An analysis of the dispute process regarding high-level nuclear waste repository siting in Toyo-cho, Japan: Decisive factors in the dispute and roles of the governments and experts

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Abstract
The siting policy of HLW repository in Japan was “application-based” until 2007 and Toyo-cho is the only municipality which applied for the Literature Survey. In Toyo-cho, however, a serious antagonism among citizens occurred and the application was withdrawn after the mayor was replaced by election. Our detailed analysis of the process based on the methods of political science and psychology shows five decisive factors: 1) opposing activists both in the town and from outside successfully changed citizens’ perceptions of HLW by rhetorical expressions, 2) the mayor lacks careful actions and effective policy adviser, 3) NUMO, an organization which runs HLW projects, didn’t effectively coordinate Toyo-cho and stakeholders, 4) the municipal government and council exercised very limited influences on the dispute despite their political authority, and 5) the existence of grant adversely influenced the citizens since it causes criticism that Toyo-cho applies a repository for grant. We finally conclude that the substantial problems, caused by the five decisive factors, were the propagation of enthusiastic opposition and the lack of peaceful deliberation based on local governance. In order to avoid enthusiastic opposition and to realize responsible decision making, or negotiation, we suggest that A) active and prompt response of experts, especially political/administrative ones, to radical opposing activities, B) solution to the adverse influence of the grant by the government’s agenda setting, and C) careful design and use of “democratic” decision making procedure are important.

1. Introduction
Based on the Designated Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Act enacted in May 2000, Japan adopts the four-step repository siting process, which consists of 1) the Literature Survey (2 years), 2) the Preliminary Investigation (4 years), 3) the Detailed Investigation (15 years), and 4) the site selection for...
repository construction, and the “application-based” (voluntary) siting policy regarding the high-level radioactive waste (HLW) management. The Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan (NUMO), which was established in October 2000 based on the Designated Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Act and operates the radioactive waste management, has invited applications from mayors of municipalities for the Literature Survey since 2002. Applying municipalities, or “candidates”, will receive the Grants for development of area locating electric power stations that amount about 2 billion JPY (1 billion per year) in the Literature Survey and at most 7 billion JPY (2 billion per year) in the Preliminary Investigation. (The amount of grant after the Detailed Investigation will be determined by law in future.) The funds for the grants and the HLW final disposal, reserved by the electric power companies, are to be administered by Radioactive Waste Management Funding and Research Center (RWMC), and RWMC reimburses the funds based on NUMO’s requirements with the approval of the government. Although some municipalities have considered applications for the Literature Survey since 2002, either in municipal councils or at mayors’ discretion, none of them has sent the application to NUMO.

In January 2007, Toyo-cho, Kochi Prefecture applied for the Literature Survey, which was the first and has been the only case so far in Japan. The application and the dispute, however, resulted in a serious antagonism among residents, a strong campaign to collect opposing signatures, the mayor’s resignation, and finally, the withdrawal by the new mayor. The dispute made the residents too enthusiastic to deliberate the issue and caused the later trouble of latent chasm. Lessons about decisive factors influencing dispute regarding HLW repository siting should be learned from this case so that similar antagonism and problems can be avoided in other future applying municipalities.

This research, thus, aims at 1) describing the dispute process regarding HLW repository siting in Toyo-cho, 2) identifying decisive factors of the “failure”, and 3) finding substantial problems/factors of the Japan’s HLW repository siting policy/procedure. First, the dispute process from the beginning, the mayor’s “confidential” attempt of application in March 2006, to the replacement of mayor by election in April 2007 is summarized based on the literature reviews, newspaper reviews and interview surveys. Second, decisive factors that influenced the dispute process and caused the withdrawal of the application are discussed based on our analysis of causal relationships between events/actions in the process. Finally, substantial problems or factors that the Japan’s HLW repository siting policy or its procedure involves are suggested.

2. Method

There have basically been two kinds of perspective to analyze radioactive waste repository siting process: 1) analyzing factors that affect local acceptance or decision making, for instance by covariance structure analysis or policy attitude modeling based mainly on quantitative data (Chung and Kim, 2009; Sjöberg, 2004; Kunreuther, et al., 1990) and 2) analyzing decisive/substantial factors that influence, or even control, policy or dispute process based on methods of policy analysis (Sherman, 2008; Johnson, 2008; Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007; Pescatore and Vári, 2006; Dawson and Darst, 2006; Gerrard, 1994). We employ policy process analysis based on the post-empiricist, or social constructionist,

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1 In Japan, the law allows mayors of municipalities to apply for the Literature Survey without agreement of governors of prefectures.
perspective in order to shape social explanation and understanding of the dispute process (Fischer, 2003).

The dispute process is described based on the literature reviews regarding the Toyo-cho dispute (Tashima, 2008; Harada, 2007; Masano, 2007; Blogs\(^{ii}\) \(^{iii}\), newspaper reviews (The Kochi Shimbun; The Asahi Shimbun) and interview surveys with residents in Toyo-cho and others concerned with the dispute. The interview surveys were carried out between 2-5 August 2008 in Toyo-cho and 18 November 2008 in Tokyo, and the interviewees were the then mayor Yasuoki Tashima, two town council members, a then director of the Planning, Commerce and Industry Division of Toyo-cho, six influential or core residents of both opposing and promoting groups (including a past chair of the town council), a local newspaper reporter (the head of The Kochi Shimbun’s Muroto city branch), and a director-general of the Siting Public Relation Department of NUMO. The interview was based on semi-structured interview method and took about 1-2.5 hours.

3. Dispute Process in Toyo-cho, Japan\(^{iv}\)

As a result of surveys and analysis into the dispute in Toyo-cho, five key events that had brought the final replacement of the mayor, the withdrawal of application for the Literature Survey, and intense disputes among people which had become a factor of withdrawal of application were revealed. The dispute process in Toyo-cho is described by explaining those events respectively. We then analyze the context and process of those events and identify decisive factors that led to the withdrawal of application.

