Makgala 2004: 293.
became the very core of the government. In Uganda, the poll tax was introduced in 1900. Head, hut, and poll taxes were not based on the ability to pay, but were imposed on persons simply because they lived in society. As such, they constituted a highly regressive form of taxation which placed a heavy burden especially on the poor. In all three countries, the system of head tax collection was, in addition, decentralized. The reason for this was that, when the imposition of taxes brought with it significant changes for Africans in terms of increased labor work in exchange for cash, the colonizers rather soon discovered that taxation was a labor intensive activity, requiring far more staff than the colonial governments had at their disposal. In addition, collecting tax required detailed information about the distribution of the African population – information that most colonial governments did not possess. Only an apparatus reaching down to the village could assure a mechanism of extraction. As such, in order to be able to collect head taxes, the colonial governments enlisted the help of indigenous chiefs. As argued by Posner, it was assumed that these local rulers knew the locations of the taxable males in the areas under control and in addition already possessed a machinery for extracting tribute that could be employed also for the collection of taxes. However, in order to get African chiefs to carry out these obligations, both coercive support of the state and a share of the rewards were often needed. Consequently, in most places, a deal was struck between the colonial government and local rulers whereby the indigenous rulers would use their authority and local administrative capacity to extract revenues from their subjects and, in return, the colonial government would protect them from

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167 Jamal 1978: 419.
168 In the words of Bishop Tucker, a contemporary observer of Ugandan development, demands for taxation “[…] stirred to action and electrified into life a whole nation. Men knew that by a certain date the requisite rupees must be forthcoming” (as cited in ibid: 420). The governor of Uganda, Governor Sadler, in a similar vein told a meeting of the Royal colonial Institute in 1904 that “[the tax will prove to be] the making of the country – because of the habit of work it incalculates” (as cited in Jamal 1978: 420). In fact, the introduction of a universal poll tax in Uganda in 1900 played a very important role in the establishment of the cotton industry. By forcefully encouraging the planting of cotton, the British ensured that there was no excuse for failing to pay the poll tax (Jamal 1978). In Botswana, the hut tax precipitated an outflow of labor to South African mines and farms (Mogalakwe 2006: 76-7). Similarly, in Zambia, the imposition of the head tax induced a large number of African men to take wage employment in the mines (Posner 2005: 26).
170 ibid.
rivals and guarantee their status as local leaders.\textsuperscript{172} The chiefs were generally also given a commission on the taxes collected, which in fact often exceeded state demands.\textsuperscript{173} After the imposition of the hut tax in Botswana for example, the colonial state enlisted the support of the chiefs by offering them a 10 percent commission on the amount of tax collected from their subjects.\textsuperscript{174} Yet, in many places, material incentives by no means sufficed to ensure vigorous tax collection by the chiefs. As such, in addition to carrots, in most territories, police operations and punitive expeditions were widely required. Revocations, imprisonment, and public whippings of chiefs were frequent in the early period of derelict performance fulfilling tax and labor demands of the administration.\textsuperscript{175} Furthermore, the rest of the population often became subject to harsh methods too. In Botswana for example, the law that introduced the hut tax, Proclamation 10 of 1899, provided that anybody convicted of failure to pay tax within three months after the due date would be liable to a fine of five pounds, and in default of payment, to a term of imprisonment with or without hard labor for a period not exceeding three months.\textsuperscript{176} In general, the imposition of head tax was met with great public resistance. In Botswana, relations between tax collectors and the rest of the population was mostly hostile. For example, an attempt made during the colonial period to introduce a bicycle tax was vehemently opposed by many taxpayers, as well as by district commissioners.\textsuperscript{177} Since public opinion prevailed, the idea of a bicycle tax was, ultimately, abandoned.\textsuperscript{178} In Ngamiland, tax collection by regiments was called ‘mphahela’ (‘just give me’) and was commonly viewed as state-sanctioned banditry.\textsuperscript{179} In 1939, African members of the Botswana native advisory council unanimously rejected the suggestion to introduce a graduated income tax. According to the African members of the board, through the ancient ‘mafisa’ system (a system whereby cattle owners gave some of their cattle to other people, particularly poorer ones, to look after them and use them for draught power, milk, and meat when they died), richer people already provided for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{172} Posner 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Young 1994: 127-9.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Mogalakwe 2006: 78.
\item \textsuperscript{175} Young 1994.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Mogalakwe 2006: 78.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Makgala 2004: 291-2.
\item \textsuperscript{178} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{179} ibid: 296.
\end{itemize}
the poorer ones, hence making a graduated income tax unnecessary. In addition, they claimed that a graduated income tax would only bring panic and confusion. Similar patterns of tax resistance were prevalent in Zambia and Uganda too. In Zambia, the gradual imposition of tax and rising demands for labor, led to tax revolts and to passive resistance to labor recruitment. As argued by Rotberg, especially the Tonga were notoriously successful in avoiding tax payments, as were their Bisa and Unga neighbors, who annually fled into the Bangwelu swamps in order to avoid the tax collectors. In some areas, the imposition of taxes was even resisted violently. For example, in the Eastern Province of Uganda there were at least seventeen revolts against taxation from 1903 to 1911. In other parts of Uganda, the perceived burden and illegitimacy of taxation was sufficient to cause mass migration. Those who stayed composed songs about taxation that are still sung to this day. The chorus of one song goes:

“Olumbe musolo terudukwa, Werukusangira Wobera” – “Tax or government’s obligations are like death. You cannot run away from them. Wherever you go, you will feel their wright. You will be taxed there.”

In conclusion, as illustrated in Table 1.2, prior to independence, patterns of taxation in the three countries were very similar.

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180 ibid: 299-300. However, as argued by Makgala, later research has in fact shown that poverty and income inequality was a part of the Tswana society already in the pre-colonial era (see, for example, Iliffe 1987).
181 Makgala 2004: 300.
182 Henderson 1970: 593.
183 Rotberg 1965.
185 ibid: 25-6.
More specifically, all three countries were characterized by mainly indirect forms of regressive taxation. In fact, figures of tax collections as a percentage of GDP collected just before independence reveal that central government direct tax collections contributed to as little as 3 percent of GDP in Botswana, 2 percent in Uganda, and 5 percent in Zambia. To the extent that central governments collected direct taxes at all, they mainly managed to collect regressive direct taxes in the form of head, hut, and poll taxes. In all three countries, the collection of head, hut, and poll taxes was in addition decentralized and often subject to great resistance from the African population. Yet, while Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda

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186 Figures are from 1960 for Botswana and Uganda and from 1963 for Zambia (collected from: UN Economic Commission for Africa 1968; UN Economic Commission for Africa 1971, own calculations).
demonstrated great similarities in terms of tax state development before independence, after independence the scenario much changed.

**Post-independence divergences**

As previously argued, the main reason for conducting a comparative study of tax state development in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda is that, despite great similarities in terms of tax state development prior to independence, after independence the three countries vary in a way that could potentially enrich the theory of taxation. In fact, today the three countries run the gamut of possibilities from one comparatively very weak tax state, Uganda, to one relatively strong tax state, Botswana. In between is Zambia, today an average sub-Saharan African state in terms of taxation abilities. More specifically, today Botswana defies the picture of the ‘weak’ African state and is considered a success case not only in African comparison, but also by global standards. While even today a significant proportion of the potential tax take remain uncollected in all three countries, the Botswanan state still manages to collect a significantly larger amount of direct taxes in the form of personal and corporate income taxes as a share of GDP compared to its Zambian and Ugandan counterparts, and this despite of the fact that marginal tax rates are much lower in Botswana than in Zambia and Uganda.\(^{187}\)

In Botswana a top marginal individual and corporate income tax rate of only 25 percent\(^{188}\) corresponds to 26.4 of GDP collected in taxes on income and profits, while top rates of 35 percent for both individuals and corporations in Zambia\(^{189}\) and of 30 percent in Uganda\(^{190}\) correspond to income tax-to-GDP ratios of only 7.2 and 2.4 percent respectively. Consequently, Botswana has one of the most effective and

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\(^{187}\) Yet, differences in tax outcomes cannot be explained by the low rates in Botswana as is often claimed since Uganda with the weakest capacity to tax its population, still has lower rates than Zambia, the medium case. In addition, it should be noticed that, much because of international pressure and then especially from the IMF, top marginal income tax rates have been lowered considerably in both Uganda and Zambia during the last couple of years, but with no resulting major changes in taxation capabilities. In Uganda, the corporate as well as individual income tax rates were lowered from 60 percent in 1987 to 30 percent in 1997 (Kangave 2005: 149). In Zambia too the top marginal income tax rate has been significantly reduced over time (von Soest 2006). That is, well in line with Casanegra de Jantscher’s assertion that, in a very real sense, tax administration is tax policy there does not seem to be any obvious connection between the respective tax rates and taxation outcomes in any of the three countries.

\(^{188}\) Botswana Government Gazette 2006.

\(^{189}\) Republic of Zambia 2007.

\(^{190}\) Republic of Uganda 1997.
progressive tax systems of all the former British colonies in the region.\textsuperscript{191} What is more; a considerable amount of the income taxes collected come from the diamond industry.\textsuperscript{192} Ever since diamonds were discovered in the 1970s, the Botswanan state has put an emphasis on natural resources as \textit{national} resources.\textsuperscript{193} Within this framework, the government has managed to negotiate a very favorable revenue-sharing formula for the different mines. For example, the contract entered into with the mining company De Beers provides that 75 percent of the revenue extracted from the Orapa mine and 80 percent from the Jwaneng mine remain with the state.\textsuperscript{194} That is, quite contrary to what theory predicts, Botswana has successfully managed to avoid the natural resource curse and is today even able to extract corporate income taxes from the diamond industry. In many ways, this can be considered to be the ultimate proof of the comparative strength of the Botswanan state.

In great contrast to Botswana, Uganda, the only country of the three not having an economy highly dependent on minerals and hence the country we should – according to theories about the natural resource curse – expect most from in terms of tax collection, is today far below the sub-Saharan African average in terms of taxation abilities with central government total tax revenues mounting up only to about 10 percent of GDP, and income tax collections to about 2.4 percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{195} Compared to the tax system in Botswana, the Ugandan tax system is in addition considerably more regressive.

Finally, central government total tax revenues in Zambia, the medium case in terms of unearned income from natural resources, amount to about 18 percent of GDP, and central government income tax collections to about 7.2 percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{196} As such, Zambia falls somewhere in between Botswana and Uganda in terms of tax abilities and hence provides a good example of a middle-range case. Quite contrary to in Botswana, the Zambian elites have predominantly viewed the country’s rather extensive natural resources as a curse rather than a blessing. Kenneth Kaunda, the first president of Zambia, commonly blamed the copper resources for

\textsuperscript{191} Total central government total tax collections mount up to 32 percent of GDP. In addition, the Botswanan central state collects about 8 percent of GDP in indirect taxes.

\textsuperscript{192} von Soest 2006.

\textsuperscript{193} For a further discussion on how the Botswana state has managed to avoid the resource curse and managed to hold natural resources as national resources, see Poteete 2007.


\textsuperscript{195} The indirect tax-to-GDP ratio in Uganda is about 8.5 percent.

\textsuperscript{196} The indirect tax-to-GDP ratio in Zambia is about 11 percent.
Zambia’s poor development performance, stating that “We are in part to blame, but this is the curse of being born with a copper spoon in our mouths.” On top, the copper industry is widely exempted from taxation, which means that the Zambian government has only to a very limited degree reaped the fruits of the at times very high world copper prices.

Besides having developed significantly different taxation abilities after independence in terms of central government income tax collections as a share of GDP, the three countries vary with regard to a large number of other indicators of tax state performance. While all three states face great resistance from the population when trying to collect taxes, compared to Zambia and Uganda, Botswana still performs better in terms of basically all indicators of tax state development. To begin with, whereas a large proportion of Botswana’s potential tax base remains outside the tax net, compared to its Zambian and Ugandan counterparts, the Botswanan state still has a considerably smaller informal sector. According to recent measures, the informal sector (or shadow economy) constitutes between 27 and 34 percent of GDP in Botswana, compared to about 49 percent in Zambia and 45 percent in Uganda. In Zambia, both the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural informal sector, which account for a significant percentage of the labor force, remain outside the tax net and thereby outside the realm of the state’s reach. While recent tax reforms have sought to bring Zambian street vendors and Asian traders based in Zambia into the tax net, the Minister of Finance has continued to grant significant exemptions to corporations and individual businessmen with political connections. Consequently, there are widespread perceptions in Zambia that tax policies are unfair. These concerns were well illustrated in the 2001 election campaign as a number of party programmes referred to unfair tax policies as a major concern.

Similar to its Zambian counterpart, the Ugandan tax policy has been characterized by a large number of exemptions and loopholes since independence. As such, similar to Zambia, Uganda too has a wide range of zero-rated and exempt goods. In addition, the new income act that was

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197 As cited in Ross 1999: 297.
199 Schneider 2004; Friedman et al. 2000. According to recent figures, between 1990 and 1994, more than 90 percent of new jobs created in Africa were in the informal sector (Auriol & Warlters 2005).
201 Rakner & Gloppen 2003.
enacted in 1997 in effect made the poor in Uganda ‘exempted’ from personal income tax since, in an attempt to broaden the definition of taxable income and eliminate discretionary tax exemptions and tax incentives, the annual threshold income in order for people to become subject for income taxation was set comparatively high (Ush 1,560,000 which is approximately US$ 900 by the 2005 exchange rate). As a result, the Ugandan income tax covers only a very small proportion of the population. Furthermore, similar to in Zambia, attempts made by the Ugandan state to expand the tax net have only been met with very little enthusiasm in the Ugandan Revenue Authority (URA), as well as in political circles and in the media. The fact that Uganda in comparison to the other two countries has put a considerably greater effort and a larger amount of resources into measures aiming at getting rid of tax evasion further supports the claim that Uganda is the weakest of the three tax states in focus of the study. More specifically, in a serious attempt on the side of the Ugandan state to raise the levels of taxpayer compliance, along with the recently discussed tax reforms, the Ugandan state has invested a large amount of resources in taxpayer education and tax advice facilities. In fact, the URA even publishes a cartoon about paying taxes, the Acul-Ocolo (A Taxpayers) Magazine. In addition, the Large Tax Payers Department was set up in 1998 to offer corporate service on all domestic taxes to the top 100 taxpayers and their subsidiaries. Moreover, the Tax Appeal Tribunal (TAT) was introduced in August 1998 to provide an independent mechanism to which taxpayers who are aggrieved by URA actions can go for redress. URA has furthermore instituted tax investigation mechanisms to ensure greater accountability on the part of revenue collectors and to strengthen the procedure for investigating allegations of corruption. However, in the end, the measures taken by the Ugandan state that perhaps most effectively illustrate that it suffers more severely from popular distrust, widespread perceptions of illegitimacy, and a resulting unwillingness among the population to respond to tax demands compared to its Botswanan and Zambian counterparts, is the fact that it has established para-military units to crack down on smuggling and tax evasion. More specifically, during the 1990s, a large number of more or less

203 ibid.
204 ibid.
205 Rakner & Gloppen 2003.
206 See http://www.ugrevenue.com/aculocoro/index.htm for the online version.
militarized units have been established to curb smuggling and tax evasion, such as the Anti-Smuggling Unit (ASU), followed by the Revenue Protection Service (RPS) and the Special Revenue Protection Service (SRPS). These units are deployed in all the revenue collection departments of the URA to curb tax malpractices and are staffed by military personnel. As such, over the last couple of decades, the Ugandan Revenue Service can be argued to have undergone a transformation towards a practice best characterized as a militarization of the revenue collection. The result is numerous articles in the Ugandan press reporting on the public complaints about the behavior of these units, certainly leading to even more widespread unwillingness among the Ugandan population to quasi-voluntarily comply with tax demands. While tax evasion is a real problem in Zambia and Botswana too, none of the measures taken to combat tax evasion in these two countries matches the measures taken by the Ugandan state, and yet the Zambian and the Botswanan states are both more effective in terms of tax ability. In fact, in order for the Ugandan state to collect 11 percent of GDP in total taxes, in average it pays as much as 3.6 percent of the total taxes collected in administrative costs. This figure can be compared to corresponding figures of 0.3 percent in Botswana (to collect 32 percent of GDP in taxes) and a little above 3 percent in Zambia (to collect 20 percent of GDP in taxes).

In sum, as illustrated in Table 1.3, after independence, the three cases provide the differences in tax regimes that could enrich theory.

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208 Ibid; Rakner & Gloppen 2003; Therkildsen 2003.
209 According to Rakner & Gloppen 2003, the anti-smuggling units employed by the Ugandan state represents one of the most blatant examples of how the long-term process of building a tax culture based on quasi-voluntary compliance is undermined by the short-term goal of meeting tax demands set by the international finance situation.
210 This figure reveals the average collection cost as a percentage of total taxes collected 1991-2001 (Taliercio 2004).
211 Figures are from 2000 and reveal the costs of collection prior to the establishment of a semi-autonomous tax structure in Botswana, and after the establishment of a semi-autonomous tax structure in Zambia (von Soest 2006: 118, 182).
### Table 1.3. Post-independence taxation patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TAX POLICY</td>
<td>Top marginal individual and corporate income tax rate: 25 percent * Some exemptions and loopholes</td>
<td>Top marginal individual and corporate income tax rate: 35 percent * A large number of exemptions and loopholes</td>
<td>Top marginal individual and corporate income tax rate: 30 percent * A large number of exemptions and loopholes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAX ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>Some problems with tax evasion</td>
<td>A lot of problems with tax evasion</td>
<td>A lot of problems with tax evasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax reforms have led to some expansion of the tax base *</td>
<td>Tax reforms have not led to the expansion of the tax base *</td>
<td>Tax reforms have not led to the expansion of the tax base *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some sanctions needed to collect taxes *</td>
<td>Some sanctions needed to collect taxes *</td>
<td>A lot of sanctions and force needed to collect taxes *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some degree of quasi-voluntary compliance</td>
<td>Little degree of quasi-voluntary compliance</td>
<td>Minimal degree of quasi-voluntary compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME TAX/GDP</td>
<td>26.4 percent</td>
<td>7.2 percent</td>
<td>2.4 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Considering the differences in tax regimes between the three countries, it is reasonable to theorize that if official manifestations of ethnic diversity matter for tax state development, the three cases should vary in terms of such manifestations. Accordingly, while the empirical focus of this study is comparative sub-Saharan African tax state development, the account put forward to explain varying national trajectories of tax state development in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda, should be as interesting for researchers whose interest lies with other parts of the world. Yet, before I develop my argument further, in the next section I discuss some of the potential alternative accounts of why states vary in terms of the ability to collect taxes.
Potential alternative explanations

How has variation in taxation outcomes been explained earlier in the literature? And how powerful are these explanations in terms of accounting for the varying national trajectories of tax state development in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda? As will be evident from the discussion below, while some of the earlier accounts have indeed generated a large number of important insights which help us understand why states vary in terms of taxation outcomes, there are still missing pieces that need to be explained.

Modernization

Since the mid-sixties, modernization theory has been highly influential among scholars aiming to account for systematic differences in taxation systems across countries. According to the argument, modernization leads to greater taxation capabilities through mainly two different mechanisms. To begin with, tax systems seem to vary according to the level of economic development insofar as the tax bases depend on national wealth. In addition, modernization seems to bring with it greater concentration and specialization of production which leads to increased demands for public goods and services on behalf of the population. This development makes tax collection easier since citizens can be convinced of the state’s need for financial resources.

Two general empirical observations can be derived from the literature on the relationship between modernization and taxation. First, there seems to be a positive relationship between modernization and tax revenues in an absolute sense. Secondly, there seems to be a positive relationship between modernization and tax revenues in relation to the size of the economy. In addition, while the modernization argument has traditionally been put forward to explain cross-national variation in levels of taxation, economic development has moreover been argued to be an important factor when trying to account for cross-national variation in tax structures. According to this latter argument, the least developed countries rely more on taxes that are easy to administer but not very productive and efficient, such as tariffs.

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212 See, for example, Peters 1991; Hinrichs 1966; Musgrave 1969.
213 Hinrichs 1966; Musgrave 1969.
215 ibid.
and excise, while the reliance on direct income taxation tends to increase with the level of economic development.\textsuperscript{216} As such, in sum, according to the modernization argument, the level of economic development in the end explains both the level and the structure of tax revenue.\textsuperscript{217} These general observations led a large number of earlier analysts to expect that countries would follow a common path of development and that developing countries would “catch up” with the industrialized world, resulting in the convergence of tax capabilities.\textsuperscript{218} In the same vein, politics was argued to matter very little for development. Yet, despite great convergence along similar modernization paths, persistent and even increasing differences with regard to taxation outcomes have been discovered in more recent comparative public policy studies.\textsuperscript{219} That is, while varying degrees of modernization can potentially explain some of the variation in taxation outcomes and structures, it cannot possibly account for all the variation. Figure 1.3, illustrating taxes on income and profits as a function of GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa, supports this critique.

\textsuperscript{216} Peters 1991.
\textsuperscript{217} See Fauvelle-Aymar 1999; Burgess & Stern 1993.
\textsuperscript{218} Lieberman 2003: 11.
\textsuperscript{219} Lieberman 2003.
The state of taxation

Figure 1.3. Taxes on income and profits/GDP as a function of GDP/capita in sub-Saharan Africa, 1999-2003

As illustrated in the above figure, the limits of modernization theory become evident even if we consider only the three cases of concern for this study. While Botswana had both the highest level of modernization as measured by GDP per capita and collected the greatest amount of income taxes as a share of GDP between 1999 and 2003, Uganda collected less income tax as a share of GDP than did Zambia despite the fact that Uganda had a higher GDP per capita level during the relevant period. In addition to the evidence against modernization theory provided by the cross-country comparison, over-time evidence too suggests that there are certain limits in terms of how far the modernization thesis can be stretched. Especially the Zambian and Ugandan cases provide good evidence that economic growth is not necessarily related to greater taxation abilities and the expansion of the tax base. Since 2000, Zambia’s economy has grown by

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While Botswana had an average GDP per capita of $8763 between 1999 and 2003, it collected 26.4 percent of its GDP as taxes on income and profits during the same period. Uganda, on the other hand, had an average GDP per capita of $1189 and income tax collections mounted up to only 2.4 percent of GDP. Finally, Zambia had the lowest degree of modernization at the time with a GDP per capita of $807, but still managed to collect more income taxes as expressed as a percentage of GDP, 7.2 percent.
4.4 percent on average with no increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio, indicating that the Zambian Revenue Authority has not been able to participate in the expanding economy. The same pattern exists in Uganda. That is, despite significant economic growth, taxation in general, and perhaps the broadening of the tax base in particular, is still regarded a politically very sensitive matter in Uganda and suggested reforms have been met with only little enthusiasm in political circles as well as in the press. As a result, the growth in the number of taxpayers does not nearly reflect the rather broad and rapid economic growth recorded in recent years.

In sum, even though modernization theory has traditionally been able to explain much of the variation in tax regimes, there are certainly limits to the theory’s explanatory power with regard to the variation in taxation outcomes not only in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda, but in sub-Saharan Africa in general.

Culture

Along with the modernization approach, the cultural approach is one of the more influential ways of explaining variation in tax regimes. In particular Webber and Wildavsky’s study, in which they argue that political culture (defined as “shared values legitimating desired social practices”) determines the tax systems different countries adopt, has gained a lot of influence. According to their argument, political systems that are organized around markets favor individualism and hence prefer lower tax rates, while political

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221 von Soest 2006. In addition, in Zambia in the beginning of the 1970s, total tax revenue amounted to about 30 percent of GDP, a value that was at least partly caused by the high copper price on the world market. Since 1975, however, it more than halved and in 1993, it amounted to only 15.3 percent. While many would probably argue that this can be attributed to Zambia’s economic crisis during this period, this is presumably not the case since a significant proportion of the potential tax take remains uncollected. In 1992, the Minister of Finance stated that the tax administration only tapped on one third of formal sector income (i.e. they collect about 33 percent of the taxes they want to collect in relation to the size of the economy) (see Republic of Zambia 1992; von Soest 2006).

222 Rakner & Gloppen 2002.

223 ibid.

224 Webber & Wildavsky 1986. Other studies define culture, or a social norm, as rules developed by a group that specify how people must, should, may, should not, and must not behave in various situations (see Edlund & Åberg 2002). The essence of a social norm is, in other words, not basically what is legally defined, rather, it is an informal or socially defined rule specifying what actions are regarded as proper and correct, or improper or incorrect. These rules are based on interests, values and attitudes developed within the group. Norm obedience may follow from internalization of the norm and the values upon which it is founded, and/or from an effective system of social sanctions. Thus, we cannot assume a direct relation between a moral value prescribed and actual behavior.
regimes that are organized around centralized hierarchies favor collectivism and hence prefer higher taxes.

Yet, while a cultural approach towards taxation at a first glance might seem fairly reasonable, it still faces at least two major problems. First, while similar to what theory predicts a tradition of liberal ideology and state culture in Botswana co-exists with rather low tax rates and a tradition of socialism in Uganda and Zambia co-exists with comparatively higher tax rates, as previously argued, there seems to be no obvious connection between the respective tax rates and taxation outcomes in any of the three countries. Rather, Botswana – with the traditionally most liberal state ideology and the lowest tax rates – still manages to collect far more taxes than do both the Zambian and Ugandan states.225

In addition to the problems that the cultural approach faces in terms of explaining empirical variation in tax regimes, the approach has been rather heavily criticized on more theoretical grounds. A common critique has been the argument that cultural theories are often almost impossible to test empirically. According to this critique, there are at least three reasons for this. First, key concepts are often only specified vaguely. As a result, the concept ‘culture’ has itself been criticized a lot. What does it really mean? Secondly, as a result of the vagueness and indistinctiveness of the key concept culture, it has been hard to use culture as an analytical tool. Instead, culture has often been argued to be the “black box” that explains outcomes when other explanations fail.226 Thirdly, cultural approaches have generally had problems in terms of specifying the specific causal mechanisms involved.227 As a result, they have been criticized for not being able to separate cause and effect.228 If patterns of taxation or patterns of compliance are described as tax cultures, then culture cannot be said to explain patterns of variation. This would indeed be true by definition. To

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225 For a more detailed discussion on this matter, see the discussion in the section on case selection. Furthermore, when comparing responses to the statement “The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes” in the Afrobarometer only 58 percent of the respondents in Botswana agree or strongly agree (28 percent disagree or strongly disagree) with the statement. In Zambia 70 percent agree or strongly agree (21 percent disagree or strongly disagree) and in Uganda a total of 87 percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree (9 percent disagree or strongly disagree) (Afrobarometer Network 2004). That is, a reverse relationship seems to be in place between tax culture in terms of the perceived legitimacy of the state in the role as a tax collector and the ability of states to actually collect taxes. Yet, as argued earlier in the text, and quite contrary to what the survey results imply, the degree to which people quasi-voluntarily comply with tax demands still seems to be higher in Botswana compared to both Zambia and Uganda.

226 See Campbell 1993; Lieberman 2003 for this critique.

227 Campbell 1993: 173.

228 See for example Lieberman 2003: 28-30 for an excellent review and critique of this perspective.
explain high levels of tax compliance with a specific tax culture or specific social norms is, in other words, close to a tautological explanation. Since cultural arguments adhere to a view that the maintenance of certain institutions requires that the values supported by these institutions be engrained in the public upheld by norms and values prevalent in the society, they are better at explaining the maintenance of a certain pattern than its emergence. Yet, what is more interesting is to understand under what circumstances taxation-friendly norms develop.229 A historical institutional perspective as the one adopted in this study provides the framework for such an understanding.

Population size

Group size has frequently been argued to matter for how effectively collective action dilemmas, such as the one of taxation, can be solved. The ways in which group size might influence collective action outcomes are twofold. First, it could potentially be the case that the administrative costs of collecting taxes are higher in countries where there are more people than in countries with smaller populations. Secondly, it might be easier for smaller groups to solve collective action dilemmas. According to Mancur Olson, small groups can provide themselves with collective goods without relying on coercion while larger groups have a much harder time doing this.230 This is because “in small groups each of the members, or at least one of them, will find that his personal gain from having the collective good exceeds the total cost of providing some amount of that collective good; there are members who would be better off if the collective good were provided, even if they had to pay the entire cost of providing it themselves, than they would be if it were not provided”.231 Thus, in a very small group, where each member gets a substantial proportion of the total gain simply because there are few others in the group, a collective good can often be provided by the voluntary, self-interested action of the members of the group.

In fact, population size in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda varies in a way that supports the argument that the smaller the population, the easier it is to solve collective action outcomes. Of the three countries, Botswana has the smallest population, mounting up to 1.7 million people in the mid-2003,
while Zambia had 10.4 million people and Uganda 25.3 million people in the same period.\textsuperscript{232} Yet, to completely attribute the differences in tax regimes between the three countries as an effect of variation in population size is still far from unproblematic. First, in terms of the argument that a smaller population size should relate to smaller administrative costs, economies of scale suggest the exact opposite approach. That is, the more people, the cheaper administrative costs. In fact, both the small population and the small scale of many African countries have commonly been cited as a structural problem. For instance, Stock has complained that “there are forty-six independent states, some of which are too small to be considered economically viable.”\textsuperscript{233} Similarly, Alesina and Spolaore have noted that “any model with increasing returns in the size of the economy implies increasing returns in the size of the countries.”\textsuperscript{234} Secondly, as illustrated in Figure 1.4 below, in a comparison between sub-Saharan African countries, while there is some correlation between the two variables, there is still a lot of variation left to be explained. A regression analysis conducted by Lieberman supports the argument that there is no statistically significant effect of population size on taxation outcomes.\textsuperscript{235}

\\textsuperscript{232} World Bank 2005b.  
\textsuperscript{233} Stock 1995: 15.  
\textsuperscript{234} Alesina & Spolaore 1997: 1029. For a further discussion on the relationship between the size of nations and the production of public goods, see Alesina & Spolaore 2003.  
\textsuperscript{235} Lieberman 2003.
Administrative capacity

Much of the public finance literature identifies the poor technical quality of administration in developing countries as the root of high levels of tax evasion. In addition, authors of multiple prominent case studies on the development of tax systems and tax reform around the world have emphasized the importance of a well-functioning, well-trained bureaucracy for achieving high levels of tax collection. The implication of such arguments is that it is possible to improve the performance of collections by reforming the technical skills of the state bureaucracy.\(^{236}\)

At the time of independence, especially Botswana had a serious shortage of qualified personnel which, in turn, had fundamental repercussions on the public administration.\(^{237}\) In addition, Botswana was the only territory in the world whose administrative center lay beyond its territorial boundaries.

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\(^{236}\) Kangave 2005; Taliercio 2004.

\(^{237}\) Acemoglu et al. 2003.
The state of taxation
during the colonial period. In fact, not until October 1961, there was a removal of the administrative headquarters from Mafeking to Gaborone, which has remained Botswana’s capital ever since. In other words, at the time of independence, Botswana lagged behind both Zambia and Uganda in terms of administrative capacity. However, over the last couple of years, all three countries of concern have undergone significant administrative reforms with regard to the tax system. More specifically, they have employed what is commonly referred to as semi-autonomous revenue authorities, responsible for collecting government taxes. Yet, while the introduction of semi-autonomous revenue authorities have to some extent helped produce more effective tax collection institutions, at least Zambia and Uganda have followed about the same pattern as have most other countries to which the semi-autonomous revenue system has been introduced. That is, there has been an initial success with tax revenues rising, and then stagnation. In Uganda, total tax revenues were raised from 7 percent of GDP in 1991 to more than 12 percent of GDP in 1999. Since 1995, however, tax revenue contribution to GDP has remained stagnant, suggesting that overall revenue performance has reached a plateau below the level needed to achieve fiscal sustainability. A similar pattern can be discerned in Zambia where the ratio of total tax to GDP improved from

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238 Best 1970.
239 Mafikeng was a small farming community and railhead sixteen miles south of the border. First after extensive field surveys, cost appraisals, and debate both in London and Bechuanaland, Britain authorized in October 1961 the removal of headquarters from Mafeking to Gaborone.
240 The Ugandan Revenue Authority (URA) is the oldest semi-autonomous revenue authority in sub-Saharan Africa behind Ghana’s (Kiser & Sacks 2007). It was formed in 1991 after two government commissions outlined the inefficiency and rampant corruption in the Ugandan civil service and created as a government agency under the general supervision of the minister of finance and given control of all major indirect taxes and some direct taxes (income tax, but not property or social security tax). The Zambian Revenue authority (ZRA) started to operate on April 1st 1994. Similar to its equivalent authority in Uganda, the ZRA closely follows the institutional logic of new public management advocated by the IMF, the World Bank and bilateral donors, such as the DFID (von Soest 2006: 94). Finally, the Botswana Unified Revenue Service (BURS) was launched first in 2004 and follows the same business-oriented logic as other semi-autonomous revenue services (von Soest 2006: 160). The BURS administers both direct and indirect taxes (von Soest 2006: 160). With the introduction of semi-autonomous agencies, the collection of revenue as a core state function was outsourced from the traditional public administration for at least three reasons. First, a semi-autonomous revenue authority has been argued to limit political interference in tax matters. Secondly, it has been argued to have the potential to attract and retain more competent staff compared to a public revenue authority since it can offer better remuneration to the staff than civil service. Thirdly, it was hoped that higher pay would motivate staff and reduce corruption of tax officials. Since the employees of the semi-autonomous revenue authorities are still being public servants, they are not completely run as enterprises which would make them fully autonomous (compare Rakner & Gloppen 2002; Rakner & Gloppen 2003; Kangave 2005: 148).
15.3 percent to 18.7 percent during the first year after the creation of Zambia Revenue Authority. In the following years, however, the tax-to-GDP ratio has by and large remained stagnant with extreme values above 19 percent in 1996 and 2000 and below 18 percent in 1999 and since 2002.\textsuperscript{242} Considering the fact that administrative reform in Botswana took place only a few years ago, it is still too early to estimate the effects of this reform.

The fact that both Zambian and Ugandan revenue collections seem to have reached a plateau despite significant administrative reform supports another critique that can be directed towards the administrative efficiency explanation, namely that technical skills should be seen as a necessary but yet far from sufficient basis for collection.\textsuperscript{243} As argued by Lieberman, in a context in which evasion and false reporting are the norm, the most skilled and efficient administration would still find it difficult to collect taxes since society plays at least as an important role as the state in the process of tax state development.\textsuperscript{244}

The size and scope of the public sector

It has long been argued that the sheer size and generosity of states influence the degree to which citizens quasi-voluntarily comply with demands for taxation since individuals in welfare states actually get something in return for the taxes paid. This is also what Levi refers to as the quid-pro-quo of taxation, i.e. the vertical contract between state and society. Furthermore, the design of social policies seems to matter a great deal for levels of taxation. In an attempt to explain the reason behind the fact that the Swedish state is able to collect 98.7 percent of the taxes it has set out to collect while the Russian state only manages to collect about 24 percent of the taxes it has set out to collect, Rothstein emphasizes the important role played by universal welfare programs.\textsuperscript{245} According to Rothstein's argument, it is the differences between universalism and the means-testing in welfare regimes that shape more or less cooperative state-society relations and the tax and social security policies associated with them. What Rothstein argues is, in other words, that universal social policies may function to increase social capital in societies and that social

\textsuperscript{242} von Soest 2006: 117.
\textsuperscript{243} Lieberman 2003.
\textsuperscript{244} ibid: 32.
\textsuperscript{245} Rothstein 2003.
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policies subjected to a means test risk decreasing social capital. The propensity of the Scandinavian welfare state to take redistribution seriously is what leads to a wider commitment to equality and trust in government.\textsuperscript{246} In this sense, universal welfare programs provide societies with the necessary political glue to solve the collective action problem of taxation.

While the argument accounted for above is in many ways convincing, it still has difficulties accounting for variation in type and magnitude of taxation between the different cases of interest for this study. This is because one of the necessary prerequisites for welfare programs in general, and universal welfare programs in particular, is exactly a significantly large tax capacity. Universal welfare programs are expensive and, as a result, most societies that have them have a strong tax capacity too. However, at the time of independence, the quid-pro-quo of taxation was more developed in Zambia and Uganda than in Botswana. Despite this fact, Botswana has a more developed quid-pro-quo today.\textsuperscript{247} What seems to be at stake if we want to further understand varying levels of taxation is then rather how some countries managed to collect the taxes necessary to develop universal welfare programmes. What advocates of the welfare state approach have in general been inclined to dismiss is, in other words, the fact that the establishment of a welfare state (or a quid-pro-quo of taxation) to a certain extent requires the previous consent of the community. Before reaching a solution in terms of who belongs to the national political community and on what terms, it is difficult to establish welfare programmes since this in itself demands cooperation. Before the question of who owns the state (and on what terms) is solved, it will be difficult to establish universal welfare programs since they are not only material in

\textsuperscript{246} Rothstein 1998.

\textsuperscript{247} At the time of independence, the provision of public goods was close to non-existent in all three countries of concern for this study. The number of inhabitants per physician was 9,300, 9,200 and 15,900 respectively (UN Economic Commission for Africa 1968: 168.) Today, the number of inhabitants per physician is 3,846 in Botswana (26 physicians per 100,000 people), 14,286 in Zambia (7 physicians per 100,000 people), and 20,000 in Uganda (5 physicians per 100,000 people) (UNDP 2003, own calculations). In terms of other indicators of the pro quid quo of taxation, especially Botswana faced a precarious situation at the time of independence. When the British left the colonial territory of Botswana, there were only 12 kilometers of paved road, 22 Batswana who had graduated from University, and 100 from secondary school. In 1966, there were only two secondary schools in the country that offered full five-year courses and only 80 Batswana in the final year. In contrast, Zambia had 10 times as many secondary school graduates and Uganda 70 times (Acemoglu et al. 2003). Compared to Botswana’s 0.01 km of road per square km of land, Zambia had 0.05 and Uganda 0.08 (Herbst 2008: 86., the figures are from 1963).
kind, but in addition express and mirror core national values and identities.\textsuperscript{248}

The role of a trustworthy state

One of the most widely recognized accounts of variations in revenue collections and structures, as well as of citizen compliance more generally, focuses on the trustworthiness and credibility of the state executive and the bureaucracy. The theory of a trustworthy state is strictly to be considered as an account of the quality of government as procedure, not content. That is, what matters is the way government power is exercised in the implementation of policies, rather than the policies proper.\textsuperscript{249} More generally, political and institutional trust develops because people believe “that the institutions that are responsible for handling ‘treacherous’ behavior act in fair, just and effective manner, and if they also believe that other people think the same of these institutions, then they will also trust other people.”\textsuperscript{250} The failure of the state to insure impartiality and non-excludability might, on the other hand, lead to a situation where individuals turn to their ethnic communities, as a sort of alternative statehood, for the provision of public goods. The effects that this may have on the state’s legitimacy is argued to be detrimental since the process can initiate a vicious cycle in which ethnic communalism breeds attitudes of illegitimacy, which in turn are argued to reduce the effectiveness of the state, and further intensify the attitudes of illegitimacy.\textsuperscript{251} Hence a social dilemma is created.

In many ways, as argued by Lieberman,\textsuperscript{252} the idea of the importance of a trustworthy state for solving national collective action dilemmas is close to Levi’s model of relative bargaining power in that it emphasizes they ways in which quasi-voluntary compliance is related to the trustworthiness of states and of other members in society.\textsuperscript{253} However, while the idea that a trustworthy state and impartial policies affects the state’s ability to solve national collective action dilemmas positively is indeed very attractive, such an explanation still has at least two problems when it comes to explaining varying national trajectories of tax state development. To begin with, while it seems reasonable that perceptions of corruption or the perception that

\textsuperscript{248} See also Wimmer 1997.
\textsuperscript{249} Rothstein & Teorell 2008.
\textsuperscript{250} Rothstein 2000: 492. See in addition Rothstein 2002; Rothstein & Stolle 2003.
\textsuperscript{251} See Lassen 2001.
\textsuperscript{252} Lieberman 2003.
\textsuperscript{253} See Levi & Stoker 2000 for a review of this literature.
one’s interests are not being considered, as well as the perception that other peoples’ interests are to a larger extent looked after compared to ones’ own, are likely to make the government seem less trustworthy, and as a result, justifying evasion, studies focusing on these aspects of public policy face problems when it comes to explaining cross-country variation. In the studies that put forward corruption and similar factors as the explanation to cross-country variation in tax regimes, it is often presumed that the higher the level of corruption and the lower the level of trust in absolute terms, the lower will the state’s ability to collect taxes be, since the less quasi-voluntarily the citizens will comply with taxes. Such an analytical framework is, however, most problematic in at least one sense since it, as forcefully argued by Lieberman, completely neglects the fact that people seem to be more sensitive to changes in their own environment than these studies do actually presume. That is, a comparatively small increase in the levels of corruption in a state with already high levels of corruption will probably lead to quite a different outcome in terms of compliance with tax demands compared to a similar change in the level of corruption in a less corrupt state. On the other hand, a state that makes improvement despite comparatively high levels of corruption, can still increase levels of quasi-voluntary compliance. It has furthermore been proven that transparent institutions may lead the average citizen to perceive higher levels of corruption and/or lower levels of trustworthy and credible behavior on the part of the government. That is, while perceptions of corruption and trustworthy and impartial state institutions are likely to influence on people’s willingness to comply with government demands for taxation, cross-country studies do not seem to be very well-suited to capture these aspects of taxation.

An additional, and more serious, critique against the trustworthy state thesis is that such a perspective ignores the fact that, if the content of public policies is partial, this will most likely serve to limit any positive effects of impartiality in the implementation of such policies. Consider for example an apartheid system. While everyone knows what to expect from such a system in terms of its implementation (i.e. that all colored and black people will be discriminated against and all white people will be favored), it is still difficult to imagine that the predictability of such a system will produce any general trust among the population or feeling of trustworthiness towards the state since the content of the system is from the beginning partial. That
is, if a prior consent about the content of policies is missing, it will certainly not matter whether policies are implemented according to principles of impartiality. As such, the impartiality thesis is far more trustworthy when it comes to explaining the failure of states that from the beginning were built on consent (e.g. former Yugoslavia) than it is in terms of explaining state building in states which are not based on any previous consent (e.g. Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda).

Economic structure

It has commonly been argued that a country’s economic structure has an important impact on the ability to collect taxes. Apart from the impact of natural resource abundance discussed earlier in this chapter, especially foreign aid and the share of agriculture in the economy have been argued to negatively influence taxation outcomes.

First, in terms of foreign aid, especially sub-Saharan Africa is often cited as the paradigmatic example of the destructive political and economic effects of this type of income. According to the argument, Africa is ‘aid dependent’ in the sense that few of its states can carry out routine functions or deliver basic public services without external funding and expertise. In 1996, the African governors of the World Bank even conceded that aid on balance had been undermining institutional capacity in Africa. In terms of the impact of foreign aid on taxation outcomes, Mick Moore has asserted that foreign aid-dependent countries suffer similar pathologies as do states that rely on unearned income coming from natural resources. However, empirical evidence of the impact of foreign aid on state capacity in general, and on tax capacity in particular, does not entirely support such a statement. For example, a study conducted by Arthur Goldsmith only finds little evidence of a negative relationship between foreign aid and state capacity in the African context. In addition, in an article from 2002, Ole Therkildsen partly questions the presumed negative relationship between foreign aid and state capacity as he argues that while incomes from natural resources and aid share some common features that partly justify the use of rentier state theories to assess possible aid-accountability linkages, there are

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257 Goldsmith 2001: 123.
258 Moore 1998.
also differences that are not captured by such theories.\textsuperscript{260} In fact, if we consider the three countries in focus of this study, the thesis that foreign aid has an adverse effect on taxation abilities does not find much support. Rather, overtime data reveal that if we are to consider any potential relationship between dependency on foreign aid and taxation abilities, we should expect weak states to attract foreign aid and not the other way around. At the time of independence, Botswana was a comparatively very poor country, and in fact the only country of the three countries of concern for this study that was dependent on foreign aid (i.e. net development assistance to the government was greater than 10 percent of GNP).\textsuperscript{261} The state with the second greatest ability to collect taxes in the sample, i.e. Zambia, did not become aid dependent until between 1980-89, and at this point Botswana was no longer in the group of aid-dependent countries. Uganda, today the weakest tax state in the sample, became aid dependent first between the years 1990-97, and has, like Zambia, remained so up to today.\textsuperscript{262} That is, while a relationship between foreign aid dependence and (tax) state capacity may very well exist, with reference to the three countries of interest for this study, the causal relationship seems to run in the reverse direction to what has commonly been assumed. That is, states receive foreign aid because they are weak and hence not able to mobilize internal resources.

Secondly, in terms of agricultural share in GDP, governing peripheral areas has been a major challenge for rulers throughout history,\textsuperscript{263} and an economic structure dominated by agriculture has commonly been argued to make it difficult to trace, and hence tax, incomes.\textsuperscript{264} For sure, as illustrated in Table 1.5 below, there seems to be a rather strong relationship between the share of agricultural production in GDP and taxation abilities. Yet, there still seems to be some variation left to be explained.

\textsuperscript{260}Therkildsen 2002.
\textsuperscript{261} As the figure appears in Goldsmith 2001: 126.
\textsuperscript{262} ibid.
\textsuperscript{263} Herbst 2000.
\textsuperscript{264} Musgrave 1969; Bird & Oldman 1990.
Figure 1.5. Taxes on income and profits/GDP as a function of agricultural production/GDP in sub-Saharan Africa, 1999-2003

Pearson’s $r = -0.53$, source: (World Bank 2005b; 2007).

