|Publicerad i||Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics|
Centrum för finans
Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik
|Ämnesord||Charity, Incomplete contracts, Experiments, corporate social-responsibility, reciprocity, fairness, behavior, Business & Economics|
|Ämneskategorier||Ekonomi och näringsliv|
We propose that donating profits to charity may improve firm performance through reduced moral hazard and increased effort in incomplete contract environments. This proposition is tested and confirmed in an incomplete contract principal-agent laboratory experiment where principals' profits are donated to charity. The results show that both principals and agents have higher earnings in treatments where principals are working on behalf of a charity. Only in the charity treatments do agents respond positively to the effort levels suggested by the principals, and do higher requested levels of effort result in higher principal earnings. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.