A) November, 2006: Opposition groups in town and outside the town collaborate to hold independent workshop

In March 2006, being recommended by NPO World Organization of Energy Development, the then mayor Yasuoki Tashima of Toyo-cho had handed in the application for the Literature Survey to build a high-level nuclear radioactive waste disposal site, however, was rejected since it had been confirmed at talk with NUMO, Mayor Tashima and the director of the Planning, Commerce and Industry Division of Toyo-cho and that he had not gained an understanding from the council and the residents. Nevertheless, the mayor had started considering re-application around July, and first reported the investigation for the application on September 10. Since Mayor Tashima deeply understood the severe situation of Toyo-cho (e.g., the decreasing population, the rapid aging, too high rate of households on welfare, shrinking budget, and so on), he got interested in the HLW repository project when he looked at an advertisement on newspaper in 2002 and the same understanding became his motivation to consider seriously the application.

As quite a few opinions both for and against from residents had been reported to councilors after this report, the committee of all councilors agreed on 19 September to hold a briefing session for residents as soon as possible. At this point, they all agreed that they would invite lecturers who are for and against and

\(^{iv}\) In this section, some people’s names are anonymous since we have not had agreement with them. Only when names are reported in official documents, literatures and newspapers, the names are put in the process below. And we use affiliations, positions and titles at the time of the dispute.
study and hold a workshop, and that they would not argue whether they are for or against or whether they should apply or not until the workshop finishes, and the mayor approved. The mayor also requested that the first workshop should be held only for representatives of each organization such as the chamber of commerce, the agricultural cooperative, and the fisheries cooperative, and that the workshop for residents should be held stepwisely. Therefore, workshops were scheduled for representatives from all kind of groups in the town, for administrative/public officials of Toyo-cho, and for the people in district of None and Kannoura on 28, 29 September, and on 11 and 12 October respectively.

On 28, the workshop was held for representatives from all kinds of groups of the town at the main hall in the Town Hall. Invitations had been sent in advance to representatives, however, activists and surfers from outside the town who had not been invited also attended, which made the number of participants 54 organizations and 80 people. Lecturers were Mr. Manabu Uragami, the director-general of the Technology Department of NUMO, Mr. Masanobu Futakuchi, the director-general of the Siting Public Relations Department of NUMO, and Mr. Kyoji Yoshino, the director of the Radioactive Waste Management Policy Office in Agency for Natural Resources and Energy The representative from NUMO explained about technical safety and economic effect such as employment. At a question-and-answer session, one of the people asked about the meaning of ‘respect’ as the lecturer referred that they would ask people for opinions stepwisely and they would respect them after the application. To answer, Mr. Yoshino quoted a statement at the Diet of May 2000, and explained that the project would not be carried out without the consent from the community. Surfers gave an opposing opinion. 30 people attended at the next workshop for the administrative/public officials on 29, and 40 people attended at the workshop under the sponsorship of the chamber of commerce for its members.

The workshops were held in None district on 11 October, and in Kannoura district on 12, and about 100 people attended at each workshop. Lecturers were invited from NUMO, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy and universities. Mr. Yoshino from Agency for Natural Resources and Energy explained the necessity of the nuclear power and Mr. Kazumi Kitayama, the director-general of the Technology Department of NUMO emphasized the safety of formation disposal. Mr. Futakuchi from NUMO made a point of the economic effect for the local community by explaining about the project duration, the cost, and the grant. The mayor explained the significance of the workshop and his opinion at the beginning. The lecturer from NUMO felt at this point that the people of the town trust the mayor and willing to listen to him and that they understood well. On the other hand, interviews by press showed that common responses of the people when they had been told about the project were ‘difficult to understand, scary’, and the puzzlement about receiving the grant.

While these workshops were held, opposition campaigns were going on. The earliest campaign in the town was said to be by Ms. P who is a professional surfer from the town. It is thought that she had made contacts with her colleague surfers on 19 and 20 September to tell about the situation of the application by e-mail and fax and that called for the cessation. This seemed to be the beginning of the opposition campaigns. Surfers were not satisfied that the residents were taking no action against the project while they

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Toyo-cho has a very good and famous beach for surfing where surfers come from all over Japan throughout the year.
were puzzled about it. They carried on the campaign thinking they would take an action if adults were not going to.

At that time, groups of both for and against petition the council in Tsuno-cho in the same prefecture which was reported and increased people’s awareness gradually about the issue of the repository siting in the prefecture. In Tsuno-cho, on 16 the workshop was held by the volunteers in the town who were against the project with those who made a petition playing a central role, where Mr. Hiroaki Koide, the research associate in the nuclear reactor research laboratory from Kyoto University and Mr. Teisuke Ishio who was leading nuclear and environmental campaign in Okayama Prefecture were invited to give lectures in the opposing stance. Resolutions to oppose the application passed at several communities around Tsuno-cho.

By the end of September, some opposing opinions with Toyo-cho in mind were reported from neighboring communities. At Kochi prefectural assembly, an opposing resolution had been handed in to the committee of projects and constructions with Tsuno-cho and Toyo-cho in mind on 4 October. It was, however, not agreed and shelved to pass on to the general session, and attitude expression was to be avoided for the time being.

On 13 October, Tsuno-cho had rejected both petitions from groups for and against the application, and on 31 Mayor Takeo Myojin of Tsuno-cho declared that he was not going to apply. Once the matter in Tsuno-cho had been solved, opposition movements in Toyo-cho activated. The people who had been attending the opposition campaign in Tsuno-cho came into Toyo-cho, and started opening workshops and having contacts with the residents.