Class mobilization

Yet another potential rival explanation might be that the varying taxation outcomes in the three countries of concern are a story primarily about class mobilization since it is reasonable to believe that the mobilization of lower classes will pressure the state to demand progressive taxation from upper classes. In Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda, as well as in most other developing countries, resources are unevenly distributed. As a result, managing to attract the support of upper classes is of course of great importance. To test the argument that the varying capacity of states to collect taxes is merely a story of class mobilization, I consider the influence of a measure of union density (i.e. union membership as a proportion of the non-agricultural labor force).265 However, neither this factor can

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265 The nonagricultural labor force is often regarded as the union’s main domain. In fact, according to the International Labour Organization unionized farm workers are found only where there is a plantation system or where unions have established a tradition of providing social security benefits (International Labour Organization 1997). However, it still needs to be mentioned that there are some disadvantages to use non-agricultural labor force as the denominator, maybe the most important one...
account for the variation in taxation abilities between Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda since while the least successful tax collector, i.e. Uganda, demonstrates the lowest degree of union density (3.9 percent), Zambia (which is the medium case) still has a higher degree of organization than Botswana (12.5 percent as compared to Botswana’s 11.5 percent).266

Political regime type

Scholars focusing on the role played by political regime type have commonly asked whether democracies or authoritarian political regimes are more effective tax collectors. The answer to this question is theoretically as well as empirically rather inconclusive. On the one hand, some theories suggest that if rulers are revenue maximizers and if the bargains formed in representative government allow rulers to extract more revenue than would otherwise be the case, then democracies should have higher levels of taxation than authoritarian regimes. It has moreover been argued that democratic institutions may have a direct influence on the quality of state-society relations by establishing mechanisms of rewards and sanctions, and an indirect influence by helping individuals governing themselves by providing information, technical advise and alternative conflict resolution mechanisms that are conducive for the development of cooperative state-society relations.267 Yet, other stories argue that authoritarian regimes are much better at disregarding public pressures and conflicting interests within societies and hence able to collect taxes more effectively since they are not as reluctant in terms of using more coercive means.

Empirical evidence concerning the role played by political regime type goes in both directions. In a study from 1998 that focused directly on the question whether democracies or dictatorships are more effective tax collectors, Cheibub found that regime type had at least no independent effect on the amount of taxes collected by governments.268 However, in a study being the fact that many groups (such as the self-employed and unpaid family workers) which do not belong to the target population of trade unions are also part of the non-agricultural labor force, making the number of wage-earners smaller than the whole non-agricultural labor force (International Labour Organization 1997). Another potential disadvantage related to the use of union density as a measure of class mobilization is, as pointed out by Lieberman, the fact that unions themselves may be at odds with each other (Lieberman 2003). As a result, they may lack the collective bargaining power needed to pressure upper classes to pay progressive taxes. However, even though this may potentially be the case, union density must still be considered a reasonable, and the best available, proxy of the political organization of lower groups.

268 Cheibub 1998.
that considered only developing countries, these results were questioned by Fauvelle-Aymar who reached the conclusion that authoritarian regimes collect more taxes than do democracies. Yet, these results have been questioned too. In a comparative study of developing countries, Thies came to the conclusion that the more democratic the state, the more taxes it collected. When it comes to the cases of interest for this study, as will be further discussed in chapter seven, at the time of independence, hopes were high in terms of the prospects for democratic development in all three countries. Yet, over time, the situation has changed and Botswana is today ranked as the most democratic country, followed by Zambia and, lastly, Uganda. That is, there seems to be reason to believe that democratic development, similar to the development of a trustworthy state, to a certain extent requires the previous consent of the community.

War and conflict

Given that Western Europe’s early experience with the expansion of taxation began with inter-state war, a large number of studies have put forward the argument that war is a great stimulus to taxation and that the varying capacities of states to forge cooperative state-society relations can hence best be understood from a bellicist approach. In Western Europe, in states that were not “natural” from the beginning, homogenizing processes such as inter-state war, ethnic cleansing, and the re-organization of territorial borders, are argued to have served to build the nation-state through increased demands for taxation. At the most cynical level, it has even been argued that the dynamics of interstate war served as a “filter” by eliminating weak or non-viable political arrangements. States that did not have societies that were sufficiently homogenous to permit the development of a common sense of national citizenship did not either have the capacity to develop effective infrastructural powers to mobilize resources and promote development. In the end, the inability of a state to generate significant revenue through taxation was often a precursor to state failure, or even collapse. Left were relatively strong states with more or less homogeneous societies.

269 Fauvelle-Aymar 1999.
270 Thies 2004.
271 See, for example, Mann 1988, Tilly 1985; 1990; Herbst 2003.
272 Herbst 2003: 166.
273 Mann 2002.
274 Alesina & La Ferrara 2000; Bergman 2003; La Porta 1999; Lieberman 2003; Tilly 1990.
However, while a large number of researchers agree that “war makes states” (and vice versa), they disagree on why this happens. While some have argued that increasing extractive capacities following from war are best understood as an effect of citizens becoming more tolerant of tax increases during war, others mean that war leads to higher taxes because it alters the priorities of elites. More specifically, the argument emphasizing the increasing tolerance of citizens has pointed to the ways in which the threat of war makes people realize that they are under threat only because who they are as a nation, and that they as a result are “forced to recognize that it is only as a nation that they can successfully defeat the threat.” As has been pointed out in many studies, Western European states were hardly natural from the beginning. At the time for state formation, many of the states still had highly diverse populations that did not have many emotional links with the state. According to the bellicist approach it was war, or the threat of war, that in large part solved this problem. The almost constant presence of external threat during the time for state formation in Western Europe can, as such, by and large explain why surviving states became as strong as they did.

Compared to the Western European experience, state creation and consolidation in Africa, as well as in many other parts of the world, have proceeded in quite a different manner. As a result, while the bellicist approach towards state formation and consolidation can perhaps successfully explain the relative strength of Western European states, the approach seems to have limited explanatory power outside this context. In a comparative study of Latin American countries, Centano reached the conclusion that war did not build these states. Instead of increasing the levels of taxation in times of war, Latin American states by and large resorted to debt. In addition, the dynamics of civil war – the type of conflict most prevalent in younger states – have proved to differ radically from the interstate war that contributed the most to state-building in Western Europe. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to most of the armed

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277 ibid; Mann 1999; Mann 2002.
278 Herbst 2003: 170. See also Howard 1978. It should be noted that Belgium, in this context, is often referred to as a comparatively weak state (Herbst 2003: 167).
279 Centano 1997; Centano 2002.
280 It is not only in the African context in which intra-state war is more common than inter-state war. This pattern holds for the whole world. Over the past two decades, the world has not only witnessed the quick spread of democratic government, but also the explosion of intercommunal violence around
conflicts in the world today. At the same time, a large percentage of the world’s worst performing states can be found in this region.\textsuperscript{281} In other words, in sub-Saharan Africa, war seems to break rather than make states. The former British colonies in sub-Saharan Africa have been argued to be particularly weak as a result of intra-state conflict and civil war.\textsuperscript{282} Yet, as previously argued, not all sub-Saharan African states are as bad performers.

The explanation of why states vary in terms of tax state development put forward in this study indeed attributes importance to both inter- and intra-state conflict. However, apart from Uganda which experienced the 1978-79 Uganda-Tanzania War (usually referred to as the Liberation War in Uganda) that eventually led to the overthrow of Idi Amin’s regime\textsuperscript{283} – all the countries were under British control during the two world wars. As such, apart from the two world wars, only Uganda has had any real experience of inter-state war. However, considering that Uganda is today the weakest tax state of the three countries in the sample, there is little reason to believe that this factor can explain any of the variation in tax regimes (apart from that Uganda would perhaps have had an even weaker tax regime without the war). With intra-state conflict, however, things are different. Since independence, Uganda has experienced significant intra-state conflict in the form of civil war while Zambia has experienced conflict, if not as prolonged and violent as in Uganda. Botswana, on the other hand, has not experienced any violent intra-state conflict at all. One could, in other words, attribute differences in taxation regimes partly to the fact that the countries of concern have experienced different degrees and levels of intra-state conflict. However, once again, the most interesting thing would be to take one step backward and instead ask why states vary in terms of conflict patterns in the first place. The model put forward in this study provides a framework for the deeper understanding of why varying conflict patterns emerge.

In conclusion, while some of the potential alternative explanations of why states vary in terms of taxation outcomes discussed above certainly have some degree of explanatory power – and perhaps most decisively so the ‘agricultural production in GDP’ argument – there is still a lot of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{281} Herbst 2003: 166.
\textsuperscript{282} Blanton et al. 2001.
\textsuperscript{283} Idi Amin was a Ugandan politician and military leader who served as the President of Uganda between 1971 and 1979.
\end{footnotesize}
variation that needs to be explained. The argument put forward in this study is that given the limits of earlier approaches to fully understand cross-country variation in tax state development, there is reason to consider the role played by other factors as well and, more specifically, the impact of the degree of official multiculturalism specified in key legal and policy documents during formative moments of state development.

Plan of the study

How can we understand the varying abilities of states to collect taxes? As previously argued, a state’s ability to collect taxes seems at least in part to depend on the degree to which citizens quasi-voluntarily comply with tax demands. Quasi-voluntarily compliance in turn seems to arise when there are some guarantees that other parties – i.e. the state and other taxpayers – meet their commitments. Two specific social contracts are as such of central importance if citizens are to voluntarily comply. On the one hand, a vertical contract must be in place between state and society that guarantees that states keep their bargain, i.e. that taxpayers get sufficient public goods in exchange for the taxes paid and that they get the public goods mix they prefer. On the other hand, a horizontal contract must exist between citizens that make sure that other constituents will keep their bargain since, if people expect others to comply, they will themselves comply, but if they expect others to evade or avoid taxes, they will try to do so themselves. In the end, quasi-voluntary compliance is contingent on both contracts – that is, tax evasion is a result of that at least one of these contracts are breached. Accordingly, it seems like the puzzle of explaining variation in taxation outcomes merely reflects one aspect of a larger question of explaining the degree to which particular states are successful in their attempts to mobilize the support of their respective populations through the successful establishment of cooperative vertical and horizontal social contracts. What we want to know, in other words, is how we can understand varying paths of tax state development.

The argument put forward in this study is a historical institutional argument in the sense that it links the degree to which citizenship is associated with ethnic group rights during formative periods of state development to notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, sub-sequently, varying national trajectories of tax state development. The argument that the extent

285 Levi 1988
to which constituents share a national identity is a decisive factor in explaining varying collective action outcomes such as the one of taxation is not very controversial. In chapter two, I discuss this argument more thoroughly. In chapter three, I discuss the institutional perspective adopted in the study. Moreover, I develop a set of tools that makes it possible to cross-nationally compare the degree to which citizenship is associated with ethnic group rights.

Since, as argued by James Mahoney, the key concept of path dependency within the historical institutional approach characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or chains of events that have deterministic properties, the identification of a path dependent process must involve both tracing a given outcome back to a particular set of historical events, and showing how these events are themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of prior historical conditions. Accordingly, in chapter four, I explore notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ prior to independence in the three countries of concern. As will be evident from the discussion, notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ were in many ways very similar before independence. Consequently, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that the formal criteria for citizenship that were articulated at the time of independence were not merely the result of prior patterns of social organization in new, institutional disguise, but truly novel definitions of the ethnic boundaries of citizenship. Chapter five empirically investigates the ways in which leaders of the different countries ultimately specified the ethnic boundaries of citizenship in key legal and policy documents at the time of independence. The chapter in addition explores how these initial definitions of the formal criteria for citizenship have been redefined over time. Chapter six then explores the impact of the formal criteria for citizenship on notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Finally, in chapter seven, I summarize the main findings and provide the conclusions of the study.

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Notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and collective action

The argument put forward in this study relates the degree to which citizenship is associated with ethnic group rights to notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately, varying national trajectories of tax state development. According to the argument, depending on the degree to which multiculturalism gets officially recognized and codified in key legal and policy documents during formative periods of state development, ethnic interests and ideas will vary in terms of political salience, in turn leading to varying paths of tax state development.

The idea that the degree to which constituents share some sense of national identity has decisive effects on collective action outcomes such as the one of taxation is not very controversial. Rather, it has commonly been argued that the fraternity of the nation is what makes it possible for so many millions of people to pay taxes to the ambitions of the state.287 In the same vein, it has been argued that when different ethnic identities become triggered within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state, this generates an important and non-universalistic set of views concerning appropriate collective goods and standards of fairness.288

The aim of this chapter is to explore the identity argument further and provide a framework for the empirical study of notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. As such, the following sections discuss the theoretical foundations for the identity argument, and give an account of how national and ethnic identities relate to individual incentives to engage in collective action on the national

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287 Young 1976: 38.
288 See, for example, Levi 1997: 24.
and ethnic group level respectively. The chapter then reviews the debate over which type of ethnic marker that provides the greatest threat to the collective good. Finally, in the last section of the chapter, I provide a framework of how notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ can be studied empirically.

**Conceptualizing notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’**

Providing a historical institutional argument which focuses on how various groups develop and gain power within the political arena depending on whether they get officially recognized or not, this study adheres to a view of national and ethnic identities as being socially constructed. As such, the argument developed and tested in this study diverts from a large number of studies which argue that national and ethnic identities are primordial and, as such, to be understood as inherently political. In particular over the last couple of years, primordial theories have gained renewed influence through the large number of studies using the Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index as a basis for separating ethnically diverse societies from ethnically homogeneous ones. According to these studies, ethnically diverse societies are *per se* extra troublesome when it comes to reaching cooperative solutions to development goals as various as economic growth, the promotion of good economic policies and high income levels, political participation, as well as the promotion of institutions for “good”

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289 According to the primordial view of identity mobilization, national and ethnic identities are to be understood as ‘givens’ of social life and, as such, inherently political. That is, ethnic identities have natural political consequences. The view that ethnic identities are ‘givens’ of social existence can, in turn, be argued to originate in the idea that ethnic markers (such as region, language, tribe, race, and religion) are the natural, and most fundamental, constitutive elements of individual and collective personalities. As such, they form a ‘natural’ basis for collective action (see Lecours 2000: 504).

290 The ELF measure indicates the chance between 0 and 100 that two randomly drawn individuals from a population in a country belong to different ethnic groups. ELF is calculated as follows. Let us consider a country with a total population N that is in turn divided into J groups, each group’s population denoted by n. ELF is then given by

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ELF = 1 - \sum_{j=1}^{J} \left( \frac{n_j}{N} \right)^2
\]

ELF increases with the number of groups n. The index also increases the more equal the sizes of each of these groups. The consequence of the latter characteristic added to the first is that very different societies can despite of this fact have a quite similar ELF. For a more detailed discussion on the index and its limitations, see Posner 2004a.

governance. In addition, high levels of ethnic fragmentation have been argued to have detrimental effects on the accumulation of social capital, as well as increasing the degree of information asymmetry and moral hazard in the market sphere. They are also more likely to waste resources in distributional struggles, and less likely to provide public goods and collect taxes.

However, despite the renewed influence of primordial theories, such theories still suffer from at least two major weaknesses. To begin with, peaceful relations between ethnic groups are in fact far more common than is violence. There are, in other words, far more cultural cleavages in the world than there is conflict. For every cultural cleavage that serves as a basis of political division there are numerous others that have no political importance at all. This statement also counts for stereotypically violent places like sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 2.1, illustrating the relationship between ethnic diversity and income tax collections in sub-Saharan Africa, serves to further strengthen the critique against the primordial view that ethnic diversity is a threat to states per se.

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298 Fearon & Laitin 2000; Fearon & Laitin 1996.
300 See also Posner 2005: 10. In fact, in a study from 1996, Fearon and Laitin estimate that there has been only one instance of ethnic violence in Africa for every two thousand cases that would have been predicted on the basis of ethnic differences alone (Fearon & Laitin 1996). Another telling example is the strong Basque nationalist movement in Spain and the absence of such a movement in the French Basque country. The differences in terms of Basque mobilization in the two countries suggest that the Basque identity may in fact have very different consequences depending on institutional context. That is, cultural identities are not inherently political and do, as a consequence, not have natural political consequences. While ethnic groups may exist ‘as such’ in anthropological categorization, they may, in other words, not have constructed themselves ‘for such’ as politically salient actors (see Laitin & Posner 2001 for this argument).
Moreover, identity groups may vary in their importance for politics over time. That is, in real life, groups are forming and dissolving in response to political and institutional circumstances. Yet, the conceptualization of ethnic groups as natural, coherent, permanent, and inherently subjective entities within the cultural approach makes it impossible to explain how ethnic groups are transformed. Consequently, if we want to be more specific about the relationship between ethnic diversity and national collective action outcomes, the puzzle of why some cultural differences come to matter for politics more than others needs to be solved. The limited capacity of the primordial approach to illuminate the processes of ethnic mobilization suggests exploring other avenues. One such avenue is to view ethnic mobilization as a socially constructed phenomenon, influenced by the institutional context of which it is part.

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301 See Lecours 2000: 509.
The idea that national and ethnic identities are socially constructed rather than ‘givens’ of social and political life is not new. Rather, according to most researchers on the subject there is no ‘natural’ or genetic basis for nationhood. Instead, nations are most commonly perceived to be “imagined communities”. Following the perhaps most prominent advocate of this view, Benedict Anderson, all nations are imagined since “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of the communion.” In this context, the word “imagined” does not simply mean “invented” in the sense of the creation or invention of a myth of a common historical past as it is sometimes understood. Instead, it signifies a contemporary belief in shared cultural and historical ties and a shared destiny created by myth. A group of people becomes a nation when it has an image of its collective past and when its members are aware of and responsive to that image. Yet, to claim that nations and ethnic identities are socially constructed is not to say that they are not important or that they are perceived as less real by those who are included in them. Rather, the imagining of a nation has the potential to tie millions of people together and create a bond between past and future generations. That is, more than merely serving as a form of political organization, the state or the ethnic group as an imagined community appeals to fundamental needs of belonging and as such becomes central to the formulation of collective identities.

However, as argued by Anderson, the nation as an imagined community is limited because “even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.” As such, national, as well as ethnic, identities are relational and shaped by the nature of the ‘relevant’ others in the social arena.

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302 Anderson 1983.
303 ibid: 6.
304 For example has Hobsbawn, arguing that “nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way around”, put forward the view that states have ‘invented’ traditions of a common historical/linguistic past as to survive (Hobsbawn 1990: 10). In the same vein, Gellner has argued that “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations and self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (as cited in Anderson 1983: 6).
305 See Smith 1997: 609 for this point.
306 Young 1976: 43.
307 Anderson 1983.
308 ibid: 7.
309 Young 1976: 41.
certain features of the group which render it distinctive, implicitly, these attributes are contrastive. Fredrik Barth makes this point well in his book on ethnic groups and boundaries.\textsuperscript{310} Contrary to the widely held view that identity groups have clear and defined boundaries that make sense for political action, Barth argues in favor of the view that the formation of groups makes sense only on the basis of differences of culture.\textsuperscript{311} One of Barth’s original claims is, in other words, that ethnicity, the production, reproduction and transformation of the social boundaries of ethnic groups, is a two-way process that takes place across the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The contrast between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is hence what is embedded in the organization of ethnicity, or as Barth puts it: “an otherness of the others that is explicitly linked to the assertion of cultural differences.”\textsuperscript{312} What matters are, in other words, imagined communities, based on politically relevant categories rather than all cultural traits. That is, the features that are taken into account are not the sum of objective differences but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant.\textsuperscript{313} Barth’s, as well as Anderson’s, view hence gives us the insight that a national or ethnic identity is not necessarily an immutable bundle of reciprocity and equal preferences which is sufficient to refer to in order to identify a person as an ‘X’ or a ‘Y’ or locate the boundary between ethnic collectives. Rather, identity should be seen as a situationally defined concept. Boundaries are constructed and are hence socially attributed by both in- and out-groups.\textsuperscript{314} Accordingly, the social constructivist approach separates between the notions of ethnic diversity and ethnic mobilization. That is, ethnicity can exist in anthropological categorization without necessarily being politically mobilized, and the degree to which ethnicity is politically mobilized/salient can vary across countries and over time.\textsuperscript{315} Yet, only when mobilized the idea of collective identities forms the basis for political organization.\textsuperscript{316}

Following the lead of social constructivist scholars such as Fredrik Barth, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm, this study adopts a conceptualization of ethnic identity as fluid and situation-bound. That is, in the wording of Posner, rather than assuming that individuals are being hard

\textsuperscript{310} Barth 1969.
\textsuperscript{311} ibid: 9-10.
\textsuperscript{312} Barth 1995: 1.
\textsuperscript{313} Barth 1969.
\textsuperscript{314} See ibid.
\textsuperscript{315} See Fearon 2004; Olzak 1983 for a further discussion on the distinctions between the two concepts.
\textsuperscript{316} Farrands 1996: 7; Laitin 1986: 11.
wired with a single ethnic identity, I hold the idea that individuals possess repertoires of identities whose relevance “wax and wane with change in context.” As such, ethnicity is also defined with reference to boundary markers. That is, an ethnic group is a group of people who hold in common a set of markers that distinguish them from others with whom they are in contact. These markers can, in turn, vary from geographical origin, tribe, race, religion, and language. They can also refer to some sense of historical continuity, a common ancestry, or some other symbolic feature associated with ethnicity.

From the perspective of national and ethnic identities being socially constructed, it becomes interesting to explore the impact of varying institutional arrangements –– such as the extent to which ethnic diversity is officially recognized –– on notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately, tax state development. However, before we turn to the empirical study, it is important that we know more about the ways in which national and ethnic identities have been argued to impact on collective action outcomes, such as the one of taxation. In the next section, I turn to this matter.

The identity argument

As argued by Chandra, what ultimately links ethnic mobilization to specifically sub-par national collective action outcomes is the fact that ethnic demands to a greater extent than others are ‘indivisible’, i.e. they cannot be satisfied in partial quantities. Becoming the focus of intense loyalties, mobilized ethnic groups challenge the legitimacy of state authority since the clash between mobilized cultural groups and civil order, each making an absolute moral claim on its adherents, reduces the possibilities of national integration. In a study of partisan cleavages and regime strain in post-war Europe for example, Richard Rose and Derek Urwin argue that the character of demands made by different kinds of mobilized social groups differ systematically. Ethnic participation, the authors claim, has a more unbargainable character as it tends to take the form of ultimatums and thus creates zero-sum conflicts. As a result, it will become much harder to find a solution to national collective action dilemmas such as the

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318 See, for example, Olzak 1983.
320 Geertz 1963.
one of taxation. Horowitz follows a similar line of argument when he accounts for the indivisible character of ethnic demands by pointing to their symbolic character:

“Symbolic claims are not readily amenable to compromise. In this, they differ from claims deriving wholly from material interests. Whereas material advancement can be measured both relatively and absolutely, the status advancement of one ethnic group is entirely relative to the status of others.”

In a similar vein, Rustow argues that:

“On matters of economic policy and social expenditures you can always split the difference. In an expanding economy, you can even have it both ways. […] But there is no middle position between Flemish and French as official languages or between Calvinism, Catholicism and Secularism as principles of education.”

In sum, according to the above claims, since ethnic demands are often more concerned with non-material issues than material ones, it is much more difficult for states to strike a bargain with ethnic groups compared to groups defined by other sets of identity markers such as class. However, while most researchers agree that ethnic identities are more indivisible in their character compared to other boundary markers, there is still an ongoing discussion regarding the degree of (in)divisibility of different types of ethnic markers. According to Kymlicka for example, regional groups are potentially able to provide more of an alternative statehood than other groups and do, as such, constitute a greater threat to the integration of the larger community compared to ethnic groups based on other cleavages. In a similar vein, Toft has argued that regional identities are more indivisible than others and are therefore more likely to serve as a basis for violent conflict. Oomen, on the other hand, argues that out of the several factors that influence and inhibit the process of nation-building, the two most important are race and religion. To support his argument that racial cleavages are particularly dangerous, Oomen refers to Young who argues that “physical appearance is the most indelible attribute; where skin

322 Horowitz 1985: 223.
324 This proposition has, however, been challenged by some scholars. For example Chandra argues that symbolic goods are often far more divisible than we might expect (Chandra 2001).
325 Kymlicka 1995.
pigmentation serves to segment communities, only a handful of persons at the color margins may be permitted any choice of identity on racial lines.”

A similar argument is put forward to defend the hypothesis that religious cleavages are comparatively more indivisible, as Oommen argues that: “… one cannot belong to two religions or be an atheist and a believer at the same time.” Comparing the potential threat of mobilized linguistic identities to that of racial and religious ones, Gurr supports Oommen’s view as he argues that “language issues alone are not a common source of deadly rivalries, because language differences, unlike racial and religious ones, are subject to individual and collective compromises. Individuals in heterogeneous societies can and ordinarily do speak several languages, but they cannot be both black and white, or both Hindu and Muslim.”

However, in some respect Fearon at least undermines the proposition that religious identities are more indivisible than others as he points to the fact that membership in religious groups are often (if yet far from always) reckoned by profession of faith rather than descent, i.e. in many cases one can become a member of a religious group by conversion. Yet, as argued by Preece, around the globe, whether in Northern Ireland, former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Tibet or Nigeria, to name only a few examples, religious differences are still a source of great controversy and discord.

Finally, discussing the comparative threat of the mobilization of linguistic identities, Laitin minimizes the importance of language as he argues that, for reasons of practical adaptation (e.g. getting a job or civic rights), an ethnic group will adopt the language of the majority, even to the point of giving up its language. However, there seems to be disagreement on this matter too. Safran has for example argued that minorities do not give up their linguistic heritage without a fight, even if the payoff is significant. To back up this argument, Safran refers to the mobilization of linguistic cleavages during the Soviet period where only a relatively small number of non-Slavic-speaking people in the federal republics of the Soviet

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329 Oomen 1997.
331 Fearon 2004.
332 Preece 2005: 19.
Union switched to Russian, despite the political advantages of doing so. In addition, he refers to the large number of other ethnic minorities, such as the speakers of Basque, Welsh, and Yiddish, which have fought hard to preserve their languages despite the economic advantages of not doing so.

In sum, while most researchers agree that mobilized ethnic identities are more indivisible than other types of mobilized identities and as such a greater threat to the nation-state, there seems to be less agreement on whether all forms of ethnic divides threaten national collective action outcomes to the same extent. By exploring the degree to which politically mobilized ethnic identities actually have different effects on collective action outcomes depending on the basis for their mobilization, this study has the potential to further increase our understanding of this matter. However, before we turn to this question, we need to know more about the mechanisms involved in the process.

The link between identity and collective action

What explains the positive impact of a shared national identity on collective action outcomes such as the one of taxation, and the equivalent negative impact of ethnic mobilization? The degree to which individuals share a national identity has been argued to influence the degree to which citizens are willing to quasi-voluntarily comply with tax demands through both the vertical and the horizontal contract. First, in terms of the vertical contract between states and citizens, i.e. the extent to which tax payers perceive they receive ‘sufficient’ public goods in return for the taxes paid, as well as the public goods mix they prefer, a shared national identity has been argued to lead to an increased willingness to pay since people that share an identity are likely to prefer similar public good mixes. That is, a shared identity facilitates collective action by structuring actors’ preferences to assign positive values to the welfare of fellow group members. Therefore, if different ethnic group identities become mobilized within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state, preferences will accordingly be divergent across groups, making it more difficult to solve national collective action dilemmas such as the one of taxation. Furthermore, people may not want to contribute to public goods benefiting other ethnic groups. For example, focusing on the American context, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly have found that individuals from different ethnic groups prefer distinct types of public

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335 ibid: 2.
goods and that this in turn leads to less agreement on public goods choices and thus lower funding in diverse areas. In an article from 2001, Luttmer provides individual-level evidence that support these claims. Analyzing general survey data, Luttmer demonstrates that individual preferences for income redistribution are affected by others around them. Individuals furthermore seem to increase their support for redistributive spending when the share of local recipients from their own ethnic group increases. Moreover, Alesina and Ferrara have asserted that, for the most part, individuals that identify with different ethnic groups do not like ‘mixing’ across ethnic lines, leading to poor collective action outcomes in diverse areas. In addition, in their analysis of multi-ethnic societies, Rabushka and Shepsle argue that ethnic salience can result in the ethnicization of collectively provided goods in the sense that the political process allocates excludable public goods and transfers based on ethnic characteristics. According to this argument, the failure of states to insure non-excludability makes individuals turn to their ethnic communities, as a sort of alternative statehood, for the provision of public goods. This process may, in turn, initiate a vicious cycle in which ethnic communalism breeds attitudes of illegitimacy which reduce the effectiveness of the state and, consequently, further intensifies attitudes of illegitimacy.

Secondly, in terms of the horizontal contract – i.e. the contract that assures citizens that if they themselves comply with tax demands, they can also trust others to comply with such demands – it has been argued that a shared identity may function as a form of reciprocity by providing a set of institutions or norms allocating the responsibilities that members of a group hold to other members of that group. These institutions or norms are, in turn, seen as facilitating collective action by promoting the flow of information about reputations, facilitating sanctioning, and generating expectations that cooperative overtures of fellow group members will be reciprocated. For social norms and sanctions to be effective, however, it is important that individuals are affected by them. To the extent that individuals are affected mainly by social sanctions exercised by their own ethnic group, such sanctions will not be as effective in ethnically

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fractionalized communities as in more homogeneous communities.\textsuperscript{342} That is, given the argument that people are willing to comply only if they expect others to comply, since trust within one ethnic group implies feelings of distrust for other groups, ethnic mobilization is likely to decrease these expectations and, consequently, affect tax collections negatively. For example, in an article from 2001, Lassen concludes that the degree of voluntary tax compliance – and the size of the informal sector – depends on the degree of ethnic mobilization in a society. According to Lassen’s argument, ethnic mobilization decreases the level of trust within a community, as well as increasing the risks of a corrupt regime, hence hampering the prospects of a well-functioning society.\textsuperscript{343}

Furthermore, it has been argued that a shared identity serves as a \textit{technology} for collective action, i.e. individuals find it ‘technologically’ easier to coordinate with members of their own group than to coordinate with individuals from other groups. This technological effect of membership in a group is argued to have mainly two causes. The first is the potential use of a common language.\textsuperscript{344} The second is the existence of a shared set of understandings over modes of social interaction.\textsuperscript{345} Related to this argument is the idea that a shared identity may serve as a \textit{focal point} by providing ‘tags’ for individuals.\textsuperscript{346} By providing ‘tags’ for individuals, a shared identity facilitates within-group problem solving by giving group members convergent expectations. These convergent expectations differ from other potential mechanisms since they may occur even if there are no preference-based, institutional, or technological reasons why coordination with members of one’s own group is preferential to coordination with members of other groups.\textsuperscript{347}

In sum, there are at least four different mechanisms through which a shared identity may structure individual incentives to engage in collective action; preference homogeneity, reciprocity/trust, a shared technology, and focal points. Consequently, while people share some sense of national identity, the state will find it easier to solve collective action dilemmas since preferences are convergent and relationships characterized by reciprocity

\textsuperscript{342} See Lassen 2006 for this argument. For an application of the argument to school financing in Kenya, see Miguel & Gugerty 2005.
\textsuperscript{343} Lassen 2001. For a discussion on ethnic diversity and corruption, see Knack & Keefer 1997; Mauro 1995.
\textsuperscript{344} See for example Laitin 1994.
\textsuperscript{345} Humphreys et al. 2002: 10.
\textsuperscript{346} For a broader discussion on these mechanisms, see ibid.
\textsuperscript{347} ibid. These mechanisms have, for example, been studied by Fearon 1999.
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and trust. While individuals identify more with their ethnic group than with the larger community, the state will, on the other hand, find it more difficult to solve collective action dilemmas since preferences will be divergent across different groups and reciprocity and trust will be non-generalized. However, in order to be able to capture the degree to which constituents share a national identity empirically, we need analytical tools well-suited for this matter. In the next section, I develop such tools.

The empirical study of notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’

To find any consensus on what the concept of ethnic mobilization actually means is not an easy task. However, since studies on ethnic relations have traditionally been concerned mainly with violent conflict, the concept of ethnic mobilization has increasingly come to be seen as synonymous with such. Yet, as previously argued, though both media and academic literature on ethnic conflict give the opposite impression, peaceful relations between groups are in fact far more common than is large-scale violence. From this perspective, it becomes more fruitful to focus not just on ethnic violence but also on the logic and dynamics of ethnic organization and political competition more generally. In line with this argument, for the purpose of this study, ethnic mobilization is broadly understood as a spectrum of varying forms of ethnic organization running from ethnic solidarity on the lower end to ethnic collective action on the upper end. Following Tilly and Olzak, within this framework, ethnic solidarity should broadly be understood to mean the “conscious identification with a given ethnic population.” That is, ethnic solidarity is when people take action within the social sphere as members of a specific ethnic group. As such, it includes the maintenance of strong ethnic interaction networks and informal institutions that socialize new members and reinforce social ties. Empirical indicators of ethnic solidarity would, in turn, include such measures as marital endogamy rates, participation in and density of network interaction in ethnic social organizations and associations, and the retention

348 Fearon & Laitin 2000; Fearon & Laitin 1996.
349 This way of thinking about ethnic politics is inspired by, among others, Posner 2005.
of various practices that differ from those of other groups in society.\textsuperscript{352} Ethnic collective action should, on the other hand, be understood as collective action that takes some set of ethnic markers (e.g., skin color, language, region, etc.) as criteria for membership.\textsuperscript{353} Ethnic collective action can furthermore be divided into violent and non-violent forms. Among the indicators of more violent forms of ethnic collective action are ethnic civil or separatist wars, ethnic genocide, clashes or repeated violent conflict between ethnic groups or between ethnic groups and government forces, ethnic rebellion, ethnic-based demonstrations and riots in which people are killed, local ethnic guerrilla movements, ethnic terrorist attacks, and the suppression of particular ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{354} Non-violent manifestations of ethnic collective action in turn include such things as ethnic voting, the organization of ethnic parties, the formation of ethnic interest groups, non-violent ethnic autonomy movements, the redistribution of ethnic resources along ethnic lines, ethnic inequality in political representation, and ethnic discrimination.\textsuperscript{355} Generally, violent forms of ethnic collective action can be argued to demand much more in terms of organization and individual sacrifice than others. Consequently, there are differences in terms of the strength of ethnic divides not only between ethnic solidarity and ethnic collective action, but also between non-violent and violent forms of ethnic collective action. Compared to ethnic solidarity and non-violent forms of ethnic collective action, violent forms of ethnic collective action are both more costly and more risky.\textsuperscript{356} Consequently, where there is ethnic violence, there are often also other types of ethnic organization. Figure 2.2 illustrates the spectrum of ethnic mobilization.

\textsuperscript{352} Olzak 1983.
\textsuperscript{353} Definition taken from ibid: 357.
\textsuperscript{354} ibid; VanHanen 1999.
\textsuperscript{355} Horowitz 1985; Olzak 1983; VanHanen 1999.
\textsuperscript{356} Toft 2003: 2.
In sum, while ethnic solidarity refers to a socially relevant ethnic identity in terms of that people notice – and condition their actions – on ethnic distinctions in everyday private life, ethnic collective action refers to the formal organization of ethnic groups with the aim of collective political action. Ethnic collective action can further be divided into non-violent forms and violent forms.

Following the definition of ethnic mobilization offered above, in order to account for the degree to which ethnic identities are mobilized in the three countries of concern for this study, in chapter six, I will explore the extent to which the political climate has been characterized by varying forms of ethnic solidarity and collective action such as, for example, ethnic voting, the organization of party politics on the basis of ethnic identities, ethnic violent conflict, and the distribution of public goods and appointments along ethnic lines.\textsuperscript{357} The more of such organization, the more mobilized ethnic identities are taken to be, and the less notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are understood to coincide with the territorial boundaries of the nation state. Furthermore, the more ethnic collective action in general, and ethnic \textit{violent} collective action in particular, the more mobilized are ethnic group identities understood to be since such forms of ethnic mobilization require more than others in terms of organization and sacrifice on behalf of group members. However, before we turn to the empirical analysis, in the next chapter, I develop more thoroughly the institutional perspective employed in the study.

\textsuperscript{357} Hulterström 2004.
The institutional sources of statehood

The argument developed in this study highlights the important role played by the formal criteria for citizenship – articulated by national elites during formative periods of state development – in shaping notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (i.e. patterns of ethnic mobilization) and, ultimately, tax state development. As previously argued, the formal boundary of the national political community is an issue that manifests itself in the answer to three questions: Who is a citizen? Among citizens, who has what privileges? And whose norms and practices (i.e. identity) are symbolically aligned with those with the state? This study in particular focuses on the third question as it explores the impact of the degree of multiculturalism manifested in key legal and policy documents on sub-sequent developments of notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, eventually, taxation outcomes. As such, this study mainly draws upon an emerging stream of comparative historical institutional analysis that shares a concern for explaining enduring, national patterns of variation in policies and outcomes. The most relevant example for this study would be Evan S. Lieberman’s Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa from 2003. However, while Lieberman focuses primarily on the impact of federalism and apartheid policies on taxation outcomes in so called fragment societies (i.e. societies which are characterized by political traditions in which a European-descended group retained political, economic, and administrative control of territories simultaneously inhabited by themselves and other groups

understood as belonging to different, inferior races after independence), the focus of this study is the impact of varying forms of politics of inclusion on taxation in non-fragment societies. Moreover, while Lieberman to a significant extent focuses on the impact of politics of exclusion, this study exclusively focuses on measures aiming to include various groups in the larger political community.

With its focus on the role of political institutions in shaping, and not only reflecting and mediating, social and political outcomes, the historical institutionalist approach represents a promising source of theoretical, as well as empirical, insights about how notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ get constructed.\(^{360}\) Furthermore, historical institutionalism’s historical perspective, its concept of ‘path dependency’, and its conceptualization of structure-agency relationships, represent theoretical, conceptual, as well as methodological tools that enable theorists to make sense of the contingences, irregularities, and spatial-temporal variations associated with ethnic identities and their political consequences.\(^{361}\)

The aim of this chapter is to provide a framework for testing the validity of the main argument put forward in this study empirically. As such, I first explore and discuss the institutional perspective adopted in the study. I then discuss the formal criteria for citizenship as an institution. Finally, I develop a set of tools for cross-national comparison.

### The institutional perspective

Researchers focusing on the impact of formal institutions on paths of tax state development ask whether public institutions can be arranged as to induce quasi-voluntary compliance and, as a result, strengthen the ability of states to collect taxes. Accordingly, the major challenge for studies focusing on the institutional origins of statehood is to pin down specific institutional traits in various countries to see what separates those states that are able to collect a large amount of taxes from those with weaker taxation capabilities. This is also the main empirical task of this study. Yet, before we can proceed with this task, we need to know more about the institutional perspective. What constitutes an institution? And which are the channels through which institutions may potentially influence patterns of identity mobilization and ultimately, tax state development?

\(^{360}\) This argument is put forward by Lecours 2000: 510.

\(^{361}\) Ibid.
Institutions defined

While there has been some controversy regarding what counts as an institution, at the most basic level, institutions are most commonly referred to as simply 'the rules of the game'.\(^{362}\) As such, the organization of political institutions systematically structures actors’ political preferences and behavior.\(^{363}\) They define who the legitimate actors are, the number of actors, the ordering of action, and to a large extent also what information actors will have about each other’s intentions.\(^{364}\) In short, institutions define who can play and how they play.\(^{365}\) As such, they can, according to Hall, be understood as "the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy".\(^{366}\) North provides a similar definition, viewing institutions as the "humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction."\(^{367}\) According to both these definitions, institutions are made up of either formal rules, such as constitutions, laws, and regulations, or informal ones, such as conventions, moral codes and other norms of social behavior.\(^{368}\) However, as argued by among others Rothstein, analytically it could sometimes be more fruitful to think of institutions as existing in a continuous dimension, spanning from, at the one extreme, formal institutions setting incentive structures to, at the other extreme, informal ones, functioning mainly as social norms.\(^{369}\) Yet, being the formal criteria for citizenship, the institutions in focus for this study are best understood as formal institutions.

However, despite similar understandings of the concept, different kinds of institutionalisms define different ways in which actors behave and are shaped by institutions.

Three institutional approaches

Institutional theorists normally distinguish between three different institutional perspectives; the rationalist, the sociological, and the historical.

\(^{362}\) See, for example, North 1990; Steinmo 2001a; Steinmo 2001b.
\(^{365}\) Steinmo 2001a.
\(^{366}\) Hall 1986: 19.
\(^{367}\) North 1990: 3.
\(^{368}\) See ibid: 4.
\(^{369}\) Rothstein 2003: 66.
For rationalist scholars, institutions are mainly seen as structuring actors’ strategies concerning certain political outcomes. According to this perspective, institutions are mainly important as features of a strategic context, imposing constraints on self-interested behavior. The rational choice approach to institutions begins with a set of individuals, each with a well-defined set of preferences which they are also able to rank in a rational manner. Furthermore, actors are seen as utility maximizers. In the game that follows, institutions then determine the exchanges that occur among the actors, but the institutions as such do not influence the preferences held by the different actors. That is, according to rational choice institutionalism, institutions may very well induce a change in actors’ strategies, but the preferences stay the same independent of context.

On the other extreme would be sociological institutionalism. Scholars following this approach have most commonly been interested in understanding culture and norms as institutions, i.e. they are concerned more with informal institutions than they are with formal ones. As such, they study patterns of behavior and cognitive maps and argue that these social and informal institutions are critical for the understanding of social, political, and economic interactions. According to the sociological institutional perspective, individuals cannot be considered to have the abilities necessary to be fully rational in their interaction with other agents. In other words, in a given institutional setting, individuals do not calculate what action would enhance his or her utility most. Instead, individuals act according to a logic of appropriateness. That is, they follow templates given to them by the institutions in which they are acting. As pointed out by Rothstein, in this cultural understanding of institutions, institutions do not only determine actors’ preferences, but institutions do to some extent also create the actors themselves.

The historical institutionalist approach commonly uses both rational and sociological approaches to specify the relationship between institutions and behavior. Accordingly, in line with the historical institutionalist perspective, political institutions do not only distribute power and influence strategies but, over time, they have even the potential to influence how various groups come to define their political interests and worldviews, as well as

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371 Rothstein 1996; Weingast 1996.
373 See, for example, March & Olsen 1989; Steinmo 2001a.
374 Rothstein 1996: 147.
Chapter 3

their very identities. The structure of a polity’s institutions hence profoundly affects how actors develop their policy preferences. However, this is not to say that historical institutionalists have trouble with the rational choice idea that political actors are acting strategically to achieve their goals. Rather, what historical institutionalists turn against is the idea that actors and preferences are given from the beginning, i.e. before the game starts. In other words, according to the historical institutionalist view, institutions provide the context in which individuals interpret their self-interest and thereby define their policy preferences. Rationality in itself is, as such, embedded in context. In the words of Sven Steinmo: “[one] cannot even define what a rational act is without examining the context of that behavior.” Accordingly, within the historical institutionalist approach, formal political institutions are not understood as simply neutral brokers among competing interests, but they are “social forces in their own right”, mediating actors’ goals, their relations of cooperation and conflict and, as a result; they determine varying patterns of political mobilization, leaving their own imprint on political outcomes. National political institutions have, as such, the capability to foster distinct clusters of norms, values, and subsequent behaviors that fundamentally structure policy processes and hence make particular policy outcomes much more likely than others. While some institutions tend to promote cooperation and consensus, others have the opposite effect. However, while the historical institutional perspective may, at a first glance, seem similar to a cultural explanation as some of the mechanisms through which institutions shape identities and politics are part of a more general phenomenon that many describe as ‘political culture’, what differentiates the historical institutionalist approach from a more outright cultural approach is that the cultural attitudes, norms and beliefs from the perspective of this study have

380 Hall & Taylor 1996. Mettler and Soss have emphasized the ways in which public policy define membership, forge political cohesion and group divisions, and build and undermine civic capacities (Mettler & Soss 2004). Lately, some rational choice analysts have begun to incorporate ideas and values into their work to explain why actors move toward one outcome when a conventional analysis specifies many possible equilibrium outcomes. However, in these studies ideas serve almost only as ‘focal points’, i.e. ideas are unquestionably important to such analyses, but not ideas as ideas – that is, their content, valence, and intensity are less important than the role they play in a causal tableau (see Lieberman 2002: 699 for this critique).
specific institutional origins, and are hence mutable within the context of institutional change.\textsuperscript{381}

Specific for the comparative historical institutional approach is furthermore the ways in which it emphasizes critical junctures and the lingering effects of early policy choices. The argument here is that, depending on their timing and sequencing, initial policy choices will have a pervasive effect on future developments even once the initial conditions have changed. That is, while the exact idioms used for politics may change the institutions that remain in form of the ideas and myths that sprung from the initial conditions may still be reinvented and adapted to new circumstances over time, hence be setting in motion path-dependent processes of state development.\textsuperscript{382} In other words, it is not just single institutions that are subject to increasing returns. Rather, once in place, institutional arrangements induce complementary organizational forms, which in turn may generate new complementary institutions.\textsuperscript{383} As such, for social scientists interested in paths of development, the key issue is often what North calls “the interdependent web of an institutional matrix” since such a matrix “produces massive increasing returns.”\textsuperscript{384} Consequently, institutions that were only in place for a very short time, or even considered to be mistakes, might still cast a long shadow on the future, shaping political outcomes for a long period of time.\textsuperscript{385} In this sense, historical institutionalists tend to have a view of institutional development that emphasizes also unintended consequences.\textsuperscript{386} However, while the institutions that are at the center of historical institutionalism are argued to have the potential to shape and constrain political strategies and outcomes in different ways, they are themselves the outcome of different strategies, conflicts, and choices.\textsuperscript{387} As a result, institutions according to this view are never the only cause of different political outcomes. Rather, as has been pointed out by among others Hall, what historical institutionalists claim is that institutions structure political interactions and, as such, ultimately affect political outcomes.\textsuperscript{388} Rothstein has, in the same vein argued that, by

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{381} Lecours 2000; Lieberman 2003.
\textsuperscript{382} Lieberman 2003: 14.
\textsuperscript{383} North 1990. In addition, see Katznelson 1997; Pierson 2000a.
\textsuperscript{384} North 1990b: 95. See in addition Pierson 2000a.
\textsuperscript{385} See, for example, Peters 1996; Rothstein 1996; Thelen & Steinmo 1992.
\textsuperscript{386} Hall & Taylor 1996.
\textsuperscript{387} Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 10.
\textsuperscript{388} From ibid: 13.
\end{footnotesize}
focusing on the intermediate institutions of political life, historical institutionalism provides the theoretical “bridge between ‘men [who] make history’ and the ‘circumstances’ under which they are able to do so.”

