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Explaining (away) the epistemic condition on moral responsibility

Kapitel i bok
Författare Gunnar Björnsson
Publicerad i Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition / Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland.
Sidor 146–162
ISBN 978-0-19-877966-7
Förlag Oxford University Press
Förlagsort Oxford
Publiceringsår 2017
Publicerad vid Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori
Sidor 146–162
Språk en
Länkar https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198...
https://philpapers.org/rec/BJREAT
Ämnesord Moral responsibility Blameworthiness Ignorance Excuses The explanatory condition
Ämneskategorier Filosofi, Praktisk filosofi, Etik

Sammanfattning

This chapter combines the familiar Strawsonian idea that moral blame and credit depend on the agent’s quality of will with an independently motivated account of responsibility as grounded in a normal explanatory relation between agential qualities and objects of responsibility. The resulting ‘explanatory quality of will condition’ on moral responsibility is then further motivated by being shown to account for the effects on moral blame and credit of justifications, excuses, and undermined control in cases where agents are fully aware of what they are doing. Having been independently motivated, the explanatory quality of will condition is then applied to cases involving lack of awareness. Though this condition involves no explicit epistemic condition on responsibility, it is shown how it accounts for the degrees to which lack of awareness can excuse.

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