At this time, movements from both sides began to take full effect; The Kochi Shimbun (newspaper) published the advertisement of NUMO and activists both in and outside the town appeared to make phone calls to the major residents in town such as the chief of the ward and women’s association to address the opposition campaign. In November, new opposition groups in town began to be organized. The surfer referred previously launched the group ‘National volunteers who love Ikumi beach’, and launched a signature campaign with surfers from all over the nation playing a central role. The group ‘Fellowship to think about Toyo-cho’ was also launched with the people from neighboring Kaiyo-cho, Tokushima Prefecture as representatives, and people of Toyo-cho also joined this group. This group held a workshop called ‘Let’s think about nuclear waste together’ in Toyo-cho on 19 November. This workshop was planned because the activist from Tsuno-cho and the person in Toyo-cho who was against the project had had a contact. People from Kaiyo-cho also joined positively the opposition campaign, and it was thought to be not only because they were next to Toyo-cho but also because they had experienced the commotion about building a nuclear power plant in 1940’s. Before the workshop, leaflets of the notice were sent out with newspapers in Toyo-cho and Kaiyo-cho. Ms. P was also invited to be involved in the administration, and she asked surfers in Shikoku and Kansai to attend the workshop by sending e-mail and so on. The final number of the participants in this workshop was approximately 150. The lecturer was Mr. Baku Nishio, the co-leader of Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center. He gave a lecture in the stance of the opposition group. Major contents of his lecture were the perspective that once application is sent there would be no way to stop the process, doubts about the process of selecting the formation disposal and its technique, and the
criticism about the way of the government to entice people with money. In the lecture, the expression ‘Forty thousand of vitrified wastes are going to be dumped in the soil and even single waste contains the radioactivity equal to 30 Hiroshima-type a-bombs.’ was used frequently, which became later widespread among opposition groups. Some information was provided by the member of ‘Tsuno-cho fellowship to think about high-level nuclear radioactive waste’ who was present at the workshop. A town councilor asked whether it is true that they can rescind even after the application as NUMO told. The member answered that that is only an oral agreement, and not legally guaranteed, and that proposed disposal site evaluation data of the national government which a civic association of Gifu Prefecture had made public previously showed that Tsuno-cho scored 4 out of 10, but Toyo-cho scored 5. Some audiences clapped and there was a stir. Furthermore, people began to express their attitudes to stand against the project one after another, and someone declared “We local people should stand up by ourselves because people of Tsuno-cho and Tokushima are supporting us, and let’s unite to work together in the wake of today” to which all the people clapped and cheered.

This workshop could be a pioneering figure in the process to gain knowledge and passion for opposition groups in the town to carry out the opposition campaign, and is thought to have supported the signature campaign later both theoretically and emotionally.

B) November to December 2006: Signatures of opposing petition were collected.

There were some councilors present at the workshop as described above. On the day of workshop, town people from the opposition group asked these councilors for their opinions, and some of them appeared to be either in favor of the project or unsure about their opinions as they had been expecting that the investigation would be soon over. There was one councilor who just wanted to receive the granty after the Literature Survey. Town people from the opposition group had requested the council to express the opposition against the project, but it did not come true because there had been an agreement since July between the mayor and town councilors that councilors would not discuss whether they were in favor or not of the project. At the regular assembly in December, it was concluded that opposing opinions had been expressed by town people, but they would keep on studying.

Town people from the opposition groups who recognized that councilors are not reliable started the signature campaign for opposing petition on 14 December, with the group ‘Fellowship to think about Toyo-cho’ playing a central role. On signature forms, there was an introduction saying “There is a movement to invite the final disposal site for high-level nuclear radioactive waste in Toyo-cho” which was followed by sentences “It will be inevitable that this would do the significant damage on local agriculture, forestry, and fishing”, “the research on disposing HLW under the ground has just started and there is no evidence to prove its safety”, and “we have to protect safe and peaceful living environments in order to hand over the rich natural environment to our children.” Lots of signatures were collected, and the number reached 60% of the subjects (town people of 13 or over) by 30 December.

This factor seemed to have had the especially strong influence compared to other dominant factors. The fact that the large number of signatures for the opposing petition had been collected later became the
strong backing for the opposition groups to make people expect the success in leading opposition activities such as persuading councilors to oppose the project, and the campaign to directly request a ban on the introduction, and recall campaigns, and also indicated the victory of the mayor from the opposition group candidate in the future. Some harmful effects that were related to the form of signature was observed, such as they had to sign because their acquaintances came to ask for the signature, however, it was proved consequently that signatures had reflected the public opinion to some extent since Mr. Yasutaro Sawayama, a candidate from the opposition group who was a citizens’ ombudsman in Muroto city won 1821 votes later at the mayor’s election.

On the other hand, the mayor recognized that these signatures had been based on false information. First, he indicated that there are three incorrect points on the signature form; it says “There is a movement to invite the final disposal” but this is not the invitation but an investigation for the application for the Literature Survey, the sentence ‘this would do the significant damage on local agriculture, forestry, and fishing’ is the rumor spread by antinuclear activists, and there is not such a rumor where nuclear plants were built, and it says ‘there is no evidence to prove its safety’ of the formation disposal, but the formation disposal is employed in developed countries and Japan will use examples from them. Secondly, he had doubts about two points. One is that subjects were 13 or over, and he doubted that junior and high school students were signing having considered about the finance of Toyo-cho and the status of the power supply of Japan. Another is that he heard from some people that they had had no choice but to sign because their acquaintances had come to ask for the signature, and he doubts that the form of collecting signature reflects the person’s will in the human relationship in the countryside. In addition, he was amazed to see names of five councilors written as recommended councilors. The mayor felt he was neglected by the council since they had agreed to carry on the research holding the will to want to apply at the talk with the mayor on 22 December, nevertheless half of them gained the initiative to support the opposition group, and the chairman did not stop the action of councilors of opposition groups while respecting the mayor’s intention. The mayor also had an idea that he himself was a representative of people who had been elected democratically, and therefore it was not only the signature that reflected the people’s will. On the other hand, he also knew he had to seriously accept the truth that a large number of signatures had been collected.

For the mayor who had these recognitions, the result of the signature campaign worked as a factor to let him decide to apply from the thought that he should not give in the false opposition, rather than the thought of not respecting it. Thus, it seems true that the fact ‘lots of signatures had been collected’ gave significant influences on opposition groups and the mayor.

C) January 2007: a councilor clarified his stance of opposition

On 8 January 2007, Mr. Q who was a town councilor held an assembly in Shirahama district. His intentions were to hear from both promoting group and opposition group, and to discuss frankly. Councilor Q had been taking a neutral stance about this issue. He distributed leaflets to inform people, however, all of about 50 participants were from opposition group in the town. Councilor Q explained the process of the
application and so on, and that it was possible to decline the project after the application and receiving the subsidy. Then during his talk, Mr. R who was playing a central role in the opposition group and are trusted by town people became furious. Mr. R showed Councilor Q the signature for the petition by ‘Fellowship to think of Toyo-cho’ which had been already signed by more than half of the town population at this point, and protested that why he said “You had become a candidate because you wanted to work for people as a counselor, and you have been working as you had wished until now. But why do you say now that we can decline after the application and receiving the subsidy? Isn’t the people’s opposition will clear enough?” Other town people who were present pursued the question against Councilor Q severely. Because of this, Councilor Q put emphasis on the result of the signature, and declared to change his stances to opposition. On the next day, he handed in questions of fifteen categories to Agency for Natural Resources and Energy.