The formal criteria for citizenship as an institution

According to the tenets of institutional theory, as the highest level definition of the nation (in a hierarchy of possible definitions of the nation advancing from how the public, elites, mainstream parties, and the state ‘imagine’ the nation), the formal criteria for citizenship is frequently at the heart of the idea of a community and should hence be intimately connected with sets of common values and a shared identity. As such, they should provide an extraordinary opportunity for the state to tie people to specific geographic entities, as defined by territorial boundaries. That is, the formal criteria for citizenship have the potential to serve as what Brubaker has called a ‘powerful instrument and object of social closure’ of the nation-state. Furthermore, depending on how citizenship gets defined, the
The institutional sources of statehood

formal criteria for citizenship have the potential to serve as a powerful instrument and object of social closure within the nation-state. That is, depending on how the national political community is defined, certain identities, including regional, religious, racial, and linguistic ones, are more likely to become politically salient than others.\(^{392}\) As argued by Posner, this is not necessarily the product of some passive psychological process, but could also be the result of deliberate decisions designed to maximize material and/or non-material payoffs.\(^{393}\) Ethnic identities are hence not just situational, but potentially also instrumental. Consequently, the specification of ethnic group rights in the form of official state documents and policies are likely to provide a strong set of incentives for political entrepreneurs and individual citizens to make claims based on such identities. In the same vein, when particular identities or cleavages are ignored in the definition of the national political community, they are much less likely to become politically mobilized.\(^{394}\) Since the most prominent characteristics of the national political community are defined during comparable periods of significant change, so called critical junctures, they have according to the historical institutional perspective the potential to cast a long shadow on the future, even after the initial conditions have changed.\(^{395}\) This potentially happens via a variety of different channels (apart from the specifications in the constitution, various laws, and national policies), including the media, museums, the census, and maps.\(^{396}\) Because of the costs of inventing new bases for political mobilization are likely to be high, political entrepreneurs have strong incentives to preserve existing patterns of political organization. The idea that some people are insiders and some outsiders, that some groups are allies and some are adversaries, hence becomes a natural part of political life in a given society, shaping reactions and counter-reactions to particular political orders. As such, once an ethnic identity has become politically salient, the state has not always the power to easily dismantle its creation.\(^{397}\) Accordingly, the formal criteria for citizenship as defined by national elites during formative periods of state

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\(^{392}\) See Lieberman 2003.

\(^{393}\) Posner 2005: 11.

\(^{394}\) Lieberman 2003.

\(^{395}\) Ibid: 14; Goldstone 1998.

\(^{396}\) Anderson 1983; Lieberman 2003.

\(^{397}\) Lieberman 2003: 14.
development may ultimately function as a hegemonic power, understood as “the political forging and institutionalization of a pattern of group activity in a state and the concurrent idealization of that schema into a dominant symbolic framework that reigns as common sense.”

Much in line with the institutional perspective, multicultural approaches towards citizenship remain controversial. More specifically, there is a widespread worry that if groups are encouraged by the very terms of citizenship to turn inward and focus on their ‘difference’, then the hope of a larger fraternity of all the people living within the territorial borders of a nation-state will have to be abandoned. That is, if multiculturalism is officially recognized, citizenship will cease to be a device to cultivate a sense of community and a common sense of purpose, ultimately serving a disintegrative function. In the end, if ethnic conflict is understood as struggles for the collective goods of the nation-state, multicultural policies are argued to impact negatively on both the social contract between states and their societies and the social contract between citizens. In order to avoid this damage, the critics argue, rather than highlighting differences, one needs instead to emphasize the commonalities if a shared identity is to develop, hence adopting an assimilative approach towards citizenship. Rejecting multicultural approaches towards citizenship, Miller for example argues that since national identity is not a fixed concept, a state-promoted inclusive national identity would be the best option in order to create trust and unity between different cultural groups. According to Miller, multicultural approaches towards citizenship tend to fix individuals into essentialist cultural categories, over time preventing integration, as well as the development of a shared identity. Miller even argues that the politics of the common good will predominate only if there is a shared national identity. Similar arguments have been put forward by, among others, Barry. In his book “Culture and Equality”, Barry argues that a sense of belonging together provides the basis for social trust which, in turn, is essential for the smooth functioning of the state. Gellner holds a similar view as he argues that a shared culture is a prerequisite for any state as such, claiming that “Nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in

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398 Laitin 1986: 19. This definition is, by and large, inspired by the work of Antonio Gramsci.
400 Wimmer 1997.
401 Miller 1995.
particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state – a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation – should not separate the power-holders from the rest. Furthermore, with regard to the redistributive functions of states, critique has been directed towards multicultural approaches towards citizenship based on the motivation that such policies risk weakening pro-distribution coalitions by diverting time, energy and money from redistribution to recognition, weaken redistribution by eroding trust and solidarity amongst citizens, and hence erode popular support for redistribution, leading to growing tax resistance, and misdiagnose the problems that minorities face as cultural rather than economic. This line of critique against multicultural citizenship is summarized quite well by Wolfe and Klausen as they argue that, “if the ties that bind you to increasingly diverse fellow citizens are loosened, you are likely to be less inclined to share your resources with them.” That is, by officially separating ‘us’ from ‘them’, multicultural approaches towards citizenship risk to erode the political glue in terms of a shared national identity that is argued to hold the nation together and that, in the end, makes it possible for so many millions of people to pay the taxes to, or even willingly die for, the ambitions of the state.

Defenders of multicultural approaches towards citizenship have, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of the recognition of ethnic group rights in order for the state to gain the loyalty of all groups in society and, as such, be able to establish itself as the legitimate organization not only among dominant majorities. Drawing on the examples of post-independence Sudan and Ethiopia, Keller has argued that the strategy of granting cultural autonomy to ethnic communities in the most deeply divided African societies would seem the best solution for averting the emergence of claims to self-determination which threaten the survival of the state. In his seminal work on ethnic groups and politics from 1985, Horowitz too provides a strong critique against assimilative policies, drawing on examples from the developing world. According to Horowitz, conscious policies of assimilation in the end only lead to increasing

404 For a good summary of this critique, see Banting & Kymlicka 2004.
406 Young 1976: 38.
407 See, for example, Kymlicka 1995.
408 Keller 1983: 268.
insecurity for states since they provoke separatist feelings among already frustrated groups.\textsuperscript{409}

Yet, while communitarians and liberals have time and again engaged one another in discussions over the importance of individual and group rights as means to forge solidarity among culturally diverse populations, on the whole, quite few systematic comparisons have been conducted on the subject. In addition, the relatively few studies that have been conducted tend to point in contradictory directions.\textsuperscript{410} As a result, we still have a poor understanding of which approaches towards citizenship have the greatest potential to generate a sense of solidarity. Are certain approaches towards citizenship more conducive than others when it comes to promoting the development of a shared national identity and, ultimately, the tax state? By investigating whether varying paths of tax state development can partly be understood as a result of the degree to which multiculturalism was ultimately manifested in key legal and policy documents at the time of independence in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda this study has the potential to provide an answer to this question. In the next section, I provide the analytical tools needed in order to do so.

**Analytical framework**

The aim of this section is to develop the indicators and analytical tools needed to test the main argument put forward in this study, namely that cross-country variation in the degree of officially recognized multiculturalism accounts for cross-country variation in tax state development. To determine the degree of officially recognized multiculturalism in the three countries of concern, I will explore the extent to which the different states employed assimilative and multicultural policies towards pre-existing ethnic cleavages at the time of independence. Furthermore, I will identify the ways in which the law and policy choices made at the time of independence in the respective countries were reinforced with other strategies and ancillary institutions. In the end, the

\textsuperscript{409} Horowitz 1985: 567-9.

\textsuperscript{410} For this critique, see Kymlicka & Banting 2003; Miguel 2004. As argued by Horowitz, the lack of empirical evidence on the matter can perhaps partly be understood as a consequence of that there, within the consociational and multiculturalism theories, has been an inadequate specification of consequences. While some have been aiming at stable democracy; others have aimed at the absence of widespread violence and government repression, while yet others have aimed at the authoritative allocation of scarce resources and opportunities among competing communal actors (Horowitz 1985: 571).
broader the coverage of multicultural policies in terms of the number of pre-existing ethnic cleavages (i.e. regional, tribal, linguistic, and religious) that was recognized at the time of independence, the more sympathetic to official multiculturalism is that particular state understood to be. Equivalently, the broader the coverage of assimilative policies in terms of the number of ethnic cleavages that were not recognized at the time of independence, the less sympathetic to official multiculturalism is that particular state understood to be. Below, I discuss multicultural and assimilative policies more in detail.

Defining multicultural and assimilative policies

Assimilative and multicultural policies can be argued to be the two basic ways through which a state may aim at integrating an ethnically diverse society through the terms of citizenship. If at the most fundamental level citizenship is understood in terms of that it bestows upon individual membership in a national political community, each of these two approaches can be understood in terms of the varying degree to which citizenship is also associated with the granting of ethnic group rights. That is, while both approaches involve fashioning a new transcendent identity, i.e. the identity of citizenship or full, equal membership in the state, and as such seek to integrate people from various ethnic backgrounds into common social and political institutions, they differ in their means of doing

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411 There are a large number of ways in which a state can choose to deal with ethnic diversity. McGarry and O’Leary, for example, differ between mainly two strategies: methods for eliminating differences and methods for managing differences. Among the methods for eliminating differences, we find genocide, forced mass-population transfers, partition and/or secession (self-determination) and integration and/or assimilation. Among the methods of managing differences, on the other hand, we find hegemonic control, arbitration (i.e. third-party intervention), federalization and consociationalism (McGarry & O’Leary 1993). However, while this typology provides a healthy reminder that there are many methods of ethnic conflict resolution that, as argued by Kymlicka and Norman (Kymlicka & Norman 2000: 12), fall outside the bounds of contemporary theorizing about minority rights, at least two of them (genocide and forced mass-population transfers) completely fall outside the analytical framework of this study since they cannot be considered part of an overall integrative framework. The same is true for policies of exclusion such as, for example, apartheid politics or the refusal to grant citizenship to immigrants (similar to the jus sanguinis system of citizenship in for example Germany and Austria where membership of civil society as workers, tax-payers, etc., does not confer a right to membership of the nation-state, see Castles 1995 for a further discussion on this type of citizenship).

412 See Howard 2006; Lieberman 2003. The official membership in a state is always associated with certain goods, rights, and obligations. These could for example include such basic goods as security and access to the labor market (Brubaker 1992: 24). In a liberal democracy, citizenship is also associated with the right to vote, the right to run for office, and to participate freely in public activities (Howard 2006). The obligations of citizenship would be such things as fulfilling demands for taxation, and possibly serving the military.
so. More specifically, multicultural and assimilative policies differ in the sense that while assimilative policies have the intent or expectation to eliminate cultural differences between sub-groups in the state, multicultural policies do not have this kind of intent. Rather, multicultural policies accept that ethno-cultural identities matter to citizens and that they, as such, should be recognized and accommodated within the common institutions of the state. The hope is, as such, that citizens from different backgrounds can all recognize themselves, and feel at home, within such institutions. As such, at the most general level, multicultural policies can be understood to be policies that give recognition to ethnic groups within the realm of the public sphere. That is, it is a form of citizenship that allows, or even supports, ethnic groups to maintain their distinct traditions and/or retain specific group rights.

As such, multicultural policies may be analytically conceived as having, by and large, two variants; one which is more laissez faire (sometimes also referred to as amalgamation, blending, structural assimilation or the ‘melting pot’ model) and one which is more full-fledged and that allows for the division of power between different groups.

414 See Weldon 2006 for a similar understanding of the concept.
415 Some theorists would further divide full-fledged multicultural rights into categories of (more) full-fledged and symbolic multicultural rights. In this context, the more symbolic type of multicultural policies have been argued to be more relevant for states that have multiple ethnic groups that share a set of integrative institutions and national values, but that still retain collective sub-state practices that do not compromise their loyalty to the unity of the state (see Premdas 1997 for a similar understanding). In comparison to the more full-fledged variant of MCPs, this ‘lighter’ form of multicultural policy does most often not give special attention or concession to political demands, but mainly recognizes symbolic claims. As such, quests for equal access to power and opportunities becomes submerged and submerged in the wider grid of political and economic claims of the community as a whole (see Premdas 1997: 13). The more fullfledged variant of multicultural policies on the other hand have generally been argued to be most relevant for the discussion of how to forge a sense of nationhood in so called pluralized states, i.e. states with sizeable national minorities that conceive of themselves as nations within a larger state (Banting & Kymlicka 2004: 15). According to the argument, in this category, multicultural policies are more than just concerned with the distribution of recognition in cultural symbols (Premdas 1997: 12). Instead, the main functions of such policies are to redistribute political power, privileges and resources so as to accommodate the demands of different groups (Keller 1983: 266). However, according to the argument of this study, states can themselves both create and take the wind out of ethnic divisions. As such, while at a first glance the distinction between full-fledged and symbolic multicultural policies may seem to make sense, there are still some limits with such an approach since it may in fact be the multicultural policies that create the sizeable national minorities in the first place. In addition, the main question in the debate has not been whether different degrees of power create more or less ethnic mobilization, but rather if any degree of recognition poses a threat to national integration. Furthermore, even if the aim was to distinguish between multicultural policies depending on if they were more full-fledged or symbolic, there would be problems inherent in such an approach since all recognition in some sense means the transfer of power. All this taken together, I have chosen to not make the distinction between full-fledged and symbolic recognition, but all policies that explicitly recognize ethnic group rights are considered to be multicultural policies.
Within the framework of the laissez-faire multicultural approach, difference is tolerated, but it is not seen as the role of the state to support the maintenance of ethnic cultures.\textsuperscript{416} That is, while the state allows diversity to be expressed in the public sphere, specific policies are still not adopted to support diversity. Rather, it is a type of citizenship in which different cultures mix to form a new and unique culture, with characteristics distinct from a number of the different original cultures. Yet, exactly for this reason, as argued by among others Weldon, this strategy has often proven untenable since it has led to a situation characterized by that ethnic minorities are the only ones not permitted to express their cultural traditions, while the dominant ethnic tradition ‘masquerades’ as the national political community.\textsuperscript{417} Historically, the United States is one of the countries often argued to partly have pursued such an approach.\textsuperscript{418}

For the purpose of this study, multicultural policies are positively defined, i.e. I exclude policies that simply involve the non-discriminatory access to, or non-discriminatory enforcement of, traditional civil and political rights of citizenship for the individual members of ethnic groups from the definition. That is, while respecting that common individual rights of citizenship are indeed one essential form of accommodating the members of minority groups, the main focus of this study is rather policies that go beyond such protection to instead provide some additional form of public recognition of ethnic diversity. It is also such policies that have been the main target of the discussion about how to forge a sense of shared identity in ethnically diverse societies. As such, the understanding of multicultural policies employed in this study in much coincides with the definition of multicultural policies as put forward by Kymlicka and Banting.\textsuperscript{419}

The specific policies that can be argued to be emblematic for the more full-fledged multicultural variant of concern for this study would for example be: Federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy and self-government rights; constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation or representation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional levels; official language status; the upholding of historic treaties and/or the signing of new treaties; the recognition of customary law; public funding of

\textsuperscript{416} Castles 1995.
\textsuperscript{417} Weldon 2006: 334-5.
\textsuperscript{418} Castles 1995.
\textsuperscript{419} See Kymlicka & Banting 2003.
minority language universities/schools/media; and affirmative action policies.\textsuperscript{420}

Quite contrary to multicultural policies, assimilative policies are most commonly understood as policies which aim to produce an outcome in which members of some ethnic community abandon at least some of their customs and practices.\textsuperscript{421} Assimilation can, as such, be understood in terms of the ‘idea of trying to eliminate difference within the state by seeking to integrate or assimilate the relevant ethnic communities into a new transcendent identity’.\textsuperscript{422} As argued by Connor, depending on the degree to which assimilative policies are in fact aimed at building nation-states without destroying other nations or not, they could also be understood in terms of either ‘nation-building’ or ‘nation-destroying’ policies.\textsuperscript{423}

While the broader understanding of assimilation presented above in many ways makes sense, such a definition of the concept does, however, not help us much in understanding the variety of assimilative approaches employed by different states. We therefore need to distinguish between different types of assimilative policies. One such important distinction is between different variants of assimilative approaches which I have chosen to refer to as ‘pure assimilation’ and the ‘neutrality’ approach.

\textit{Pure assimilation} is commonly understood as a one-way (or one-sided) process in which minority groups give up their languages, cultures, and traditions and assume those of a more dominant group. Ethnic minorities and immigrants can attain citizenship, but they are expected to assimilate fully into the political majority (or native population).\textsuperscript{424} Moreover, the state’s role is to facilitate ethnic assimilation. As argued by Castles, pure assimilation aims “to create conditions favorable to individual adaptation and transferal of majority culture and values, through insistence on use of

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item Banting & Kymlicka 2004: 17-8. Together, the different aspects of multicultural policies by and large capture some of the ideas of what Arend Lijphart has called ‘consociational democracy’. All in all, Arend Lijphart identifies four defining characteristics of consociational democracy: 1) grand coalition of all ethnic groups; 2) mutual veto in decision-making; 3) ethnic proportionality in the allocation of certain opportunities and offices; and 4) ethnic autonomy, often expressed in federalism (Lijphart 1980). However, what distinguishes the multicultural approach from the consociational democracy approach is, among other things, the fact that a multicultural approach is not aimed at fostering democracy in particular, but rather aimed at fostering stability and avoiding conflict more in general. As such, it is possible to talk about multicultural policies also in a context of non- or semi-democratic political environments.
  \item Mason 1999: 266.
  \item McGarry & O’Leary 1993: 17.
  \item Connor 1972.
  \item Weldon 2006: 334.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the dominant language and attendance at normal schools [...]". As such, it is a policy that aims to create a polity in which members of less dominant ethnic communities abandon all their distinctive customs and practices within the realm of (at least) the public sphere. In the end, pure assimilation, as such, aims to undermine non-dominant communities all together. However, even though the overall aim of pure assimilation is that all cultures but the majority culture should eventually be abandoned, the approach still allows ethnic political minorities to maintain their culture in private. As argued by among others Castles, France is probably one of the countries that closest constitute a prototype of pure assimilation. Especially France’s prohibition on Muslim girls wearing headscarves in public schools illustrates the principle of pure assimilation well. Policies that can be argued to be emblematic for pure assimilation would for example be: The adoption of a unitary state structure; the refusal to officially affirm ethnicity at the central and/or regional levels in the constitution, legislation, and parliament but the ethnic identity of the majority; the adoption of the majority language as the official language; and the refusal to publically fund minority language universities/schools/media.

While pure assimilation means the assimilation of minority groups into the majority culture, within the neutrality approach there is total rejection of any kind of grouping based on ethnicity. In other words, under this approach, neither majority or minority groups have any group rights, but instead individual and non-ethnic rights are regarded as the core of the social order. That is, it defines the nation in ‘neutral’ terms. The neutrality approach is, as such, very similar to what Rothchild and Olorunsola has called the ‘avoidance’ strategy. Within the avoidance strategy approach, decision-makers attempt to insulate themselves from ethnic demands, as well as avoid the political mobilization of ethnic cleavages by ignoring the ethnic question all together and instead adopt a more neutral stance towards the diversity of ethnic interests. Emblematic for the neutrality approach would for example be: The adoption of an ethnically neutral language only as the official and national language; the establishment of a secular state; the refusal to officially affirm any ethnic

428 See Weldon 2006 for this example.
group identity at the central and/or regional levels in the constitution, legislation, and parliament; and the refusal to publically fund minority or majority language universities/schools/media.

Comparing the degree of official multiculturalism

In order to empirically assess the degree of officially recognized multiculturalism in the three countries of concern for the study and the extent to which such institutions have affected subsequent paths of tax state development, I will conduct an empirical analysis in two steps. More specifically, in a first step, I will explore the degree to which each of the three countries assimilated or, through the adoption of multicultural policies, recognized the existence of pre-existing regional, tribal, linguistic, and religious cleavages at the time of independence, as ultimately specified in key legal and policy documents. In a second step, in order to be able to empirically test the argument that cross-country variation in degree of official multiculturalism as ultimately manifested in key legal and policy documents during formative periods of state development explains cross-country variation in tax state development, I will then compare the three countries in terms of how many pre-existing ethnic cleavages (i.e. regional, tribal, linguistic, and religious cleavages) that became officially recognized in key legal and official documents at the time of independence. In the end, the larger the number of ethnic cleavages that are officially recognized, (i.e. the more all-embracing the official approach is in terms of the dimensions of ethnicity that it acknowledges), the more sympathetic to official multiculturalism that particular state is taken to be. According to the same logic, the broader the coverage of assimilative policies in terms of the number of ethnic cleavages that are not recognized, the less sympathetic to official multiculturalism that particular state is taken to be. Comparing the two different assimilative approaches in terms of the degree to which they support official multiculturalism, since policies of neutrality do not explicitly favor one particular ethnic group but rather an ethnically ‘neutral’ identity, for the purpose of this study, they are ultimately understood to be more sympathetic to official multiculturalism than pure assimilation (but still less sympathetic than multicultural policies).

Important to remember is that the aim of this study is not to categorize countries into absolute categories of assimilative and multicultural approaches towards citizenship, but the aim is rather to explore and compare the degree to which the three states of concern officially recognized ethnic diversity at the time of independence.
The historical context of ethnicity and nationhood

In order to gain analytical leverage from a critical junctures framework, it is important to illustrate that the initial conditions under which the three countries operated prior to the critical juncture were similar enough that neither the critical junctures themselves, nor the outcomes that would follow, should appear to be pre-determimated. In addition, to the extent that other periods have been widely recognized as important in the respective national histories, it is useful to explain why such periods were not identified as the relevant critical juncture for the question being studied. The identification of path dependence therefore involves both tracing a given outcome back to a particular set of historical events, and showing how these events are themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of prior historical conditions. Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the definitions of the national political community that were adopted at the time of independence did not automatically follow from pre-independence patterns of ethnic diversity and organization. Hence, this chapter takes a historical turn and describes how ethnic relations evolved in the three countries before independence. As will be evident from the discussion, given the similarities in ethnic relations in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda before independence, there was substantial reason to expect that the three states would in fact promote very similar definitions of the national political community at the time of independence. If a nation is conceived as “a deep horizontal comradeship”,

431 Lieberman 2003: 68.
432 Mahoney 2000.
and constitutes a bounded, political identity tantamount to the notion of a “people”, there were many “peoples” living within the territorial boundaries of all these new African states. Moreover, all three societies were ethnically divided along multiple ethnic (tribal-territorial, linguistic, and religious) cleavages, lacked a numerically dominant ethnic group, and had comparatively very few white settlers. Furthermore, due to British policies of indirect rule, in all three countries mainly tribal-territorial cleavages created political fault lines that risked threatening national cohesion. In all countries there was, in addition, widespread fear that one specific territorially-based tribal grouping would come to dominate the political arena after independence. In Botswana, it was Tswana dominance that was feared, in Zambia Bemba dominance, and in Uganda Baganda dominance. Yet, despite these similarities in terms of ethnic diversity and organization in the pre-independence era, as will be demonstrated in chapter five, leaders in the three countries ultimately adopted very different definitions of the national political community at the time of independence.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first discuss the ethnic composition of the Botswanan, Zambian, and Ugandan societies in the pre-colonial and colonial period. I then demonstrate how ethnic identities were consolidated and mobilized during the period of colonial rule, and especially as a result of British policies of indirect rule. Finally, I provide a short summary of the key differences and similarities between the three countries in terms of ethnic diversity and mobilization at the time of independence.

**Ethnic composition before independence**

Contrary to the commonly held view that states and state systems did simply not exist in pre-colonial Africa, there is in fact extensive evidence that also African pre-colonial tribal state systems aimed at extending their authority, had firm notions of what consolidation of power meant, and developed conventions for relations between states. In fact, in a comparison with other continents that later became European colonies, Africa stands out as the continent which in the pre-colonial period provided the largest number of emergent state systems. Hence, the desire to expand control was at least as much a constant in pre-colonial Africa as

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433 Anderson 1983.
it was elsewhere in the world. However, compared to the extension of authority in Western Europe and in some other regions of the developing world, the extension of power in Africa meant something quite different. While in Western Europe power was, at least in the first instance, based on the control over land, in pre-colonial Africa, power over people was what mattered most. This was because in pre-colonial Africa land was plentiful and populations scarce, making control over territory less attractive and less of a comparative advantage than control over people, of which there was less in the way of to tax. Consequently, property rights over people were extraordinarily well-developed in Africa compared to other parts of the world.

Since the pre-colonial African state systems were based primarily on people they were exceptionally dynamic, i.e. they were created, rose and fell naturally in response to opportunities and challenges. As such, they had frontiers, rather than boundaries. Others have described existing pre-colonial political systems as ‘galaxy-like’ in the sense that power radiated from the chief’s palace and diminished toward its edges, rather than being territorially defined. As a result, ethnic relations in the pre-colonial period were much in flux as polities continually expanded and contracted.

Yet, if pre-colonial African states were fluid, the imposition of colonial rule much altered this since, during the colonizing process, former frontiers were transformed and negotiated to instead become boundaries. However, Europe’s transfer of its own state system to Africa was not accompanied by any prior calculation to make statehood coincide with nationhood. Consequently, after the scramble for Africa had taken place and the colonizers had managed to agree on how to divide up the African continent, very few of the new territorial units which were carved out as countries could be described as nations in the classical European sense. Rather, after the imposition of colonial rule, ethnically fragmented countries became the rule rather than the exception. In fact, in only a

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441 Bounded territories are, in general, seen as colonial inventions, which created clearly demarcated units of administration, ended the ambiguities of sovereignty in buffer zones and placed formerly autonomous communities under paramount chiefs (see Werbner 2002).
442 The specific mechanism used to divide Africa was the Berlin Conference of 1884/5 (Herbst 2000: 71–3).
minority of African countries – and especially in those previously ruled by Great Britain – was there one ethnic group which comprised more than half of the population of the country.\textsuperscript{443} In many countries, there was in addition a lack of congruence between statehood and nationhood stemming from the fact that many pre-colonial political systems were partitioned by colonial borders. As such, when the British left the territories that are now Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda, they left what can best be described as artificial state constructions. In fact, estimations reveal that as many as 56 percent of Zambia’s population belong to an ethnic group that was partitioned by colonial borders.\textsuperscript{444} Corresponding figures for Uganda and Botswana are 37 and 10 percent.\textsuperscript{445} Furthermore, in all three countries, colonial expansion led to the incorporation of extremely diverse pre-colonial polities. A census conducted in Botswana before independence (in 1946), counted to at least 97 different tribal groups in what was then the Bechuanaland Protectorate.\textsuperscript{446} The whole region of what is today Botswana was an arena of migrations of tribes until the colonial consolidation of the territory in 1885. San (or Sarwa) are generally acknowledged to have been in what is now Botswana before any other group, c. AD 500. The Kgalagadi came after 500, and the Rolong and Tlhaping after them. It was only after these groups were in the area that the arrival of what we would today call the core of Setswana-speaking peoples; the Kwen and the Kgotla, can be identified.\textsuperscript{447} The ancestors of what today are the modern Tswana tribes migrated into the area of modern day Botswana as late as in the middle of the eighteenth century from the south-east (modern South Africa).\textsuperscript{448} The entry of Tswana groups into Botswana initiated a process of disruption of indigenous land tenure and economic production.\textsuperscript{449} After 1750, the Tswana groups formed a powerful military state, controlling Kalahari hunting and cattle, as well as the copper production west of Kanye.\textsuperscript{450} They conquered the indigenous San and other tribes, and by 1800, several related

\textsuperscript{443} Mazrui 1983: 26-7.
\textsuperscript{444} Englebert 2000c: 158, own calculations.
\textsuperscript{445} ibid.
\textsuperscript{446} Shapera 1952. This was in fact also the last census conducted in Botswana that asked questions about ethnic origin (Solway 2004).
\textsuperscript{447} Adamolekun & Morgan 1999: 585.
\textsuperscript{448} Today, there are eight main Tswana tribes: the Bangwato, Batawana, Bangwaketse, Bakwena, Balete, Bakgatla, Barologo, and Balokwe. See Acemoglu et al. 2003.
\textsuperscript{449} Wilmsen 2002: 826.
\textsuperscript{450} Robinson & Parsons 2006: 113.
Tswana societies had been established.\(^{451}\) Over time, also new groups were created as certain groups broke away from the existing ones. For example, the Bangwato resulted from a split in the Bakwena, and the Batawana was, in turn, created as a result of a split in the Bangwato.\(^{452}\) Meanwhile, other related Tswana chiefdoms settled further north: Kwena around Molepolole, Ngwato further north at Shoshong among Kalanga and other groups, and Tawana by about 1770 in the far northeast around Lake Ngami, in a country occupied by Yei people.\(^{453}\)

Similarly to Botswana, the territory of Zambia (during the colonial period formerly known as Northern Rhodesia) embraced a large number of often rival polities of varying sizes and with different state systems, languages and cultures at the time when the British arrived in 1899.\(^{454}\) While the Lozi and the Bemba were among the most formidable state systems, a large number of other political entities were also fairly well-organized.\(^{455}\) In fact, at the time of independence, Zambia was estimated to incorporate roughly 70 different tribes.\(^{456}\) A similar picture is revealed in Uganda. At the time when the colonizers arrived in Uganda in 1894,\(^{457}\) tribal kingdoms of fluctuating strengths, similar polities but of smaller scale in Busoga, and chiefdoms of varying forms and strengths in the north, some of which were also involved in relations with neighboring kingdoms, were incorporated into the territory.\(^{458}\) In addition, there were other peoples who lived in small-scale political communities that were not very well-organized. From a geographical point of view, most people from the northern and eastern parts of Uganda lived under what have often been referred to as non-stratified social systems (i.e. societies in which power, and therefore the right to use violence, was not centralized under a king or

\(^{451}\) Acemoglu et al. 2003.
\(^{452}\) ibid.
\(^{453}\) Robinson & Parsons 2006: 113. See also Adamolekun & Morgan 1999.
\(^{454}\) Tordoff & Molteno 1974: 2. From 1894 to 1924 when the British Colonial Office took over, Zambia was ruled by the British South Africa Company. In 1953, the British then created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, or the Central African Federation, which consisted of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), and Nyasaland (now Malawi). The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved on January 1, 1964.
\(^{455}\) Henderson 1970: 592.
\(^{456}\) Dresang 1974; Posner 2005.
\(^{457}\) In 1894, the kingdom of Buganda became a British protectorate, which was extended in 1896 to cover Bunyoro and most of what is now Uganda.
Chapter 4

The people of the kingdoms — Baganda, Banyankole, Batoro, Banyoro and Basoga, on the other hand, lived under hierarchical social systems. Among these kingdoms, Buganda, in the south of the country, was the most consolidated and centralized, held together by a common language, customs, territory, clan structure, and above all, by clearly defined and viable political institutions centering on the monarchy under the Kabaka, or king. As noted by Kasozi, similar to the Tswana ‘Kgosii’, the Kabaka kingship as an institution was the link that bound all Baganda into a ‘nation’, and the relationship with the Kabaka was, in this sense, almost sacred. Every Muganda belonged to a clan whose ultimate head was the Kabaka. As leader of the clan heads, the Kabaka was connected to every single family in Buganda, i.e. he was the Buganda in a political, social and cultural sense.

Along with tribal-territorially diverse state constructions, when the British left the territories of Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda, they also left behind linguistically diverse territories. When mapping ethnic diversity in Botswana shortly before independence, Schapera reached the conclusion that probably no more than maximum 50 percent of Batswana belonged to the largest ethnic group; the Tswana-speaking people. The way the political process advanced just before independence supports the claim that there was a rather large amount of underlying linguistic diversity in Botswana at the time of independence. The use of five different languages in the electoral campaign was, for example, a clear testimony of the multilingual character of the Botswanan society. On the eve of Botswana’s independence in 1966, to train people in the civic responsibility of voting, the Bechuanaland Protectorate administration prepared special materials consisting of two films and a poster in a number of different languages to make certain everyone would be able to participate in the first free elections held in March the same year. Versions of the films were in Setswana, English, Afrikaans, Ikalanga, and Otjiherero, and the posters were in

459 Among these were the Lango, Madi, Lagbara, Karamajong, Acholi, Iteso, Sebei, Alur, Kakwa, Jonam, Japadholo, Gwere, Samia, Bagishu, Bamba, Banyuli, Bagwere, and in the southern parts, the Bakiga, Bakonjo and Bamba (Kasozi 1994: 17).
460 ibid: 19. See Apter 1961, 1967: 84-107 for a more detailed discussion about the different political organization of Ugandan pre-colonial political systems.
461 Kosozi 1994: 49.
462 ibid.
463 Shapera 1952.
465 Solway 2004: 129.
Setswana, English and Ikalanga. To make certain that all different local districts - populated by more or less ethnically homogeneous tribes - were reached by the information, the films and posters were widely distributed throughout the territory. The effort seemed to pay off quite well since, in the end, 74 percent of the registered electorate, representing 58 percent of the potential total electorate, went to the polls to vote, thereby launching one of Africa’s greater successes in liberal multiparty democracy.

In Zambia, as will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section, especially Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, and Lozi increasingly achieved the status of first among equals in so far as language was concerned during the period of colonial rule. Yet, a large number of additional languages were in active use throughout the colonial period, among them Tumbuka and Lamba. Also in Uganda, there were a large number of languages in active use at the time of independence, among them Lutoro, Acholi, and a large number of different Bantu languages.

Besides tribal-territorial and linguistic diversity, all three societies were characterized by religious diversity at the time of independence. In Botswana, among the socially more relevant religions, a variety of traditional belief systems could be found, as well as Christianity (Protestant and Roman Catholic) and Islam. Similar to the case of Botswana, Zambia and Uganda too saw the introduction of mainly various branches of Christianity through missionary activities during the colonial period. Yet, as will be more thoroughly discussed in the next section, in Uganda religious cleavages were politically mobilized at the time of independence, making the political situation rather different if compared to the situations in Botswana and Zambia.

In terms of racial diversity, all three countries had comparatively very few white settlers. In 1955, the settler population as a percentage of the total population was 1.0 percent in Botswana, 0.1 percent in Uganda, and 3.0 percent in Zambia. In fact, in none of the countries was the white

466 ibid.
467 ibid.
470 Christianity was brought by European and African missionaries from the south, notably the Scottish Congregationalist Robert Moffat and his son-in-law Dr. David Livingstone. During the last part of the 19th century, Christianity was even established as the official religion of the five major Tswana tribal states. However, allegiance to tribal state churches was disrupted by incoming missions (Anglican, Seventh Day Adventist, and Roman Catholic) as early as in the 20th century (Parsons 1985).
settler population large enough to help unite different tribal groups against the white settlers and the imperial order.\textsuperscript{472} Rather, quite on the contrary, in all three countries, in particular tribal-territorial cleavages gained increased importance during the colonial period, threatening national cohesion and, together with linguistic and, to certain extent religious, cleavages demanding political solutions at the time of independence. In the next section, I discuss this development more thoroughly.

**Ethnic mobilization before independence**

In the above sections, I have described the ways in which Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda were all ethnically diverse along multiple ethnic cleavages (tribal-territorial, linguistic, and religious) at the time of independence. However, not all these ethnic cleavages created political fault lines during the colonial period. In this section, I first demonstrate how linguistic cleavages were to a significant extent consolidated in all three countries of concern during the period of colonial rule. Moreover, I demonstrate how the touchstone of British colonial policy – indirect rule – served to mobilize mainly tribal-territorial cleavages in all three countries.

**The consolidation of linguistic cleavages**

During the colonial period, linguistic identities were to a significant extent consolidated in all three countries. The consolidation of language use was primarily the result of missionary activities, educational policies, and labor migration. In Botswana, especially Setswana and Ikalanga received more attention from the colonizers than other indigenous languages. This commenced with the writing down of Setswana grammar as well as the translation of the Bible into Setswana as early as in the 1820s.\textsuperscript{473} In 1929, a translation of the New Testament into the Ikalanga language was undertaken. Such developments in turn, influenced a gradual shift towards the use of Setswana and Ikalanga especially in the schools and in other settings like the church. During the colonial period, Setswana was used in the school system in the initial years alongside English. Ikalanga was, meanwhile, used during the first two years of primary education in those

\textsuperscript{472} In those African countries which had a substantial white population during the colonial period, racial discrimination in many cases helped to unite different tribal groups against the white settlers and the imperial order. As such, in some respects racism in those societies did have a unifying impact on those who were discriminated against (Mazrui 1983: 27-8).

\textsuperscript{473} Mooko 2006; Smieja 2003.
areas that were pre-dominantly Ikalanga-speaking. As such, both Setswana and Ikalanga were part of the official sphere during the period of colonial rule while other languages played mainly a secondary role for official purposes.

In the beginning of the colonial period in Zambia, the connection between tribal identities and patterns of language use was so close that almost all of the earliest tribal maps were language maps. However, by the end of the colonial era, patterns of language use had consolidated considerably. More specifically, by the time of independence, Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, and Lozi had achieved the status of “first among equals” insofar language use was concerned. Similarly to the case of Botswana, language consolidation in Zambia was the result mainly of missionary activity and colonial education policy. Yet, to a certain extent even labor migration played a role. As in Botswana, language was central to the missionary activities for the reason that, in order to be able to spread the missionary message, the Bible first needed to be translated into the local language. Yet, before the Bible could be translated, the local language itself had to be written down. Because the transcription of an African language required an enormous investment, missionary societies sought to locate their stations in areas where large numbers of people already spoke the same language. Thus many missionary societies found themselves in a position where, once they had reached the entirety of the population into whose language they had translated, they simply extended the use of that language to neighboring peoples who spoke different but structurally similar dialects. As such, missionaries amortized their investment by maximizing the diffusion of the standardized language forms to neighboring groups. The consolidation of language use initiated by missionaries was further reinforced and expanded by the policies adopted by the colonial government when it took over the responsibility for education after 1925. In Zambia, the most important such policy was the decision to simplify the administration’s job by adopting just four languages – Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, and Lozi – as languages of instruction in African

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476 ibid.
477 ibid.
478 ibid.
479 Young 1976: 166.
schools.\textsuperscript{480} Furthermore, of the 1.7 million copies of 484 book titles that were published or reprinted between 1937 and 1959, more than 92 percent were in Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi, or English.\textsuperscript{481} Moreover, increased labor migration affected patterns of language use since, in order to be able to communicate with each other, labor migrants had to speak the same language.\textsuperscript{482}

Finally, in Uganda, despite widespread attempts before the imposition of colonial rule to make Swahili the lingua franca, soon after the establishment of colonial rule, there was a drive to instead make Luganda (the language of the Baganda) the lingua franca of the Protectorate.\textsuperscript{483} As a consequence, Luganda was the first vernacular written down. However, due to the fact that only a rather limited number of the population in Uganda had Luganda as their first language, combined with the missionaries’ aim to translate the Bible so that as many people as possible could read it, Luganda was at least in the beginning of the colonial period in many ways disqualified as the universal language in the Protectorate. Instead, the missions gradually committed a large number of local languages to writing down and in addition used them as the medium of instruction in schools.\textsuperscript{484} For example, in the Toro district, Lutoro was to some extent used and in schools in the Lango district the missionaries used Acholi. In addition to the missionaries’ promotion of a number of different languages, at least in the beginning of colonial rule, the colonial administration accepted the use of a variety of vernaculars. For example, despite verbal assurances and a declaration of intent to support the idea of making Luganda the primary language of the Protectorate, the administration made Swahili obligatory and Luganda and some other Bantu and Nilotic languages so called ‘bonus languages’ for official use. However, as colonialism had established itself more rigidly, the language policy of the protectorate administration was somewhat reversed. Among other things, when Jackson returned as governor in 1911, he recommended Luganda as the new obligatory language with the argument that the Luganda-speaking Baganda tribes were “not only numerically, but also qualitatively”, the tribes with the highest status in the Protectorate.\textsuperscript{485} As such, the language policy pursued during

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{480} Posner 2005: 64.
\item \textsuperscript{481} ibid: 65.
\item \textsuperscript{482} ibid: 69-70.
\item \textsuperscript{483} Pawliková-Vilhanová 1996: 163-5.
\item \textsuperscript{484} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{485} quoted in ibid: 166.
\end{itemize}
the period of colonial rule in Uganda can in many ways be argued to have
matched the overall colonial policy pursued in favor of the Baganda within
almost all areas. Yet, despite the overall idea of Baganda superiority, for a
long time after 1911, Swahili, as well as a number of other local languages,
continued to be bonus languages for use in the official arena.486

In sum, although all three countries of concern for this study were to a
significant extent characterized by linguistic diversity at the time of
independence, some languages had a more given place in the public sphere
than others. In Botswana, it was Setswana and Ikalanga that were more
commonly used for official purposes, in Zambia it was Bemba, Nyanja,
Tonga, and Lozi, and in Uganda it was especially Luganda and Swahili, but
to some degree Lutoro and Acholi as well.

The mobilization of tribal-territorial cleavages

During the colonial period, the British employed policies of indirect rule in
all countries of concern for this study. Indirect rule meant that indigenous
African tribal institutions were officially recognized as ‘native authorities’
and endowed with powers that would enable them to provide limited
governmental services in line with colonial requirements in addition to the
functions which they had previously performed.487 That is, the overarching
idea of indirect rule was to rule the colonies as far as possible through
native authorities and institutions. The underlying conviction was that
people are best ruled through instruments they understand and on the basis
of conventions they can to some extent identify with. In addition, many
colonial officers genuinely believed that African societies were naturally
communitarian and that the most appropriate way to organize rural
administration was in tribal units.488 In practice, the arrangement of indirect
rule meant chiefs as ‘rulers’ of their people but as instruments of the
colonial administrators.489

Policies of indirect rule fundamentally changed ethnic relations in the
area. As argued by Mamdani, the more custom was enforced, the more the
tribe was restructured and conserved.490 As a result, due to the British, the
tribe as a political entity over time became an increasingly self-contained

486 ibid: 168.
489 Adamolekun & Morgan 1999: 587.
490 Mamdani 1996: 51.
community. In other words, the British strategy of indirect rule helped to perpetuate and in some cases even create the kind of tribal consciousness which is most commonly seen as seriously militating against nation-building. That is, indirect rule in many ways functioned to reduce the prospects for national consciousness for years ahead compared to in colonies in which such policies were not pursued. In fact, up to today, the British colonial history of indirect rule manifests itself in internecine wars; there have been far worse ethnic convulsions in former British than in former French Africa. In fact, in general, the former British colonies have fared worse in terms of ethnic challenges to the nation-state compared to all other former colonies. However, as will be evident from the discussion in chapter six, not all former British colonies have experienced violent ethnic conflict after independence. Among the cases in focus of this study, only Uganda has witnessed more repeated outbursts of violent ethnic conflict in the post-independence period. Yet, contrary to what has often been assumed, these differences between the countries in the degree of ethnic mobilization in the post-independence period cannot be understood very well from the perspective that the British ruled the three countries differently. Quite on the contrary, British rule in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda was in fact very similarly conducted with regard to a number of important points. In the three sub-sections below, I discuss this more in detail.

Patterns of tribal-territorial mobilization in Botswana

The British arrangement in the Bechuanaland Protectorate reflected the overall British desire to minimize administrative overhead very well by the adaptation of tribal indigenous institutions to facilitate administration. As such, the establishment of the Protectorate also brought with it great changes in patterns of ethnic interaction as the British way of ruling in many ways prevented internal revolt, as well as the movement of people

\footnote{491 ibid.}

\footnote{492 See, for example, Englebert 2000a; Englebert 2000b.}

\footnote{493 See, for example, Blanton et al. 2001; Mazrui 1983: 28.}

\footnote{494 Mazrui 1983: 29.}

\footnote{495 Acemoglu et al. (Acemoglu et al. 2003) have for example argued that what explains Botswana’s success is that the British left the Tswana political structures almost untouched during the period of colonial rule. However, the validity of this argument is highly questionable if we regard the empirical evidence that suggests that the British used about the same strategy in, among other countries, Uganda. Kasozi even argues that the very same strategy as discussed in Acemoglu et al.’s work can in fact partly explain Uganda’s failure in the post-independence period (Kasozi 1994).}
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between different tribes. The Bechuanaland Protectorate as a colonial state was federal and granted tribal citizenship to individuals and group-specific rights to subject communities, yet on an unequal basis. Whereas, on the political level, the pre-colonial system in Botswana, and in particular the Tswana tribal system, had emphasized control, continuity, and the quiescence of the bulk of the population of commoners and serfs, colonialism was not opposed to such priorities and, as a result, cooperation soon developed between the Tswana chiefly elite and the colonial administration. In addition to being divided into tribal areas – each populated by one of the major Tswana nations (Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana, and Batlokwa) – the protectorate was further divided into crown lands and freehold districts. The freehold districts involved the securing of claims to land by the European settler communities. The crown lands, on their part, incorporated all those communities that did not get incorporated into the tribal lands under the rule of Tswana chiefs. Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary in 1895, explained the arrangement he had in mind as one in which chiefs would be in rule ‘much as before’. This was also what happened, and at least until 1930, the Protectorate Administration largely confined itself to supervising and restricting European activities in the territory. Nevertheless, there were exceptions to this rule. For example, if there was serious trouble in a Reserve, the British colonial administration would step in and support the chief. However, during at least the first

496 Gillett 1973: 179. From 1750 onwards, Southern Africa as a whole saw an increasing tempo of disruption, migration, and war as raiding for ivory, cattle and slaves spread inland from the coasts of Mozambique, the Cape Colony and Angola (Robinson & Parsons 2006). Until the colonial consolidation of the territory in the 19th century, the whole region of what is today Botswana and the northern Transvaal of the Republic of South Africa was an arena of migrations of tribes.

497 Werbner 2002: 676.


499 Proctor 1968.

500 The crown lands were in two sections. One was roughly the same as present-day Ghanzi and Kgalagadi; the other included parts of North-West and Central. The tribal reserves were Batawana (now the western part of North-West), Bamangwato (most of Central), Bakgatla (Kgatleng), Bakwena (Kweneng), Balete (part of South-East), and Bangwaketse (Southern). The freehold districts were the Tati District (North-East), the Gaborone Block, the Lobatse Block (both South-East), the Barolong Farms (a small part of Southern), and one which was unlabeled but that matches the Tuli Block (Central) (Maylam 1980). At the time for independence, Botswana consisted of 47 percent tribal land, 47 percent crown land (state land), and 6 percent freehold land (white settlement).