Since Councilor Q had become the member of the opposition group, the majority of the town councilors declared their stances as opposition. It showed again that the opposition group is predominant in the town, and this fact later became the bucking of the opposition campaign, and also the factor for the mayor to decide the application with the thought of ‘he was cheated by the council’.

Councilor Q also had been in contact with Mr. Sawayama since he was impressed by his ombudsman activity in Muroto city. Councilor Q also came to support Mr. Sawayama during the mayor’s election campaign, therefore they had a lot of time to spend together. Especially the most significant achievement he had made as a councilor was that he made a great effort until Mr. Sawayama was selected as a candidate for the mayor of the opposition group to start the recall campaign. It is not in chronological order, but circumstances until Mr. Sawayama was elected are explained as follows.

On 15 May, town volunteers launched ‘association to recall’ aiming at the demand for the dismissal of the mayor. About 50 town people participated and held a indignation meeting at ‘Hirune-go None’, the former branch office of the Forestry Bureau of None which was owned by a councilor of the opposition group. Mr. S who had been a representative of the direct demand for the ban on the introduction became the representative of this meeting. Voting and ballot counting for the election of Kochi prefectural councilors were on 8 April, so they could start the signature campaign for the recall on 9 April. They decided to support Mr. Sawayama as a candidate for the mayor if the recall would be approved, however, there had been many twists and turns behind it. They did not have a candidate from the town, while supporting Mr. Sawayama raised strong opinions about opposition.

A candidate could not be selected among the opposition group, and he had to be chosen from outside the town. One of the reasons for this was said to be that some had been threatened by a group of promotion group. Many people of the opposition group had received phone calls saying “We don’t mind killing people, and if you are opposing the project so much we wouldn’t let you alive”, and had been threatened by the people who said that they were from Kyoto and Osaka. In addition, some of the promoting group kept chasing after people of the opposition group to their houses or to their works. Many people in the town who had come up for the mayor declined the support because of these threats.

With these situations, Councilor Q’s action had had a lot to do closely with the process until finally Mr. Sawayama was chosen as a candidate. At that time, the opposition group wanted to work on the recall, but
they did not have a candidate and could not take action. On 26 February, Councilor Q who was in hospital for the examination received the phone call from Mr. Sawayama who came to visit the hospital later. Then Councilor Q said to Mr. Sawayama that they did not have a candidate and asked Mr. Sawayama to be the candidate, which became the beginning of the support. On the next day, 27, opposition discussion against promoting the project was held by ‘Association to love nature in Toyo-cho’, and they had a social gathering later by opposition group where they touched the subject of a candidate after the recall. Some people were recommending each other to be a candidate, but none of them accepted it. Mr. Sawayama and Councilor Q were also at the gathering, and Mr. Sawayama suggested that Councilor Q should be the candidate. Councilor Q refused the offer, but Mr. Sawayama still insisted and made Councilor Q say “Let me think for a while” to stop this discussion. On the next day, Mr. S visited Councilor Q and said “I have asked two people to be a candidate, but they refused. You are responsible for selecting a candidate from the council.” Later, Councilor Q decided to run for the election, and called Mr. Sawayama on the phone the next day. The opposition group was to meet at 7pm on the day (1 March) to launch ‘association to aim at the recall’. Councilor Q said, “I’ll do it if nobody stands up as a candidate when all the councilors meet to confirm their wills before the launch,” and Mr. Sawayama just answered “Okay”, which made Councilor Q surprised. Then, Councilor Q phoned Mr. S and the chairman. He told the chairman that he was going to confirm wills of all the councilors, and the chairman replied “I will make contact with everyone to meet at 6pm”. After 30 minutes, the chairman called Councilor Q on the phone and said, “I made a contact with the second person, Councilor X, and he showed disapproval.” Councilor Q answered “Okay, then please withdraw what I said” and he gave up running for the election. At this point, Councilor Q asked Mr. Sawayama once again to be a candidate, and he said he wanted to consult three leading lights including Mr. T who was the former chairman of the town council. To be on time for the meeting at 7pm, Mr. Sawayama hurried to see these three people, and he could see two of them except Mr. T. For supporting Mr. Sawayama had been admitted here, Councilor Q suggested the plan to support Mr. Sawayama at the meeting at 7pm, and that everybody agree it. Two of them had agreed, however, nobody supported Mr. Sawayama at the actual meeting. Therefore, they could not choose a candidate at the meeting. Mr. T said that he could not accept Mr. Sawayama. It is said that after Councilor Q had made an appeal again and again angrily “If we keep acting like this, we will never achieve the recall,” “Who is going to be a candidate instead?” at meetings and had persuaded people, he finally let people to support Mr. Sawayama.

On the other hand, if we view the movement for supporting Mr. Sawayama from the point of ‘Association to love nature in Toyo-cho (women’s branch)’ which had been organized at the time as an opposition group, situations were slightly different. This ‘women’s branch’ was launched by Ms. U who was from the town and played the central role through the indignation meeting and the discussion meeting by ‘Association to love nature in Toyo-cho’ as described previously, contacts with the people and citizen’s network of Tsuno-cho, and independent workshops, so that they could be a window to spread the information they had collected. Before launching this branch, some people from the opposition group criticized that ‘Association to love nature in Toyo-cho’ were controlled by Mr. R alone, and because of this, Mr. R excluded himself from the central role of the opposition campaign. Mr. U, et al., who had attached
themselves to him and had been working with him, could not trust those people who were trying to exclude Mr. R from the central role, and felt the necessity that they should unite together. First 60 people came to the invitation for the launch and arranged to select district officers in each district, and on 12 March, they distributed invitation leaflets to invite all the ladies in Toyo-cho to participate. In this leaflet, they declared that they were going to hold the lecture meeting in the stance of opposition on 22, and activity purposes of the group; Calling off the application to be a candidate for the disposal sites for HLW, respect the freedom of thought and creed and work together in accordance, and study through collecting information and holding workshops and lecture meetings properly to be confident to promote the campaign (Please send any kind of information to the office), respect the coordination with the people in and outside the town. However, there was a claim that why they needed to launch another group before launching ‘Association to recall’.