501 Ng’ong’ola 1997.


504 Ibid.
period of colonial rule, the Tswana chiefs enjoyed almost unchallenged power over their respective territories. In the end, due to indirect rule, the organizational pattern of the Tswana tribal groups – that had revolved around a Kgosi (chief) representing a royal clan – was cemented in at least two ways. To begin with, by demarcating ‘Tribal Reserves’ for each Tswana nation, the colonial state petrified what was previously a quite fluid social and spatial process.\(^\text{505}\) Secondly, by recognizing the chiefs as the legitimate traditional rulers of the tribes, and proclaiming that they could only be removed by the colonial administration, it put an end to potential challenges. That is, while in theory, the chiefs were accountable to both the British administration and to their own people, in practice, the British policy only to intervene in tribal matters through the chief meant that he could play off both sides against the middle, hence making himself almost untouchable.\(^\text{506}\) Except among the Tswana of Ngamiland, most non-Tswana groups were left in their own wards with their own chiefs subordinate to the Tswana rulers. In addition, non-Tswana peoples, such as the Khoisan-speaking peoples, were subordinated to Tswana groups as a secondary labor reserve. As a result of sub-ordination, non-Tswana people increasingly became homogenized ideologically into an undifferentiated ‘ethnic’ category named Basarwa (Bushmen), having their different languages lumped together into a Sesarwa (the language of Bushmen) category.\(^\text{507}\) Similarly, eponymous independent Sekgalagadi-speaking groups, such as the Bangologa, Bakgwa, Bashaga, Baloonwe, were non-differentiated as Bakgalagadi (meaning ‘the peoples of the Kalahari’).\(^\text{508}\) In a similar manner, Wayeyi and other Okavango Delta peoples were renamed Makoba, and Tswana-speaking peoples that were more distantly related to the emerging hegemonic polities of Bangwato and Bakwena were to some extent categorized according to the dictates of hegemonic Tswana merafe (meaning tribe).\(^\text{509}\)

However, while the British colonial state recognized that it needed the consent and assistance of tribal chiefs to govern the territory, by the end of colonial rule, it nevertheless gradually tried to reform the chieftaincy in order to reduce the power of the institution. One means through which they did this was by reserving the right to recognize new chiefs to the

\(^{508}\) ibid: 830.
\(^{509}\) ibid.
The historical context of ethnicity and nationhood

colonial state. In 1934, the British sketched the Native Administration Proclamation to open up for yet more channels through which to prevent chiefs from abusing their position of power. As a result, while in the beginning the chiefs of Botswana quite successfully managed to resist attempts to further reduce their authority over tribal matters and their land, gradually the power of chiefs within the traditional meeting places (kgotla) were nonetheless reduced over time. Consequently, chiefs were not able to rule as independently as before, but instead increasingly forced to follow the consensus achieved by the native authorities. In the same vein, administrative powers concerning law and order were increasingly removed from the chiefs and instead vested in the native authorities. As such, during the end of the period of colonial rule, chiefs, if yet only to a limited extent, increasingly became the messengers of power rather than the holders of power.

Patterns of tribal-territorial mobilization in Zambia

At the time when the British South Africa Company (BSA Company) took over the administration of the territory that later became Zambia in 1894, the Lozi and the Bemba formed the two most formidable state systems in the region. Similar to the colonial regime in Botswana, the BSA Company sought to administer the territory with mainly two goals in mind. First, it sought to extract labor from the local population to sustain its mining efforts. Secondly, it sought to minimize its costs. To satisfy these demands, the company used the authority and the local administrative capacity of local chiefs. In return, the company protected the local chiefs from potential rivals and guaranteed their status as local leaders. However, a more formal system of indirect rule was not adopted until 1929, shortly after the British Colonial Office had taken over the responsibility for the territory from the BSA Company. Like the BSA Company, the colonial administration adopted the tribe as its unit of rural administrative organization. However, different from the earlier arrangement pursued by the BSA Company, the British arrangement replaced chiefs by local governmental structures called ‘native authorities’.

515 ibid: 26-8.
Similar to in Botswana, however, important policy decisions continued to be made by colonial officials in the territorial and district capitals. In addition, many chiefs lacked the education and administrative skills to run their native authorities effectively.\footnote{ibid.} Yet, through the establishment of native authorities, pre-colonial political systems were more formally transformed into units of territorially-based administration than had been the case under the rule of the BSA Company. As argued by Posner, equipped with their own courts, schools, treasuries and, in some cases, even health and education officers, these new administrative units were “miniature rural bureaucracies in their own right.”\footnote{ibid: 31.} In addition, similar to the tribal authorities in Botswana, the native authorities in Zambia were in control over land. The formalization of communal land rights meant the creation of a system in which loyalty to the chief and membership in a tribe became prerequisites for gaining access to land. In other words, just like in colonial Botswana, people were recognized as having a legal claim to land only in the territory of the group to which they belonged by birth.\footnote{ibid: 34.} In practice, preserving that claim required investing in one’s credentials as a tribe member in good standing. This meant abiding by customary rules, participating in the social life of the community, and otherwise investing in one’s identity as a tribe member.\footnote{ibid: 34.} However, as in Botswana, Zambian colonial administrators found the number of pre-existing tribal units (72) too large for viable administration. As a result, over the years, a series of consolidations and reorganizations by the colonial government shrank the number of native authorities to just thirty-nine. Some of these thirty-nine native authorities were ‘hyphenated’ combinations of two or more named groups (e.g. the Mukulu-Unga Native Authority). Others were one of a pair of native authorities affiliated with a single tribe (e.g. the Plateau Tonga and Gwembe Tonga Native Authorities or the Chewa and Southern Chewa Native Authorities). In all, the thirty-nine native authorities carried the names (and were run by the chiefs) of just slightly more than half of the tribes that had been officially identified by the government. Although these tended to be the larger tribes, this still meant that a large number of people – roughly a sixth of the total population – lived in (and, for the purpose of
local government; were ruled by native authorities whose chiefs were from tribes other than their own.520

While the ways in which the British used indirect rule to consolidate and expand colonial rule in Zambia was in many ways identical to how indirect rule was pursued in Botswana and, as will soon be more thoroughly discussed; Uganda, there was at least one difference: while the British openly favored mainly one kingdom in order to establish and expand colonial control in both Botswana and Uganda (the Tswana in Botswana and, as will soon be discussed; the Baganda in Uganda), there was no such explicitly favored tribe in Zambia. However, implicitly, the colonial government in many ways favored the Bemba. As such, in the end, relations of power between different tribes in Zambia did not differ remarkably from the situation in Botswana and Uganda. That is, in Zambia most people feared the dominance of one specific group at the time of independence; the Bemba.521 However, rather than viewing Bemba dominance in Zambian society as a direct result of the Bemba having a special status during the colonial period, it is probably more correct to view the political dominance of the Bemba mainly as the result of their size and the fact that they came to dominate the politically crucial mining towns of the Copperbelt.522 That is, had it not been for its smaller size and peripheral location away from the industrial line of rail, the Lozi could perhaps have constituted a potential alternative to Bemba dominance.523 Like many other well-established systems of political rule, the Barotse Kingdom (home territory of the Lozi) enjoyed a close to semi-autonomous status during the colonial period. With the rise of the nationalist movement in the post-World War II era, the Barotse reacted in terms of the emergence of a separatist movement on the one hand, and the preference for a federal rather than a strong central system on the other.524 This reaction in turn created deep divisions between Barotseland and the rest of the country and in 1961, the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) even sent representatives to Britain to seek separate independence for Barotseland.525 However, they

520 ibid: 36.
523 The homeland of the Lozi – Barotseland – lies about 600 km west of Lusaka, in what is now the Western Province. Anchored around the floodplains of the Zambezi River, it is, as such, geographically distinct from the rest of Zambia and distant from the Copperbelt and the rail axis along which much of the country’s wealth is concentrated (Englebert 2005).
525 Englebert 2005.
were turned down. As such, in the end, Zambia managed to achieve independence in one piece.

Patterns of tribal-territorial mobilization in Uganda

In 1894, the kingdom of Buganda became a British protectorate, which was extended in 1896 to cover Bunyoro and most of what is now Uganda. As a consequence of Buganda being the most highly centralized tribal-territorial unit in the area, Buganda came to form the original geopolitical center of the protectorate during the period of British rule. Similar to the history of the Tswana in Botswana, the history of Baganda is characterized both by territorial expansion and by the growth of royal power, expressed in centralized government through appointed chiefs. The Baganda thus already had a uniform administration that the British were sufficiently impressed by to envisage it as a model for creating a uniform administration throughout the surrounding regions.\footnote{Roberts 1962: 436-7.} Under the Uganda Agreement of 1900, Buganda was ruled indirectly by the British, who in turn used the Baganda leadership as agents to extend British control indirectly throughout Uganda. As such, the agreement confirmed the privileged position of Buganda in Uganda and of the traditional chiefs in Buganda. Through the 1900 Buganda Agreement, the Baganda accepted British protection until their sub-state was developed enough to look after itself. With the formalization of the ‘Lukiiko’, or gathering of the more important chiefs, as a council of defined membership and regular sessions, Buganda offered the British a model for native administration.\footnote{Ibid: 438.} It was, as such, in effect by extending Buganda that the rest of Uganda was consolidated.\footnote{Kasozi 1994; Roberts 1962.} Its political institutions were exported to the rest of the country; the Baganda were used as partners in the conquest of Uganda, and later, as sub-imperialist agents. In addition, the colonial headquarters were located in the sub-state. The sub-state was, as such, favored in many ways. For example, individual land tenure was allowed in Buganda under the mailo system but not elsewhere. In 1915, the colonial secretary, in vetoing the extension of the mailo system, made all land outside Buganda Crown land. Thus, as in Botswana where Tswana tribes were the only ones being entitled to their land, among the different tribal groups in Uganda, only the Baganda were allowed to own their land. The Crown lands incorporated all

\begin{footnotes}
\item Roberts 1962: 436-7.
\item Ibid: 438.
\item Kasozi 1994; Roberts 1962.
\end{footnotes}
those communities that did not get incorporated into the mailo system. In addition to being the only group owning their land, the Buganda Lukiiko could veto any tax increase proposed by the colonial government. Furthermore, in 1955, a new agreement was signed that allowed the Baganda chiefs even more power, although the Kabaka was legally made a constitutional leader. Buganda could directly elect its own members of Parliament; other areas could not. The Lukiiko acted like a state parliament, and more social services were transferred to Bugandan control.\footnote{Kasozi 1994: 50-1.} In sum, during the colonial period in Uganda, Buganda was the nucleus from which European expansion to the rest of the country radiated. It was thus the first to receive the benefits of European rule, thereby winning a head start in the race for development. All communication networks converged at its capital, Mengo, near Kampala. Because of its proximity to the administrative centers of Kampala and Entebbe, Buganda gained more from the multiplier effects of government development initiatives than the more isolated regions of the protectorate.\footnote{ibid.}

As a result of the great similarities in British policy, tribal relations during the period of colonial rule in Uganda were very alike especially tribal relations in Botswana. In the early 1930s, the Baganda were described as having translated the old sense of superiority into the idea that skilled labor is the sphere of the Baganda and unskilled that of other tribes. They regarded themselves as the employer class and other ethnic groups as hewers of wood and drawers of water. To them, all non-Buganda were Banyoro – the ethnic group whose kingdom had competed with Buganda for centuries but whom the Baganda crushed with the help of the British.\footnote{ibid: 54.} In 1960, the Baganda even made an attempt to establish itself as a separate independent state. However, like the secession attempt made by the Lozi in Zambia only one year later, Buganda’s attempt failed. Consequently, like its Botswanan and Zambian counterparts, Uganda too managed to achieve independence in one piece. Yet, despite a large number of similarities, the situation in Uganda still differed in one important regard. While the British did not make a practice of politicizing religion,\footnote{For a further discussion on this matter, see Kasfir 1998.} they made an exception in Uganda. More specifically, they commanded that of the twenty counties in enlarged Buganda, ten were to have Protestant chiefs, eight Catholic, and...
two Muslim.\textsuperscript{533} The result stemming from this was that, at the time of independence, no single religion united Buganda. Rather, a politically quite intense religious division was cross-cutting tribal cleavages. More specifically, the linkage of religious ideology with an epochal power struggle for control of Buganda left in its wake a high degree of mobilization around symbols of religious difference. In fact, so important was a shared religion as a political platform by the end of colonial rule that Uganda was even led to independence by a coalition between Kabaka Yekka (KY), a political organization based in Buganda, and the United Party Congress (UPC), led by Milton Obote from the northern parts of Uganda. The coalition was mobilized on the basis of shared religion; both parties were defenders of the Protestant chiefly ascendancy, and the opposition Democratic Party (DP) as a whole opposed this ascendancy and instead adhered to Catholic beliefs.\textsuperscript{534} Since different regional groupings were in this sense able to come together under the umbrella of a shared religion, religion must be considered to have been one of the major social and political dividers in Uganda at the time for independence. However, seen from the perspective that the Baganda were still able to mobilize enough support for a secession attempt as late as 1960, religion was certainly not the only important political cleavage. That is, even though religion certainly played an important role for politics in Uganda at the time of independence, tribal cleavages were in many regards even more important.

\textbf{Sum-up: Converging patterns of ethnic diversity and mobilization before independence}

As summarized in Table 4.1, Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda were in fact very similar in terms of patterns of ethnic diversity and organization at the time of independence. More specifically, at the time of independence, there were many ethnic groups living within the territorial boundaries of all these African states. All three societies were ethnically heterogeneous along multiple ethnic (tribal-territorial, linguistic, and religious) cleavages and lacked a numerically dominant ethnic group. In neither of the countries were there any larger white settler communities. Furthermore, in all countries, mainly tribal-territorial identities formed the basis for political

\textsuperscript{533} Young 1976: 231.
\textsuperscript{534} Mutibwa 1992: 27.
action. In all three countries, because of linguistic consolidation during the colonial period, tribal-territorial cleavages only partly overlapped with linguistic cleavages. There was, in addition, widespread fear that one specific ethnic group would come to dominate the political, as well as economic, arena after independence. In Botswana it was Tswana dominance that was feared, in Zambia Bemba dominance, and in Uganda Baganda dominance. Tswana, Bemba, and Baganda collective identities were all rooted in beliefs about a shared culture and ancestry, were all mobilized around a territory, and were all unified by a shared language. The Tswana shared the language of Setswana, the Bemba the language of Bemba, and the Baganda the language of Luganda.

Table 4.1. Ethnic diversity and mobilization at independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PATTERNS OF ETHNIC DIVERSITY</td>
<td>Tribal-territorial, linguistic, and religious diversity</td>
<td>Tribal-territorial, linguistic, and religious diversity</td>
<td>Tribal-territorial, linguistic, and religious diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATTERNS OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION</td>
<td>Particularly tribal-territorial political cleavages</td>
<td>Particularly tribal-territorial political cleavages</td>
<td>Particularly tribal-territorial and religious political cleavages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY DOMINANT ETHNIC GROUP</td>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>Bemba</td>
<td>Baganda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since in all three countries political and economic power was vested in one particular, well-defined ethnic group at the time of independence, if the newly independent states were to be able to build a strong tax state capacity, it was of great importance that they managed to tie these groups to their territory. Furthermore, since a state’s failure to gain the support of even the most remote villages negatively affects its ability to govern, it was important that the support of political and economic majorities was not gained at the expense of the support of other, less-advantaged groups.

As previously argued, this is with the exception of the political mobilization of religious cleavages (Protestant versus Roman Catholic) in Uganda.

Given their political and economic dominance, the Tswana, Bemba, and Baganda shared equal opportunities in their respective states at the time of independence, making it equally possible for them to capture state power and assimilate the rest of the population into their own, majority culture. As such, the situation in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda did not differ considerably from the situation in most other former colonies on their way towards independence. As described by Horowitz: “Everywhere the word domination was heard. Everywhere it was equated with political control. Everywhere it was a question of who were the ‘real owners of the country’ and of who would rule over whom.” 537 Furthermore, since in all three countries there were a large number of other, politically important groups, the situations in the three countries were in addition similar as regards the incentives to make concessions to political minority groups at the time of independence.

In sum, considering the great similarities in terms of ethnic relations (and especially in terms of tribal-territorial and linguistic relations) in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda at the time of independence, there was in fact all reason to expect that the three states would promote similar definitions of the national political community in their independence constitutions and ancillary institutions. Yet, at the time of independence, leaders in the three countries ultimately chose very different solutions in order to deal with pre-existing ethnic cleavages. That is, following the logic of Benedict Anderson’s notion of ‘imagined communities’, leaders constructed very different notions of what it meant to be a member of the respective national political communities. As will be further discussed in chapter six, these different solutions did, in turn, help produce very contrasting notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, in the end leading to diverging paths of tax state development in the post-independence period. In the next chapter, I demonstrate how the similar ethnic cleavages that existed at the time of independence got addressed in very different ways in the respective constitutions, laws, and policy documents.

537 Horowitz 1985: 189.
Critical juncture: Degree of official multiculturalism at independence

“At the birth of societies, it is the leaders of the commonwealth [state] who create institutions; afterwards, it is the institutions that shape the leaders.”

In order to test the theoretical argument developed in this study, i.e. that cross-country variation in the degree of multiculturalism recognized in key legal and policy documents during formative periods of state development can account for cross-country variation in paths of tax state development, this chapter explores and compares the formal criteria for citizenship in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda at the time of independence. As a first step, I will explore the degree to which each of the three countries sought to assimilate or, through the adoption of multicultural policies, recognize the existence of tribal-territorial, linguistic, and religious ethnic cleavages at the time of independence. In a second step, I will compare the three countries in terms of how many ethnic cleavages (i.e. tribal-territorial, linguistic, and religious cleavages) that were officially recognized in key legal and official documents at the time of independence. The number of ethnic cleavages recognized is taken as an indicator of the degree of official multiculturalism. As such, the larger the number of ethnic cleavages that are recognized through the adoption of multicultural policies, the more sympathetic to official multiculturalism that particular state is taken to be. Equivalently, the larger the number of ethnic cleavages that are not recognized as a result of the adoption of assimilative policies, the less sympathetic to official multiculturalism that particular state is understood to

538 Montesquieu as quoted in Rustow 1967: 156.
be. Recalling the discussion in chapter three, there are at least two potential ways a state may aim at assimilating its population: through pure assimilation and through policies of neutrality. Of these two approaches, pure assimilation is understood to be the least sympathetic to official multiculturalism.

In all three countries, peaceful paths towards independence paved the way for constitutional negotiations and, ultimately, new constitutions.\(^539\) The constitutional conventions took place in London and were in all three countries characterized by consultations between the Colonial Office and local ministers and officials.\(^540\) As such, contrary to what has often been assumed in the literature, the independence constitutions did in general not merely emerge from a ‘scissors and paste’ process whereby the Westminster model was put in place by the departing colonial rulers, essentially indifferent to local conditions and susceptibilities.\(^541\) For example, the members of the Uganda Constitutional Conference (which was held in London from 18\(^{th}\) September to 10\(^{th}\) October, 1961) represented all the most important elements in Uganda’s political life, including the Buganda Government, the Democratic Party (i.e. the then Government party by virtue of its victory in the March 1961 elections), the Uganda People’s Congress (an essentially non-Buganda party consisting of Protestant factions), and representatives of each of the twelve government districts outside Buganda.\(^542\) In Botswana and Zambia too, representatives from important political actors took part in the constitutional negotiations. In Botswana, the Resident Commissioner was authorized in April 1963 to undertake consultations in preparation for the writing of the independence constitution. He then invited the major chiefs to designate three of their number to meet with three representatives from each of the three political parties, three Europeans, one Asian, and two officials, in a series of joint discussions under his chairmanship.\(^543\) In the end of the process, the British officials then prepared a tentative outline of the independence constitution, which was finally announced on 21 February 1966.\(^544\) In Zambia too, the independence constitution was the result of a long period of negotiations between different political groups. For example, in 1964, the Litunga of

\(^539\) In fact, the only countries in Africa that fought national wars of liberation to gain independence were Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe (Herbst 2000: 128).
\(^540\) Hatchard et al. 2004: 15.
\(^541\) ibid.
\(^542\) Lowenkopf 1961.
\(^543\) Proctor 1968: 61.
\(^544\) Republic of Botswana 1966.
Barotseland and representatives of different factions of the Barotseland Native Government flew to London to meet with president-to-be, Kenneth Kaunda, and Duncan Sandys (then the minister responsible for Central Africa). In all three countries, these periods of constitutional negotiations were critical junctures during which Botswanan, Zambian, and Ugandan political elites peacefully engaged in the process of specifying definitions of the national political community.

The chapter concludes that, despite similar initial conditions in terms of ethnic cleavage structures at the time of independence, Botswanan, Zambian, and Ugandan leaders ultimately provided quite different definitions of the national political community. In fact, the only pre-existing ethnic cleavages that were dealt with in a similar manner were religious cleavages, which in fact were the only type of cleavages that were mobilized to a different extent at the time of independence. More specifically, in the chapter, I demonstrate how Botswanan leaders ultimately adopted an official approach towards ethnic diversity that was to a greater extent influenced by pure assimilation than were the respective approaches in Zambia and Uganda. Within this overall assimilative approach, the political majority identity (the Tswana identity) was, and to a significant extent still is, almost exclusively promoted as constituting the national identity, within the framework of a unitary state structure. That is, since independence, with some exceptions, more or less all Botswanan policies towards ethnicity have served to strengthen the position of Tswana culture as the hegemonic culture. Furthermore, I demonstrate how, in Zambia, leaders chose to recognize ethnic diversity to a much greater extent than did leaders in both Botswana and Uganda. Within this overall multicultural framework, the Zambian state officially recognized a variety of only partly overlapping regional, linguistic, and tribal cleavages. Finally, I demonstrate how the leaders in Uganda, similar to in Zambia, pursued an approach to a considerable extent compatible with multiculturalism, but within the framework of which only one ethnic dimension was officially recognized. More specifically, at the time of independence, Ugandan leaders chose to recognize regional cleavages by granting federal or semi-federal status to a large number of tribal kingdoms.

While the leaders of the three states chose to deal with pre-existing tribal-territorial and linguistic cleavages in quite different manners, there are still some similarities to be discerned. In the chapter I demonstrate how all three countries have partly favored policies of neutrality in the post-

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545 Caplan 1968: 356.
independence period. Especially in terms of how pre-existing religious cleavages got addressed, policies of neutrality have been a general feature in all three states. That religious cleavages got addressed in similar ways despite the fact that they were to a varying extent mobilized at the time of independence serves to further strengthen the argument that the formal criteria of citizenship specified at the time of independence were not pre-determined by the respective historical contexts.

In the end, if we compare the three countries in terms of the degree of officially recognized multiculturalism at the time of independence on the basis of a scale running from less multiculturalism on the left to more multiculturalism on the right, the Botswanan approach is closest to the left, while the Zambian approach is closest to the right. Recognizing only one ethnic dimension, the Ugandan approach falls somewhere in between the Zambian and Botswanan approaches. Given the similar initial conditions in terms of pre-existing patterns of ethnic diversity and mobilization, and given the varying paths of tax state development that followed, it is of course reasonable to ask why Zambia and Uganda did not adopt a similar solution to the one adopted in Botswana? While it is almost impossible to provide an answer this question, at least it seems quite clear that elites could not foresee the consequences of the varying solutions. The British government, and particularly Governor Sir Andrew Cohen, had for example planned to leave Uganda a unitary government, but in the end a quasi-federal construction was instead agreed on.\textsuperscript{546} Similarly, in Botswana, there were at least five possibilities identified as for the position to be accorded to chiefs, ranging from no special arrangements at all to the adoption of a federal system in which the tribal administrations would function as regional governments and be represented equally in an upper house of legislature (i.e. a solution similar to the one finally adopted in Uganda). Yet, in the end, the Botswanan elites chose a more assimilative approach within the framework of which only Setswana-speaking tribes were granted some forms of power-sharing rights.

The aim of the remainder of this chapter is to further elaborate the constitutional choices in the respective countries. Furthermore, I will identify the ways in which the specifications of the formal criteria for citizenship in key legal and policy documents were reinforced with other strategies and ancillary institutions. As such, the chapter demonstrates how similar questions of how to deal with pre-existing ethnic cleavages got addressed in quite different ways in the respective constitutions, laws, and

\textsuperscript{546} Mutibwa 1992: 24.
Critical juncture: Degree of official multiculturalism at independence

policies at the time of independence. In addition, I describe how the official definitions of the respective national political communities adopted at the time of independence have evolved over time.

In favor of neutrality and pure assimilation in Botswana

“Our aspirations, our goals, our politics, our principles must be identified and expressed in terms, which our people understand. This means that we must build them on the foundations provided by Botswana’s culture and by Botswana’s values and traditions.” 547

The new national leader to take over power from the departing British colonial administration in Botswana was Seretse Khama, a paramount traditional chief of the Tswana people. 548 While Tswana tribes traditionally often attempted to integrate other groups into their institutional structure, the promotion of ethnic assimilation in much continued in Botswana even after independence, if in a somewhat different manner. 549 The new constitution adopted in Botswana at the time of independence, along with the new policies and laws, had the effect that Botswanan culture, values, and traditions were soon interpreted to mean mainly Tswana culture, values and traditions. That is, what Werbner has referred to as a ‘One-Nation Consensus’ was soon established. In practice, the One-Nation Consensus meant tribal and regional centralization and linguistic and cultural assimilation. That is, the Botswana Independence Act of 1966, as well as related policy documents and laws, limited the official manifestation of ethnic diversity by recognizing the culture, language, and tribal institutions of mainly one ethnic community – the Tswana. Within this framework, if the Botswanan state at all agreed on multicultural policies, it was only to the extent that such policies in the end favored the overarching idea of a shared nationhood based on the Tswana identity. For example, while tribal chiefs in Botswana were able to retain at least some of their power through the establishment of a House of Chiefs, this power did not apply equally to all chiefs since eight out of fifteen members are to be paramount chiefs of the

547 Seretse Khama, Botswana’s first President, BDP Conference, Francistown, 1st April 1972.
548 Adamolekun & Morgan 1999.
549 Acemoglu et al. 2003.
eight Setswana-speaking tribes.\textsuperscript{550} Tribes whose members did not speak Setswana as mother tongue were not allowed to be represented by paramount chiefs. Instead, they had to, and still have to, be represented by someone who speaks Setswana as a first language. In addition, the channeling of government resources went through Tswana tribal capitals only.

In effect, the One-Nation Consensus meant the increasing hegemonic status of Tswana language and culture.\textsuperscript{551} Building one state was, by and large, building one nation – the Tswana nation.\textsuperscript{552} Within this post-independence framework of nation-building, political minorities were not prohibited from speaking their own language or engaging in their own cultural practices, but the public sphere, while portrayed as neutral, clearly reflected the language, interests, everyday practices and dispositions of the Tswana political majority. According to the same logic, political minority languages and practices were, at least compared to Zambia and Uganda, more or less completely relegated to the private sphere, while the public sphere was, and still very much is, the preserve of the Tswana political majority.\textsuperscript{553} In the sections below, I discuss the policies directed towards each pre-existing ethnic cleavage in more detail.

Essentially pure assimilation of tribal-territorial cleavages

A major issue encountered by the builders of many of the new states in Africa has been that of defining a satisfactory position for the traditional tribal authorities in a more integrated political system. As such, in Botswana, among the first critical questions for the new elites to decide was whether to establish a more centralized, unitary state or a more decentralized, federal state to be able to integrate regionally concentrated tribal groups into a single, horizontally conceived nation. While during the colonial period, a central feature of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, as well as of most other former British colonies, was the wide jurisdiction accorded to tribal chiefs by the administration, allowing traditional leaders to retain a considerable measure of autonomy to govern their tribal territories, this territorial autonomy was significantly reduced in Botswana only shortly

\textsuperscript{550} Republic of Botswana 1965b, section 78. A paramount chief refers to someone being chief by birth (Nyati-Ramahobo 2000: 249).

\textsuperscript{551} Werbner 2002: 676.

\textsuperscript{552} See also ibid.

\textsuperscript{553} Solway 2004: 136.
after independence. More specifically, concerned to forge a common national allegiance, as well as to build an effective administration, political authority in the country was rapidly centralized after independence and this afforded little autonomy to the old tribal territories that, by and large, became the new administrative councils. Parliamentary sovereignty was made explicit and few avenues were left open for the expression of regional interests since within the new administrative councils, the chiefs were replaced with District Commissioners selected by the national government. In turn, the chiefs were made ex-officio members of the District Councils while most of their authority was transferred to the council. As in Great Britain, the executive was responsible to a majority of the House of Assembly and the Senate.

In the years following the promulgation of the constitution, the government of Botswana implemented a series of legislative and executive measures attenuating the power of the tribal leaders, complementing and deepening the original ideas of a centralized state and parliamentary sovereignty as established in the constitution. Perhaps the most important of these measures were the Chieftainship Act of 1965, the Chieftainship Amendment Act of 1970, and the Chieftainship Amendment Act of 1973 which subjected the chief to the authority of the state, as well as adumbrating his functions in the tribe. In these acts, the chief of the tribe was of particular significance and, more specifically; the ability to suspend and depose him following a judicial commission of inquiry. Especially stringent controls were introduced by the Chieftainship Amendment Act of 1970. This act stipulated that the final sanctions in appointments of sub-chiefs and any representatives of chiefs were to rest with the Minister of Local Government and Lands. Hence, the president was permitted to remove a chief at his own prerogative without waiting for complaints from his tribe and, furthermore, without reference to a judicial commission. That is, an administrative inquiry was mandatory but its recommendations needed not to be followed. In addition, under the Chieftainship Amendment Act of 1973, the President was to determine the nature of the administrative inquiry preceding his judgment on the removal of a chief.

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554 Jones 1983: 133.
555 Acemoglu et al. 2003.
556 Samatar 1997: 690.
557 Jones 1983: 133.
559 Jones 1983: 133.
from office, and such an inquiry could be instigated without there being, as was previously the case, a compliant from the tribe about the conduct of the chief.\textsuperscript{560} As a result, according to the Chieftainship Act as it is in work still today, the Minister may, at any time, make an order withdrawing recognition from a Chief, for example if the Minister considers it to be in the public interest to withdraw recognition.\textsuperscript{561} In addition, if the Minister has “reasonable cause to believe that the Chief of any tribe”, or if “any tribe or section of a tribe lodges with the Minister a complaint that the Chief of that tribe is incapable of exercising his powers, has abused his powers or is for any reason not a fit and proper person to be a Chief”, the responsible Minister has the power to remove a chief provided that he informs him of the facts in writing of the reason for his suspension.\textsuperscript{562} The Chieftainship Act of 1965 in addition gave the Minister of Local Government and Lands the power to decide on the salary of each Chief.\textsuperscript{563} Before the implementation of the act, the chiefs had relied on the commission earned from the collection of taxes as a revenue stream not only for themselves, but for the community.\textsuperscript{564} The implication of the new measure was that chiefs were placed in the salary scale of the general administration class of the civil service and, as a result, they came to occupy a relatively subordinate rank within the state bureaucracy, which they still today hold.\textsuperscript{565}

In addition to the Chieftainship Act and the Chieftainship Amendment Acts, a large number of other laws and policies adopted by the Botswana government after independence further stripped chiefs of their legislative and administrative powers. The Local Government Tax Act of 1965 removed authority from chiefs and their tribal administrations to levy and collect taxes and instead transferred this field of responsibility to the newly created District Councils.\textsuperscript{566} The Matimela Act of 1968 further removed from the chiefs the disposal authority over stray cattle, stating that “a council [understood as the District Council within the area in which the tribal area is situated] may by resolution establish any kraal or enclosure as a

\textsuperscript{560} ibid.
\textsuperscript{561} Republic of Botswana 1965a, section 4.3.
\textsuperscript{562} ibid section 12.1.
\textsuperscript{563} ibid section 21.
\textsuperscript{564} Adamolekun & Morgan 1999.
\textsuperscript{565} Solway 2004: 136.
\textsuperscript{566} Jones 1983: 133.
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Furthermore, according to the act, “any kraal or enclosure in the vicinity of any kgotla in which Matimela [stray animals] has, prior to the coming into operation of this Act, been customarily placed shall be deemed to have been established as a matimela kraal under this section”. Hence, with the implementation of the Matimela Act, yet another source of revenue, however modest compared to the withdrawal of taxation powers, was taken away from the chiefs since, according to the act, “any revenue accruing from matimela or any expenses incurred in connection with matimela should be paid into or charged on the general revenue of the council”.

Furthermore, also in terms of land, most resources were transferred from the tribal chiefs and instead vested in the Republic shortly after independence. The passing of the Tribal Land Act in 1968 removed the right of chiefs to hold tribal land in trust and to allocate it according to customary or common law. Instead this allocative authority was vested in so called ‘land boards’. According to the tribal land regulations, the head of each land board should be elected, as the majority of its members, immediately after national and local elections. As ex-officio members, chiefs’ role was to provide information and verify that land about to be allocated had not been previously allocated. As a result, under the Tribal Land Act, the tribal administrations experienced a substantial reduction in their complement of staff. In addition to the transfer of taxation authority and land rights to the Republic, the passing of the Mines and Minerals Act in 1976 transferred all rights of ownership in minerals to the national government, even further weakening the position of tribal chiefs and their authority over tribal territory.

In sum, the more or less hegemonic authority of chiefs over tribal lands in the pre-independence period was, soon after independence, to a significant extent undermined in at least two respects. To begin with, after independence, tribal chiefs by and large forfeited their independence as regards the central government. Secondly, they were impelled to concede

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567 Republic of Botswana 1968a, section 3.1.
568 ibid section 3.2.
569 ibid, section 12.1. See also Adamolekun & Morgan 1999: 588-9.
570 Republic of Botswana 1968b.
571 In sum, there are 12 land boards with 36 sub-land boards in the larger districts (Adamolekun & Morgan 1999: 589).
572 ibid.
573 Jones 1983: 134.
574 Republic of Botswana 1976, section, 3.
many of their long-established responsibilities to the District Councils, the Land Boards, as well as to other forms of local government agencies with no tribal connection. Yet, despite the overall great reduction in chiefly power at the time of independence, at least some of the chiefs have still been able to retain certain responsibilities as they continue to administer customary law, resolve personal disputes and grievances, and articulate local interests in the Kgotla. Some chiefs have in addition advisory powers in terms of both government and parliament issues of national importance through the House of Chiefs. As such, as argued by among others Nyati-Ramahobo, if chiefs do not possess any greater amount of real power, up to today, chiefs hold some degree of symbolic power. Important to note for the purpose of this study is, however, that this symbolic power does not apply equally to all chiefs. More specifically, as specified in sections 77, 78, and 79 of the constitution, in the House of Chiefs, eight out of fifteen members are to be paramount chiefs of the eight Setswana-speaking tribes. These eight Tswana chiefs are Bamangwato, Batawana, Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bangwaketse, Bamalete, Barolong, and Batlokwa. Among the rest, four are elected sub-chiefs from areas where languages other than Setswana are spoken and that do not fall under any of the eight paramount chiefs. In addition, the House of Chiefs elects three additional members by special elections. Tribes whose members do not speak Setswana as their mother tongue are not allowed to be represented by paramount chiefs. Instead, they have to be represented by someone who speaks Setswana as a first language. In other words, at independence, the ruling party introduced a constitution that enshrined a qualified, somewhat contradictory version of the so called working consensus. It contained, and still contains, clauses, for example in sections 77, 78 and 79, which fixed continuity in tribal citizenship, but in a highly unequal way. In the same vein, the Chieftainship Act of 1965 and the Tribal Land Act recognize exclusively

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575 See Jones 1983: 134.
576 ibid.
577 ibid.
578 Nyati-Ramahobo 2000: 249.
579 Republic of Botswana 1965b, section 78.
580 ibid, section 78.
581 These include the North-east, Kgalagadi, Gantsi and Chobe districts (ibid, section 79). Those tribes in the North-west, including the Hambukushu, Herero, Subia, Wayeyi, Baciruku, and Basarwa, are, in turn, represented and ruled by the Batawana and are, as a result, officially regarded as such (Nyati-Ramahobo 2000: 249).
582 See Werbner 2002: 677.
Tswana tribes as sovereigns of tribal land. In addition, what determines whether a tribe is major or minor according to Botswanan official policy is not the actual number of members, but whether the tribe belongs to one of the eight Tswana tribes and if the members speak one of the eight Setswana dialects. Accordingly, the general pattern of Botswana nation-building policy towards tribal-territorial cleavages as codified in the constitution can by and large be understood as the favoring of Setswana-speaking tribes at the expense of non-Tswana tribes. The ways in which the provision of government services are organized further confirms this picture since the village capital of the ‘major’ (as in political majority) tribe, i.e. the village capital of Tswana tribes, is seen by the government as the capital of all the other tribes nearest to it. Consequently, it is also the place where government services are delivered and the way in which linguistic and cultural hegemony penetrate the social and economic lives of those tribes that do not speak Setswana as a first language. This official policy allowing for the preservation of the spatial basis of Tswana hegemony, especially the tribal capital, continues to marginalize political minorities within the public sphere. In general, it is against this background that the Botswana government, if yet partly outside the realm of the constitution, up to today continues to promote policies of pure assimilation, aiming to assimilate political minorities into the Setswana language and culture. In the next section, I further discuss the role of language under this approach.

An assimilative approach towards linguistic cleavages through policies of neutrality and pure assimilation

Apart from the question of how to organize tribal-territorial cleavages politically as to promote the development of an over-arching national identity, another sticking point for the new leaders was how linguistic differences should be handled in order to achieve the same goal. A common language is normally argued to provide a very strong basis for political community, but the attractiveness of a single language for the new nation had to be balanced against the cultural claims of other groups at the time of independence. Yet, in the end, the Botswanan elites chose to officially promote the ethnically neutral language English and the national
language Setswana (the language of Tswana tribes) solely, while not officially recognizing so called ‘minority’ languages. The combination of policies of neutrality and pure assimilation within the linguistic realm further strengthens the impression that the Botswanan state followed mainly an assimilative tendency at the time of independence since, while the Botswanan state accords individual rights as granted by the constitution to all citizens, at the same time, it has since independence embodied the language, symbols and rituals of its political majority.\footnote{According to the Constitution of Botswana, “[E]very person in Botswana is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest…” (Republic of Botswana 1965b, chapter 2, section 3). As argued by Young, the state can sometimes also embody the symbols and rituals of the numeric majority (Young 1982).} That is, apart from a short period of flirtation with multiculturalism just before independence in terms of the spread of government information in a number of different languages, since independence, Tswana linguistic and cultural assimilation has permeated in principle all relevant aspects of Botswanan citizenship. The political marginalization of minority languages through assimilative policies has occurred as a result of a variety of different policies, including the drawing of internal boundaries and the language of schools, courts, government services and media. That is, while the constitution is of course an important document, apart from this, there are still a large number of other means through which supposedly group-blind policies can further institutionalize the linguistic and cultural hegemony of one ethnic group.\footnote{Solway 2004; Young 1982.} However, as argued by Nyati-Ramahobo, these sources do not always explicitly define the official policy or make it a subject of discussion. Accordingly, Botswana’s national policy on language is, for example, in much “…inferred and observed from reality” and as such referred to in various documents as if it was established in the constitution.\footnote{Nyati-Ramahobo 2000: 274.} However, despite the lack of a clearly defined official policy towards linguistic cleavages in the constitution (apart from the fact that the constitution is itself written in English), under Seretse Khama’s rule, English soon after independence became the only official, and Setswana the only national, language recognized by the government.\footnote{See ibid.} Government affairs, the official media, as well as education, were then limited to these languages, a fact that despite recent government agreement in principle to change the existing
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policy, by and large persists. In addition, the official language policy was, and still is, referred to in various national documents and reports, such as in national development plans, in national commissions on education, as well as in several curricular materials and in the media. The official language policy is furthermore reflected in the lyrics of the Botswanan national anthem, adopted at the time of independence, since its lyrics is only available in English and Setswana. In terms of language use in schools, already at the time of independence, there was a general understanding that English should be the medium of instruction. However, as a result of the lack of knowledge of English among teachers, instruction in Setswana was partly tolerated in lower grades. Other languages, such as Ikalanga, which had been allowed as a medium of instruction before independence, were subsequently banned from use in schools and school instruction.

In sum, the overall official approach towards linguistic cleavages adopted at the time of independence in Botswana can, by and large, be described as an assimilative model, within the framework of which the official language did (and still does) in reality not belong to any of the ethnic groups residing within the country and the national language and culture belonged, and still belong, to the political majority, i.e. the Tswana. In the next section, I turn to the policies formulated in order to incorporate religious diversity.

Neutrality and pure assimilation within the religious sphere

Similar to the policy on language, the set of official policies formulated in order to incorporate religious diversity at the time of independence revealed pure assimilative tendencies even though the constitution gave the picture of a more neutral approach. According to the constitution, Botswana was to have no official state religion. The constitution in addition provided for the protection of individual rights and freedoms, including the right to observe and practice any religion without the unsolicited intervention of members of any other religion or the state. The constitution in addition prohibited forced religious instruction, forced participation in religious ceremonies, or taking oaths that run counter to an individual’s religious

591 Solway 2004: 129.
592 In Setswana, the Botswanan national anthem is called “Fatshe leno la rona”, while in English it is called “Blessed Be This Noble Land”.
594 ibid.
595 ibid.
beliefs. Yet, it is not without its problems to draw the conclusion that the Botswanan state has been a completely secularized state since independence. Rather, a number of traditions and policy paths pursued since independence strengthen the suspicion that the Botswanan state has never been purely secularized. For example, even today it is common for government meetings to begin with a Christian prayer, even though members of other religions are not excluded from leading non-Christian prayers at such occasions.\textsuperscript{596} In addition, only Christian holy days are recognized as public holidays. These include Good Friday, Easter Monday, Ascension Day, and Christmas Day.\textsuperscript{597} Furthermore, the education curriculum reveals a clear priority of Christianity over other religions on the government’s side, and especially since the 1970s when, despite various forms of earlier government opposition, the Christian syllabus became popular again.\textsuperscript{598}

**Summing-up: In favor of assimilation in Botswana**

In sum, as illustrated in Table 5.1, at the time of independence, the Botswanan state demonstrated quite strong tendencies in favor of assimilative policies. Within this approach, Botswanan leaders chose to adopt a unitary state structure within the framework of which tribal authorities saw their real power being significantly reduced. Centripetal forces have furthermore been clearly visible in the official approach towards linguistic diversity. Since the time of independence, the Botswanan state has strongly favored the use of English and Setswana solely in the bureaucracy, media, as well as for the purpose of education. This unwillingness on behalf of the government to recognize existing ethnic diversity becomes evident also if we consider the national censuses. In fact, the last national census to record tribal and linguistic identity was the 1946 Census, conducted during the colonial period. As argued by Solway, the

\textsuperscript{596} U.S. Department of State 2006.
\textsuperscript{597} ibid.
\textsuperscript{598} Yet, in 1993, a movement toward a multi-faith syllabus gained increased momentum, leading to the multi-faith religious education introduced at the junior secondary level in Botswana in 1996 (Matemba 2005; Davies 2007). However, while the syllabus for religious education in secondary education in Botswana takes cognisance of the religious pluralism of the society in Botswana and elsewhere – according to the syllabus the contents should be drawn from Christianity, Islam, African Traditional Religion, Bahai, Sikhism, Buddhism and Hinduism – it still reveals a primary emphasis on Christianity. For example, the government prescription is that all learners are expected to do Christianity and, apart from this, they are free to choose any other two religions (Republic of Botswana 2006). From this perspective, to argue that there are multicultural tendencies in Botswana’s official approach towards religion would certainly be stretching the concept too far.
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fact that subsequent censuses have avoided questions about tribal and linguistic identity reflects the political sensitivity of the issue, as well as the desire of the state to perpetuate its vision of ethnic homogeneity.\textsuperscript{599} Considering the overall assimilative trend, this conclusion seems not to be too far away. In fact, as regards multicultural policies, the Botswanan state demonstrated only very weak tendencies of adhering to such an approach at the time of independence. Yet, sections 77, 78 and 79 of the constitution granted, and still grant, at least some degree of power to tribal authorities, even though not equally applied to all chiefs. In other words, even within the framework of this seemingly multicultural policy, Tswana dominance is clearly revealed since eight out of fifteen members are to be paramount chiefs of the eight Setswana-speaking tribes and since tribes whose members do not speak Setswana as mother tongue have to be represented by someone who speaks Setswana as a first language. Seen from this perspective, the granting of group rights to tribal authorities at the time of independence can in the end not be argued to be much more than a façade, this policy too in effect serving to reinforce Tswana linguistic and cultural domination.

\textsuperscript{599} Solway 2004: 130-1.
Table 5.1. Sum-up: Official approach towards ethnic diversity in Botswana at independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRIBE AND TERRITORY</th>
<th>Official Approach Towards: LANGUAGE</th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall approach:</td>
<td>Pure assimilation with some</td>
<td>Overall approach: Combination of neutrality and pure assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>elements of symbolic multiculturalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unitary state</td>
<td>Official language: English</td>
<td>• State religion: None, but priority of Christianity over other religions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structure</td>
<td>National language: Setswana (1)</td>
<td>• The constitution recognizes freedom of religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sub-central</td>
<td>Educational policy: Primarily</td>
<td>• Educational policy: Curriculum secularized, even though flavored by Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative</td>
<td>English, but Setswana used in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>units originate</td>
<td>lower grades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Tswana tribal</td>
<td>Language use in media: Almost</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitals</td>
<td>exclusively English and Setswana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chiefs significantly reduced power at independence</td>
<td>Language use in administration: English and Setswana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Symbolic recognition of traditional authorities (however, power unbalanced in favor of Setswana-speaking chiefs)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In favor of neutrality and multidimensional multiculturalism in Zambia

Similar to Botswana, Zambia attained independence without extensive or protracted violent struggle. Peaceful political competition between parties became established well in advance and by and large included electoral competition between politicians pursuing the same nationalist end. Yet, alert to the potential dangers that ethnic cleavages can give rise to, from the start, Zambia’s first president, Kenneth Kaunda, set out to build ‘One

600 Burnell 2005: 112.
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Zambia, One Nation’. By promoting a national motto emphasizing national unity, Kaunda hoped to discourage rival politicians from making diverse ethnic appeals. However, as will be clear in the analysis of Zambia’s official approach towards ethnic diversity as specified in key legal and policy documents, the national motto has not always been as strong in practice as in rhetoric. Rather, along with policies of neutrality, the Zambian official approach towards ethnicity adopted at the time of independence reveals strong tendencies in favor of a multi-dimensional multicultural approach within the framework of which partly overlapping regional, linguistic, and tribal cleavages were officially recognized. For example, since independence, Zambia has officially (and besides the official language of English) promoted the use of as many as seven different national languages in the bureaucracy and media, as well as for the purpose of education. In addition, at the time of independence, traditional authorities were able to retain at least some degree of power through the establishment of a House of Chiefs. Furthermore, there have been continuing official attempts to achieve tribal balance in the parliament and on key positions in government. Moreover, the drawing of new provincial boundaries at the time of independence served to recognize – and in some instances even create new – partly overlapping regional, tribal, and linguistic identities. Below, I discuss the Zambian official approach towards ethnic diversity.

Unitarism combined with multiculturalism in tribal and regional politics

Although traditional elites in Zambia fought desperately to preserve their position through the momentous and fluid years prior to independence in 1964, the national leaders ultimately chose to establish a centralized system of government.\footnote{Silverman 1984: 154.} As such, like the Botswanan state, the Zambian state was proclaimed a unitary state in the independence constitution. As in Botswana, the movement towards a more centralized state structure carried with it a large number of changes. Especially tribal authorities saw their traditional bases of power significantly eroded. With the adoption of a unitary state, tribes as administrative units were for example replaced by provinces.\footnote{Posner 2005: 117.} Furthermore, the Local Government Bill of 1965 set up a system of elected rural councils (so called District Councils) to replace native authorities as decision-making agencies. Shortly before the passing of
the Local Government Bill, the Parliament had also approved the Chiefs Act.\(^{603}\) According to this act, the President was unilaterally empowered to recognize or depose any chief in Zambia as he deemed fitting.\(^{604}\) As argued by among others Silverman, together, the Chiefs Act and the Local Government Bill can be argued to have been the final blow trying to undermine the power bases of all native authorities in Zambia. Especially for the Lozi, the passing of these two acts meant a significant change in terms of recognition. As argued in chapter four, in August 1960 the National Council (i.e. the legislature) of the Lozi people had asked Britain to allow Barotseland to secede from Northern Rhodesia and instead be proclaimed a protectorate directly under the British government on the lines of the High Commission Territory. The British colonial authorities rejected this demand. However, not giving up on the idea of being recognized as a distinct community, at the time of independence, the Lozi instead asked to have its rights, privileges and status as a distinct people entrenched in the Zambia Independence Constitution of 1964.\(^{605}\) However, neither this attempt to achieve autonomous status fully paid its way. Using the argument of the national motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ the governing party, UNIP, rejected the demand of the Lozi people to be recognized as a nation within the nation, and instead arranged for the Barotseland Agreement.\(^{606}\) The Barotseland Agreement was signed on May 18\(^{th}\) 1964 in London by the Lozi paramount chief (Litunga) and Kaunda, witnessed by a host of other nationalist freedom fighters and can be seen as a compromise between the Lozi people and the new national leaders, if yet a compromise achieved on rather unequal grounds.\(^{607}\) The purpose of the agreement was to formalize Barotseland’s position as an integral part of Zambia to enable Zambia to proceed to independence as one country and at the same time guarantee that the traditions of the Lozi people would be preserved within the new nation. As such, the Barotseland Agreement gave wide-ranging concessions, if still not the full autonomous status aimed for, to the Barotse National Government over wildlife and local government.\(^{608}\) Through the Agreement, the Litunga retained powers of local government matters greater than those conceded to any other chief in Zambia. Section 4

\(^{603}\) Government of Zambia 1967.

\(^{604}\) ibid, sections 3 and 4.

\(^{605}\) Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 182.

\(^{606}\) Caplan 1968: 356.

\(^{607}\) ibid.

of the Zambia Independence Act preserved the status of the agreement. However, as argued, the special status of Barotseland did not last for long. In fact, already in June 1965, Zambian newspapers were printing sensational stories of the increasing rift between Barotseland and the central government.  

Although the traditional elites in Barotseland fought desperately to preserve their position, the national leaders within a year after signing the Barotseland Agreement succeeded in establishing a strongly centralized system in which Barotseland was hardly distinguished from other parts of the country. The key documents in this transformation of Lozi power were the Chiefs Act and the Local Government Bill. For Barotseland, the Local Government Bill in effect meant the abolishment of the National Council – which had previously served as the only decision-making function for the whole Kingdom – in favor of five District Councils. Over one night, the Litunga lost the right to appoint councilors and judges, his control of the Barotse Treasury, and his right to reject legislation of which he disapproved. In addition, the central government was to pay the salaries of the royal family, and the President’s office itself was to provide his own annual income. In short, the Litunga’s power base was cut from under him and he instead became almost totally dependent on the national government. As previously mentioned, the same rules applied to tribal chiefs also in areas other than Barotseland Province. According to the Chiefs Act, the President was unilaterally empowered to recognize or depose any chief in Zambia as he deemed fitting. The Litunga of Barotseland was explicitly mentioned as falling under the provisions of this Act. Section 3.1.a states that “Subject to the provisions of this section, the President may, by statutory order, recognize any person as being, within the area in Zambia specified in the order, the holder of the office of Litunga of the Western Province or of any other chiefly office in the Western Province specified in the order”. In 1969, a referendum sought to remove the entrenched provisions of Barotseland in the constitution, which gave the Litunga rights over the land in Barotse Province. In relation to this, President Kaunda also announced that Barotse Province would be renamed Western Province and that its traditional rulers would lose their authority over the area’s fishing and wildlife rights.

609 Caplan 1968: 357.
611 Caplan 1968: 358.
Yet, even though Zambia at a first glance seems to share many similarities with Botswana in terms of how the issue of tribal diversity was dealt with at the time of independence, there were in fact a large number of differences to be discerned. More specifically, despite the adoption of a unitary state structure and the withdrawal of many aspects of traditional chiefly power, the Zambian state has continued to officially recognize tribal, as well as regional, diversity within a large variety of public policy areas since independence. As already argued, the first few years of independence saw the emergence of provinces rather than tribes as units of development administration. At independence, Zambia had eight provinces: Barotse, Central, Eastern, Luapula, Northern, Northwestern, Southern and Western. In 1969, Western Province was renamed Copperbelt Province and Barotse Province was renamed Western Province. In 1978, yet another province, Lusaka Province was carved out of the former Central Province.613 As argued by Posner, provinces had first been demarcated in Northern Rhodesia in the early 1930s, and by the mid-1940s, each of the Protectorate’s then six provinces had its own African-staffed administrative council. Yet, it was not until after independence that the political importance of provinces –– and the scale of the resources allocated to them –– became large enough for provincial administrators to become perceived as potential sources of patronage.614 By channeling a large number of political and economic resources to the provinces, the Zambian government officially recognized them as being important for politics. In addition, the decentralization of power over political and economic resources to provincial district councils served to recognize linguistic and tribal cleavages. This is because, leaving aside the provinces located along the rail line, the provincial boundaries that gained increased political importance after independence by and large overlapped with pre-existing linguistic cleavages.615 In addition, at the time of independence, in Zambia as well as in most other African countries, tribal and language groups were (and still is) organized in concentric circles, with all the members of each tribal group located entirely within a single language category and each language category containing several different tribal groups. Furthermore, the name of each of the four major language groups in Zambia is the same as the name of the largest tribe in each language coalition (Bemba, Lozi, 

614 ibid: 117-8.
615 Dresang 1974; Posner 2005.
Thus, every Lozi tribesperson, for example, is also a Lozi-speaker, but every Lozi-speaker is not a Lozi tribesperson. In the end, the increased political importance granted to provinces as such served to recognize not only the political importance of partly new regional identities, but perhaps to an even greater extent it served to recognize the political importance of pre-existing tribal and linguistic identities (for a discussion about the ways in which provincial boundaries have served to recognize linguistic identities, see the section below). In addition, a large number of other institutions have further recognized the importance of tribal, regional, and linguistic identities.

For example, similar to in Botswana, the independence constitution of Zambia provided for a House of Chiefs which allowed chiefs to retain at least some of their symbolic power even after independence. By establishing a House of Chiefs, the government hoped to create a link to the political legitimacy of the pre-colonial past. However, while membership in the House of Chiefs in Botswana was, and still is, based on linguistic origin (and heavily favors Setswana-speaking tribes), the Zambian allocation of chiefly symbolic power as specified in the independence constitution, as well as in subsequent constitutions, is based on provincial origin and more evenly balanced between regions. More specifically, the Zambian House of Chiefs consists of twenty-seven chiefs in total that, in turn, “consist of three chiefs elected by the Chiefs [i.e. Paramount Chiefs] from each of the nine provinces of the republic”. That is, in the end, the Zambian House of Chiefs as specified at the time of independence promoted not only tribal identities, but also regional and linguistic ones. Nevertheless, as its Botswanan counterpart, the Zambian House of Chief serves primarily a symbolic function as specified in the independence constitution since it constitutes mainly a deliberative body. As such, it can consider and discuss any bill introduced or proposed to be introduced in the National Assembly or any other matter referred to the House by the President, but it has no legislative powers and can accordingly not enact or block legislation.

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617 ibid.
620 Republic of Zambia 1964, chapter 6, sections 85-96; Ndalo & Kent 1996: 263.
In addition to the recognition of tribal and regional diversity in the House of Chiefs, the years around independence furthermore witnessed the concession of tribal rights in continuing attempts to achieve tribal balance in the parliament and on key government positions. For the first years after independence, Zambia was ruled by a government and party whose top officials had been selected with the outspoken mission to achieve a balance between expertise and political support on the one hand, and a representation of all major ethnic groups on the other.\footnote{Dresang 1974: 1609.} In addition, national censuses have collected information about the tribal heritage of the population throughout the post-independence period, further strengthening the impression among the population that such identities matter for politics.

Neutrality and multiculturalism in the linguistic sphere

Questions of language and identity have played an important role throughout modern Zambian history and particularly after independence when the question of the national identity of the new state took center stage. In line with the national motto ‘One Zambia, One Nation’, at the time of independence, Zambia, similar to Botswana, adopted English as the nation’s official language. Since then, English has been widely used in the media, in administration, for business correspondence, and as a medium of instruction in schools (especially higher education).\footnote{Laitin 1992: 130-1; Marten & Kula 2006.} However, even if English up to today has had a stable role as the official language, local languages have throughout the independence period been promoted for use in different official settings. As previously argued, the first set of policies to officially recognize linguistic diversity in Zambia at the time of independence was the increased political and economic powers given to provinces. More specifically, since the provincial boundaries by and large overlapped with pre-existing linguistic cleavages, by recognizing provinces as the new administrative units of the state, the Zambian state in effect gave increased recognition to some of the many different linguistic groups in the country. More specifically, by giving extended administrative powers to Southern Province, the government recognized the Tonga-speaking groups of the country. Eastern Province is the country’s Nyanja-speaking region,
while Western Province is the home of Zambia’s Lozi-speakers. As will be more thoroughly discussed in chapter six, as a result of the increased recognition given to provincial identities, in each of these cases, the name of the province and the name of the language group are today used interchangeably in popular discourse. Tonga-speakers are referred to as Southerners, Nyanja-speakers as Easterners, and Lozi-speakers as Westerners. There are, however, two exceptions to the otherwise close match between provincial and linguistic boundaries. The first exception is Northwestern Province, which is not associated with any of the country’s four major language groups. As a result, today, provincial identities tend to play an analogous role for people in Northwestern Province to linguistic identities in other parts of the country. That is, along with Nyanja-speakers, Tonga-speakers, and Lozi-speakers, Zambians often refer to “Northwesterners” as an equally politically relevant group. The second of the exceptions is the Bemba-speaking region, which spans both Northern and Luapula Provinces, and (in the eyes of many Zambians at least) Copperbelt Province and the northeastern portions of Central Province. Yet, despite the increased recognition and promotion of local languages in Zambia following from the increased political importance granted to provinces at the time of independence, English has throughout the independence period served an important role as the official language to be used for official purposes such as in the administration and for the purpose of national and international official communication. For example, the lyrics of the Zambian national anthem are only available in English and Bemba. The strong official position of the English language is in addition evident when it comes to language use in media, since English up to today remains the most frequently used language. The three daily newspapers – the Times of Zambia, the Post, and the Daily Mail are all in English, and print media in other languages are restricted to weekly and monthly...
magazines. In addition, television programmes by the Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) are predominantly in English with only short programmes in other languages. Moreover, English is widely used on the national radio. However, indigenous languages play an important role in the production of radio programmes as well. According to investigations, radio air coverage per week for Zambian local languages on the multi-lingual Radio 1 of ZNBC is 23 hours each for Bemba and Tonga, 21 hours each for Nyanja and Lozi, and 15 each for Kaonde, Luvale, and Lunda. As such, among media, radio is the most explicitly multilingual forum. Radio is in addition the media forum that reaches the largest share of the Zambian population. The number of radio receivers in 1996 was 1,000,000. The number of actual listeners is much higher than that because of large numbers of family members who gather around each radio set, plus those who listen to broadcasts in beer halls and other community gathering centers. Radio furthermore attracts more Zambians because it is not affected by literacy and requires no active participation by audiences who can be engaged in other activities while still being able to listen and hear the messages, music, advice, and call-in programs.

In terms of education, especially in the beginning of the independence period, English played the most important role. In fact, already before independence, in 1963, a group of educationalists reviewed the education system in what was to become Zambia, and recommended that the medium of instruction should be English from the beginning of schooling. In addition, they recommended that, as soon as possible, a pilot should be set up to commence the introduction of English as the medium of instruction. This recommendation was further endorsed in 1965 by the Hardman Report, written by a language officer seconded by the United Kingdom to Zambia to investigate the challenges of teaching English to primary school children. Later the same year, in June 1965, the newly

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630 Marten & Kula 2006.
631 ibid.
632 In 2002 ZNBC remains the country’s sole television broadcaster and is still seen, despite the change in government from UNIP to the supposedly press-freedom-committed MMD, as a state broadcaster. ZNBC runs three government-oriented radio stations: Radio 1, which is multilingual and can be heard in Zambia’s major languages; Radio 2, which is an English language service; and Radio 4.
633 Chanda 1996.
634 In comparison, television reaches considerably less people; about 270,000 in 1996 (www.pressreference.com/Uz-Z/Zambia.html).
635 UNESCO 1964: 105.
636 Hardman 1965.
formed independent Zambian cabinet deliberated on the issue and on the advice of the then Minister of Education, J.M. Mwanakatwe, the cabinet decided to legislate in line with the recommendations of the Hardman report. As a result, the first educational curriculum to take form in the independence era promoted English as the sole medium of instruction for Zambian primary school students. This decision was enshrined in the 1966 Education Act which legislated that English should be the medium of instruction from the first grade to the end of tertiary education, while vernacular languages were to be taught as subjects. The motivation behind the new policy was, by and large, the perceived risk of national disintegration if different local languages were officially promoted by the government.

However, the 1966 policy caused considerable controversy in Zambia, and supporters of the vernaculars soon demanded its reassessment. In 1976, the Ministry of Education, recognizing the ambiguous results of the curriculum, partly reintroduced the vernaculars as media of instruction for the first four years of school. According to the new policy – formally adopted in 1977 – teachers were allowed to explain concepts that might otherwise not be understood through the medium of English in one of the seven national languages, provided that a majority of the students in a class could understand the vernacular language in question.

Neutrality in the religious sphere

From independence in 1964 until the constitutional amendment of 1996, similar to in Botswana, the question of religion has not been a considerably sensitive political matter in Zambia. While the first President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, always presented himself as a Christian and frequently articulated his appreciation of religion in the task of nation building, he still held a wide view of religion. At a meeting with church leaders in 1969 on the topic of religious and moral education, he reflected that that there was something good in every religion and this should be communicated in the schools. Since independence, the Zambian constitution has legally protected the right to freedom of religion by stating that “Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom

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640 Kaunda 1969.
of conscience, and for the purposes of this Article the said freedom includes freedom of thought and religion, freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others, and both in public and in private, to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”

During the period of Kaunda’s rule, a clear distinction between religious education (which would be done in the school) and Catechesis (which would be done in church settings) emerged. The goal of this policy was that religious education would be separated from, as well as independent of, churches. By 1971, the Ministry of Education and Culture in collaboration with the churches approved a non-denominational religious education syllabus for primary schools. This new education policy proved to be a significant landmark in Zambia’s religious history since religious education for the first time officially became professional rather than confessional. More specifically, it became a school subject under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, eventually leading to the appointment of a religious education inspector in 1978. In terms of secondary education, the stated aim of these syllabuses was to ‘enable pupils to appreciate spiritual, moral and religious values and behavior based on them’. The appreciation was drawn from the four main religious traditions in Zambia; Christianity, Hinduism, Indigenous Zambian beliefs and Islam, as well as from the religious elements of the Zambian philosophy of Humanism. Yet, as argued by Carmody, the allocation of material reflected a clear preference for Christianity. Syllabus 2046 included 82 percent Christian material while the 2044 had 56 percent at the time.

Summing-up: In favor of neutrality and recognition of multiple ethnic cleavages in Zambia

As illustrated in Table 5.2, the Zambian approach towards ethnic diversity at the time of independence can best be described as inconclusive in the

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642 Carmody 2003.
643 ibid.
644 ibid.
645 ibid. Since independence, religious education has been taught as a core subject in all non-private primary and basic schools in Zambia. At senior secondary level, religious education is an option with between 50 and 60 percent taking either what is called the 2044 syllabus or the 2046 syllabus. In addition, religious education is accepted as a subject for university entrance and since 1991 it is also offered at the University of Zambia (UNZA) at Lusaka both as a minor and a major in the BA education program (Carmody 2003).
sense that it combined assimilative policies with a multi-dimensional multicultural approach when dealing with all potential ethnic cleavages despite religious ones. That is, on the one hand, the national motto “One Zambia, One Nation” manifested itself in the adoption of a unitary state structure in the independence constitution, as well as in the adoption of English as the official language of the country, and in the tilting towards Christianity as the sole officially promoted religion. On the other hand, the Zambian state officially recognized ethnic diversity along multiple ethnic cleavages in the constitution as well as in ancillary institutions. The emergence of provinces rather than tribes as administrative units at the time of independence served not only to recognize regional identities as important for politics, but it served to politically recognize tribal and linguistic cleavages too. In addition, the establishment of a House of Chiefs allowed chiefs from different tribes to retain at least some degree of symbolic power. Furthermore, since membership in the House of Chiefs is based on provincial origin, it serves to recognize the political importance of regional identities. Tribal identities have in addition played an important role in the balancing of parliament and key government positions.

Along with a combined approach of assimilation and multiculturalism within the spheres of tribe and region, in terms of the language question too, the Zambian state promoted a mixed approach. While the partly multicultural approach towards language was most evident in the overlap of provincial boundaries with pre-existing linguistic boundaries, alongside the official language English the Zambian state has increasingly promoted the use of as many as seven national languages in the media, education, as well as in the bureaucracy. That is, in conclusion, while the Zambian state on the one hand aimed at preserving the national motto “One Zambia, One Nation” through the adoption of assimilative policies, on the other hand, the Zambian state officially accepted and promoted diversity along partly overlapping tribal, linguistic, and regional ethnic cleavages.
Table 5.2. Sum-up: Official approach towards ethnic diversity in Zambia at independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRIBE AND TERRITORY</th>
<th>Official Approach Towards: LANGUAGE</th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall approach: Combination of neutrality and multiculturalism</td>
<td>Overall approach: Combination of neutrality and multiculturalism</td>
<td>Overall approach: Until 1991 neutrality, after that combination of neutrality and pure assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unitary state structure</td>
<td>• Official language: English</td>
<td>• State religion: Not before 1991, since 1996 Christianity is the officially recognized and constitutionally promoted state religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sub-central administrative units by and large overlap with pre-existing linguistic cleavages and partly with tribal cleavages (government services channeled through the administrative units)</td>
<td>• National languages: Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi, Lunda, Luvale, and Kaonde</td>
<td>• The constitution recognizes freedom of religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chiefs significantly reduced power at independence</td>
<td>• Sub-central administrative units by and large overlap with linguistic cleavages</td>
<td>• Educational policy: Curriculum secularized, even though flavored by Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Symbolic recognition of traditional authorities (balanced membership in House of Chiefs based on provincial origin)</td>
<td>• Educational policy: Before 1991 mainly English, after 1997 national languages grade 1-4, English from grade 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Information about tribal origin collected by national censuses since independence</td>
<td>• Primarily English, but national languages are heard especially on the radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tribal balancing in Cabinet and on key government positions</td>
<td>• Language use in administration: English and national languages (written law still in English only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Information about language use collected by national censuses since independence</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Critical juncture: Degree of official multiculturalism at independence

As will be evident from the discussion below, it is mainly in terms of this tilt towards multi-dimensional multiculturalism that the Zambian framework differs most clearly from the Ugandan approach. More specifically, while both Zambia and Uganda were considerably more generous in terms of the granting of ethnic group rights in the independence constitution and ancillary institutions than was Botswana, Zambia and Uganda still differ in the sense that while the Zambian state officially recognized three, partly overlapping types of ethnic cleavages, the Ugandan state almost exclusively recognized one type of ethnic cleavages, namely regional cleavages.

In favor of neutrality and one-dimensional multiculturalism in Uganda

“...since civilisation and the art of peace are the monopoly of no one culture but the product of all cultures in continuous relationship, the plurality of culture within and between nations must be protected.” (From Obote's Presidential address to the UPC delegates at the Party Conference held at Mbale, in August 1962)

The leader that brought Uganda to independence on October 9th 1962 was Milton A. Obote, a son of the Lango people living in the northern parts of the country, and Uganda’s first Prime Minister. At the time of independence, Obote was in many ways a very popular leader since he managed to guide Uganda through what was at least a seemingly peaceful, and also quite democratic, transition to independence. As argued by Rothchild, Obote himself was quite proud of his achievement. As he told a reporter on the first anniversary of independence: “I am proud of the fact that we have delivered Uganda to the first anniversary of her independence in one whole piece. We took it over from the British in one piece and we have delivered it in one piece.” In fact, Uganda’s move to independence in 1962 can be argued to have marked, at least so far, the only peaceful change of government in Uganda’s history as an independent nation. Yet, it is commonly argued that the precedents of what was to become such a common feature in the body politic of Uganda in terms of intra-state conflict and violence was clearly, and as it turned out irreversibly, laid and

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646 Obote 1962.
648 As cited in Rothchild 1966: 279.
established exactly during these first years of Obote’s rule. In an attempt to take the wind out of potential ethnic rivalries, during the first four years of independence, the Ugandan state provided a combined policy consisting of, on the one hand, multicultural policies directed towards a number of territorially-defined tribal groupings and, on the other, a neutrality-like form of assimilative policies towards pre-existing linguistic cleavages within the framework of which English was the sole official and national language.

Despite attempts made by Obote already in 1966 to restrain the development towards the increasing politicization of tribal-territorial cleavages by adopting a new constitution which allowed for the territorial centralization of the state, since independence, as will be more thoroughly discussed in chapter six, the first constitution seems to have had a decisive impact on state-society relations ever since. Even though the federal state of Buganda, as well as the other quasi-federal states, lost both their power-sharing rights and their recognition as separate tribal-territorial units with the promulgation of the 1967 constitution, since then, by and large every Ugandan government has sought the support of especially Buganda, still today the most influential and wealthy province in the country. Since the current Ugandan president, Museveni, took over power in 1986, the Ugandan government can perhaps be argued to have more sincerely tried to break this pattern of Bugandan dominance and resulting anti-Bugandan sentiments by even further promote the centralization of state powers. Yet, as argued by among others Ofcansky, Museveni too has integrated himself with the Baganda by, for example, sanctioning the return of Mutebi II as the thirty-six Kabaka of Uganda. The complex relationship between the state and the Baganda since independence, has in many ways led non-Baganda Ugandans to resent what they have perceived as special treatment for Buganda. According to a large number of studies, it is also for exactly this reason that repeated attempts to foster national unity have failed and that Uganda has remained a divided country. However, before we go any further into this discussion, we should first take a look at how the national political community of Uganda was actually defined at the time of independence.

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650 See, for example, Mutibwa 1992.
651 Ofcansky 1996: 73.
652 Ibid.
653 See, for example, ibid.
A multicultural approach towards tribal-territorial cleavages

Uganda’s independence constitution came into force on October the 9th, 1962 and was in many ways the culmination of a long period of negotiations in an attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests of Buganda, the western kingdoms and Busoga on the one hand, and the rest of the country on the other. The result of these negotiations was that when Uganda entered independence, she did it as a delicate compromise and as a quasi-federal arrangement, within which some tribal territories and kingdoms were granted formal federal status and others semi-federal status. More specifically, chapter 1 (section 2) of the 1962 Independence Constitution reads: “Uganda consists of Federal States, Districts and the territory of Mbale. The Federal States are the Kingdom of Buganda, the Kingdom of Ankole, the Kingdom of Bunyoro, the Kingdom of Toro and the territory of Busoga. The Districts are the Districts of Acholi, Bugisu, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei, Teso and West Nile.” That is, in the 1962 Ugandan constitution, the four kingdom regions in Uganda, as well as the territory of Busoga, kept, or even gained, power in terms of the recognition of some form of power-sharing rights. Each kingdom had a local government made up of chiefs, who reported to the king, and a central government official who was an adviser to the king. In addition, non-monarchical districts that had before independence not been very well-organized, did, soon after independence, and in an attempt to achieve some parity with the kingdoms in terms of federal status, appoint district constitutional heads. As such, at least in a formal sense, the non-monarchical districts too moved one step closer to achieving federal powers.

However, despite appearances, central authorities in Uganda were after independence in effect left with quite wide discretion to determine the nature of the federal relationship. The central government had, for example, despite the seemingly federal arrangement full control over certain key areas, such as foreign affairs, the army and the police. As argued by Rothchild, the wide discretion left with the central government became

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654 Morris 1966: 112.
655 Government of Uganda 1963. Yet, before independence, there had been recommendations that only Buganda was to be granted full federal status, while Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro was only to be granted semi-federal status. However, at the 1962 Constitutional Conference, the political elite pressed for full federal status for all the Kingdoms, to which was added the territory of Busoga (Dinwiddy 1981: 513).
apparent to all especially with the publication of the Western Kingdoms and Busoga Act soon after independence. This act was modelled closely upon the Local Administrations Ordinance of 1962, which was in the tradition of unitary administration. In effect, this act meant that central administration was given the powers to, for example, supervise services, regulate finances, and compel the performance of functions in a proper manner. Consequently, despite their formal status as full federal units, the Western Kingdoms and the territory of Busoga were left only a little more powerful than local authorities without official federal status. However, the 1962 constitution still gave them strong protection of their traditional customs, their king, and the trappings of local government rather than local administration. The remaining districts, with the exception of Karamoja, retained sufficient autonomy to elect their own councils and pass laws on specified topics, but were otherwise governed directly by the national authorities. As a result, at least in a legal sense, they lost the significant elements of their traditional political systems. However, since the rulers in federal states as well as in the districts still occupied positions to which traditional and customary dignity attached, they were still able to keep much of their symbolic power. As such, while many of the traditional rulers in the different federal states and districts had only limited constitutional discretion, they were still able to keep vital roles in the governments, as well as in the eyes of the population within their own districts.

While many chiefs were mainly able to retain symbolic power – a result of the uneven balance in terms of federal powers between different regions – within the framework of the 1962 independence constitution, Buganda actually became quite superior to the other kingdoms and districts in terms of truly federal powers. That is, in view of the guarantees for traditional rights and institutions made, the services transferred, and the sources of taxation allocated to Buganda, there seems little reason to doubt that Buganda was the kingdom that gained the most significant power and stature through the years of constitutional negotiations just before independence. The most evident example of this was perhaps the election

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658 Rothchild 1966: 279.
660 Kasfir 1972: 75.
661 Morris & Read 1966: 125.
662 ibid: 141.
663 ibid.
of Sir Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka (i.e. the king) of Buganda, as the ceremonial president of the whole country in 1962.\footnote{Englebert 2002: 348.} Thus, in Buganda, the position of the Kabaka, a focal point for the unity and loyalty of his people, was ensured by the constitution.\footnote{Morris & Read 1966: 125.} The legislature was the Kabaka acting with the advice and consent of the Lukiiko which, although the years after independence composed mainly of elected members, was in many ways the successor of the council which in ancient Buganda advised the Kabaka.\footnote{ibid.} It should, however, be emphasized that the 1962 constitution did in fact provide for a President and a Vice President to be elected by the National Assembly from the Rulers of all the Federal States and the constitutional heads of the Districts for a five years term.\footnote{Government of Uganda 1963: chapter 4, section 36(1).} However, in effect, considering the unequal distribution of power between the different kingdoms and districts, and perhaps even more important; Obote’s reliance on Bugandan support for staying in power,\footnote{Rothchild 1966: 278.} other federal units and districts than Buganda stood more or less without any real chance.\footnote{Englebert 2002: 348.} Among the five units granted federal status in the constitution, Buganda was in addition the only one allowed to raise its own tax revenues. According to Schedule 9 (section 1) of the independence constitution, i.e. the agreement between the Uganda and Buganda government delegations on the financial relationships between the government of Uganda and the Kabaka’s government, the Kabaka government had the right to independent sources of revenue, including graduated tax. In addition, Buganda was alone among the kingdoms in terms of receiving the powers to pass laws on specified subjects, enjoy entrenched protection for land tenure and local courts, and even control through its local legislature the election of the kingdom’s representatives to the national parliament. The Buganda federal state had in addition the unrestricted power to make laws relating to Buganda public holidays and festivals, as well as to traditional matters and customary matters relating to Buganda alone.\footnote{Government of Uganda 1963: schedule 7, part 1, sections 8 and 9.}

In sum, while the central government during the first four years of independence did not completely surrender its crucial position with respect to the security, stability and well-being of Uganda in terms of territorial...
control, it still went quite far in the 1962 Constitution in terms of decentralizing functions and powers at least in the case of Buganda.\footnote{Rothchild 1964: 14.} Yet, as argued by, for example, Rothchild, neither the relation between the central state and Buganda was completely federal in kind. During the period when the 1962 Constitution was in use, all major disputes over economic matters, such as the computation of grants to the Kabaka’s government, the transfer of police posts to Buganda authorities, and supremacy in the juridical sphere were, in the end, but for one issue, determined in favor of the central government.\footnote{ibid: 15.} As the years went by, Obote’s pragmatism that led to the initial agreement to a federal relationship was significantly reduced and the internal distribution of power was over time radically altered. As argued by Rothchild, the same Obote that had described the 1961 report proposing a federal relationship as an admirable piece of work was already by 1965 dwelling on the difficulties and drawbacks involved in the federal system.\footnote{Rothchild 1966: 280.} As will be more thoroughly discussed in the next chapter, as a direct response to significantly strengthened sub-national sentiments resulting from the power-sharing rights granted to regionally-based tribal kingdoms in the independence constitution, in the following year, Obote seized power and suspended the 1962 constitution ‘in interest of national unity and public security and tranquility’ as he put it.\footnote{Mutibwa 1992: 39.} Changes were also introduced which greatly curtailed the powers of the Kabaka of Uganda and the Lukiiko, as well as of monarchs in general.\footnote{ibid: 58.} In 1967, parliament subsequently adopted a new constitution, which abrogated Buganda’s entrenched privileges and treated the country as a unitary state. However, as will be further developed in the next chapter, the curtailing of power-sharing rights, as well as of other types of group-based rights, in the 1967 constitution has not changed much when it comes to the prospects for national integration. In fact, the failure to achieve a proper, integrated relationship between especially Buganda and the rest of the country has hunted Ugandan political leaders ever since the drafting of the independence constitution. As such, antagonism between the central state and Buganda, which also happened to be the country’s most populous, richest and most productive, region has persisted throughout Uganda’s independent period. Yet, before we turn to this discussion, we should take

672 Rothchild 1964: 14.
673 ibid: 15.
674 Rothchild 1966: 280.
676 ibid: 58.
a closer look at what kind of policies the Ugandan state adopted to deal with pre-existing linguistic cleavages at the time of independence.

Mainly neutrality within the linguistic sphere

In Uganda, as in many other former colonies in Africa and elsewhere, the issue of choosing official and national language has been a continuous and sensitive matter since independence. Although Luganda was (and still is) the most geographically spread language in Uganda, as well as the language spoken and understood by the greatest percentage of the population, there was already at the time of independence a widespread reluctance towards having it as an official and a national language among people outside Buganda, as well as among Buganda tribes. Especially since the mid-seventies, when Idi Amin took over power, deciding what languages that should be the official and national language in Uganda has been a policy era full of conflict, and the potential upgrading of any of the vernacular languages to a national or an official status has increasingly come to be associated with the political hegemony of the tribes so favored. The sensitivity of the matter, in combination with the inability of leaders to cope with it in an effective way, has up to today left Uganda with a quite inconclusive and shattered policy on language, even though neutrality has been the dominating approach. More specifically, the official policy towards linguistic cleavages as specified in the independence constitution has been characterized by neutrality within the framework of which English, apart from a few short interruptions, has served as the sole official and national language of the country. In 1967, Obote claimed that his government did not find any alternative to English in Uganda’s present position, and with the exception of attempts made during the rule of Idi Amin to introduce the East African lingua franca Kiswahili as a second national language and a

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677 As previously argued, the British rulers depended heavily on Baganda agents to administer also other parts of Uganda. This led to the imposition of Luganda on, among other regions, the Eastern Province and Ankole. Parts of those areas still speak Luganda as a second language and use Luganda bibles and prayer books although the language is no longer taught there as a subject as it was throughout the colonial period (Mukama 1991: 338).

678 Ibid: 337. In a study conducted between 1968 and 1970 it was calculated that 39 percent of Ugandans could hold a conversation in Luganda. Of these, 16 percent were native speakers, and 23 spoke Luganda as a second language (Ladefoged et al. 1972: 24-5). In addition, see Pawliková-Vilhanová 1996: 163.


681 Pawliková-Vilhanová 1996.
medium of instruction in schools by decree, since independence, leaders have until recently taken no concrete steps to develop or popularize any African or vernacular language on the national level.\textsuperscript{682} As such, English has throughout most of Uganda’s post-independence history served as the sole official medium of communication.\textsuperscript{683} In its position of being the official and national language, despite the fact that a large number of Ugandans neither understand nor speak English, up to today, English has been used as the official language of administration and the court system, and knowledge of English is still, more than forty years after independence, a prerequisite for employment in the public sector.\textsuperscript{684} The lyrics of the national anthem of Uganda are only in English.\textsuperscript{685} Until recently, English has in addition been the official language of instruction in schools even though already by 1968 literacy campaigns had been conducted in over twenty different languages. However, lacking literature in the vernacular languages, the campaigns were rather ineffective.\textsuperscript{686} The use of English as a medium of acquiring literacy was thought to be a good means to establish the validity of the language in the eyes not only of the students, but of the society as a whole.\textsuperscript{687} As a result, schools in Uganda even today continue to use English as a medium of instruction even in as low grades as nursery school.\textsuperscript{688} Yet, the practice has led to the marginalization, and at times even the complete denial, of vernacular languages in education, as well as in everyday life.\textsuperscript{689} As such, as argued by among others Kasozi, having English

\textsuperscript{682} Kasozi 1994; Ofcansky 1996. In 1973, Idi Amin initiated a countrywide national language debate involving the choice between Swahili and Luganda. After weeks of deliberations, on 7 August 1973, Swahili was declared the second national language by decree. However, the decree was never implemented in practice (Pawlíková-Vilhanová 1996: 168) and in the 1995 Constitution it lost its official and national status (Mukama 1991). The most recent development regarding Swahili was in July 2005 when the Parliament of Uganda passed an amendment in the 1995 Constitution making Swahili the second official language of Uganda, after English. Already in October 1970, however, on being installed as Chancellor of Makerere University, Obote promised that the Government would endeavor to introduce the teaching of Swahili into the schools and urged the University to establish a proper school for African languages (Pawlíková-Vilhanová 1996). The draft constitution of 2005 (part 2, section 7:2) even states that, in addition to English, “[a]ny language, other than the official language, may be used as a medium of instruction in educational institutions or for legislative, administrative or judicial purposes, as prescribed by an Act of Parliament” (Parliament of Uganda 2005).

\textsuperscript{683} Ornstein 1964.

\textsuperscript{684} Kasozi 1994; Mpuga 2003.

\textsuperscript{685} The national anthem of Uganda is called “Oh Uganda, Land of Beauty!”.


\textsuperscript{687} Mpuga 2003.

\textsuperscript{688} Kyeyune 2003.

\textsuperscript{689} Mpuga 2003. However, the opinions differ somewhat on this matter. According to Ladefoged for example, in the beginning of the independence era, as many as six Ugandan languages were frequently
as the sole official and national language within the spheres of education and public administration has in Uganda ultimately served as a stratifying rather than a unifying agent “separating society into two [more] groups: the privileged, who speak it, and the deprived, who don’t,” in the end undermining the potential role played by English as a basis for nationhood.

However, in the media, as well as in other means of public information, English is still not as dominant as one would perhaps expect. Yet, being aware of the critique often directed against policies of neutrality within the linguistic sphere, this is perhaps not very surprising. According to Esman, the use of a neutral foreign language is often a less satisfactory method since often only a very small percentage of the population is able to communicate in the language. As a result, leaders are often forced to go outside the framework of unilingualism and provide at least some public services in vernacular languages. According to this logic, the Ugandan state has, along with constitutional neutrality towards language cleavages, over the years come to officially accept, if yet not promote, a large number of different vernacular languages in the media, as well as in other means of public information. Especially the national radio, Radio Uganda, is a telling example in this regard. When Uganda achieved independence in 1962, Radio Uganda was broadcasting in English, Luganda, Runyoro/Rutoro and Lwo. In March 1967, when President Obote delivered his opening speech before a seminar on mass media and linguistic communication in East Africa, he announced that another ten languages had been added on the radio. By September 1969, yet other languages had been introduced on the programme by Radio Uganda to make a total of eighteen languages.

A neutrality approach towards religion

As argued in chapter four, quite different from in Botswana and Zambia, religious cleavages were already politically mobilized at the time of independence in Uganda. Especially Catholics and Protestants have historically been bitterly opposed to one another and in the run-up to independence the Uganda People’s Congress, led by Milton Obote, became known as the non-Buganda Protestant Party, and the opposing Democratic

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used in teaching, giving the impression that there were tendencies towards a multicultural approach as early as then (Ladefoged 1992: 811).


Mpaga 2003.

Chapter 5

Party as the Buganda Catholic Party. Yet, despite these differences in terms of the degree of political mobilization of religious cleavages before independence, the policies that were adopted towards religion in Uganda after independence were indeed very similar to the policies adopted in Botswana and Zambia. That is, if the church in Uganda has had a special relationship to the state, it has never been defined by law after independence. Already the first prime minister of Uganda, Milton Obote, during his two periods of rule (1962-71, 1980-85) endeavoured to create a secular state in which religion did not obtrude into the political sphere. Since independence, successive constitutions of Uganda have – just as corresponding documents in Botswana and Zambia (until recently) – stated explicitly that Uganda shall not adopt a state religion.

In line with the constitutional provisions of state neutrality towards religion in Uganda since independence, the Ugandan school system was secularized in the 1960s.

Summing-up: Neutrality and one-dimensional multiculturalism in Uganda

In general, as summarized in Table 5.3, the Ugandan approach towards ethnic diversity adopted at the time of independence can best be described in terms of neutrality and one-dimensional multiculturalism.

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693 Pirouet 1980: 13. In addition, see Mujaju 1976.
695 ibid: 117.
Critical juncture: Degree of official multiculturalism at independence

Table 5.3. Official approach towards ethnic diversity in Uganda at independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRIBE AND TERRITORY</th>
<th>Official Approach Towards: LANGUAGE</th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall approach: Neutrality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1967:</td>
<td>Official language: English</td>
<td>State religion: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiculturalism,</td>
<td>National language: English</td>
<td>The constitution recognizes freedom of religion (some exceptions made during the rule of Amin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after 1967:</td>
<td>Educational policy: English only before 1996</td>
<td>Educational policy: Curriculum secularized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Language use in media: Primarily English, but national languages are heard especially on the radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Language use in administration: English only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-federal state structure 1962-1967, unitary state structure since 1967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More specifically, at the time of independence, Uganda adopted a constitution that allowed for a pseudo-federal arrangement within the framework of which the kingdom of the southern region of the country – Buganda – was given full federal status and a couple of other kingdoms were in effect given pseudo-federal status. That is, compared to the recognition and promotion of ethnic diversity along several ethnic dimensions in Zambia, the Ugandan state was, at the time of independence, more restrictive in terms of that it mainly recognized regional diversity.

In terms of linguistic cleavages, the official approach since independence has been characterized mainly by neutrality, the emphasis being on English as the sole official and national language. This policy bears a striking resemblance to what Rothchild and Olorunsola have called the ‘avoidance strategy’. That is, the Ugandan state has to a certain extent

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696 Rothchild & Olorunsola 1983.
attempted to keep out of ethno-linguistic politics by adopting a non-vernacular language as the sole official and national language. Laitin would, as such, argue that the Ugandan state has promoted a 2-language outcome within the framework of which no indigenous language is promoted by the state to serve as a lingua franca, and within which citizens will still maintain their own vernaculars but communicate with citizens who speak other languages through a common international language.\footnote{Laitin 1992: 18.} However, the approach has not worked fully as expected and the Ugandan state has as such been forced to at least to some extent accept the use of vernaculars also in public contexts. However, compared to Zambia, the Ugandan state has not officially promoted the use of vernaculars. Rather, it can be argued to have resigned, confronted by the fact that only 21 percent of the population are able to hold a conversation in English. The most telling example of such resignation would probably be language use in media. Since independence, the Ugandan state has broadcasted programmes on the national radio in about 25 different languages. However, this acceptance of multiple language use in broadcasting media is not accompanied by any more outspoken multicultural policies within any other areas.

**Redefinitions of the national political community**

According to historical institutional theory, the existence of path-dependent processes of tax state development does not necessarily imply that the sources of such development, i.e. the formal institutions in play, remain unchanged over time. Rather, as previously discussed, at particular moments in time, the national political community can very well be redefined. Yet, according to historical institutionalism, the changes made to initial arrangements most often tend to be responses to old definitions, in which previously recognized groups are now assimilated or vice versa. That is, according to the logic of historical institutionalism, within the political arena, discussions of contemporary problems and prospects for future change tend to be shaped by a repertoire of existing frameworks developed during formative years of state development. Accordingly, as argued by Lieberman, “[p]olitical organization, normative obligations, and commonly accepted ideas about justice and equity as such evolve with a political
Critical juncture: Degree of official multiculturalism at independence

vocabulary developed within a country’s own national history." To be able to identify early definitions of the national political community as critical junctures it is, as such, important that such definitions have had a long-term impact on subsequent developments. That is, for the historical institutional argument to hold, even if the exact idioms used for politics partly change, the institutions that remain in form the ideas and myths that sprung from the initial conditions should be reinvented and adapted to new circumstances over time, further reinforcing the path-dependent processes of state development that were initiated during the identified formative moment. That is, in terms of this study, independently of later changes in the formal criteria for citizenship that were adopted at the time of independence, it should be possible to identify a clear relationship between the initial definitions of the national political community and subsequent patterns of ethnic mobilization and, ultimately, tax state development.

In fact, as the three sub-sections below reveal, the official definitions of the national political community that were constructed at the time of independence have been at least partly altered since then in all three countries in focus for this study.

Redefinitions of the Botswanan national political community

Over time, the Botswanan government has to some extent become somewhat more moderate in its attempts to assimilate minorities into the Tswana political majority. For example, in December 2006, the San won a historic court case granting them rights to ancestral lands they were driven off in 2002, giving more than 1,000 Kalahari San the right to return to their ancestral hunting grounds.