They had been already discussing about the candidate for the mayor at the district meeting of the opposition group, and women’s branch arranged the candidate they wanted to recommend. Because there had been some opinions to recommend Mr. Sawayama, they investigated into his old activities, some of which turned out to be not acceptable by women. On the other hand, women’s branch made a contact with the person who was working on supporting Mr. Sawayama because they had heard ‘administration’ which was playing the central role in the opposition campaign almost made up their mind to recommend Mr. Sawayama. They thought their candidate would take priority since they had heard that Mr. Sawayama would not run for the election if a local person became a candidate. The person whom women’s branch had made contact with said that he could not decline his nomination because he had already asked Mr. Sawayama. Women’s branch asked him to consider and to refrain from the announcement. As a result, it was agreed that women’s branch would make contact with him about the candidate for the mayor by 14 March. They set the deadline because Mr. Sawayama was going to run for the mayor’s election of Muroto-city if he was not going to run for the one of Toyo-cho. Women’s branch visited the candidate they had recommended, where she and other town councilors of the opposition group told them “If we can’t stop the nuclear disposal site, it would do a significant damage on our future generations. But the mayor has his term of office, and we can change them. So I will recommend you to cooperate with the administration to work on nuclear stopping. I will stand up to help you if needed.” As a result, women’s branch decided to nominate Mr. Sawayama on 13 March, and informed the administration. The representative of the administration said that he was going to resign his post if women’s branch would nominate a different candidate.

When it comes to the situation in the town, there had been still many objections, however, it seemed people could predict the current mayor’s resignation and the victory of the opposition group at the election when Mr. Sawayama had been nominated as a candidate officially, since it could be predicted that it would almost end up in the change of mayor if recall campaigns started. Therefore, it is worth pointing out especially as a dominant factor that councilors who had played major roles when Mr. Sawayama had been nominated changed their stances to the opposition group.
D) January 2007: Disclosure of handing in the application in March 2006

On 12 January, Councilor Q received the phone call from Mr. Sawayama. He was asked to come to Muroto quickly, and he hurried there to find that Mr. Sawayama had documents to disclose that Mayor Tashima had already handed in application form to NUMO in March 2006, and the copy of the application form. This document and the copy were sent on the same day by mail to ‘Liaison meeting of Kochi citizens’ ombudsmen’. It said in the letter that the enclosed document (a copy) shows the fact that Mayor Tashima has already handed in the application to NUMO for the investigation to build the final disposal site of nuclear wastes, and that it seemed to have something to do with a kind of real estate agent, although it was only his speculation. In addition, some money (2000-3000 JPY) was enclosed. The sender was unknown but was canceled with a postmark at Aki post office. Councilor Q was surprised by the story, however, he needed to confirm whether it was based on truth or not, and decided to check whether the common seal in the copy was genuine or not. It took only a few days to confirm, and Mr. Sawayama visited the Town Hall with 10 people from Muroto-city and Toyo-cho and news media to ask the mayor in the conference room on the second floor, and to present urgent questionnaire on15. The mayor answered that “I went too far but I wanted to do something as a person who is responsible for the finance of the town,” and apologized “I’m liable to the imputation of the hasty.” The town people urged him to withdraw the application, but he answered, “It would be appropriate to judge after workshops which have been planned.” Then he explained the circumstance in March 2006 that ‘The town returned the application form, and it doesn’t mean the application.’ It sounded more like that he had once applied but rejected by NUMO, which were different from the recognitions of the mayor and NUMO. It became public as ‘The mayor of Toyo-cho had applied last spring without agreement by the people, and rejected’, and later the recognition that the mayor had applied on his own authority to be rejected shamefully by NUMO became common and settled among media and so on. In addition, the mayor said that he had destroyed the document, to which Mr. Sawayama accused him of destroying public documents and declared to press criminal charge against it. It is said that the movement of Mr. Sawayama was not cooperating with other opposition groups at this time. The chairman of the town council criticized the mayor, saying “A bolt from the blue. The relationship of mutual trust has collapsed between the mayor and council.”

After this disclosure, the urgent meeting of all councilors was held on the next day, 16, and it was scheduled to hold general conference of all councilors on25 to ask the mayor for the explanation. There were arguments for and against among councilors such as “Let’s sponsor a no-confidence motion,” “the mayor was only thinking about the finance of the town, and it is not a problem.” Explanations also came from the mayor, NUMO, and Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, and Mr. Yamauchi of NUMO said, “We haven’t received the application from Toyo-cho.” Mr. Yoshino of Agency for Natural Resources and Energy said, “It did not reach to the national level. It is said to be held at NUMO,” and Mr. Hayashi of NUMO said, “We received the application but returned it”, and lastly the mayor explained that he destroyed the document which had been returned.

On 18, the president of fisheries cooperative who introduced NPO to the mayor at the first place had requested to arrange the meeting for explanations, and it was scheduled to hold the additional conference
for it. Then, the conference of all councilors was held on 22, at which town councilors, town administration, the president of fisheries cooperative, Mr. Yoshino of Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, and Mr. Hayashi of NUMO attended. Each person gave an explanation and about 60 town people heard it. The mayor repeated to express the same opinion, and apologized that he had troubled the council and the town people. The president of fisheries cooperative emphasized that it had been the application to show we were going to study, and was not an official application, and questioned that citizen’s ombudsmen made it public without consulting him. The president of fisheries cooperative also asked Councilor Q whether he had asked the director of NPO World Organization of Energy Development that whether the director was sending money to the president of fisheries cooperative when he had made a phone call. Councilor Q answered that he had said there was a rumor about the money, but he had just told the director that he should stop the rumor. This conversation later developed into the lawsuit of directors of NPO against Councilor Q.

At Questions and Answers session, Councilor Q and other people questioned about the relationship between the NPO and NUMO, but they said they had nothing to do with. In addition, it was agreed to discuss about the petition to oppose the application to be a candidate site at the conference on 25 which had been already scheduled on 16. In addition, at the interview after the conference the mayor declared that he would postpone indefinitely the workshop on 4 February by the town and the symposium jointly sponsored by NUMO and the town after taking the confusion in the town into consideration.

This incidence gave the factor of ‘the distrust of the mayor’ to feelings of the opposition group, accelerated the power of the opposition group which had been strong originally, and supported later the campaign for direct demand for the ban on the introduction, and the recall campaign. Furthermore, the workshop sponsored by the town to which the lecturer from the opposition group had been invited was cancelled because of the influence. However, this also seemed to be a factor for the mayor to decide to apply quickly since the mayor had applied on 25, which was only 10 days after the disclosure.