Other concessions include the 1995 Parliament approval of the review of sections 77 to 79 of the constitution which stipulate that only chiefs of the eight Tswana tribes can be ex-officio members of the House of Chiefs. Furthermore, in August 1997, the Parliament passed a motion to allow all languages to be taught in schools, used on the radio, and in other areas as necessary. In addition, in the national vision of the country, as expressed in a Government document known as Vision 2016, there is a passage that acknowledges the challenge

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699 The Independent 14 December 2006.
701 ibid.
to recognize and develop equally all languages in Botswana.\footnote{Republic of Botswana 1997, section 21.} Moreover, the National Policy on Culture from 2002, which is explicitly argued to be part of the overall strategy to reach the goals of Vision 2016, to some extent focuses on how the different ethnic groups of Botswana “together represent a rich and diverse cultural heritage”, that gives Botswana its “distinct character from which it derives its unique personality”.\footnote{Republic of Botswana 2002, 3.1.} According to the same policy, this ‘valuable’ heritage of cultural heterogeneity must be “preserved, nurtured and developed to foster a strong sense of national identity, pride and unity and to become a vitalizing force in the development process”.\footnote{Ibid.}

Yet, despite the increased willingness of the Botswanan government to give concessions to political minorities, up to today the overall assimilative approach by and large persists, and have in many regards even become strengthened over time. In fact, the laws and policies bearing the message that “ethnic equality is fine as long as Tswana remain ‘more equal’ than others, and Tswana language and culture are the ones to which others assimilate,”\footnote{Solway 2002: 716.} still today by far outnumber the concessions made. For example, in 1995, the 1968 Tribal Land Act was further amended to allow every citizen of Botswana access to communal land no matter tribal background. This amendment, together with the influx of Botswana citizens who are not of the tribal group where they are seeking the use of tribal land, has led some researchers to draw the conclusion that the tribal chief and the tribe in general will be even further weakened in the near future.\footnote{See, for example, Adamolekun & Morgan 1999: 589.}

In addition, two government papers – the Government White Paper No. 1 of 1977: National Policy on Education (NPE) and the Government White Paper No. 2 of 1994: The Revised National Policy on Education (RNPE) – have served to further strengthen the position of English and Setswana as the sole official and national languages. Both these government papers were the result of investigations conducted on the demand of the government, by the First National Commission on Education (NPE1) and the Second National Commission on Education (NPE2). On the basis that first language education facilitates not only early concept formation but even the acquisition of other languages, the NPE1 recommended the use of Setswana as the language of instruction for the
first four years of primary education, and also saw the use of a compensatory programme to be developed for children who speak other languages in order to make these children more equal in terms of competition.\textsuperscript{707} Quite in the opposite, the NPE2 recommended a reduction in the number of years for Setswana as a medium of instruction from four years to one, as they felt that ‘[t]he present language policy denies the child mastering of the main language [i.e. English] needed for better achievement in primary school and in further education and in working life’. The NPE2 in addition recommended first languages – minority languages included – to be used only in pre-primary education. However, this recommendation, as well as most of the other recommendations favoring a multi-linguistic approach to education, was by and large rejected by the Botswana Government. In 1989, the second President of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, even went so far as to ask Batswana not to spoil the prevailing peace and unity in the country by fighting for ethnic language groupings to take precedence over Setswana. In addition, he argued that tribes insisting that their languages become media of instruction within their respective areas would, in the longer run, directly serve to break up the nation.\textsuperscript{708} Because of the favoring of a mono-linguistic and mono-cultural approach by the ruling party, the RNPE (approved by Parliament in April 1994) contains only those recommendations of the NPE2 which deal with teaching of Setswana and English. However, as argued by Nyati-Ramahobo, it is worth noting that, while the new policy has advocated the use of English as the only medium of instruction at the expense of Setswana, the rest of the recommendations still advocate the use of Setswana in education.\textsuperscript{709} Besides, as a result of that none of the recommendations of the NPE2, as specified in the RNPE, have actually yet been implemented, the recommendations from the NPE1, as specified in the NPE, are the ones which are still at work. Therefore, Setswana up to today remains the medium of instruction in standards 1 to 4 while English is taught as a subject in those grades. In standard 5, English then becomes the medium of instruction and extends through the tertiary level, while Setswana is taught as a subject.\textsuperscript{710} This policy applies to all government schools in the country.\textsuperscript{711}

\textsuperscript{707} Nyati-Ramahobo 2000: 266.
\textsuperscript{708} Botswana Daily News 30 June 1989.
\textsuperscript{709} Nyati-Ramahobo 2000: 267.
\textsuperscript{710} Republic of Botswana 1977, section 4.
\textsuperscript{711} Nyati-Ramahobo 2000: 268.
Besides being the dominant languages in education, English and Setswana dominate the spheres of government business, information, and media. In the 1982 Citizenship Act, under the heading of ‘Qualifications for naturalization’ it can be read that “the qualifications for naturalization of any person shall be that [...] (e) he has sufficient knowledge of the Setswana Language and such other language as may be prescribed.”712 Up to today, all government correspondence and records are in English, and all meetings in the civil service are conducted and recorded in English.713 In addition, the media language is limited almost exclusively to English. In fact, all eight private newspapers in Botswana are written in English (even if one of them has also a few pages in Setswana and a column in Ikalanga).714 The only government-owned newspaper – Daily News - consists of eight pages, of which six and a half are written in English and the rest in Setswana.715 In addition, radio programmes are mainly in English and Setswana. Of all the programmes, 36 are in Setswana, 19 in English, and 30 in both Setswana and English.716 Moreover, the spread of Christianity – Botswana’s officially promoted, if yet not explicitly official, religion – has further consolidated the official status of Setswana and English. While during the colonial period, many chiefs were taught by missionaries in English, a study conducted in 1991 concluded that most churches in Botswana today use both English and Setswana, even if the former language still plays a major role in the proceedings of the church.717 For instance, in the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa (UCCSA), the main message of the sermon is delivered in English with translations into Setswana. Furthermore, Batswana ministers in urban areas use English to deliver their messages. In making announcements, the secretary may use his/her discretion as to which announcements are to be in both Setswana and English and which ones are to be monolingual in Setswana. The church choir sings hymns both in Setswana and English, while the congregation sings hymns in Setswana. In turn, the Scripture may be read in Setswana or English, but not necessary the same text in both languages. Through the channel of the officially promoted religion, past years have also seen an increasing divide in terms of language use between

713 Nyati-Ramahobo 2000.
714 ibid.
715 ibid.
716 ibid.
the urban and rural churches, where there, largely as a result of an increase in the number of younger church leaders and of a greater participation of younger parishioners in church activities, has been an increase in the use of English in urban churches, while Setswana is still being the dominant language in rural churches.\textsuperscript{718}

In sum, since independence, the Botswanan official approach towards ethnic diversity that was adopted at the time of independence, characterized mainly by policies of neutrality and pure assimilation, has by and large remained intact but for a small tilt towards increased official multiculturalism in terms of a smaller number of concessions to political minorities. That is, in many regards, the Tswana has managed to strengthen their official and social position even further since independence.

Redefinitions of the Zambian national political community

Similar to the case of Botswana, the Zambian approach towards ethnic diversity adopted at the time of independence has in many regards been further consolidated since then. For example, besides the territorial demarcation of linguistic cleavages, today as many as seven local languages are designated by the government as national languages of Zambia in addition to English, namely; Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi, Lunda, Luvale, and Kaonde.\textsuperscript{719} In 1991, it was decided that these seven major Zambian languages should be the basic languages of education from grades one to four.\textsuperscript{720} A new policy document called ‘The Focus of Learning’ was formally adopted by the Cabinet in 1992, replacing the earlier policy.\textsuperscript{721}

Consequently, especially after 1995 when the new policy was implemented, the language situation in Zambia has changed dramatically as the use of vernaculars as languages of instruction in primary schools has been adopted more widely.\textsuperscript{722} In addition, since the re-launching of a multi-party system in 1991, the seven national languages have been increasingly promoted for broadcasting, literacy campaigns, and the dissemination of government propaganda. The national languages are moreover used to disseminate specific government policies such as, for example, Cholera alerts.\textsuperscript{723} Furthermore, the national languages are increasingly used in the lower ranks

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{718} Nyati-Ramahobo 2000: 257.
\textsuperscript{719} Zambia Central Statistical Office 2000.
\textsuperscript{720} Linehan 2004.
\textsuperscript{721} ibid.
\textsuperscript{722} Marten & Kula 2006; Carmody 2004.
\textsuperscript{723} Marten & Kula 2006.
\end{flushleft}
of formal administration and in local court proceedings (even though the legislating judicial law is still in English).\textsuperscript{724}

In addition to the further recognition of linguistic cleavages, over the last decades provinces have gained even more autonomy than was the case at the time of independence. There has even been an intensified discussion among the elites concerning whether Zambia should remain a unitary state or not. In 1993, President Chiluba appointed a Constitution Review Commission, chaired by Mr. John Mwanakatwe, State Counsel and a former minister in the First and Second Republics. The Mwanakatwe Constitution Review Commission found that a majority of petitioners actually favored the creation of a federal state.\textsuperscript{725} Yet, on the basis of that a change from a unitary to a federal state risked leading to a number of political and economic difficulties, possibly even leading to the destruction of the state, the Mwanakatwe Commission rejected federalism and instead recommended retention of the unitary state. The Government accepted this recommendation, and consequently Zambia remains a unitary state.

However, while the Zambian state has in many ways further consolidated its multi-dimensional multicultural approach since independence, there have been some moves towards more assimilation too. For example, to avoid the further politicization of tribal cleavages, there has recently been a change in the rules that regulate the participation of chiefs in the partisan political arena. The Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act no. 18 of 1996 provides that “a Chief shall not be qualified for election as a member of the National Assembly”. In addition, article 65.4 of the same Act provides that “a Chief who intends to stand for election to the National Assembly shall abdicate his Chieftaincy before lodging his nomination.” Moreover, the official stand towards religion as a non-political matter ended when, upon assuming the presidency in 1991, Frederick Chiluba officially declared Christianity to be the official state religion of Zambia. This declaration has attracted much debate on the relationship between the state and religion ever since, and then especially the question of how President Chiluba’s proclamation should be dealt with in the constitution. Before the drafting of the 1996 constitution, the Mwanakatwe Constitutional Review Commission discussed the matter thoroughly before giving their advice on the issue. The commission observed that partly as a result of the presidential statement declaring

\textsuperscript{724} ibid.

\textsuperscript{725} The Times of Zambia June 26, 1995.
Zambia a Christian nation, petitioners were ‘at pains in championing the need to reaffirm in the constitution Zambia’s position as a Christian nation or to, respectively, demarcate clearly the separate spheres of influence between religion and the state’. However, according to the Commission, the majority of petitioners were in fact against the inclusion of the proclamation in the constitution on the basis that such a move could be seen as both discriminatory and inconsistent with the constitution itself. In addition, some petitioners viewed the possible inclusion of the Christian Nation Proclamation as a potential source of conflict among the Zambian people. As a result, in the conclusive report, the Mwanakatwe Constitutional Review Commission made the recommendation that religion and state should continue to be separated in Zambia. Furthermore, the Mwanakatwe Commission argued that Christianity or any other religion could be safely secured without any form of declaration. The government, however, viewed the matter differently. As a result, the Commission’s proposal was ultimately rejected by the government, bearing with it the institutionalization of the proclamation of Zambia as a Christian nation in the Constitutional Amendment Act of 1996. More specifically, the Act reads that: “We the people of Zambia […] declare the Republic a Christian Nation while upholding the right of every person to enjoy that person’s freedom of conscience and religion.”

Since Zambia was declared a Christian nation, the issue of the role of Christianity in the education curriculum in general, and in religious education in particular, has enjoyed increased attention. Today many argue that in a country where the majority is Christian, it remains reasonable to give Christianity the preponderant emphasis in the religious education syllabuses. However, despite this discussion, up to today, the religious education syllabuses from primary to university levels in Zambia are predominantly educational as against confessional in focus. In this sense, they are acceptable for the religious education of students regardless of creed, even if they give greater weight to the study of Christianity.

In sum, since independence Zambia has, on the one hand, further consolidated the multi-dimensional multicultural approach that was adopted at the time of independence and, on the other hand, moved from

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726 ibid.
727 ibid.
728 Republic of Zambia 1996.
729 Carmody 2003.
730 ibid.
neutrality towards pure assimilation within the religious sphere. In addition, there have been a few attempts to take the wind out of tribal cleavages, and especially in partisan politics.

Redefinitions of the Ugandan national political community

The post-independence constitutional history of Uganda has been quite volatile compared to the situations in Botswana and Uganda. In 1966, in a desperate attempt to secure ‘national unity and public security and tranquility’, Obote seized power by storming Buganda’s capital Mengo.\(^{731}\) Subsequently, he also suspended the 1962 Constitution.\(^{732}\) Changes were introduced which greatly curtailed the powers of the Kabaka of Uganda and the Lukiiko, as well as of monarchs in general.\(^{733}\) In 1967, parliament subsequently adopted a new constitution, which abrogated Buganda’s entrenched privileges and treated the country as a unitary state.

In its overall emphasis on strengthening central control, the 1967 constitution gave the parliament the right to establish district councils and their offices, to decide whether some or all of their members would be elected or nominated, and to empower a national minister to suspend a district council or to undertake any of its duties. The 1967 Local Administrations Act and Urban Authorities Act created a uniform set of regulations that gave the central government direct control over local administration in each district. District Councils were limited to specified areas of responsibility – particularly primary education, road construction, land allocation, community development, law and order, and local tax collection. When district councils were revived in 1981, their members were again nominated by the central government. Chiefs and local officials continued to be appointed on the basis of the 1967 act until 1986. Among the more notable changes were the abolition of kingship altogether, and the establishment of a republic with Milton Obote himself as president in place of the king of Buganda.\(^{734}\) Thus Obote erased the kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro from the map of Uganda, as well as removed the kings and constitutional heads of the districts, thereby removing any centers of loyalty and authority other than his own emanating from the

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\(^{731}\) Englebert 2002: 348.
\(^{733}\) ibid: 58.
\(^{734}\) Englebert 2002: 348.
central government in Entebbe. With the exception of the Kabaka of Buganda who was sent into exile, the traditional rulers were merely pensioned off.

Having molded Uganda into a unitary nation-state that did not officially recognize territorially-based loyalties much at the expense of particularly Bugandan power and recognition, Obote went on to weaken it still further by dividing the former kingdom into four districts; West Mengo, East Mengo, Masaka and Kampala. The term Buganda was thus removed from the political language of Uganda. As described by Mutibwa, to make matters even worse, Obote in addition turned the former parliament building (Bulange) into the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense, the Kabaka’s place at Mengo (Twekobe) was turned into army barracks, and his palace was occupied by Obote’s soldiers. In addition to the new constitution aiming to take the wind out of sub-national sentiments, the old UPC party structure was overhauled in an effort to eliminate its earlier tendencies toward factionalism on an ethnic basis. Moreover, new electoral rules were adopted in order to decrease the role of ethnicity as a basis for political competition. In 1970, debates were held in Uganda over electoral proposals for parliament and presidency. President Obote proposed in what was called document no. 5 that every candidate for parliament should stand in one basic and three national constituencies. The basic constituency should be in the candidate’s home region and the three national constituencies would be in other regions of the country. The percentages won in each constituency would count as electoral votes, and the winning candidates would be those with the highest total for the four constituencies. The stated idea behind the proposals was that a candidate would have to appeal beyond his local constituency and reach out to different ethnic communities.

In sum, the official position of the government after 1966 has been that nation-building in Uganda is based on unity and not on ethnic origin. According to this logic, the question of ‘tribe’ dropped from the 1969 census forms. Furthermore, in 1974 Amin increased the districts to thirty-eight and grouped them into ten new provinces. In 1979 each district

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737 Government of Uganda 1967: 115: 2. The other formal federal states were constructed as references to the corresponding Districts.
739 Bienen 1983: 111.
was in addition named after its capital in an effort to reduce the significance of old ethnic loyalties in politics. A uniform set of regulations that gave the central government direct control over local administration in each of the districts was introduced in the 1970s. In fact, until recently, all constitutional arrangements have upheld the arrangements made in the 1967 constitution. As such they essentially reject communal groups as a legitimate basis for state institutions (such as federal sub-units) or political parties.\textsuperscript{741} With the explicit aim to reduce the salience of ethnicity in political life, President Museveni has furthermore called for the elimination of ethnicity and sectarianism from the political arena.\textsuperscript{742} As such, the current arrangement essentially rejects communal groups as a legitimate basis for state institutions (such as federal sub-units) or political parties.\textsuperscript{743} In other words, traditional leaders in Uganda are today legally banned from politics.\textsuperscript{744} The leading party, Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM), has moreover replaced the District Councillors with new officials; the District Administrators, appointed by the president as the political head of the district. In addition to providing political direction to the district, the District Administrators are responsible for overseeing the implementation of central government policy, chairing the security and development committees.\textsuperscript{745} Museveni has in addition made more explicit attempts to take religion out of politics and politics out of religion. Within the framework of the Ugandan non-party democracy, and in order to decimate the influence of religion in political life altogether, the 1995 Constitution added the proviso that ‘a political party shall have a national character’ and shall not be based on ‘sex, ethnicity or religion’.\textsuperscript{746} That is, religious parties are today, similarly to other ethnic-based parties, banned from entering the Ugandan political scene.

As argued by Carbone, the contextual philosophy – laid out in the ruling National Resistance Movement’s Ten Point Programme manifesto – is aimed at breaking with Uganda’s past experience through the condemnation of “sectarian, religious and tribal cleavages” as

\textsuperscript{741} Carbone 2001: 229.
\textsuperscript{742} Kasfir 1998.
\textsuperscript{743} Carbone 2001.
\textsuperscript{744} ibid: 231.
\textsuperscript{745} Ward 2005.
\textsuperscript{746} Amin, the only Muslim ever to become president of independent Uganda, over time came to greatly fear the Churches as centres of opposition for his rule. As a result, under his rule, the small evangelical and Pentecostal churches were prohibited (Ward 2005).
“manufactured divisions”.

As concluded by Uganda’s current president Museveni “One’s religion, colour, sex or height is not a consideration when new members are welcomed in the National Resistance Movement.” Yet, some policies that have been adopted in the post-independence period can still be argued to be somewhat contradictory to this overall aim. For example, compared to the years following directly after independence, today even a larger number of languages are broadcasted on the radio, making the total number twenty-five. In addition, on national television, apart from English, both Luganda and Swahili are used. Over the last couple of years, the government has moreover increasingly begun to satisfy the need to translate public information into a variety of local languages. For example, interpreters are often hired in courts of law in order to provide translations from English to local languages. Furthermore, since the launching of the Government White Paper on Education in 1992, there has been a renewed discussion concerning the official policy on language in education that can be argued to act in direct contravention of the holding on to English only as the official and national language. More specifically, the 1989 Report of the Education Review Commission and the Government White Paper from 1992 on the Education Policy Review Commission Report recommend that children be taught in their mother tongue (or the relevant local language) for the first four years of primary school, while learning English as a subject, and then be gradually weaned on to English as a medium of instruction. Yet to date, there is no written language education policy to guide practice. In addition, transmission in English still takes the lion’s share of programming airtime. English furthermore continues to be the dominant language in the administration and bureaucracy.

In sum, since independence, the Ugandan approach towards ethnic diversity has changed dramatically and then especially in terms of the attitude towards regional diversity. In fact, already in 1967, the President

750 Mpuga 2003.
751 ibid.
756 Mpuga 2003.
then in force, Milton Obote, cancelled the independence constitution and instead opted for a neutrality-type of citizenship along all ethnic dimensions. Within this new nation-building approach, the ethnically neutral English language is what has been officially promoted from the government's side to serve as the only political glue holding together the Ugandan national political community.

Summing-up: Redefinitions of the national political communities in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda

In conclusion, since independence, the initial definitions of the national political communities adopted at the time of independence in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda have all to some extent been altered. The by far most all-embracing changes have been carried out in Uganda. In Uganda, the national political community was close to completely redefined only five years after independence, in 1967. In the new constitution, the official recognition of regional cleavages was abrogated and a unitary state was created instead. As such, apart from the four years following immediately after independence, the Ugandan approach towards ethnicity has been characterized almost exclusively by policies of neutrality. Compared to the Ugandan case, the national political communities of Botswana and Zambia as defined at the time of independence have remained more intact. In fact, with a few exceptions, the initial approaches towards ethnicity can be argued to have been further consolidated over time in both Botswana and Zambia. As such, in Botswana the Tswana has further consolidated their position as being the ethnic community upon which citizenship is constructed, while in Zambia citizenship continues to be the property of a large variety of partly overlapping tribal, linguistic, and regional communities. However, as will be evident from the analysis in the next chapter, in neither of the countries, post-independence redefinitions of the national political community have had any more pervasive effects on the subsequent developments of the different states. That is, in line with the historical institutional argument, while the exact idioms used for politics have partly changed since independence, the institutions that remain in form of the ideas and myths that sprung from the initial conditions have, by and large, been reinvented and adapted to new circumstances over time, further reinforcing the path-dependent processes of state development that were initiated at the time of independence.
Comparing the degree of official multiculturalism

So far, this chapter has explored the formal criteria for citizenship specified Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda at the time of independence. More specifically, the chapter has explored the degree to which pre-existing tribal-territorial, linguistic, and religious ethnic cleavages were officially recognized at the time of independence. Furthermore, the chapter has explored the ways in which these initial definitions of the national political community have been redefined over time.

As summarized in Table 5.4, the empirical study of the respective official approaches reveals that the three countries in fact treated the issue of ethnic diversity in rather distinct ways at the time of independence, even though some similarities may be discerned.

Table 5.4. Sum-up: Comparative official approaches towards ethnic diversity at independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BOTSWANA</th>
<th>ZAMBIA</th>
<th>UGANDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRIBE AND TERRITORY</td>
<td>Pure assimilation with some elements of symbolic multiculturalism</td>
<td>Combination of neutrality and multiculturalism</td>
<td>Multiculturalism before 1967, after that neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall approach towards:</td>
<td>LANGUAGE</td>
<td>Combination of neutrality and pure assimilation</td>
<td>Combination of neutrality and multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RELIGION</td>
<td>Combination of neutrality and pure assimilation</td>
<td>Neutrality before 1991, after that assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUM-UP: INITIAL COMPARATIVE OFFICIAL APPROACHES TOWARDS ETHNIC DIVERSITY</td>
<td>Combination of neutrality and pure assimilation, with some elements of symbolic multiculturalism of tribal diversity</td>
<td>Combination of neutrality and multi-dimensional multiculturalism (recognition of partly overlapping regional, linguistic, and tribal diversity)</td>
<td>Combination of neutrality and one-dimensional multiculturalism (recognition of regional diversity), with some acceptance of linguistic diversity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be read from the table, on the one hand, at the time of independence, leaders of all three countries to some extent adopted neutrality policies in order to deal with ethnic diversity. However, the countries differ in terms of which approach they pursued alongside the neutrality approach. More specifically, Botswanan leaders were more anxious than their Zambian and Ugandan counterparts in their attempts to assimilate political minority groups into the political majority culture. Several policy choices have as such served to substantiate the consolidation of the Tswana identity as the national identity of Botswana since independence. In response to tribal-territorial diversity, Botswanan state leaders ultimately chose to adopt a unitary state structure within the framework of which the power of traditional authorities was severely restricted. Combined with the assimilation of linguistic differences, the territorial centralization of the Botswanan state strengthened the position of Tswana tribes at the expense of other ethnic groups. In fact, the only multicultural policy adopted in Botswana at the time of independence was the establishment of a House of Chiefs. However, as previously argued, at a closer glance, neither this policy can be considered purely multicultural. While chiefs have been able to retain at least some of their power in the House of Chiefs, the uneven distribution of power between Setswana- and non-Setswana-speaking chiefs in fact makes it more correct to fit even this seemingly multicultural policy within the larger framework of Tswana assimilation. The official recognition of only one national language, i.e. Setswana, for use in education, media and administration (i.e. besides the use of the official language English), serves to enhance this view as well as does the channeling of government resources through Tswana tribal capitals only.

Quite in contrast to the Botswanan approach towards nation-building stands Zambia’s approach. At the time of independence, Zambian leaders chose to officially recognize ethnic group rights along several ethnic dimensions. Language diversity was officially promoted in education, in the media, as well as for administrative purposes besides the official language English. In addition, the provincial units that gained political and economic importance after independence by and large overlapped with pre-existing linguistic cleavages. In addition, a House of Chiefs was established in the independence constitution. However, quite different from in Botswana, in the Zambian House of Chiefs there is not an uneven balance in terms of the recognition of chiefly symbolic power, but all tribes are represented on the basis of regional origin. More specifically, the House of Chiefs shall consist of three chiefs from each of the nine provinces of the republic. In addition to the recognition of the power of chiefs in the House of Chiefs,
Critical juncture: Degree of official multiculturalism at independence

the promotion of various national languages has as a result of the overlap of linguistic and administrative boundaries in much served to allow chiefs to retain some of their powers.

The approach that Ugandan leaders adopted at the time of independence tilted considerably more towards multiculturalism than did the Botswanan approach. However, while the Zambian state recognized ethnic diversity along three partly overlapping ethnic cleavages, Ugandan leaders ultimately constructed a solution that alongside neutrality promoted multiculturalism mainly along regional cleavages. Within this one-dimensional multicultural framework, Ugandan leaders adopted an independence constitution that allowed for a pseudo-federal arrangement which gave the kingdom of the southern region of the country – Buganda – full federal status and a couple of other kingdoms pseudo-federal status. In addition, a large number of districts were granted at least some degree of political autonomy. That is, compared to the recognition of ethnic diversity along several ethnic dimensions in Zambia, the Ugandan state was more restrictive in terms of that it mainly recognized regional diversity at the time of independence. In terms of the granting of religious group rights, the Ugandan official approach since independence has in general been of the neutrality type with the emphasis on the establishment of a secular state. In a similar vein, the Ugandan state has attempted to avoid the mobilization of linguistic cleavages within a neutrality framework which bears a striking resemblance to what Rothchild and Olorunsola has called the ‘avoidance strategy’.

Within this framework, the Ugandan state has attempted to keep out of ethno-linguistic politics by adopting a non-vernacular language, i.e. English, as the sole official and national language. That is, the Ugandan state has, by and large, promoted what Laitin would call a 2-language outcome within the framework of which no indigenous language is promoted by the state to serve as a lingua franca, and within which citizens will still maintain their own vernaculars but communicate with citizens who speak other languages through a common international language.

In sum, while some similarities can be discerned in terms of the definitions of the national political community constructed at the time of independence, there are great differences between them too. In particular, the overall approaches differ in terms of the number of ethnic cleavages officially recognized alongside policies of neutrality. Among the three countries, the Botswanan state clearly stands out as the state having

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757 Rothchild & Olorunsola 1983.
recognized ethnic diversity the least since it, alongside policies of neutrality, pursued mainly policies of pure assimilation. That is, among the three countries, Botswana clearly followed the most radical assimilative approach at the time of independence. Zambian leaders, on the other hand, pursued the most radical multicultural approach since they officially recognized diversity along as many as three, partly overlapping, ethnic cleavages; tribe, region, and language. Finally, the Ugandan approach falls somewhere in between the Zambian and Botswanaan ones in terms of the number of ethnic cleavages officially recognized alongside policies of neutrality. That is, in terms of the degree of official multiculturalism, Botswana has the lowest degree, Zambia the highest, while Uganda falls somewhere in between. As will be further discussed in the next chapter, the different solutions that were constructed at the time of independence have, amidst later changes, had a decisive impact on constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and ultimately; tax state development. More specifically, while assimilation to a comparatively greater extent seems to be related to the development of a sense of shared national identity and the lack of ethnic mobilization, states identified by multi-dimensional multiculturalism is to a comparatively greater extent affected by ethnic mobilization and lack of a similar sense of shared nationhood, even though there are still some indicators of such. However, in the end, one-dimensional multiculturalism seems to lead to both deeper divides between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and to a comparatively weaker sense of shared nationhood than both assimilation and multi-dimensional multiculturalism.
Diverging notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ after independence

The argument developed in this study links the degree of multiculturalism codified in key legal and policy documents during formative periods of state development to tax state development through the intervening effects of notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. By structuring the organization of political parties, political organizations, as well as of the political discourse more generally, institutions regulating the official manifestation of ethnic diversity help give meaning to ethnic interests and ideas which could otherwise aggregate in multiple alternative forms and configurations. Politically salient ethnic labels, in turn, provide a basis for discussions about fairness and equity that are central within the process of political competition. As such, varying official manifestations of ethnic diversity provide a starting point for individual and collective actors to evaluate the likely benefits of complying with government demands for taxation. According to existing theory, the more individuals identify politically with the smaller ethnic community rather than the larger national community, the less likely they will be to quasi-voluntarily comply with tax demands. This is because the political identification with ethnic groups implies a more exclusionary set of views regarding who to trust, an increased unwillingness to contribute to the welfare of ‘others’, preference divergence across groups, and difficulties to cooperate across groups because of the use of different languages and codes of conduct. Ethnic conflicts can in this sense be interpreted as struggles for the collective goods of the nation-state.\textsuperscript{759} As such, “the socially enacted relationship between ethnic identity, authority, and

\textsuperscript{759} Wimmer 1997.
legitimacy competes with the legally sanctioned membership, authority, and legitimacy of the nation-state.”

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the Botswanan, Zambian, and Ugandan leaders, despite the availability of a host of similar constitutional questions and options, ultimately constructed quite different solutions for dealing with ethnic diversity at the time of independence. Compared to its Zambian and Ugandan counterparts, the Botswana Independence Act of 1966, as well as related policy documents and laws, limited the official manifestation of ethnic diversity by recognizing the culture, language, and institutions of mainly one ethnic community – the Tswana, alongside policies of neutrality. In the sense that the Botswanan state agreed on multicultural policies, it was only to the extent that such policies favored the overarching idea of a shared nationhood based on the Tswana identity. Zambian leaders adopted a different strategy as they promoted the recognition of multiple ethnic cleavages (tribal, territorial and linguistic) alongside neutrality policies in the Independence Constitution of 1964, as well as in related legal and policy documents. Finally, the Ugandan Independence Constitution of 1962 promoted mainly a one-dimensional multicultural approach alongside policies of neutrality, within the framework of which regionally-based kingdoms were granted varying degrees of power-sharing rights and within which linguistic cleavages were politically avoided through the adoption of English as the sole official and national language. That is, in conclusion, alongside policies of neutrality, while Botswanan elites almost exclusively recognized one ethnic community – the Tswana, Zambian elites recognized tribal, regional, and linguistic divides, and Ugandan elites mainly regional divides. In other words, of the three countries, Zambia adopted the most all-embracing multicultural approach and Botswana the least all-embracing, Uganda falling somewhere in between.

The purpose of this chapter is to empirically explore how these different approaches towards ethnicity have influenced the nature of political competition in the post-independence period. As such, the aim of this chapter is to test the historical institutional argument holding that, depending on how the formal criteria for citizenship get defined during formative periods of state development, some identities are more likely to serve as a basis for political organization than others.

The analysis conducted in the chapter in fact provides a strong defense of historical institutional theory. As such, the chapter demonstrates how,
Diverging notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ after independence

amidst later changes in the initial definitions of the formal criteria for citizenship, the group identities that were officially recognized in key legal and policy documents at the time of independence have remained central to political life in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda up to today. Accordingly, early definitions of the national political community are largely responsible for the relative salience of certain identities over others, as the political identities that were officially recognized in the past still shape what matters today. More specifically, the chapter demonstrates how, in Botswana, the assimilation of political minority groups into the political majority identity – i.e. the Tswana identity – has helped create a greater sense of shared nationhood within the framework of which nation comes first and ethnic group second. That is, the demarcation line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is today drawn mainly between Botswanan citizens and non-Botswanan citizens, i.e. much according to the nation-state ideal. Accordingly, ethnic solidarity and ethnic collective action much coincides with national solidarity and national collective action.

In Zambia, on the other hand, the official recognition of multiple ethnic cleavages (regional, tribal, and linguistic) at the time of independence produced a pattern of political code-switching between these different identities, as well as between ethnic identities and the national identity. As a result of people holding multiple identities, nation and ethnicity both seem to attract only lukewarm support. That is, leaning more towards multiculturalism than its Botswanan and Ugandan counterparts, the Zambian approach has helped produce an extraordinarily complicated dynamics of ethnic self-definition and ascription, in the end making Zambians more or less equally likely to support neither nation nor ethnic group. Consequently, while on the one hand the Zambian approach has rendered it more difficult to create a more robust sense of shared nationhood, on the other hand, the Zambian approach has still made it possible to avoid the development of more advanced forms of ethnic conflict.

Finally, the Ugandan approach, officially recognizing only one ethnic dimension (region) as being important for politics has, by and large, resulted in the absence of a shared national identity in combination with comparatively rather extreme forms of ethnic mobilization along regional divides. In fact, as a result of the political (unequal) recognition of mainly regional cleavages, up to today, notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in Uganda are clearly manifested in the demarcation line especially between the Baganda on the one hand and the non-Baganda on the other, but between other regional groupings too, and between different regional groupings and the state.
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss more in detail how the degree of officially promoted multiculturalism, as codified in key legal and policy documents at the time of independence, have shaped subsequent patterns of political competition in the post-independence period.

**Post-colonial patterns of national integration and disintegration**

**Nation first, ethnic group second: Towards a sense of shared nationhood in Botswana**

As previously argued, at the time of independence, Botswanan elites adopted an approach towards ethnic diversity that alongside with policies of neutrality to a comparatively greater extent than its Zambian and Ugandan counterparts aimed at assimilating political minorities into the language and culture of the political majority – i.e. the Tswana. Within this framework, the language of the Tswana, i.e. Setswana, was recognized as the sole national language and was as such used for the purpose of administration and education. Furthermore, the rhetoric of the ruling elite in official pronouncements has projected the country as ethnically and linguistically monolithic. To the extent to which pre-existing tribal-territorial cleavages were officially recognized and promoted, mainly Setswana-speaking tribes were granted some degree of symbolic power. Other tribes did, on the other hand, see their real, as well as symbolic, power significantly reduced. In sum, the nation-building project that was initiated in Botswana at the time of independence was, by and large, premised on the notion that “for the nation to live, the tribe must die”, at least all but one – the Tswana. The nation-state was as such, and still is, seen largely as the site of ethnic homogeneity in which the main goal is to achieve one language in a politically unified territory and under the rule of one law.

As a result of the overall assimilative approach towards ethnic diversity pursued by Botswanan elites since independence, Botswana has experienced only limited political mobilization along ethnic cleavages compared to Zambia and Uganda in the post-colonial period. That is, the assimilation of other ethnic groups into the Tswana culture and language

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Diverging notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ after independence

has paved the way for a greater sense of shared national identity than in Zambia and Uganda. Yet, despite the overarching assimilative approach towards pre-existing ethnic cleavages, similar to in Zambia and Uganda, the territory of Botswana up to today accommodates a large number of different ethnic groups. While there are many different views on the exact composition of Botswanan ethnic groups as of today, it is commonly argued that, if taken together, the different ethnic minorities in Botswana still constitute a numerical majority of the population (about 60 percent) while the largest group – Tswana – should be seen as constituting a political majority rather than a numerical minority. Parsons supports this view, arguing that probably no more than maximum 50 percent of Batswana belong to the Tswana. Recent data collected by the Afrobarometer reveals that the Botswanan society is in addition characterized by a significant degree of linguistic heterogeneity. Answers to the question “Which Botswana language is your home language?” reveal that there are at least eleven languages being actively spoken in Botswana still today (English, Setswana, Sesarwa, Sekgalagadi, Sesobe, Sekalanga, Seherero, Sembukushu, Sebirwa, Sengologa and Seyei). The Ethnologue counts to as many as 28 living languages. In terms of religious diversity, according to recent figures, about an estimated one-half of the country’s citizens identify themselves as Christians. Most other citizens adhere to traditional indigenous religions or to a mixture of religions. There is in addition a small Muslim community to which approximately one percent of the total population belongs.

Considering the fact that the Botswanan society still today reveals a great deal of underlying ethnic diversity, the political development in Botswana after independence can be argued to function as an important reminder of that “majorities are made, not born”. That is, numerically, ethnically, politically, and culturally, societies make and mark their political majorities and minorities under specific historical, political and social circumstances. For instance, Parsons maintains that the concept of a “Tswanadom” that is both philosophical and territorial has led many observers to assume that Botswana is a mono-ethnic state “… [but] only in

762 See, for example, Nyati-Ramahobo 2000.
763 Parsons 1985.
764 Afrobarometer 2005: question 3.
so far as the Tswana minority has successfully imposed its culture on the majority population of the extreme diverse origins… [and even then] ethnic identities have not disappeared”.

Furthermore, Solway has argued that the degree to which Setswana was actually not the predominant language before independence, as well as the wide acceptance of the popular view of Botswana as ethnically homogeneous, reflect the success of the politically dominant Tswana in asserting their cultural hegemony rather than a homogeneous society. According to Solway, “… [like] the process of establishing official nationalism elsewhere, ‘Tswanaificaion’, reminiscent of ‘Russification’, as emphasized by Anderson (1991) has been an attempt to create and promote a unified nation while sustaining, if not strengthening, existing suzerainty.”

That is, rather than understanding the limited degree of political mobilization along ethnic cleavages as the result of ethnic homogeneity, it is more adequate to interpret the comparatively greater sense of a shared national identity as the result of assimilation. As will be further discussed in the next section, empirical indicators in the form of ethnic solidarity and collective action in Botswana in the post-independence period strengthen the impression of a successful assimilationist policy.

**Empirical evidence of ethnic solidarity and collective action in Botswana**

Botswana scores low on all the indicators of the more extreme forms of ethnic conflict. For example, while natural resource abundance has appeared to be a curse rather than a blessing for many other countries, Botswana’s extensive diamond resources have not generated any major ethnic conflicts so far. In addition, there are no overtly ethnic parties in Botswana. The ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), has maintained a majority party since independence and would, if faced with allegations of being a Tswana party, probably quite quickly point to the fact that the party includes members from most ethnic groups in the country. They would probably also highlight their attempts to distribute infrastructure widely, and the fact that members of minority groups have been able to transcend certain boundaries and attain valuable positions in national society. The politics of the BDP can be argued to have been quite successful in this regard since, by and large, all ethnic groups in

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768 Parsons 1985: 27.
769 Solway 2004: 129.
770 Acemoglu et al. 2003; Solway 2002; Solway 2004.
771 Solway 2004: 140.
Botswana are today internally differentiated along class lines.\textsuperscript{773} In fact, in Botswana there is generally very little correlation between income and ethnicity among persons of African descent, although many persons of Asian and European descent are prominent in the commercial sector.\textsuperscript{774} The fact that cross-ethnic economic associations are common strengthens this view.\textsuperscript{775} In addition, urban neighborhoods are not to any significant extent ethnically segregated.\textsuperscript{776}

Furthermore, similar to the ruling party, neither the main opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF), explicitly supports any specific ethnic group. However, there is some correlation between being member of a political minority group and voting for the opposition since the opposition's support for greater inclusivity and its intention to refigure the House of Chiefs has won it growing support amongst minorities.\textsuperscript{777} For example, Pamphlet 1 of the BNF endorses the establishment of a House of Representatives that would include leaders of several organs of civil society in addition to the chiefs of all the nation's different tribal groups. In addition, the party attempted to print its 1999 election materials in several national languages.\textsuperscript{778} In a similar vein, the leaders of the Botswana Congress Party (BCP) which broke from the BNF in 1998 try to appeal to minorities in about the same manner. However, important to note is that neither the BDP, the BNF, nor the BCP overtly identify with any particular ethnic group. Nor has there been a proliferation of ethnically-based parties to accompany minority polarization. Rather, BNF's and BCP's support of minority goals is often argued to be a means by which these parties have been able to extend their bases of support into the rural areas.\textsuperscript{779} In the end, if a party is deemed a more decidedly ethnic actor if its support is ethnically cohesive and its leadership ethnically homogeneous,\textsuperscript{780} there are not any

\textsuperscript{773} ibid. However, the San (sometimes also called 'Bushmen' or '(Ba)Sarwa') should perhaps be considered to be an exception from this rule. According to some arguments, the growth economy of recent decades in Botswana has by and large worked to strengthen the already wealthy while neglecting or worsening the plight of, in particular, the San (see, for example, Good 1999). In their case, ethnic status is largely homologous with class status. In addition, while the San have experienced some internal economic differentiation, few if any San have found their way into the national bourgeoisie. This is not the case for other former subject peoples (Solway 2002: 720).

\textsuperscript{774} U.S. Department of State 2001.

\textsuperscript{775} Solway 2002.

\textsuperscript{776} U.S. Department of State 2001.

\textsuperscript{777} Solway 2002; Solway 2004.

\textsuperscript{778} Solway 2002: 726.

\textsuperscript{779} ibid: 726-7.

\textsuperscript{780} For similar understanding of the concept, see Hultström 2004: 101.
ethnic parties to be discerned within the sphere of Botswanan party politics even though some weak patterns of ethnic voting can perhaps be argued for.

However, despite a strong preponderance on behalf of Botswana’s government towards assimilation of ethnic minorities into Tswana language and culture, and despite the success to avoid violent ethnic collective action so far, it cannot be neglected that since the beginning of the 1980s, the antagonism in the voices of some political minorities (i.e. non-Tswana tribal groupings) has actually begun to be audible.\footnote{Solway 2004: 137.} In general, these struggles have been motivated by a combination of redistributive and recognition goals and emphasize, to a varying degree, cultural and/or material transformation. In the end, most minority struggles have been premised on the argument that justice on one front can positively impact on the other, and that most desired outcomes actually entail change on both fronts.\footnote{ibid.} The last years have, as such, seen minority struggles taken place within at least two different domains. On the one hand, more every-day counter-hegemonic acts, entailing the use of minority language, refusal to behave in a subservient manner, and assertions of cultural pride and difference, have taken place. For example have some cultural groups contemplated to boycott the singing of the national anthem which is largely seen as a symbol of Tswana domination.\footnote{Sunday Standard April 3-9 2005.} On the other hand, Botswana has in addition increasingly witnessed more organized challenges to Tswana hegemony. These include, for example, the formation of cultural organizations, amongst the more well-organized being SPIIL (founded in 1981 and devoted to promoting the Ikalanga language and culture) and Kamanakao (founded in 1995, devoted to revitalizing and preserving Yei language and culture).\footnote{Solway 2004: 138.} As already mentioned briefly, Botswana’s government has in addition witnessed the increased support for the political opposition (The Botswana National Front, BNF) which has sometimes been argued to be more sympathetic to, as well as more pro-active on, minority issues than the ruling party.\footnote{ibid.} Moreover, recent years have seen more direct challenges to the constitution and government policy in terms of different statements by minority organizations such as The Multicultural Coalition of Botswana (RETENG). In 1999, the Wayeyi’s cultural organization, Kamanakao filed a
law-suit against the political regime arguing that sections 77, 78, and 79 of
the Constitution violate the rights of its chief to receive official
recognition. In other words, while Botswana has not witnessed any
ethnic mobilization in the form of violent ethnic collective action since
independence, empirical evidence suggests that the degree of ethnic
solidarity, as well as to some extent non-violent forms of collective action,
has in fact increased over time.

**Summing-up: Patterns of ethnic mobilization in Botswana in the post-
independence period**

In sum, since independence, patterns of political competition in Botswana
have not to a considerable extent been structured along ethnic lines,
allowing the government to, apart from a few detours, continuously
reinforce the assimilative approach that was initially adopted at the time of
independence. As summarized in Table 6.1, the country scores low on all
the indicators of more violent forms of ethnic mobilization.

**Table 6.1. Empirical evidence of ethnic mobilization in Botswana**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVIDENCE OF ETHNIC SOLIDARITY</th>
<th>EVIDENCE OF NON-VIOLENT ETHNIC COLLECTIVE ACTION</th>
<th>EVIDENCE OF VIOLENT ETHNIC COLLECTIVE ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural networks and organizations</td>
<td>Limited ethnic voting</td>
<td>Lawsuits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotts of the national anthem</td>
<td>Protests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Official statements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, while natural resource abundance has appeared to be a
curse rather than a blessing for many other countries, Botswana’s extensive
diamond resources have not generated any major ethnic conflicts so far. In
addition, there are no overtly ethnic parties in Botswana. Neither are there
any clear patterns of ethnic voting, even though some degree of ethnic
voting can be discerned. As such, to the extent that the mobilization of
ethnic interests has in fact occurred, it has rather been in the form of the

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786 Solway 2002; Solway 2004.
establishment of political minority cultural organizations and, in some regards; in more organized attempts to alter existing laws and policies in order to further advance minority interests with regard to recognition and redistribution. In fact, in a categorization of countries made by Vanhanen and based on the extent to which countries are characterized by institutionalized and violent ethnic conflict, Botswana scores as low as a 5 on the scale of institutionalized ethnic conflict and a 0 on the scale of violent ethnic conflict, meaning that the share of ethnic parties comprises less that 10 percent of the votes cast in parliamentary or presidential elections, that only a few ethnic organizations exist, that there are minor ethnic inequalities in political representation, that some small ethnic groups are being discriminated, and that there are no reported ethnic demonstrations, riots, or violence. In other words, among the political minority groups in Botswana, it is not Botswana citizenship that is in question, but rather the terms of that citizenship. That is, while to some extent minority groups may try to alter the internal boundaries of the country, they do not try to alter the external ones. In other words, Botswana minorities are neither irredentist nor nationally secessionist in kind. As such, even though recent years have witnessed the rise of increasingly vociferous ethnically-based consciousness and demands, most citizens of Botswana still seem to share some kind of civic identity based on the Tswana ethnic identity. In addition, as a result of the assimilation of minority languages into Setswana, most Batswana share a common language making interaction and cooperation between different ethnic groups at least technologically easier as compared to in many other African countries. In fact, Setswana is today spoken by a total of 80-85 percent of the population as a first or second language. Furthermore, intermarriage rates between Setswana-speaking and non-Setswana-speaking ethnic groups are high. That is, in conclusion, the Botswanan state can be argued to

787 Vanhanen 1999. The institutional dimension of ethnic conflict is measured in terms of the relative significance of ethnic parties and organizations, significant ethnic inequalities in governmental institutions and customary ethnic discrimination. The violent dimension of ethnic conflict extends from demonstrations, strikes, destruction of property and sabotage to attacks on persons, violent clashes between groups, arrests, killing of people, rebellions, terrorism, forcible deportation of people, ethnic guerilla war, separatist war, ethnic civil war, ethnic cleansing and genocide.


789 Obondo-Okoyo & Sabone 1996. The second greatest group, the Ikalanga-speaking Kalanga, is, in turn, argued to make up about 10-15 percent of the population.

790 Solway 2002; Solway 2004; U.S. Department of State 2001. Survey answers from the Afrobarometer confirm the picture of Botswanans sharing an overarching civic identity. When asked the question “Besides being Batswana, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?”, only 27.5 percent of the respondents ranked their linguistic, tribal, ethnic, or regional group as the secondly most
have been quite successful both in terms of conflict-avoidance and nation-building in the post-independence period.

Neither nation nor ethnic group: Multiple bases of political loyalty in Zambia

Since independence, the Zambian state has, alongside neutrality policies, officially recognized and promoted ethnic diversity along several (linguistic, tribal, and regional) ethnic cleavages. For example, out of about 40 national languages, a total of seven have been officially promoted for use in the administration, as well as for the purpose of education. Moreover, the Zambian state has officially recognized tribal cleavages through the establishment of a House of Chiefs within the framework of which tribal groupings have been given an advisory role on the basis of their size and region. In addition, nine new administrative units were carved out after independence, each with a significant extent of self-determination despite the absence of full federal status. The new provincial boundaries to a large extent overlapped with pre-existing linguistic cleavages, further emphasizing the political importance of such cleavages.

As in Botswana, while the formal criteria for citizenship specified at the time of independence have had some effects on the degree of ethnic diversity, far more ethnic groups still exist than were officially recognized at the time of independence. While roughly 70 different tribes existed at the time of independence, this figure by and large holds even today. Both in the 1990 and the 2000 national censuses, the total number of tribes was given as 72. In their major survey of language in Zambia in the 1970s, Kashoki and Ohannessian distinguished between as many as 83 varieties (excluding European, Indian and Khoisan languages) of local languages in Zambia, which they, in turn, grouped based on lexical and grammatical similarity, as well as on mutual intelligibility, into 26 dialect clusters or ‘languages’. The Ethnologue counts the today living languages of Zambia important besides their Batswana identity (Afrobarometer 2003a, own calculations). In total, there were 1201 respondents of which 331 ranked their linguistic, tribal, ethnic, or regional group as their second most important identity.

While encouraging the use of a few national languages, the Zambian official policy towards language has, albeit implicitly, officially encouraged the death of a large number of living languages (Laitin 1992: 130).


791 While encouraging the use of a few national languages, the Zambian official policy towards language has, albeit implicitly, officially encouraged the death of a large number of living languages (Laitin 1992: 130).


794 Kashoki & Ohannessian 1978.
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to be 41.\textsuperscript{795} The most widespread language is Bemba and is today spoken by about 40 percent of the population as a first or second language.\textsuperscript{796} Estimations from 1998 reveal that about 34 percent of Zambia’s population are Protestant, while 27 percent hold traditional beliefs, 26 percent are Roman Catholic, and the rest follow other Christian belief systems, Islam, and other faiths.\textsuperscript{797} According to the 2000 National Census, 87 percent of the population is Christian; 1 percent Muslim or Hindu; and 7 percent adhere to other faiths, including indigenous faiths.\textsuperscript{798}

However, similar to the case of Botswana, patterns of ethnic mobilization clearly follow the definitions of the national political community that were constructed at the time of independence. That is, today, tribal, linguistic, and regional identities all constitute a basis for political mobilization. However, as a result of that the cleavages that were officially recognized at the time of independence partly overlapped, the independence period has witnessed a large amount of code-switching between regional, tribal, and linguistic identities, as well as between different ethnic identities and the national identity. That is, the consequences of the Zambian approach within the framework of which multiple ethnic cleavages were (and have throughout the post-independence era continued to be) officially recognized are well summarized in a rather complicated dynamics of ethnic self-definition and ascription. Consequently, the process of ethnic mobilization in Zambia has been much more complex than in many other African countries. More specifically, since three, partly overlapping, dimensions of ethnic identity are available to Zambian political actors – one stemming from territorial affiliation, one from linguistic affiliation, and one from tribal affiliation – the calculation surrounding how best to employ ethnicity as a coalition-building tool has entailed an additional decision in Zambia compared to in many other countries; that is the question about whether to stress tribal connections, territorial connections, or linguistic ties.\textsuperscript{799} As such, the

\textsuperscript{795} Gordon 2005.
\textsuperscript{796} Posner 2005.
\textsuperscript{797} Gall 1998.
\textsuperscript{798} Central Statistical Office of Zambia 2000. 5 percent did not report their religion.
\textsuperscript{799} The Zambian official approach towards ethnic diversity has in addition led to a situation in which provincial identities in some regions tend to play an analogous role to linguistic identities in other parts of the country. For example, stemming from the fact that Northwestern province is not associated with any of the country’s four major language groups, Zambians often refer to Northwesterners as the fifth major ethnic group alongside the Bemba-speakers, Nyanja-speakers, Tonga-speakers, and Lozi-speakers. People from Northwestern Province also commonly identify themselves in such terms. The fact that the Bemba-speaking coalition does not map onto a single province has further complicated the process of
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Zambian official approach towards ethnic diversity has, on the one hand, functioned to prevent the development of deep political cleavages between different ethnic groups – and this perhaps even more since the dynamics of self-definition and ascription are further complicated by the fact that the different collectivities with which people identify themselves with nest inside one another. In other words; the fact that people have more than one ethnic affiliation means that the information that ethnic identities convey about for example patronage commitments is ambiguous and sometimes even misleading. As a result of widespread political code-switching among both the masses and the political elite, the national motto “One Zambia, One Nation” has at least been able to manifest itself in the absence of extremely violent forms of ethnic conflict. However, on the other hand, while the multi-dimensional multicultural policy adopted at the time of independence has helped Zambia to avoid the most severe forms of violent manifestations of ethnicity, the approach at the same time seems to have prevented the development of a more broad-based identification with and support for the Zambian state. As such, people in Zambia up to today seem to be stuck in what can perhaps best be described as a trap of loyalty confusion. In the next section, I further discuss the empirical evidence of ethnic mobilization in Zambia in the post-independence period.

Empirical evidence of ethnic solidarity and collective action in Zambia

As argued by Posner, at a first glance, there does not seem to be much empirical evidence supporting that ethnic mobilization along different ethnic cleavages is part of everyday life in post-colonial Zambia. For example, high rates of inter-tribal marriage reveal many Zambians to be relatively unconcerned about ethnic attachments in their day-to-day social relations.

Ethnic self-definition and ascription. More specifically, unlike coalitions defined by the other major language groups, Bemba-speakers can be divided not only into tribal sub-groupings but also into provincial sub-units. This, in turn, means that what is meant by Bemba is even more ambiguous than what is meant by, for example, Tonga, Nyanja and Lozi (Posner 2005).

As was more thoroughly discussed in chapter four, at the time of independence, there was only a partial overlap between linguistic and tribal cleavages in Zambia (as well as in Botswana and Uganda). More specifically, tribal and linguistic groups were all organized in concentric circles, with all the members of each tribal group located entirely within a single language category and each language category containing several different tribal groups. Thus, in Zambia, every Lozi tribesperson, for example, is also a Lozi-speaker, but every Lozi-speaker is not a Lozi tribesperson (ibid: 116). In addition, the new provincial boundaries that were established by the Zambian state at the time of independence only in part overlapped with pre-existing linguistic boundaries (Posner 2005). For a further discussion on overlapping social identities in Zambia, see Molteno 1974.

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claim to attach only minimal importance to ethnic group affiliations as motivations for their political behavior. For example, of the nearly 1,200 Zambians questioned in a 1996 University of Zambia/Michigan State University (UNZA/MSU) Democratic Governance Survey, fully 83.6 percent agreed that: “When it comes to politics, being a Zambian is more important than belonging to a particular tribe”.802 An investigation conducted by Posner in 1995 reveals similar results.803 When asked which they put first when it came to politics, being a Zambian or “being a member of their group,” 83 percent of the respondents said they put being a Zambian first. When asked which they thought was more important, to support a politician from their own group or to support the politician with the best abilities, even if he was from a different group, 85 percent said that they thought it was better to support the politician with the best abilities. When asked whether they thought that “people can only rely on members of their own group”, only 30 percent agreed. When asked the question “Besides being Zambian, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?” in the Afrobarometer, only 10 percent of the respondents ranked linguistic, tribal, ethnic, or regional identities as their second most important identity.804 In addition, similar “non-ethnic” orientations are reflected in and, as emphasized by Posner – are probably no small part a product of – the pronouncements of the country’s public officials, newspaper editors, and civil society leaders, who regularly denounce “tribalism” as retrogressive and incompatible with national development.805

The non-ethnic orientation claimed by many Zambians is in addition supported by routine compilations of countries that have crossed a notable threshold denoting civil war, rebellion, revolution or other forms of violent protest such as successful military coups since they invariably leave Zambia as one of the few anomalous cases where prolonged violent ethnic conflict has not yet taken place in the post-independence era.806 Neither do the names of political parties reveal that ethnic identity matters for Zambian politics. Since independence, almost every political party that has ever been formed in Zambia has adopted labels with pan-territorial connotations.807

802 Bratton 1996.
804 Afrobarometer 2003b, own calculations. In total, there were 1198 respondents of which 123 ranked their linguistic, tribal, ethnic or regional group as their second most important identity.
As such, words like ‘national’, ‘united’, ‘Zambian’, or ‘African’ are common when it comes to Zambian party names. In fact, of the 24 parties registered in August 2000, six included ‘national’ and five ‘united’ in their title.\(^{808}\) That is, they all try to send out signals that they are “above tribe”.\(^{809}\) In addition, similar to the situation in Botswana, in Zambia, ethnic groups are not identified with socio-economic classes; instead each includes members of all classes and levels of society.\(^{810}\)

Yet, even though a large amount of empirical evidence seem to support the argument that Zambia is a place where ethnic group belonging does not structure politics, there is in fact a large amount of evidence pointing in the opposite direction too.\(^{811}\) That is, notwithstanding a significant number of Zambians claiming non-ethnic political orientations, and notwithstanding the successful avoidance of violent ethnic confrontation, below the surface, Zambia is still a place where ethnicity matters for politics. In other words, despite appearances, in Zambia ethnicity in much serves as one of the principal lenses through which Zambians perceive their social and political environments. As such, it undergirds expectations about how others will behave; it colours understandings about where social conflicts originate; and it shapes perceptions about who stands to gain –– and to lose –– from the current distribution of political power.\(^{812}\) In fact, if we consider other measures than those discussed above of how Zambians actually behave in their daily and political life, there is considerable empirical evidence supporting the claim that ethnic mobilization has increasingly taken place along all the officially recognized ethnic cleavages since independence.\(^{813}\)

For example, for every Zambian who chooses a spouse from a different tribe, there are nearly two that marry within their groups.\(^{814}\) In addition, even though most Zambians at least officially condemn tribalism, there are still widespread perceptions of ethnic favoritism both when in comes to the distribution of government development resources and in terms of political appointments.\(^{815}\) For example, according to results from a survey conducted by Posner, almost half of all Zambians think that the President’s

\(^{808}\) Burnell 2001: 250.
\(^{810}\) Dresang 1974: 1609.
\(^{812}\) ibid: 94.
\(^{813}\) See, for example, Molteno 1974: 63.
\(^{814}\) Posner 2005: 94.
\(^{815}\) ibid: 95-8.
region of the country gets more than its share of development resources.\footnote{ibid: 96-7. However, depending on if people belong to the President's group or not, people perceive the problem of favoritism to be more or less widespread. More specifically, perceptions of that the President favors his own ethnic group are particularly strong among people that do not belong to the President's ethnic group themselves. At the time for Posner's field research, Fredrick Chiluba, a Bemba, was president. As a result, on a direct question whereas only 23 percent of Bemba-speakers in Posner's survey said they thought that "people from the President's region benefit more than people from other areas of the country," 52 percent of non-Bemba-speakers said they thought that this was the case (Posner 2005: 97).} The President is in addition widely assumed to favor members of his own ethnic group when it comes to making official appointments. In fact, since independence, all Zambian cabinets have been alleged by one group or another to favor people from the President’s ethnic community. President Kaunda’s early cabinets were criticized for being Bemba-dominated and later they came to be viewed as biased toward Nyanja-speakers. President Chiluba’s cabinets were criticized for being filled with his fellow Bembas.\footnote{Posner 2005; Osei-Hwedie 1998.} What is more, these perceptions of ethnic favoritism persist despite the fact that there is little evidence that patterns of resource expenditure and political appointments actually are biased in favor of the President’s region.\footnote{However, as argued by Osei-Hwedie (1998), while Kaunda pursued a deliberate policy of ethnic balance in government and party posts to dilute Bemba domination, Chiluba has perhaps not been as deliberate in his attempts to balance power. Rather, the further balancing of power between different ethnic groups during Chiluba’s rule can be understood as an attempt to reflect the people that supported his victory. Since his victory rested on mass support from most regions, he had to make cabinet appointments reflect the different regions. Hence he opted for the incorporation of every ethnic group in the cabinet, albeit with some groups such as the Bemba speakers having a predominant position. Chiluba in addition party reduced the threat to his presidency by appointing especially Bemba speakers as government officers.} In fact, as argued in the previous chapter, since independence, every Zambian cabinet has been ethnically balanced.\footnote{From Posner 2005.} In addition, evidence put forward by Times of Zambia suggests that President Chiluba’s home province of Luapula was rather disadvantaged vis-à-vis other provinces in securing financial assistance from the government for its development programs.\footnote{From Posner 2005.} In other words, the widely held perception that the President’s part of the country benefits from his rule is much more powerful than the facts on the ground. Yet, as will be clear from the discussion below, perceptions of reality, rather than reality, are what trigger political responses. As such, in Zambia, perceptions of ethnic favoritism have resulted in increased pressures for ethnic balancing, in widespread ethnic voting, as well as in the mobilization of ethnic parties.

\footnote{\[816\] ibid: 96-7. However, depending on if people belong to the President’s group or not, people perceive the problem of favoritism to be more or less widespread. More specifically, perceptions of that the President favors his own ethnic group are particularly strong among people that do not belong to the President’s ethnic group themselves. At the time for Posner’s field research, Fredrick Chiluba, a Bemba, was president. As a result, on a direct question whereas only 23 percent of Bemba-speakers in Posner’s survey said they thought that “people from the President’s region benefit more than people from other areas of the country,” 52 percent of non-Bemba-speakers said they thought that this was the case (Posner 2005: 97).\[817\] Posner 2005: 98.\[818\] Posner 2005: 98.\[819\] However, as argued by Osei-Hwedie (1998), while Kaunda pursued a deliberate policy of ethnic balance in government and party posts to dilute Bemba domination, Chiluba has perhaps not been as deliberate in his attempts to balance power. Rather, the further balancing of power between different ethnic groups during Chiluba’s rule can be understood as an attempt to reflect the people that supported his victory. Since his victory rested on mass support from most regions, he had to make cabinet appointments reflect the different regions. Hence he opted for the incorporation of every ethnic group in the cabinet, albeit with some groups such as the Bemba speakers having a predominant position. Chiluba in addition party reduced the threat to his presidency by appointing especially Bemba speakers as government officers.\[820\] From Posner 2005.}
In terms of increased pressures for ethnic balancing over time, in a survey conducted in the 1970s, when asked whether it was more important to abide by the bureaucratic norm of basing appointments and promotions solely on merit or whether conscious effort should be made to maintain a tribal balance in the bureaucracy, a total of 45 percent of the respondents indicated that the latter was essential for Zambia.\textsuperscript{821} Partly as a response to such pressures, since independence, political leaders have commonly used the mechanism of ethnic arithmetic or ethnic proportionality in order to secure ethnic balance in the cabinet, as well as in the bureaucracy. Under President Kaunda, Zambians called it ethnic balancing. Every time the president reshuffled his many political appointees or the minister of finance announced budgetary allocations to fund development and social services politicians calculated whether their section had gained or lost.\textsuperscript{822} Policies of ethnic balancing have, in turn, functioned to strengthen perceptions among Zambians that ethnicity matters for politics. According to Sichone and Simutanyi, policies of ethnic balancing have in addition fuelled the political blackmail that allows aggressive politicians to win concessions from the central government.\textsuperscript{823}

The widespread expectations that people in positions of power will favor members of their own ethnic groups has had important implications for the way party politics is conducted in Zambia. First, it makes voters inclined to support politicians from their own ethnic group over others. Secondly, because politicians know that voters will do this, it creates incentives for politicians to couch their electoral appeals and frame their coalition-building strategies in ethnic terms.\textsuperscript{824} In Zambia, most people simply assume that if the party leader is a member of a particular ethnic group, he will put the interests of that group first. Even when the president surrounds himself with deputies from other groups, the overwhelming tendency has been for voters to ignore this, and still draw their inferences about the party’s patronage orientation from the ethnic background of its top leader.\textsuperscript{825} In this sense there has at times been a mismatch between how elites mobilize for votes and how the masses cast their votes. For example, while the United National Independence Party (UNIP) became the single state party in the 1972 elections, it comprised a broad elite coalition of

\textsuperscript{821} Dresang 1974: 1610.
\textsuperscript{822} Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 175.
\textsuperscript{823} ibid.
\textsuperscript{824} Postner 2005.
\textsuperscript{825} ibid: 108-10.
various ethnic groups, the dominant groupings being Bemba-speakers of Northern-Luapula and the Copperbelt and Nyanja-speakers of Eastern Province. In addition, the party’s support comprised Tonga- and Lozi-speakers. Yet, despite its quite broad-based support, the UNIP was generally both perceived and identified as a Bemba party, perhaps because its former leader, Kenneth Kaunda, was born in Northern Province. In addition, in the 1972 election, none of the opposition parties received any significant support from the Bemba community. Rather, the African National Congress (ANC) had its support base mainly among the Tonga-speakers of Southern Province and the United Party (UP) among the Lozi of the Western Province.

As demonstrated by Posner, the tendency among the population to associate parties with the ethnic groups of their leaders has, in turn, led to that the home regions of party leaders have historically been the parts of the country where Zambian political parties have had their greatest political success. That is, in the process of competing for votes, Zambian leaders have appealed to geographic constituencies and thereby further politicized linguistic, economic, and other sectional differences in Zambia. In an address to the United National Independence Party Council as early after independence as 1967, Kaunda went to official attack against the ways in which politicians appealed to ethnic loyalties in order to gain votes:

“What happened in the last elections shows clearly that we do not understand [the dangers of our methods]. We have canvassed so strongly and indeed, viciously, along tribal, racial, and provincial lines, that one wonders whether we really have national or tribal and provincial leadership. I must admit publicly that I have never experienced, in the life of this young nation, such a spate of hate, based entirely on tribe, province, race color and religion, which is the negation of all that we stand for in this party and government. I do not think that we can blame the common man for this. The fault is ours, fellow-leaders – we, the people here assembled.”

(President Kaunda on Tribalism, from an address to the United National Independence Party Council, August 29, 1967)

Further, President Kaunda continued:

“It is very easy to shout ‘ONE ZAMBIA ONE NATION’, but very difficult to think and act in that way honestly and sincerely. As we discuss this matter here, I

826 Erdmann 2007: 12.
827 ibid.
829 As cited in Rotberg 1967: 33.
don’t want to hide from you all that here are very few fields in the life of this nation which have not been adversely affected. How difficult it is to build, but how easy to destroy! Since the election campaign started, up to this time, we have become false prophets of ‘ONE ZAMBIA ONE NATION’.”

As argued by Posner though; from the standpoint of capturing national power, the tendency among Zambians to associate parties with the ethnic group of their presidents has been a problem for all parties since even the largest ethnic group in the country (the Bemba-speakers) comprise less than 50 percent of the total population. As such, to be nationally viable Zambian political parties must win support across ethnic communities, and this means that they must try to eschew public identification with any single ethnic group. Perhaps hence the public ‘non-ethnic’ orientation by Kaunda in the address above, as well as by most political parties in Zambia up to today. For example, during the election campaigns that took place before the multi-party elections in 1991, the leader of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), Frederick Chiluba, did not appeal to ethnic loyalties, but instead looked for the support of various ethnic groups. Yet, in the elections, except for the Copperbelt Province which is the melting pot of all tribes in Zambia, the MMD candidates stood in their home areas and won, showing the influence of ethnic identities. In addition, although the MMD candidates did not appeal to ethnic loyalties during election campaigns, ethnicity still lay dormant, remaining in the background ready to be mobilized at an appropriate time. For example, selections to the shadow cabinet at the MMD national party convention, prior to the general elections, were fraught with ethnic tensions. There was, as such, fierce competition for the posts as each faction fought for top posts. In particular the Lozis felt disillusioned at their failure to capture the vice presidency of the party. In fact, it was partly due to disagreement over the sharing of cabinet posts that, soon after winning the elections, the elite cohesion broke down. The other factor that can explain the breakdown of the elite coalition was that with the defeat of Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP), there was nothing to keep the elites of MMD together. Consequently, they turned to ethnicity to

830 ibid.
833 ibid.
834 ibid.
835 ibid.
consolidate and legitimize their political position. In fact, after the elections, despite the fact that he is a former trade union leader, Chiluba has still easier been able to garner the sympathy of his own ethnic group rather than gain working class support, leaving ethnicity an important force in Zambian politics even today.\textsuperscript{836} As a result, party politics have increasingly been associated with ethnic politics. Among other things, since the 1991 elections, there have been demands for resignation of the president, for holding elections earlier than the scheduled date, and for the impeachment of the president.\textsuperscript{837}

However, despite the widespread existence of ethnic voting and ethnic parties in Zambia in the post-independence period, such patterns have still been far from straightforward. More specifically, since there are three different ethnic cleavages for Zambians to choose from, there have been changes over time with regard to which ethnic cleavage that matters most for party politics. More specifically, as a result of the official approach to recognize multiple ethnic cleavages, there is no real consistency or homogeneity in ethnic preferences. In a study from 2005, Posner demonstrates how Zambian party politics has evolved around mainly two principal ethnic axes: language and tribe.\textsuperscript{838} More specifically, he shows how the different logics of political competition in one-party and multi-party settings create incentives for political actors to emphasize different kinds of ethnic identities: tribal identities in one-party elections and linguistic identities in multi-party elections. According to Posner, it is not that the salience of ethnicity per se is altered by the change in regime type. But the particular ethnic card that politicians play, and the particular rules that voters apply to determine who is a member of their ethnic group differ depending on the different logics of political competition in one-party and multi-party systems.\textsuperscript{839}

\textsuperscript{836} ibid.
\textsuperscript{837} ibid: 238.
\textsuperscript{838} Posner 2005.
\textsuperscript{839} For a further discussion on Posner’s main results, see Posner 2007. However, while Posner argues that the repertoires of potentially mobilizable ethnic identities that individuals possess are a result of the politics pursued by the British during the colonial era, this study shows that these repertoires are in fact the result rather of the official policy towards ethnic diversity adopted at the time of independence. That is, the reason behind that both tribe and language matter for how party politics is conducted in Zambia today is the result of that both these dimensions of ethnicity were officially recognized in key legal and policy documents at the time of independence.
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If yet not as evident in the ways in which party politics is conducted,\textsuperscript{840} also regional identities have since a couple of years after independence played an increasingly important role for Zambian politics.\textsuperscript{841} That is, in the post-independence era, provincial divisions have come to play a similar role to tribal and linguistic divisions as a foundation for political coalition-building.\textsuperscript{842} As previously argued, after independence the scale of the resources allocated for rural development through provincial units became large enough for provincial administrations to become perceived as sources of patronage. When this happened, provinces increasingly became focal points for political competition and Zambians came to view the struggle for state resources partly in terms of a conflict among the country’s provinces.\textsuperscript{843} For example, there are today widespread perceptions among the population that the Bemba-dominated provinces of Zambia have more to gain from the government than other provinces.\textsuperscript{844} This widespread perception of Bemba dominance is quite well captured in one of the answers Silverman got when he interviewed Zambians (in this case a person from the Lozi-dominated Western Province) about their view on ethnicity and nationhood in the beginning of the 1980s. When asked the question “Nationalism, What does it mean to you?” one of the respondents answered:

“When I hear Kaunda and his friends talk about it, I think it means the unity of tribes put together to make up one Zambia, one nation. To a certain extent it has been a good idea. But then there are some little points that make me doubt. Sometimes this one Zambia, one nation is just verbal. For example, we have little in this Province, but we do have forests, game, and other things, and it is hard to see the central Government get all the profit from it. What does Bembaland contribute? Nothing! They have no forests and no fish, but they get all the development projects and the best jobs.”\textsuperscript{845}

Since a couple of years after independence, there is also an ongoing discussion whether Zambia should remain a unitary state or not. Especially

\textsuperscript{840} The fact that regional identities do not seem to matter as much as tribal and linguistic identities for how party politics is conducted in Zambia, Posner derives from the fact that the new provincial boundaries that were established at the time for independence to such a large extent overlapped with pre-existing linguistic boundaries (see Posner 2005: 118).
\textsuperscript{841} See also Molteno 1974: 63 for this argument.
\textsuperscript{842} Posner 2005.
\textsuperscript{843} ibid: 118.
\textsuperscript{844} See, for example, ibid; Silverman 1984.
\textsuperscript{845} Silverman 1984: 160.
the Lozi have been a driving force in this discussion even though the Lozi leadership has not directly challenged the Zambian project.\textsuperscript{846} As discussed in chapter four, like the Baganda in Uganda, the Lozi of the former Barotseland (now Western Province) made a serious attempt to secede from Zambia before independence to form their own independent state. However, this attempt failed (as Buganda’s attempt failed in Uganda) and Barotseland instead became integrated into the centralized Zambian political system. However, Lozi demands for autonomy has in part resurfaced since this arrangement, and in the 1991 multi-party elections the Lozi proved to be able to overcome problems of collective action quite well when they overwhelmingly voted for the opposition Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in the hope that it would look more favourably upon the restoration of their autonomy. However, the MMD and its leader, Chiluba, in the end turned out to be rather unsympathetic to the Lozi agenda and instead adopted policies that were perceived as favoring the president’s Bemba group. Partly as a response to President Chiluba’s ignorance of the Lozi agenda, a group of 5,000 Barotse royalists gathered in the kingdom’s capital, Limulunga on a Saturday in July 1993 and called for the province’s secession through the courts. However, President Chiluba reacted sharply to this demand and promised to crush any uprising.\textsuperscript{847} This did not put an end to Lozi struggle, however. In 1994, the resentment the Lozi felt against the MMD and, in particular, against Chiluba, was overtly expressed when Chiluba’s motorcade was stoned upon a visit to Mongu, the capital of Western Province. The following month, fearful that the government would retaliate against the Litunga, locals raised a temporary ‘army’ of some 3,000 Lozi to protect their king, an act that was deemed treasonable by the government. In 1995, relations further deteriorated when the government passed a new Land Act, which vested the allocation of public lands into the presidency, removing from the Litunga a prerogative he had hitherto enjoyed. Later that year, the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) made its strongest ever public pronouncement on the issue of national integration in the ‘Resolutions of the Barotse National Conference” held at Lealui. These resolutions stressed the

\textsuperscript{846} See, for example, Englebert 2005. Other evidence of minority mobilization in favor of a higher degree of self-determination is the Mwambe-speakers who are not officially recognized as a language group, but whose politicians are striving for a separate North-Eastern Province, distinct from the Bemba-proper dominated Northern Province. This attempt has, however, been complicated by the fact that Mwambe-speakers are considered to be Bemba by those who live in the South, West and East (Erdmann 2007: 11).

\textsuperscript{847} Englebert 2005.
Barotseland’s dejection at the government’s refusal to recognize the Barotseland Agreement of 1964, accused it of deceit and of “total abrogation of the rights of the people of Barotseland”, before resolving that the recognition of the Barotseland Agreement “must be incorporated in the constitution”. Furthermore, “if the government continues to be obstinate, the people of the Barotse shall have the right to self-determination by reverting to the original status of Barotseland before 1964.”

However, this statement being the closest thing to a threat of secessionism that the BRE ever ushered, it is also an exception. In fact, throughout the independence period (and, as we soon will see – quite different from the Baganda in Uganda), the Lozi leadership has continued to publicly reject the secessionist option. As argued by Englebert, in 1994 for example, The Lozi Litunga (King) Ilute Yetan reiterated that “We shall not secede from Zambia” (while simultaneously expressing his grievance at the government for its “perpetual enslavement” of his region).

Furthermore, overall, the BRE stayed away from separatist claims despite, as being argued by Englebert, “being extremely explicit about its grievances vis-à-vis the Zambian state.” That is, over and over again, though systematically ignored, the BRE has continued to focus almost exclusively on the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement as its only demand, and has been quite able to live without this wish being fulfilled. In fact, during the post-colonial era, up to today, no regional grouping in Zambia has taken arms in support of a separatist agenda.

**Summing-up: Patterns of ethnic mobilization in Zambia in the post-independence period**

In sum, as summarized in Table 6.2, in Zambia, since three partly overlapping dimensions of ethnic identity are available to Zambian political actors as a result of the official approach towards ethnic diversity adopted at the time of independence – one stemming from territorial affiliation, one from linguistic affiliation, and one from tribal affiliation – the calculation surrounding how best to employ ethnicity as a coalition-building tool in Zambia has entailed an additional decision compared to in many other countries; that is the question about whether to stress tribal connections,

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848 ibid.
849 ibid.
850 ibid.
851 ibid.
territorial connections, or linguistic ties. As such, the Zambian official approach towards ethnic diversity can, on the one hand, be argued to have in many ways successfully functioned to prevent the development of deep political cleavages between different ethnic groups – and this perhaps even more since the dynamics of self-definition and ascription are further complicated by the fact that the different collectivities with which people identify themselves with nest inside one another.

Table 6.2. Empirical evidence of ethnic mobilization in Zambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVIDENCE OF ETHNIC SOLIDARITY</th>
<th>EVIDENCE OF NON-VIOLENT ETHNIC COLLECTIVE ACTION</th>
<th>EVIDENCE OF VIOLENT ETHNIC COLLECTIVE ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Cultural networks and organizations</td>
<td>• Some degree of ethnic voting</td>
<td>• The organization of (weak) autonomy movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High degree of intra-ethnic marriages</td>
<td>• Some degree of ethnic party mobilization</td>
<td>• Isolated violent attacks and protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Only limited social bonding across ethnic boundaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is, as illustrated in the above table, while in Zambia, ethnicity matters for politics, ethnic identities do not constitute completely contrasting political identities. Neither are they completely indivisible. Rather, since independence, there has been widespread political code-switching among the elite, as well as among the masses, between different politically relevant identities. As argued by Posner, framing political conflicts in terms of one dimension of ethnic identity rather than another, politicians and political parties have been able to shape perceptions about the fairness of the distribution of government resources to convince voters that they are disadvantaged and that mobilization for change should be a priority. And by defining themselves in terms of the right (in the sense of strategically optimal) dimension of ethnic identity, they have also been able to convince voters that this mobilization should take place behind their banner. The fact that people have more than one ethnic political affiliation moreover means that the information that ethnic identities convey about, for example, patronage commitments is ambiguous and sometimes even
misleading. Because of the widespread political code-switching among both the masses and the political elite, the national motto “One Zambia, One Nation” has been able to manifest itself at least in the absence of violent ethnic conflict. Yet, ethnic mobilization has still manifested itself in ethnic voting, ethnic party mobilization, and in the organization of (if yet weak) autonomy movements. In addition, up to today, there is only limited social bonding across ethnic boundaries in Zambia. In his categorization of countries in terms of the degree of institutional and violent ethnic conflict, Vanhanen classifies Zambia as a 20 on the measure of institutional conflict and as a 10 on violent conflict, meaning that the share of ethnic parties is 15-29 percent, that there is significant ethnic organization, significant ethnic inequality in governmental institutions, serious forms of ethnic discrimination, sporadic ethnic demonstrations, riots or violence involving small groups, destruction of property in ethnic riots, and killing on the basis of ethnicity.

However, while the multidimensional multicultural policy adopted after independence has perhaps helped Zambia to avoid at least extremely violent manifestations of ethnicity, the policy seems also to have prevented the development of any real broad-based identification with and support for the Zambian state. The liberal multicultural policy towards linguistic cleavages pursued by the Zambian state has complicated the national integration project. More specifically, in addition to the confusion in terms of ethnic self-identification and ascription and, as a result; the inconsistency in terms of ethnic preference formation and networking, nation-building in Zambia has been further complicated by the fact that most adults in Zambia, particularly in the rural areas, speak only their home language. As a result, they rely on it entirely for communication and their choice of social contacts is made within the limits set by language. Language thus, in large, serves to further separate Zambians into several non-interacting groups, whose members perform their main roles within the social confines of their particular language group. In addition to the problems of ethnic and national mobilization already described, it is obviously difficult for a sense of common identity to develop among people who seldom interact across the boundary of language.

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854 Molteno 1974: 86.
Ethnic group first, nation second: National disintegration in Uganda

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, at the time of independence, the Ugandan state adopted an approach towards ethnic diversity that falls somewhere in between the approaches adopted by Botswana and Zambia respectively in terms of the degree of official multiculturalism. As such, while the Zambian approach was quite generous in terms of the number of cleavages officially recognized, along with policies of neutrality, the Ugandan state mainly recognized ethnic diversity along one dimension, namely region. More specifically, Ugandan elites adopted a set of laws and policies that allowed for a semi-federal arrangement within the framework of which the kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro and the territory of Busoga were given federal status, and the districts of Acholi, Bugisu, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei, Teso and West Nile official recognition with some autonomy. However, quite soon it became obvious to most regions that Buganda had drawn the winning ticket. That is, in terms of the guarantees for traditional rights and institutions made, the services transferred, and the sources of taxation allocated, Buganda was superior to the other kingdoms and districts in terms of truly federal powers.

The consequences of the Ugandan approach in terms of the impact on ethnic diversity per se in much remind of the respective consequences of the Botswanan and Zambian approaches. As such, while the formal criteria for citizenship specified at the time of independence have had some effects on patterns of ethnic diversity, there are still far more ethnic groups than were officially recognized at the time of independence. According to the Ethnologue, there are as many as 43 living languages in Uganda. These languages in addition belong to a variety of main language groups. The south and west comprising Buganda, Ankole, Kigezi, Toro and Bunyoro are all Bantu-speaking areas and today nearly two-thirds of the population of Uganda speak one of the closely-related Bantu languages. The largest

858 The Eastern Bantu languages (Luganda, Lusoga, Lamasaba/Lugisu, Lugwere, Lunyole, Lasamia/Lugwe) are spoken by a third of the country’s population, while the Western Bantu languages (Runyankole, Rukiga, Runyarwanda, Rutoro, Runyoro, Runundi, Rukonjo, Rwamba) are spoken by an almost equal proportion (Pawliková-Vilhanová 1996: 163). See Ofcansky 1996: 72-3 for a further discussion on overlapping linguistic and tribal-regional ethnic diversity in Uganda.
language – Luganda – is, however, spoken as a first language by only sixteen percent of the population. The North-East can be associated with Eastern Nilotic languages (Akaramojong, Ateso, Kakwa and Sebei), the North with the Western Nilotic languages (Lango, Acholi, Alur, Dhopadhola and Kumam) and the extreme North-west with the Central Sudanic languages (Lugbara and Madi).

Similar to at the time of independence, up to today, only 20-30 percent of the population in Uganda are actually able to hold a conversation in English.

In terms of religious diversity, according to the 2002 national census, Christians of all denominations make up 85.1 percent of Uganda's population. The Catholic Church has the largest number of adherents (41.9 percent), followed by the Anglican Church of Uganda (35.9 percent). The second most preferred religion of Uganda is Islam, with Muslims representing 12.1 percent of the population. A variety of other religions, including traditional indigenous religions, Hinduism, and Judaism are practiced freely and today make up approximately 10 percent of the population.

Furthermore, there exists a lot of tribal diversity. According to the 2002 national census, the biggest tribe is the Baganda, who make up 17.3 percent of the population, followed by Banyankole with 9.8 percent, Basoga 8.6 percent and Bakiga 7.0 percent. The smallest tribe is the Vonoma with only 128 people by the time of the census. Other tribes with less than 10,000 people are Mvuba with 870, Mening 2,227, Bahehe 3,403 and Batwa 6,738. The biggest eight tribes make up 70 percent of the population, while the remaining other 40 tribes constitute 30 percent.

However, despite similarities in terms of ethnic diversity, as a result of that only one ethnic cleavage was officially recognized at the time of independence, patterns of ethnic mobilization in Uganda look very different from patterns of ethnic mobilization in Botswana and Zambia. First, while linguistic identities in Uganda do not to the same extent serve as a basis for political calculations and demands as is the case in Zambia, compared to Botswana (in which mainly pure assimilation has been pursued towards linguistic cleavages after independence), the Ugandan state has not been quite as successful in promoting national integration based on a common language. As such, the linguistic outcome in Uganda by and

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860 See, for example, Ladefoged 1992; Mukama 1991; Ofcansky 1996.
862 U.S. Department of State 2004b.
large verifies Esman’s theory which concludes that while the use for official purposes of a foreign language that is neutral among competing indigenous communities is a practical formula for keeping the peace, for depoliticizing language and removing it from the public agenda, it is a less satisfactory unilingual expedient than pure assimilation in that it lacks the passion necessary to promote a shared identity.\textsuperscript{864} Consequently, while the Ugandan approach towards linguistic diversity can be argued to have contributed to the maintenance of peaceful relations between different linguistic groups, it does not seem to have been very helpful in terms of forming a basis for a shared Ugandan identity.\textsuperscript{865} Secondly, since Ugandan elites promoted a one-dimensional multicultural approach within the framework of which regional cleavages were the only ones being officially recognized, Uganda has witnessed the development of comparatively very deep cleavages between different regions, and especially between Buganda and the rest of the country, in the post-independence period. In fact, the granting of power-sharing rights to a number of kingdoms in the independence constitution, as well as the granting of semi-autonomous status to a large number of districts, can be argued to have been the starting shot for many of the problems Uganda have faced since then in terms of problems of national integration. In view of the Uganda’s subsequent political, social, and economic turmoil, it has in fact frequently been asked whether independent Uganda would not have fared better if, already from the beginning, inherited ethnic cleavages had been managed in a different way.\textsuperscript{866} In a comparison of patterns of ethnic mobilization in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda this thought does not seem too far away.

In addition to the mobilization of tribal-territorial cleavages, the time after independence has to some extent continued to witness the mobilization of religious cleavages too. However, Obote’s policy towards tribal-territorial cleavages in combination with his neutral stance towards religious cleavages much took the wind out of religious antagonisms in Uganda after independence. That is, rather than conflict revolving around religious cleavages, much of Uganda’s history after independence has been characterized by antagonisms between different tribal regions in the country, and especially of antagonisms between the north and south

\textsuperscript{864} Esman 1992: 386.
\textsuperscript{865} See Kasozi 1994: 10 for this argument.
\textsuperscript{866} Mutibwa 1992: 24.
Diverging notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ after independence

(former Buganda). As such, while the neutral official holding towards religion in Uganda has perhaps not led to the abolishment of the political relevance of religion all together, religious conflict is today clearly subordinated to regional conflict. In the next section, I further discuss the indicators of post-colonial patterns of ethnic mobilization in Uganda.

Empirical evidence of ethnic solidarity and collective action in Uganda

As argued in the previous chapter, Uganda was led to independence by a coalition between Kabaka Yekka (KY), a political organization based in Buganda, and the United Party Congress (UPC), led by Milton Obote from the northern parts of Uganda. The coalition was mobilized on the basis of shared religion; both parties were defenders of the Protestant chiefly ascendancy, and the opposition Democratic Party (DP) as a whole opposed this ascendancy and instead adhered to Catholic beliefs. Since different regional groupings were in this sense able to come together under the umbrella of a shared religion, religion can be argued to have been one of the major social and political dividers in Uganda at the time of independence. However, as a consequence of the adoption of a quasi-federal system and the establishment of a secular state at the time of independence, region increasingly came to play the role as the primary basis for political competition. However, this is not to say that religious cleavages altogether lost their political importance. To begin with, the way in which the first post-independence government formed, meant an intensification of ill-feelings between Protestantism and Catholicism. In this debate, Obote, as a Protestant, was by no means a neutral force. In addition, he could not take Catholic political support for granted, nor could he, after the devastating blow the KY-UPC alliance had delivered to the DP in the pre-independence elections, expect Catholic support for his ideas and programmes as the years went by. Later, the importance of religion on the Ugandan political scene became evident in the extent to which Idi Amin (the only Muslim ever to become president of independent Uganda) feared the Churches as centres of opposition for his rule.

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867 Pirouet 1980: 13, emphasizes the more complex nature of religious antagonisms in Uganda when she argues that “any presentation which suggests that it was a simple matter of Muslims persecuting Christians, or that the churches naturally found themselves united in opposition to an evil regime is truly misleading.”


870 In fact, as argued in the previous chapter, Idi Amin feared Christian opposition so much that, under his rule, small evangelical and Pentecostal churches were even prohibited (Ward 2005).
Furthermore, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)\textsuperscript{871} formed in 1987. With its basis in northern Uganda (the Acholi region), in its guerrilla war waged against the Uganda state and its own people (the Acholi), the LRA has referred to religion as its key motivating force.\textsuperscript{872} More specifically, the LRA, under the leadership of Joseph Kony, claims to have the intention to establish a state based on the Ten Commandments. However, many analysts mean that region rather than religion is the major driving force behind the activities of the LRA and, as such, plays a more important role in the conflict.\textsuperscript{873} More specifically, it has commonly been argued that the social disorder that the National Resistance Movement (NRM), led by current President Museveni, inherited in 1986 after the downfall of the Acholi-led Okello regime, contains the root causes for continued insurgency.\textsuperscript{874} From this perspective, the core of the conflict is argued to ultimately lie in the failure of Ugandan leaders to construct and consolidate a modern state that legitimizes and promotes collective aspirations other than by divide-and-rule tactics.\textsuperscript{875} In fact, still today, many Acholi claim that they have been singled out and treated by Museveni as a negative force, mainly because of their numerical majority in the army of former President Milton Obote.\textsuperscript{876} In addition, the Acholi region, apart from Karamoja, is the laggard of the nation in terms of all basic human development indicators. The proportion of households below the poverty line in the north when compared to the rest of Uganda is not only high, but actually increased from 1997 to 2000, in contrast to other regions. The

\textsuperscript{871} The movement started as the Holy Sprit Movement II, but was later renamed the Lord’s Salvation Army, the United Democratic Christian Force, and finally the Lord’s Resistance Army (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 22).

\textsuperscript{872} Lord’s Resistance Army operates mainly in northern Uganda and parts of Sudan and it’s armed rebellion against the Ugandan government is now one of Africa's longest-running conflicts. The LRA is led by Joseph Kony, who proclaims himself a spirit medium, and apparently wishes to establish a state based on the Ten Commandments. However, it has continuously been questioned whether the LRA in reality has anything to do with religion. Throughout the 1990s, and especially after January 1994, the rebels have plagued Acholi villagers, killing, maiming, burning down houses, and kidnapping thousands of children and forcing them to train as soldiers in Sudan, where the LRA has its bases. Many female children have also been forced into marriage with rebel commanders (Minority at Risk Assessment 2007).

\textsuperscript{873} See, for example, Doom & Vlassenroot 1999; van Acker 2004.

\textsuperscript{874} van Acker 2004. In a parliamentary report written by the ‘Committee on Defence and International Affairs on the War in Northern Uganda’, the quite laconic conclusion was finally reached that ‘The Committee failed to establish the cause or causes for which LRA is fighting’ (from van Acker 2004: 20).

\textsuperscript{875} van Acker 2004: 336.

\textsuperscript{876} ibid. See MAR’s risk assessment of the situation for the Acholi for a further discussion about the relationship between the Ugandan government, the LRA, and the Acholi population in Uganda today (Minorities At Risk Project (MAR) 2007).
dissatisfaction among the Acholi in terms of government policies becomes clear also in the light of voting patterns. The Acholi community votes overwhelmingly anti-National Resistance Movement (and hence anti-Museveni) in local, parliamentary, and presidential elections. During the 1996 election, the LRA even declared a unilateral ceasefire to allow people to campaign and vote for the opposition.\textsuperscript{877}

The idea that region rather than religion has been, and still is, the main driving force behind the activities of the LRA is well in accordance with the overall pattern of ethnic mobilization in Uganda since independence. In general, even if religious cleavages have at times proved to be important for how politics have been conducted in the post-independence period, regional identities have been even more salient. More specifically, as a result of the liberal policy in terms of the granting of ethnic group rights especially to the Baganda, but also to a large number of other territorially-based communities in the independence constitution, Uganda almost did not survive its first years as an independent state. In fact, very soon after independence, territorially-based identities were even more salient in Uganda than they were in most other African countries. That is, in the years following from independence, policies taking tribal-territorial loyalties into account rather than disregarding them were unsuccessfully applied.\textsuperscript{878} Instead of satisfying the demands of sub-national groups, they exacerbated them and during the first few years of independence there was a distinct growth in sub-national appeals.\textsuperscript{879} The mobilization of sub-national loyalties, and particularly of Baganda sub-national sentiments, in turn served to weaken national political leaders and divert resources.\textsuperscript{880} In other words; Uganda had taken its first steps towards state failure. In fact, already by late 1965, one could say that sub-national mobilization had resulted in political decay.\textsuperscript{881}

The increased importance of territorial cleavages after independence can be argued to first have become visible in the ways in which most constitutionally-defined non-monarchical districts tried to gain increased power. That is, having achieved a pseudo-traditional monarch in the 1962 Constitution, the next logical step for the districts was to agitate for federal

\textsuperscript{877} van Acker 2004: 337.
\textsuperscript{878} See Kasfir 1972: 134 for a similar critique.
\textsuperscript{879} ibid: 133.
\textsuperscript{880} Mutibwa 1992: 29.
\textsuperscript{881} Kasfir 1972.
status, which several of them also did. More specifically, in an attempt to achieve some sort of parity with the constitutional kingdoms, many of them appointed district constitutional heads. As such, districts were slowly but steadily transformed into more state-like political organizations with their own constitutional non-hereditary monarch. However, while the mobilization of district separate identities overall evoked quite low levels of organizational activities based mainly on district council and administration as bases of support of the movement, sub-national mobilization was soon to become much more violent.

What can be argued to be the starting shot for the violent history of Uganda was a dispute over the so called ‘lost counties’. The ‘lost counties’ were six territories of Bunyoro granted to Buganda at the end of the nineteenth century in recognition of the military support which the Baganda had given the British in the conquest of Bunyoro. The territories concerned were of great cultural and historical importance to Bunyoro since the tombs of former Bunyoro were located in the area, and more specifically; in the counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi. However, while the Molson Commission had made the recommendation that the counties should be returned to Bunyoro at independence, this had not happened. Instead provisions were made in the 1962 Constitution to hold a referendum later if parliament sanctioned it. In 1964, the parliament decided to hold such a referendum in the ‘lost counties’ so that their inhabitants could decide whether to remain in Buganda or return to Bunyoro, as stipulated in the independence constitution. The Baganda was against the referendum and the issue gradually came to transform the KY-UPC alliance into two opposing parties; the Baganda KY and the non-Baganda UPC. That is, when matters were brought to a head, the factor that had before united the KY-UPC alliance – i.e. a shared concern for the Protestant mission – was evidently not enough to overarch regional cleavages. Rather, each party managed to bridge conflicts over religion, class, and ideology in the aim to secure regional identities. In the end, despite frantic attempts by the Kabaka and his government to influence the outcome of the referendum – for instance by settling the Baganda ex-servicemen on the disputed areas – the inhabitants of the two counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi voted overwhelmingly to join Bunyoro.

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882 ibid: 75.
884 ibid: 27.
885 ibid: 33.
Diverging notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ after independence

As argued by among others Kasfir, the resolution of the ‘lost counties’ controversy undoubtedly contributed to the anxiety of Baganda, who without intension had officially demonstrated their inability to control their own destiny.\textsuperscript{886} Buganda’s prestige was shattered, as were Mengo’s hopes over reconciling itself with Obote and the UPC.\textsuperscript{887} In August 1964, the alliance between KY and UPC was formally dissolved and Obote dismissed the KY members from the government, as well as from ministerial posts they had held up to then.\textsuperscript{888} In the years that followed, relations between Buganda and Obote’s government went from bad to worse. Buganda could not tolerate what it saw as the arrogance of power of Obote’s government in Entebbe; Obote and his UPC, for their part could not remain silent and impotent when the unity of the government was being challenged and flouted by Mengo. Thus, as argued by Mutibwa, Obote’s difficulties in the 1960s were in many ways very similar as the ones Cohen had faced in the 1950s, i.e. how to bring home to Buganda the needs of a united and independent Uganda.\textsuperscript{889} In addition, the ‘lost counties’ issue triggered sub-national sentiments in other parts of the country. More specifically, in the wake of the ‘lost county’ issue, Sebei nationalists organized their followers behind the demand for a separate district and Baamba and Bakonjo leaders began to demand entrenched protection from the Batoro and, when they failed to get it, launched the Rwenzururu movement. In addition, the Bahororo living in Ankole and the Iteso of Bukedi demanded separate districts.\textsuperscript{890} As previously argued, in 1966, in a desperate attempt to secure ‘national unity and public security and tranquility’, Obote eventually seized power by storming Buganda’s capital Mengo.\textsuperscript{891} Subsequently, he also suspended the 1962 Constitution.\textsuperscript{892} Changes were introduced which greatly curtailed the powers of the Kabaka of Uganda and the Lukiiko, as well as of monarchs in general.\textsuperscript{893} In 1967, parliament subsequently adopted a new constitution, which abrogated Buganda’s entrenched privileges and treated the country as a unitary state.