E) January 2007: The application

At 13:30 on 25 January, the conference of all councilors was held to discuss about the opposing petition, however, the situation developed rapidly. At the beginning of the conference, the mayor asked for the attention to announcement and said, “I will apply today. Local referendum should be held before the detailed investigation. It was against the rule of the council that five councilors had become the recommended councilors on the opposing petition form, so I decided to apply today. The town people were given opportunities to study briefly about the project. I will talk about the rest at the press conference.” The mayor’s decision for the application could not be changed any more. Before 25, the superintendent who had heard about the mayor’s intention suggested the mayor that he withdraw the application with the chief of projects in commerce and industry, however, the mayor’s will was firm.

When the mayor actually applied, various sorts of factors had given the influence on him: the system allows the mayor to apply at his own responsibility, the subsidy based on three kinds of electric power laws secure the financial resource, that he was betrayed as five councilors signed on the petition form which
was presented on 15, that the chairman let the mayor refrain from expressing his will, however he did not stop the behavior of the opposition councilors, that there are four councilors from the promoting group, that there were opinions and signatures for the petition to demand promoting of the project (presented on 25 January, there were signatures of 200 constituencies), that he had doubts about the signatures of the opposition group. Most of all, the biggest factor that led him to apply was the recognition that there is no risk because it does not mean the disposal site will be build straight away after the application for the Literature Survey. Despite this, the opposition group was agitating people by telling the town people that as if the disposal site would be built straight away, and what they said was based on the incorrect information which would be mistaken as something more horrible than actually it was. He thought he should not stop this process for the application which will be beneficial to the town by giving in to these opposing arguments. He applied because he was sure that his opinion was not wrong, although he was aware that opposing opinions were dominant as the number of the signature showed. Therefore it is said that the mayor was ready to face the recall campaign and its passage.

When the mayor told about his intention to apply, councilors of the opposition group whose number increased to six out of 10 answered with anger saying, “I thought it was the conference to discuss about the petition. It is not appropriate to bring this subject all of a sudden”, “You are ignoring council. This is so oppressive and unilateral,” and the discussion became complicated. The remaining four councilors of the promoting group clapped. The mayor had a press conference at 14:40 to express his intention for the application by explaining; that he can contribute to the national project, that this is the opportunity to boost the economy of the town with the subsidy, that people will increase the knowledge about the project and the local referendum will be held before the detailed investigation including during the investigation, and that he will make arrangements with the national government and NUMO so that the result of the local referendum will be reflected. After this statement, Mr. Sawayama and other ten people of ‘Kochi citizen’s liaison meeting to oppose building nuclear wastes disposal site in Toyo-cho’ visited the Town Hall to protest. Mr. Sawayama protested that the mayor had applied knowing about the large number of opposition signatures, but the mayor replied, “Political judgment takes precedence over the opposition signatures.” Therefore, Mr. Sawayama arranged the cooperation with the local ‘fellowship to think of Toyo-cho’, and declared that he would consider the recall finally. Councilor Q who was at present said, “The ratio of promotion versus opposition in the council is 6 versus 4, so it would be difficult to conclude the no-confidence motion,” and explained that they would aim ‘the ban on the introduction of nuclear wastes’ as a final measure. The chairman of the council also said, “This is a glaring neglect of the council, so we have to consider no-confidence motion or resignation-demanding resolution.”

In addition, at the time of the press conference, they dispatched the staff to communities around the prefectural government’s office to explain about the application. This was arranged since there had been some requests to demand ‘sensitive handling’ from local communities. Then Governor Hashimoto held the press conference and said, “I have a strong doubt against the ways of NUMO and the national government. It is like slapping cheeks with a wad of bills by dirtily using difficult financial situation of rural municipality,” “the national government and NUMO should not accept the application” expressing strong
stance of opposition. He also mentioned, “I can’t deny the inclination to think that way as a municipality with harsh situation located on the edge of the prefecture.” Criticisms also came from neighboring Muroto-city, Kitagawa-village, and Kaifu-gun of Tokushima Prefecture on the same day.

On the next day, 26, mayors of Muroto-city and Kitagawa-village presented the request to oppose the application, and five phone calls of opposition, seven phone calls of promotion from and outside the town, and e-mails came to the Town Hall. There were about 45 opinions delivered on the day, and most of them were to oppose the application. The town people talked about nothing but this subject, and opinions from both sides were reported. On the other hand, NUMO accepted the application on the same day. They explained that they would not take the local opposition campaign into consideration in the process until they apply the project to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. They accepted the application with the thought that the mayor’s will was unchangeable unlike when he had applied March 2006, and that all the necessary factors for the process had been fulfilled. Akira Amari, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry expressed his intention that he had welcomed the application. Daijiro Hashimoto, the Governor of Kochi who had been opposing the acceptance of the application responded on the same day, declared that he would go up to Tokyo as soon as beginning of February to directly give advice to the national government.

In addition, the town people of the opposition group started the direct demand campaign to institute the regulation to refuse the introduction of nuclear wastes and building the disposal site from this day. For this demand, the signatures of a fiftieth (60 people) constituencies is required during 30 days of the signature campaign period, however, the election for prefectural councilors was to be held on 8 April, and it was forbidden to carry out the signature campaign sixty days before that. Therefore, campaign period had to pause on 6 February and resume on 9 April. With this situation, the people of the opposition group aimed at the demand by 6 February, but some of the opposition group doubted, “It looks like the mayor applied now knowing this is the difficult time to carry out the signature campaign.” On 31, six town councilors sent requests by mail to Minister Amari, the minister of economy, trade and industry for understanding and consideration into opposing the application, and to Mr. Toru Yamaji, the president of NUMO for withdrawal of accepting the application, respectively.

On the other hand, the mayor reported about the application and apologized about the handing in the application in 2006 on the leaflet which was distributed in public relations magazines after 25.

The opposition group worked on the signature campaign positively aiming at the demand by 6 February. The representative of the demand authorized 35 people to conduct the signature campaign. They visited each house and some people answered “I’ve already signed for the opposition”, but they asked again for the signatures saying “It’s different this time. We want to make a regulation, so please sign again.” Mr. Sawayama also addressed for the signature by distributing the official publication ‘communality’ to all the houses on 1 February. As a result, the signatures of 1452 people were collected by 6 February which was largely more than 60 signatures which was required to the demand, and more than 200 signatures which had been their goal. On the same day, seven of the representatives of the demand visited the Town Hall to present the signature to the board of elections, and the demand was accepted. ‘Association to love
Toyo-cho’ and ‘National volunteers who love Ikumi beach’ also additionally handed in the signatures which had been collected since the previous year, which reached 12048 signatures from and outside the town all together. The sum of all the signatures from and outside the town including the ones which had been already presented became 25127.

When they handed in the signatures, about fifty people from the opposition group came together at the Town Hall holding placards. When representatives of the demand were handing in the signatures to the board of elections and the chairman at the conference room, someone shouted, “Bring the mayor here.” The mayor came into the conference room and commented about the signatures that “If it comes, I will deal with it legally” and left, however, people kept asking him to explain about the circumstance. The mayor came into the room again and replied that “It required the political judgment of high standard” with other explanations he had given previously to the question “Are you going to carry on the project ignoring the opposing signatures?” the opposition group did not understand, and shouted angrily for about half an hour. There was also a woman started crying and glared at the mayor with her mouth tightly fastened among them.

Another movement in the town was that Mr. Sawayama and Councilor Q accused the mayor of destroying public documents at Muroto police station on 2 February. On the same day, the mayor decided to convene the extraordinary session on 9, based on the demand to convene the extraordinary session which had been presented by three town councilors of the opposition group when the mayor had announced the application. On 3, Mr. Sawayama distributed the second copy of ‘communality’ in which he said as follows; that it is inevitable that the whole district will be a ghost town, that money and lies parade for the promotion of nuclear industries all around the world, and the method to recall the mayor. On 7 the steering committee was held, where they agreed to set up ‘Special committee of high-level radioactive waste’ at extraordinary session on 9. It was also scheduled that they will hold the extraordinary session at the general conference room on the second floor of the Town Hall expecting that there would be lots of media and observers.

Local communities around the prefecture also took actions. On 5, neighboring communities, Nahari-cho, Tano-cho, and Kitagawa-village unanimously adopted the resolution to oppose the attraction to build a disposal site. Six people who were chiefs or chairmen of two towns and a village visited Toyo-cho and read out the resolution. On 6, Governor Hashimoto of Kochi and Governor Kamon Iizumi of Tokushima Prefecture visited NUMO and Agency for Natural Resources and Energy to express their stance of opposition, and proposed to withdraw the acceptance of the application. At NUMO, Governor Hashimoto criticized that NUMO had accepted the application while it had not been agreed in the district, and the nuclear energy policy to use the subsidy, however, Mr. Yamaji, the president of NUMO replied after the talk that they would apply the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry for the Literature Survey based on the predefined procedure. The director of Agency for Natural Resources and Energy said that he had accepted it seriously. As described above, the opposition group needed to take another measure after the signature for the demand because of the application on 25 January 2007, and they started the campaign for the direct demand for the ban on the introduction and the serious investigation into the recall campaign.
At the moment in town, the opposition group had convincing dominance because of the disclosure of the presentation of the application in March, therefore, it was possible to predict the passage if the recall campaign started. Therefore, this application is thought to be the factor that made the mayor resign under the circumstance that the passage of the recall was inevitable. This application also had effects on the opposition people to let them recognize clearly that the mayor had ‘power’ and to increase their antipathies and the sense of crisis. Institutionally, the chief can apply at one’s own authority, and the mayor emphasized that he had followed the system. However, this resistance was natural under the circumstance that the majority of the council was opposing it, and existence of a large number of the signatures. For this reason, the mayor received the antipathy correlatively with the disclosure of the presentation of the application, as to be called as ‘the mayor of dogma’ or ‘a dictator’ from the opposition group.

On 4 April 2007, Mayor Tashima sent in his resignation although he was almost sure that he would be defeated in the forthcoming election. One of the reasons of his resignation was his consideration that the recall would be inevitable and a resignation by recall is dishonorable. The other was that the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry had authorized the application of Toyo-cho for the Literature Survey on 28 March and Mayor Tashima thought it was timely for the judgment of the residents. Finally, on 22 April 2007, the election resulted in Mr. Sawayama’s win (1812 votes for Sawayama and 761 for Tashima) and its voting rate reached 89.26%, which was unusually high. The new mayor Sawayama withdrew the application for the Literature Survey on 23 April, and the withdrawal was authorized on 26 April.

4. Discussion

Analyzing the dispute process in Toyo-cho, we identify five decisive factors that resulted in the withdrawal of the application: 1) opposing activists both in the town and from outside successfully changed citizens’ perceptions of HLW by rhetorical expressions, 2) Mayor Tashima lacked careful actions and effective policy adviser, 3) NUMO, an organization which runs HLW projects, didn’t effectively coordinate Toyo-cho and stakeholders, 4) the municipal government and assembly exercised very limited influences on the dispute despite its political authority, and 5) the existence of grant adversely influenced the citizens since it causes criticism that Toyo-cho applies a repository for grant.

First, the opposing activists both in the town and from outside effectively influenced the residents’ recognition, or “problem definition”, of the HLW repository siting and HLW itself. The rhetorical expression “forty thousand vitrified wastes, each of which equals to 30 Hiroshima-type a-bombs”, which Mr. Baku Nishio of Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center used, was so widely and deeply propagated among the residents that almost all interviewees in Toyo-cho mentioned it. Governor Hashimoto’s word “slapping cheeks with a wad of bills” was also widely propagated and became a dominant phrase for opposing residents to criticize promoting stakeholders. As Lau and Schlesinger (2005) mention by using the term “cognitive frame” and “policy metaphor”, most residents had framed their understanding of the HLW’s risk by that metaphor and never trust explanations of the HLW’s safety by NUMO or experts after the framing. The residents had a vague fear for unknown material (HLW) from the beginning and the metaphor effectively met their needs to understand, or “frame”, the fear. Explanations of the safety could
not satisfy such needs, and once their recognition was framed, those words of safety could not get to their hearts. Regarding the metaphor of Governor Hashimoto, it met the residents’ needs to frame their potential fear for and distrust of the national government. The particular residents of the opposing group in Toyo-cho worked as a receptor and a propagator; for instance, residents who had worked with anti-nuclear activists and/or had some experiences of social movements got in touch with outside anti-nuclear activists as receptor, and others who have close relationships with receptors and are well trusted by town-wide residents organized the opposing movement as propagator. The framing of the residents’ understanding by rhetorical expressions and the effective collaboration of opposing activists both in the town and from outside, thus, strongly affected the dispute process.