\textsuperscript{886} Kasfir 1972: 106.
\textsuperscript{887} Mutibwa 1992.
\textsuperscript{888} ibid: 34.
\textsuperscript{889} ibid: 38.
\textsuperscript{890} Kasfir 1972: 88-109. Already in October 1963, a motion for a separate district in East Acholi had been proposed but defeated.
\textsuperscript{891} Englebert 2002: 348.
\textsuperscript{892} Mutibwa 1992: 39.
\textsuperscript{893} ibid: 58.
Rather than taking the wind out of regional conflict, Obote’s adoption of a new, ethnically neutral constitution served to further mobilize the regional divides that had been officially recognized at the time of independence. The Baganda reaction to the attack was immediate and angry. More specifically, the Lukiiko rejected the new constitution and on May 20 Mengo ordered the central government to withdraw from Buganda in what was the region’s second attempt to secede. When three Buganda county chiefs were arrested by central government police two days later, the Baganda rioted and attacked police stations.\textsuperscript{894} However, the chiefs in the countryside did, in the end, not live up to their vows to defend the ‘lion of Buganda’, and with their leadership disorganized or paralyzed, the people were hardly in a position to rise against the government, which would have meant marching on the capital where the military scores were being settled. Thus, in the end, Mutesa was failed and abandoned by the people of Buganda who proved to be talkers rather than actors when the chips were down.\textsuperscript{895} Yet, up to today, the political mobilization of regional cleavages have continued to undermine government attempts to mold a sense of shared Ugandan national identity. Especially the Baganda/non-Baganda divide has been particularly severe and manifested itself in, for example, voting patterns and conflict over resources and government positions. The Baganda/non-Baganda divide has moreover manifested itself in a series of isolated attacks, one of them being an assassination attempt on Obote already in 1969, in which he survived miraculously a bullet through the jaw.\textsuperscript{896} After this, Obote felt unable to travel publicly through Buganda. That Baganda sub-nationalism in many ways have remained entire was, in addition, confirmed when General Amin overthrew Obote in 1971. When this happened, Buganda was delirious.\textsuperscript{897} In fact, so salient has the Baganda identity been in the post-independence period, and so widespread the perception of Baganda privileged status among the rest of the population, that most other groups, as well as the central state, in one way or another have been forced to relate to the kingdom. The current Ugandan president, Museveni, integrated himself with the Baganda by sanctioning the return and the coronation of Mutebi II as the thirty-sixth Kabaka of Buganda.\textsuperscript{898} In addition, the 1993 constitution allowed for the restoration of ‘traditional

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{894} Kasfir 1972: 113.
\item \textsuperscript{895} Mutibwa 1992: 40.
\item \textsuperscript{896} Young 1976: 265.
\item \textsuperscript{897} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{898} Ofcansky 1996: 73.
\end{itemize}
Diverging notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ after independence

and cultural’ chiefs.\textsuperscript{899} Since then, Buganda has engaged in a largely successful effort to create itself as a quasi-state institution, and although its lobbying efforts in favor of federalism have so far been in vain, it has by and large succeeded in creating a dual structure of power in its own region.\textsuperscript{898} Since the NRA took over, Mengo’s objective has been the creation of a federal system with Buganda as a member state and in the 1994 elections Baganda leaders campaigned vigorously for federalism.\textsuperscript{901} Parallel to the reinforcement of its local structures, the kingdom has even expanded beyond the national state. In May 2000, the king appointed ‘envoys’ to Britain, Sweden and Kenya. Both the Kabaka and Katikkiro frequently travel abroad, and on some of these occasions behave very much as would government officials.\textsuperscript{902} The state is furthermore highly visible symbolically as expressed in Buganda’s own anthem, flag, national monuments in the form of the Kasubi royal tombs, and rituals of national commemoration such as Lubiri Day, and the anniversary of the storming of Mengo by Obote’s troops.\textsuperscript{903} In fact, as argued by Englebert, “[w]ith a king, a parliament, a government, an administrative structure, buildings, representatives deep in the country and abroad, symbols and an ideology, the kingdom has by and large acquired or recovered most of the political institutions which characterizes states, short of the recognition of its sovereignty by others. The only missing element is an army.”\textsuperscript{904} With continuing Baganda political mobilization, there is also continuing non-Baganda resentment, making the goal of national integration difficult to reach.

\textit{Summing-up: Patterns of ethnic mobilization in Uganda in the post-independence period}

As summarized in Table 6.3, although all post-independence governments in Uganda until recently but Obote’s regime during the first four years of independence have downplayed the role of ethnicity, Ugandans continue to regard their family background as a critically important factor in both their professional and private lives. As such, bureaucrats, business people,

\textsuperscript{899} Englebert 2002: 349.
\textsuperscript{898} ibid: 347.
\textsuperscript{901} ibid: 361.
\textsuperscript{902} ibid: 350.
\textsuperscript{903} ibid: 351.
\textsuperscript{904} ibid.
farmers, and all other Ugandans rely on ethnic considerations to conduct their day-to-day affairs.\textsuperscript{905}

Table 6.3. Empirical evidence of ethnic mobilization in Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>EVIDENCE OF VIOLENT ETHNIC COLLECTIVE ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural networks and organizations</td>
<td>Widespread ethnic voting</td>
<td>Outburst of violent conflict along ethnic lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High degree of intra-ethnic marriages</td>
<td>Widespread ethnic party mobilization</td>
<td>Prolonged armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only limited social bonding across ethnic boundaries</td>
<td></td>
<td>Isolated attacks and riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The organization of (strong) autonomy movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In his categorization of countries in terms of the degree of institutional and violent ethnic conflict, Vanhanen classifies Uganda as a 40 on the measure of institutional conflict and as a 40 on violent conflict. That is, according to Vanhanen’s measure, in Uganda, the share of ethnic parties is 30-49 percent, ethnic organizations cover a significant part of the population, ethnic interest conflicts characterize social life, there is conspicuous ethnic inequality in governmental institutions, large ethnic groups are discriminated, there is repeated violent conflict between ethnic groups or between ethnic groups and government forces, there is suppression of particular ethnic groups, ethnic rebellions, significant ethnic terrorism, and ethnic refugees.\textsuperscript{906} As a result of the official approach towards pre-existing ethnic cleavages adopted at the time of independence, especially regional differences have played an extraordinarily important role for post-independence politics in Uganda. Since independence, every Ugandan government has sought the support of Buganda, the most influential and wealthy province in the country. Needless to say, as a result,

\textsuperscript{905} Ofcansky 1996: 73.
\textsuperscript{906} Vanhanen 1999.
a large number of non-Baganda Ugandans continue to resent what they perceive as special treatment for Buganda. As a result, the Ugandan prospects for a shared national identity are actually not much different today from in 1962. It is also for this reason that repeated attempts to foster national unity have failed and that Uganda has stayed a divided country. That is, in a comparative perspective, Uganda can be argued to have failed both in terms of nation-building and conflict-avoidance.

**Comparative notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the post-independence period**

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore and compare the impact of the degree of multiculturalism specified in key legal and policy documents at the time of independence on notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in post-independence Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda. As summarized in Table 6.4, the analysis reveals that there is a clear relationship between the degree of officially recognized multiculturalism and the construction of notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Table 6.4. Comparative notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the post-independence era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>FORMAL CRITERIA FOR CITIZENSHIP</th>
<th>NOTIONS OF ‘US’ AND ‘THEM’</th>
<th>COMPARATIVE DEGREE OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Combination of neutrality and pure assimilation, some elements of multiculturalism directed towards tribe</td>
<td>Nation-building and conflict-avoidance: National identity politically most important identity, some degree of minority mobilization</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Combination of neutrality and multidimensional multiculturalism (official recognition of regional, tribal, and linguistic cleavages)</td>
<td>Lukewarm support for both ethnic group and nation: Political code-switching between regional, tribal, linguistic, and national identities</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Combination of neutrality and one-dimensional multiculturalism (official recognition of regional cleavages)</td>
<td>Neither nation-building nor conflict-avoidance: Regional identities politically mobilized (specifically the Baganda/non-Baganda divide)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More specifically, the solution adopted by Botswanan leaders, i.e. a combined policy of neutrality and pure assimilation with a few elements of multiculturalism directed towards tribal cleavages, in the end opened up for the development of a to a greater extent shared sense of national identity, based primarily on a shared national language – Setswana (today spoken as a first or second language by 80-85 percent of the population). As such, in the post-independence period, the Botswanan national identity has served the purpose of being the most important political identity. The widespread feeling among the population of being first and foremost Botswana citizens has, in addition, served to prevent the emergence of any more organized forms of political competition between different ethnic groups. For example, while natural resource abundance has appeared to be a curse rather than a blessing for many other countries, Botswana’s extensive diamond resources have not generated any major ethnic conflicts so far. In
fact, the Botswanan state is today even able to tax the diamond industry, an
achievement that works against the well-recognized ‘natural resource curse-
theory’. In addition, there are no overtly ethnic parties in Botswana. Neither
are there any clear patterns of ethnic voting. To the extent that the
mobilization of ethnic interests in fact has occurred it has rather been in the
form of the establishment of political minority cultural organizations and,
in some regards; in attempts to alter existing laws and policies in order to
further advance minority interests with regard to recognition and redistribution. However, as previously argued, among the political minority
groups in Botswana, it is not Botswana citizenship that is in question, but
rather the terms of that citizenship.

In Zambia, the pursuit of neutrality policies in combination with a
multidimensional multicultural approach has resulted in the political
mobilization of multiple and partly overlapping ethnic identities. That is, in
modern Zambia, tribal, regional, linguistic, and national identities all seem
to be more or less equally important for politics. However, since ethnic
identities to a significant extent overlap (i.e. each person can choose from a
repertoire of different ethnic identities), the official recognition of multiple
identities has resulted in a rather complicated dynamics of ethnic self-
definition and ascription. Consequently, the process of ethnic mobilization
in Zambia has been much more complex than in many other African
countries. More specifically, since three, partly overlapping, dimensions of
ethnic identity are available to Zambian political actors – one stemming
from territorial affiliation, one from linguistic affiliation, and one from
tribal affiliation – the calculation surrounding how best to employ ethnicity
as a coalition-building tool has entailed an additional decision in Zambia
compared to in many other countries; that is the question about whether to
stress tribal connections, territorial connections, or linguistic ties. That is,
notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ has not been as clear-cut in Zambia as in, for
example, Uganda. In the end, the Zambian official approach towards ethnic
identity can be argued to have resulted in two clear patterns. On the one
hand, since there is no real consistency or homogeneity in ethnic
preferences, political leaders have found it difficult to mobilize support for
the more violent use of ethnicity. On the other hand, despite the successful
avoidance of violent ethnic conflict, different from the citizens of
Botswana, Zambians do not seem to share any real sense of national
identity. That is, while ethnic identities are not completely indivisible in
Zambia, they still attract enough support in order to undermine the
potential for any stronger overarching national identity to develop.

Finally, in Uganda, the granting of power-sharing rights to a number of
kingdoms in the independence constitution and the granting of semi-
autonomous status to a large number of districts alongside with neutrality policies directed towards language and religion can be argued to have been the starting shot for many of the problems Uganda have faced since then in terms of national integration. More specifically, as a result of the Ugandan official approach towards ethnic diversity, regional identities soon became the most important political identities. As a result of that Buganda drew the winning ticket in the federal lottery, notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ have, in particular, circled around the Baganda/non-Baganda divide. More specifically, since independence, the Baganda/non-Baganda divide has manifested itself in voting patterns, conflict over resources and government positions, prolonged violent conflict, and in a series of isolated attacks. In addition, the extensive group rights granted to Buganda at the time of independence laid the basis for the continued importance of Baganda sub-national sentiments. In fact, so salient has the Baganda/non-Baganda divide been that, since independence, every Ugandan government has sought the support of Buganda. Needless to say, as a result, a large number of non-Baganda Ugandans have continued to resent what they perceive as special treatment for Buganda. That is, by and large, the Ugandan prospects for a shared national identity are not much different today from in 1962. It is also for this reason that repeated attempts to foster national unity have failed and that Uganda has stayed a divided country.

In sum, in comparison, if the aim is to avoid the political mobilization of ethnic cleavages and promote the development of a shared national identity, in the end making it possible to build a comparatively strong tax state, there seems to be reason to adopt policies of pure assimilation. Furthermore, while policies of neutrality seem to prevent the politicization of ethnic cleavages, they do not to the same extent as policies of pure assimilation stimulate the emergence of a sense of shared belonging. In this sense, the Botswanan approach towards ethnic diversity – to a comparatively greater extent favoring policies of assimilation – led to the outcome least characterized by political competition along ethnic lines. Compared to Botswana, both Zambia and Uganda to a significantly greater extent officially recognized the existence of ethnic diversity. As a result, both countries to a much greater extent failed to encourage the development of a shared national identity among the population. However, when comparing Uganda and Zambia in terms of the degree of ethnic mobilization, it is still possible to discern significant differences between the two countries. More specifically, multicultural approaches that recognizes only one dimension of ethnic diversity seem to trigger political mobilization along ethnic lines to a much greater extent than do multicultural approaches recognizing a larger number of ethnic cleavages.
The reason explaining this outcome seems to be the fact that notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ tend to be much less clearly demarcated within a framework of multi-dimensional multiculturalism. As such, patterns of ethnic self-definition and ascription become much more complex and can partly be described in terms of what Amartya Sen has referred to as non-contrasting identities. Distinctive for such identities is precisely the fact that when they are not involved in any disputes about who ‘owns’ the state, they can still compete with each other for attention and priorities. In other words, when one has to do one thing or another, the loyalties can conflict between giving priority to different identities. As such, in the end, the ability for ethnic groups to coordinate activities in such polities becomes much more difficult compared to in polities where only one demarcation line exists. That is, in conclusion, drawing on the analysis conducted on this chapter, if the aim is to encourage the development of a shared national identity and, consequently, the development of a comparatively strong tax state, pure assimilation seems to be the preferable choice, followed by neutrality, multi-dimensional multiculturalism and, finally; one-dimensional multiculturalism. In the following concluding chapter, this discussion is further developed.

Summary and conclusions: Institutions and identity in the politics of taxation

A growing consensus holds that, for a state to be able to govern effectively in general, and collect taxes in particular, it needs the support of its society. In line with this argument, taxation has most commonly been modelled as a collective action dilemma most effectively solved by quasi-voluntary compliance.\footnote{Levi 1988.} Quasi-voluntary compliance is, in turn, argued to depend on the successful establishment of two social contracts.\footnote{Levi 1997.} First, a \textit{vertical} contract must be established between the state and society that guarantees that states keep their bargain, i.e. that taxpayers get sufficient public goods in exchange for the taxes paid and that they get the public goods mix they prefer. Secondly, a \textit{horizontal} contract between citizens must exist that makes sure that other constituents will keep their bargain since, if people expect others to comply, they will themselves comply, but if they expect others to evade or avoid taxes, they will try to do so themselves.\footnote{Levi 1988.} In the end, quasi-voluntary compliance is contingent on both contracts – tax evasion is hence the result of that at least one of these contracts is breached.

Yet, although the conceptualization of taxation as a collective action dilemma most effectively solved by quasi-voluntary compliance in many important ways makes sense, a better specified model of taxation would still include also the a priori factors that can account for differences in the ways
in which social contracts emerge across time and space. Taking this critique seriously, I argue that in order to increase our understanding of varying paths of tax state development, we should more explicitly focus on the role played by the various ways in which the political environment can be affected by socially constructed factors, such as the political mobilization of ethnic group identities. More specifically, in the study, I develop and test a historical institutional argument that relates the formal criteria for citizenship – in the form of the degree of multiculturalism manifested in key legal and policy documents during formative periods of state development – to subsequent notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately, tax state development.

The empirical investigation reveals that the degree of multiculturalism officially recognized in key legal and policy documents during formative periods of state development indeed plays a decisive role in shaping notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately, tax state development. More specifically, by structuring the organization of political parties, political organizations, political conflicts, as well as of the political discourse more generally, political institutions regulating the official manifestation of ethnic diversity help give meaning to ethnic interests and ideas which could otherwise aggregate in multiple alternative forms and configurations. Politically salient ethnic labels, in turn, provide a basis for discussions about fairness and equity that are central within the process of political competition. As such, in the end, varying official manifestations of ethnic diversity provide a starting point for individual and collective actors to evaluate the likely benefits of complying with government demands for taxation.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first discuss the main findings of the study more in detail. Further, I address the extent to which these insights can be exported to other questions. I also consider some predictions and hypotheses that should follow from the main results and the theoretical relationships that we have observed. First, I identify the potential relevance of the findings for other cases in Africa, as well as for other cases in general. I furthermore discuss the potential relevance of the findings for other political and policy questions. After that, I look toward future politics and policy-making in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda. Finally, I discuss potential further implications to be derived from the study.

911 I.e. variation in “[…] the aggregate of a set of relationships between the state executive and state bureaucracy on the one hand, and citizens or taxpayers on the other, manifest in a set of national tax policies and administrative practices” (Lieberman 2003: 39).
Main results

The analysis and evidence presented in the previous chapters of this study reveal the important role played by the formal criteria for citizenship – in the form of the degree of multiculturalism manifested in key legal and policy documents during formative periods of state development – in shaping notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately; tax state development. As such, the study confirms the idea that the ability of states to collect taxes at least to some extent depends upon the state’s bargaining power vis-à-vis its citizens, but it adds specification to this model by revealing the important role played by politically mobilized ethnic identities in shaping consent. Taken together, as summarized in Table 7.1, the analysis reveals how a policy approach combining mainly neutrality and pure assimilation was responsible for a legacy of a comparatively much more effective and progressive tax system in Botswana than was an approach combining mainly neutrality and official recognition of multiple ethnic cleavages (tribe, region, and language) in Zambia, and an approach combining mainly neutrality and official recognition of one ethnic cleavage (region) in Uganda. Moreover, the analysis reveals how this relationship between the formal criteria for citizenship and tax state development is channeled via varying notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and resulting patterns of ethnic mobilization.
Table 7.1. Key findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>OFFICIAL DEFINITION OF CITIZENSHIP</th>
<th>NOTIONS OF ‘US’ AND ‘THEM’</th>
<th>DEGREE OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION</th>
<th>TAXATION PATTERN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Mainly combination of neutrality and pure assimilation</td>
<td>National Botswanan identity the most important basis for political mobilization (Botswanan citizens versus non-Botswanan citizens)</td>
<td>Comparatively low degree of ethnic mobilization</td>
<td>Comparatively strong tax state (average central government income tax collections/GDP 1999-2003: 26.4 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Mainly combination of neutrality and official recognition of multiple ethnic cleavages (tribal, linguistic and regional)</td>
<td>Complex dynamics of ethnic self-definition and ascription (National, tribal, linguistic and regional cleavages all important, but not necessarily contrasting, bases for political mobilization)</td>
<td>Average degree of ethnic mobilization (relatively speaking)</td>
<td>Average tax state (average central government income tax collections/GDP 1999-2003: 7.2 percent) (relatively speaking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Mainly combination of neutrality and official recognition of regional cleavages only</td>
<td>Regional identities the most important bases for political mobilization (especially Baganda versus non-Baganda)</td>
<td>Comparatively high degree of ethnic mobilization</td>
<td>Comparatively weak tax state (average central government income tax collections/GDP 1999-2003: 2.1 percent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More specifically, in Botswana, a combined approach towards citizenship characterized mainly by neutrality and pure assimilation, eventually allowed for the development of a comparatively strong sense of a shared national identity, in the end making citizens more inclined to comply with central government demands for taxation. Assimilation policies, in other words, to a comparatively greater extent seem to facilitate the development both of a social contract between the state and its citizens and a social contract between citizens than other approaches. In Zambia, on the other hand, an overall approach combining mainly neutrality and the official recognition of multiple ethnic cleavages (regional, linguistic, and tribal) resulted in a comparatively complex dynamics of ethnic self-
definition and ascription. That is, the overall Zambian approach favored the development of only partly indivisible ethnic identities. As such, while today regional, linguistic, and tribal cleavages all serve as bases for political competition in Zambia, such loyalties are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Accordingly, they do not either pose the same kind of direct threat to the development of cooperative state-society relations and, ultimately, the tax state, as do regional identities in Uganda. Rather, in Zambia, a lukewarm support for a variety of ethnic identities seems to co-exist with an equally lukewarm support for the nation-building project. That is, in Zambia, regional, tribal, linguistic, and national identities can partly be described in terms of what Amartya Sen has referred to as non-contrasting identities.912

Distinctive for such identities is that when they are not involved in any disputes about who ‘owns’ the state, they can still compete with each other for attention and priorities. In other words, when one has to do one thing or another, the loyalties can conflict between giving priority to, in the case of Zambia, region, language, tribe, and nation. Consequently, compared to Botswana, while citizens in Zambia to some extent comply with tax demands, people are still not willing to sacrifice as much as in Botswana. However, compared to the Uganda state, the Zambian state must still be considered successful. In Uganda, the adoption of a combined approach of mainly neutrality and one-dimensional multiculturalism (regional cleavages being the only ones officially recognized) at the time of independence has severely undermined all subsequent attempts to foster a sense of national unity. Rather, the Ugandan approach favored the development of a clear demarcation line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the form of regional cleavages. As such, the post-independence period in Uganda can best be described in terms of the ongoing dispute between different regionally-based ethnic groups (and especially between Baganda and non-Baganda) regarding who should be the ‘legitimate’ owner of the state, severely constraining the central state in its attempts to consolidate its authority in general, and to collect taxes in particular.

Taken together, based on the analysis conducted in this study, if the aim is to establish a strong tax state, a combination of neutrality and one-dimensional multiculturalism seems to be the least favorable option, a combination of neutrality and multi-dimensional multiculturalism the second best option, and a combination of neutrality and pure assimilation the best option.

Beyond Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda

The analysis and evidence presented in this study both confirm and contradict a large number of prior beliefs and existing knowledge about state development in general, and African state development in particular.\footnote{According to George Tsebelis, the value of social scientific explanations may best be measured by the degree to which they force us to re-evaluate our prior beliefs (Tsebelis 1997).}

First, on a more general level, my analysis of tax state development confirms what also others have found: Political institutions matter a great deal when it comes to forming and setting the incentive structures for subsequent development paths. More specifically, political institutions structure politics by influencing individuals’ subjective models of the world, by making the development of certain types of organizations and coalitions more likely than others, and by shaping patterns of politics for long periods of time, also after the initial conditions have changed. Perhaps especially exciting are these results if we consider that they are derived from the African context which in many ways can be considered a harsh test for institutional theory. As argued in chapter one, it has often been claimed that an institutional perspective is inappropriate in the African context since ‘the lack of stable and strong political institutions is precisely what characterizes many African states’. The results of this study strongly oppose such a claim. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while colonial patterns of state construction have in general continued to constrain African states severely, the Botswanan, Zambian, and Ugandan experiences still demonstrate that also African political institutions have the potential to function as strong and at least partly autonomous actors. Accordingly, the results of this study support researchers such as for example Keller who has stressed the importance of looking upon the post-colonial African state as a potentially autonomous political actor whose primary objective is survival.\footnote{Keller 1983: 253.} That is, just as their industrialized siblings, African states – intentionally or unintentionally – play an important role in fostering development, via political institutions.

Secondly, by demonstrating how political institutions established during formative periods of state development cast a long shadow on future social and political developments even once the initial conditions have changed, the results of this study specifically provide a strong defense of the tenets of historical institutional theory. The Ugandan case is probably the most
powerful example of the important role played by political institutions established during critical junctures. The overall combined approach of mainly neutrality and one-dimensional multiculturalism adopted at the time of independence in Uganda was only in place for four years. After that, until recently, all subsequent governments have tried to downplay the importance of ethnicity by adopting policies of neutrality only. Yet, as argued in chapter six, regional identities have since the time of independence played an extraordinarily important role for politics in Uganda also after the initial conditions changed. Accordingly, since independence, every Ugandan government has sought the support of Buganda, the most influential and wealthy province in the country. As a result, a large number of non-Baganda Ugandans continue to resent what they perceive as special treatment for Buganda. It is also for this reason that repeated attempts to foster national unity have failed and that Uganda has stayed a divided country. That is, while the exact idioms used for politics have changed, the political institutions established at the time of independence in Uganda, as well as in Botswana and Zambia, have continued to exist in form of the ideas and myths that sprung from the initial conditions, reinvented and adapted to new circumstances over time, hence setting in motion path-dependent processes of tax state development.

Thirdly, by highlighting the important role played by political institutions in shaping not only tax state development, but also notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the results of the study reveals the limits of today’s generally claimed ‘truth’, assuming that ethnic diversity is per se a threat to the nation-state. This finding is, in turn, as relevant for scholars interested in violent ethnic conflict as for scholars interested in state development more in general. As argued in chapter four, at the time of independence, all three societies in focus of this study were ethnically diverse. Yet, after independence, ethnicity has still played a very different role in shaping state development in the different countries. In Botswana, the response to ethnic diversity in the form of an overall combined approach of mainly neutrality and pure assimilation led to a situation characterized by, in comparison, only a limited degree of ethnic mobilization. That is, compared to the Zambian and Ugandan approaches, the Botswanan approach was considerably more successful in producing a demarcation line between ‘us’ and ‘them’
Summary and conclusions

primarily drawn between Botswana citizens and non-Botswana citizens.\footnote{However, this is not to say that in Botswana ethnicity does not at all matter for politics. As discussed in chapter six, especially recent years have seen the increased importance of ethnic identities as bases for political action.} In stark contrast, the overall combined approach of neutrality and recognition of one ethnic cleavage (region) in Uganda, favored the production of a clear demarcation line between friends and enemies within the territorial boundaries of the national political community. In fact, twice since independence, regional identities have been a major factor contributing to extreme disorder – even civil war – in Uganda: 1966 and 1978-1982.\footnote{Jackson & Rosberg 1982: 5.} The more Buganda pressed its own dominance or autonomy, the more other groups tried to combine to hold it in check – or to assert an equivalent political coherence. Regional identities as such became a central factor in Ugandan politics and became bound up in these conflicts, partly because there was somewhat greater cultural similarity within each region, but also because the southern regions, particularly Buganda and the east, achieved greater economic development and thus had more in the way of social services, schools, hospitals, and jobs than did the west or especially the north.\footnote{Kasfir 1998.} As such, Uganda stands out among the three countries of interest for this study being the only one that has experienced more advanced forms of violent ethnic conflict. Finally, in Zambia, an overall combined approach of mainly neutrality and the official recognition of a large number of partly overlapping ethnic cleavages (region, language, and tribe) helped to produce a situation in which it has been comparatively difficult to distinguish between friends and foes. As a result, Zambia falls somewhere in between Botswana and Uganda in terms of the degree of ethnic mobilization.

Considering the different outcomes in terms of ethnic mobilization after independence despite great similarities in terms of ethnic diversity and mobilization before independence, it seems quite reasonable to draw the conclusion that political institutions rather than ethnic diversity per se are what structure patterns of ethnic competition within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. However, even though political institutions seem to play quite a decisive role in this sense, the analysis of post-independence patterns of ethnic mobilization conducted in chapter six still reveals the potential impact of other factors. Especially the situation in Botswana should make us wary in this regard. More specifically, as argued in chapter six, despite a strong preponderance on behalf of Botswana’s
government towards assimilation of ethnic minorities into Tswana language and culture, and despite the success to avoid ethnic mobilization for a long period of time, since the beginning of the 1980s, antagonism in the voices of some political minorities (i.e. non-Tswana tribal groupings) has begun to be audible.\footnote{Solway 2004: 137. See chapter six.} How can we understand this? There are two explanations that seem to be more likely than others. The first explanation would be that assimilation has a ‘best before date’, and that the effects of such a policy fade over time. The second explanation is not necessarily separate from the first one but emphasizes the role played by international norms in shaping national responses. Over the last two decades, the claims for minority rights have become audible not only in Botswana but world-wide, and minority rights protection is today an integral part of international human rights law.\footnote{Minority rights cover protection of existence, protection from discrimination and persecution, protection and promotion of identity, and participation in political life. Subsequent human rights standards that codify minority rights include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 27), the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, two Council of Europe treaties (the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages), and the OSCE Copenhagen Document of 1990.} Increasingly, the active protection of minority rights is often demanded by the international community if states are to be granted international aid. Seen in this light, it is perhaps easier to understand the concessions towards minorities made by the Botswanan state in the last few years.\footnote{See chapter five.}

In addition to questioning the notion that ethnic diversity is a threat to nation-states \emph{per se}, the results of this study force us to question also another commonly held belief about the relationship between ethnicity, ethnic mobilization, and state development and that is the belief that the \emph{type} of ethnic cleavage matters for the degree of ethnic mobilization.\footnote{See chapter two.} At the time of independence, regional cleavages were officially recognized in both Zambia and Uganda. Yet, such cleavages have served as a basis for political mobilization to a much greater extent in Uganda than in Zambia. How can we understand this fact? The most plausible explanation is that it is the \emph{degree} of multiculturalism –– i.e. the \emph{number} of ethnic cleavages officially recognized –– rather than which dimensions of ethnicity that are recognized, that determines the degree to which ethnic group identity serves as a basis for political mobilization. Socially, individuals most often have multiple identities, i.e. they recognize themselves as members of a large number of
different groups. If the state responds to such facts ‘on the ground’ by recognizing individuals as members of a large number of different groups, this leads to a more complex pattern of ethnic self-identification and ascription compared to in polities in which only one cleavage line is recognized. As the demarcation line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ becomes unclear, group mobilization becomes difficult. The result is a weaker degree of group mobilization compared to in political systems where only one ethnic cleavage is officially recognized. This result works against the commonly held presumption that ‘the more ethnic diversity, the bigger the problem’. However, comparing recognition to non-recognition, assimilation still seems to be the safest path to follow towards the development of a shared national identity.

Finally, in addition to emphasizing the importance of political institutions regulating the ethnic boundaries of citizenship in shaping notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the degree of ethnic mobilization and, ultimately; taxation outcomes, the analysis and evidence presented in the previous chapters reveal the limited explanatory power of a number of potential rival explanations to why states vary in terms of taxation outcomes, such as modernization, bureaucratic capacity, and the establishment of trustworthy state institutions. While some of these alternative explanations have produced a number of important insights, there are still a number of pieces missing if we fully want to understand the puzzle of why states vary in terms of taxation outcomes. With this study, we are yet one step further towards this goal.

Implications for policy areas beyond taxation

While the main focus of this study has been how the formal criteria for citizenship in the form of the degree of multiculturalism manifested in key legal and policy documents shape taxation outcomes, there is reason to consider the potential impact of such institutions also on other policy outcomes. As previously argued by Levi and Lieberman, the most obvious choice would be to consider the area of conscription for military service.\textsuperscript{922} Other key research areas would include the influence of definitions of the national political community on the expenditure side of the welfare state.\textsuperscript{923}

\textsuperscript{922} See Levi 1997; Lieberman 2003.
\textsuperscript{923} See Miguel 2004; Miguel & Gugerty 2005 for interesting studies on the relationship between ethnic diversity, nation-building policies, and public goods provision in Kenya and Tanzania. See Banting &
As argued by Lieberman, although the expenditure side of the budget does not involve a demand for sacrifice, the challenge of allocating scarce community resources still involves questions about distributive justice and collective identity that are central to the argument developed in this study.924

In addition, there seems to be good reason to consider the impact of official multiculturalism on democratic development. At the time of independence, the hopes were high in terms of the prospects for democratic development in all three countries in focus of this study. However, today, the situation is quite different. According to Freedom House, Botswana is today the only country of the three considered to be free, having a combined average rating of political rights and civil liberties of 2.925 It is an electoral democracy being considered to have both free and fair elections, as well as a free and vigorous press. Equivalent to its position in terms of tax state development, Zambia falls somewhere in between Botswana and Uganda in terms of democratic development. According to the Freedom House, Zambia has a combined average rating of 3.5 and, as such, is considered partly free.926 While today an electoral democracy, since independence, Zambia has had systems of both one-party and multi-party rule. However, compared to Botswana, the Zambian political system is fraught with considerably more corruption, unclear election rules, and duress directed towards the opposition. Further, even if freedom of speech is constitutionally guaranteed, the government often restricts this right in practice. Finally, in terms of democracy too, Uganda is the least developed, having a combined average rating of 4.5 (also this rate considered to be partly free).927 As a result of the political instability in the years following its independence, democracy was increasingly eroded already during the first period of Obote’s rule until it disappeared.928 Ever since, Uganda has remained an undemocratic country in most regards. In fact, until 2005 there was a long-standing ban on political party activity within the framework of a so-called ‘no-party democracy’.929

Kymlicka for a further discussion on the relationship between the recognition of ethnic group rights and redistributive policies in developed democracies (Banting & Kymlicka 2006).

924 Lieberman 2003.
925 Freedom House 2007a. A combined average rating of 1-2.5 means free, of 3-5 partly free and 5.5-7 not free.
926 Freedom House 2007c.
927 Freedom House 2007b.
928 ibid. See, in addition, Munibwa 1992.
How can then these varying paths of democratic development be potentially attributed to the political institutions established at the time of independence under scrutiny in this study? In general, it has been argued that ethnic divisions play a major role in democratic development. In fact, in many parts of the world, ethnic divisions have been sufficiently threatening to prompt governments to control political participation severely out of fear that they would otherwise jeopardize their command of the state.\textsuperscript{930} The Ugandan state provides a good example of such a case. As argued by Kasfir, to understand the NRM's use of no-party democracy, it is necessary to know something about the nature and origins of political sectarianism. In fact, the NRM's initial premise to introduce a no-party democracy was that competition among the old parties exacerbated sectarian tendencies, and hence could never produce democracy.\textsuperscript{931} In general, African politics have been argued to be characterized by the opposition of governments to competitive party systems as well as their preference for political monopoly generally and their attack on political liberties (among other things).\textsuperscript{932} Yet, once again, it seems to be far too easy to automatically draw the conclusion that ethnic diversity is the problem per se. A more plausible conclusion would rather be that political institutions regulating the official manifestation of ethnic diversity play a role in shaping ethnic competition and, ultimately; democratic development. Potentially, the relationship could in addition be affected by the intervening variable of taxation abilities. As argued in chapter one, a large literature has pointed at a potential relationship between weak tax capacities and undemocratic and bad quality government.\textsuperscript{933} To the degree that I am right in my brief analysis of the potential origins of varying paths of democratic development in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda, this should strengthen the incentives to further look at the relationship between, tax capacity and democratic governance on the one hand, and political institutions regulating the official boundaries of the public sphere and democratic development on the other. While both these potential relationships have been widely discussed in the literature, especially the discussion on the relationship between assimilation and multiculturalism respectively and democracy has been almost exclusively of a philosophical character. More specifically, multiculturalism policies have remained controversial among

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{930} Jackson & Rosberg 1982; Kasfir 1976.
  \item \textsuperscript{931} Kasfir 1998.
  \item \textsuperscript{932} See Jackson & Rosberg 1982 for a further discussion on this subject.
  \item \textsuperscript{933} For a review of some of this literature, see Moore 2007.
\end{itemize}
political philosophers in the sense that they have been argued to be inherently inconsistent with basic liberal-democratic principles. The short analysis of the subject offered above at least to some extent supports such a claim. However, more research is needed if we should be able to answer this question in more detail.

**Implications for future development**

A common critique directed against the institutional perspective in general, and against the historical institutional perspective in particular, is that it cannot account very well for variation over time.\(^{934}\) Since institutional theories share an emphasis on finding order and stability, comprehensiveness and coherence, and patterns and models that elucidate more or less general propositions about a class of political phenomena, they run into trouble in accounting for political change. As argued by Robert C. Lieberman: “How, after all, can we explain change in outcomes by reference to stable causes?”\(^{935}\) The focus of this study has admittedly been the long-term effects of early policy choices. As such, similar to other historical institutional analyses, it has emphasized the consistency of cross-country variation rather than overtime variation. Yet, of course, the analysis of the past presented in this study would for sure be more useful if it could shed some light also on the future, in particular with regard to the possibilities and prospects for change. In particular for Uganda, the story of tax state development told in this study can appear depressing rather than promising. In Zambia and Botswana too a large amount of the potential tax revenue remains outside the tax net. As was discussed in chapter three, legacies of path-dependent development tend to be reinforced through multiple mechanisms, also after the initial conditions have changed. For Uganda, the consequences of such path-dependent effects have been that, while the exact idioms used for politics changed already four years after independence, the very same institutions have still continued to exist in form of the ideas and myths that sprung from the initial conditions, leaving Uganda with seemingly little hope of change. Nonetheless, the findings still provide significant analytic leverage for thinking about the future. As argued by Lieberman, the impact of early critical junctures can be expected to diminish over time.\(^{936}\) Consequently, there are good reasons to believe

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\(^{934}\) Steinmo et al. 1992.

\(^{935}\) Lieberman 2002.

\(^{936}\) Lieberman 2003.
that change in the tax relationship between different groups is both possible and likely in all three societies. In addition, later specifications of the political community could at least to some extent form the basis for producing collective sacrifice. As such, it is not unconceivable that the adoption of the overall neutral approach in Uganda in 1966 could in the long run succeed in terms of taking the wind out of regional conflict, and that inter-ethnic controversies could eventually change in favor of some common, civic, national identity. However, up to today, it remains difficult to foresee when such a change may take place. In fact, in the light of the ‘new’ international human rights agenda, it remains uncertain whether either of the states can at all adopt anything else than a multicultural approach in the future, which in turn may potentially further increase the incentives for ethnic mobilization. The move towards increased multiculturalism in Botswana supports such a claim. At the same time, as discussed previously in this chapter, the fact that the voices of minorities have begun to become increasingly heard in the public debate in Botswana may be in support of the thesis that institutions in fact have a ‘best-before-date’, and that the effects of them will, as such, diminish over time.

**Outlook**

As argued in chapter one, the need for a deeper understanding of how the degree of multiculturalism officially recognized in key legal and policy documents structure politics could not be more urgent. Despite the fact that almost all states today are, or claim to be, nation-states, and do hence subscribe to the legitimating doctrine of national sovereignty, very few states have nations in terms of what the word actually implies; i.e. “an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history.” This counts for the more well-established states too. In the industrialized parts of the world, increased immigration during the past few decades have transformed the societies and, as a consequence, partly altered the ‘nation’ subsumed into the realm of the state. While the change towards more diversified societies has often been considered most dramatic for the states in the before more or less ethnically and culturally homogenous Western European countries, traditional immigration countries such as the U.S. and Canada have in fact experienced an even more significant increase

938 Definition taken from Kymlicka 1995: 18.
in terms of new groups of people entering the countries. The last years actually saw record numbers of people moving into the OECD countries in general and into the Commonwealth countries in particular. That is, while territorial boundaries have persisted, nations have not. Furthermore, an integrated European Union will be an area with a high degree of ethnic fragmentation. Along with this “new” reality, the discussion concerning how diverse states should best be governed has grown increasingly loud and infected. While, for some observers, the general lack of fit between political and ethno-cultural boundaries is at complete odds with the very idea of the nation-state, and hence argued to constitute a threat to the strength and survival to the nation-state per se, the general debate on the subject has rather been concerned with how policies directed towards ethnic and immigrant groups should be designed as to best forge a sense of nationhood. However, while over the past fifteen years, communitarians and liberals have time and again engaged in philosophical discussions over the importance of individual and group rights, pluralism, self-determination, and nationalism, as means in order to forge a sense of community and belonging among diverse populations, these debates have only rarely engaged empirical social science research. As a result, the understanding of what kind of policies that have the potential to generate a sense of shared belonging, or nationhood, as well as an empirical understanding of those policies that do not have such potentials, is still rather limited.

This study has moved one step closer to a fuller understanding of the relationship between states and nations by revealing the important role played by political institutions regulating the ethnic boundaries of citizenship in shaping notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, ultimately; varying national trajectories of tax state development in post-independence sub-Saharan Africa. More specifically, the analysis and evidence presented in this study reveal the comparative advantage of assimilation over multi- and uni-dimensional multiculturalism in producing a sense of shared national identity and, consequently; a comparatively strong tax state. Considering the overall comparative weakness of African political institutions at the time of

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939 The United States admitted more than a million permanent immigrants in 2001 and 2002, 25% more than in 2000. The stocks of foreign-born population in the Commonwealth countries in the beginning of the 21st century were about 20 percent of the total population in all Commonwealth countries except the United States, where the foreign-born population was about 11 percent of the total population. While the stock of foreign-born population varies more among Western European countries, there has been a significant increase in immigration also in these countries since the mid-1990s. In 2001 and 2002, several European countries admitted about 15 percent more immigrants compared to in 2000. Only Japan, Korea and Northern Europe saw smaller increases (OECD 2004b).
independence, there is good reason to believe that the adoption of similar institutions in other contexts and at different points in time would have decisive effects. That is, as long as the world system continues to be structured on the basis of nation-states, official definitions of the national political community will continue to have important political impact. As argued by Lieberman; when new states are constructed or when opportunities arise to alter definitions of the national political community within existing states, political elites must choose which approach to adopt.  

Yet, there is every reason to be careful in terms of policy prescriptions. As previously argued, the historical institutional perspective put a heavy emphasis on both the timing and sequencing of policies. When Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda specified the formal criteria for citizenship that later on proved to have such decisive effects on subsequent paths of tax state development, they were all comparatively very weak states and they all underwent periods of formative political change. Accordingly, it cannot be taken for granted that similar policies as the ones adopted in Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda at the time of independence would have the same effects, or as decisive effects, in other contexts and at other points in time. The fact that it is often easier to identify critical junctures after they have taken place than when they are actually occurring further complicates the task of what policy prescriptions to derive from this study. Yet, should it be the case that a particular state finds itself in a similar position as did Botswana, Zambia, and Uganda at the time of independence, there is reason to believe that an approach towards citizenship not recognizing ethnic diversity would be more fruitful in terms of fostering a sense of national identity than would a multicultural approach.

Apart from the discussion about the potential effects of assimilative and multicultural policies in other contexts and at other periods in time, there is another question that remains unanswered, namely whether all states should be recommended to adopt assimilative policies presuming they have positive effects for tax state development independently of context. As always when more complex policy areas are dealt with, there is not necessarily a straightforward answer to this question.

As argued by Okin, until the past few decades, ethnic minority groups were typically expected to assimilate into majority cultures. However, this assimilationist expectation is now often considered inherently oppressive

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940 Lieberman 2003: 283.
and discriminatory, and many countries are seeking to devise new policies that are more responsive to persistent cultural differences and, as argued, more compatible with the pursuit of democratic politics. The main argument here has been that assimilative policies are oppressive since they ultimately require the promotion of a specific conception of the good, which can only be done through the oppressive use of state power, since individuals could not be expected to converge on such a conception by free will.\textsuperscript{942} As noted by Kymlicka and Norman, assimilation has also gone out of favor amongst most Western theorists.\textsuperscript{943} In fact, in many ways assimilation is problematic, even oppressive, and of course especially for political minorities. For example, many studies have demonstrated how children that are not allowed to learn to read and write in their mother tongue also have greater difficulties learning to read and write other languages. This, in turn, lead to difficulties for the children in learning other subjects as well. In the end, this may lead to that these children are not able to attain higher education. Since in many countries, higher education is still intimately connected not only to the possibility to engage in community and democratic activities, but also to a higher economic standard, forced assimilation risks leading to the social marginalization of large segments of the population. A recent debate that well reflects these fears of assimilation is the debate that preceded and followed the passing of the “English for the Children” Proposition 227 in California in 1998 which promotes “English-only” in all government services, including education, for both immigrant and resident language minority groups. In addition, studies have pointed to the fact that many people who are deprived from fully living out their identity in the public sphere feel deprived of their own personal identity. Tajfel has for example argued that while all individuals strive to maintain or enhance their self-esteem in the form of a positive self-concept, this is in turn derived from the social categories to which they perceive themselves as belonging.\textsuperscript{944}

It cannot be denied that, as a result of the overall assimilative approach pursued in Botswana, the ability of ethnic political minorities to actually enjoy the full benefits of citizenship has, in many ways, been compromised.\textsuperscript{945} Especially less educated members of minority groups have been constrained from fully participating since they do often not know the

\textsuperscript{942} Mason 1999: 266.
\textsuperscript{943} Kymlicka & Norman 2000.
\textsuperscript{944} Tajfel 1972.
\textsuperscript{945} Solway 2004: 135.
appropriate language, codes or behavioral rules that make this possible.\textsuperscript{946} That is, assimilation is in many ways related to the political and economic marginalization of large segments of the population. Yet, as this study illustrates, depending on the perspective, at least from some aspects it is still possible to defend assimilation. In a country like Uganda, both majorities and minorities have suffered tremendously due to the one-dimensional multicultural solution ultimately constructed by elites at the time of independence and that recognized the importance of regional cleavages for politics. The Ugandan state is up to today beyond fragile, unable to coordinate itself for the easiest of purposes, let alone tax collection. In Zambia too, the population has, if yet not to the same extent as in Uganda, suffered enormously from the implications of state weakness, and perhaps especially in terms of widespread poverty. As previously argued, in addition to being dangerous to their own populations, weak states are potentially threats also to other populations and to the stability of the world system in large. In addition, if we compare policies of assimilation to other types of policies that have traditionally been employed by states in order to prevent ethnic mobilization, assimilation in many ways stands out as the more sympathetic alternative. For example, referring to the Western European context, Leo Kuper noted that the modern state’s monopoly of sovereignty over a territory that was, in reality, culturally plural and economically stratified, created both the desire and the power to commit genocide.\textsuperscript{947} It has moreover commonly been argued that, at the time for state formation in Western Europe, it was by and large the dynamics of interstate war that served as a “filter” by eliminating weak or non-viable political arrangements.\textsuperscript{948} In this light, assimilation can perhaps still –– together with other important institutional and structural factors such as modernization, the increased trustworthiness of government institutions, and urbanization – be considered one of the better alternatives among a large number of even worse ones.

\textsuperscript{946} See ibid: 136 for this argument. As also argued by Solway, some of the most subjugated minorities, such as the San, also experience stark material deprivation as a result of government assimilationist policy. Compared to other minority groups, there are very few San that have found their way into the national bourgeoisie. As a result, in their case, ethnic status is largely homologous to class status (Solway 2004: 136).

\textsuperscript{947} Kuper 1981.

\textsuperscript{948} Tilly 1990; Herbst 2003: 166.
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