Second decisive factor is Mayor Tashima’s “confidential” attempt of application, which was finally exposed in January 2007, and his lack of careful and prompt handling of opposing activities. Although his motivation of application, that is, the solution to the current severe condition of the town, was reasonable as he continuously mentions (Tashima, 2008; interview), he did not understand enough how sensitive the HLW and nuclear issues are. Only the deputy mayor and the director of the Planning, Commerce and Industry Division of Toyo-cho, except for NPO, NUMO and himself, knew the first attempt of application, and Mayor Tashima did not take any prompt action to deal with the rapidly growing opposing signature campaign which finally influenced the attitude of Councilor Q and his own election. He, thus, did not consult with influential residents and reliable administrative officials, and he paid no attention to advices of the director of the Planning, Commerce and Industry Division, which meant he lost the only possible advisor in the town.

Third, on the other hand, NUMO and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry did not support the mayor effectively. As NUMO and the Ministry have much more experiences of such opposing movements and more experts of not only technology but also politics, they should have actively and initiativly taken measures in the town and given advices to the mayor. It was a big pressure for Mayor Tashima that he got a barrage of criticisms from the opposing residents, and that closed structure of antagonism within the town made the opposing part overwhelm. If NUMO and/or the Ministry had actively took the brunt of the residents’ and opposing activists’ criticisms, the mayor could have been partly free from the antagonism structure and the majority rule within the town might have lost its meaning, or at least weakened. In addition, NUMO and the Ministry did not effectively coordinate stakeholders, especially Kochi Prefecture. Indeed, a mayor of municipality can apply for the Literature Survey of his/her own will without approval of governor by law. In the case of Toyo-cho, however, Governor Hashimoto continuously expressed critical opinions and took opposing actions, and Mayor Tashima had been strongly pressed. Since a governor of prefecture actually has stronger political influence than a mayor of municipality whatever the law defines, and it is common practice in Japan, NUMO and the Ministry that can influence a governor should negotiate with him/her when any municipality begins considering an application, or even at the searching phase of potential applicant.

Fourth, despite their political authority, the town government and council had very limited influences both on supporting and opposing activities on the HLW repository siting dispute. It is true that the town
government is an administrative body and has limited influence on political issue. In a small municipality, such as Toyo-cho, however, administrative officials often include influential residents (e.g., family members of past village head, Shinto/Buddhist priest, various associations’ heads and so on) that are trusted by other residents, and they could be advisors or mediators for both a mayor and residents. In the case of Toyo-cho, most town administrative officials took any action neither for nor against the siting and even sometimes allowed intrusions of some extreme promoting and opposing activists into the Town Hall and their threats to the mayor, council members, and themselves. The town council, another entity elected democratically, did not substantially influence the dispute process as well. Although Councilor Q was an important player in the process who made opposing members in the majority in the council and contributed the nomination of Mr Sawayama as the opposition candidate for the election, even his actions were taken after the signature campaign clearly showed the opposing party overwhelmed. As well as NUMO and the national government, local administrative officials and council members should influence dispute more actively and effectively as political/administrative experts with knowledge of local context.

Finally, the grant adversely affected the attitude of the residents because of the criticism that the town applied the Literature Survey for grant and the guilty feeling of receiving money at the cost of the town. As the metaphor “slapping cheeks with a wad of bills” by Governor Hashimoto demonstrates, Japanese, or perhaps people in other nations, cannot avoid feeling like accepting a bribe when they think compensation and it seems difficult to justify receiving money at the cost of acceptance of hazardous waste. We hypothetically analyzed the problem of grant by using multiple scenarios of solutions, and consider that it would be inevitable under the “voluntary-base” siting policy since it is always true that an applicant voluntarily applies for money. In order to solve this problem, there may be at least two measures: 1) the introduction of “offer-base” or “recommendation-base” siting policy, and 2) building the consensus among the nation that the HLW problem must be solved at any cost and an accepting municipality must be deeply appreciated. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, in fact, introduced the “offer-base” siting procedure as well as the “voluntary-base” procedure since 2007 in order to relieve pressure from applying mayors, to enable stakeholders to negotiate and build some consensus in advance, and to ease the guilty feeling by allowing people to excuse as “The government recommends our town as the HLW repository site, and we obey it against our will. The grant is the only thing we can ease our own feeling.”

5. Conclusion

The decisive factors of the dispute process in Toyo-cho do not include the technical security/safety or the amount of grant. The rapid propagation of rhetorical opposing expressions might have been caused by the residents’ lack of scientific knowledge about safety. But its substantial problem was the framing of the residents’ recognition and the lack of trust in promoting stakeholders, NUMO and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, that is, the national government. Although peaceful deliberation based on well-organized local governance is essential in order to let residents negotiate and judge the approval of application, ultimately accept the repository, the dispute in Toyo-cho was never the matter of negotiation. No interviewee mentioned that the amount of grant influenced their attitudes. The residents began
opposing radically after the propagation of rhetorical opposing expressions and movement, and peaceful and “rational” deliberation regarding on what condition the application for the Literature Survey could be accepted was never realized.

In order to avoid such an enthusiastic opposition and to realize peaceful deliberation, among the other factors discussed above, the adverse influence of the grant must especially be solved since that factor is difficult to avoid under any siting policy since the reception of money is always fact. Fundamentally, the consensus among the nation must be built that the HLW problem must be solved at any cost and an accepting municipality must be deeply appreciated. We consider that the role of the national government is important to deal with this agenda setting. Without a clear declaration of national agenda to solve the HLW repository siting problem and national government’s resolution to solve it, people never understand the need and any policy could not be justified.

In addition, “democratic” decision making (e.g., referendum and election only for the single issue) does not always mean “success” because of the two reasons: 1) it is very difficult to turn over a democratically determined conclusion, and 2) a democratic decision making under enthusiastic situation often causes a later trouble of latent chasm among residents. Without enough deliberation and mutual understanding among stakeholders, even democratic decision making would possibly cause future troubles. The case in Korea regarding the LILW repository siting in 2005 (Chung and Kim, 2009) perhaps demonstrates that a democratic decision making procedure which is legally and initially secured (“built-in”) requirement may let people consider conditions of acceptance and avoid radical opposition to some extent. The role of democratic decision making should, thus, be analyzed and argued based on the other existing cases in further studies. And the “appropriate” amount of compensation, which would matter after deliberation is realized, should also be studied.

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